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## The Anglo-Saxon Model of Democracy in the West German Political Consciousness after World War II\*

Judgments made by nationals of one country about the political system and culture of another country will reflect a kaleidoscope of truths and untruths, clichés and prejudices. This study will seek to test such judgments by first examining briefly the pre-World War II German image of the United States and Great Britain, then the West German political reactions to the American-British attempts to produce a democratic model in their occupation zones and in the Federal Republic, and finally West German impressions of the two models of democracy as imbedded in the United States presidential and British parliamentary systems. Although the two political systems have a common heritage of protection of civil liberties, limited government, and common law, they differ appreciably in their constitutional base, their historical development, and their political culture.

In the course of the study, we must ask: How were German judgments about these models of democracy arrived at? Was there uniformity or diversity in attitudes among different strata of the population? What were the consequences of their supporting or opposing such Allied policies in Germany as denazification and re-education? Could the American and British democratic institutions and practices have been transplanted with any degree of success to West Germany?

In seeking answers to these questions, we will concentrate on beliefs held by the opinion leaders, including those in the mass communications field (press, radio, and eventually television), and by the public as expressed primarily in national opinion polls. The polls, conducted or commissioned in the initial postwar years by the occupation authorities and eventually also by independent polling organizations, provide important clues to national attitudes, but fail to measure the intensity of feelings held by respondents.

The attitudes of the German public toward the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy were conditioned (1) by American and British policies in their own countries and in West Germany, (2) by the responses of West German leaders and mass media to policies having an impact on their country, and (3) by impressions – often contradictory – gained in earlier decades but still in the consciousness of the people. Impressions of the United States were shaped by German proletarian emigrants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who in reports back to their families were enthusiastic about the vast land of unlimited possibilities. On the other hand, German and other European intellectuals who traveled to or resided in the United States before the 1930s often painted a negative picture. They noted a lack of culture and tradition, the tyranny of the dollar, the all-pervasive materialism, standardi-

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\* The author wishes to thank the University of Massachusetts and the DAAD for providing research grants for this study. Dr. Angelika Volle was kind enough to read and comment on the manuscript.

zation of products, advertising, and licentiousness. The criticisms reflected varying degrees of truth, but also were based on a traditional European resentment against the increasingly powerful New World<sup>1</sup>.

In the 1930s, many émigré intellectuals were more ambivalent in their feelings about the new home which gave them permanent asylum. They still nurtured some of the negative feelings, but were also impressed by the American political freedoms and the pluralistic society. As we note below, those who returned after the war to Germany were positive about the United States and sought to correct what they saw as a distorted image produced not only by intellectuals of earlier periods but also by negative propaganda stemming from Nazi leaders, especially in the latter period of the Third Reich.

The German image of Great Britain in the period before 1945 was no less contradictory than that of the United States. It was colored by direct observation, the nature of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the commonality of race, cultural tradition, and (before World War I) monarchical family ties. Some viewed the British as being quite emotional and sentimental, others regarded them as living in the past, and being cool, distant and reserved. As one observer noted, to German nationalists Britain's status as a world power *par excellence* was »at once the object of their envy and their hatred«<sup>2</sup>. These Germans were enthusiastic about Britain being ahead of Germany in acquiring imperial possessions, dominating overseas investments, and developing a huge merchant fleet. Considering the British to be arrogant and unscrupulous in their business methods, and not advanced in their industrial techniques, they were ready to challenge the dominance of the British.

In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, close and friendly relations existed between the two countries, but the situation worsened when Bismarck assumed power. He viewed the British monarchy as too weak and dependent on Parliament and public opinion. He feared the increasing democratization of the country, which in turn would have an impact on other countries, including Germany. Relations remained at a low ebb during the Boer war, the two world wars (Dresden in 1945 could not be forgotten), and the Nazi era. As President Heuss noted once, German-British relations in the twentieth century had been a chain of misunderstandings<sup>3</sup>. Hitler's propaganda picturing the British government as a decadent democracy did not help to cement the fragile bonds.

## REACTIONS TO THE OCCUPATION

When Allied troops poured into Germany in 1945 the population had a chance to see first-hand whether the prewar images of the United States and Great Britain needed to be corrected. Obviously the initial punitive policy and the chaotic food and economic situation were bound to produce negative impressions, tempered perhaps by the good behavior

1 For details, see *Manfred Henningsen*, *Der Fall Amerika*, Munich 1974; *Wolfgang Wagner*, *Das Amerikabild der Europäer*, in: *Amerika und Westeuropa: Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsprobleme*, ed. by *Karl Kaiser* and *Hans-Peter Schwarz*, Stuttgart and Zurich 1977, pp. 17–28; *Helmut Hirsch*, *How Germans view America*, in: *The Politics of Postwar Germany*, ed. by *Walter Stahl*, New York 1963.

2 *D. C. Watt*, *Britain looks to Germany: British opinion and policy towards Germany since 1945*, London 1965, p. 15.

3 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 Oct. 1958.

of some occupation troops with whom the Germans were in close contact. On the basis of personal experiences it was tempting for the people to make generalizations about the »Americans« and the »British«, which were bound to be subjective.

In a 1950 public opinion poll by the Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie, positive and negative responses were given to a question on attitudes toward both occupation forces as they entered Germany. In the British zone, one pianist stated that she had hardly ever met such kind people, while a sales clerk lauded the humane treatment of the passing troops. On the other hand, a pensioner believed that, on the basis of British promises, the troops should have acted more fairly. An agricultural worker accused the soldiers of acting like robbers who took everything they could steal. Of those polled who experienced the British occupation, 16 percent viewed it positively, 37 percent viewed it negatively, and 47 percent noticed little of it<sup>4</sup>.

In the United States zone, the responses were similar, although negative views were more numerous. While one farmer praised the correct attitude of American soldiers, others complained of their plundering and rowdy behavior. Of those who experienced the American occupation, 15 percent viewed it positively, 49 percent viewed it negatively, and 36 percent noticed little of it<sup>5</sup>.

Although Germans formed opinions about the behavior of occupation troops from direct observation, the time was premature for public opinion to crystallize on Allied policies in Germany. Newspapers and radio were under tight control of the military, political parties did not yet exist, and appointed mayors and other leaders were operating under the constraints of occupation officials. Years later, when restrictions on the media were lifted, then press criticisms of the occupation period mounted. For instance, the illustrated journal *Copress Europäische Hefte* (in a 1953 issue) praised the Western allied powers for having ameliorated the catastrophic economic situation in the early postwar years by their massive shipment of foodstuffs, CARE packages, and warm lunches for millions of schoolchildren (their only warm meal of the day). Yet it also emphasized the contrast between the well-clothed and well-fed »Amis« and the still gaunt and underfed German people who were living precariously in a country that according to the will of the victor »nicht besetzt wird zum Zweck seiner Befreiung, sondern als ein besiegter Feindstaat« (according to a United States directive to Supreme Commander Eisenhower)<sup>6</sup>.

In 1953 also, the *Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung* presented its snapshot views of the top Allied policy makers. It claimed the military commanders (including Eisenhower and Montgomery) were dictatorial in their role of conquerors; the military governors (including Clay and Robertson) were military potentates who held court like »absolute Monarchen«; and the civilian commissioners (including McCloy and Kirkpatrick) were less visible in wielding power, but nonetheless were still strong. Only as the Federal Republic gained a limited degree of sovereignty did the veto power of the civilian commissioners become less important. Incidentally, according to the article, all these top officials resided in luxurious palaces, in a style of modern feudalism, that certainly was anachronistic in view of the democratic systems they were to represent<sup>7</sup>.

4 Poll cited by Kurt Zentner (ed.), *Aufstieg aus dem Nichts: Deutschland von 1945 bis 1953*, Vol. II, Cologne 1954, p. 84.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Das Deutsche Wunder: Deutschland 1945–1953*, in: *Copress Europäische Hefte*, Vol. I, No. 2, Sep. 1953, p. 23.

7 *Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung*, 17 Jan. 1953.

While these negative views about the occupiers from 1945 on surfaced during the less constrained period of the Federal Republic, there were enough indications in surveys and reactions in the controlled press during the 1945–1949 era that the American and British occupation powers did not receive the support of all Germans.

In a UNESCO multi-national survey of 1948–1949 designed to see how nations view each other, German respondents in the British zone characterized the British as intelligent, self-controlled, practical, and progressive, but also as conceited and domineering. They characterized the Americans as progressive, practical, generous, intelligent, peace-loving, and hard-working. The survey indicates that the Americans scored considerably higher on a »friendliness score« than the British (23 percent to 11 percent). The Americans received the greatest support from the twenty-one to twenty-nine age group, and the poorer working class with primary education, while the British received the highest score from the wealthy upper class and those with a secondary education<sup>8</sup>.

The gap in score between the Americans and the British may be due not only to perceived differences in national character but also to different occupation policies on reparations, the controls on the economic system, and the position toward the Russians. The British were seen to be tough on the first two policies, and weak on the third policy – as a consequence receiving less »friendly« scores. Yet, as we shall see presently, both Allies did not score too highly either in their punitive policies – as was to be expected – or in their democratization policies.

## REPARATIONS

Allied reparations policy could not have been expected to be greeted with cheers by the Germans. Since they viewed such a policy as another blow against their collapsed economy and as a way for the Allies, especially the British, to curtail German commercial competition in the future, their views of the Americans and the British as model democrats were bound to be negatively affected. These views were shaped or reinforced in the schools and in the media. Children were exposed to criticism of reparations in textbooks, which assailed the restrictions on German industry, the seizure of patents and inventions, and the dismantling of factories. Germans of all ages read critical comments in the press or heard news reports on the radio. One illustrated journal carried a photograph of an undamaged factory lying dormant. The accompanying caption blamed the »wahnwitzigen« Morgenthau Plan, supported by Roosevelt at the 1944 Quebec Conference, for the damaging reparations policy. »Auch dem erbittertsten Feind Deutschlands muß klar sein, das es unmöglich ist, das bisher zweitgrößte Industrieland der Welt völlig lahmzulegen, ohne die Weltwirtschaft aus dem Gleichgewicht zu bringen und Europas (nicht nur Deutschlands) Existenz zu vernichten«. The journal also stated that the program contradicted the 1941 Atlantic Charter of Roosevelt and Churchill urging the world's peoples to live their lives free of fear and scarcities<sup>9</sup>.

Another illustrated journal noted that despite pleas and protests ranging from works councils to German public officials, the British High Commission ordered much dismantling,

<sup>8</sup> William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other*, Urbana, Ill., 1953, pp. 74, 159.

<sup>9</sup> *Copress Europäische Hefte*, Vol. I, No. 2, Sep. 1953, p. 25.

including the dynamiting of one section and dismantling of another section of the mammoth steel works in Salzgitter<sup>10</sup>. Typical of critical comments appearing in the press was a column by Ernst Friedländer in a 1948 issue of *Die Zeit*<sup>11</sup>. He noted that the American government had shown the most restraint in the reparations question, but that the British and the French were still pursuing a tough policy that made no sense for the reconstruction of Europe. He cited the protest strikes in the western zones and the pleas of three German minister-presidents to the Allies to review their reparations policy.

In a 1951 public opinion poll, more people named reparations policy as being the biggest blunder committed by the occupying powers since 1945 than any other (not as high in the criticisms were the »soft« policy to the Soviet Union, the conduct of Allied soldiers, and the defamation of Germans)<sup>12</sup>.

## DENAZIFICATION

German public responses to the controversial Allied denazification policy varied considerably. In the American zone, two-thirds of respondents in a 1949 survey deemed it important (in an abstract manner perhaps) to hold people responsible who furthered National Socialism in any way. But the measure of support for the actual policy to remove all »active Nazis« from policy-making positions received much less support, declining from about half of the respondents in 1945–1946 to one in six in early 1949<sup>13</sup>. Among the most frequent complaints was the harshness in which minor party members were dealt with as compared to major offenders, the arbitrariness of denazification proceedings, the inconsistency in judgments, and the lack of awareness that during the Nazi era one often had to join the party in order to keep a job.

