

Lawrence S. Wittner

## About the Peace Movements and Their Relations

### A Comparison of their Development and Impact in East and West

#### I. BACKGROUND

For most of the Cold War, a group of peace organizations found their home in the World Peace Council (WPC), an international organization that ritually supported the Soviet government's line in world affairs. Launched with great fanfare in 1950, the WPC was dominated by the Soviet Peace Committee which, in turn, was controlled by the Soviet government. On the surface, the WPC constituted a formidable organization. Lavishly funded by the Soviet Union, it had over 100 national affiliates in 1970. Although these affiliates were dominated by veteran Communists, some non-Communists participated in them as well. The WPC staged large world conferences, usually in Communist nations, that drew thousands of delegates. In Eastern Europe, WPC affiliates also organized mammoth peace demonstrations, in which Western policies were condemned and Soviet policies lauded. On the other hand, by 1970 the WPC's Cold War partisanship – including WPC endorsements of the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia – had undermined the WPC's credibility and appeal, particularly in Western Europe and North America. Even the Communist Chinese affiliate, disgusted with Soviet control of the organization, had withdrawn from the WPC. Only the U.S. role in the Vietnam War – which aroused widespread revulsion – coupled with munificent Soviet funding, provided the WPC and its affiliates with continued vitality, particularly in Eastern Europe.<sup>1</sup>

A second group of peace movements adopted a nonaligned stand in the Cold War and, accordingly, directed their criticism at the militaristic policies of nations on both sides of the iron curtain. Far less unified than their Communist-led rivals, they came from a variety of traditions. Some were pacifist groups, often affiliated with the War Resisters' International, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, or the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, which had been founded in the early twentieth century. Others – such as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in the United States, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain, and Gensuikin in Japan – had developed during the antinuclear upsurge of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and in many cases had joined together in 1964 to form the nonaligned International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace. Still others were scientists' groups, women's organizations, and religious bodies committed to peace and disarmament. Although the struggle against the Vietnam War sparked a mass peace movement, the upsurge of antiwar protest did little to benefit these nonaligned groups organizationally. Furthermore, they had minimal influence in the Third World and could not operate at all in Communist nations, where the authorities repressed independent peace activism. Weak and relatively impoverished

1 Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World or None. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953*, Stanford 1993, S. 171 ff.; *Ders.*, *Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954 to 1970*, Stanford 1997, S. 94 f.; *Christopher Andrew/Oleg Gordievsky*, *KGB. The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*, New York 1990, S. 504 f.; interview with Rob Prince, 27.7.1999; interview with Günther Drefahl, 19.5.1999.

in 1970, they had their greatest strength in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan.<sup>2</sup>

## II. PEACE MOVEMENTS IN THE 1970S

During the early 1970s, relations between the Soviet-aligned peace movement and its nonaligned counterpart were quite chilly. Viewing the WPC's world peace conferences as Soviet propaganda exercises, almost all Western nonaligned peace groups refused to send delegates to them or to provide them with any publicity. In 1973, however, when the WPC's general secretary, Romesh Chandra, made substantial efforts to draw independent activists to the WPC's ›World Conference of Peace Forces‹ in Moscow, small delegations of activists from Western nations did agree to attend the gathering. Even so, no rapprochement occurred.irate at a SANE letter protesting Soviet human rights violations, the Soviet government refused to admit the SANE delegation. Typically, the WPC closed ranks behind the Soviet action. A top conference official, applauding it, explained that »fascists, racists, and openly aggressive organizations« could not be tolerated.<sup>3</sup> Those independent U.S. peace activists who were admitted sought to raise the human rights issue at the conference, only to be gaveled out of order and told that there were no political prisoners in the Soviet Union. Finding the conference atmosphere one-sided and intimidating, most nonaligned Western activists came away from the event convinced that there was little to be gained by developing closer relations with the WPC and its party-line affiliates.<sup>4</sup> For their part, the official East bloc peace groups continued to work primarily with, whatever marginal, pro-Soviet peace groups they could find in the West.<sup>5</sup>

Later in the 1970s, with the Vietnam War at an end, the WPC and its affiliates began to emphasize the need to oppose the reviving Cold War and the nuclear arms race – albeit in their usual partisan fashion. Throwing themselves into the campaign against the neutron bomb – an exclusively U.S. weapon – WPC partisans called upon the world's people to »say ›No‹« to Washington's »horror-bomb«.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, *Peace Courier*, the WPC journal, charged that NATO's plan to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in five west European countries »casts the shadow of nuclear holocaust over Europe«.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, Soviet foreign and military policy received nothing but praise. Citing the Soviet Union's alleged service to the cause of peace, the WPC presented a special Peace Medal to Soviet party secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The ongoing deployment of Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles, targeting Western Europe, was not criticized or even mentioned.<sup>8</sup> In August 1979, shortly

2 Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*; April Carter, *Peace Movements. International Protest and World Politics since 1945*, London 1992, S. 13 ff.

3 Homer A. Jack, *The World Congress of Peace Forces. Some Preliminary Thoughts*, 17.4.1973, and Ilona Sebestyén to Sanford Gottlieb, 29.6.1973, Box 59, Series G, SANE Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as SCPC); USSR Blocks SANE at Moscow Confab, in: *Sane World*, October-November 1973, S. 2 f.

4 Margaret Gardiner, *Report on the World Congress of Peace Forces Held in Moscow*, 25.–31. October 1973, by the ICDP Delegate, Box 59, Series G, SANE Records; *Maris Cakars*, *World Peace Congress, or Maris Goes to Moscow, and On Soviet Dissidents*, enclosures in Mary Clarke to Maris Cakars, 30.11.1973, Box 6, Series B,1, Women Strike for Peace Records, SCPC.

5 Interview with Günther Drefahl.

6 *Unite, Say ›No‹ to Horror-Bomb!* in: *Peace Courier* 8, August 1977, S. 1 f.; *WPC Urges Protest Actions*, in: *Peace Courier* 8, August 1977, S. 1 f.

7 *Growing US Military Buildup*, in: *Peace Courier* 11, January 1980, S. 1.

8 *Marian Turski/Henryk Zdanowski*, *The Peace Movement. People and Facts*, Poland 1976, S. 104; *Prevent Implementation of NATO Decision!* in: *Peace Courier* 11, January 1980, S. 1 ff., 6.

after the Communist coup in Afghanistan, the WPC hosted an International Conference of Solidarity in Kabul, which unanimously passed a resolution of support, concluding: »The world's peace forces stand solidly with Afghanistan – today, tomorrow and for all time.«<sup>9</sup> Even as Soviet troops poured into that stricken nation to prop up the rickety Communist regime against growing Afghan resistance, the WPC and its affiliates staunchly defended Soviet military intervention. Chandra assured a WPC gathering: »We all know that the Soviet Union has been and is the best friend of all the countries of the third world.«<sup>10</sup> Not surprisingly, this Cold War partisanship narrowed the appeal of the WPC and its affiliates still further.

By contrast, independent groups in the West – focusing upon many of the same issues, but from a nonaligned perspective – showed increasing vigor during the late 1970s. In Britain, CND began a dramatic revival, protesting against the neutron bomb, NATO's planned deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles, and the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles.<sup>11</sup> Many of the same concerns animated the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) in the Netherlands, church groups and the new Green party in West Germany, and two new organizations – No to Nuclear Weapons and Women for Peace – in Norway and Denmark.<sup>12</sup> In early 1980, with Western Europe increasingly torn by protests against nuclear weapons, a group of long-time British and continental peace activists, led by the historian E. P. Thompson, put together an Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament (END). Declaring that »we are entering the most dangerous decade in human history,« the Appeal blamed both sides in the Cold War for having »adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.« As little could be expected from the missile-wielding governments, »the remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe [...] from nuclear weapons.« Prominent individuals and organizations signed the END Appeal and began to rally a mass antinuclear movement under END's auspices.<sup>13</sup>

In the last years of the decade, a similar surge of energy swept through other Western nations. In Canada, religious-based organizations like Project Ploughshares and traditional peace groups like the Voice of Women plunged into disarmament activities.<sup>14</sup> In the United States, SANE and Physicians for Social Responsibility, appalled by the escalating

9 International Conference of Solidarity with Afghanistan, in: *Peace Courier* 10, September 1979, S. 4; The Kabul Declaration, in: *Peace Courier* 10, September 1979, S. 5.

10 *Romesh Chandra*, *Defend Détente! Fight Against Imperialist Arms Build-Up!* in: The World Peace Council Bureau Session, 1980, S. 7 ff., Box 3, World Peace Council Records, SCPC.

11 Reports of the CND Organizing Secretary, May 6–July 15, and 16.12.1978, and minutes of the CND National Council meetings of January 14, March 4, May 6, and 16.12.1978, and 15.12.1979, Reel 17, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Records (Harvester microfilm, hereafter cited as CND Records-M); interview with Bruce Kent, 7.6.1999.

12 *Philip P. Everts*, *Reviving Unilateralism. Report on a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the Netherlands*, in: *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 11 (1980), H.1, S. 45–50; interview with Mient Jan Faber, 7.8.1986; West Germany, in: *Disarmament Campaigns*, Nr. 1, February 1980, S. 10; *History of Die Grünen*, 1983, Box 2, The Greens Records, SCPC; *Kvinder for fred, Kvinder for Fred Records*, SCPC; *Michael Krasner*, *The Political Influence of the New Danish Peace Movement, 1979–1986*, Aarhus 1986, S. 8 f.; interview with Berit Ås, 12.8.2000.

13 Interview with E. P. Thompson, 1.11.1989; *Ken Coates* (Hrsg.), *The Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament*, Nottingham 1981, S. 277 ff.

14 *Kay Macpherson/Sara Good*, *Canadian Voice of Women for Peace*, in: *Peace Magazine* 3, October–November 1987, S. 26; *Gerd Greune*, *Action News* Nr. 2, January 1981, PB1, Series G, SANE Records.

nuclear arms race, began a dramatic revival,<sup>15</sup> while a new organization, Mobilization for Survival, drew many grassroots activists into a movement blending criticism of nuclear power and criticism of nuclear weapons.<sup>16</sup> Launched by the American Friends Service Committee and Clergy and Laity Concerned, a Stop the B-1 Bomber campaign began to flourish and, in January 1977, held some 300 demonstrations against this projected \$50 billion U.S. weapons system.<sup>17</sup> The most effective U.S. peace mobilization, however, was developed by Randall Forsberg, a young defense and disarmament researcher. In late 1979, eager to focus the U.S. peace movement upon a simple, popular theme, she came up with a plan for a Nuclear Freeze, a bilateral agreement to halt the development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. The idea was quickly endorsed by most U.S. peace groups and, by 1980, had become the basis for an increasingly widespread and popular Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign.<sup>18</sup>

Elsewhere, too, the nonaligned movement began to accelerate, usually emphasizing antinuclear themes. Long divided by their differing political perspectives, Gensuikyo and Gensuikin, Japan's leading antinuclear organizations, began to work more closely together and to stir up broad popular support.<sup>19</sup> In Australia, movements opposed to uranium mining and French nuclear testing and championing a nuclear-free Pacific grew increasingly vocal.<sup>20</sup> In New Zealand, activists sailed small craft into the path of nuclear-armed and -powered vessels, seeking to block their entry into the nation's ports.<sup>21</sup> In small Pacific island nations, native people – deeply resenting the »nuclear colonialism« of the great powers, which used their islands and waterways for nuclear tests and nuclear dumping grounds – formed a Nuclear Free Pacific Movement. A popular poster read: »If it's so safe, Dump it in Tokyo, Test it in Paris, Store it in Washington.«<sup>22</sup>

As before, relations between Soviet-aligned groups in the East and nonaligned groups in the West were strained. On occasion, the WPC or its affiliates promoted joint projects; but nonaligned activists in the West, repelled by their pro-Soviet orientation, remained

15 Interview with David Cortright, 29.6.1987; *Helen Caldicott*, *A Desperate Passion*, New York 1996, S. 160 ff., 198 f., 228.

16 Mobilization for Survival, Box 2, American Friends Service Committee-Rocky Flats Project Records, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado; *Dorothy Nelkin*, *Anti-Nuclear Connections. Power and Weapons*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 37, April 1981, S. 38.

17 American Friends Service Committee press release, 7.1.1974, Box 10, Series II, American Friends Service Committee Records, SCPC; interview with Terry Provance, 20.7.1999.

18 Interview with Randall Forsberg, 7.7.1999; *Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race*, Box 15, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Records, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri, St. Louis, Missouri (hereafter cited as Freeze Records-SL).

19 *Japan Times*, 20.5.1977; interview with Koichi Akamatsu, 15.5.1999, interview with Ikuro Anzai, 15.5.1999; *The Meaning of Survival. Hiroshima's 36 Year Commitment to Peace*, Hiroshima 1983, S. 253, 255, 259.

20 *Verity Burgmann*, *Power and Protest. Movements for Change in Australian Society*, Sydney 1993, S. 196 ff.; *International Mobilization for Survival News Service*, April-June 1980 and June-July 1980, Reel 20, CND Records-M.

21 *Tom Newnham*, *Peace Squadron. The Sharp Point of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand*, Auckland 1986, S. 8, 11 ff.; *Kevin Clements*, *Back from the Brink. The Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand*, Wellington 1988, S. 108 ff.

22 *Lyuba Zarsky*, *Creating a Nuclear Free Pacific*, in: *WIN* 18, 1.8.1982, S. 4 f.; *Peter Jones*, *Towards a Nuclear Free Pacific*, in: *END Bulletin*, February 1981, S. 19; *Rachel Sharp*, *Militarism and Nuclear Issues in the Pacific*, in: *Dies*. (Hrsg.), *Apocalypse No. An Australian Guide to the Arms Race and the Peace Movement*, Sydney 1984, S. 190–196.

reluctant to participate in them.<sup>23</sup> More frequently, the WPC simply worked with its pro-Soviet affiliates, or acted to establish them, in Western nations. In the United States, where WPC leaders viewed nearly all the existing peace groups as politically retrograde and, therefore, unreliable, the WPC acted in the late 1970s to set up its own American branch, the U.S. Peace Council.<sup>24</sup> Sometimes, the WPC even denounced independent groups – for example, when it charged, quite without justification, that the freewheeling, leftwing Mobilization for Survival was a CIA front organization.<sup>25</sup> Nor were most Western peace groups any fonder of their Soviet-aligned counterparts. In August 1980, outlining what they considered the best course of action for END, E. P. Thompson and his activist wife, Dorothy Thompson, came out strongly in defense of the position that »the thrust against both NATO and Warsaw Pact positions be steadily maintained.« And this, in turn, meant, as they explained, that »we must keep our nose clean of any association with official Soviet-sponsored ›peace‹ organizations.«<sup>26</sup>

In fact, more appropriate allies for END were beginning to emerge in the East. In Hungary, Catholic ›base communities‹, drawing upon the teachings of György Bulanyi, a Catholic priest, promoted resistance to militarism. Although Hungary's Catholic Church hierarchy assailed these radical communities, many young priests and Catholic laypersons were drawn to them. Other prominent Hungarians risked imprisonment by backing the END campaign.<sup>27</sup> In East Germany, the Evangelical Church joined its West German counterpart in the fall of 1979 to issue a Statement on Peace that promoted peace education in the schools. The following year, the East German denomination organized a ›Peace Week‹ under the slogan ›Make Peace Without Weapons‹. When, as part of ›Peace Week‹, the Evangelical Church produced a ›Swords into Plowshares‹ emblem, young people immediately adopted it as the symbol of an increasingly dissident ›Swords into Plowshares‹ movement.<sup>28</sup> In the Soviet Union, too, nonaligned protest began to surface, usually among intellectuals. The physicist Andrei Sakharov publicly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a move that led Soviet authorities to exile him, along with his wife, to the closed city of Gorky. Despite living under virtual house arrest thereafter, Sakharov continued to speak out, usually for human rights and nuclear disarmament, and emphasized the similarity of his position on disarmament with that of a leading U.S. peace group, the

23 Minutes of War Resisters' International executive committee meeting, 19.–20.8.1980, Box 56, War Resisters' International Records, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (hereafter cited as WRI Records); *Katsuya Kodama*, Red vs. Green. A Comparative Study on Peace Movements in Japan, Denmark, and Finland, paper presented at the Lund Conference on Peace Movements, Lund, Sweden, 17.–20.8.1987, S. 3 f.

