


Guadalupe González, Monica Hirst, Carlos Luján,  
Carlos A. Romero and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

# AMLAT Radar 2026

## Navigating Uncertainty: Latin American Views on Europe and the World

*April 2026*



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[↗ amlatradar.org](http://amlatradar.org)



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# Prologue

In the face of global turbulence and the erosion of the international order, a range of actors—from governments to broad segments of the public—tend to turn inward.

AMLAT Radar offers reasons to resist that temptation. It does so on the basis of a dual conviction: that now, more than ever, it is necessary to strengthen international partnerships, and that this task is not the sole responsibility of states. In a global scenario that is far from conducive to those who continue to strive for more solidarity and a more just and peaceful world, a statement made half a century ago by Willy Brandt's North-South Commission remains fully relevant: "*Shaping our common future is far too important to be left solely in the hands of governments.*"

The survey focuses on public opinion on international affairs, a topic that often does not occupy a prominent place in public debate. The findings reveal a citizenry that closely follows international developments and, in some cases, highlight gaps between public opinion and government positions.

The findings not only provide a revealing snapshot of the present, but also make it possible to trace developments over time. This is the second survey of its kind, following the one conducted in 2021–2022. Special thanks are due to Svenja Blanke, who, as director of *Nueva Sociedad* at the time, initiated and coordinated the first edition, and to her successor, Ingrid Ross, for promoting the second one at the beginning of 2025.

This project has been—and continues to be—enabled by the extensive and diverse academic expertise, as well as the strong commitment, of the *Diálogo y Paz* group, composed of Guadalupe González, Monica Hirst, Carlos Luján, Carlos A. Romero, and Juan Tokatlian, with the support of Luis Martín Sosa. The role of *Latinobarómetro* and its director, Marta Lagos, in the methodological implementation and data collection was also essential.

Equally important has been the work of the outstanding team at *Nueva Sociedad* and colleagues from more than a dozen offices of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Latin America and Europe. They are the ones who are now opening spaces to discuss the findings and reflect on their political implications.

In both its conception and execution, AMLAT Radar already embodies what it seeks to promote: an international cooperation that transcends regions and takes concrete shape through dialogue among diverse actors and different bodies of knowledge on both continents.

This report outlines a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation of the survey results prepared by the *Diálogo y Paz* group, but it does not seek to close the discussion. Rather, it aims to open up new questions and to encourage a deeper exploration of the data collected, which are openly available at <[amlatradar.org](http://amlatradar.org)>.

For Latin America, the survey findings foster a reflection on how the region can carve out its own room for maneuver amid the turbulence of contemporary global politics. For Europe, they highlight the significant potential of partnerships on various levels with Latin America and encourage a debate about what is required to harness it, as well as to reverse the erosion of its own standing.

This report also shows that, even in a scenario of uncertainty, a willingness to cooperate and to sustain interregional ties persists and should not be underestimated. Even in a scenario of uncertainty, broad segments of Latin American society continue to value cooperation, interregional engagement, and the search for room for autonomy in a turbulent world. There are still social and political foundations on which to imagine renewed forms of international coordination and cooperation—more responsive to the concrete needs of our societies and, at the same time, capable of sustaining a shared horizon of justice, equality, peace, and solidarity.

Sebastian Sperling

Resident Representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Argentina  
Director of *Nueva Sociedad*

# Introduction

January 3, 2026 proved to be a baptism by fire for Latin America, confronting a world that is violent, uncertain, and dominated by fear. The US-led military attack on Venezuela thrust the region into a landscape of urgent and forceful geopolitical decisions—actions that, in practice, disregarded global public goods such as sovereignty, international law, and peace. It is undeniable that an externally imposed logic of power, driven by the overt use of force, creates both shock and disorientation among Latin American citizens—though this does not come as a complete surprise. On the contrary, societies across the region demonstrate significant awareness of the dynamics unfolding globally and within their own neighborhood. Regional feelings and perceptions reflect deeply held values and priorities regarding both the present and the future. From this perspective, we examine the findings of the AMLAT Radar 2026 survey.

Here we present the analytical report of the AMLAT Radar 2026 survey: *Latin American Views on Europe and the World*, which provides a Latin American perspective on a rapidly changing global landscape, marked by signs of a breakdown in the international order. This is the second edition of a public opinion study commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and *Nueva Sociedad* to Latinobarómetro, designed and conducted by the Diálogo y Paz group.<sup>1</sup> The survey is based on a sample of 12,000 interviews conducted in ten countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This research presents a representative coverage of Latin American diversity as it includes countries of different sizes from different subregions.

## Why does it matter to listen to the voices of Latin American societies in times of international upheaval?

Today, it is essential to understand how Latin American societies feel and perceive the current cracks in the international system, as well as to discern the expectations they project for the future of their region and their own countries. It is also crucial to understand the role they assign to external actors—Europe among them—in a

context of growing global contestation and conflict. In democracies that are renewing or reaffirming leadership and domestic and foreign policy orientations, this information takes on clear strategic value. We are aware that this kind of report competes with an avalanche of content that floods the public sphere with misinformation, hatred, and falsehoods, undermining the quality of public debate.

This report is primarily intended for attentive audiences around the world, particularly in Europe and Latin America, who have both the interest and the capacity to influence the conduct of foreign policy and the bi-regional agenda. Even more, it aims to inform and enrich the debate among decision-makers, as well as actors in the business sector, civil society organizations, trade unions, academic communities, the media, international organizations, and specialized agencies. Additionally, for new generations of analysts, emerging scientific communities, and epistemic networks that will begin to shape intellectual and strategic agendas in the coming decades, these results provide an empirical foundation to trigger and bridge further reflections.

## Bringing evidence to the debate

In the current context, the added value of this survey lies in addressing the scarcity of rigorous, and specialized research on international affairs in Latin America. Available evidence is often fragmentary, scattered, or focused on isolated events and moments, which limits understanding of structural trends in regional public opinion. This study seeks to take a step forward in filling these gaps, while recognizing that valuable efforts already exist in the field of public opinion surveys on international affairs. It is worth mentioning the Security Radar of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), which allows for comparisons with European public opinion.

The present study is broad and comprehensive; it provides a systematic and comparative perspective that focuses on how Latin Americans perceive, evaluate, and engage with Europe. It aims to enrich a field of analysis that has often been dominated by a focus on the United States and China, among others. In doing so, the survey seeks to

<sup>1</sup> Among the publications by the Diálogo y Paz group, it is worth mentioning: “Coyuntura crítica, transición de poder y vaciamiento latinoamericano” in *Nueva Sociedad* N° 291, 1-2/2021; “Afganistán y América Latina frente a la primacía desafiada de Estados Unidos” in *Nueva Sociedad* N° 295, 9-10/2021; “El humanismo desarmado de América Latina” in *Nueva Sociedad* digital edition, 11/2023; and “Trump y América Latina y el Caribe: ¿un laboratorio de control?”, analysis, 2025, all of which are available at <nuso.org>.

contribute to a better understanding of the region's international positioning from a perspective rooted in the Global South.<sup>2</sup> Perceptions of Europe and the international environment as a whole have been prioritized, while relevant topics—such as Latin America's relations with the Global South or the crisis of multilateralism—are not addressed in this edition. We invite readers to share suggestions that may enrich future surveys. Lastly, the study's data base includes additional questions than those presented in this report, as well as respondents' sociodemographic profiles.

The past four years have witnessed a surge of significant events, alongside changes in modes of coexistence and communication driven by technological leaps, particularly the expansion of artificial intelligence. In this survey, we have included topics aimed at reflecting some of these transformations. We believe it is crucial to understand the region's perspective on an urgent agenda, which highlights the war in Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza, the future of the United States as a global leader, and the role assigned to Europe and the European Union in the coming years—issues that give this survey both relevance in the present and foresight for the future.

In a context of democratic erosion at both the global and regional levels, the disconnection between politics, citizens, and external constraints emerges as a growing risk that demands better evidence for decision-making. The increased visibility and intertwining of international affairs with domestic agendas—driven both by the intensity of global events and by the technological revolution that allows them to be followed in real time—underscores the importance of having systematic measurements of public opinion. Within this framework, the survey contributes by giving voice to citizens' perceptions and feelings and by identifying potential gaps between social preferences and government positions. Likewise, it aims to highlight democratic deficits and blind spots in foreign policy beyond the information routinely provided by the media and social networks.