In the British zone, where the British pursued denazification less energetically, criticisms surfaced widely too. One view often expressed was that denazification was a policy of Allied revenge against the German people. If the Allies were democratically oriented, then why endanger the rule of law they were attempting to recreate, why were the tribunal proceedings not published, and why was it impossible to appeal the military government verdicts? German democratic, anti-Nazi leaders, who themselves had been the victims of Nazism, decried the various denazification categories (leading to different punishment of Germans) as a continuation of untenable Nazi conditions. They, and others, criticized the eagerness of the Allies, and subsequently German denazification tribunals, to punish the small Nazis; the scandals and improprieties (such as personal denunciations and vendettas) emerging out of the policy; the differences between the zones, or even within a zone (as in the British case), in the execution of the policy<sup>14</sup>.

10 45 bis 55: *Bilderbuch der letzten zehn Jahre*, in: Quick, Sonderheft, no date.

11 *Ein Halt der Demontage*, in: *Die Zeit*, 9 Sep. 1948.

12 *Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann*, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung, 1947–1955*, Allensbach 1956, p. 140.

13 *Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt* (eds.), *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949*, Urbana, Ill., 1970, pp. 36–39, 79, 162–163, 304–305. See also *Kurt H. Wolff and Guenther Roth*, *German Images of Denazification* (unpublished paper, no date).

14 See, e.g., *Justus Fürstenau*, *Entnazifizierung: Ein Kapitel deutscher Nachkriegspolitik*, Neuwied and Berlin 1969, pp. 107–111, 187–193; *Harold Zink*, *American Military Government in Germany*, New York 1947, pp. 130–146; *Raymond Ebsworth*, *Restoring Democracy in Germany: The British Contribution*, London 1960, pp. 1–20.

For many school children, the Nazi period was history sparingly recounted by parents and teachers. Thus textbooks should have been an important instrument in informing them about that period, the question of guilt of the population, and the subsequent denazification proceedings. The textbooks said little about the principles of denazification, but were critical of the controversial administration of the program. One history textbook noted that many unfair verdicts were meted out in the proceedings, partly because each zone used different yardsticks that changed constantly. Returned émigrés, who had no idea of the difficult conditions facing the population under Nazi rule, often sat on the tribunals. The author concluded that denazification hardly contributed to the democratic education of the Germans<sup>15</sup>.

General Clay would have disagreed with that conclusion. He had warned the minister-presidents of the American zone to speed up their denazification proceedings because these were considered a test of their commitment to democracy and of their ability to govern themselves<sup>16</sup>.

### THE NÜRNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS

The German reaction to the Allied trials of major Nazis at Nürnberg from 1945 to 1946, and to the subsequent trials of other Nazis, varied in the course of time. A number of public opinion polls taken while the trials were going on showed that more than half of the respondents thought the top Nazi leaders were guilty, the trials had been conducted fairly, and the sentences had been just<sup>17</sup>. Whether the responses would have been as supportive of Allied policy if the press and radio had been free of controls and had been able to feature prominently the statements of the German defense lawyers (rather than of the Allied prosecutors) is doubtful. Moreover, some of the respondents may have attempted to exonerate themselves of any blame for the Nazi crimes, and pushed their own guilt feelings on to others.

From the early 1950s on, as the communications media were freed of controls, and as the policies of the Allies in Germany and elsewhere were scrutinized more critically, the initial support for the trials evaporated. German specialists, writing in the press, made a challenging case, which must have been persuasive to the public, that the Allied trials had not been fair. For instance, Dr. Paul Leverkühn contended in *Die Zeit* that the Nazi leaders had been accused of starting an aggressive war. But, he queried, did not the Soviets participate in an aggressive war against Poland? Consequently, how at Nürnberg could they be judges and prosecutors at the same time? The Western Allies were not spared in his indictment. Many procedural safeguards normally accorded the accused in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence were not applied at the trial. Moreover, writing at the time of the Korean war, Leverkühn contended that American officers in Korea gave orders to kill partisans without a trial, and forced the civilian population to remain in a combatant area by cutting off their

15 *Grundzüge der Geschichte: Einheitsausgabe für Mittlere Klassen*, Band 4, *Von 1815 bis zur Gegenwart*, Frankfurt 1953, p. 148.

16 He also threatened intervention if they did not make substantial improvements within two months. *John Gimbel*, *Governing the American Zone of Germany* (unpublished paper, no date), p. 10.

17 Those who thought the leaders were guilty: 75 percent in March 1946 and 52 percent in August 1946; who thought the trials were fair, 78 percent; and the sentences were just, 55 percent. *Merritt and Merritt*, *Public Opinion, 1945–1949*, pp. 33–36.

escape routes – actions which did not differ from orders given by condemned German officers. Why should not the Allies be bound by the same Hague Convention on War as the Germans<sup>18</sup>?

Other commentators writing in different newspapers voiced additional criticisms. German judges, or those from neutral countries, should have presided over the trials. The German judges could have conducted the proceedings on the basis of the German penal code and the Weimar Constitution which rest on the principles of international law. That would have been fairer than the drafting of Allied charges which made Nazi acts illegal on an *ex-post-facto* basis. The Nürnberg proceedings rested too much on the power of the victors to mete out their kind of justice, a questionable practice which can be regarded only with skepticism. Although the proceedings were not considered to have been a farce and the verdicts by German judges would hardly have differed from those of the Allied judges, nevertheless the outcome was not the creation of new international law, but only a demonstration of its limitations<sup>19</sup>.

The press also sought to defuse the implicit charge at Nürnberg that the Germans were war-like. It quoted from an information bulletin distributed to American soldiers in Germany which stated that in the previous eighty years, the Germans had conducted three wars, or one every twenty-seven years, while the Americans were involved in a war every fifteen years. It also quoted Professor Quincy Wright, author of *A Study of War*, who wrote that of the 278 wars between 1800 and 1940, the British started 28 percent of them, and the Germans only 8 percent.

As a result of these press commentaries, public opinion became more critical of the Nürnberg trials. In one 1950 American-sponsored survey, 30 percent of the respondents viewed the trials as unfair as compared to 6 percent in 1946, and 40 percent considered the verdicts too severe as compared to 9 percent in 1946<sup>20</sup>. The degree of criticism was much higher among some groups. For instance, in 1951 the *Münchener Allgemeine* polled its readers on the fairness of the sentences for the seven Nazi leaders still incarcerated in the Spandau prison. While 3,124 persons were critical and demanded leniency, only 45 persons approved the sentences. One reader wrote that it was ironical for the Allies to urge German rearmament when rearmament under the Nazis had produced Allied death sentences at Nürnberg<sup>21</sup>.

Thus, the continued detention of Nazi leaders in Spandau contributed to a further questioning of Western Allied principles of justice and humanity. The press launched a vigorous campaign to seek the release of the prisoners or at least a reduction of their sentences, and an easing of the rigid prison regulations, on the ground that they had been punished enough. *Ruhr-Nachrichten* commented that Spandau represented the spirit of Allied inhumane treatment and vengeance (for instance, von Neurath was forbidden to notify family members of his three heart attacks). No wonder, wrote the newspaper, that many Germans refused to participate »für die Verteidigung der Freiheit und der Zivilisation«, meaning rearmament<sup>22</sup>.

18 Paul Leverkühn, Die Kriegsverbrecherprozesse, in: Die Zeit, 28 Sep. 1950.

19 Christ und Welt, 8 Feb. 1951; Die Welt, 25 Nov. 1954; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 Nov. 1955; Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 Oct. 1956.

20 Merritt and Merritt, Political Perspectives in Semisovereign Germany (unpublished paper, to appear in: Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955, ed. by Merritt and Merritt, Urbana, Ill., 1978), pp. 13, 14.

21 Münchener Allgemeine, 11 March 1951.

22 Ruhr-Nachrichten, 17 Feb. 1951.

In sum, Allied denazification policy and the sentencing of top Nazi leaders, compounded by arrests without trial, large-scale requisitioning of houses and property, and abuse of power by Allied military forces, produced over time a mounting resentment among most Germans against Western Allied claims to stand for political democracy, principles of justice, equity, tolerance, and humanity. The Anglo-Saxon democratic model had little resonance among the German population on an issue which affected so many of them adversely. But even Germans who had suffered under the Nazi regime were resentful about the closely related issue of collective guilt of all Germans propagated by the Allies. The anti-Nazis were willing to support the thesis that the German state should be collectively responsible for the consequences of the war, but balked at accepting the collective guilt thesis<sup>23</sup>. Hence, they too looked at Allied claims about justice with some misgivings, even though they supported the Allied aim of eradicating Nazism in postwar Germany.

From the viewpoint of the American and British authorities, the increasing criticism of their punitive policies put them on the defensive. They argued that the continued incarceration of Nazi leaders in Spandau was the fault of the Russians, but they said little about Nürnberg, knowing that a number of international lawyers in the United States and Great Britain also were critical of substantive and procedural aspects. On the other hand, they were worried about the number of Germans who clung to Nazi ideas during this period. Several public opinion polls showed that Allied denazification policy had not produced a shedding of Nazi ideology among the entire population. In one poll, 12 percent of those questioned maintained that »the horrors committed by the Germans are an invention of the propaganda of our enemies«, while 30 to 33 percent contended that the Aryan race was superior to Negroes and Jews. During the entire occupation period, from 47 to 55 percent of respondents in several polls indicated that National Socialism was »a good idea badly carried out«. Conversely, those who felt it was a bad idea dropped from 41 to 30 percent in the same time span. Typical among the adherents of National Socialism were those with a minimum of schooling, those under the age of thirty, Protestants, former Nazi Party members, West Berliners, and Hessians. They criticized the postwar communications media, the Allied democratic systems, and opted instead for governments promoting security rather than freedoms<sup>24</sup>.

## DEMOCRATIZATION

German reactions to Western Allied attempts to democratize the country were as mixed as their reactions to the punitive aspects of reparations and denazification. On many occasions the Allies asserted that they did not want to make Germany a mirror of themselves, but rather wanted to encourage German democrats to develop their own reforms in governments and society. The Allies were aware that if they pushed their own reforms, failure would ensue unless these were adapted to German traditions and circumstances<sup>25</sup>. In a similar vein, Professor Carl J. Friedrich wrote, »American policy is not ›imposing‹ demo-

23 Wolfgang G. Friedmann, *The Allied Military Government of Germany*, London 1947, pp. 223–234.

24 Merritt and Merritt, *Public Opinion, 1945–1959*, pp. 30–33.

25 See, e.g., *Fortschritt der Demokratisierung in Deutschland*, in: Amt des Amerikanischen Hochkommissars für Deutschland, 4. *Vierteljahresbericht über Deutschland*, 1. Juli bis 30. September 1950, pp. 54–55.

cracy, but is imposing restraints upon those elements of the German population who would prevent democracy from being established«<sup>26</sup>.

Yet despite avowals of restraint, the Americans especially (and the British less so), in order to eradicate Nazi ideology, sought to make significant reforms in the German political culture and institutions that reflected their own democratic model. This obviously implied cultural imperialism and a feeling of moral superiority. Arnold Brecht, in his role as advisor to the American government, wrote a revealing memorandum to the Democratization Branch of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). He noted that American and German conceptions of democracy differ; that the United States emphasizes more the rights of individuals while Germans emphasize the democratic techniques of government and party system (cabinet formation, majority rule, elections); and that, »It is more important for us to persuade the Germans to accept the American practice of democracy in those respects where they are lagging behind desirable standards, than it is to bring about a uniform use of terms«<sup>27</sup>. Brecht's »desirable standards« referred to the American ideal of »the state is made for men, not man for the state«, an ideal less accepted by the Germans who he considered were looking at the state and the nation (Volk) in more abstract terms. As an example, he cited the civil servants who see themselves as servants of the state rather than the people. He did acknowledge, however, that the rule of law and individual rights, such as the freedom to assemble, to speak and write, were derived from Kant and other European philosophers<sup>28</sup>.