24 Interview with Rob Prince; Introducing the U.S. Peace Council, U.S. Peace Council Records, SCPC.

25 Minutes of War Resisters' International executive committee meeting, 20.–21.5.1978, Box 31, WRI Records; interview with Terry Provance.

26 *Dorothy Thompson/E. P. Thompson*, END – Retrospect and Next Steps, 18.8.1980, Mary Kaldor Papers, London School of Economics, London.

27 *Klaus Ehring/Hans-H. Hücking*, Die neue Friedensbewegung in Ungarn, in: *Reiner Steinweg* (Hrsg.), Faszination der Gewalt. Politische Strategie und Alltagserfahrung, Frankfurt/Main 1983, S. 320 f.; *Ferenc Köszegi/Istvan Szent-Ivanyi*, A Struggle Around an Idea. The Peace Movement in Hungary, in: *New Society* 62, 28.10.1982, S. 164; *Ferenc Köszegi/E. P. Thompson*, The New Hungarian Peace Movement, London 1982, S. 4 f., 12.

28 *John Sandford*, The Sword and the Ploughshare. Autonomous Peace Initiatives in East Germany, London 1983, S. 40 f., 49 ff.; *Bruce Allen*, Germany East. Dissent and Opposition, Montreal 1989, S. 98 f.

Federation of American Scientists. In 1980, when END issued its Appeal, the dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev gave it his enthusiastic, public support.<sup>29</sup>

In their search for reliable partners in the East, Western nonaligned activists also found allies among physicians. Bernard Lown, a prominent American cardiologist who had founded Physicians for Social Responsibility in the 1960s, desperately wanted to mobilize Soviet doctors in the cause of nuclear disarmament. Contacting Evgenii Chazov, a distinguished Soviet cardiologist with whom he had become acquainted professionally, Lown arranged to pursue the issue with him in Moscow. But, in the spring of 1980, when the U.S. doctor arrived for their meeting, he found Chazov very reluctant to proceed, for the Soviet doctor felt that such political activity would sacrifice his medical career for an impossible goal. Only a heated colloquy with Lown, the intervention of Chazov's daughter, and considerable soul-searching convinced Chazov to go ahead with the venture. Thus, in December 1980, a small group of American and Soviet physicians met in Geneva and, after a stormy meeting, agreed to establish an organization that Lown and Chazov would co-chair: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).<sup>30</sup> Although IPPNW was not a dissident organization – and almost certainly would not have gotten off the ground if Soviet authorities had objected – it was not controlled by the Soviet government, either. Instead, using his position as the attending physician to top Kremlin officials to extend the limits of their tolerance, Chazov worked in tension with Soviet authorities, at least during the Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko years.<sup>31</sup>

### III. PEACE MOVEMENTS IN THE 1980S

During the early 1980s, as hawkish national leaders such as Ronald Reagan ascended to power and the Cold War seemed to spiral out of control, END began coordinating a vast antinuclear campaign throughout Europe. It focused largely on the deployment of the Euromissiles, but also brought the issue of nuclear disarmament and nuclear-free zones to the fore.<sup>32</sup> In Great Britain, CND turned out unprecedented throngs of protesters – 400,000 at Hyde Park in October 1983 – and national membership soared to 100,000. Swept up in the antinuclear fervor, the Labour Party adopted CND's call for Britain's unilateral nuclear disarmament and carried this position into subsequent elections. Although polls indicated that most Britains opposed unilateralism, they also revealed majority opposition to the planned installation of cruise missiles. Women's peace encampments at proposed missile sites grew into long-term, active resistance movements. At one of these sites, Greenham Common, thousands of women maintained a peace vigil for years, tore down fences around the site, and even invaded the base and danced defiantly on the

29 *Tatiana Pavlova*, *Hundred Years of Russian Pacifism*, in: *Journal of Human Values* 5 (1999), H. 2, S. 152; *Jeremy Stone*, *Every Man Should Try. Adventures of a Public Interest Activist*, New York 1999, S. 164 ff.; *Tony Simpson*, *Protest and Survive*. October 1980, London, in: *END Bulletin*, February 1981, S. 14.

30 Interview with Bernard Lown, 6.7.1999; *Matthew Evangelista*, *Unarmed Forces. The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*, Ithaca 1999, S. 149 ff.; *Irwin Abrams*, *The Origins of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*. The Dr. James E. Muller Diaries, in: *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 15 (1999), S. 20–24.

31 O podgotovke sovetsko-amerikanskoi Konferentsii uchenykhmedikov za predotvraschenie yadernoi voyny, Dezember 1980, f. 89, op. 43, d. 48, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Records, Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Moscow; interview with Bernard Lown.

32 Interview with Mary Kaldor, 7.6.1999; interview with E. P. Thompson.

missile silos.<sup>33</sup> In the Netherlands, the churches issued critical statements on the proposed missile deployment and the Labor Party vowed to oppose it. IKV's anti-missile demonstrations grew to mammoth proportions, with 400.000 participants in Amsterdam in 1981 and 550.000 at The Hague in 1983. Polls in the Netherlands showed not only massive opposition to missile deployment, but to the maintenance of any nuclear weapons in the country.<sup>34</sup>

Elsewhere in Western Europe, the situation was much the same. In West Germany, the churches, young people, the unions, professional groups, the Greens, and – after a brief struggle – the Social Democrats all moved into the ranks of the antinuclear campaign. Polls in the Federal Republic showed overwhelming opposition to missile deployment. In October 1983, more than a million people protested against it, forming a ›human chain‹ linking cities and filling their downtown areas with vast open-air meetings.<sup>35</sup> In tiny Norway, No to Nuclear Weapons grew into an organization with 350 local groups and 130.000 members. This enabled the antinuclear organization to place its newspaper in every mailbox in the country, free of charge, and shattered the monopoly on political information enjoyed by the political parties. Indeed, within short order, these parties sought to assure the movement that they opposed nuclear weapons, as well.<sup>36</sup> In France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, massive demonstrations erupted, church groups and – for the most part – social democratic parties joined the anti-missile campaign, and polls showed overwhelming opposition to missile deployment and other aspects of the revived nuclear arms race.<sup>37</sup> It was a stunning expression of public protest.

Nor was the uprising limited to Western Europe or to concerns about the Euromissiles. In Japan, approximately 29 million people signed petitions calling for the outlawry of nuclear weapons, the expansion of nuclear-free zones, and a worldwide disarmament treaty. Hundreds of thousands also took part in antinuclear demonstrations.<sup>38</sup> Attracting support from major professional groups, unions, and women's organizations, antinuclear activists staged the largest protest rallies in the history of Australia and New Zealand. Although activists had only mixed success in securing the support of the Labor Party in Australia, in New Zealand they won the staunch backing of the Labour Party for their

33 Interview with Bruce Kent, 10.7.1990; Factfile 5. The History of CND, membership figures, CND Records, London; Greenham Common and Beyond. A View of the British Peace Movement, January 1984, Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp Records, SCPC; interview with Michael Foot, 19.6.1998; *Connie DeBoer*, The Polls. The European Peace Movement and the Deployment of Nuclear Missiles, in: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (1985), S. 126 f.

34 Interview with Mient Jan Faber; END Briefing Notes. The Netherlands, New Accessions, War Resisters League Records, SCPC; *Wall Street Journal*, 28.1.1982.

35 *Manchester Guardian*, 24.10.1983; *Peter H. Merkl*, Pacifism in West Germany, in: *School of Advanced International Studies Review* 4 (1982), S. 82 f.; *Hartmut Grewe*, The West German Peace Movement. A Profile, in: *Werner Kaltefleiter/Robert L. Pfaltzgraff* (Hrsg.), *The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States*, London 1985, S. 117 f., 124; *Petra Kelly*, Offener Brief an Willy Brandt, 5.11.1982, Box 1, The Greens Records.

36 Interview with Ole Kopreitan, 14.5.1999; *Erik Alfssen*, De første år av Nei til atomvapen, Nei til Atomvapen Records, Oslo; *International Herald Tribune*, 4.10.1982.

37 *Manchester Guardian*, 24.10.1983; Initiative pour la Création des Comités pour le Désarmement Nucléaire en Europe, Comité pour le Désarmement Nucléaire en Europe Records, SCPC; *New York Times*, 23.10.1983; J.C. Billault to Chers amis, 16.7.1982, Folder 748, Interchurch Peace Council Records, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (hereafter cited as IKV Records); *Moving Ahead*, in: *Disarmament Campaigns*, Nr. 18, January 1983, S. 5 f., 11–14.

38 *Hitoshi Ohnishi*, The Peace Movement in Japan, in: *International Peace Research Newsletter* 21 (1983), S. 26 f.; *Glenn D. Hook*, The Ban the Bomb Movement in Japan. Whither Alternative Security? in: *Social Alternatives* 3 (1983), S. 37.

demand that nuclear-powered and -armed ships be banned from New Zealand's ports.<sup>39</sup> In Canada, mass agitation broke out against Canadian testing of cruise missiles and behind the attempt to make Canada a nuclear-free zone, with disarmament, political, and church groups playing leading roles.<sup>40</sup> Meanwhile, the Nuclear Free Pacific Movement, rejecting the East-West nuclear confrontation, convinced nine out of ten South Pacific countries to adopt a treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in their region.<sup>41</sup> Although antinuclear agitation remained much weaker in Latin America, nuclear disarmament campaigns did emerge in Brazil and Argentina.<sup>42</sup>

In the United States, the antinuclear campaign burgeoned into the largest peace movement in the country's history. Groups like SANE, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, and Physicians for Social Responsibility grew into mass organizations.<sup>43</sup> Entire cities were swept up in the antinuclear fervor.<sup>44</sup> In June 1982, nearly a million Americans turned out for a New York City rally against the nuclear arms race – the largest political demonstration up to that point in American life. Meanwhile, the Nuclear Freeze campaign drew the backing of major religious bodies, professional organizations, and unions.<sup>45</sup> Despite efforts by the Reagan administration to discredit the Freeze movement,<sup>46</sup> polls indicated that it had the support of 70 percent or more of the public. The Freeze was endorsed by 275 city governments, 12 state legislatures, and 446 New England town meetings. In the fall of 1982, when Freeze referenda were on the ballot in ten states containing 30 percent

39 *Wayne Robinson*, Current Peace Research and Activism in New Zealand, in: International Peace Research Newsletter 21 (1983), H.3, S. 34; *Paul Landais-Stamp/Paul Rogers*, Rocking the Boat. New Zealand, the United States, and the Nuclear-Free Zone Controversy in the 1980s, Oxford 1989, S. 21, 26 f., 77; Elections Special, in: Peacelink, July 1984; *Malcolm Saunders/Ralph Summy*, One Hundred Years of an Australian Peace Movement, 1885–1984. Part II, in: Peace and Change 10 (1984), S. 69 ff.; Medical Association for the Prevention of War Australia, September 1986, Medical Association for the Prevention of War Records, SCPC.

40 *William Epstein*, Canada, in: *Jozef Goldblat* (Hrsg.), Non-Proliferation. The Why and the Wherefore, London 1985, S. 179 f.; Goals and Strategies for the Canadian Peace Movement, in: Our Generation 16 (1983), S. 3; *Ernie Regehr*, Canada as a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, in: *Ders./Simon Rosenblum* (Hrsg.), Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, Toronto 1983, S. 245.

41 For a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, in: Peacelink, September 1983, S. 16; *Roman Bedor*, Protecting the Source of Life, in: Mobilizer 5 (1986), S. 8; South Pacific Treaty, in: END Journal, Nr. 27, May-June 1987, S. 3.

42 An Appeal from the Brazilian Pacifist Movement, April 1984, Informative Bulletin of the Brazilian Pacifist Movement, June 1984, and Movement to stress pacifism, in: Buenos Aires Herald, 15.1.1984, clipping in Box 506, WRI Records; Declaracion Inicial del Movimiento por la Vida y la Paz-MOVIP, Folder 748, IKV Records.

43 Interview with Bernard Lown; interview with Helen Caldicott, 27.2.99; Physicians for Social Responsibility Director's Report, December 1983, Physicians for Social Responsibility Records, SCPC (hereafter cited as PSR Records); interview with Robert Musil, 20.7.1998.

44 Interview with Judy Lipton, 31.7.1999; Workshops: PSR Annual Meeting, 21–23.1.1983, PSR Records.

45 Interview with Robert Musil; The Challenge of Peace. God's Promise and Our Response, in: *Jim Castelli* (Hrsg.), The Bishops and the Bomb. Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age, New York 1983, S. 184–283; New York Times, 16.6.1983; Bishops Say No to Deterrence, in: Nuclear Times 4, July-August 1986, S. 6 f.; *Renata Rizzo*, Professional Approach to Peace, in: Nuclear Times 1, August-September 1983, S. 10–13; interview with David Cohen, 19.7.1999; *Gene Carroll*, The following national labor organizations, 5.5.1983, author's possession; Los Angeles Times, 5.10.1983.

46 Interview with Robert McFarlane, 21.7.1999; interview with Thomas Graham, Jr., 23.8.1999.

of the American electorate, voters approved it in nine of them.<sup>47</sup> Meanwhile, the Freeze campaign took the Democratic Party, and particularly its liberal wing, by storm. Top candidates for the party's presidential nomination endorsed the Freeze and other arms control demands. They included the Democratic nominee, Walter Mondale, who, in meetings with disarmament group leaders, assured them of his strong backing for their agenda. During the 1984 presidential campaign, Mondale declared that, on his first day as president, he would urge the Soviet Union to freeze the arms race.<sup>48</sup> The Freeze fell just short of the votes needed to win passage in the U.S. Senate. But, despite fierce opposition from the Reagan administration, it sailed through the House of Representatives easily, by a vote of nearly two-to-one.<sup>49</sup>

Even though the nonaligned peace movement waned in many Western nations during the latter half of the 1980s – largely because nuclear fears were eased by great power moves to halt the nuclear arms race – it remained a formidable force. The 1986 Palm Sunday antinuclear rallies in Australia drew 250,000 people.<sup>50</sup> In 1987, 100,000 protesters turned out for an antinuclear demonstration in London and another 100,000 for a similar demonstration in Bonn.<sup>51</sup> Unprecedented numbers of Canadians participated in antinuclear rallies during early 1987, including an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 in Vancouver alone.<sup>52</sup> In Spain, where the peace movement was stronger than ever before, there were vast turnouts for protests against the country's membership in NATO. A February 1986 demonstration in Madrid drew nearly a million people.<sup>53</sup> As in the earlier part of the decade, the Western nonaligned movement focused primarily upon the nuclear menace, and in doing so could usually count upon substantial support from mainstream political parties, including the British Labour Party, the Scandinavian social democratic parties, the Dutch Labor Party, the German Social Democratic Party, and America's Democratic Party. Major labor federations, religious groups, and women's organizations also backed the antinuclear campaign.<sup>54</sup>

Although peace organizations declined somewhat in the Western Cold War camp in the final years of the decade, they remained quite substantial. In Britain, CND distributed two million leaflets assailing the British government's Trident submarine program in 1988.<sup>55</sup> In the United States, antinuclear activists sharply assailed the Reagan administration's

47 Nuclear Arms, in: The Gallup Report, Nr. 208, January 1983, S. 10; *James Finn*, The Peace Movement in the United States, in: *Kaltesleiter/Pfaltzgraff*, S. 163; The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, in: *Freeze Newsletter* 3, August 1983, S. 2.