## Context is crucial

This survey represents the second poll in an effort to generate a public good of reliable information, seeking to understand the fabric of regional perspectives based on ten national realities. The first poll was conducted in the second half of 2021 and was published in early 2022.<sup>3</sup> This second survey was conducted at the close of 2025, a year characterized by a sequence of dramatic changes with global and regional impact. Both exercises share the

distinguishing feature of taking the pulse of Latin American public opinion at pivotal moments in the international and regional system: they were carried out prior to events that would redefine the course of international affairs. In 2021, the survey data were processed shortly before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine; and in 2025, prior to the events of January 3 in Venezuela. 2025 was stamped by the return of Donald Trump to power and his territorial appropriation threats, the deepening tragedy in Gaza, the intensification of the war in Ukraine, the escalation of Trump's trade war and mass deportations from Washington, military tensions in the Caribbean, and the electoral advance of radical right-wing forces in Latin America.

Nonetheless, the contrast between the external context of the two surveys is significant, having influenced both the survey's design and the systematization and interpretation of its results. From 2022 to 2026 all dimensions of the international system have undergone profound transformations, affecting both Europe and Latin America and creating new challenges and realities. The transition in the global order, anticipated in the survey of the second half of 2021, has given way to a process of accelerated fractures, in which militarized options are progressively displacing avenues of dialogue and convergence in world affairs.

In this second round, with the goal of gaining greater depth, stronger inferential analysis and clearer identification of the agenda, the survey expanded its thematic scope and exceeded the size of the 2022 edition. Two main concerns guided the content and structure of the questionnaire. On the one hand, the survey sought to track trends and shifts by repeating a core set of questions focused on the international context and comparative world power influence, expectations, and interests. On the other hand, new topics were included and additional extraregional actors were fit into the radar. In the same vein, the survey took into account the presence of international leaderships that challenge the *status quo*, normalize violent prescriptions, and shake institutions and democratic consensus on a global scale. Besides, —as a distinctive feature of this second survey—a subjective dimension was incorporated to capture Latin American feelings towards new realities and scenarios, prominent political actors, and the dramatic nature of certain international circumstances. This inclusion acknowledges the role of emotional language in current national and international political life, giving way to new mechanisms of social control and media communication.

<sup>2</sup> Our approach engages with Amitav Acharya's conceptualization of an inclusive multipolarity with autonomy, which he refers to as the emerging multiplex order. This perspective, developed from the Global South, contrasts with the classical notion of multipolarity formulated within the Western tradition and in countries of the Global North. See *The End of American World Order*, 2nd ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 2018.

<sup>3</sup> For an analysis of the results of the first survey, see C.A. Romero, J.G. Tokatlian, C. Luján, G. González, and M. Hirst: "How Latin America Sees Europe. Survey by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation / Nueva Sociedad / Latinobarómetro" in *Nueva Sociedad* digital edition, 4/2022, available at <nuso.org>. The 2022 databases and charts can be accessed at <<https://data.nuso.org/es>>.

Some of the results of this survey highlight the increasingly unfavorable perception of the United States in Latin America—a trend that was already evident in 2021—across various fields, compared with other international powers. The return of Donald Trump to the presidency immediately turned Latin America and the Caribbean into a testing ground for the international projection of MAGA (Make America Great Again) policies. Since 2025, Washington has sought to test its capacity for subordination and coercion through specific agendas such as migration, security, border control, defense, trade, and investment, while downplaying issues such as the environment, energy transition, international cooperation, and technology. One way to measure the effectiveness of this “experiment” in the region is to compare societies’ perceptions of US leadership with those of other international powers, particularly the European Union and China.

### Structure and thematic scope

This report is organized around five thematic units: (1) emotions and subjectivities; (2) worldview; (3) global order and power; (4) Europe and the European Union; and (5) Latin America. The structure follows a logic that moves from the subjective to the geopolitical and foreign policy arenas: it begins with societies’ emotional perceptions and dispositions, follows with their worldviews and interpretations of the international order, and culminates with the assessment of specific actors and geopolitical areas—first Europe and the European Union, and finally Latin America.

Current shifts in the international agenda are strongly shaped by the new role of conflict, domestic political polarization, and the instrumentalization of economic and trade ties as a form of threat. The first chapter intends to analyze the subjective impact produced by this novel context. The hyper-securitization imposed through narratives that overstretch the notion of threat is the flip side of the crisis of a rules-based system reinforced by multilateral organizations and regimes sustained upon collective consensus. The prominence of uncertainty as the primary feeling shared by Latin Americans speaks for itself as a reflection of a reality rife with insecurity.

The second and third chapters include questions from the 2022 survey, as well as a set of new issues, with the aim of offering a more thorough longitudinal comparison of the influence of major powers, their modes of projection in the international system, and the emerging agendas that define the global landscape. Notably, there is a high level of disapproval of Donald Trump, followed by Vladimir Putin—two leaders who have chosen to flout international rules and principles in pursuit of their political and territorial ambitions. As a result, the survey records a decline in the democratic evaluation of the countries under

their leadership. Expanding the focus to development models, it is striking that some Asian countries receive more positive evaluations than several Western nations.

Attention to Europe and the European Union is the focus of the fourth chapter, where the most significant differences between the first and second surveys emerge. The main change is the weakening of the European Union’s overall image among Latin American public opinion. Although it remains positive, its leadership and its status as a normative power has diminished. The example of European integration as a model for Latin America has lost prominence. This section describes Latin Americans’ evaluations of the European Union as a promoter of global peace and its response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the conflict in Ukraine. Of particular note is the shift in perceptions about the European Union’s strategic autonomy relative to the United States over the past four years.

The fifth and final chapter of this report focuses on Latin America. The ongoing void of regionalism is now expressed more forcefully by foreign policy preferences for transactional approaches that forgo integration in favor of bilateral ties that assure tangible benefits. Commercial ties and sovereignty are highly valued, while concern for military capacity and territorial defense is less pronounced. The region also continues to support democracy and human rights globally, though setbacks and advances show more fragmentation than commonalities. Notwithstanding, in an international context that inspires fear and uncertainty, Latin American countries do stand firm in their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

# A Brief Tutorial

The AMLAT Radar 2026 database includes a broader range of questions—43 thematic and 11 sociodemographic—compared with the 2022 survey, which included 39 and 9, respectively. All of this information can be fully accessed at [amlatradar.org](https://amlatradar.org). Below, we offer some interpretive insights to approach the questionnaire and its responses.

## **What do Latin Americans think today?**

Our survey reveals that Latin American citizens have a clear awareness of the present juncture and, as a result, show a troubled perception of the advance of a militarized world in which rules are disregarded or contested. They understand that, in a context of conflict and economic instability, their own well-being and their countries' prosperity are at stake. At the same time, they aim for the leitmotif of Latin America's international engagement to be the preservation and expansion of its room for maneuver, in pursuit of greater policy autonomy.

Latin American societies perceive—with a certain sense of urgency in response to the coercive turn in US foreign policy—that they are not a marginal player in global affairs and that their destiny is within the world, not apart from it. Public opinion clearly recognizes that we are witnessing a system characterized by greater dispersion of power and fewer commanding leaderships. Besides, it reaffirms the value of democracy and upholds the importance of peace.

## **Latin America and Europe: Where it comes from and where it stands today**

In critical junctures such as the present, history offers key insights for interpreting and guiding the future. For decades, Europe and Latin America have sought to build bi-regional bridges to strengthen both sides. In the 1980s, a sense of closeness was consolidated, based on European support for Latin America's democratic transitions and Latin Americans' perception of Europe as dynamic and model for integration processes. In the 1990s, material expectations emerged in investment and trade, as Latin America rigorously adopted the recommendations of the Washington Consensus. Social unrest and economic difficulties in the early 2000s led to a renewed bi-regional rapprochement. Political dialogue and cooperation promoted by the CELAC–EU Summits expanded the agenda but had limited material results. At the same time, bilateral economic diplomacy—for example, with Mexico and Chile—and bi-regional initiatives—such as the launch of negotiations for an EU–Mercosur agreement—show uneven results.

Interregional relationship is shaped by a history of partially built bridges, unmet expectations, and unfulfilled promises. Both sides have experienced growing frustration and a certain disconnection in more recent times, as their agendas have gradually drifted apart. If left on autopilot, it risks leading to mutual distancing and missed opportunities.

Europe and Latin America have historically played a significant role in building multilateral rules and institutions, which are now being questioned or abandoned by several key actors. At this intersection of trajectories and challenges, an inevitable question arises: is there room for deeper dialogue and more concrete commitments between the two regions?

# Survey Methodology

A total of 12,000 interviews were conducted: 1,200 interviews in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela, respectively, between October 3 and November 18, 2025. They were administered to a representative sample of the population aged 18 and over, with eight or more years of education in each country.

The sample was designed using quotas for age, gender, and education, based on each country's census, drawing on a digital panel under the WAPI (web-assisted personal interview) methodology.

