

Alar Kilp
November 2025

Public Distrust in the National Government in Estonia's 2025 Local Elections



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Beate Martin, Head of the FES Regional Office for Baltic States
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Copy-editing

James Patterson

Contact

office.baltic@fes.de

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Introduction

Local elections in Estonia are held every four years under a system that was restructured in 2017, when the number of municipalities was reduced from 213 to 79 and the voting age lowered from 18 to 16. These changes continue to shape the current electoral framework. In most cases, each municipality functions as a single electoral district. However, there are two exceptions to this rule: Tallinn, the capital city, is subdivided into eight electoral districts, while the rural municipality of Peipsiääre is divided into four. As a result, the total number of electoral districts across the country stands at 89.

According to § 156 of the Estonian Constitution, the right to vote in local elections is granted to Estonian citizens and citizens of the European Union who are permanent residents of Estonia. A constitutional amendment adopted in March 2025 removed this right from third-country nationals – non-EU citizens – who had previously been eligible to vote as permanent residents. Additionally, the voting rights of stateless persons (holders of the so-called “grey passport”) with legal residence in Estonia will be suspended after the 2025 elections.

According to data from the Ministry of the Interior, this amendment resulted in 71,827 individuals losing the right to vote, reducing the total number of eligible voters from 1,073,323 to 1,001,496.¹ The impact of the amendment was most pronounced in Narva, a predominantly Russian-speaking border city, where the number of eligible voters dropped from 42,743 to 27,240, a 36 per cent decrease. The capital city Tallinn also saw a significant change, with 29,443 residents losing voting rights, representing 8.35 per cent of those who had been eligible under the previous constitutional framework.

Thus, although voter turnout in the 2025 local elections in Estonia was notably higher than in 2021, at 59.16 per cent compared with 54.7 per cent, the total number of votes cast remained almost unchanged, namely 591,319 in 2025 and 584,593 in 2021.

Voting was held over the course of a week, from 13 to 19 October 2025; electronic voting was available from Monday to Saturday. The proportion of voters who cast their

ballots online remained relatively stable, with 45.8 per cent in 2025 compared with 46.9 per cent in 2021.

This continuity in voter participation contrasts with deeper structural changes in Estonia’s local political landscape, most notably the evolving role of electoral coalitions, persistent urban–rural divides, and shifting party dynamics that have shaped competition over the past two decades.

¹ ERR News (2025): “Nearly 72,000 people in Estonia lose the vote ahead of October’s local elections”, 6 September. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/1609791678/nearly-72-000-people-in-estonia-lose-the-vote-ahead-of-october-s-local-elections>.

Electoral coalitions, urban-rural divides and shifting party dynamics

As Table 1 shows, electoral coalitions have typically competed with the Centre Party for dominance in local elections. An electoral coalition (*valimisliit* in Estonian) is a group of at least two eligible voters who jointly form a candidate list for a specific municipality instead of a registered political party. The data for “electoral coalitions” in the table represent the combined electoral results of all such groups (in the 2025 Estonian local elections, there were 159 electoral coalitions in total).

It is important to note that the participation of party-affiliated candidates in mixed electoral coalitions often obscures clear attribution of electoral outcomes to specific parties in Estonia’s local elections. In the 2025 local elections, EKRE prohibited its members from joining electoral coalitions, requiring them to run solely on the party’s official lists. As a result, some members resigned or were expelled to join coalitions, which probably contributed to EKRE’s weaker overall performance. In contrast, the Social Democrats allowed their members to choose between party and coalition lists. Many such coalitions included candi-

dates from multiple parties. For example, Katri’s List in Narva won five seats, filled by candidates from the Social Democrats, Reform Party, Estonia 200 and one unaffiliated. Thus, while party members did participate in coalitions, the results of mixed lists cannot be attributed to any single party.