48 Gary Hart to Bernard Lown, 26.5.1984, Box 18, Gary Hart Papers, University of Colorado; Meeting of Walter F. Mondale with Representatives of Arms Control Groups, 23.1.1984, in Washington, DC, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Records, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts (hereafter cited as *Freeze Records-C*); *New York Times*, 6.9.1984.

49 *Karin Fierke*, Overwhelming Victory for the Freeze in the House, in: *Freeze Newsletter* 3, June 1983, S. 5; *Chaplain Morrison*, The Freeze in Congress. Past and Present, in: *Freeze Focus* 4, April 1984, S. 6 f.

50 *International Herald Tribune*, 1.4.1985.

51 *Paul Byrne*, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, London 1988, S. 153; *Diana Johnstone*, German Peace Movement Says Scrap All Missiles, in: *In These Times* 11, 24.6.–7.7.1987, S. 11.

52 April 25. Rallies Across the Continent, in: *Canadian Peace Alliance News* 2, Summer 1987, S. 13.

53 *Maria Margaronis*, Notes From Abroad, in: *Nuclear Times* 4, March-April 1986, S. 41.

54 *Lawrence S. Wittner*, *Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present*, Stanford 2003, S. 336 ff.

55 *James Hinton*, Good news, bad news, in: *END Journal*, Nr. 34–35, Summer 1988, S. 15.

Star Wars proposal and developed a growing campaign to secure a nuclear test ban treaty.<sup>56</sup> In New Zealand, the movement was so effective in popularizing its demand for a ban on visits by nuclear warships that the Labour Party, in the face of fierce resistance by the opposition and by the U.S. government, staunchly defended it.<sup>57</sup> Even in South Korea, where there was little peace protest in the past, the late 1980s saw rising antinuclear agitation among student, women's, and church groups.<sup>58</sup> By late 1988, Britain's CND, though waning, had a very respectable 70.000 national members and another 130.000 local members.<sup>59</sup> In the same year, the Dutch IKV still maintained more than 300 active branches.<sup>60</sup> In 1987, when the two largest U.S. peace groups merged to form SANE/Freeze (later renamed Peace Action), SANE brought with it over 150.000 members – about four times its membership of 1983. The Freeze campaign did not have a formal membership, but it contributed about 1.800 state and local affiliates, as well as 109 paid staff members in 56 state and regional offices, to the new organization.<sup>61</sup>

Independent nuclear disarmament groups – encouraged and to some extent shielded by support from END and other nonaligned organizations – also made significant breakthroughs in Communist-ruled Eastern Europe. In March 1981, after meetings with IKV, the Study Group on Peace Affairs of the East German Evangelical Churches produced a statement calling for the public renunciation of nuclear deterrence and nuclear war. In February of the following year, as peace activity grew within the East German churches, some 5.000 people attended a peace forum in Dresden and, at its end, about a thousand of them marched off to stage an illegal peace demonstration: a silent, candle-lit vigil. That summer, another 2.000 attended a similar forum in East Berlin, arranged by Pastor Rainer Eppelmann. A courageous and flintily independent figure, Eppelmann had already sent a letter of complaint about East German militarism to the prime minister and, that January, together with Robert Havemann, one of the best-known critical Marxists in the country, had launched the ›Berlin Appeal‹. Focused on making all of Europe a nuclear-free zone, the ›Berlin Appeal‹ suggested beginning this process with the denuclearization of both halves of Germany. Prominent East Germans signed this appeal – and similar ones by Havemann and Eppelmann – despite arrests and other difficulties with the authorities.<sup>62</sup>

There was also a remarkable surge of resistance to nuclear weapons elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In Hungary, high school students formed an Anti-Nuclear Campaign in the

56 *David Cortright*, *The Peace Movement Role in Ending the Cold War*, in *Ralph Summy/Michael E. Salla* (Hrsg.), *Why the Cold War Ended. A Range of Interpretations*, Westport/Connecticut 1995, S. 86; interview with Dottie Burt, 29.6.1987; *Patricia Morgan*, *Nuclear Test Ban. The Next Step*, in: *The Mobilizer*, Spring 1985, S. 10; interview with Robert Musil.

57 *Landais-Stamp/Rogers*, S. 152; *Clements*, *Back from the Brink*, S. 120 f.; *James W. Lamare*, *The Growth of Antinuclearism in New Zealand*, in: *Australian Journal of Political Science* 26 (1991), S. 472–487.

58 *Hyuk-Kyo Suh*, *INF Treaty and Nuclear Weapons in Korea*, in: *Korea Report* 1, January-February 1988, S. 10; *Peace News*, May 1988; *Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace*, in: *Korea Report* 2, July 1988, S. 19.

59 *Guardian*, 2.4.1988; *Membership Figures*, CND Records.

60 *Dion van den Berg*, *Conciliar Process*, in: *END Journal*, Nr. 34–35, Summer 1988, S. 23.

61 *SANE*, 1986 *Members' Report*, *Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign*, *Status of State Level Freeze Organizations: August 1986*, and *Nick Carter to Freeze supporters*, spring 1987, author's possession; *Robert Kleidman*, *Organizing for Peace. Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze*, Syracuse 1993, S. 161 f.

62 *Sandford*, S. 42 ff., 58 ff., 67–70; *Suzanne Gordon*, *From the Other Shore. Movements for Nuclear Disarmament in Eastern Europe*, in: *Working Papers* 10, March-April 1983, S. 34 f.; *Ronald D. Asmus*, *Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?* in: *Orbis* 27, Summer 1983, S. 312 f.

spring of 1982, with the slogan »Let's Melt Down the Weapons«. Meanwhile, university activism crystallized around the Peace Group for Dialogue, which soon claimed several thousand supporters.<sup>63</sup> In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, a human rights group already encountering great difficulties with the authorities, began to take on nuclear issues as well. In November 1983, police rounded up seventeen antinuclear demonstrators, including Charter 77 leaders, for distributing leaflets opposing deployment of new Warsaw Pact missiles in Czechoslovakia. In factories, workers signed petitions protesting the forthcoming deployment. The following year, Charter 77 dispatched an open letter to the END convention in Perugia, praising the peace movement »as an expression of profound civic responsibility that does not hesitate to take a stand in the name of human life and its fundamental values«. <sup>64</sup> In Poland, underground organizations, including the Solidarity movement, created links with Western antinuclear groups. Poland's Committee for Social Resistance, issuing calls for opposition to nuclear missiles on both sides of the Cold War divide, sent greetings to END conventions. In 1985, Freedom and Peace groups began to appear and, by the following spring, END estimated that they existed in ten Polish cities. Rejecting a role as defenders of East Bloc military policy, they announced that they wanted »to work together with the international peace movement«. <sup>65</sup>

Independent protest escalated in the Soviet Union. The most daring of the resistance organizations was undoubtedly the Group to Establish Trust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Launched at a press conference in June 1982, the new group – despite fierce persecution by the authorities – worked to establish person-to-person contacts with Americans, to demonstrate against nuclear dangers, and to publish a small journal. By late 1983, Trust Groups had drawn together some 2.000 men and women in about a dozen cities in the Soviet Union. <sup>66</sup> Another increasingly outspoken group, though tolerated by the authorities, was the Committee of Soviet Scientists (CSS). Organized by the physicist Evgenii Velikhov, a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, shortly after Ronald Reagan's March 1983 »Star Wars« announcement, the CSS brought together scientists genuinely concerned about the nuclear arms race and determined to do something about it. Given their high-level contacts with Soviet government officials, Velikhov and his lieutenants – Roald Sagdeev and Andrei Kokoshin – were able to operate from a position of prestige within the Soviet establishment. Even so, Velikhov took risks – working closely with leaders of the Federation of American Scientists and pressing Soviet officials to make significant changes in Soviet nuclear policy. <sup>67</sup>

63 Interview with Ferenc Köszegi, 28.8.1986; *Köszegi/Thompson*, S. 11, 24 f.; Hungarian Leadership Reacts to Independent Peace Groups and Initiatives, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 1, Winter 1984–85, S. 6.

64 Towards an International Peace Movement. Bridging the Atlantic, Menlo Park 1985, S. 9; *Cathy Fitzpatrick*, Update. Independent Peace Groups in the Eastern Bloc, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 1, Spring 1984, S. 3; An Open Letter from Charter 77 to the Western Peace Movement, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 1, Winter 1984–85, S. 15.

65 *Fitzpatrick*, S. 12; Letter from KOS in Poland to the END Convention in Amsterdam, 29.6.1985, Box 507, WRI Records; Polish Peaceniks Held, in: *END Journal*, Nr. 21, April-May 1986, S. 3; *Franek Michalski*, Freedom and Peace Movement Emerges in Poland, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 2, Summer-Fall 1986, S. 3–6.

66 From Below. Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR, New York 1987, S. 107 ff.; *Fitzpatrick*, S. 12; The Independent Soviet Peace Movement. An Interview with Two Founding Members, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 2, Summer-Fall 1985, S. 14–17.

67 Interview with Sergei Kapitza, 28.6.1990; interview with Frank von Hippel, 22.8.1999; interview with Jeremy Stone, 22.7.1999.

During the late 1980s, the nonaligned movement in the East continued to gather strength. Despite constant harassment and arrests by the Soviet regime, Trust Groups demonstrated against the Soviet war in Afghanistan, held peace-oriented seminars, produced a monthly magazine, and opened an exhibit of anti-military art in Red Square.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster and Mikhail Gorbachev's call for glasnost, thousands of other small, independent citizens' organizations emerged, discussing democratization, the dangers of nuclear power, and disarmament. In June 1987, pacifists from all over the country staged an anti-military demonstration in Moscow.<sup>69</sup> Taking advantage of the political influence that it acquired after the advent of the country's reform regime, the Committee of Soviet Scientists promoted a nuclear test ban and, in 1987, organized an International Scientists' Forum on Drastic Reductions and Final Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>70</sup> Meanwhile, Sakharov, freed by Gorbachev from house arrest, resumed his anti-military activism, pressing both Soviet and U.S. leaders for disarmament.<sup>71</sup>

Elsewhere in the East, the authorities were more repressive, but the movement flourished nonetheless. In East Germany, where the Evangelical Church wavered when confronted by the authorities, peace activists succeeded in pushing it to take a stronger stand against militarism. In 1986, they also founded a new organization of their own, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights.<sup>72</sup> In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, the Jazz Section of the Prague Musicians Union, and the Independent Peace Association – a new group, devoted exclusively to peace – issued statements and organized protests against East bloc militarism.<sup>73</sup> In 1987, when Czech police sought to disperse large crowds of young people honoring the memory of John Lennon, hundreds of these ›Lennonists‹ broke loose and staged an unauthorized peace march through downtown Prague.<sup>74</sup> In Poland, Freedom and Peace organized public meetings, marches, sit-ins, and petitions in more than twenty cities.<sup>75</sup> In late 1986, hundreds of East European peace activists signed a daring memorandum, ›Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords«. Warning against ›any tendency to play off peace against freedom or vice versa«, it called for drastic nuclear arms reductions in Europe, the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty, and the establishment of nuclear free zones.<sup>76</sup>

68 Howard Clark to Catherine Fitzpatrick, 25.11.1987, Box 517, WRI Records; The Independent Soviet Peace Movement. An Interview with Two Founding Members, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 2, Summer-Fall 1985, S. 18; Trust Group latest, in: *END Journal*, Nr. 27, May-June 1987, S. 4; *Brian Morton/Joanne Landy*, East European activists test glasnost, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44, May 1988, S. 24.

69 Interview with Ruzanna Ilukhina, 22.5.1991; *Morton/Landy*, S. 24, 26.

70 *Frank von Hippel*, Arms Control Physics. The New Soviet Connection, in: *Physics Today* 42, November 1989, S. 41–46; *Yevgeny Velikhov*, Science and Scientists for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, in: *Physics Today* 42, November 1989, S. 36; interview with Frank von Hippel.

71 *Andrei Sakharov*, Of Arms and Reforms, in: *Time* 129, 16.3.1987, S. 40–43; *New York Times*, 16.12.1989.

72 *Morton/Landy*, S. 22; *Fritz Klein*, East Germany and Eastern Europe, paper presented at the International Congress of Historical Sciences, Montreal, 1.9.1995, S. 5.

73 Political Opposition in Czechoslovakia Today, in: *Across Frontiers* 2, Winter 1985, S. 8 f.; Let the Bands Play! in: *Across Frontiers* 3, Fall 1986, S. 29–34; Lynne Jones to David McReynolds, 18.12.1988, and The Declaration of the Independent Peace Association, April 1988, New Accession, War Resisters League Records.

74 *Morton/Landy*, S. 18; *Jan Kavan*, Is the Ice Finally Melting? in: *Across Frontiers* 4, Spring-Summer 1988, S. 20 ff.

75 *Michalski*, S. 3 f.; Freedom and Peace: Poland's Independent Peace Movement, in: *East European Reporter* 2, Spring 1986, S. 44–48; *Morton/Landy*, S. 19 f.

76 *Jan Kavan*, Helsinki, the Peace Movement, and the East-West Dialogue, in: *Across Frontiers* 3, Spring 1987, S. 37–45.

The emergence of independent peace movements in the East delighted Western non-aligned activists, who worked zealously to cement an alliance with them. Fostering what it called »détente from below«, END developed close relationships with the Moscow Trust Group, the Hungarian Dialogue group, Charter 77, and other new peace campaigners in the East. It also published pamphlets about their activities and established a series of Western working groups to assist them. At the 1984 END convention, participants formally launched a European Network for East-West Dialogue.<sup>77</sup> Although the Communist governments of Eastern Europe prevented most of their countries' independent activists from attending END's annual conventions, the Easterners nevertheless managed to send messages to these gatherings and produced formal statements on peace that were discussed at these meetings and elsewhere. In a joint declaration by Eastern and Western activists, submitted to END's 1984 convention, they set out a common platform for action, including opposition to »every new missile that is deployed in Europe, West and East«. <sup>78</sup> Recognizing the barriers that blocked their Eastern counterparts from travelling to the West, Western activists traveled to the East. Here they met their allies in cramped apartments and brought them news of the Western campaign, plus antinuclear literature, cassettes, and Fax machines. Sometimes, they held public protests in support of their embattled allies. On January 1, 1983, responding to a plea by the Moscow Trust Group, Western activists staged silent support vigils in U.S. and West European cities.<sup>79</sup>

Although there was a key difference between the Western and Eastern nonaligned movements, they effectively surmounted it. Both movements defended peace and human rights, but the Western movement, operating for the most part in a context of political liberty, emphasized securing peace, while the Eastern movement, operating in the context of authoritarianism, stressed securing human rights. This difference produced lengthy discussions during which participants came to agree that there was no contradiction between these two goals. Quite the contrary. Peace, they recognized, would be facilitated by a loosening of the Eastern restrictions on political freedom and political freedom would be enhanced by an easing of the Cold War military confrontation. As Thompson put it: »Neither the cause of peace nor that of liberty can wait upon the other: it is natural that they go forward together.« And, increasingly, they did. Breaking with what Thompson called the »Cold War dogma [...] that one must be for ›human rights‹ or for ›peace‹«, the nonaligned movement championed both. Denouncing the declaration of martial law and the repression of Solidarnosc in Poland, END proclaimed that »peace and democracy are indivisible«.<sup>80</sup>

77 *Mary Kaldor*, Introduction, in: *Dies*. (Hrsg.), *Europe from Below. An East-West Dialogue*, London 1991, S. 1; *E.P. Thompson*, *Ends and Histories*, in: *Kaldor*, S. 10; *Mient Jan Faber*, *Détente from Below*, in: *Disarmament Campaigns*, Nr. 35, July-August 1984, S. 4; *E.P. Thompson* to *Mary Kaldor*, 27.7.1983, *Kaldor Papers*; *Kavan*, Helsinki, S. 37.