Panel samples do not have a margin of error; however, given the sample size, if they were probabilistic, their sampling error would be 3% per country.

Country	Target population	Sample size	Method	Representation	Weighting	Survey language
Argentina	Population aged 18 and over with secondary or higher education	1.200	WAPI	60%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Bolivia	Population aged 18 and over with secondary or higher education	1.200	WAPI	52%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Brazil	Population aged 16 and over with internet access who have completed basic education	1.200	WAPI	70%	Region × Sex, Region × Age, Region × Education, and Region × Condition	Portuguese
Chile	Population aged 18 and over with secondary or higher education	1.200	WAPI	70%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Colombia	Population aged 18 and over	1.200	WAPI	72%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Costa Rica	Population aged 18 and over	1.200	WAPI	100%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Guatemala	Population aged 18 and over	1.200	WAPI	100%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Mexico	Population aged 18 and over with secondary or higher education	1.200	WAPI	100%	It was not weighted	Spanish
Uruguay	Population aged 18 and over with secondary or higher education	1.200	WAPI	66%	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish
Venezuela	Population aged 18 and over with secondary or higher education	1.200	WAPI	NA	Sex, Age, Region and Education	Spanish

# 1. Emotions and Subjectivities: The Emphasis upon Uncertainty

# 1. Emotions and Subjectivities: The Emphasis upon Uncertainty

## Feelings. Expectations on the world, the country and the individual. Concerns about global issues.

In today's rapidly evolving international context, understanding how citizens feel is just as important as knowing what they think. Global politics is increasingly shaped in emotional and performative terms: political narrative, social media, and disinformation trigger and amplify feelings of fear, anger, and uncertainty that shape how events and international actors are understood. For this reason, the survey incorporates the emotional dimension of public opinion and explores how Latin Americans feel about the international context. (1.1 *Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality*).

Across the region, negative feelings regarding the global reality are twice as frequent as positive ones. Uncertainty stands out as the dominant feeling in all countries

surveyed. It is also noteworthy that Latin Americans are not indifferent to global developments, with Venezuela showing the highest levels of hope (1.2 *Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality Today [%]*). Overall, the emotional landscape reveals a region that views the international scene with concern and uncertainty, rather than with enthusiasm or indifference.

The predominance of negative and neutral emotions over positive ones tilts the regional balance toward a moderately pessimistic assessment of the global landscape (1.3 *Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality Today [%]*). Although this pattern repeats itself, marked differences do emerge among countries due to diverse political contexts and expectations regarding the international environment. While Chile and Brazil record the highest net balances of negative feelings, adopting a more critical view of the world stage, Venezuela is the only country to exhibit a positive net balance.

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### *Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality*

Figure 1.1

Q: Given the current context, what is your main feeling about the global reality today?



Figure 1.2

Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality Today (%)


Q: Given the current context, what is your main feeling about the global reality today?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Hope	15	13	17	13	9	12	11	18	13	14	30
Curiosity	5	4	6	2	4	3	4	7	3	5	6
Enthusiasm	2	2	3	1	2	1	2	2	3	3	3
Uncertainty	40	43	35	40	44	46	42	32	38	40	35
Indifference	4	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	2
Irritation	2	3	1	4	2	1	2	1	2	1	1
Fear	8	7	6	16	9	6	7	8	9	7	4
Distrust	10	7	13	7	14	8	13	13	12	10	7
Impotence	12	12	13	8	9	14	13	13	13	14	10
DK/NA	3	5	2	6	3	4	2	1	4	2	2

Figure 1.3

Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality Today (%)

Q: Given the current context, what is your main feeling about the global reality today?



Regarding the subjective dimension, generational gaps are visible. (1.4 *Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality Today by Age (%)*). Uncertainty—the predominant feeling—appears less frequently among younger people and increases steadily with age, particularly among older adults as it nearly doubles compared to younger generations. In contrast, younger cohorts reveal a more diversified emotional repertoire, with distrust, fear, and curiosity more prominent, suggesting an exploratory attitude towards global affairs.

Negativity, coupled with uncertainty, is reflected in varying expectations about the future. (1.5 *Perceptions about the Future: World, Country and Family (%)*). Significant differences are observed between perceptions oriented toward the international, national, and family domains.

Mounting pessimism characterizes both the international and the national contexts. In contrast, there is shared optimism regarding personal and family circumstances. Such dissociation may indicate a defensive response to situations that generate concern but lie beyond individual control. The family environment emerges as a primary source of support and protection for individuals across all countries.

Intra-regional differences ought to be underscored as well. (1.6 *Net Agreement: “My close friends and family are heading in the right direction” (%)*). Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Brazil hold the most pessimistic views of the global landscape. Argentina and Uruguay exhibit a less apprehensive outlook regarding their national future, while Uruguay and Chile are notable for their relative positive perceptions of their personal and family futures.

Figure 1.4

*Latin American Feelings about the Global Reality Today by Age (%)*

Q: Given the current context, what is your main feeling about the global reality today?


	Average	16 - 29	Age ranges 30 - 49	50 - 64	65+
Hope	15	13	15	17	17
Curiosity	5	8	3	2	1
Enthusiasm	2	3	2	2	1
Uncertainty	40	28	42	49	53
Indifference	4	6	3	2	1
Irritation	2	2	2	2	2
Fear	8	10	8	6	3
Distrust	10	14	10	7	6
Impotence	12	11	12	12	13
DK/NA	3	5	3	2	1

**Figure 1.5**

*Perceptions about the Future: World, Country and Family (%)*

Q: Thinking about the future of the world and your country, please indicate if you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3) or strongly disagree (4) with the following statements:

Net agreement = (strongly agree and agree) - (strongly disagree and disagree)



**Figure 1.6**

*Net Agreement: “My close friends and family are heading in the right direction” (%)*

Q: Thinking about the future of the world and your country, please indicate if you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3) or strongly disagree (4) with the following statements:

“The world”/“My country”/“My family and I” are heading in the right direction.

Net agreement = (strongly agree and agree) - (strongly disagree and disagree)

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
My family	57	57	48	58	63	55	59	58	54	63	58
My country	-46	-19	-52	-54	-52	-51	-40	-61	-53	-21	-52
The world	-62	-61	-47	-70	-69	-76	-71	-55	-73	-56	-46

When examining a broad agenda of 16 global issues of diverse kinds, heterogeneous concerns emerge. The issues selected encompass security, social, economic, political, and climate-related problems. (1.7 *Concern about Global Issues in Latin America*). At the regional level, six major issues are particularly salient: wars and conflicts, poverty, drug trafficking, climate change, and hunger. However, there is considerable variation on how countries rank these issues, reflecting the absence of a basic consensus regarding global priorities. War is the primary concern for Colombians, Uruguayans, Venezuelans, and Brazilians, while poverty ranks first among Guatemalans and Argentines; drug trafficking for Costa Ricans and Chileans; climate change for Mexicans while for Bolivians, economic issues constitute the main priority. (1.8 *Concern about Global Issues in Latin America [%]*).

Specific concerns are particularly prominent in certain countries. For Chile, migration is a major source of concern; in Venezuela, the same applies to human rights; in Bolivia, to the crisis of democracy; and in Guatemala, to natural disasters. Across this set of questions, the relatively small share of “do not know/no answer” responses suggests a

region that is attentive to global concerns. Notwithstanding, as already mentioned, Latin America’s distinctiveness lies in the fact that attentiveness coexists with considerable cross-country variation in the intensity of these concerns.

This cross-country heterogeneity is accompanied by equally significant generational differences. (1.9 *Concern about Global Issues in Latin America by Age [%]*). Across the four age groups considered (16–29, 30–49, 50–64, and 65 and over), a clear pattern can be observed: the older the cohort, the higher the level of concern regarding the main global challenges. Concern about the crisis of democracies, migration and refugees, war and armed conflicts, as well as drug trafficking, is significantly lower among younger individuals than among older adults, with a maximum gap of 23 points.

Far from the image of an inward-looking region, the emotions and perceptions recorded in the survey indicate that Latin Americans are not indifferent to what occurs beyond their borders and acknowledge that global processes influence their lives.

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### *Concern about Global Issues in Latin America*

**Figure 1.7**

Q: Which of the following issues concern you the most?