Professor John Gimbel put it most incisively: »Americans proceeded as though the origin and evolution of democracy is a natural process that needs only to be guarded against evil agents who would block that process. They seemed to hope, in vain, that a new democratic leadership would arise in Germany and freely and readily (instinctively?) accept the American image of democracy and thus also accept the American administrative necessities and policy changes as prerequisites to the attainment of democracy«<sup>29</sup>.

The Allied democratization efforts proceeded along many paths, the first an attempt to reeducate a captive audience – the German prisoners of war. Authorities in the United States shipped a group of selected prisoners to Fort Getty for an indoctrination into democracy. The purpose, as in later exchange programs, was to instil democratic theories into specially chosen individuals who would upon their return to Germany hopefully act as a transmission belt to the local population. In 1947, a mailed questionnaire to the prisoners of war (three-fourths of whom were professionals and white-collar workers) produced some revealing facts: half felt that their fellow-Germans were politically apathetic, intolerant, and lacked understanding for the concept of freedom. But they themselves, in many instances, claimed that, due to the lack of enough newspapers and radio sets and their need to cope with the burdens of daily existence, they were ill-informed on current political developments<sup>30</sup>.

26 *Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, New York 1948, p. 14.

27 *Arnold Brecht, Reorientation and Democratization: Instructions for OMGUS Personnel, Introductory Section (draft, 1948)*, in: *OMGUS, Democratization Branch, U.S. Specialists' Reports, 1948–1949*, Vol. I, p. 3.

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

29 *John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation*, Stanford 1961, p. 4.

30 *Merritt and Merritt, Public Opinion, 1945–1949*, pp. 200–201. Thousands of prisoners of war at other bases also took indoctrination courses. See *Judith M. Gansberg, Stalag: U.S.A.*, New York 1977.

## EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AND BINATIONAL CONFERENCES

The Americans also organized a large exchange program. Up to 1952 more than 3,000 Germans from all walks of life (public officials, trade unionists, journalists, radio specialists, judges and lawyers, doctors, nurses, social workers, and representatives from the churches, youth and women's organizations) had a chance to visit the United States for one to four-month stays. In addition, thousands of high school students, who lived with families in the United States, and college students attended schools for one-year periods. After 1949, American officials in Germany decided to send fewer university students and more »young potential leaders« from various organizations to the United States because »it is with the 90 percent who will not go to universities that the power of Germany rests«<sup>31</sup>. The last statement seems far-fetched, but it reflected the views of some officials.

An American specialist wrote that the value of the program in democratizing Germany depends on »how these Germans learn the meaning of democracy through living and working among free people and how well they transmit to their countrymen not only the knowledge and techniques but more important the ideas and values which are basic to self-government [ . . . ]«<sup>32</sup>. He also noted that given the tradition-bound country it was difficult to predict the contribution to democratization which the teen-agers will make ten, twenty, or thirty years from their return home. But chances were good that the returnees would bring ideas and knowledge back from the United States and apply them in their future professional life.

The reports of participants were generally favorable about their exposure to American life and their specialized activities. They were impressed by the every-day democracy, the informality of living and inter-human relationships, the seemingly greater happiness (»the old continent seemed lifeless against this vitality«), and the drive for assimilation, but they also warned about the difficulty of making comparisons between the two countries. Once back in Germany, they sought to produce changes based on the American model, and to communicate their experiences and knowledge to fellow-Germans. They gave lectures, led group discussions, formed new groups, and sought to instil a democratic spirit among other citizens. One returned city councilor was able to convince his city council to have open meetings; others sought a reform of the electoral system and the participation of women in politics. A group of public personnel experts, impressed by their American experience, published a book in Germany on the United States public service<sup>33</sup>.

Exchangees also encountered reversals on their return home. One teacher was dismissed from her post as a result of her advocacy of a different pedagogical approach in school. Others could not make changes in the light of determined opposition from conservative citizens who feared new ideas and methods. In order to weaken such opposition American authorities also organized visits of specialists from the United States, set up a scholars' consulting program, and an artists' program, and helped establish leadership training schools for youth leaders, among many activities. In addition, other German and American

31 Speech by Alonso G. Grace, Director, Education and Cultural Relations Division, OMGUS, at a conference, Oct. 1948; cited by *Harry P. Pilgert*, *The Exchange of Persons Program in Western Germany*, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner of Germany 1951, p. 8. See also *Ulrich Littmann*, *Der Austausch von Akademikern*, in: *Amerika und Westeuropa*, ed. by Kaiser and Schwarz.

32 *Pilgert*, *The Exchange of Persons Program*, p. 50.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 71. The title of the book: *Der Öffentliche Dienst in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, Frankfurt 1950.

organizations (Steuben-Schurz and Carl Duisberg societies, DAAD, Fulbright, etc.) sponsored exchanges in both countries; and a yearly German-American Conference, organized by Atlantik-Brücke (Hamburg) and the American Council on Germany (New York) and attended by leading politicians, professors, business and media people, discussed foreign, military and economic policy questions<sup>34</sup>.

The British, less rich than their American brethren and more insular in spirit, organized exchange programs on a more modest scale, although over 1,000 Germans visited the United Kingdom up to late 1950, and 450 British visited Germany in various capacities. The distribution of the latter group serves as an indicator of the emphasis the British put on different activities: seventy-five went to universities, seventy to secondary schools; fifty to adult education; and forty each to elementary schools, teacher training, physical education, and youth programs; while the rest were assigned to vocational training, women's, cultural, and religious organizations. The Education Branch sponsored in Germany a number of language courses attended by British and German teachers<sup>35</sup>.

The Hansard Society, organized to promote parliamentary institutions, invited a number of prominent German politicians to Britain to study its form of parliamentary government and public institutions. The Treasury invited senior German officials to study British civil service organization, training, and methods, with emphasis on the non-political character of the service. Finally, the Home Office invited many German police chiefs and members of police committees to Britain to gain first-hand knowledge of the police forces<sup>36</sup>.

From 1947 on, a »Host-Guest« program was set up to provide an opportunity for German local government officials to visit their British counterparts to see how their system works in practice. They attended meetings of local councils, magistrates' courts, and other institutions, and stayed with individual councilors or officials.

This program was the base of partnership accords (twinning) between German and British cities that also gave an opportunity to ordinary citizens to visit each other's city. Since the visits entailed living with a family, the relationships produced an understanding and appreciation of each other's way of life. By 1954, more than 10,000 people per year took part in such exchanges. As one observer remarked, »The important fact is that in the overwhelming majority of cases prejudice melts before personal experience, and common interests create extraordinarily effective bonds«<sup>37</sup>.

One British project, Wilton Park, proved very successful from its inception in 1946. At that time German prisoners of war participated in seminars dealing with British political, economic, and cultural themes. Soon after, Germans between the ages of twenty-five and forty from the British zone also participated in the seminars that were led by British professors, journalists, and politicians. Many of the participants eventually assumed leading positions in the Federal Republic, and acted as multipliers in spreading the democratic message in Germany<sup>38</sup>.

34 See, e.g., Bulletin (Bonn), 29 Nov. 1962. Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany both seek to promote an understanding of the two countries.

35 *Pilgert*, The Exchange of Persons Program, p. 47.

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49.

37 *Christopher Steel*, Anglo-German Relations, II. A British View, in: *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 39, No. 4, Oct. to Dec. 1963, p. 530.

38 *Angelika E. C. Volle*, *Deutsch-Britische Beziehungen: Eine Untersuchung des bilateralen Verhältnisses auf der staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Ebene seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Ph.D. University of Bonn 1976, pp. 76–79. See also *Dexter Keezer*, *A Unique Contribution to International Relations: The Story of Wilton Park*, London 1973.

Another project, begun in Germany, was the creation in 1949 of the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft*. The Society was founded by Dame Lilo Milchsack and other Germans as a way of bridging »the abyss that separates peoples and individuals from one another«. This citizens' initiative created an independent forum to discuss the historical and psychological Anglo-German misunderstandings of previous decades and to promote mutual confidence. About forty British and ninety German participants – leading politicians, journalists, academicians, and business leaders – have been invited to the yearly meetings, normally held at Königswinter, to hear distinguished speakers on such themes as the responsibility of the press, Britain and the Continent, and East-West relations. The effect of such meetings has been for the elite participants to know each other personally and to influence one another as well as public opinion<sup>39</sup>.

Another organization founded to promote understanding between the two countries was the Anglo-German Association, with headquarters in England. Begun in 1951, its goal is to dissipate the deep-seated anti-German feelings in England, which in turn might make Germans think more highly of England. Leading Germans have been invited to London to give speeches about the new Germany. A youth group was founded in 1957 to promote contacts between young Germans and Britons.

Finally, in 1960 Bundestag deputies took the initiative to cement closer German-English relations in the wake of anti-German statements in the House of Commons. They founded the *Deutsch-Englische Parlamentarische Gesellschaft* as a parallel organization to the British-based Anglo-German Parliamentary Group. Both work together, meeting once a year and discussing parliamentary matters, in addition to such substantive issues as the recognition of the German Democratic Republic and German reunification.

#### INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Both occupation powers sought to gain the support of the population in their zones through a wide range of other activities and through the communications media. Such programs were designed to reach a much bigger audience than the more select exchange programs and binational conferences.

The United States opened Amerikahäuser in the most important cities in their zone. Visitors either used the libraries or came to hear lectures, see exhibits, films, theater and music performances, or take English language courses. In a typical postwar year, 1950, about 500,000 people visited the libraries, and 620,000 attended special events. One survey in the American zone indicated that only about 10 percent had actually visited an Amerikahaus, but the impact on that group has been considerable. The average visitor tended to be a young, university-educated professional man with a good income and an interest in politics. Only 7 percent of the visitors had been in the United States, but two in five had been in contact with someone there<sup>40</sup>.

A report to the Democratization Branch by Professor Karl Loewenstein, who had emigrated to the United States, on his speeches to Amerikahäuser in 1948 provides glimpses

39 Personal interview with Lilo Milchsack, Duesseldorf. See *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, 25 Jahre Königswinter, Deutsch-Englisches Gespräch, 14.-16. März 1975; Volle*, p. 91.

40 Merritt and Merritt, *Political Perspectives*, pp. 56-57; Amt des Amerikanischen Hochkommissars, *4. Vierteljahresbericht 1950*, pp. 91-92.

of the types of questions that interested his German audience. While most concerned controversial American occupation policies, a few dealt with racial discrimination in the United States, the power of advertisers on the American press, the intricacies of the American political party system (including the selection of candidates, primaries, and finances), and Congressional Un-American Committees. Since most audience members were pro-American, only occasionally did he encounter skepticism among audiences concerning the values of a democratic society. In his report, Loewenstein writes, »The meetings may have demonstrated to them [the Germans] that democracy is primarily an attitude of tolerance, and that a democratic discussion can bring out the opposing viewpoints without making the acceptance of any opinion compulsory«<sup>41</sup>. He urged military government to select speakers who will not approve all United States actions since it is best propaganda for a democratic society to openly admit its deficiencies<sup>42</sup>.

One deficiency was the excesses committed by Senator Joseph McCarthy not only in the United States but abroad. In an ironic twist showing the limitation of American democracy, American agents of the Senator combed the Amerikahäuser libraries to weed out books by such »subversives« as Dreiser, Steinbeck, and Dos Passos, and prevented performances of Arthur Miller's plays. Similarly, the United States Information Service held a tight rein on which books would be purchased for the libraries. Books critical of the United States or its foreign policy, such as that of the journalist Walter Lippmann criticizing Truman's German and Russian policy, did not get on shelves.