However, electoral coalitions secure significantly more seats in local councils than the best-performing political parties. In 2021, they collectively garnered nearly as many votes (24.3 per cent) as the most popular political party, the Centre Party (24.4 per cent), yet managed to secure more council seats (753) than the combined total of the three most successful political parties (736 seats). This is mainly because such alliances tend to be less successful in cities but dominate in small rural municipalities, where competition for council seats is much lower. In 2021, the lowest competition rate was on Muhu Island, with 2.1 candidates per seat, compared with 15 candidates per seat in Tallinn. This supports the rule of thumb according to which “the larger the municipality, the more party-driven

Votes of electoral coalitions and the top six parties in municipal elections

Table 1

	2005		2009		2013		2017		2021		2025	
1	Centre	25.5	Centre	31.5	Centre	31.9	Electoral coalitions	27.4	Centre	24.4	Electoral coalitions	23.9
2	Electoral coalitions	17.5	Electoral coalitions	23.3	Electoral coalitions	22.7	Centre	27.3	Electoral coalitions	24.3	Centre	21.1
3	Reform	16.9	Reform	16.7	IRL	17.2	Reform	19.5	Reform	17.3	Isamaa	18.6
4	People’s Union	12.5	IRL	13.9	Reform	13.7	Social Democrats	10.4	EKRE	13.2	Reform	10.0
5	Isamaaliit*	8.6	Social Democrats	7.5	Social Democrats	12.7	IRL	7.9	Isamaa	8.4	Social Democrats	9.9
6	Res Publica	8.5	People’s Union	1.9	EKRE	1.3	EKRE	6.7	Estonia 200	6.0	EKRE	8.2
7	Social Democrats	6.4	Greens	1.1	United Left Party	0.01	Greens	0.9	Social Democrats	4.9	Right-wingers	4.7
Turn-out	47.0		60.1		58.0		53.4		54.7		59.2	

Note: * Before 2018, Isamaa was known as IRL (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union). Prior to its merger with Res Publica in 2006, the party was called Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union).

Source: <https://kov2025.valimised.ee/en/election-result>

the campaign tends to be”, as urban electorates are larger, more diverse and less personally connected to candidates. This trend is further illustrated by the fact that the last notable successes of electoral coalitions in major cities (Tallinn and Tartu) occurred in 2013 and 2017, when two such lists received 5–7 per cent of the votes and won seats in the city councils.

Furthermore, the Centre Party, which put in the strongest overall performance, also dominated in administrative districts classified as cities. Its top three results in 2021 were all in urban areas. In contrast, EKRE (the Conservative People’s Party) secured its best outcomes in rural municipalities. In the 2025 elections, the Centre Party maintained its voter base in larger cities with higher populations, while the Social Democratic Party (SDE) made notable gains, achieving the second-best result in the capital with 18.8 per cent, well up from 7.5 per cent in 2021. The Reform Party, meanwhile, experienced a decline in urban support, despite remaining competitive in Tartu, Estonia’s second-largest city. This decline was even more pronounced in rural areas. Overall, urban voters showed a preference for the Centre Party in Tallinn and for Isamaa in Tartu.

Finally, the performance of political parties in the 2025 local elections was also influenced by the number of electoral districts in which they registered candidate lists. Estonia 200, which saw a significant decline in support – receiving just 1.7 per cent of the national vote compared with 6.0 per cent in 2021 – fielded candidates in only 10 out of 89 districts. The party’s only notable success came in Tartu, where it secured 6.4 per cent of the vote and won 3 out of 49 council seats. In contrast, EKRE ran candidate lists in 74 districts, followed by Isamaa (71), the Centre Party (51), the Rightwingers (42), the Reform Party (38) and the Social Democrats (25).²

The 2025 local elections became a referendum on public trust in the national government, as dissatisfaction with tax increases, policy reversals and perceived indecisiveness eroded confidence in ruling parties. National controversies, ranging from new levies and rising living costs to debates over citizenship and language policies, overshadowed local issues, turning municipal contests into a broader judgement on government performance.

² Henry-Laur Allik and Meinhard Pulk (2025): “Kolm erakonda lähevad püüdma üldvõitu, ülejäänud teevad väiksemaid panuseid” [Three parties are going for an overall victory, the rest are making smaller bets], Postimees, 18 September. Available at: <https://www.postimees.ee/8325990/analuus-kolm-erakonda-lahevad-puudma-uldvoitu-ulejaanud-teevad-vaiksemaid-panuseid>.