Figure 1.8

## Concern about Global Issues in Latin America (%)

Q: Which of the following issues concern you the most?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
War and armed conflicts	65.8	56.8	54.3	68.6	62.2	79.4	70.7	59.2	61.8	72.6	72.5
Extreme poverty	65.0	68.8	64.6	57.2	54.9	63.4	70.5	72.7	58.7	70.2	68.8
Drug trafficking	64.9	66.2	63.5	59.2	75.6	52.6	79.8	56.4	69.6	70.2	55.7
Climate change	63.8	54.8	62.9	67.1	58.2	69.8	67.6	66.7	70.5	59.5	60.4
World hunger	61.3	60.4	57.1	61.6	57.4	62.1	63.7	61.4	49.1	68.0	72.4
Economic issues	59.9	62.5	69.4	51.4	55.9	52.5	63.3	65.9	56.6	52.9	68.8
Violations of human rights	59.7	53.5	58.2	50.3	49.5	66.8	63.1	60.8	58.2	63.7	72.2
Natural disasters	53.1	44.1	52.9	54.1	45.5	52.9	51.5	64.2	57.1	48.9	59.6
Crisis of democracy	45.0	39.8	55.9	52.0	40.3	48.9	50.0	33.6	35.9	42.5	51.0
War over control of natural resources	44.6	44.1	46.0	43.6	42.1	52.2	45.9	38.6	42.1	47.2	44.6
Migration and refugees	42.6	28.3	31.8	18.8	64.6	49.2	52.4	40.9	36.8	41.5	60.7
Pandemics	37.3	21.6	39.4	47.1	28.4	37.3	38.6	42.3	42.1	37.1	39.4
Cyber attacks	31.4	22.4	29.1	31.2	28.6	33.1	40.6	33.1	30.9	38.4	26.5
Foreign debt	27.5	37.1	43.0	23.3	19.7	18.9	32.6	32.9	20.4	22.5	24.6
Trade war	25.7	14.1	21.5	30.1	28.2	22.9	27.4	29.1	25.1	22.6	36.1
Fascism	21.9	24.6	15.9	31.0	25.2	25.3	18.8	12.5	17.9	21.4	26.8
DK/NA	1.1	2.0	0.4	2.1	2.2	0.9	0.4	0.5	1.4	0.7	0.3

Figure 1.9

## Concern about Global Issues in Latin America by Age (%)

Q: Which of the following issues concern you the most?

	Average	16 - 29	30 - 49	50 - 64	65+
War and armed conflicts	65.8	62.9	64.5	69.0	77.9
Extreme poverty	65.0	64.4	65.8	64.7	63.7
Drug trafficking	64.9	55.1	65.2	75.7	78.1
Climate change	63.8	60.1	63.5	68.9	68.4
World hunger	61.3	58.2	60.5	66.4	66.5
Economic issues	59.9	60.5	62.1	57.0	52.2
Violations of human rights	59.7	58.4	58.9	61.8	64.4
Natural disasters	53.1	51.3	53.1	55.9	53.7
Crisis of democracy	45.0	40.9	43.3	49.9	60.3
War over control of natural resources	44.6	41.4	45.4	47.0	48.3
Migration and refugees	42.6	34.5	41.3	53.1	58.0
Pandemics	37.3	32.5	41.3	37.0	35.6
Cyber attacks	31.4	26.9	31.8	35.3	38.8
Foreign debt	27.5	31.2	27.5	23.7	21.5
Trade war	25.7	26.4	26.5	23.5	24.1
Fascism	21.9	19.7	21.2	24.8	28.2
DK/NA	2.2	3.3	2.0	1.1	0.3



# **2. Global Outlook: The Fog of War and Erosion of Consensus**

## 2. Global Outlook: The Fog of War and Erosion of Consensus

**The fog of war. A world without rules. Violence in Gaza. The decline of US power and the Trump effect. Trust in international leaders.**

Latin American public opinion reflects a widespread conviction that the world has entered a more conflictive phase. This is consistent with findings showing that war and military conflicts constitute the primary source of concern in the region. (2.1 Net Agreement: “The world has entered an era of wars and conflicts” [%]). This is hardly surprising considering the proliferation of active international armed conflicts in today’s global landscape. That said, the key finding lies not only in the extent of agreement but also in its intensity: “somewhat agree” clearly predominates over “strongly agree.” This suggests a general sense of a deteriorating international environment that translates more into a mood of concern than into a full-fledged sense of alarm. A comparison between Latin America and Europe indicates that the perception of an increasingly conflictive international system is widely shared across both regions and it is not limited to societies directly exposed to war.


To examine and compare the mood of Latin American and European public opinion, the survey replicated three questions on perceptions of the state of the world from the Security Radar 2025<sup>4</sup>—a long-standing project of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), presented regularly at the Munich Security Conference: this is one of them. The comparison highlights that the proportion of respondents in Latin America who share the view of a war-prone and conflictive world is slightly higher (70% strongly and somewhat agree) than in Europe (67%). In other words, although Latin America is far from zones of military conflict, it recognizes the contentious nature of the current critical juncture just as European public opinion does. Another finding is that the gap among the 14 European countries<sup>5</sup> surveyed by the Security Radar reaches up to 37 percentage points, whereas the maximum gap in Latin America is 10 points.

In a region like Latin America, where governments have historically been committed to multilateralism and the defense of international law, it is relevant that public opinion largely perceives a decline in the relevance of the rules and

Figure 2.1

### Net Agreement: “The world has entered an era of wars and conflicts” (%)

Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of the world?  
 Net agreement = (strongly agree and somewhat agree) - (strongly disagree and somewhat disagree)



<sup>4</sup> The questions from the latest Security Radar, which were replicated in the 2026 AMLAT Radar, measure the level of agreement with three statements about the global situation: “A new era of wars and conflicts has begun in the world,” “International laws and norms are no longer relevant,” and “The power of the United States as a global superpower is coming to an end.” For an analysis of the results, see <<https://collections.fes.de/publikationen/content/zoom/1596478>>.

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that the Security Radar country sample includes the United States.

norms that structure the international order (2.2 *Net Agreement: "International laws and norms are no longer relevant" [%]*).

However, this perception requires a close look: those who report being "somewhat in agreement" with the idea that this normative framework has become less relevant are twice as numerous as those who are "strongly in agreement," suggesting a perception of gradual erosion rather than a categorical diagnosis of irrelevance. Unlike the other countries, Brazil displays a clearly divided public opinion, revealing a weaker perception of the erosion of this normative framework.

When compared to European public opinion data from the Security Radar, it can be observed that the regional level of skepticism regarding the continued relevance of international rules is slightly higher in Latin America (53% agreement) than among Europeans (47%). A similar pattern emerges regarding perceptions of current global conflict dynamics: Europe exhibits greater cross-country variation than Latin America. This suggests that, although average skepticism is somewhat higher in the latter region, European perceptions regarding the erosion of international law are more fragmented.

Regarding the violence in Gaza, most respondents in Latin America believe that Israel is committing a genocide (2.3 *Net Agreement: "Israel is committing a genocide in Gaza" [%]*). This perception is particularly strong, as the share of respondents who "strongly agree" exceeds that of those who "somewhat agree." Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica surpass the regional average, whereas Brazilians are the most hesitant to embrace this opinion.

Against the backdrop of expanding armed conflicts, the erosion of international law, and a high-profile case such as the violence in Gaza, the region appears divided in its perceptions of the United States' decay. (2.4 *Net Agreement: "The United States' status as a global superpower is coming to an end" [%]*). In four countries, the prevailing perception is that the United States is in decline, whereas in six countries the opposite view dominates. The most pronounced contrasts are between Chile and Argentina on one hand, and Mexico and Guatemala on the other. Overall, these findings reveal a pronounced regional ambivalence regarding the hypothesis of US decline: the net agreement average indicates an almost perfect balance between respondents who perceive a weakening of US power and those who do not. Notably, the Security Radar data suggest that Europe also lacks a clear majority opinion on this issue.

Figure 2.2

*Net Agreement: "International laws and norms are no longer relevant" (%)*

Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of the world?  
 Net agreement = (strongly agree and somewhat agree) - (strongly disagree and somewhat disagree)




Figure 2.3

Net Agreement: "Israel is committing genocide in Gaza" (%)

Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of the world?  
 Net agreement = (strongly agree and somewhat agree) - (strongly disagree and somewhat disagree)





Figure 2.4

Net Agreement: "The United States' status as a global superpower is coming to an end" (%)

Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of the world?  
 Net agreement = (strongly agree and somewhat agree) - (strongly disagree and somewhat disagree)



Latin Americans express a critical view of the global impact of Trump's policies, with largely negative perceptions (2.5 *Perception of the Impact of Trump's Policies on the World: Net Impact [%]*). The most negative views come from Mexico and Central America, while the most cautious assessments are noticed in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile. Notably, there is a stark contrast between Mexico and Venezuela: Mexicans express strong rejection of US coercion, whereas Venezuelans display more divided reactions to American pressure. In Mexico's case, it is important to underscore that the country had already been confronting a dense agenda of commercial, migratory, and security threats from its immediate neighbor prior to the survey. It should be noted that this survey was conducted amid ongoing US airstrikes in the Caribbean as part of pressure on Venezuela, in a context of intimidation

preceding the military operation to extract Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife—an extraordinary intervention that has reshaped regional dynamics.