The British also opened information centers, *Die Brücke*, primarily because of the visit of a Labour Party delegation to the British zone in June 1946. Upon its return, the delegation noted that »There is a great and at present unsatisfied hunger for news of existing conditions abroad of the workings of British democracy[. . .] Information centres should be established by the Control Commission for Germany in all important centres in the British Zone, and a representative selection of British newspapers and periodicals should be available[. . .]«<sup>43</sup>. The same year, British authorities created the first centers, with thirty in existence by 1950. The activities in them paralleled those of the Amerikahäuser except that discussions with British soldiers were also encouraged. According to a British top official the centers succeeded in their mission: »[. . .] they are getting over democratic ideas to a fair section of the German community. This is really doing something to put real and positive ideas into the German mind and encourage the frail flower of German democracy«<sup>44</sup>.

Despite the visit of 15,000 persons per month to each *Die Brücke*, financial difficulties and the greater availability of foreign literature produced the closing by the late 1950s of all centers except those in five major cities. The books from the closed centers were turned over to German schools, universities, and libraries.

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41 Karl Loewenstein, Report on the Assignment with the Democratization Branch, OMGUS, Aug.-Sep. 1948 (dated 25 Oct. 1948), OMGUS, *U.S. Specialists' Reports, 1948-1949*, Vol. I, p. 9.

42 *Ibid.*

43 *The Labour Party Annual Report, 1946*, p. 4, cited by Volle, pp. 190-191.

44 *The Manchester Guardian*, 1 Feb. 1952, cited by Volle, p. 192.

## PRESS AND LITERATURE

The Americans and the British had no difficulty in blanketing the two zones with information – or propaganda as critics claimed – through all media in the initial occupation years. They sought to portray their countries as the models of democracy and to justify their policies in Germany. The Americans launched *Die Neue Zeitung*, which was designed to bring the American point of view to the Germans in a newspaper reflecting the best traditions of American journalism. The newspaper, reaching a circulation of 2 million by 1948, sought to change the image of the United States as a conqueror to one of protector and friend. During the Berlin blockade, it attempted to instil among the residents of the city a sense of confidence that the United States would maintain their protection. According to one observer, German opinion leaders read it with great care<sup>45</sup>.

The Allies also licensed German newspapers, carefully screening applicants for political reliability. In the first postwar years the newspapers depended on foreign press services for all their information: Reuters for the British zone; Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service for the American zone<sup>46</sup>. Eventually the British permitted the creation of German press services. In addition, a United States government Feature Service, called *Amerika Dienst*, supplied not only the press but also radio stations, leaders of public opinion, schools and universities, youth groups and hospitals with feature stories, background news, and photos about the United States. The stories also were sent to the German press service, DPA, with the result that 90 percent of its coverage of American news and 10 percent of its entire foreign news dispatches came from the *Amerika Dienst*<sup>47</sup>.

The Americans printed several periodicals designed to appeal to various segments of the German population. Among them were the illustrated *Heute* (circulation 750,000 in 1948), *Neue Auslese* (260,000), and *Der Monat* (30,000). Finally, when the Cold War erupted the Americans also published the weekly *Ost-Probleme* and a series of pamphlets about the menace of communism. By 1952, 70 different titles had been published, with a circulation of 200,000 copies each. These materials were then distributed to a list of selected German individuals and two hundred organizations, representing educators, public officials, labor, and women, to be distributed to their members<sup>48</sup>. In addition, American agencies, including the CIA, subsidized the translation and publication of close to 200 American books, many of them dealing with communism.

What was the reaction of the Germans to this massive information and propaganda campaign? Since the data is sparse one can only provide tentative answers. Letters to the editors provide one clue, but they were written usually by embittered people who had small grudges. When they did touch on major issues, it is difficult to know how representative they were of the general readership. No doubt, the high politicization during the Nazi era produced a strong political apathy among a significant percentage of the population. Such people, also harboring a resentment against the victorious powers, obviously were not that interested in happenings in the United States or Great Britain, but were more concerned about their own immediate plight. But a minority of politically active

45 Harold Hurwitz, *Die Pressepolitik der Alliierten*, in: *Deutsche Presse seit 1945*, ed. by Harry Pross, Bern and Munich 1965, p. 353.

46 INS was later amalgamated into the UP and became UPI. *Ibid.*, pp. 104–105.

47 *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61.

citizens, often representing the higher socioeconomic groups, were open to ideas propagated by the Western Allies in the press and the literature<sup>49</sup>.

From 1947 on, German editors, journalists, and columnists did become more outspoken in their views about Allied policies, either in support or in opposition. General Clay's attempt in October 1947 to enlist them in a propaganda campaign against communism did not produce the desired result. Many felt that the West Germans should not once again as in the Nazi period carry an anti-communist banner. Some had doubts about American military capabilities, feared a new war in which Germany might become involved, or were worried that reunification would become an impossibility. SPD leaders were critical of Clay's juxtaposition of the »American way of life« (in which he included the free enterprise system) with anti-communism. The criticism of most editors softened in the months following when the Soviets became more aggressive and started the Berlin blockade<sup>50</sup>.

## RADIO

In 1945, the population depended solely on Allied radio transmissions for broadcasting, but gradually Germans took over operations. The BBC served as a model for the Radio Councils supervising the newly-established stations in both zones, and for their style and content of programming. The British ensured that all employees of North-West Radio in their zone were trained technically and in a non-partisan manner on the style of the BBC. The four stations in the American zone and RIAS in Berlin reflected the United States influence. Daily they beamed the »Voice of America« presenting news and commentary concerning the United States. One survey showed that 57 percent of the radio audience listened to the program, and two-thirds of them found they learned much about the American way of life<sup>51</sup>.

American officials made sure that United States government policy was propagated on its radio stations. According to one study, certain themes received »heavy« or »top« play. Thus, in the first three months of 1948 five were emphasized: Interpreting America, American foreign policy, the Marshall Plan, Germany, and human rights. Each theme had sub-themes (Interpreting America dealt with the way Congress works, trade unions, and atomic energy). Not only was radio used as a medium for these themes, but so was the press through feature articles and news commentaries, the newsreels, and the *Amerika-häuser* through films and exhibits of books and magazines. Many of the themes were designed not only to rebut Communist propaganda, but also criticism by the SPD and the Left in the United States. For instance, Kurt Schumacher's speech of October 1947 criticizing the American capitalist system and its policy toward Germany was downplayed, as was, in 1948, Henry Wallace's critique of the Cold War and his candidacy for the presidency<sup>52</sup>. The British tolerated more dissent on North-West Radio, partly because they were not the Western spearhead in the Cold War and partly because dissent fit into their tradition of tolerance.

49 See Gesellschaft für kulturellen Austausch mit England, *Königswinter Konferenz, Verantwortung der Presse, 19.–23. April 1951* (mimeographed).

50 Harold Hurwitz, *Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse*, Cologne 1972, pp. 362 ff.

51 Merritt and Merritt, *Political Perspectives*, pp. 54–55.

52 Barbara Mettler, *Demokratisierung und Kalter Krieg: Zur amerikanischen Informations- und Rundfunkpolitik in Westdeutschland 1945–1949*, Berlin 1975, pp. 67–68, 77–78.

## FILMS

Americans and British co-sponsored the weekly newsreel »Welt im Film« shown to an estimated 20 million viewers in over 2,000 movie houses<sup>53</sup>. Until the Occupation Statute was promulgated the newsreels had to be shown in all movie houses, but thereafter the exhibitors had a choice of showing them or not. The films sought to portray the accomplishments of the democracies, people's attitudes toward current events, their way of living, cultural and professional developments, etc. There were problems: One writer noted that »some of the early films pointed a ›finger of indictment‹ at the Germans or eulogized the American way to the point of creating a psychological barrier between the audience and the desired message of the film«<sup>54</sup>.

The Allies also showed a number of documentary films in their information centers and permitted the showing of selected feature films made in the United States or Western Europe. As to the Hollywood films, one 1949 survey indicated divided opinions as to whether or not they gave a true picture of how the average American lives. When asked which films had been chosen, the German respondents stated those depicting the American way of life, those reflecting American cultural values, and those providing democratic indoctrination<sup>55</sup>.

The critics of indoctrination, especially those on the extreme Right of the political spectrum, whose sympathies did not lie with the American model of democracy, must have found solace in a book, published in 1965 but dealing mostly with the occupation period, by the conservative author Schrenck-Notzing. He objected to the brainwashing of the Germans: »The character reformers had nothing else in mind but the long-range alteration of the German character«<sup>56</sup>. Whether this accusation is close to the truth may be tested by examining Allied attempts to make changes in the German educational system.

## EDUCATION

The Allies knew that a primary effort at democratization must be the school system where the youth might absorb new ideas more readily than their elders. At Potsdam, the Allied Control Council received instructions to control German education so that Nazi and militarist doctrine will be eliminated and the successful development of democratic ideas will be made possible.

The British played a low-key role in re-education compared to the Americans. The staff of the Education Branch fostered the publication of new textbooks and periodicals, and advised the Land Ministries of Education. It also sought to graft British ways on the young German's political consciousness in the schools, to decentralize control of the schools, to

53 British co-sponsorship ended in 1950. Amt des Amerikanischen Hochkommissars, 4. Vierteljahresbericht 1950, p. 91.

54 Pilgert, *The History of the Development of Information Services through Information Centers and Documentary Films*, HICOOG, 1951, p. 72.

55 *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74; *Film, Radio, Television*, in: *Germany Reports*, Press and Information Office (Bonn), 4th rev. ed. 1966, p. 980.

56 Caspar Schrenk-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche: Die amerikanische Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen*, Stuttgart 1965, p. 182.

increase the interest of the public in the schools, and to introduce civics into the curriculum. But it knew that in the long run the task of re-education would have to be done by the Germans. In the short run, the mere problems of reopening schools with teachers cleared by denazification boards, and providing textbooks, equipment, and food to the children was crucial, but hardly conducive to creating conditions in which re-education was possible. To provide guidance to youth who were living in a political vacuum was especially difficult given the shortage of funds to organize youth groups and to start exchange programs. The young Germans tried to make contact with some British military personnel, but the latter's lack of interest in reciprocating the contact (»keeping one's distance«) or the existence of language barriers often made re-education in an informal setting impractical. In addition, a number of British administrators adopted a »colonial« attitude (tolerant, kindly, efficient superiority, and cautious) that gave them some plus marks, but that also did not endear them to all engaged in education<sup>57</sup>.

The British – and American – effort at re-education (later the word was altered to the more modest »reorientation«) was an attempt to change such basic values as authoritarian thinking and behavior patterns through reforms of the system. But the Americans, realizing the difficulty of superimposing their own model of education, indicated that they were willing to set long-range goals and proffer advice as long as the Germans worked out their own progressive reform plans. However, most German educational authorities and teachers, especially in Bavaria, were unwilling at first to make any changes, even though some American ideas had originally been adopted from Weimar Germany, altered in the United States and then reintroduced into Germany. The conservative authorities were opposed to progressive education (especially if it had an American imprint), partly because they viewed German culture, including education, superior to American culture and felt that one could not learn much from the Americans<sup>58</sup>.

For instance, the American goal of creating comprehensive high schools to remedy the traditional double tracking (according to the Americans: one for the rich and one for the poor) met with immediate strong German resistance, even though liberal German educators, steeped in the Weimar reform tradition, proposed the change, while the Americans remained in the background. German conservative administrators, teachers, and parents, argued that the intellectually gifted child should be provided with a separate classical and academic program in a *Gymnasium*, an argument that is currently still reverberating in the Federal Republic.

The Americans (and the British, as noted) also sought to introduce *Sozialkunde* or *Gesellschaftskunde* (social studies) into the school system. They set up Education Service Centers and held workshops for German teachers at which curriculum ideas, textbooks aids, and teaching materials were discussed. According to one report, at a Heidelberg workshop many teachers were willing to use American educational techniques to improve German education for citizenship and in the end build a new social order. They welcomed the workshop idea as an expression of real democracy in action, although critical of the few instances in which the conference organizers rescinded majority decisions<sup>59</sup>.