Political landscape ahead of the 2025 elections

By the end of September 2025, public support for the governing coalition parties – the Reform Party and Estonia 200 – had dropped to an all-time low, with only 13.7 per cent of respondents backing them. In contrast, the four opposition parties represented in the Riigikogu enjoyed a combined support of 77.2 per cent.³ The primary reason is that since 2023, Reform Party-led governments have introduced or planned a series of tax increases. These include a rise in the flat personal income tax rate from 20 to 22 per cent; increases in reduced value-added tax (VAT) rates, such as for accommodation services, which will rise from 9 to 13 per cent; and higher excise duties on alcohol and tobacco products.

Widespread public dissatisfaction with the government's tax policy has been reflected in an unprecedented surge of citizen-led petitions submitted to the Riigikogu. One of the most notable was the Petition against the Motor Vehicle Tax, which opposed the new levy on vehicle registration that ultimately came into force on 1 January 2025. This petition, launched via rahvaalgatus.ee, gathered 65,565 signatures, making it the most-signed petition on the platform at the time. It was formally submitted to the parliament on 8 September 2023, but despite its popularity, the petition was “archived” in the legislative process, meaning that no direct legislative reversal followed.

The record was broken less than two years later by another civic initiative, the Petition to Lower VAT on Food Products, launched in July 2025 in response to the government's decision to raise the VAT rate on food to 24 per cent as of 1 July 2025. This initiative drew over 80,000 signatures, becoming the most widely supported petition in the history of Estonian e-democracy. Both examples illustrate a growing public pushback against the government's taxation strategy, particularly concerning cost-of-living impacts.

In addition, the governing coalition – which included the Social Democrats until spring 2025 – came under considerable pressure during the 2024 European Parliament elections, in which opposition parties outperformed the ruling bloc. Isamaa and EKRE recorded their highest-ever results, receiving 21.5 and 14.9 per cent of the vote, respectively.

³ ERR News (2025): “Norstati reitingud: võimuerakondade toetus püsib rekordmaal” [Norstat Ratings: Support for Governing Parties Remains at a Record Low], 1 October 2025, <https://www.err.ee/1609816779/norstati-reitingud-voimuerakondade-toetus-pusib-rekordmaal>.

The Centre Party faced a major setback when its Tallinn mayor, Mihhail Kõlvart, was removed from office on 26 March 2024, following a vote of no confidence. This political shift paved the way for a new governing coalition in the capital, comprising the Social Democrats, the Reform Party, Isamaa (Fatherland) and Estonia 200. The newly formed coalition quickly set about implementing a series of Estonian nationalist-oriented cultural reforms, marking a clear break from the policies of the previous administration. Among the most significant measures were the transition of municipal schools to Estonian-language instruction, the closure of Russian-language city-funded media outlets, such as Stolitsa and Pealinn, and the renaming of public spaces with ties to Russian heritage, including the establishment of a symbolic “Ukrainian Square”.⁴

The Reform Party's popularity has also come under pressure following its withdrawal from the Tallinn city government coalition in July 2025, after a failed vote on abolishing kindergarten fees in the capital. The situation was further complicated by a subsequent, unsuccessful attempt to bring the Centre Party back into the city government.

It is worth noting that, in contrast to the previous round of local elections in 2021, in which the Centre Party emerged as the leading force, the party was under the leadership of Jüri Ratas. In 2024, Ratas left the traditionally centre-left Centre Party, which has long enjoyed strong support from Russian-speaking voters, and joined Isamaa, a centre-right, nationalist-conservative party. He subsequently secured a seat in the European Parliament. In the 2025 local elections, Ratas ran (successfully) as an Isamaa candidate for a seat on the Tallinn City Council.