Distrust toward President Trump is overwhelming, and it is also significant toward Vladimir Putin, with both together surpassing the rest of the 7 world leaders displayed in the results (selected from a list of 16 world leaders evaluated) (2.6 *Latin America's Distrust of World Leaders [%]*). In summary, in Latin America, the reputational costs of the MAGA foreign policy and Trump's personal style, as well as the four years of the war in Ukraine, in Putin's case, are major sources of distrust. Besides, Washington's hostile narrative toward China has a limited impact in the region when assessing the image of Xi Jinping.

### Perception of the Impact of Trump's Policies on the World: Net Impact (%)

Figure 2.5


Q: Based on what you know or have heard, what impact do you think the policies being implemented by Donald Trump, President of the United States, will have on the world?

Perceived net impact = (highly positive and positive impact) - (highly negative and negative impact)



## Latin America's Distrust of World Leaders (%)

Q: Which world leader do you trust the least?



# **3. Global Order and World Powers: Multipolarity and Uncertainty**

### 3. Global Order and World Powers: Multipolarity and Uncertainty

**Opinion on countries. Development models. Economic influence. Global democracy: an assessment. Comparisons between the European Union, the United States and China: leadership, influence, feelings, bilateral relations, and key strategic partners.**

Geopolitical competition has returned to the center of the global agenda, with increasing realignments and a stage where diverse actors play a role. For this reason, the survey included a set of questions to explore perceptions on countries with international presence and recognition and to evaluate how these perceptions have changed between the first and second surveys (2022–2026).

Participants were asked to assess their general opinion on ten countries (3.1 *Latin American Views on Other Countries: 2022–2026 [%]*). Among the seven highest-rated, only China improved its image between the 2022 and 2026 surveys. The remaining six experienced a general decline in positive opinions, particularly the United States, France, and

Germany. Consequently, the leading countries of the Western world face a deterioration in reputational standing in the region, even though they continue to top the list.

Notably, none of the countries surveyed receive positive opinions from as much as a third of respondents, indicating fading prestige even for those leading the list, such as Spain and the United States (3.2 *Latin American Views on Other Countries [%]*). Favorability toward the United States is very low in Mexico, nearly three times lower than for China while in Brazil, the opposite takes place. Among European countries, Spain ranks highest, although significant differences exist: Germany leads in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (3.3 *Latin American Views on European Countries [%]*).

In the 2022 survey, the United States led Latin Americans' preferences as a development model, followed by Germany in second place and Canada in third. By 2026, this landscape has shifted dramatically: Latin Americans are turning their attention to Asia, with China in first place and

*Latin American Views on Other Countries: 2022–2026 (%)*

**Figure 3.1**

Q: Which of the following countries do you have the most favorable opinion of?  
Variation = (2026 – 2022)




Figure 3.2

### Latin American Views on Other Countries (%)


Q: Which of the following countries do you have the most favorable opinion of?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Spain	30.8	24.1	33.3	19.1	27.6	28.4	34.6	38.7	19.2	39.1	43.5
United States	30.6	29.6	42.7	33.5	25.1	22.2	32.9	33.4	11.8	30.8	43.8
Germany	30.2	33.5	32.2	21.9	32.8	30.3	31.8	29.6	32.5	29.1	28.6
France	24.9	16.5	24.5	20.7	30.1	27.1	28.2	26.3	20.6	24.4	30.9
China	24.2	16.1	30.1	19.6	16.2	25.5	21.5	36.2	29.8	17.5	29.2
Great Britain	20.8	18.4	19.3	14.8	27.2	23.2	26.6	14.3	20.2	25.3	18.3
Russia	10.1	7.8	14.5	3.9	8.3	8.2	7.9	13.1	16.5	5.9	14.7
Israel	7.9	5.0	8.8	9.7	6.5	5.6	7.5	16.8	2.2	5.7	11.0
India	2.9	1.8	3.6	2.6	3.6	2.4	2.5	2.8	3.4	2.8	3.4
Iran	1.4	0.7	2.4	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.0	3.0
None	13.5	17.3	9.9	15.9	15.7	14.9	13.6	10.1	18.9	12.5	6.1
DK/NA	7.5	9.9	5.9	12.4	6.0	9.2	6.4	4.6	9.7	5.6	5.3

Figure 3.3

### Latin American Views on European Countries (%)

Q: Which of the following countries do you have the most favorable opinion of?




Japan in second. The displacement and decline of Western countries from their position as preferred development models is particularly striking (3.4 *Development Models for Latin America: 2022–2026 (%)*).

The ranking of development models shows significant variations across Latin American countries (3.5 *Development Models for Latin America (%)*). While Mexico exhibits a significant gap in favorability between China and the United States, in Southern Cone countries both

### Development Models for Latin America: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: Thinking about the future, which countries do you consider as best models of development for your country?  
Variation = (2026 – 2022)



Western and Asian models register similar levels of preference. A noteworthy case is Venezuela, where the Chinese and US models appear virtually tied. In Brazil, although the United States still outranks China as the preferred model, one in five respondents chose “don’t know” or “no answer,” suggesting considerable degree of indecision or a lack of clear preference. These variations indicate that, although

there is a general trend toward diversifying development references, the process unfolds unevenly across the region.

Beyond assessing preferred development models, the survey examined the ability of key international actors to exert economic influence in the region. Perceived levels of economic influence reveal the tangible scope of their

### Development Models for Latin America (%)

Q: Thinking about the future, which countries do you consider as best models of development for your country?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
China	36.1	21.1	40.9	30.8	30.9	41.6	36.8	45.1	43.0	29.3	40.9
Japan	31.9	24.1	37.9	26.0	28.9	35.3	36.1	29.5	40.1	27.1	33.2
United States	31.5	27.4	41.4	34.2	26.7	23.3	38.7	37.2	18.0	27.0	41.4
Canada	29.7	23.0	18.4	25.2	34.3	32.4	35.6	36.7	35.4	28.9	26.3
Germany	28.9	32.2	28.3	20.8	30.9	30.3	32.2	24.0	34.4	27.2	28.2
Spain	17.1	12.0	20.4	9.1	10.5	16.4	19.3	25.9	13.5	18.9	25.2
Sweden	16.8	19.3	15.7	11.8	19.8	17.2	21.6	9.6	14.7	22.9	15.6
South Korea	15.8	10.6	20.3	12.5	14.2	15.0	15.2	20.1	22.0	11.0	16.9
France	13.9	9.1	14.4	12.3	13.5	17.2	15.7	14.1	12.8	11.3	18.1
Great Britain	10.3	8.3	10.3	8.1	14.7	11.9	13.3	6.6	10.5	8.7	10.5
Italy	9.5	9.6	7.6	8.8	9.1	8.5	10.2	10.8	8.2	8.2	13.5
Russia	9.2	6.0	13.1	4.1	5.7	7.0	6.5	10.2	17.5	3.5	17.5
India	3.4	1.8	4.4	3.3	2.2	5.5	2.8	4.4	3.8	2.3	3.6
DK/NA	11.4	17.5	6.9	18.7	14.3	12.6	8.0	5.0	11.2	10.9	9.1


external presence (3.6 *Leading Countries in Terms of Economic Influence in Latin America [%]*). The United States maintains the greatest economic presence, followed by China: together, they account for three-quarters of the economic influence perceived by respondents. In contrast, Europe's economic projection is limited and fragmented, restricting its ability to act as a unified reference point. Notably, Brazil stands out as the only Latin American country exercising regional economic influence.

A widespread perception of democratic decline exists worldwide. The sharpest decline in democracy ratings is observed in the United States, France, and Germany, all of which started from relatively high levels in 2022. Russia's political regime ratings also fell, though from a more moderate baseline in 2022, before the Ukraine invasion. By 2026, Russia's democracy rating has fallen slightly below China (3.7 *Assessment of Democracy Worldwide: 2022–2026 [average]*). Thus, it is worth noting that the actors with the greatest economic influence today face scrutiny regarding the strength and legitimacy of their political systems.

### Leading Countries in Terms of Economic Influence in Latin America (%)

Figure 3.6

Q: In your opinion, which country exerts the greatest economic influence on your country?