57 Helen Liddell, *Education in Occupied Germany: A Field Survey*, in: *Education in Occupied Germany*, ed. by H. Liddell, Paris 1949, pp. 127–132; Edmond Vermeil, *Les Alliés et la Rééducation des Allemands*, in: *ibid.*, p. 39; Ebsworth, pp. 159–171.

58 Karl-Ernst Bungenstab, *Umerziehung zur Demokratie? Re-education Politik im Bildungswesen der US-Zone 1945–1949*, Duesseldorf 1970, p. 150.

59 Loretta E. Klee, Director of Social Studies, Ithaca, N.Y., report (appended to one by Joseph

The positive spirit of these teachers was not an isolated instance of support for social studies, though it took time to convince vested educational interests that these were important subjects<sup>60</sup>. Only in the late 1950s and early 1960s was civic education recognized as a subject in its own right, partly helped by the writings of a German educator and psychologist, Friedrich Oetinger. He contended that education for democracy must first create a democratic climate in which behavior and attitudes are changed, followed by the study of political conditions<sup>61</sup>.

No doubt, German social studies or civic education, reflecting the American model, has encouraged support for the Federal Government, for democratic values, political understanding, and some participation in politics. This has meant that students learn the norms and values of political democracy, gradually reshaping the German political culture as a result. Another effect may be that political education becomes a »liberating« force that could contribute to political and economic reforms<sup>62</sup>.

American authorities also sought to produce a new democratic spirit in the schools. They urged the creation of student government, teachers and parent-teachers associations, and urged that German methods of instruction be changed from »subject-matter« school to »child-centered« school, in which there would be more flexibility and classroom discussions in the daily schedule. One American writer noted that, »education for citizenship in a democracy must begin with techniques in school which children can learn and apply«<sup>63</sup>. Such changes, often initiated by educators who had studied in the United States, have been noticeable in many schools, although once again they were made only very gradually. In other instance, no changes occurred when blocked by »popular pressures« against foreign influences.

In the Allied attempt at re-education, the content of textbooks played a vital role. Not only were the Americans and the British interested in removing all vestiges of Nazism in them, but they also sought to have the students learn more about their countries. What kind of Anglo-Saxon political model was depicted? A number of textbooks dealing with Britain referred to its constitutional history, the monarchy, parliamentary and legal systems, the Commonwealth, the social classes, and the grassroots tradition. They noted the ability of political leaders to compromise and make concessions as an important element in the democratization of state and society<sup>64</sup>.

Textbooks on the United States cited the land and the people, the historical evolution (including references to the Declaration of Independence, and statements by Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt), the democratic spirit, social and economic structures, and cultural aspects. The political section emphasized the Constitution, the role of the President, Congress and the courts, separation of power, and federalism<sup>65</sup>.

At a 1961 conference on textbooks attended by American and German specialists, all

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Roemer), Heidelberg Social Studies Workshop, July 17 to August 26, 1950: in: *International Workshop on Social Studies in Germany*; HICOG, Education and Cultural Relations Divisions, Education Branch, 1950.

60 Wolfgang Mickel, *Politische Bildung an Gymnasien, 1945–1965*, Stuttgart 1967, pp. 16–29.

61 Friedrich Oetinger, *Partnerschaft: Die Aufgabe der politischen Erziehung*, Stuttgart 1956.

62 Charles R. Foster, *Civic Education in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany*, in: *International Journal of Political Education*, No. 1, 1977, pp. 45–60.

63 Pilgert, *The West German Education System*, HICOG, 1953, p. 53.

64 See Paul Hartig (ed.), *Englandkunde*, Frankfurt 1955; *Grundzüge der Geschichte*; Heinrich Schnee, *Die Britische Völkerfamilie: Vom Imperium zur Völkergemeinschaft*, Paderborn 1952; *Mit eigener Kraft*, *Geschichte IV*, Unterrichtswerk für Volksschulen, Stuttgart, no date (c. 1954).

65 See Wilhelm Frerichs (ed.), *The Mind and Soul of Britain and the U.S.A.*, Frankfurt 1956.

participants agreed that while the coverage of most textbooks was adequate, many improvements in their contents should be made. Criticism was voiced that since the study of the United States was of more recent vintage, the textbooks used in English language and literature courses did not give enough space to it as compared to Great Britain. Even when they did, then the selections were often by British authors, or some material was dated and did not give pupils an idea of modern American politics, culture, and literature, and of the American contribution to the international community<sup>66</sup>.

What textbooks had to say about Allied policy in Germany also was a commentary on the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy. The Americans and the British received mixed scores. They were praised for helping to relieve the extreme deprivation of the immediate postwar period. The United States received additional applause for the Marshall Plan – evidence of its generosity in helping to rebuild Germany and other West European countries<sup>67</sup>. But some textbooks were more critical. One stated that »Die Sieger wollten Deutschland für immer wehrlos machen und das deutsche Volk für die Verbrechen des Nationalsozialismus bestrafen«<sup>68</sup>. Often enough, »bekam die Bevölkerung die harte Hand der Sieger zu spüren« (such as in dismantling), but slowly the »Fesseln« were loosened<sup>69</sup>.

Since pupils learn not only from textbooks but also from their teachers, the Americans especially made a concerted effort to inculcate a knowledge of the United States in the teachers. They sought to promote more American studies programs at teachers colleges and universities, and to provide more teachers' instruction and audiovisual aids. They also suggested that Länder educational plans include more materials on the United States, especially in English classes<sup>70</sup>. They were pleased that the *Staatsexamen* were to include questions on American history, politics, as well as literature, which then should have an impact on the pupils. They were also pleased that many modern language teachers, who had studied in the United States, or who had participated in seminars organized by the numerous American education specialists sent to Germany (in 1948, there were 200), were convinced that the United States had to be examined in their English classes<sup>71</sup>.

In addition to the schools, the Americans also sought to encourage the civic education of members in youth groups, and to discourage any indoctrination by political parties to those under the age of eighteen. To help »inculcate the American way of life« into young people, the Army organized the German Youth Activities program, which had only limited success in terms of the indoctrination aspect<sup>72</sup>.

Adult education was another target for the Americans and the British. Their hope that people would study the politics of democratic states was dashed, however, when most

66 William E. Stupp, Textbook Analysis, and Paul Hartig, Kritische Überprüfung der Behandlung der USA in den deutschen Lehrbüchern für den englischen Unterricht, in: *Amerikakunde im deutschen Lehrbuch: Ergebnisse der 4. amerikanisch-deutschen Tagung*, Braunschweig, 27. Juni bis 1. Juli 1961. Sonderdruck aus dem Internationalen Jahrbuch für Geschichtsunterricht, Band 9/1962, Braunschweig 1962.

67 *Grundzüge der Geschichte*, pp. 146, 150–152.

68 Rolf Lasius and Hubert Recker, *Geschichte: Ein Lese und Arbeitsbuch*, Band 3, Das Zeitalter der Weltmächte und Weltkriege, Weinheim 1963, p. 105.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

70 *Empfehlungen der Amerikakunde-Konferenz*, Braunschweig, 27. Juni bis 1. Juli 1961, Sonderdruck aus dem Internationalen Jahrbuch für Geschichtsunterricht, Band 9/1962, Braunschweig 1962.

71 Hartig, *Kritische Überprüfung*, pp. 3–9. A number of teachers, who had read Ernst Fraenkel, *Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens*, Opladen 1959, became more interested in the subject.

72 Liddell, p. 125.

shied away from courses in modern history, economics, and international relations. The mood of the people at the time was such that they mistrusted or lacked interest in these subjects, and chose instead technical, art and other non-political courses<sup>73</sup>. However, in later years, German leaders established a number of organizations designed to strengthen the West German democratic system. Typical was the »Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst« founded in 1952 and renamed »Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung« in 1963. Its publications (such as *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, the supplement to *Das Parlament*), designed especially for teachers and students, have printed articles on the United States and Great Britain, including translations of works by Churchill, Gaitskell, Dulles and Kennan<sup>74</sup>.

## UNIVERSITIES

A final target for educational reform were the universities. British and American authorities sought to broaden university education to all classes of the population, to include students in governing councils that would break the monopoly of the professors in the academic enclaves, to encourage universities to become involved in teacher training and adult education, to foster a spirit of independence from state authority, and to prevent student fraternities (Körperschaften) from forming again. The Allied record of success was mixed as conservative German vested interests attempted to maintain the status quo. The American military government also sought to introduce American studies, but the task was difficult given the reluctance of the established institutes to support new inter-disciplinary institutes. By 1951, only seven professors had been appointed to teach American studies specifically, although at most universities courses on the United States were given – normally in the English seminars<sup>75</sup>.

Another goal was to introduce a limited degree of egalitarianism by having more women enrol as students, fostering closer ties between professors and students, and by establishing student parliaments to combat the feeling of disillusion, apathy, and lack of interest in democratic methods. When the Free University was founded in Berlin these goals could be realized in the absence of Establishment rectors and professors who at other universities worried that reforms would dilute academic standards and be a threat to them<sup>76</sup>.

A final goal was to introduce social science subjects on the assumption that they would serve as a base for establishing democratic forms and processes, and understanding of other political systems. Many social scientists had emigrated to the United States or Great Britain, where they had participated in the development of political science and sociology. A number of them had advised the American government in its Germany policy, and then returned to the Federal Republic to occupy newly-created university chairs, or taught there on occasion, but maintained their residence and positions in the United States<sup>77</sup>.

73 *Ibid.*

74 Personal interview with Franklin Schultheiss, Director, Bundeszentrale, Bonn. See Klaus W. Wippermann, *Die publizistische Tätigkeit der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, in: *Publizistik als Gesellschaftswissenschaft, Internationale Beiträge*, ed. by Hans Jürgen Koschwitz and Günter Potter, Konstanz 1973.

75 Pilgert, *The West German Education System*, pp. 96–98.

76 Liddell, p. 136.

77 Among the advisors to the government were Carl Friedrich, Franz Neumann, and Herbert Marcuse. Émigrés who returned were Ernst Fraenkel, Ossip Flechtheim, and Richard Löwenthal (Free University, Berlin); Ferdinand Hermens (Cologne); Hans Rothfels (Tübingen);

Those who returned permanently or temporarily had been impressed by the American or British democratic systems, and felt that it could be a model in many respects for the Federal Republic. They were successful, after initial resistance, in forming political science and sociology institutes at German universities, and attracting many students who considered these disciplines as relevant. Thereafter they groomed a new generation of young social scientists, many of whom studied in the United States, to occupy vacant or newly-created chairs. Both the older and the younger professors sought to promote the study of Germany's immediate past history, of democratic theory, and of other political systems, especially the United States as the model of a presidential system, Great Britain as the model of a parliamentary system, and the Soviet Union as the model of a totalitarian system.

Yet the returned émigré professors were reluctant to criticize the Western systems where they had been hospitably received. Once the Cold War erupted, many attempted to rally the West Germans to an anti-Soviet alliance by defusing anti-American sentiments. Partly as a result, their students shied away from scrutinizing the domestic affairs of Britain and the United States, and research institutes devoted solely to the study of these two countries were not created. A number of textbooks dealing with the Anglo-Saxon system did appear, but they were descriptive rather than analytical<sup>78</sup>. Nevertheless, methodological breakthroughs did occur as the scholars used techniques, such as public opinion surveys, aggregate data, field research, and empirical studies, that had been developed in the United States<sup>79</sup>. The need to catch up was pressing, and a number of institutes were set up in which the founders had spent some time in the United States (e. g. Institut für Demoskopie, EMNID) or to which United States funds had been contributed (e. g. Institut für Sozialforschung, University of Frankfurt)<sup>80</sup>.