The Centre Party has traditionally served as the primary political representative and advocate for Estonia's Russian-speaking community. However, its position weakened significantly following the leadership election on 10 September 2023, after which several prominent Estonian MPs left the party. This internal fragmentation led to a decline in support among Estonian-speaking voters. While the party's overall popularity had already been declining since February 2022, it has only recently returned to pre-2022 levels.

⁴ ERR News (2024): “Tallinn's governing coalition wants to boost district councils' roles”, 18 July. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/1609399966/tallinn-s-governing-coalition-wants-to-boost-district-councils-roles>.

A key factor contributing to the Centre Party's relative loss of support has been the effective use of security-focused narratives in electoral campaigns, most notably by the Reform Party under Prime Minister Kaja Kallas. Since February 2022, the national government has significantly accelerated the transition of Russian-speaking schools to Estonian-language instruction and moved to revoke local voting rights from non-citizens and Russian citizens, framing these measures as necessary for national security. Another controversial development was the Law on Churches and Congregations, which aims to sever the ties between the Estonian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Moscow. This law, which directly affects the majority of Estonia's Orthodox Christians – who are predominantly Russian-speaking – was passed by Parliament three times during 2025 but repeatedly refused promulgation by the President. By election week, the law had been referred to the Supreme Court for constitutional review.

Campaign themes

Overall, while national political themes were prominent in party platforms during the local elections, there was also a notable degree of consensus on local policy issues. All parties expressed a commitment to defending rural and regional interests, pledged support for efficient and smart (neoliberal) public administration, and adopted “green” positions concerning parks and the natural environment. Moreover, when it comes to education and social policy, most parties converged around principles broadly aligned with social democratic ideals, emphasising inclusive education and a reliable social safety net.

At the same time, parties differed not only in their individual positions, but also in terms of broader ideological alignments. Isamaa’s national platform included 15 critical references to the current Reform Party–led government, including claims such as: “The government’s policies disproportionately harm rural areas.” EKRE adopted a similar oppositional tone, but even more directly, repeatedly naming the Reform Party, the Social Democrats and Estonia 200 as adversaries who, in their words, “have collectively raised absolutely all taxes, fines, and state fees”. In contrast, other parties refrained from engaging in polarising rhetoric. The Centre Party, for instance, ran under the slogan “End the deadlock”, focusing on system-level criticism rather than targeting specific political opponents. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats explicitly called for a shift away from divisive debates, advocating instead for calm, practical dialogue on policy issues.

Above all, the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and Estonia 200 strongly emphasised building a more inclusive and compassionate society. An insight into each party’s priorities is provided by their treatment of mental health within their national platforms: the Social Democrats, Estonia 200, the Centre Party and Isamaa all address the issue explicitly. Broadly speaking, the parties that neglect this topic – namely, EKRE, the Reform Party (whose national platform is notably brief) and the Right-wingers – focus instead on fostering a society of enterprising, self-reliant individuals, who are expected to contribute back to the community.

Electoral result

Voter turnout in the local elections reached 59.2 per cent of eligible voters, marking the second-highest level since 2009, when turnout was 60.1 per cent. That earlier peak occurred just two years after the Bronze Soldier Riots of April 2007 when ethnic tensions were stirred by the relocation of a Second World War memorial from Tallinn city centre to its outskirts. This reignited the dispute between Estonian and Russian speakers concerning historical perceptions and collective identity.

There were several key outcomes that pre-election surveys failed to anticipate. Most notably, EKRE performed significantly below expectations, receiving only 8.2 per cent of the vote, compared with 13.2 per cent in the previous elections. The party also underperformed in Tartu (receiving about half the votes predicted) and failed to cross the 5 per cent electoral threshold in Tallinn. According to the party leader, the setback in the capital was largely the result of internal disunity and the departure of several senior figures during the summer of 2024.⁵ The party leader pointed to internal turmoil during the summer of 2024, when several high-profile figures resigned from EKRE. They included MEP Jaak Madison and former Riigikogu Speaker Henn Põlluaas. The latter played a key role in launching a new political group, the Party of Estonian Nationalists and Conservatives, in August 2024. However, the new party failed to gain traction in the 2025 local elections, receiving just 0.4 per cent of the national vote.