Regarding geopolitical competition, the Latin American perspective reflects a fragmented world order, but with two predominant actors in terms of material capabilities: the United States and China (3.8 *Global Leadership: The European Union, the United States and China [%]*). The European Union is perceived as a global leader in advancing values, norms, and public goods such as peace and the environment. The United States maintains leadership in military power, security affairs, and coercive capacity, while sharing economic preeminence with China. In technology, China stands apart for its leadership in artificial intelligence and scientific and educational development. Thus, while China positions itself advantageously in the strategic areas of the future, the European Union continues to play a significant role in shaping global norms and standards.

its regulatory leadership, a significant decline—of up to 20 percentage points—is evident across all components of its leadership by 2026. Moreover, the European Union is perceived as having limited relevance in hard attributes of global leadership and in the strategic sectors of the future.


Yet data reveals a pronounced contraction of European soft power on the global stage compared to 2022 (3.9 *Global Leadership: The European Union, the United States and China: 2022–2026 [%]*). While the European Union maintains

Another key finding to be underscored refers to diffusion of global power. When comparing the responses on the power attributes of the European Union, the United States, and China between the 2022 and 2026 surveys, a notable decline is observed in all three cases. Furthermore, in areas such as the defense of human rights, the promotion of world peace, and the fight against poverty and inequality a significant leadership vacuum is revealed. This is evident in the high proportion of respondents selecting “none,” “don’t know,” or “no answer” across these areas, between one-third and two-fifths of the sample. This raises an open question as to whether the region identifies itself as part of an emerging Global South—an issue that warrants further research.

Assessment of Democracy Worldwide: 2022–2026 (average)


Q: On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “not a democracy” and 10 means “a full democracy,” where would you place each of the following countries?

Variation = 2026 average – 2022 average




Global Leadership: The European Union, the United States and China (%)

Q. Between China, the United States, and the European Union, which do you consider to be the global leader in each of the following aspects?



Q: Between China, the United States, and the European Union, which do you consider to be the global leader in each of the following aspects?

Variation = average 2026 – average 2022



Latin American projections of global influence over the next five years place China first and the United States—virtually at parity, although the latter shows more heterogeneous evaluations across countries. The European Union, for its part, is relegated to third place, although its perceived relevance is concentrated in certain countries (3.10 *Influence of World Leaders over the Next Five Years [average]*). It is noteworthy that Argentina and Brazil rank the United States above China, while in Mexico the European Union occupies second place, surpassing the United States—reflecting significant nuances in Latin American perceptions of global leadership.

In 2022, Latin Americans expected the European Union to wield greater global influence (7.5 on a scale from 1 to 10) than they currently attribute to it today in 2026 (6.8) (3.11 *Influence of the European Union on the World 2022–2026*). Nor do they anticipate this influence will increase over the next five years, as projections remain nearly stable at 6.9. Taken together, these data provide a telling indicator of Europe’s gradual fading in the Latin American imaginary over the past four years.

In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of Latin American views on leading global actors, an emotional dimension was included in the analysis. Overall positive feelings toward the European Union outweigh negative ones across Latin America. However, patterns vary significantly: hope is highest in Bolivia, Guatemala, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, while distrust stands out in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Venezuela (3.12 *Latin*

*American Feelings toward the European Union [%]*). Consistent with the findings reported in the first chapter of the report, the emotional dimension appears more diffuse than when concrete issues are addressed. This is evident by the comparatively higher proportion of “don’t know” or “no answer” responses to emotion-related questions.

The United States projects an emotional image that is the reverse of that of the European Union: negative sentiments outweigh positive ones, with distrust and hope predominating, respectively. Mexico records the highest levels of distrust toward the United States and low levels of hope in the region, while Venezuela exhibits the highest levels of hope in the region, albeit with a more balanced distribution between the two feelings (3.13 *Latin American Feelings toward the United States [%]*).

Positive sentiments toward China, in turn, outweigh negative ones. The former are concentrated in admiration and hope, while distrust prevails among negative sentiments. Fear of China is negligible, calling into question narratives that portray China’s presence in the region as a threat. Admiration is particularly strong in Guatemala and Colombia, whereas distrust toward China is more pronounced in Argentina, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Uruguay (3.14 *Latin American Feelings toward China [%]*).

When comparing feelings toward the European Union, the United States, and China, clear differences emerge (3.15 *Latin American Feelings toward the European Union, the*

Figure 3.10

*Influence of World Leaders over the Next Five Years (average)*

Q: Thinking about the next five years, on a scale from 1 to 10—where 1 means “no influence at all” and 10 means “a lot of influence”—how influential do you think each of the following will be in the world: China/the United States/the European Union? Where would you place each?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
European Union	6.1	5.5	6.0	5.6	5.9	6.5	6.5	6.7	6.3	6.1	5.8
United States	6.9	7.4	6.5	6.8	7.1	6.6	7.6	6.9	6.0	7.3	6.6
China	7.2	6.8	7.0	6.6	7.2	7.0	7.7	7.7	7.2	7.5	6.8

Figure 3.11

*Influence of the European Union on the World: 2022–2026 (%)*

Q (2022): Thinking about the next five years, how much influence do you think the European Union will have on the world?  
 Q (2026): How much influence do you think the European Union has on the world today? On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means “no influence at all” and 10 means “great influence,” where would you place it?




Figure 3.12

Latin American Feelings toward the European Union (%)

Q: Which of the following words best describe your feelings toward the European Union?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Hope	24	19	29	18	19	28	25	29	21	28	28
Safety	19	18	21	16	22	20	18	22	24	17	15
Admiration	13	10	14	13	9	12	19	17	15	11	13
Disdain	2	4	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	2	1
Fear	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	2
Distrust	15	19	14	16	17	12	13	12	13	18	17
DK/NA	24	29	18	32	27	24	20	16	23	23	24

United States, and China [%]). While hope is most prominent for the European Union and the United States, admiration is more clearly reflected in the case of China. With distrust as the predominant negative sentiment, the United States record roughly twice the level observed for the European Union, with China occupying an intermediate position. An exactly inverse pattern is observed among those who respond “don’t know” or “no answer.”

How attractive are these powers as partners for Latin America in key strategic areas? (3.16 *The European Union, the United States, and China as Latin American Partners [%]*). The European Union is the preferred partner in environmental protection and in efforts to combat poverty and inequality. The United States is viewed as the more attractive partner for strengthening democracy, surpassing the European Union. It is also regarded as a leading partner in combating drug

Figure 3.13

Latin American Feelings toward the United States (%)

Q: Which of the following words best describe your feelings toward the United States?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Hope	19	19	25	17	13	16	19	25	8	17	33
Safety	12	13	14	13	17	12	14	11	8	13	9
Admiration	10	9	17	9	10	7	15	11	3	13	12
Disdain	8	9	3	10	5	9	4	9	17	5	3
Fear	8	7	6	7	9	9	7	11	10	6	7
Distrust	30	29	24	27	31	34	31	27	45	33	24
DK/NA	12	13	10	17	15	13	9	6	9	13	13

Figure 3.14

Latin American Feelings toward China (%)

Q: Which of the following words best describe your feelings toward China?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Hope	17	13	18	17	10	18	16	20	19	18	16
Safety	12	9	12	11	15	11	11	15	18	11	12
Admiration	23	16	25	15	20	28	25	35	28	20	19
Disdain	2	3	2	4	2	2	1	2	2	2	2
Fear	7	9	6	9	9	6	6	5	5	6	7
Distrust	21	26	22	21	22	17	25	11	15	24	25
DK/NA	18	25	14	23	21	18	15	12	14	19	19

trafficking, while China stands out as a key benchmark in digital technology, as well as in trade and infrastructure. In culture and education, an interesting parity emerges between the European Union and the United States, taken together, and China.

Perceptions of bilateral ties with these three actors show that positive assessments prevail in all cases (3.17 Net Score

of Your Country's Relations with Major Powers (%)). Views of relations with China are highly positive; in the case of the European Union, very positive; and in relation to the United States, somewhat positive. This reflects a stronger preference for the European Union within the Western camp. Notably, the share of highly critical views of the relationship with the United States is not observed in the cases of the European Union or China.

Figure 3.15

Latin American Feelings toward the European Union, the United States, and China (%)

Q: Which of the following words best describe your feelings toward ...?




Figure 3.16

The European Union, the United States, and China as Latin American Partners (%)

Q: If you had to choose between China, the United States, and the European Union, which would be the best partner for your country in each of the following areas?