As the social science community swiftly caught up with methodological developments in the United States, the students taking social science courses also learned more about the politics of the United States and Great Britain. William Sollmann, a visiting expert for OMGUS and former Reichstag deputy, provides an account of what transpired in a Cologne university class which he taught in 1949. His account is valuable because it pinpoints areas of knowledge and ignorance of the subject matter at that time. His German students felt that they were being swamped by foreign professors whose aim was to indoctrinate them with propaganda. Consequently, he wrote, it will take time to gain their confidence by convincing them that no one wants their Americanization: »Facts and ideas

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Gerhard Leibholz (Göttingen); Arnold Bergsträsser (Freiburg); Eric Voegelin (Munich); and Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (Frankfurt). Eugen Kogon (Darmstadt) and Wolfgang Abendroth (Marburg) had been in concentration camps. Those who returned for short periods were Friedrich, Neumann, Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Karl Deutsch, Karl Loewenstein, Otto Kirchheimer, Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Morgenthau, Leo Strauss, Alfred Schütz, and Karl Wittfogel. For details, see *Gebhard Schweigler*, *Contemporary International Studies in the Federal Republic of Germany*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1975.

78 For instance, *Ivor W. Jennings and Gerhard A. Ritter*, *Das britische Regierungssystem*, Cologne 1958; *Friedrich Glum*, *Das parlamentarische Regierungssystem in Deutschland, Großbritannien und Frankreich*, Munich 1950. For analyses, see *Schweigler*, *Contemporary International Studies*; *Henningsson*, pp. 195 ff.

79 Details in *A. R. L. Gurland*, *Political Science in Western Germany: Thoughts and Writings, 1950–1952*, Washington, D.C., 1952.

80 *George Katona*, *Appraisal of German Organizations conducting Public Opinion and Attitude Studies*, and *C. B. Robson*, *Research in the Social Sciences in Germany: Preliminary Report*, in: *American Embassy, Office of the Cultural Attache, U.S. Specialists' Projects, Civic, Political and Labor Education*, Vol. III, 1950.

about the USA should be presented as information and not more. The German students should be made to feel that it is up to them to form their own conclusions<sup>81</sup>.

Who were the students interested in learning more about the United States? They were those who specialized in the study of American institutions and literature, and who wanted to study in that country; those who wanted to emigrate there; and those, interested in international affairs, who wanted to become career diplomats or enter public life. Sollmann found that the students' lack of knowledge of American history was great; most had not heard of Jefferson or Hamilton. They could not understand the lack of ideology and discipline among political parties, the check and balance system among the three branches of government, and the federal nature of the system. They wondered why the United States had no strong workers' party in the face of capitalist power, and why the Negroes had made so little progress against their oppression. He concluded that the students were looking at the distant country from a purely local perspective, hence missing the essentials of the system's operation<sup>82</sup>.

Had the situation changed a decade later? At the University of Frankfurt, this author taught a comparative government course, which included descriptions of the politics of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The students had less difficulty understanding Britain's parliamentary system, because it resembled their own, than the American presidential system. Yet their understanding of the latter had been enhanced somewhat by the advent of television (to be noted below), which provides frequent pictorial coverage, and by a greater degree of sophistication than that of students a decade earlier. Needless to say, even though most universities give courses in which the two countries will be examined, only a small fraction of the students will take those courses and gain specialized knowledge that most of the German population does not have.

There is one other target group that has received some exposure to a description of the Anglo-Saxon democracies: the members of the West German armed forces. In order to integrate them into the democratic state, they are exposed to lectures two hours a week in their political education program. In the monthly *Information für die Truppe*, published as part of the program, there have been occasional articles on Britain and the United States<sup>83</sup>. In addition, in 1961, an eighty-page pamphlet, *Our Partner: The United States of America*<sup>84</sup>, covering all aspects ranging from history to culture, was published. How much of an impact the transmitted information has had on the soldiers is difficult to determine. But, according to one knowledgeable Ministry of Defense official, this political education is frequently more than the average soldier receives in civilian life before or after his tour of duty<sup>85</sup>.

81 William F. Sollmann, Report No. 1: Course: Problems of the USA; Place: University of the City of Cologne, in: *US Specialists' Reports 1948-1949*, Vol. I (typed copy), p. 10.

82 *Ibid.*, pp. 1 ff.

83 See Heft 5, 1957, pp. 16-21; Heft 1, 1958, pp. 27-35; Heft 3, 1961, pp. 178-180.

84 Schriftenreihe Innere Führung, Reihe: Bundesrepublik/Freie Welt, Heft 6, 1961.

85 Personal interview with Dr. Hund, Innere Führung, Ministry, Bonn. He also noted that air force pilots, trained in the United States, received direct exposure to the American way of life and politics while there.

## PUBLIC SERVICE

While education played a key role in Allied attempts to win over the minds of children and adults to a democratic way of life, perhaps on the Anglo-Saxon model, the Allies also attempted to introduce changes in the German political institutions. The civil service was high on the list. The aim was to reestablish Weimar practices, but correct those weaknesses which »caused the public service to be such an easy prey to the Nazis«<sup>86</sup>.

The Americans, eager to set up a more equitable personnel system, established personnel commissions in each Land that would, as in the United States, certify the three top candidates from whom the appointing authority had to make its selection. But the reaction of German authorities was not too positive. One OMGUS report notes that after eight months two Länder had not yet allocated one full-time staff member to the new personnel office due to the opposition of old-time civil servants. »The success of this clique serves to point out the need for aggressive action to abolish this vestige of former times which has and still is negating the will of the people«<sup>87</sup>. As a result, military government officials contacted political, business, and union leaders to win them over to their point of view. But the civil servants' lobbying did not end. Once the Federal Republic had the right to enact its own legislation, a planned federal personnel commission never materialized. Again, an institution that was deemed un-German ran into serious roadblocks when transposed to another cultural setting.

The Allies also sought to eradicate the old Beamten caste system by extending civil service laws to include nearly all full-time classified positions. The purpose was to make it easier for all applicants, not just the offspring of wealthy families, to enter the public service. But when old-time civil servants opposed the proposal, it too was not included in German federal legislation.

The Allies intended to change the Beamten image by encouraging democratic attitudes among the civil servants. The OMGUS report stated, »Democratic attitudes in German public officials cannot be inculcated by order either of the German governments or Military Government. The public servants must conclude for themselves that living and working in a democratic organization provides a satisfaction greater than that experienced before«<sup>88</sup>. Gradually the new civil servants felt more responsible to the public than had their predecessors. The report pointed out that »they are being asked to achieve objectives foreign to the German practice and they need assurance that what they are striving toward has been achieved in other places and can be achieved here in Germany«<sup>89</sup>.

Finally, the Allies, as was the practice in their own countries, wanted to prevent civil servants from running for public office and engaging in partisan activities during campaigns. But this German tradition could not be abolished by fiat. Most Länder officials, civil service organizations, and political parties rejected the plan. One conservative leader argued »that without civil servants there would not be brains enough in Germany for high level parliamentary work«<sup>90</sup>.

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86 Civil Service and Administrative Courts Branch, Civil Administration Division, OMGUS, *Public Service in Germany: Part IV, Development during the Occupation; U.S. Specialists' Reports, 1948-1949*, Vol. I, p. 67.

87 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

88 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

89 *Ibid.*

90 *Arnold Brecht, German Civil Service Today*, in: American Embassy, Office of the Cultural

To sum up, when the Allies sought to transfer their conception of the civil service to Germany, with its different and strongly entrenched institutions and tradition, they failed – except perhaps for the more democratic manner of many younger civil servants.

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The British took the initiative to introduce their system of local government into their zone. In Britain, a distinction is made between honorary elected officials and the administration which is in the hands of non-political permanent officials. In 1946, this practice was put into effect in the British zone. Mayors, heading city councils with strong powers, were to be honorary political functionaries, while *Oberstadtdirektoren* (or *Stadtdirektoren*), the full-time administrative heads, were to be responsible to the mayor and council, and were forbidden to engage in any political activity<sup>91</sup>.

The British ordinance aroused much opposition from German political parties and organizations because it was viewed as being too alien a reform and would increase the cost of local government. But the British insisted that bureaucrats had to be responsible to elected officials who in turn were to be responsible to the electorate. Their reforms were accepted by North Rhine-Westphalia in 1953 and by Lower Saxony in 1955, but not by Schleswig-Holstein.

The British also decentralized the police, as in their own country, letting the local governments rather than the Länder governments and the ministers of the interior have control. The latter were displeased, and insisted on a return to the more centralized Weimar system. After protracted discussions, the British (as well as the Americans and the French) retreated from their earlier position and acknowledged the need for more centralization in case of an emergency<sup>92</sup>.

In the instance of local government and police reforms, German reactions depended on how individuals were affected. Those who supported the reforms had a stake in them because their own careers or power were enhanced, while the opposite was true for those who opposed the reforms. With Germans divided, it was easier for the British to get grudging acceptance for the reforms.

American officials pushed also for other reforms, but not as dramatic as those of the British. A report by Rodney Mott, an American specialist in local government to the High Commissioner's Office, gives an insight into the reactions of German officials in one sphere of local government – municipal finance. He contended that these officials, provincial in their attitude, were not interested in British or American practices, partly because many held office under the Nazi government and were wary of discussions with Allied officials. But more important, since it was easiest for them to perform routinized tasks with few mistakes and some secrecy, they were not eager to improve their methods

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Attache, U.S. Specialists' Projects; *Civic, Political and Labor Education*, Vol. III, 1950, p. 39. Only North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin required Land officials to resign before they entered a political campaign. Cf. *Brecht*, *Personnel Management*, in: *Governing Postwar Germany*, ed. by *Edward H. Litchfield*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1953.

91 Similar changes were made in *Gemeinden* and rural districts. See *Deutsche Gemeindeordnung*, Ordinance No. 22, April 1, 1946, and Instruction No. 100, August 1946. *Friedmann*, p. 103.

92 *Wolfgang Rudzio*, *Die Neuordnung des Kommunalwesens in der Britischen Zone*, Stuttgart 1968, pp. 106–108.

or to provide budget details for the public's scrutiny. According to Mott, »The German system of local finance is undermining democracy at the base of the pyramid«<sup>93</sup>. He was pleased that American Resident Officers in the Kreise had stimulated budget forums, budget publicity in the press, and general discussion of budget matters, and had worked with the press, groups of citizens, and local administrations to produce a few needed reforms<sup>94</sup>.

While reforms were discussed not only in municipal finance and other areas of local government, the Allies permitted the Germans to form political parties and hold elections at various governmental levels. The electoral system was based partly on Weimar, and partly on the Anglo-Saxon system, primarily because in their zone, the British insisted that pure proportional representation was unacceptable to them. Assisted by a German advisory committee, they worked out a compromise mixed majority-proportional representation system that with only some changes became the basis for the Federal Republic's system<sup>95</sup>.

In the course of time, the political parties became less ideologically committed, as in the United States and Britain, and their numbers shrank to a system consisting of two major parties and one minor party, as in Britain. But these party developments were indigenous, and were only influenced slightly by the Anglo-Saxon model. On the other hand, electoral campaigns took on the trappings (automobile bumper stickers, television debates, etc.) of their American counterparts.

In the economic field, the Allies viewed the swift revival of trade unions as the best guarantor of a democratization of Germany, but they insisted on unions being built up gradually on a decentralized local base. Eventually they permitted them on a zonal level if a central nonpartisan federation made up of industrial unions was created. They opposed the formation of one General Trade Union initially desired by many German unionists because they feared a system that would be overly centralized. The British Labour government took the lead in pushing for limited centralization.

By 1949, the British and American model of a unitary labor federation became the basis for the German Trade Union Federation. Former German labor leaders who had been in British exile as well as others who remained in Germany agreed that there should be no revival of three major competing ideological federations of the Weimar era that had weakened the labor movement at a crucial stage in German history. The Americans also were wary about permitting shop councils to form, primarily because of their unfamiliarity with them, but then granted them permission.