Despite running one of the most strategically polarising campaigns, centred on opposition to wind farm development, EKRE performed poorly in the 2025 local elections. Public opinion surveys had revealed widespread scepticism toward the government's renewable energy policies, with particularly strong opposition among EKRE supporters, 81 per cent of whom disapproved of offshore wind farms. Capitalising on this sentiment, EKRE positioned itself as the defender of local communities, pledging to block wind farm projects in voters' immediate areas. The party's campaign programme included promises such as, "Of course we won't allow wind turbines or solar parks in your home municipality", underscoring EKRE's broader rejection of renewable energy initiatives.

A minor surprise was the relative resurgence of the Reform

Party and Estonia 200 in Tartu. The Reform Party came within fewer than 700 votes of winning the election, while Estonia 200 secured its only local council representation nationwide, gaining three seats in the city. With Isamaa's victory in Tartu, the Reform Party now faces the prospect of losing the mayor's office in the city for the first time since 1997.

In the capital city Tallinn, the turnout was 60.7 per cent (up from 54.5 per cent in 2021). As expected, the Centre Party won 37 seats in the 79-seat City Council (only one seat fewer than last time). The Social Democrats finished second with 17 seats. In Tallinn, their incumbent mayor Jevgeni Ossinovski campaigned on the promise of forming an "anti-Centre Party alliance", marking a departure from the party's generally non-polarising approach at national level.⁶ The party performed strongly in both Tallinn and Tartu, as well as in several smaller districts, securing victories in the city of Võru and the county of Hiiu. But despite their programmatic emphasis on regional equality, they were less successful in smaller rural areas. If the next Tallinn city government is formed without the Centre Party, the Social Democrats are well positioned to retain the mayor's office as other parties are reluctant to work with Centre Party, which failed to gain a majority in the City Council.

In the third largest city, Narva, the electoral coalition "Mihhail Stalnuhhin's people's list" won 12 seats on the 31-seat council, followed by the Central Party with 10 seats. This is significant because Mihhail Stalnuhhin is a former member of the Centre Party, who was expelled in 2022, after he called members of the Estonian government "fascists" in the context of the Soviet monument removal debate.⁷ As it is likely that the Narva city government will be formed in a coalition with the electoral coalition *Katri's List* (which is led by a Social Democrat Katri Raik and received 15.3 per cent of votes), its most intense criticism of the Estonian government is likely to remain confined to the election campaign. A week after the elections, the electoral alliances of Stalnuhhin's list (holding 12 of the 31 council seats) and Katri Raik's list (with 5 seats) began coalition

⁵ ERR News (2025): "Helme: me alahindasime eelmise suve tüli mõju" [We underestimated the impact of last summer's dispute], 20 October. Available at: <https://www.err.ee/1609834431/helme-me-alahindasime-eelmise-suve-tuli-moju>.

⁶ Tõnis Saarts (2025): "Unprecedented local elections", ERR News, 19 September; available at: <https://news.err.ee/1609806255/tonis-saarts-unprecedented-local-elections>.

⁷ ERR News (2024): "Narva mayor says stability key in forming coalition with controversial politician", 18 November. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/1609524664/narva-mayor-says-stability-key-in-forming-coalition-with-controversial-politician>.

Votes received by electoral lists and the largest political parties

Table 2

	Nationwide	Tallinn	Tartu	Narva
Electoral coalitions	23.9	0.4	1.3	67.5
Centre	21.1	41.7	6.9	30.8
Isamaa	18.6	12.8	28.2	–
EKRE	8.2	4.5	6.3	0.4
Reform	10.0	9.5	26.7	1.1
Social Democrats	9.9	18.8	14.9	–
Rightwingers	4.7	7.6	3.8	–
Estonia 200	1.7	2.8	6.4	–

Source: <https://kov2025.valimised.ee/en/election-result>

talks. Katri Raik framed the coalition with Stalnuhhin's list as a pragmatic response to local political realities: the electoral success of Stalnuhhin's list signaled a protest against national-level decisions, and cooperation was necessary to form a majority and secure external funding. Raik underscored that the alliance is not based on ideological alignment, noting that she found "nothing alarming" in Stalnuhhin's programme.⁸ This development reflects a divided electorate in Narva, where public distrust has split voters, some aligning with former Centre Party members, while others remain loyal to the party itself. This suggests that Narva is no longer the stronghold of the Centre Party's traditional Russophone electorate.