Figure 3.17

Net Score of your Country's Relations with Major Powers (%)

Q: How would you rate the relation between your country and the European Union/the United States/China/Russia? Would you say they are very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

Net score = (very good and fairly good) – (very bad and fairly bad)





# **4. Europe and the European Union on the Radar: Blurred Proximity and Declining Presence**

# 4. Europe and the European Union on the Radar: Blurred Proximity and Declining Presence

**Image. EU leadership. Evaluation of the European Union’s foreign policy and integration model. The importance of Latin America for the European Union. Cooperation preferences with the European Union.**

Understanding how Latin Americans view Europe and the European Union can help inform foreign policy decisions about the present and future of their relationship. The current context poses multiple challenges for Europe’s international affairs: strategic divergences with the United States and continuous tensions with Russia; differing positions on the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East; the rise of radical political forces, some with significant electoral presence; increasing migration flows; evolving dynamics within the European institutions, and the threat of renewed economic and financial crisis affecting EU member states. These factors not only reflect Europe’s

internal and external challenges, but also shape perceptions of its relevance and strategic autonomy among Latin Americans. Europe’s image in Latin America (4.1 *Europe’s Image in Latin America [%]*) is constructed based on the associations respondents make between this actor and a predefined list of 12 words or phrases. These choices make it possible to identify the primary attributes and images through which Europe is perceived by Latin Americans. A comparison between the 2021–2022 survey and the present one shows that significant changes have occurred. One major finding is the fading of regional integration and the welfare state as defining European traits. The 2025–2026 survey reveals three distinct ranking levels. At the first level, the most prominent elements are: (1) cultural aspects linked to museum heritage and gastronomy; (2) sports, particularly football—which, it is worth recalling, originated in England; and (3) the monarchy as the enduring political trademark of European

*Europe’s Image in Latin America (%)*

Figure 4.1

Q: Which of the following words do you most associate with Europe?



Words	2026 %	2022 %
Monuments, museums and culture	44	61
Football	43	-
Queens and Kings	41	43
Cuisine	35	-
Wealth	35	32
Compliance with international law	34	-
Welfare State	34	43
Democratic societies	32	-
Capitalism	31	27
Managed migration	31	-
Economic integration	30	44
Wars and armed conflicts	25	-
Environment	23	25
Colonialism	18	10
Racial discrimination	17	12
Artificial intelligence	15	-
Far right	8	3

history. At a second level, a profile more centered on economic, political, and social dimensions emerges, associated with the contributions of European democratic societies. A third level image emerges, encompassing wars and military conflicts on the one hand, and environmental protection on the other. It is worth noting aside that Europe does not appear to be meaningfully associated with artificial intelligence, a field at the forefront of global scientific and technological development.

With regard to leadership within the European Union (4.2 *Leading European Union Countries: 2022–2026 [%]*), leading countries are no longer perceived as clearly as they were four years ago. Despite a decline in its rating, Germany continues to lead among two thirds of respondents, followed by France and Spain. It is important to note that Spain and Italy have experienced less pronounced declines in perceptions of their leadership.

From the perspective of Latin Americans, Europe retains its role as a normative power at the global level (4.3 *Opinion on the European Union’s Foreign Policy [%]*). Evaluations of

different aspects of its foreign policy indicate that it continues to be seen as a promoter of world peace.

When assessing its response to specific conflicts (Gaza and Ukraine), the share of “don’t know/no answer” responses is higher than for general issues. There is a favorable view of the continuation of the European Union’s military support for Ukraine, alongside a more nuanced view regarding Gaza.

As shown in the chart (4.4 *Strategic Autonomy of the European Union [%]*), in 2022 an absolute majority of Latin Americans rejected the idea that the European Union’s strategic preference was to align with the United States. By contrast, in 2026 a point of equilibrium is observed: the share of respondents who perceive Europe as autonomous is equal to that of those who do not. Two fifths of respondents agree with the idea of an aligned Europe, two fifths disagree, and one fifth select “don’t know” or “no answer.”

Additionally, half of Latin Americans view the European Union as a global power, although one third does not perceive a clear distinction between it and China or the

### Leading European Union Countries: 2022–2026 (%)

Figure 4.2

Q: In your opinion, which countries play major leadership roles in the European Union?  
Variation = (2026 – 2022)




Figure 4.3

### Opinion on the European Union's Foreign Policy (%)

Q: Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.  
 Net agreement = (strongly agree and agree) – (strongly disagree and disagree)





Figure 4.4

### Strategic Autonomy of the European Union (%)

Q: Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.



United States. In other words, the European Union is a global actor for a majority of Latin Americans, but does not necessarily hold a leadership position vis-à-vis other great power.

The European integration model has lost traction among Latin American public opinion (4.5 *Europe as an Integration Model for Latin America: 2022–2026 [%]*), as reflected in a decline in the regional average. In 2022, Latin Americans regarded the European Union as the integration model *par excellence*: nearly one quarter of respondents gave it a perfect score (“10”), while around 22% assigned it a very high rating (“7 to 9”). By 2026, the European Union continues to be seen as a desirable model of integration. However, over the past four years, support for the European Union as an integration model has declined. By contrast, the share of neutral opinions rose from one fifth to one quarter of the total, while more skeptical assessments doubled, increasing from 6 to 12 percentage points.

As shown in chart (4.6 *Importance of Latin America for the European Union [average]*), Latin Americans feel that the European Union assigns the region a moderate level of importance, with a regional average of 6.2 on a scale from 1 to 10. The relatively narrow range of responses—between 5.5 and 6.6—indicates that the European Union is widely seen as taking Latin America into account, but does not belong to the center of its priorities. Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico display slightly higher perceptions, possibly reflecting the relevance of bilateral ties intertwined with


their relative economic importance in the region, while Argentina and others adopt a somewhat more skeptical view. Overall, the pattern suggests a consistent yet limited recognition, pointing to a lack of centrality in the bi-regional relationship. It can be argued that Latin Americans regard their region as being on the verge of Europe’s indifference. In the absence of concrete engagement by the European Union with Latin America, the growing importance that the United States places on the Western Hemisphere, combined with China’s expanding presence in the region, could relegate Europe to a distant, secondary place in Latin American perceptions, leaving other extra-regional actors as the primary reference points through which the region views the world.

Enquiries on cooperation between the European Union and Latin America reveal differentiated priorities across issue areas. Respondents recognize that the European Union is a key partner, primarily in financing, investment, and the protection of human rights, and secondarily in humanitarian aid (4.7 *Areas of European Union–Latin America Cooperation [%]*). This aligns with broader European Union–Latin America cooperation agendas, which emphasize investment, human rights, and development cooperation as central pillars of the partnership. A different pattern emerges, however, with regard to Latin American integration, which does not appear to be a central area of cooperation, and the same applies to electoral observation. Notably, one third of respondents do not identify any area of cooperation as a

*Europe as an Integration Model for Latin America: 2022–2026 (%)*


Figure 4.5

Q: To what extent do you think European integration serves as a model for Latin America?



### Importance of Latin America for the European Union (average)

Q: In your opinion, how important is Latin America to the European Union? On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “not important at all” and 10 means “very important.”



priority—either because they are unsure or unaware of how and where European cooperation takes place. This does indicate a degree of disconnection or lack of information about the European Union’s actions in the region.

A closer look at country-level results highlights important nuances (4.8 *Areas of European Union–Latin America Cooperation [%]*). In Costa Rica, Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, financial investment emerges as the main area of cooperation; Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Guatemala emphasize human rights; Guatemala prioritizes humanitarian aid; and Brazil underscores the fight against inequality. Notably, slightly more than half of Argentines identify any area of cooperation with the European Union. These differences suggest that, to consolidate its role as a partner in Latin America, the European Union needs to tailor its approach to each country’s priorities while increasing the visibility of its cooperation efforts.

Between 2022 and 2026, Latin American preferences regarding cooperation with the European Union show a clear shift toward economic and social areas. (4.9 *Areas of European Union–Latin America Cooperation: 2022–2026 [%]*). Issues associated with tangible benefits gain prominence, particularly financing and investment, inequality reduction reflecting a growing focus on material

dimensions linked to economic and social deficits. Interest in electoral observation has also increased, indicating that democratic/institutional support continues to be valued. At the same time, human rights and humanitarian aid remain among the most important priorities, although their relative importance has declined. All in all, when comparing the evaluation of the European Union as a preferred partner between 2022 and 2026 (4.10 *The European Union as a Strategic Partner for Latin America: 2022–2026 [%]*), a generalized decline can be observed across all areas, reaching up to 25 points in some cases. This points to a significant erosion of the European Union’s standing in the region. The decrease is particularly pronounced in areas such as environmental protection, the fight against poverty and inequality, and culture and education, and is also notable in perceptions related to the strengthening of democracy.

Overall, the data assembled in this section indicate that during the past four years, Latin American perceptions of Europe reflect a persistent process of distancing that could ultimately contribute to a decoupling between Latin America and the European Union.