78 *Gerard Holden*, *A Meeting of Minds*, in: *END Journal*, Nr. 4, June-July 1983, S. 5 f.; *E.P. Thompson*, *Letter to the Editor*, *Guardian*, 30.11.1984; *John Bacher*, *The Independent Peace Movements in Eastern Europe*, in: *Peace Magazine* 1, December 1985, S. 11.

79 Interview with *Nigel Young*, 15.5.1999; *Allen*, S. 120; *Meg Beresford* to *Mary Kaldor*, 11.10.1982, *Kaldor Papers*; interview with *Mient Jan Faber*; *A Silent New Year*, in: *Disarmament Campaigns*, Nr. 19, February 1983, S. 13.

80 *Peter van den Dungen*, *Critics and Criticisms of the British Peace Movement*, in: *Richard Taylor/Nigel Young* (Hrsg.), *Campaigns for Peace. British Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century*, Manchester 1987, S. 276; interview with *Nigel Young*; *E.P. Thompson*, *END and the Soviet Peace Offensive*, in: *Nation* 236, 26.2.1983, S. 235; *Thompson*, *Ends and Histories*, S. 10; *E.N.D. Expresses Concern at Grave Situation in Poland*, 14.12.1981, Folder 200, *WRI Records*.

Western activists were particularly adamant when it came to defending the rights of their East European allies. In the summer of 1982, sixteen U.S. peace groups publicly protested against the Soviet government's harassment of the Moscow Trust group. Later that year, when the Soviet Peace Committee threatened to undermine END's forthcoming convention unless END broke off relations with independent peace activists in the East, the conference organizers sharply rejected the demand and proceeded to publicize it. Warned by East German authorities not to associate with the dangerous Pastor Eppelmann, IKV's Mient Jan Faber immediately defied them by heading off to meet with him.<sup>81</sup> In January 1984, dozens of the leaders of North American and West European disarmament groups sent a letter of protest to East Germany's Communist party leader, Erich Honecker, demanding that he release imprisoned East German peace activists »in order to facilitate our continued dialogue with all who struggle for peace.«<sup>82</sup> That July, during END's convention, the conference organizers left 57 seats empty to honor the antinuclear activists from Eastern Europe and Turkey who had been prevented from attending the event by their governments. At the opening session of the END conference, about seventy activists, wearing gags and carrying banners, seized the stage to highlight their support of the persecuted peace campaigners.<sup>83</sup>

During the late 1980s, the Western nonaligned movement continued to work closely with its Eastern counterpart. Staunchly defending Trust Group activists Vladimir Brodsky and Aleksandr Shatravka, Western peace activists managed to secure their release from Soviet labor camps. In August 1986, British, American and Soviet peace activists leafleted together at the entrance to Gorky Park, in Moscow, until they were all arrested.<sup>84</sup> Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 and the Independent Peace Association invited 35 activists from peace and human rights groups in the East and West to a June 1988 International Peace Seminar in Prague. Although the Czech police managed to break up the event, it was resurrected that November.<sup>85</sup> The Polish Freedom and Peace group also decided to hold an international peace conference, which it scheduled for May 1987, in Warsaw. Although the Polish regime tried to block the meeting – arresting Freedom and Peace activists, denying visas to Western disarmament campaigners, and pressing the Catholic church to refuse to house it – the momentum was so strong that the conference occurred anyway. Drawing more than sixty foreign activists from thirteen countries, the international gathering attracted increasing numbers of participants over the course of its three day duration, at times drawing 250 people to a single session.<sup>86</sup> Also, of course, there were the annual END conventions, which united activists from East and West. According to END's Mary Kaldor, at the 1988 convention, in Sweden, »there was a real sense of progress [...] in East-West relations.« E. P. Thompson observed that, »at last, after eight

81 Appeal on Behalf of Soviet Peace Activists from the American Peace Movement, in: *Jean Stead/Danielle Grünberg* (Hrsg.), Moscow Independent Peace Group, London 1982, S. 27 f.; *Guardian*, 2.12.1982; interview with Mient Jan Faber.

82 Mary Kaldor u. a. to Erich Honecker, 15.1.1984, Box 7, Freeze Records-SL.

83 *Bacher*, S. 11; *Lynne Jones*, Tentative Dialogue in Perugia, *New Statesman* 107, 3.8.1984, S. 16.

84 Trust Group latest, S. 4; Shatravka Released – but repression continues, in: *END Journal*, Nr. 22–23, Summer 1986, S. 6; *Bob McGlynn*, Peace Mission to Moscow, in: *Nonviolent Activist* 3, October–November 1986, S. 11 f.

85 *Judith Hempfling/Joanne Landy*, Prague. The Tale of Two Seminars, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 3, Winter 1988–89, S. 11.

86 *New York Times*, 14.5.1987; *Janet Fleischman*, Beyond the Blocs? Peace and Freedom Hosts International Seminar in Warsaw, in: *Across Frontiers* 3, Summer–Fall 1987, S. 27 f.; East-West Dialogue in Warsaw, Folder 756, IKV Records; *Morton/Landy*, S. 20 f.

years, we have put peace and freedom together.« At this point, Solidarnosc's Jacek Kuron hugged him, »to huge applause«.<sup>87</sup>

In this fashion, nonaligned groups built a powerful global alliance. In the fall of 1983 alone, an estimated five million people in Western Europe and North America took part in the nonaligned movement's anti-missile demonstrations.<sup>88</sup> Not only was the nuclear disarmament campaign far larger than at any point in its history, but – as END observed – it had become »the biggest mass movement in modern history.« Church bodies, environmental organizations, unions, women's groups, and mainstream political parties, usually of a social democratic persuasion, rallied behind it.<sup>89</sup> Professionals, particularly, were taken by storm. When IPPNW received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, it had affiliates in 41 countries with approximately 135.000 members. Meanwhile, the burgeoning nonaligned international peace and disarmament movement organized a new institutional framework for itself in the early 1980s, when the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace merged into the venerable International Peace Bureau (IPB). By 1985, when CND's Bruce Kent became the IPB's president, it claimed 38 affiliated organizations, including older pacifist and newer antinuclear groups.<sup>90</sup>

Despite a dwindling in the size of demonstrations, the worldwide nonaligned movement continued to exhibit impressive strength in the late 1980s. Peace camps established by activists persisted outside missile bases and other military facilities.<sup>91</sup> Cities and regions around the globe proclaimed themselves nuclear-free.<sup>92</sup> The Socialist International – the world body of social democratic, socialist, and labor parties – spoke out repeatedly against the testing, development, and deployment of new nuclear weapons and called for nuclear disarmament.<sup>93</sup> Mainstream institutions and constituencies rallied to the peace and disarmament campaign. In 1988, Pax Christi, the Catholic peace organization, claimed more than 100.000 members in sixteen nations, and IPPNW – which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 – had over 200.000 members in 61 countries.<sup>94</sup> The largest of the nonaligned internationals was Greenpeace. Continuing its long-term work against nuclear testing, the environmental organization added a Nuclear Free Seas campaign – challenging the naval arms race, military exercises on the high seas, and the visits of nuclear warships. It was a program with substantial popular support. By late 1987, Greenpeace had three million members in seventeen countries and was growing by about 40 percent a year.<sup>95</sup>

87 *Mary Kaldor*, From Gloom to Surprise, in: END Journal, Nr. 36, October 1988 – January 1989, S. 21.

88 *Jane Dibblin*, An Outpouring of Protest – Peaceful and Determined, in: END Journal, Nr. 7, December 1983 – January 1984, S. 10.

89 *Köszegi/Thompson*, inside cover; *Wittner*, Toward Nuclear Abolition, S. 251 f.

90 *Peter Zheutlin*, Medicine, Politics and the Nobel Peace Prize, PSR Records; *Wim Bartels*, Clarification of the IPCC-network of peace movements: 2, 7.–9.10.1983, and *Rainer Santi* and *Margie Graf* to friends and members of IPB, 19.2.1986, Mobilization for Survival Records, New York City.

91 *Gwyn Kirk*, Hanging in There. Notes on the Women's Peace Movement, in: Peace and Freedom, June 1987, S. 6 f., 21.

92 *David Pitt/Gordon Thompson* (Hrsg.), Nuclear Free Zones, London 1987; Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in Canada, in: Canadian Peace Alliance News 2, Summer 1987, S. 12.

93 See, for example: Socialist International Relations on Disarmament, in: Socialist Affairs, Nr. 2/1987, 1987, S. 12.

94 *J. Michael Henry*, International Secretary in Australia, in: Disarming Times 13, October 1988, S. 1; IPPNW, You Can Prevent This, 1988, author's possession.

95 *Robert Schaeffer*, Making Waves, Nuclear Times 6, November-December 1987, S. 23; interview with Eric Fersht, 9.9.1989.

Things did not go nearly as well for the Communist-led peace movement. In the early 1980s, the WPC – continuing its role as an apologist for the Soviet government – persisted in ignoring the Soviet nuclear buildup and the brutal Soviet war in Afghanistan. Instead, it lambasted Western nuclear missiles and lauded the forces that had »rescued the Afghan democratic revolution from the intrigues of those who sought to jeopardize it.«<sup>96</sup> Yuri Zhukov, the president of the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC), argued that responsibility for the nuclear arms race »fully lies with the United States« and that any other interpretation was »extremely perilous for the cause of peace.«<sup>97</sup> This was not an easy position to sustain and, in fact, the Communist-led movement did little that sustained it. Although the WPC and its affiliates held their usual stage-managed, one-sided peace rallies in Communist nations and lavishly-funded international conferences, these did nothing to arrest the movement's decline. Johannes Pakaslahti, who became WPC general secretary in 1986, recalled that the WPC's activities of the early 1980s were »characterized by big conferences with lots of declarations and substantial financial resources to build empty events. [...] The motto could have been: Join the WPC and see the world.«<sup>98</sup> Günther Drefahl, who headed up the GDR Peace Council, recalled that WPC leaders produced »a show«, in which they merely »spoke to themselves.« Reflecting on these activities years later, Rob Prince, the U.S. secretary of the WPC, remarked that the WPC became »totally isolated from the major peace movements«, including END, CND, and IKV. There was a massive upsurge of popular protest, but »we were not part of it.« Instead, »the WPC was on the sidelines.«<sup>99</sup>

Intensely jealous of the nonaligned movement and venomously hostile to its criticism of Soviet bloc governments, the Communist-led movement turned upon it – and particularly upon its East European component – with ferocity. In a 1982 pamphlet, the GDR Peace Council warned that »the advocates of NATO's arms buildup« were promoting »the establishment of an ›independent peace movement‹, in an apparent attempt to disrupt the joint striving for peace by the government and the people.«<sup>100</sup> Dispatching a letter that December to 1,500 disarmament groups and activists in Western Europe and the United States, the SPC's Yuri Zhukov contended that END was attempting to »split the anti-war movement« and »infiltrate ›cold war‹ elements into it.« Participants in END's 1982 convention, he charged, did not come from »the real mass peace movements« of Communist nations, but from »a group of people who [...] have nothing in common with the struggle for peace and who, while representing nobody, are busy disseminating hostile slanderous fabrications about the foreign and home policies of their former motherland.« It was »truly monstrous [...] to try and use the banner of peace in order to draw the anti-war movement into [...] a ›cold war‹ against the public in socialist countries.« END's insistence upon »equal responsibility« for the arms race was merely an attempt »to conceal and justify an aggressive militarist policy of the USA and NATO.«<sup>101</sup> The SPC followed up by orga-

96 Apocalypse, No! in: Peace Courier 14, November 1983, S. 1; Afghanistan. A Time for Mass Solidarity, in: Peace Courier 15, December 1984, S. 8.

97 Conference of Peace, Disarmament and Anti-War Movements in Europe and North America, 1984, S. 14–18, Box 4, World Peace Council Records.

98 Remarks of Johannes Pakaslahti, General Secretary of the World Peace Council, to the Meeting of CSCE National Committees of the WPC, Moscow, 3.12.1989, Rob Prince Papers, University of Colorado.

99 Interview with Günther Drefahl; interview with Rob Prince; Rob Prince, In the Name of Peace, 12.3.1990, Prince Papers.

100 Sandford, S. 20.

101 An exchange of open letters from the Soviet Peace Committee and European Nuclear Disarmament, and Zhukov to Dear Friends, 2.12.1982, Michael Bess Papers, Nashville/Tennessee.

nizing a boycott of END's 1983 convention by WPC affiliates and by arranging for the denial of visas to independent activists from the East who sought to attend it.<sup>102</sup>

According to Rob Prince, the Communist-led movement was »really upset« by END's success and »didn't know how to relate to it.« Thompson, particularly, »represented everything that scared the pants off a movement like the WPC«, for he championed »a left tradition that's not part of this monopoly.«<sup>103</sup> Consequently, in 1984, Zhukov claimed that »U. S. and NATO psychological warfare units« were »attempting to sabotage some of the anti-nuclear movements from the inside,« and that Thompson led one of these units. Grigory Lokshin, secretary of the SPC, placed Faber and other Western nonaligned leaders within this subversive plot, though he insisted that Thompson was »the noisiest mouth-piece« of »various [NATO] front organizations and groups that insinuate themselves into the anti-war movement.«<sup>104</sup> Even so, this position merely left the Communist-led movement out in the cold. END grew and the WPC stagnated. As a result, the boycott of END conventions was suspended briefly and representatives of three WPC affiliates attended END's 1984 meeting as observers. However, when this strategy also failed to turn END away from its nonaligned course, the WPC resumed its boycott in 1985.<sup>105</sup>

The ineffectiveness and corruption of the WPC had long been evident, even to many Communist officials, and after Gorbachev became Soviet party secretary in 1985, the SPC decided to set the world body on a reform course. At the WPC's April 1986 conference in Sophia, the Russians pressed Romesh Chandra, now the organization's president, to deliver a speech acknowledging the validity of past criticisms and calling for »a fresh look« at WPC operations. Chandra, horrified by the reform course and the loss of his authority, refused to deliver the address, but the Russians arranged for it to be printed and distributed as the speech of record.<sup>106</sup> For good measure, they brought in Johannes Pakaslahti, a Finnish Communist reformer, to serve as the WPC's general secretary. Thereafter, in stories that appeared in the mainstream European press and in the WPC's *Peace Courier*, Pakaslahti criticized the WPC's marginality and advocated transforming the WPC into an open, non-doctrinaire organization.<sup>107</sup> Reform-minded staffers began to visit WPC affiliates to find out what they actually did or, in some cases, if they really existed. Meanwhile, Pakaslahti spoke respectfully of nonaligned peace groups and championed a genuine dialogue with them.<sup>108</sup>

Nevertheless, the Old Guard within the WPC fought back and, ultimately, prevailed. The key battle erupted within the Soviet Peace Committee, a hidebound organization whose conservative, corrupt bureaucrats were unsettled, increasingly, by the sweeping reforms instituted by Pakaslahti in the WPC and by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. As a result, they purged their own reformers, including the outspoken Tair Tairov, and – in the battle between conservatives and reformers that convulsed the WPC – gravitated to

102 Guardian, 8.4.1983; Barna Sarkadi Nagy and Ilona Sebestyén to International Secretariat of the Liaison Committee, END, 30.4.1983, Box 447, WRI Records.