Although the establishment of unions and shop councils could hardly be questioned on the basis of Allied goals, the SPD demand for nationalization of industry ran counter to the American goal – not stated publicly – of restoring the capitalist order. General Clay swiftly stopped legislative efforts by Hesse to permit nationalization and by Bremen to permit codetermination of labor in industry. SPD leaders contended that Clay was stalling for time when he insisted that the entire zone would have to approve such measures. They must have asked themselves how could American authorities match their theoretical statements about democracy and their practice of denying it if it ran counter to their economic

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93 Rodney L. Mott, Report, HICOG Exchanges of Persons Program, Frankfurt/Main, Dec. 18, 1950, in: U.S. Specialists' Projects; *Civic, Political and Labor Education*, Vol. III, 1950, p. 8.

94 *Ibid.*

95 *Ebsworth*, pp. 53, 75.

policy<sup>96</sup>. On the other hand, the British Labour Government permitted workers' codetermination in the coal and steel industries because it was sympathetic to the principle involved<sup>97</sup>.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL AND BASIC LAW

By 1948, the Allies were ready to give up much of their sovereignty to the West Germans. The Parliamentary Council was convened to write the Basic Law. How much did this constitutional document reflect the Allied parliamentary or presidential systems? The Basic Law rested on democratic foundations developed in Weimar, which in turn reflected the British and French parliamentary systems, but also ideas expressed by American theorists. Although based on Weimar, Parliamentary Council members wanted to avoid those weaknesses which contributed to the rise of Nazism.

Without most members being aware of it, they adopted Walter Bagehot's description of the British cabinet government, in which Parliament, in its elective role, is the creative organ of the cabinet, because they wanted to ensure that the West German cabinet rested on a Bundestag working majority. If such a majority were lost, then they would have to agree in advance to support another chancellor (the constructive vote of no-confidence). Similarly, they adopted the British theory of ministerial responsibility to Parliament<sup>98</sup>.

Two FDP deputies (Dehler and Becker) proposed a presidential system, in which one person would combine the offices of president and chancellor, but they could not even get the support of their Fraktion for it. Their proposal to have a fixed term for the chief executive and parliament also was rejected. Carlo Schmid (SPD) contended that it would only be possible where a stable social structure existed, as in the United States or Switzerland, but not in a society where social conditions were in flux<sup>99</sup>.

Parliamentary Council members gave the Federal president fewer powers than those given the Weimar president. As a result, presidents since 1949 play a role somewhat comparable to the British monarch. But this model was not consciously in the minds of the constitution's authors, nearly all of whom knew very little about the intricacies of the British (or, for that matter, the American) system<sup>100</sup>.

If the Parliamentary Council delegates had abided by a poll taken in March 1949, then they would have had to rewrite the Basic Law. To the question whether respondents preferred a strong president as in the United States or a strong parliament, 41 percent opted for a strong president and 23 percent for a strong parliament (6 percent preferred neither, 28 percent were undecided, and 2 percent gave no answer)<sup>101</sup>.

96 *Gimbel*, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949*, Stanford 1968, p. 233.

97 It also was sympathetic to the nationalization in its zone.

98 *Wilhelm Hennis*, *Die Rolle des Parlaments und die Parteiendemokratie*, in: *Die Zweite Republik, 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Eine Bilanz*, ed. by *Richard Löwenthal* and *Hans-Peter Schwarz*, Stuttgart 1974, pp. 214–215, 219.

99 *Karlheinz Nieclaus*, *Demokratiegründung in Westdeutschland: Die Entstehung der Bundesrepublik von 1945–1949*, Munich 1974, p. 93. Dehler and Becker views in *Parlamentarischer Rat* 48–49, Drucksache, Vol. IV, 1.49–486, 11. 1. 1949. Cf. *Volker Otto*, *Das Staatsverständnis des Parlamentarischen Rates*, Duesseldorf 1971, p. 140.

100 Personal interview with Carlo Schmid, Bonn. See also *Otto*, p. 144.

101 *Noelle and Neumann*, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947–1955*, p. 157.

On the question of individual rights, the Basic Law authors were aware of President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms pronouncement, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and of course the Weimar constitution's provisions. After Nazi violations of these provisions, they symbolically put individual freedoms in first place in the Basic Law.

On the question of federalism, the Allies, divided among themselves, finally insisted on a decentralized system. The British, supported by the SPD, would have preferred more centralization, but they did not carry enough weight in Allied and German deliberations. Parliamentary Council members knew about the American and French insistence on a federal state, but the majority, basing their views on German precedents, would have chosen a federal system in any case<sup>102</sup>.

Article 28 of the Basic Law, dealing with the Federal guarantee of Länder constitutions, reflects in part the British insistence in their zone that the people must have the right to freely elect members to Land, district, and Gemeinde assemblies. But it does not include the concept of supremacy of local assemblies which the British also had advocated<sup>103</sup>.

Article 113, reflecting British practice since the year 1713, introduced the rule that parliamentary votes to increase government expenditures beyond those called for in the budget proposal would need the consent of the government. The SPD voted against it because it limits the right of parliamentary initiative, but the party was outvoted<sup>104</sup>.

Finally, the authors made the judiciary the guardian of the Basic Law, a reflection of the American tradition of the constitutional judiciary. But, on the whole, the provisions on the judiciary reflected German legal tradition based on Continental practice<sup>105</sup>.

After the Bundestag began its operations, committees at times held open meetings or public hearings, practices which are common in the United States Congress. In 1952, the question hour was institutionalized, patterned after British Parliament custom<sup>106</sup>.

#### IMAGE OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1949—1963: AN OVERVIEW

Once the Federal Republic was established, German views of the British were influenced by the shape of diplomatic relationship between the two countries as epitomized especially by mutual visits of top-level officials, journalistic reports, and commentaries on the new medium of television.

Chancellor Adenauer's visit to London in December 1951 produced in the German press favorable accounts of the red carpet reception accorded him by King George VI and Prime Minister Churchill, and of the decrease in British prejudices against the Germans as noted in some British newspapers. In July 1954, Princess Margaret, sister of the Queen, paid a courtesy visit to Bonn, the first representative of the Crown to be in Germany in decades; and in May 1957 Prime Minister Macmillan arrived in Bonn, the first official visit of a British prime minister since the war. The German press noted the symbolic importance of these visits, and hoped that they would mark an improvement in relations.

102 *Josef Othmar Zöller*, *Rückblick auf die Gegenwart*, Stuttgart-Degerloch 1964, p. 226.

103 *Ebsworth*, p. 194.

104 *Otto*, p. 135; *Hennis*, p. 218.

105 Ulrich Scheuner (Bonn) letter to author, 1 Nov. 1977; *C. J. Friedrich*, *The Constitution of the German Federal Republic*, in: *Governing Postwar Germany*, pp. 143–144.

106 Personal interview with Werner Blichke, Bundestag official, Bonn. See *Hans Trossmann*, *Parlamentsrecht des Deutschen Bundestages*, Kommentar, Munich 1977, p. 815.

These hopes were dashed when President Heuss paid a state visit to Britain in October 1958. Even though the Queen and government officials were most cordial, the public was lukewarm. Symbolic of an unconcerned attitude was the photo reprinted in German newspapers of Oxford undergraduates standing with hands in their pockets as Heuss passed by. The Germans reacted negatively to the cool public reception of their President. They had hoped that the British would forget the past, but it was obvious, according to the *Manchester Guardian*, »that the British take more time than other people to forgive and forget, and that Anglo-German friendship is clearly not yet an established fact«<sup>107</sup>. The left-leaning *Daily Mirror* commented that relations could be cemented only after a generation<sup>108</sup>. German susceptibilities did not take into account the reserved British character, since cheers for foreign statesmen, unless they are well-known, are rare. The Germans also did not take into account British mistrust toward their sudden conversion from being supporters of Nazism to becoming democrats, their failure to question the past, and their increasing power on the Continent. One German newspaper commented that the people should realize that it is the spirit of British democracy if press and public in England do not react necessarily in the same way as their government<sup>109</sup>.

In a cycle effect, British negative views toward the Germans undoubtedly sparked or reinforced negative views toward the British. The British democratic model, once admired in Germany, became tarnished as differences in character and style of life became accentuated, as Britain lost its preeminence in world affairs, and as it failed to join the Common Market<sup>110</sup>. Consequently, the Germans lost some interest in British politics, especially when the German press devoted an increasing amount of space to Franco-German relations and to the Common Market, which were crucial to Adenauer's policy vis-à-vis the West. To discuss these problems, a meeting of British and German journalists took place in London in 1959 (in the wake of another Adenauer visit). It produced an interesting commentary on how the British reacted to the German image of their country. The British journalists felt that the German correspondents in London, remaining primarily in the capital, failed to file enough stories from the provinces to provide a more balanced picture; and that, while understanding British institutions and traditions, they neglected to write on the ongoing social and technical progress.

Despite the meeting, tensions remained, as illustrated by a story in Axel Springer's *Bild-Zeitung*. The conservative illustrated weekly, lambasting Lord Beaverbrook's *Daily Express* for having agitated against the Germans for years, wrote »We Germans are finally fed up«. The precipitating factor was the *Daily Express'* warning to the English people of a German betrayal in concluding an accord with the Russians behind the back of the West. The *Bild-Zeitung* article concluded: »This is going too far. *Daily Express* encourages a pathological hatred of Germans«<sup>111</sup>.

No doubt, if the 3 million circulation *Bild-Zeitung* prints such a story, it will have an impact on how one large segment of the German public views Britain. Yet television, which

107 *Manchester Guardian*, 25 Oct. 1958.

108 Cited by *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 26 Oct. 1958. The SPD noted that there were other reasons for the coolness: the German government's lenient treatment of Nazis, its niggardliness toward restitution payments to the victims of Nazism, and its rearmament. *Ibid.*

109 *Allgemeine Sonntags-Zeitung*, 2 Nov. 1958.

110 *Conrad Ahlers*, *Germans turn to new ideals*, in: *The Times* (London), 6 May 1960.

111 Cited by *Daily Express*, 17 Jan. 1962, under the headline: »Ach, the *Daily Express!* Germans are »fed up«; Herr Springer leads the big attack«. Paradoxically, Adenauer was suspicious that Britain was going to make a deal with the Soviets at the expense of the West Germans.

came of age in the 1950's (with more than 4.6 million sets registered in 1960), also had its impact, often on the same people who read the mass circulation weeklies. Directors of television documentaries, such as PANORAMA and ANNO, whose format was copied from similar BBC programs, produced a number of interview programs with leading British politicians and intellectuals, and filmed documentaries about various aspects of British political, economic, social, and cultural matters<sup>112</sup>. These programs sought to be objective, and probably acted as a corrective to some of the more negative popular images of the British.

Public opinion polls provide some clues as to German views of the British. Respondents expressed a moderate degree of support for that country, but not as high as for the United States. In July 1956, for instance, 30 percent felt that Britain had the good will to work with the Federal Republic (as compared to 67 percent for the United States). But after Britain's involvement in the Suez crisis later that year, support for Britain plummeted<sup>113</sup>. In December 1957, Britain enjoyed a plus 25 degree of sympathy (on a plus 100 to minus 100 scale), as compared to plus 61 for the United States, minus 4 for France, and minus 63 for the Soviet Union<sup>114</sup>. Undoubtedly, the restrained support for Britain reflects not only foreign policy developments (such as Suez), but also more deep-seated reserved views of the British and their often negative attitudes toward the Germans.

#### IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949—1963: AN OVERVIEW

As noted above, the Germans were more positively inclined toward the Americans than toward the British. For instance, in 1960, 64 percent of respondents (SPD 59 percent, CDU 79 percent) stated that the Federal Republic should align with the United States, while 22 percent said it should align with neither super-power. In the latter instance, only 16 percent of CDU respondents opted for neutrality, but 31 percent of SPD respondents<sup>115</sup>, who probably expressed thereby their dislike for the American capitalist system.