Voters appeared to punish the governing national coalition (including Reform and Estonia 200). The Reform Party leader, prime minister Kristen Michal, admitted: "This result is not a good one. I think it was more of a signal from voters that all the confusion over the years – with taxes being introduced, then repealed, and all kinds of back-and-forth decision-making – had had an effect. The message is clearly that such ... aimless scrambling must stop."⁹

⁸ Katri Raik (2025): "Stalnuhhin's large vote count is a protest by Narva residents", ERR News, 20 October. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/1609834503/katri-raik-stalnuhhin-s-large-vote-count-is-a-protest-by-narva-residents>

⁹ Astrid Kannel and Iida-Mai Einmaa (2025): "Estonia's local elections 2025: winners and losers", ERR News, 21 October. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/1609835247/estonia-s-local-elections-2025-winners-and-losers>.

Conclusion

The 2025 local elections in Estonia were notable for several reasons. First, the electorate itself was reshaped: these were the first municipal elections since independence in which non-EU citizens were excluded from voting, unless they held dual citizenship with Estonia or another EU country. The 2025 local elections marked a turning point for Estonia's Russophone electorate. The barring of non-EU residents from voting for the first time, many of them long-term Russian-speaking inhabitants, means that the composition of the electorate had shifted, most notably in Narva. Looking ahead to the 2027 parliamentary elections, this fragmentation suggests that while the Centre may still attract many Russophone citizens, its dominance is no longer assured. The party's future success will depend on whether it can rebuild trust and consolidate support, or whether disillusionment and strong local figures will continue to divide the Russophone vote.

Second, the elections took place amid a period of decline for the governing parties, and were characterised by the dominance of national issues over local concerns. In Tallinn, the political contest once again centered not on a clash between populists and their opponents, but rather on the binary opposition between the Centre Party and an emerging "anti-Centre" coalition.

Among the key winners were Isamaa and the Centre Party, both of which emerged with enhanced national visibility and increased political leverage. On the other hand, the main losers included members of the ruling coalition, particularly Estonia 200, which now finds itself on the verge of political marginalisation.

About the author

Alar Kilp is the Head of the Bachelor's Programme in Government and Politics and a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tartu, Estonia. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Tartu in 2012. His research spans religion and comparative politics, international relations, human rights, and national identity discourses. He has published in journals such as *Religion, State and Society*, *Religions*, *Society Register*, *Studies in Church History*, *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, and the *Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society*. His recent work on religious nationalism, charismatic leadership, religion and soft power, European values, human rights, the securitisation of religion, and the secularisation of marriage laws has appeared in edited volumes from Bloomsbury, Brill, Routledge, and Central European University Press.

Public Distrust in the National Government in Estonia's 2025 Local Elections

The 2025 elections reshaped Estonia's electorate, as non-EU citizens lost voting rights. This particularly affected Russian-speaking communities, especially in Narva and Tallinn.

National issues – particularly taxation, identity politics and government performance – overshadowed local ones, driving down support for governing parties and boosting opposition forces, such as Isamaa and the Centre Party.

Isamaa and the Centre Party were the main winners, while Estonia 200 declined sharply, gaining seats only in Tartu and sliding towards political irrelevance.

Urban power dynamics shifted, as Tallinn polarised between the Centre Party and an anti-Centre bloc, and the Reform Party's decades-long rule in Tartu faces potential change.

The Social Democrats posted one of their best results in years, doubling their support in Tallinn and gaining in Tartu and other centers. This cemented their role as a key urban force despite weaker rural results.

Although electoral coalitions remained influential in rural areas, their overall success dipped in 2025 as they lost ground to national parties in major cities.

Further information on this topic can be found here:

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