103 Interview with Rob Prince.

104 *E.P. Thompson*, *Double Exposure*, London 1985, S. 39 f.

105 Looking East, in: *Economist*, 13.7.1985, S. 50.

106 Interview with Rob Prince; *Romesh Chandra*, *The Present International Situation and the Main Tasks of the Peace Movement*, Helsinki 1986.

107 Interview with Rob Prince; interview with Mark Solomon, 8.7.1999; *Johannes Pakaslahti*, *Growing Optimism in the Peace Movement*, in: *Peace Courier*, H.8, 1987, S. 12; *Renewing the World Peace Council*, in: *Peace Courier*, H. 2, 1988, S. 1 f.; *Johannes Pakaslahti*, *It Takes Two to Tango*, in: *Peace Courier*, H.12, 1988, S. 2.

108 Interview with Rob Prince; Prince to Gordie Flowers, 20.5.1988, Prince Papers.

Chandra's side.<sup>109</sup> Relying on this support, Chandra launched a conservative counterattack in March 1988, publicly denouncing Pakaslahti and charging that Peace Courier had become »a sort of END Journal.« Chandra warned Pakaslahti that »your friends in the Soviet Peace Committee have been defeated, so you had better adjust accordingly.« But Pakaslahti and other WPC reformers refused to retreat, triggering a fierce battle for control of the organization.<sup>110</sup> Although the reformers had the backing of most West European, North American, and Australasian affiliates, the Old Guard could count upon the support of WPC affiliates in Communist and Third World nations. Most important, the Old Guard had the support of the SPC.<sup>111</sup> The result was hardly surprising. At the WPC's meeting that November, conservatives – charging that the organization faced a serious menace »from within« – took control of the organization, junked its reform course, and abolished Pakaslahti's post of general secretary. Chandra circulated a letter claiming (falsely) that Pakaslahti had resigned, while the WPC Old Guard, after a secret trial of reformist staffers, informed them that they had been purged.<sup>112</sup>

During the early 1980s, when the WPC's sectarian approach went unchallenged within its ranks, most nonaligned activists continued to have little sympathy for the Communist-led peace movement. »We do not like the World Peace Council, and we are wary of its affiliated organizations«, Thompson told a meeting of Hungarian activists in 1982. The WPC »has been an organ of Soviet diplomacy for thirty years«, he observed, and the »state-sponsored Peace Committees« of Eastern Europe had »never fluttered an eyelash in protest against any action of Soviet militarism.«<sup>113</sup> Dismissing Zhukov as »truly a fossil«, David McReynolds of the War Resisters' International complained that the SPC »simply will not accept the concept of an independent peace movement!«<sup>114</sup> Major nonaligned groups like America's Nuclear Freeze campaign and Britain's CND deliberately kept their distance from the WPC and its affiliates.<sup>115</sup> To be sure, there were occasional meetings between leaders of the nonaligned groups and leaders of WPC affiliates, largely because independent East European groups pressed for them in the hope that such conclaves would open up the political space in which they could operate. But meetings between representatives of nonaligned and aligned organizations almost invariably proved unproductive, for neither side was willing to compromise its core principles.<sup>116</sup>

109 Interview with Rob Prince; Prince to Gordie Flowers, 20.5.1988, Prince to Mark Solomon, 8.9.1988, Prince Papers.

110 Rob Prince to Michael Myerson, 31.3.1988, 4.4.1988, and 15.4.1988, Prince Papers.

111 Interview with Rob Prince; Johnny Baltzersen to Chandra and Pakaslahti, 13.9.1988, Statement of the Executive of the Canadian Peace Congress, 24.9.1988, Michael Myerson and Mark Solomon to Chandra and Pakaslahti, 26.10.1988, Cay Sevon to WPC, 28.10.1988, Urban Karlsson to Chandra and Pakaslahti, 5.11.1988, and Sam Goldbloom to Chandra, 23.11.1988, Prince Papers.

112 Rob Prince, WPC Secretariat, 15.6.1988, Rob Prince, Some Thoughts Concerning the Bureau Meeting of the WPC, Geneva, 19.–22.11.1988, Chandra to Dear Friend, 28.12.1988, and Pakaslahti to Dear Friend, 12.1.1989, Prince Papers; interview with Rob Prince; Footnotes, Mark Solomon Papers, West Newton/Massachusetts.

113 *Köszegi/Thompson*, S. 45; *Thompson*, Double Exposure, S. 51 f.; *E.P. Thompson*, Beyond the Cold War, New York 1982, S. 112.

114 David McReynolds to CNAPD, 26.4.1984, New Accession, War Resisters League Records.

115 Joint Meeting of the Strategy/Executive Committee, 18.6.1984, Box 16, Freeze Records-SL; interview with Randall Kehler, 20.8.1999; minutes of the CND Executive Committee meeting of 3.7.1982, Reel 26, CND Records-M; interview with Bruce Kent, 10.7.1990.

116 *Bacher*, S. 11; Towards an International Peace Movement, S. 7; *N.H. Serry*, The Peace Movement in the Netherlands, in: *Kaltefleiter/Pfaltzgraff*, S. 58 f.

Events at the 1984 END convention were symptomatic of the political tension that persisted between the two movements. Through their vivid protest on stage during the opening session, nonaligned delegates used the occasion to demonstrate before SPC observers their dismay at the repression of independent peace activists in Eastern Europe. In turn, the SPC representatives formally denounced this »provocation in cold war style« and its »primitive anti-communism.« At a press conference called by the SPC and attended by many END delegates, SPC officials insisted that there were no disarmament activists in the Soviet Union that operated outside their organization and that embattled Trust Group members had been arrested for »hooliganism.« In response, the audience of nonaligned activists erupted with jeers, boos, and heckling.<sup>117</sup>

The relationship changed somewhat in the latter part of the decade, as reformers challenged Old Guard elements within the Communist movement, including the WPC. On the one hand, Western nonaligned groups felt they had little in common with the WPC and also did not want to offend East bloc independent activists by cooperating with a Soviet government-dominated operation. Consequently, they nearly always rejected invitations to attend WPC gatherings or made their attendance contingent upon the admission of independent East bloc groups, a condition not likely to be met.<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, they remained interested in smoothing the path for independent activists in Eastern Europe. Moreover, given the tide of reform then sweeping through Communist institutions, some grew hopeful that the WPC and its affiliates were embarking on a genuinely new course. The result was a bitter debate that raged within nonaligned ranks during 1987 and 1988 over relations with the official peace groups from the East bloc.<sup>119</sup> Ultimately, the War Resisters' International decided against inviting the official peace committees to its 1988 conference. But END chose to invite both the independent and the official groups from the East to its conventions.<sup>120</sup>

In fact, this did not create a much better relationship between the two movements. To be sure, the Hungarian Peace Council, in a surprise move, agreed at the July 1987 END convention to sign the END Appeal. But this action touched off a bitter dispute within END over the role the Hungarian group might play in helping to plan future END conventions. Rejecting the argument made by leading social democratic party spokespersons that the Hungarian move was a sign of East bloc liberalization, many Western grassroots peace activists charged that Peace Council participation in END planning would compromise END's nonaligned status.<sup>121</sup> For their part, most leaders of the official East European peace groups did not consider END's convention invitations very appealing, particularly given the nonaligned group's continued criticism of militarism in both East and

117 *Richard Falk*, Fives days of discussion, in: END Journal, Nr. 11, August-September 1984, S. 9 f.; *Jim Wurst u. a.*, Perugia Convention, in: Disarmament Campaigns, September 1984, S. 7; New York Times, 20.7.1984.

118 Judith Winther to Dear Friends, 3.12.1985, International Peace Communication and Coordination Center Records, SCPC; Jon Grepstad to members of the END Liaison Committee, 15.2.1986, and Niels Gregersen to members of the END Liaison Committee, 6.2.1986, International Peace Bureau Records, Geneva; David McReynolds to CSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 16.6.1986, New Accession, War Resisters League Records; Mient Jan Faber to Charter 77, 19.11.1987, Folder 760, IKV Records.

119 *Lynne Jones*, Time for a change, in: END Journal, Nr. 28–29, Summer 1987, S. 17–20; interview with Martin Butcher, 19.7.1999.

120 Minutes of the War Resisters' International Task Force meeting of 17.8.1987, New Accession, War Resisters League Records; interview with Martin Butcher.

121 Hungarian Peace Delegation Signs END Appeal, 18.7.1987, Folder 761, IKV Records; *Joanne Landy*, Official Peace Councils and the Non-aligned Peace Movement, in: Peace and Democracy News 3, Winter-Spring 1988, S. 3 f., 9 ff.; interview with Bruce Kent, 7.6.1999.

West and its unrelenting support for independent activism in the East. The GDR Peace Council pointedly boycotted END's 1987 and 1988 conventions, and the Czechoslovak Peace Committee was not much friendlier. Pressed by END to respect the rights of independent activists, the Czech group retaliated by refusing to send any delegates to END's 1988 convention.<sup>122</sup> In 1990, as END began planning its next convention, to be held in Moscow, it turned not to the SPC – which opposed the idea – but to a new, independent group, Tairov's Civic Peace Coalition, to host it.<sup>123</sup>

#### IV. THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY DURING THE 1970S

The upsurge of antinuclear protest had an important impact upon U.S. and West European nuclear policy in the late 1970s. Admittedly, U.S. President Jimmy Carter already was personally committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons, and announced this goal in his inaugural address.<sup>124</sup> Even so, the new administration also recognized the political importance of support from the burgeoning peace and disarmament organizations. Cultivating their leaders, the administration invited them to briefings and other meetings on disarmament issues.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, in response to their pressure, Carter made a number of important moves to halt the arms race. In 1977, after meeting twice with the leader of the campaign to stop the building of the B-1 bomber, Carter cancelled U.S. government plans for the plane – a decision taken in part because he did not want to be thought of as the President who introduced a major new weapons system.<sup>126</sup> Carter also gave way to pressure from critics of the neutron bomb. Sensitive to the controversy over the new weapon, leaders of key West European governments did not want to take the onus for requesting it, though secretly they assured the U.S. government that they would welcome its deployment. As Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, complained to him: »They are terrified by the political consequences of seeming to approve nuclear warfare on their territory and of endorsing a weapon which [...] seems to have acquired a particularly odious image.« Carter, however, had no desire to face a firestorm of protest himself, and particularly not if his NATO allies shunned all responsibility for the weapon. Consequently, he cancelled plans for deployment of the neutron bomb.<sup>127</sup>

122 *Wim Bartels*, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Peace Committees of Eastern Europe, in: *Peace Magazine* 3, October–November 1987, S. 44; Information über den 7. Konvent der Bewegung für Europäische Nukleare Abrüstung (END) vom 29. Juni bis 2. Juli 1988 in Lund/Schweden, S. 13–17, Folder 5351, AKG, HA, XX, ZA, State Security Services of the German Democratic Republic Records, Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Archiv, Berlin; Ivan Fiala to Dear Friends, July 1988, and Czechoslovak Peace Committee to Gunnar Lassinantti, 20.7.1988, Folder 762, IKV Records.

123 Interview with Mary Kaldor; Tair Tairov, Moscow. Convention–91, Box 510, WRI Records; Convention News, 7.7.1990, International Peace Bureau Records.

124 Interview with Harold Brown, 16.8.1999; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Jimmy Carter, 1977, Washington, DC 1978, S. 3.

125 Interview with Gene LaRocque, 17.8.1999; interview with Paul Warnke, 19.7.1999; interview with Sanford Gottlieb, 19.7.1998; *Ethel Taylor*, Reflections. On Being Consulted, in: *Progressive* 42, June 1978, S. 20 f.

126 Interview with Terry Provance; interview with Paul Warnke; interview with Harold Brown.

127 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Carter, 22.7.1977, Weekly Reports [to the President], 16–30 [6/77–9/77] Folder, Box 41, Draft 2/17/81, [NSC Accomplishments – Enhanced Radiation Weapon: 2/81] Folder, Box 34, Zbigniew Brzezinski Papers, and oral history interview with Jimmy Carter, 29.11.1982, S. 34, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia; interview with Paul Warnke; interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21.7.1999.

In other areas, as well, NATO leaders were responsive to antinuclear opinion. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had nuclear weapons phased out of Canada's national defense system and, in May 1978, delivered a dramatic address at the United Nations calling for a halt to the nuclear arms race through »a strategy of suffocation«. <sup>128</sup> Concerned about the prospect of Western Europe becoming decoupled from the United States, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt did propose the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in that region. However, West German and Dutch officials, recognizing that Euro-missile deployment would inflame West European antinuclear sentiment, insisted upon a second component to the NATO deployment plan: a disarmament ›track‹ that, through an agreement with the Russians, could substantially limit the number of missiles deployed by both sides. As U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recalled: »The arms control aspect of this so-called two-track approach was politically essential to contain expected internal opposition to the proposed deployments within most of the member countries.« Accordingly, it became a crucial part of the December 1979 NATO deployment plan. <sup>129</sup>

The movement also affected the Carter administration's drive to secure a SALT II treaty. Although Carter was deeply committed to reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons, he faced a growing resistance to arms control and disarmament on the part of Congressional Republicans. Given the fact that Democrats fell substantially short of the number of Senate votes necessary to ratify a treaty, the fear grew within the administration that the Senate would reject it. In this context, Carter was heartened by the dovish nature of public sentiment. In May 1979, his pollster, Patrick Caddell, reported: »One fact stands out in the recent survey on SALT – the American people stand firmly behind the idea of arms limitation and [...] behind the SALT treaty.« Indeed, »support for SALT is both broader and deeper than we would have imagined« and »the public concern over possible nuclear confrontation is much deeper than many would predict.« Carter was greatly impressed by this report, which he underlined, commented upon, and ordered to be made the basis for all his speeches and those of his Cabinet. <sup>130</sup> Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also believed that, in the long run, the public backing of nuclear arms control and disarmament would provide them with the Senate votes they needed. <sup>131</sup> And the administration viewed peace groups as crucial to this public backing. When it came to mobilizing support for the treaty, recalled Paul Warnke, the administration's chief arms control negotiator, »we were counting very heavily on them.« Ultimately, it was not a lack of public, Congressional, or movement support but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that destroyed the chances for ratification of the SALT II treaty. <sup>132</sup>

For the time being, the movement had less impact on Soviet officials. To be sure, they were pleased to some extent by the upsurge of antinuclear agitation in the West. In an article published in 1980, the deputy head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party argued that »the role of the peace-loving public in strengthening both European and international security is acquiring special importance.« Indeed, »world

128 *Carole Giangrande*, *The Nuclear North. The People, the Regions, and the Arms Race*, Toronto 1983, S. 185; *Pauline Jewett*, *Suffocation of the Arms Race. Federal Policy, 1978–82*, in: *Regehr/Rosenblum*, S. 204 f.

129 Interview with Harold Brown; *Cyrus Vance*, *Hard Choices. Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*, New York 1983, S. 392.

130 Patrick Caddell, *A Memorandum on Current Public Attitudes on SALT*, including Carter's hand-written comments, enclosure in Susan to Hamilton Jordan, 24.5.1979, SALT, 1979 Folder, Box 37, Chief of Staff's Records, Carter Library.