There were many reasons for the high degree of support for the United States, some based on its image as a democratic country, but many more on its foreign policies, especially those with the Federal Republic. As noted earlier, the image of the United States was formed by many snapshots taken at random. During the 1950s and early 1960s, several German journalists, traveling through the United States, emphasized the diversity of the country, the informal political atmosphere in Washington, the optimistic national character, and the strength of the German-American community<sup>116</sup>. The 1954 Supreme Court

112 In 1961 and 1962, programs dealt with, *inter alia*, Commonwealth immigrants, Britain and the Common Market, the currency crisis, race problems, defense policy, and pressure groups. See Ernst Loewy and Achim Klunder (compilers), *Magazinbeiträge im Deutschen Fernsehen*, Band 1: 1960–1965, Frankfurt 1973, pp. 17–33.

113 Only 15 percent held a good opinion of Prime Minister Eden, 46 percent did not, 36 percent had no opinion, and 3 percent could not identify him. Noelle and Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1957*, Allensbach 1957, pp. 336–337, 355–356.

114 In 1954, before Suez, Britain had a plus 38 score. DIVO-Institut, *Umfragen 1957: Ereignisse und Probleme des Jahres im Urteil der Bevölkerung*, Frankfurt 1958, pp. 42–43.

115 The Soviet Union received less than 1 percent support; other respondents had no opinion. DIVO-Institut, *Umfragen: Ereignisse und Probleme der Zeit im Urteil der Bevölkerung*, Band 3/4, Frankfurt 1962, p. 30.

116 See, e. g., Wolfgang Gropper, *Im Lande der Enkel Europas*, in *Mannheimer Morgen*, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 July 1963.

decision that found black-white segregation in schools to be unconstitutional was welcomed as a sign that the United States was healthy after the earlier McCarthy »circus«<sup>117</sup>. The journalists also attempted to correct wrong impressions held in Germany about the poor economic and social position of blacks, emphasizing that progress was being made. But they wrote little about the problems still facing the blacks, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and other minorities.

West Germans received similar positive impressions about the United States from television. German correspondents roving the distant land at first painted an idealized picture that was free of criticism: the home of democracy, progress above all, the land of one's dreams. The curiosity of viewers in Germany was insatiable. One correspondent noted that »Sie konnten eine Kamera auf den Broadway [in New York City] stellen und brauchten eigentlich nur auf den Knopf zu drücken. Da war soviel Interessantes [. . .]. Die Zeiten sind ja vorbei«<sup>118</sup>.

Viewers also saw American-made dramatic series featuring robbers and police, cowboys and sheriffs. Their understanding of the American legal system may thereby have been enhanced, although it was not the complete picture. Having less amusement value but perhaps more educational value were television documentaries on the United States, most of which (in the 1961–1963 period) dealt with various aspects of foreign and military policy, but hardly any with domestic policy<sup>119</sup>. Viewers – or newspaper readers, for that matter – had little idea of domestic problems such as high unemployment rates, trade export difficulties, industry moving from north to south, strikes, or social tensions.

Another reason for the high degree of support for the United States was the popular confidence in its capability to lead the West, especially in the military sphere. Appreciated also was the support the United States gave to the Federal Republic, making the latter its trusted ally in the NATO alliance. American support was demonstrated, at times insufficiently from the West German point of view, during crises in relation with Soviet bloc countries, beginning with the Berlin airlift, which to Berliners represented the highest values of peace, freedom, humanity, and charity<sup>120</sup>.

Although the diplomatic links were close, there were enough periods of tension between the two countries to cloud the favorable image the Germans had of the Americans. For example, one minor strain occurred in 1950 at the time of passage of Senator McCarran's Internal Security Act, which prohibited the immigration of persons once members of extremist groups. The consequence was that German war brides and other Germans who already were on their way to the United States were held at Ellis Island in New York. Such an incident was not important in international politics, but it could easily have poisoned diplomatic relations. More important, when the Korean War broke out the same year, West German officials were worried that the United States would neglect Europe.

Later, during the brief Kennedy period, American-German relations were bumpy, partly because Kennedy and Adenauer were not too close personally. In Bonn, officials viewed the New Frontier as being anti-German, and were worried that the Americans, just like the British, might make a deal with the Soviets. The Americans in turn noticed that the Ger-

117 Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 May 1954.

118 Georg Jürgens, Politische Auslandsberichterstattung im Deutschen Fernsehen am Beispiel der Korrespondentenberichterstattung über die USA, Ph.D. diss. Free University, Berlin 1972, p. 46. See also pp. 47–66.

119 Ernst Loewy and Achim Klünder, pp. 18–33.

120 W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade, Princeton 1958, pp. 329–331.

mans were no longer a client state and were becoming more self-assertive. *Bild-Zeitung* argued that some United States newspapers should not complain about a wave of anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic just because the Germans have dared to criticize Kennedy's defense policies. It wrote, »Wir sind keine Anti-Amerikaner [. . .]. Wir werden uns aber lieber Anti-Amerikaner nennen lassen, als gesinnungslose Mitläufer zu werden«<sup>121</sup>.

Anti-Americanism was hardly a »wave«. More often it consisted of a localized German protest against the misbehavior of some American troops. On other occasions, it was caused by anti-German statements made in the United States that exaggerated the Nazi past or neo-Nazi activities in the Federal Republic<sup>122</sup>. But by summer 1963, when Kennedy visited Berlin, any anti-American feeling must have evaporated. The tumultuous welcome, especially in Berlin, accorded the President was one he had not experienced (to that extent) anywhere outside of his country. The *Berliner Illustrierte* pointed out that the ovation of the German population to him represented a vote of thanks to America and the expression of a German-American people's festival<sup>123</sup>. Clearly, the Germans identified with Kennedy's America, with his youth, and were pleased that his visit was a recognition of the prominence of the Federal Republic in European affairs and of its political and economic stability.

Kennedy's death in November 1963 produced a shock nearly as deep as in the United States. German newspapers noted that 60,000 Berliners spontaneously came in the middle of the night to the Schöneberg town hall, and that the memorial service for him was unprecedented for a foreign leader. One journal reiterated his message to the world, »Peace, Freedom, Self-determination and Human Rights«<sup>124</sup>. The death of Kennedy marked the end of one era of United States-German relations.

## CONCLUSION

An assessment of the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy in the German political consciousness from 1945 to 1963 must be made with hesitancy and caution. General comments can be made, but will need qualifications; even so some frustrating gaps in knowledge due to incomplete available data will remain. True, public opinion polls provide a number of answers, especially to questions concerning Allied democratization efforts in West Germany, but few questions were ever asked about how respondents viewed the American and British democratic models specifically.

To come to some assessment, we must first differentiate among two groups in West German society. One large group was the apolitical one: a 1961 poll, typical for earlier years too, showed that 37 percent of those questioned were hardly, or not at all, interested in politics, and that 24 percent were only moderately interested. At first glance, this would seem to indicate that these respondents, among whom there were many more women than men, knew little about the Anglo-Saxon countries<sup>125</sup>.

121 *Bild-Zeitung*, 9 Aug. 1962.

122 *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 Feb. 1953.

123 *Berliner Illustrierte*, Sonderdruck 1963, *Präsident Kennedy in Deutschland*.

124 *Berliner Illustrierte*, Sonderdruck 1963, *Präsident Kennedys letzter Tag: Das Attentat*.

125 *Klaus Eberlein*, *Was die Deutschen möchten: Politische Meinungsumfragen in der Bundesrepublik*, Hamburg 1968, p. 10. In a June 1952 poll, only 11 percent of females said they were

Yet this group probably received some knowledge from the media. Many watched the nightly television news (when that medium joined the others) and formed views of leading American and British politicians. How else could one explain that, for example, in the 1960 election campaign between Kennedy and Nixon, 61 percent of respondents in a poll claimed to have followed the campaign, 23 percent in part, and only 16 percent not at all<sup>126</sup>. This group must have also received some impressions about Britain and the United States from newspapers and illustrated journals. Remembered will be the news that is dramatic; other news will leave little imprint. To illustrate: one suspects that the average German knows more about the pomp and circumstance of the British monarchy than about the close relationship between the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. Consequently, the image becomes fragmentary and imbalanced. (Such images, of course, are found in apolitical groups in other countries too.)

The second group consisted of more highly educated and economically prosperous Germans, including the governing elite, who were interested in politics. Numerically fewer than the apolitical group, they totaled 38 percent of all respondents in the above cited 1961 poll. We may assume that these people were relatively well-informed about Britain and the United States because some of them had been there, had followed the news in the media attentively, or, among the younger ones, had studied social science in German schools and universities.

Both groups were exposed to Allied punitive and democratization efforts in Germany, which provided them with direct evidence of negative and positive features of the Anglo-Saxon model. In the occupation period (and afterwards), the people had contact with British and American personnel, and formed impressions based on their observations or experiences. Whether these impressions changed in the period from 1945 to 1963 needs to be investigated. For example, a young lady asked an American interviewer in 1946, »What good does it [do] for Americans to talk about freedom, when we are not free and never will be as long as your soldiers are here?«<sup>127</sup> Would she still have had the same negative views in 1963 when the soldiers were part of NATO?

We can only conjecture that in 1963 she may have been highly impressed by Kennedy's assertions about freedom and democracy, but repelled by the drunken behavior of an Allied soldier in a train. In short, people will form views – and these may change or be contradictory – about foreign political systems based on a host of experiential or nonexperiential impressions that will range from complete accuracy to inaccuracy.

Obviously, in the early occupation years, negative views were bound to be more pronounced and numerous than in 1963 when the Federal Republic was closely linked to the Western alliance. Allied democratization efforts, even though not entirely successful, nevertheless had an impact on the political views of the population. We may assume that among the small group of unreconstructed Nazis, who would be ready to support another authoritarian regime, there was no support for the Anglo-Saxon model. But we may also assume that among the bulk of the population who in the early postwar years were ambivalent or negative in their attitudes toward democratic values, a political socialization process took place. This would be true especially for the younger generation which was

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interested in politics, 39 percent not especially, and 50 percent not at all. *Noelle and Neumann*, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung*, 1947–1955, p. 51. Cf. *Schweigler*, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany*, London 1975, pp. 62–63.

126 *Noelle and Neumann*, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung*, 1958–1963, p. 331.

127 *David Rodnick*, *Postwar Germans: An Anthropologist's Account*, New Haven 1948, p. 80.

exposed to Allied and German civic education efforts. As a consequence, this segment of the population (as well as stalwart Weimar supporters) would be expected to look favorably on such Allied institutions or practices as the protection of individual rights, a two- or multiparty system, freedom of interest groups to organize, and government responsiveness to popular demands.

How deeply imbedded these democratic values were in 1963 is difficult to answer<sup>128</sup>. While Germans may have thought highly of civic participation or grassroots democracy in the Anglo-Saxon model, they were clearly not ready to adopt this and some other American and British institutions or practices to their own political setting because these were viewed as alien to the German tradition<sup>129</sup>.

In addition, SPD supporters were resentful of the United States model because too often American leaders equated its democratic political feature with the capitalist economic order. The SPD supporters blamed the Americans for seeking to transplant this model onto the German scene, and thereby strengthening the CDU/CSU in its attempt to restore an economic and social order viewed as anti-democratic by the SPD.

A final note: In the Germans' rankings of Great Britain and the United States, differences such as parliamentary versus presidential systems played less of a role than foreign policy developments that affected the Federal Republic directly. On that basis, as well as the idealization of the United States by media and academicians, the Americans scored higher than the British. But when the crises of the 1960s and 1970s erupted in the United States, then the West German public, ill-prepared to understand their implications, lost some of its illusions about the model.

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128 *Charles R. Foster*, *The West German Political Culture*, in: *Convergence and Divergence in the Political Cultures of Advanced Industrial Societies, West Germany and the United States*, by *Richard M. Merelman* and *C. R. Foster* (paper given at the International Conference on Political Socialization and Political Education, Tutzing, 10-14 Oct. 1977) (mimeographed), pp. 1-5.

129 In the context of one city (Marburg), see *Gimbel*, *A German Community under American Occupation*.