131 *Vance*, S. 136, 351; *Harold Brown*, *Thinking About National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*, Boulder 1983, S. 188.

132 Interview with Paul Warnke; *Jimmy Carter*, *Keeping Faith. Memoirs of a President*, New York 1982, S. 262 ff.

public opinion has shown itself in recent years to be an increasingly active force in the struggle for the constructive solution of [...] such complex problems as disarmament.«<sup>133</sup> But, privately, Soviet officials frowned upon Western peace activism's political orientation and did not consider it influential enough to affect vital issues.<sup>134</sup> Of course, independent peace activism within the Soviet bloc was even less palatable, as illustrated by the Kremlin's crackdown upon Sakharov after he condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, the Soviet government continued to rely upon the loyal WPC and ›fraternal‹ Communist parties for the vast bulk of its ›peace‹ propaganda.<sup>135</sup>

Nevertheless, even if only for propaganda purposes, Soviet leaders wanted to project an image of their country as a peace-loving one, and this in turn necessitated certain concessions, albeit modest ones, when dealing with peace movements and with nuclear arms controls. This fact, along with Chazov's role as the attending physician to key Kremlin officials, helps explain the Soviet government's willingness to step outside the comfortable ranks of the WPC by tolerating the creation of IPPNW. The courtship of world opinion by Soviet officials also played a role in their willingness to sign the SALT II treaty with the United States, despite the fact that they were not enthusiastic about its provisions. In July 1979, Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev told Erich Honecker that, even if the treaty failed to be ratified by the U.S. Senate, »we will probably not lose politically, because then the entire world will recognize who is consistently seeking disarmament and who is working in the opposite direction.«<sup>136</sup> In addition, although Kremlin leaders feared that U.S. deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles was designed to facilitate a nuclear surprise attack on the Soviet Union<sup>137</sup>, they eventually toned down their denunciations of the NATO two-track decision and began negotiating with the United States on removal of Soviet and Western intermediate range missiles.

## V. THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY DURING THE EARLY 1980S

Based on the policy preferences of government officials, the early 1980s should have been a disastrous time for nuclear arms control and disarmament ventures, for during that period hawkish forces governed key NATO nations. In Great Britain, the Labour Party – which strongly favored nuclear constraints – was ousted from office in 1979 by Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives, who denounced nuclear disarmament, advocated upgrading

133 *Vitaly Shaposhnikov*, *The Role of the Public in the Struggle for European Security*, in: *Nikolai Inozemtsev* (Hrsg.), *Peace and Disarmament*, Moskau 1980, S. 114, 118.

134 *S. Divilkovsky*, *O simpoziume Meditsinskie posledstviya yadernogo vooruzheniya i yadernoy voyny*, 15.10.1980, f. 89, op. 76, d. 30, *O propagandistskom obespechenii coglasheniya ob OSV-2*, July 1979, f. 89, op. 76, d. 59, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Records.

135 *O dopolnitelnyh meropriyatiyah po aktivizatsii vystupleniy obschestvennosti protiv resheniya NATO o proizvodstve i razmeschenii novykh amerikanskih raket v Zapadnoy Evrope*, 15.4.1980, f. 89, op. 39, d. 1, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Records; interview with Rob Prince.

136 Interview with Bernard Lown; Minutes of the Meeting between SED General Secretary Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Crimea, USSR, 27.7.1979, JIV 2/201/1313, DY 30, Bundesarchiv, in: *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Nr. 8–9, Winter 1996–97, S. 123 f.

137 *Anatoly Dobrynin*, *In Confidence*, New York 1995, S. 396, 430; *Aleksandr Savel'yev/Nikolai Detinov*, *The Big Five. Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union*, Westport/Connecticut 1995, S. 57; *Peter Vincent Pry*, *War Scare. Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink*, Westport/Connecticut 1999, S. 5 ff.

NATO's nuclear forces, and championed victory in the Cold War.<sup>138</sup> In West Germany, the Christian Democrats, who had assailed the Social Democrats for their allegedly weak national security policy, toppled them in the fall of 1982 and made their country the continental cornerstone of plans for NATO's Euromissile deployment.<sup>139</sup> The rise of the hawks was most dramatic in the United States, where the Republican Ronald Reagan, a zealous anti-Communist ideologue<sup>140</sup>, had been elected president in November 1980. Reagan had opposed every nuclear arms control measure negotiated by Democratic or Republican presidents, and his top national security officials were drawn from the ultra-hawkish Committee on the Present Danger. Nuclear arms controls, they believed, were extremely dangerous. The policy of these Reaganites was to sponsor a vast military build-up, with nuclear weapons as the centerpiece.<sup>141</sup>

Not surprisingly, these and other NATO governments were horrified by the rising tide of peace activism. Anxious to destroy what Thatcher referred to derisively as »the so-called ›peace movement‹«, Britain's Tory government launched a fierce campaign against CND – placing secret agents in its office, tapping its phones, working to have its leaders dismissed from their jobs, and publicly denouncing it as motivated by a desire to advance the Communist cause.<sup>142</sup> It also threatened to shoot the women at Greenham Common.<sup>143</sup> In Turkey, the military government investigated, detained, and tried eighteen leaders of the Turkish Peace Association, sentencing them to lengthy terms of imprisonment.<sup>144</sup> Determined to crush protest against France's nuclear testing in the Pacific, the French navy rammed the antinuclear yacht Pacific Peacemaker at Moruroa and impounded it at Tahiti in 1984. The following year, French agents blew up the Greenpeace flagship, the Rainbow Warrior, while it was anchored in a New Zealand harbor, killing one of the crew members in the process.<sup>145</sup> In West Germany, the government warned the Evangelical Church that its functions were being subverted by Kremlin-influenced peace militants, cut off federal funding for peace research, and ran a \$2.6 million ›education‹ campaign around the theme of »peace requires security«.<sup>146</sup>

In the United States, the Reagan administration was deeply worried about the strength of the peace movement. There was »tremendous concern« within the administration about the demonstrations against the Euromissiles, recalled Thomas Graham, a top official in the

138 *Margaret Thatcher*, *The Downing Street Years*, New York 1993, S. 12, 157 ff., 236 f.

139 *Thomas Risse-Kappen*, *The Zero Option*. INF, West Germany, and Arms Control, Boulder 1988, S. 83; *Jeffrey Boutwell*, *The German Nuclear Dilemma*, Ithaca 1990, S. 138, 144, 161 f.

140 See, for example: Reagan's statements from the late 1970s in *Kiron K. Skinner/Annelise Anderson/Martin Anderson* (Hrsg.), *Reagan in His Own Hand*, New York 2002, S. 26–218; *Los Angeles Times*, 30.1.1981.

141 *George W. Ball*, *The President's Nuclear Responsibility*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 40, November 1984, S. 5 f.; *New York Times*, 23.11.1981; *Jerry W. Sanders*, *Peddlers of Crisis. The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment*, Boston 1983.

142 *Thatcher*, S. 259; interview with Bruce Kent, 7.6.1999; *Observer*, 24.2.1985; *The Times* (London), 23.4.1983 and 20.5.1983; *Daily Telegraph*, 23.4.1983.

143 *The Times* (London), 2.11.1983; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 2.11.1983.

144 *Jean Furtado* (Hrsg.), *Turkey. Peace on Trial*, London 1983, S. 13, 26 f., 44; *Mehmet Demir*, *Turkey. Thousands of Political Prisoners Still in Jail*, in: *Peace and Democracy News* 1, Spring 1984, S. 6; *Maria Margaronis*, *Where Peace is Treason*, in: *Nuclear Times* 2, January 1984, S. 25.

145 *Pacific Peacemaker*, in: *Peacelink*, June 1984; *John Dyson*, *Sink the Rainbow!* London 1986; *Michael King*, *Death of the Rainbow Warrior*, Auckland 1986.

146 *Russell Watson*, *Battle Over Missiles*, in: *Newsweek* 102, 24.10.1983, S. 43; *Christian Science Monitor*, 10.6.1983; *Diana Johnstone*, *Labor Signs on with Peace Movement*, in: *In These Times* 7, 19.–25.10.1983, S. 8.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); »we realized we were in a real battle [...] over this.« Asked how much discussion of these demonstrations occurred within the first year or so of the Reagan administration, Richard Allen, Reagan's first National Security Advisor, replied: »A lot! [...] Those people who went to the streets were the objects of our attention.«<sup>147</sup> The Reaganites also panicked at the rise of the Nuclear Freeze campaign. According to Robert McFarlane, one of Allen's successors, »we took it as a serious movement that could undermine Congressional support for the [nuclear] modernization program, and [...] a serious partisan political threat. [...] A [...] measure of how seriously we took it is how much effort we put into dealing with it, [...] a huge effort.« To counter the movement, the administration unleashed a major public relations campaign.<sup>148</sup> This included the charge by Reagan that the Freeze had been instigated by »foreign agents.« Although FBI and CIA reports belied this contention and similar ones about European activism, Reagan subsequently insisted that the »originating organization« for the Freeze was the WPC, that the first person to propose it was Leonid Brezhnev, and that the anti-Euromissile demonstrations were »all sponsored by a thing called the World Peace Council.«<sup>149</sup>

Yet, despite their fierce opposition to the peace movement, key Western governments – recognizing that the tide of public opinion was running strongly against the nuclear arms race – began to shift their nuclear policy. »As more and more of the demonstrations were held«, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recalled bitterly, »more and more defense ministers at the NATO meetings urged [...] that more be done on the ›second track‹ of the December 1979 resolution.« According to Kenneth Adelman, Reagan's ACDA director, during the Euromissile controversy all the West European governments »were nervous about their public, scared to death« – especially the Dutch, Belgian, and West German. Although he urged their representatives to »stay the course«, they proposed »all kinds of schemes« to ease the political crisis they faced at home.<sup>150</sup> One demand they made upon Washington was to hold serious arms control and disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. Another – endorsed even by the hard-line Margaret Thatcher – was to soften the U.S. negotiating position.<sup>151</sup> Growing increasingly desperate, the Dutch and the Belgian governments – rather than force the issue of missile deployment – delayed a governmental decision on it for years.<sup>152</sup> So stormy did the nuclear issue become in Western Europe that, when the Reagan administration revived U.S. plans for production of the neutron bomb, it could not find any nation willing to have the weapon deployed on its territory.<sup>153</sup>

147 Interview with Thomas Graham, Jr.; interview with Richard Allen, 29.6.1999.

148 Interview with Robert McFarlane; William Clark to James Baker, 16.8.1982, Case File 081456, ND 018, Subject File, White House Office of Records Management Records, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California.

149 New York Times, 12.11.1982, 13.11.1982, and 11.12.1982; Washington Post, 11.12.1982; *Strobe Talbott*, *Deadly Gambits. The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*, New York 1984, S. 81.

150 *Caspar W. Weinberger*, *Fighting for Peace. Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*, New York 1990, S. 338 f.; interview with Kenneth Adelman, 22.7.1998.

151 *George P. Shultz*, *Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as Secretary of State*, New York 1993, S. 149 f., 153; *Wall Street Journal*, 6.10.1983; *Talbott*, *Deadly Gambits*, S. 172 f.; *Thatcher*, S. 269 f.

152 New York Times, 13.5.1984; interview with Ruud Lubbers, 27.5.1999; *Shultz*, S. 475 f.; *Leo van der Linde*, *Missile Decision?* in: *Disarmament Campaigns*, Nr. 34, June 1984, S. 14; *Risse-Kappen*, S. 103.

153 *Vincent A. Auger*, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Analysis. The Carter Administration and the Neutron Bomb*, Lanham/Maryland 1996, S. 93; *Washington Post*, 23.10.1984.

Coming on top of the burgeoning peace activism, this dovish pressure from anxious West European government leaders led the Reagan administration to make an important disarmament proposal: the zero option. Announced in late 1981, it constituted an offer to forgo any installation of U.S. intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe if the Russians would remove all of theirs. As numerous administration officials have admitted since that time, this offer was designed as a means of dampening antinuclear protest. »My proposal of the [...] zero option sprang out of the realities of nuclear politics in Western Europe«, Reagan recalled. »Now that [...] the American-made INF missiles were being scheduled for shipment to Europe, some European leaders were having doubts about the policy [...] Thousands of Europeans were taking to the streets and protesting.« Thus, »I decided to propose the zero [...] plan.«<sup>154</sup> In turn, top U.S. and other NATO officials – many of whom were more interested in adding new missiles to Western Europe than in removing Soviet missiles from the East – went along with the proposal in the expectation that the Russians would reject it, as it traded a U.S. deployment plan for Soviet SS-20 missiles already in place.<sup>155</sup> But it did commit the U.S. government to a sweeping program of nuclear disarmament – if a Soviet government was willing to accept it.

Over the ensuing months, when the Russians displayed a lack of interest in the Reagan Euromissile proposals, the Reagan administration continued to retreat from its hard line. First, it toyed with a compromise ›walk in the woods‹ formula for the missiles proposed by its chief arms control negotiator, Paul Nitze.<sup>156</sup> Then, in response to pressure from America's West European allies, it adopted what became known as the ›interim solution‹, a significant softening of the fruitless zero option formula.<sup>157</sup> Meanwhile, in the face of fierce West European resistance, it scrapped its plans to deploy the neutron bomb.<sup>158</sup>

Antinuclear efforts also affected U.S. strategic arms policy. By building the MX missile, the administration planned a dramatic expansion and modernization of the land-based U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. But Congress – and particularly Congressional Democrats, who had begun to court disarmament groups – refused to support the Reaganites' plan. Ultimately, after years of exhausting effort, the administration managed to secure funding for only 50 of the 200 MX missiles originally proposed. Recalling the administration's frustration at its failure to substantially upgrade its ICBM force, Secretary of State George Shultz lamented: »Given the political climate in the United States, we could not keep pace in modernization, production, and deployment of these deadly weapons.«<sup>159</sup> This, in turn, meant that reducing Soviet ICBMs through a disarmament agreement became ever more important to U.S. officials. Furthermore, the administration found that the price of Senate support for funding even token numbers of MX missiles was the display of a strong commitment to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the administration opened strategic arms talks in May 1982. As McFarlane put it: »You had to have appropriations, and to get them you needed political support, and that meant that you had to have an arms control policy worthy of the name.«<sup>160</sup>

154 Interview with Robert McFarlane; *Ronald Reagan, An American Life. The Autobiography*, New York 1990, S. 295 f.

155 Interview with Richard Perle, 29.6.1999; interview with Thomas Graham, Jr.; *Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game. Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace*, New York 1988, S. 170.

156 *Talbott, Deadly Gambits*, S. 92, 116–130, 141–144, 187 f.; *Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost. At the Center of Decision*, New York 1989, S. 374 ff., 386 f.

157 *Shultz*, S. 155, 160, 351; *Talbott, Deadly Gambits*, S. 156 f., 171.

158 *Auger*, S. 93; *Washington Post*, 23.10.1984.

159 *Reagan, An American Life*, S. 557, 560 ff.; *Shultz*, S. 358, 527.

160 Interview with Richard Perle; interview with Robert McFarlane.

Moreover, despite the fact that, in the past, the Reaganites had repeatedly and publicly denounced the SALT II treaty for supposedly opening the way to Soviet military conquest, they now clung to its provisions in an effort to appease their antinuclear critics. As Adelman recalled, with distaste, »politics« overcome their earlier commitment to scrap this treaty. »The SALT accords had assumed soaring symbolic salience«, he explained. »They were the sole existing arrangements on strategic arms and the only ones on the horizon.« Thus, year after year, the Reaganites reluctantly accepted the limits on U.S. nuclear weapons set by the unratified SALT II treaty – one that they believed the Soviet Union violated.<sup>161</sup>

To be sure, with the Russians quite unyielding as to an intermediate nuclear forces (INF) treaty, the administration did begin deploying the cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe in late 1983. But, in the context of the massive public protests, Reagan grew seriously rattled. In October, he told his startled secretary of state: »If things get hotter and hotter and arms control remains an issue, maybe I should go see Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons.« Shultz was horrified by this idea. But Shultz agreed, as he recalled, that there was increasing »public alarm, both in Western Europe and America. We were feeling political pressure against our continuing INF deployment and for concessions to the Soviets. [...] We could not leave matters as they stood.« Reagan recalled: »We were on the defensive.«<sup>162</sup>

As a result, on January 16, 1984, Reagan delivered a remarkable public address, calling for peace with the Soviet Union and for a nuclear-free world. His advisors agree that this speech was designed to signal to the Russians his willingness to end the Cold War and reduce nuclear arsenals. And it appears to have been sincere.<sup>163</sup> Thereafter, he pressed hard for a summit meeting with the Russians, which they resisted.<sup>164</sup>

Perhaps most important, the Reagan administration grew more cautious when it came to using nuclear weapons. From the President on down, the Reaganites spent their first months in office talking of fighting and winning a nuclear war.<sup>165</sup> But this position quickly changed, as the administration came to recognize that its glib talk of nuclear war-fighting was a political disaster that played into the hands of its critics. In his memoirs, Reagan recalled that he traveled to Britain and West Germany in mid-1982 to deliver speeches designed »to demonstrate that I wasn't flirting with doomsday.« Conflating (as he often did) the European peace movement with the American, he explained: »Several of our European allies [...] had their hands full with the nuclear freeze movement, which was [...] depicting me as a shoot-from-the-hip cowboy aching to pull out my nuclear six-shooter.«<sup>166</sup> Starting in April 1982, Reagan began declaring publicly that »a nuclear war

161 *Kenneth Adelman*, *The Great Universal Embrace. Arms Summitry. A Skeptic's Account*, New York 1989, S. 251, 260 f., 266 ff.; *Wall Street Journal*, 20.6.1984.

162 *Shultz*, S. 372, 464; *Reagan, An American Life*, S. 590.

163 *Ronald Reagan*, *The U.S. Soviet Relationship*, Washington 1984; *Nina Tannenwald* (Hrsg.), *Understanding the End of the Cold War, 1980–87. An Oral History Conference*, Brown University, 7.–10. May, 1998, Providence 1999, S. 74, 85–92, 272; interview with Robert McFarlane; *William C. Wohlforth* (Hrsg.), *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War*, Baltimore 1996, S. 77.

164 *Talbott*, *Deadly Gambits*, S. 321; *Reagan, An American Life*, S. 602; *Jack F. Matlock, Jr.*, *Autopsy on an Empire*, New York 1995, S. 69.

165 *Elizabeth Drew*, *A Reporter in Washington, D.C.*, in: *New Yorker* 58, 3.5.1982, S. 134; *New York Times*, 18.10.1981, 21.10.1981, 22.10.1981, and 5.11.1981; *Richard A. Stubbins*, *The Defense Game*, New York 1986, S. 385.

166 *Reagan, An American Life*, S. 554.

cannot be won and must never be fought.« He added: »To those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say: ›I'm with you!«<sup>167</sup>

Of course, it is possible to dismiss this shift in Reagan administration rhetoric as no more than an empty public relations gesture. Even so, the nature of the gesture indicates that the U.S. government felt hard-pressed by protest against nuclear weapons. Moreover, such rhetoric creates a public commitment, one making it considerably more difficult to reverse direction. And the direction was not reversed. Despite the early talk by Reagan administration officials about waging nuclear war, there is no evidence that, once in office, they gave the nuclear option serious consideration. According to Adelman, within the government »I never heard anyone broach the topic of using nuclear weapons. Ever. In any setting, in any way.«<sup>168</sup>

Public policy also shifted in other non-Communist nations. In New Zealand, the Labour Party – which emerged victorious in the 1984 parliamentary elections – defied the U.S. government by banning the visits of nuclear warships. In addition, the new Labour government became a leading supporter of a South Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone and of a comprehensive test ban treaty.<sup>169</sup> Although the Australian government behaved with greater caution, it responded to antinuclear pressure by appointing Australia's first minister for disarmament, establishing a peace research center at Australian National University, voting in favor of a Freeze resolution at the United Nations, supporting a comprehensive test ban treaty, and refusing to test the MX missile.<sup>170</sup> Together with the governments of other South Pacific island nations, these two governments began to negotiate the Treaty of Rarotonga, designed to ban the testing, production, acquisition, or stationing of nuclear weapons in the region.<sup>171</sup> In Japan, more than a hundred local governments, responding to antinuclear agitation, proclaimed their jurisdictions nuclear-free zones.<sup>172</sup> Assuming a leading international role in antinuclear efforts, the government of Sweden pressed for a comprehensive test ban treaty, a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone, and a nuclear weapons-free corridor in Europe.<sup>173</sup>

At the instigation of Parliamentarians for World Order, a peace-oriented group of legislators from more than thirty countries, the heads of state of six nations – Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania – launched the Five Continent Peace Initiative in May 1984. Designed »to halt all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and

167 *Jeffrey W. Knopf*, *Domestic Society and International Cooperation. The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy*, Cambridge 1998, S. 228 f.; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan. 1. January – 2. July, 1982*, S. 487 f.; *McGeorge Bundy*, *Danger and Survival*, New York 1988, S. 583; *Reagan, An American Life*, S. 554.

168 *Adelman*, S. 167.

169 *David Lange*, *Nuclear Free. The New Zealand Way*, Auckland 1990, S. 9, 55 ff.; *Clements*, *Back From the Brink*, S. 123, 128 ff., 138 f.; *Kevin Clements*, *New Zealand's Relations with the UK, the US, and the Pacific*, in: *Alternatives* 10 (1985), S. 598.

170 *Bob Hawke*, *The Hawke Memoirs*, Port Melbourne 1994, S. 215, 217 ff., 286 ff.; *Joseph Siracusa*, *Peace Movements in Australia and New Zealand and the Cold War*, paper presented at the International Peace Research Association conference, Malta, October 30–November 4, 1994, S. 7, 9, 11 ff.; *Malcolm Saunders/Ralph Summy*, *The Australian Peace Movement. A Short History*, Canberra 1986, S. 49, 70.

171 *Greg Fry*, *Toward a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, June–July 1985, S. 16–20.

172 *Tsuneo Akaha*, *Japan's Three Nonnuclear Principles. A Coming Demise?* in: *Peace and Change* 11, Spring 1985, S. 86.

173 Address by Prime Minister Olof Palme at the North Atlantic Assembly meeting in Copenhagen, 13.6.1983, *Freeze Records-C*; *Ingrid Segerstedt Wiberg*, *Provstopp nu!* Stockholm 1986, S. 18 f.

their delivery systems«, the Peace Initiative also called for »substantial reductions in nuclear forces.« In January 1985, after a conference in Delhi, these heads of state reiterated their earlier appeal and added two additional items that, they said, required »special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty.« Most of them then flew on to Athens, where Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu hosted an antinuclear conference of national officials and representatives of leading peace groups, including IPPNW, Greenpeace, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, CND, and IKV. »The battle of the streets«, declared the Greek prime minister, »has become the battle of the governments.«<sup>174</sup>

Inside the Soviet bloc, the movement made considerably less progress. In Czechoslovakia, the authorities turned club-wielding police loose on independent peace activists, arrested and imprisoned their leaders, and publicly denounced END and E.P. Thompson for seeking to »weaken and paralyze anti-war efforts« and »influence the peace movement according to Washington's ideas«.<sup>175</sup> In East Germany, the government banned the »Swords into Ploughshares« symbol as »subversive«, rounded up independent peace demonstrators, and drew upon the Free German Youth to stage a massive, pro-military campaign entitled »Peace must be defended – Peace must be armed.« END's 1983 convention, fumed the Stasi, had been marked by the spread of »antisocialist and anti-Soviet« theories, »hostile aims toward socialist states«, and an »antisocialist direction«.<sup>176</sup> Even the relatively easygoing Communist regime in Hungary had university department chairs or party secretaries issue warnings to members of the Dialogue group at their places of employment. In July 1983, when Western peace activists arrived to participate in a peace camp organized by Dialogue, the police arrested twenty Dialogue members and deported the Westerners. A party central committee report concluded that movements »standing outside the Peace Council« would not be tolerated.<sup>177</sup>

The attitude was much the same in the Soviet Union. Although Soviet officials continued to lavish praise and funding upon the WPC<sup>178</sup> and to feel ambivalence toward IPPNW<sup>179</sup>, they sharply condemned most elements of the independent peace movement. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Soviet chief of staff, demanded stepped-up ideological efforts to combat pacifism among the nation's young people, while International Affairs,

174 *Olafur Grimmson/Nicholas Dunlop*, Indira Gandhi and the Five Continent Initiative, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, January 1985, S. 46; *Christopher Paine*, The Other Nations Speak Up, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, April 1985, S.6 f.

175 *Bacher*, S. 11 f.; *Jan Kavan*, Lis appeal, in: END Journal, Nr. 6, October-November 1983, S. 4; Trust Group member defends Thompson, in: END Journal, Nr. 12, October-November 1984, S. 7.

176 *Sandford*, S. 70–73; *A. W. Jackson*, Eastern European Peace Activists Face New Repression, in: WRL News, Nr. 241, March-April 1984, S. 6; *Petra Kelly*, Fighting for Hope, Boston 1984, S. 58; Erkenntnisse zu feindlichen Angriffsrichtungen, Mittel und Methoden während der 2. Konferenz für europäische atomare Abrüstung vom 9. bis 14.5.1983 in Westberlin, 1.6.1983, S. 321–327, Folder 5351, AKG, HA, XX, ZA, State Security Services of the German Democratic Republic Records.

177 *Bacher*, S. 10; *Miklos Haraszti*, The Hungarian Independent Peace Movement, in: Telos, Nr. 61, Fall 1984, S. 140 f.; Hungarian Leadership Reacts to Independent Peace Groups and Initiatives, in: Peace and Democracy News 1, Winter 1984–85, S. 6 f., 22.

178 Interview with Rob Prince; Session of Politburo of CC CPSU, 31.5.1983, f. 89, op. 42, d. 53, ll. 1–14, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Records, Excerpts from Politburo Minutes, 1983–86, in: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Nr. 4, Fall 1994, S. 78 ff.

179 *Evangelista*, S. 151–155; *Robert English*, Russia and the Idea of the West. Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War, New York 2000, S. 170; interview with Bernard Lown.

the official Soviet foreign policy journal, condemned the »bogus ›peace groups‹ created to counter the genuine antiwar forces.«<sup>180</sup> The Trust Groups came in for particularly rough treatment. Writing in September 1983, two Moscow Trust Group representatives reported that their members had undergone »detentions, arrests, threats, interrogations, ›talks‹ with the police, ›talks‹ with their bosses, searches, job dismissals, 24-hour shadowing [...] beatings, incarceration in psychiatric hospitals, provocations, automobile accidents, imprisonment, official warnings and charges, vilification in the press, house arrest«, and »psychological terrorizing.«<sup>181</sup> Curiously, then, despite the fierce animosities between the Eastern and Western Cold War camps, Soviet and U.S. policy converged when it came to dealing with the independent peace movement. As E.P. Thompson remarked: »If the Geneva negotiations had been, not about, cruise, Pershing and SS-20s, but about how to rub out the non-aligned peace movements [...] then the negotiators would have come out smiling and arm-in-arm.«<sup>182</sup>

But the Soviet government did recognize that, increasingly, the world was caught up in protest against the nuclear arms race and, for this reason, made a number of dovish policy moves. Pointedly contrasting their position on nuclear war with the inflammatory early talk of the Reaganites, top Kremlin officials – including Brezhnev and Soviet propaganda chief Leonid Zamyatin – issued a no first strike pledge during 1981–82.<sup>183</sup> In the spring of 1982, as the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign gathered momentum in the United States, the Soviet government announced its support for a Nuclear Freeze agreement between Washington and Moscow. Over the next two years, it publicized its backing for variants of this proposal.<sup>184</sup> In 1983, leaders of the Committee of Soviet Scientists, after meeting with American scientists anxious to ban the testing of anti-satellite weapons, convinced the new Soviet party leader, Yuri Andropov, to begin a unilateral Soviet moratorium on such tests. These same activists, led by Velikhov, also convinced the Soviet government not to develop an SDI system. This was not a forgone conclusion. Andropov had reacted angrily to Reagan's announcement of SDI in 1983, declaring that it would »open the floodgates of a runaway arms race.« Nevertheless, the Soviet scientists won the agreement of Soviet officials to an asymmetric response to SDI, including a combination of arms controls and, if necessary, cheap countermeasures.<sup>185</sup>

Yet, despite these concessions to the antinuclear Zeitgeist, the fundamentals of Soviet policy remained unaltered. In its negotiations over the Euromissiles, the Soviet government made no substantial change in its hard-line position. In December 1983, to protest the beginning of Western missile deployment, the Soviet government withdrew from the INF and START negotiations. Even when it returned to the INF negotiating table in early 1985, its position was that it should have 420 missiles and the United States none.<sup>186</sup> According to Andropov, peace could be maintained »only by relying on the invincible might

180 International Herald Tribune, 20.4.1982; *U.S. Department of State, Soviet Antipacifism and the Suppression of the Unofficial Peace Movement in the U.S.S.R.*, Washington 1988, S. 4.

181 Sergei Batovrin and Mikhail Ostrovsky to U.S., Canadian, European Peace Groups, September 1983, Folder 734, IKV Records.

182 *Thompson, Double Exposure*, S. 2.

183 New York Times, 21.10.1981; O besede s rukovoditelyami amerikanskoy kampanii »Time-Life,« 21.10.1981, f. 89, op. 76, d. 31, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Records.

184 *Talbott, Deadly Gambits*, S. 279; *David Cortright/Ron Pagnucco, Limits to Transnationalism. The 1980s Freeze Campaign*, in: *Jackie Smith/Charles Chatfield/Ron Pagnucco* (Hrsg.), *Transnational Movements and Global Politics. Solidarity Beyond the State*, Syracuse 1997, S. 171; *Melinda Fine, International Efforts for a Freeze*, in: *Freeze Focus 4*, November 1984, S. 4.

185 *Evangelista*, S. 234–239; *English*, S. 179 f., 313 f.

186 *Savel'yev/Detinov*, S. 67 f., 78 f.; *Risse-Kappen*, S. 105; *Evangelista*, S. 245.

of the Soviet armed forces.« Addressing the Politburo in May 1983, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov contended that »all that we do regarding defense we should continue doing. All the missiles that we planned to install should be installed. All the airplanes should be stationed at the spots we agreed upon.« Actually, in the aftermath of its withdrawal from the negotiations, the Soviet government not only resumed SS-20 missile deployment but expanded its military buildup – placing SS-23 nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and moving Soviet nuclear submarines closer to the United States.<sup>187</sup> In late 1984, when the Soviet government drew up its budget for the years 1986 through 1990, it included a 45 percent rise in military spending.<sup>188</sup>

Why did the peace movement make relatively little headway in the Soviet Union? One reason is that, thanks to their policies of systematic political repression, Soviet leaders, unlike most Western officials, did not face a massive domestic political upheaval. Another is that most top Soviet officials of the era were committed to a traditional approach to foreign and military policy, which emphasized the importance of the military in national defense.<sup>189</sup> Although a growing number of Soviet party reformers considered this approach counter-productive and, in the nuclear age, very dangerous – indeed, were beginning to demand »New Thinking« about world affairs<sup>190</sup> – in the early 1980s the oldest, most incapable, and most hidebound leaders in the party hierarchy managed to cling to power. »Under Brezhnev, the country was already an embarrassment,« recalled Anatoly Chernyaev, one of the reformers; »under Chernenko it became a shameful farce.«<sup>191</sup>

Perhaps most important was the fact that Reagan and his circle severely frightened Soviet officials. Viewing his belated talk of peace and disarmament as purely hypocritical, they became convinced that the Reaganites were readying Western military forces for a nuclear surprise attack upon the Soviet Union. This fear came to a head in early November 1983, as the United States and its NATO allies conducted Able Archer 1983, a nuclear training exercise that simulated a nuclear war. Terrified that the U.S. government was using the exercise as a cover under which to begin a full-scale nuclear assault upon the Soviet Union, Soviet authorities placed their own nuclear forces on alert and readied themselves for the worst. Even after it became clear that the crisis had passed, Kremlin officials could not escape their lingering assumption that the U.S. government was committed to annihilating the Soviet Union. According to a top KGB official, Andropov, then on his deathbed, passed his final months »as a morbidly suspicious invalid brooding over the possible approach of a nuclear Armageddon.«<sup>192</sup>

187 *Dobrynin*, S. 512; Session of Politburo of CC CPSU, 31.5.1983, f. 89, op. 42, d. 53, Central Committee of the CPSU Records, Excerpts from Politburo Minutes, 1983–86, S. 79; *Don Oberdorfer*, *The Turn. From the Cold War to a New Era. The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990*, New York 1991, S. 68.

188 *English*, S. 190.

189 *Mikhail Gorbachev*, *Memoirs*, New York 1995, S. 153; *Georgi Arbatov*, *The System. An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics*, New York 1992, S. 277; *English*, S. 163.

190 *Anatoly Chernyaev*, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, Pennsylvania 2000, S. 8 f.; *Gorbachev*, *Memoirs*, S. 161, 427.

191 *Dobrynin*, S. 551; *Chernyaev*, S. 5.

192 *Talbott*, *Deadly Gambits*, S. 325; *Oberdorfer*, S. 63–67; *Vladimir Kryuchkov*, *Planning and organization of the work of sections of the Service and organizations abroad in 1984*, enclosure in G.G. Titov to Residents, 2.11.1983, Nr. 2126/PR, in: *Christopher Andrew/Oleg Gordievsky* (Hrsg.), *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions. Top Secret Files on KGB Operations, 1975–1985*, Stanford 1993, S. 17; *Andrew/Gordievsky*, *Comrade*, S. 598 ff.; *Pry*, S. 33 ff.

## VI. THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY DURING THE LATE 1980S

Responding to widespread antinuclear agitation, numerous nations made nuclear disarmament a high priority in the late 1980s. In Spain, the government, having publicly pledged to make its nation nuclear-free, forced the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear-armed warplanes.<sup>193</sup> Pressed by the burgeoning antinuclear movement, the government of the Philippines adopted a nuclear-free constitution that resulted in a shut-down of the two giant U.S. military bases, which housed nuclear weapons.<sup>194</sup> New Zealand, resisting intense pressures from the United States – which went as far as excluding that small country from the ANZUS alliance – stubbornly continued its ban on visits of nuclear warships.<sup>195</sup> In Greece, the government pledged to secure the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory. In the South Pacific, thirteen nations signed the antinuclear Treaty of Rarotonga.<sup>196</sup> India halted work on nuclear weapons, and its new prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, appeared at the United Nations in 1988 to offer India's »Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order.«<sup>197</sup> Even the government of South Africa, increasingly uneasy about its international isolation, decided to scrap its nuclear weapons program.<sup>198</sup>

The changes were at their most dramatic in the Soviet Union. Becoming Soviet party secretary in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev set his nation's firmly on a course of nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev was not only a sincere believer in halting the nuclear arms race, but a peace movement convert. The Soviet leader's »New Thinking« – by which he meant the necessity for peace and disarmament in the nuclear age – came from a well-known antinuclear statement by Albert Einstein in 1946, reiterated in the Russell-Einstein Appeal of 1955.<sup>199</sup> Gorbachev's advisors have frequently pointed to the powerful influence upon Gorbachev of the leaders of the nonaligned nuclear disarmament movement.<sup>200</sup> Gorbachev himself declared: »The new thinking took into account and absorbed the conclusions and demands of the nonaligned movement, of the public and the scien-

193 *Mariano Aguirre*, Spain. No Deal, in: END Journal, Nr. 31, December-January 1987–88, S. 3; Stealing a base, in: END Journal, Nr. 32, February-March 1988, S. 12.

194 *Michael Bedford/Megan van Frank*, US Bases in the Philippines. A Clouded Future, in: Defense and Disarmament Alternatives 1, September 1988, S. 7; *Michael Ross*, Nuclear Allergy Spreads, in: Nuclear Times 7, January-February 1989, S. 7; New York Times, 25.11.1992.

195 *Lamare*, S. 473; *Landais-Stamp/Rogers*, S. 134.

196 *William M. Arkin*, Greece's balancing act, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, March 1987, S. 11 f.; *Greg E. Fry*, The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, in: World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1986, Oxford 1986, S. 449–507.

197 *George Perkovich*, India's Nuclear Bomb. The Impact on Global Proliferation, Berkeley 1999, S. 261 ff., 276, 279, 446; India Offers World Order Action Plan, in: World Federalist 13, Summer-Fall 1988, S. 2.

198 *David Albright*, South Africa comes clean, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49, May 1993, S. 3 f.

199 In 1946, Einstein called for »a new type of thinking« and, in 1955, he and Russell argued that »we have to learn to think in a new way,« if humanity were to survive. Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists press release of 22.5.1946, Box 57, Albert Einstein Papers, Princeton University, Princeton/New Jersey; Scientists Appeal for Abolition of War, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 11, September 1955, S. 236.

200 *Georgi Arbatov*, America Also Needs Perestroika, in: *Stephen F. Cohen/Katrina vanden Heuvel* (Hrsg.), Voices of Glasnost. Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers, New York 1989, S. 315; *Eduard Shevardnadze*, The Future Belongs to Freedom, New York 1991, S. 46; *Tannenwald*, S. 198.

tific community, of the movements of physicians, scientists, and ecologists, and of various antiwar organizations.«<sup>201</sup>

Gorbachev met frequently with leaders of the nuclear disarmament movement<sup>202</sup>, and often took their advice. Although he pointedly snubbed officials of the WPC, an organization that he did not even mention in his memoirs<sup>203</sup>, his treatment of the nonaligned nuclear disarmament movement was quite different. Gorbachev initiated and continued a unilateral Soviet nuclear testing moratorium on the advice of Bernard Lown of IPPNW.<sup>204</sup> He decided against the building a Star Wars antimissile system on the advice of key anti-nuclear scientists. He also split the Star Wars issue from the INF issue, thus taking the crucial step toward the INF treaty. This action, too, was based in large part on the arguments made to him by U.S. and Soviet antinuclear scientists. According to Gorbachev: »My discussions with them made a great impression on me.«<sup>205</sup> His decision also reflected worldwide antinuclear sentiment. At the key meeting of the Politburo in February 1987, he secretly told Soviet party leaders that delinking the Star Wars and INF issues would »be our response to the state of public opinion in the world.«<sup>206</sup>

When Gorbachev suddenly called the U.S. bluff by agreeing to remove all the Euro-missiles from Europe (the zero option), it horrified NATO's hawks – including Thatcher in Britain, the Christian Democrats in West Germany, and key Republican leaders in the United States.<sup>207</sup> But, as Shultz recalled, »if the United States reversed its stand now [...] such a reversal would be political dynamite!« Or, as Adelman put it, the »trump card was always that the zero option was our proposal, NATO's proposal. [...] We had to take yes for an answer.«<sup>208</sup> Thus, in late 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty, which removed all intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe. Gorbachev explained: »Urging us on is the will of hundreds of millions of people, who are beginning to understand that [...] civilization has approached a dividing line [...] between common sense [...] and irresponsibility. [...] We [...] must build a safer [...] world, free from the trappings and psychology of militarism.«<sup>209</sup>

Although, thereafter, the movement declined, it retained some influence upon public officials. Believing that Reagan had moved too fast and too far toward nuclear disarmament, President George Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, abruptly halted disarmament negotiations.<sup>210</sup> In fact, the U.S. and British governments, worried about the

201 Washington Post, 22.5.1988.

202 Interview with Robert Musil; interview with Bernard Lown; interview with Gene LaRocque; Cortright/Pagnucco, S. 169 f.

203 Interview with Rob Prince; interview with Werner Rümpel, 20.5.1999; *Gorbachev*, Memoirs.

204 *Evangelista*, S. 271; interview with Bernard Lown.

205 *Evangelista*, S. 328 f.; *Andrei Sakharov*, Moscow and Beyond, 1986 to 1989, New York 1991, S. 15 ff.; interview with Frank von Hippel; *Stone*, S. 233 f.; *Mikhail Gorbachev*, Perestroika, New York 1987, S. 153.

206 Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo Sessions of 23.2.1987 and 26.2.1987, in: *Vladislav Zubok/Catherine Nielsen/Greg Grant* (Hrsg.), *Understanding the End of the Cold War. Reagan/Gorbachev Years. An Oral History Conference*, May 7–10, 1998, Brown University, Providence 1998.

207 *Risse-Kappen*, S. 5, 169; *Barry M. Blechman/Cathleen S. Fisher*, *The Silent Partner*. West Germany and Arms Control, Cambridge/Massachusetts 1988, S. 109 ff.; *Thatcher*, S. 477, 771; interview with Frank Carlucci, 20.7.1999; *Shultz*, S. 107 f.

208 *Shultz*, S. 984 f.; *Adelman*, S. 248.

209 *Shultz*, S. 1013.

210 *Oberdorfer*, S. 329–332; *Michael Beschloss/Strobe Talbott*, *At the Highest Levels*. The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War, Boston 1993, S. 8 ff., 17 f., 24 ff.; interview with Rozanne Ridgway, 17.9.1999.

withdrawal of the INF missiles, wanted to significantly upgrade and expand short-range nuclear forces in Western Europe. But a number of West European governments, frightened at the prospect of a revival of public protest, resisted this move.<sup>211</sup> When Gorbachev heightened popular demands for nuclear disarmament by removing short-range missiles from Eastern Europe, Baker was horrified. The secretary of state wrote in his memoirs: »We were losing the battle for public opinion. We had to do something.« NATO »could not afford another crisis over deploying nuclear weapons. The alliance [...] would not be able to survive.«<sup>212</sup> Thus, the Bush administration retreated, and agreed to negotiate missile reductions. In 1991, in a sharp departure from past practice, it withdrew all U.S. short-range missiles from Western Europe unilaterally.<sup>213</sup>

The impact of the antinuclear movement upon nuclear testing was even more direct. Since the mid-1980s, disarmament groups around the world had been working to end the underground nuclear weapons explosions allowed under the terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Thanks to their pleas, Gorbachev initiated and continued his unilateral nuclear testing moratorium. But after eighteen months of rebuffs to the moratorium and to a test ban treaty by the Reagan administration, Soviet testing was resumed.<sup>214</sup> This setback, however, only heightened antinuclear agitation. Large demonstrations were organized at the U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada. Inspired by these actions, a massive Nevada-Semipalatinsk nuclear disarmament movement sprang up in the Soviet Union, where its militant and popular protests eventually forced the closure of the Soviet nuclear testing sites.<sup>215</sup>

Public policy moved in the same direction in the United States. For some years, members of the U.S. Congress had introduced a variety of bills to halt U.S. nuclear testing. In 1991, a recently-elected member of the U.S. House of Representatives – a participant in the Nevada demonstrations who was indebted to peace groups for their political support – agreed to sponsor a new Congressional attempt to terminate funding for U.S. nuclear tests. The final legislation, passed in the summer of 1992, halted underground nuclear testing for nine months, placed strict conditions on further U.S. testing, and required test ban negotiations and an end to U.S. testing by late 1996.<sup>216</sup> The Bush administration opposed the legislation and threatened to veto it. But the President ultimately signed the bill, both because it left a loophole for test resumption and because it was attached to legislation that seemed vital to his 1992 re-election campaign.<sup>217</sup>

A few years later, when most of the world's nations completed the process by signing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the credit for it was clear enough. As U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright stated at the official U.N. ceremonies: »This was a treaty sought by

211 *Thatcher*, S. 771 ff., 784 ff.; *Hans-Dietrich Genscher*, *Rebuilding a House Divided. A Memoir by the Architect of Germany's Reunification*, New York 1995, S. 232 f., 237 ff., 244 f.; *George Bush/Brent Scowcroft*, *A World Transformed*, New York 1998, S. 58 f.

212 James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992*, New York 1995, S. 82 ff.

213 *Genscher*, S. 257 f.; *Thatcher*, S. 788 f.; *Beschloss/Talbott*, S. 445 f.; *Baker*, S. 526.

214 *Gorbachev*, *Perestroika*, S. 153; *Evangelista*, S. 271–276; interview with Bernard Lown.

215 Interview with Bernard Lown; *Anti-Nuclear Arrests*, in: *Nonviolent Activist* 7, June 1990, S. 18; *Peter Zheutlin*, *Nevada, U.S.S.R.*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 46, March 1990, S. 10 f.; *Evangelista*, S. 354–357; *Disarmament Watch*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 48, January-February 1992, S. 48.

216 Interview with Peter Bergel, 3.8.1999; interview with Robert Musil; *John Isaacs*, *The Senate that can say no*, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 48, October 1992, S. 6 f.

217 *Los Angeles Times*, 25.9.1992; interviews with Christopher Paine, 14.9.1999 and 26.2.2002; interview with James Baker III, 15.9.1999.

ordinary people everywhere, and today the power of that universal wish could not be denied.<sup>218</sup>

## VII. CONCLUSION

Between 1970 and 1989, the relations between peace movements on both sides of the ›iron curtain‹ presented an apparent paradox: the most powerful peace movements in the East got on badly with the most powerful peace movements in the West. But a closer examination of their core beliefs and their interaction with each other reveals the underlying logic of this strained relationship, which reflected their divergent approaches to the Cold War. The official peace committees of the East were partisans of the Soviet bloc, while the major peace groups of the West were critics of both Cold War camps. As a result, their relations were chilly, at best. Furthermore, each formed alliances with small organizations on the other side of the ›iron curtain‹ that shared their Cold War perspective and disdained those peace organizations in their own region that did not share it. Thus, ultimately, politics proved more important than geography in determining the relations among the peace movements of the era.

These peace movements had very different effects upon public policy, particularly nuclear policy, during these years. Thanks to the one-sided approach and corruption of the WPC and its affiliates, they did little, if anything, to advance the causes of peace and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, by encouraging a double standard as to Cold War issues, by stigmatizing the antinuclear movement in the eyes of suspicious Western officials, and by fostering false expectations in the minds of complacent Eastern officials, these pro-Soviet groups might even have retarded progress toward a less violent and more secure world. But, by contrast, the nonaligned movement and the strong public sentiment it mobilized did have a substantial impact upon peace and disarmament policies on both sides of the ›iron curtain‹. Certainly, independent peace groups played an important role in curbing the nuclear arms race and preventing nuclear war.

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218 New York Times, 11.9.1996.