Figure 4.7

### Areas of European Union–Latin America Cooperation (%)

Q: The European Union cooperates with Latin America on several areas I will mention. Which of these areas of cooperation do you think are most important for your country?




Figure 4.8

### Areas of European Union–Latin America Cooperation (%)


Q: The European Union cooperates with Latin America on several areas I will mention. Which of these areas of cooperation do you think are most important for your country?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Funding and investment	52	54	55	53	53	47	61	54	51	55	36
Human rights	51	47	45	57	39	60	48	55	56	43	55
Humanitarian aid	42	36	34	38	40	46	46	57	47	31	42
Fight against inequality	34	32	30	52	38	33	34	35	35	30	22
Support for Latin American integration	33	35	35	20	36	27	38	35	35	40	30
Electoral observation	29	23	44	25	29	31	22	28	24	18	42
None	14	22	9	15	18	16	7	5	16	14	14
DK/NA	18	22	15	21	22	20	15	11	17	23	17

### Areas of European Union-Latin America Cooperation: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: The European Union cooperates with Latin America on several areas I will mention. Which of these areas of cooperation do you think are most important for your country?

Variation = (2026 – 2022)




### The European Union as a Strategic Partner for Latin America: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: Between China, the United States, and the European Union, which of the three do you think will be the best partner for your country in each of the following areas?

Variation = (2026 – 2022)

Data subset: The graph shows only the responses that identify the European Union as the best partner.



# **5. Latin America: Fragmented Agendas and Priority Dispersion**

# 5. Latin America: Fragmented Agendas and Priority Dispersion

**Latin America’s global relevance. Economic influence and regional leadership. Thematic challenges and international engagement preferences. The nuclear non-proliferation consensus. Rights, values and the perception of democracy in each country.**

Regarding Latin America’s global relevance, perceptions are broadly positive in terms of its current standing and its future trajectory (5.1 *Latin America’s Current and Future Global Relevance [average]*). At the regional average, the region’s importance stands at 6.6 and rises to 7.0 when projected five years ahead. This difference is meaningful: public opinion does not perceive the region as currently

irrelevant and anticipates gradual growth within the international system. The region’s projected importance is also close to perceptions of European influence five years from now (6.9), as discussed in the previous section.

At the national level, some nuances emerge. Mexico and Venezuela lead perceptions of current importance, followed by Colombia and Brazil, while Argentina and Chile register more moderate assessments. This pattern suggests that countries with greater demographic, economic, or geopolitical weight, tend to exhibit a stronger sense of their own regional relevance.

*Latin America’s Current and Future Global Relevance (average)*

**Figure 5.1**

Q (1): And speaking of Latin America, how relevant do you think the region is globally today? Please use a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “not relevant at all” and 10 means “highly relevant.”

Q (2): Looking ahead to the next five years, how relevant do you think Latin America will be globally? Please use the same scale from 1 to 10.

**Perception of Latin America’s Current Importance**



**Expectation of Latin America’s Importance Over the Next 5 Years**



To what extent does the positive view of Latin America's international relevance reflect the existence of regional leadership? (5.2 *Latin American Leadership: Regional Recognition and National Self-Perception [%]*). The results reveal a clear gap between perceived regional leadership and national self-perception, highlighting both well-defined hierarchies and biases in Latin America. The first map shows Brazil as the most widely recognized leader in the region, followed by Mexico, with an 11-point gap between them. While leadership is concentrated in the two largest economies and demographic powers, Argentina appears in a close third place. Chile and Colombia form an intermediate tier, trailing behind the top three. The emerging visibility of El Salvador in the current Latin American imaginary is also noteworthy. The remaining countries—across the Andean region, Central America, and the Caribbean—share a relatively low level of regional projection.

The second map reveals a systematic pattern: countries tend to perceive themselves as more influential than they are viewed by the rest of the region. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile all register higher domestic than regional evaluations, although the magnitude of the gap varies. This pattern points to the presence of a

national self-enhancement bias, whose intensity differs across countries. The largest gap is observed in Chile, indicating that this bias is most pronounced in this case.

Few changes are observed in views on regional leadership between 2022 and 2026, although some countries decline while others register modest gains, without a clear overall pattern. Recognition of Brazil and Mexico as regional leaders has decreased, while Chile experiences a more pronounced drop. Conversely, Guatemala and Colombia improve their positions, with El Salvador standing out as the country with the largest increase (5.3 *Regional Recognition of Leadership in Latin America: 2022–2026 [%]*).


Comparing recognition of regional leadership with self-perceived leadership yields several interesting findings (5.4 *Self-Perception of Leadership in Latin America: 2022–2026 [%]*). In Argentina, declining regional recognition as a leader is accompanied by a significant increase in its national self-perception of leadership. This dissociation is not observed in Chile, where both perceived and self-perceived leadership follow a downturn trend. In Brazil's case, the declines in both recognition and self-perception of leadership are identical.

*Latin American Leadership: Regional Recognition and National Self-Perception (%)*

**Figure 5.2**

Q: From the following list, which countries do you think play major leadership roles within Latin America?

**Perception of Leadership in Latin America**



**Self-Perception of Leadership by Country**




Figure 5.3

Regional Recognition of Leadership in Latin America: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: From the following list, which countries do you think play major leadership roles within Latin America?  
Variation = (2026 – 2022)



Figure 5.4

Self-Perception of Leadership in Latin America: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: From the following list, which countries do you think play major leadership roles within Latin America?  
Variation = (2026 – 2022)



Across Latin America, the regional agenda of concerns appears highly dispersed, reflecting the convergence of three key processes: the crisis of regionalism, intra-regional political polarization, and the uneven impact of international factors (5.5 *Main Challenges in Latin America [%]*). From the perspective of Latin Americans, social, economic, and security challenges strongly overlap, with the prioritization of concerns shaped by interconnected dynamics. The result is a mixed agenda structured across four levels of importance (maximum, high, medium, and low), with differentiated national subtleties.

At the regional level, poverty—followed by drug trafficking and organized crime—tops the list of the 12 issues evaluated, pointing to a shared sense of worry that combines material fragility with public insecurity. Low growth, unemployment, violence, and inequality also rank high, forming a core cluster of interconnected worries. Inflation occupies a middle tier of regional concern, followed by migration. In contrast, terrorism is relegated to a lower tier within the security agenda, while issues related to international integration are perceived as marginal.

The mixed nature of the agenda is accompanied by variations in the relative weight of challenges across the ten countries surveyed (5.6 *Main Challenges in Latin America [%]*). Poverty emerges as a common concern, particularly pronounced in Argentina and Guatemala, and

ranks first in eight out of the ten countries. Drug trafficking and organized crime cause greater worry in countries more recently affected by these dynamics, such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, than in those with longer standing exposure to their consequences, such as Colombia and Mexico. Chile and Brazil diverge from the broader regional pattern in their views on migration: the former due to its high level of concern, and the latter due to relative indifference. Inflation is more salient in Venezuela and Argentina than elsewhere in the region. Colombia stands out as the country where violence and terrorism are most prominently recognized as challenges. A similar pattern applies to Mexico regarding its perception as the United States’ “backyard.”


The list of perceived challenges largely reflects the worries shaping everyday life across the region. Latin America is emerging from a five-year period of weak economic performance, characterized by stagnation in per capita GDP growth and compounded by persistent structural problems such as inequality added to the still tangible effects of the pandemic. In this context, it is not surprising that citizens’ perceptions of the main challenges are closely in accordance with these economic and social circumstances.

The agenda of challenges is embedded in a broader framework of possibilities for international engagement,

### Main Challenges in Latin America (%)

Figure 5.5

Q: Which do you believe is the greatest challenge Latin America is facing?



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	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Poverty	67	76	64	57	57	68	72	74	68	71	65
Drug trafficking and organized crime	65	65	63	54	73	69	74	53	66	71	57
Low economic growth	54	59	61	43	46	48	57	57	53	59	57
Unemployment	53	55	52	42	47	55	60	55	51	57	53
Violence	52	46	43	48	50	61	60	54	58	55	45
Inequality	50	45	44	58	47	60	54	48	50	49	45
Inflation	44	54	48	42	40	40	44	33	42	42	59
Migration	39	20	33	15	59	44	48	40	42	31	53
Terrorism	30	20	29	20	42	48	29	28	27	23	31
Being the backyard of the United States	25	29	19	21	26	33	22	25	34	24	19
Climate crisis	21	17	22	20	21	30	22	19	20	18	18
Being irrelevant to the world	15	15	15	13	14	15	18	14	12	19	14
DK/NA	5	5	4	11	5	4	2	2	5	3	5


shaped by the degree of autonomy that citizens perceive for their countries (5.7 *Strategic Dilemmas in Latin America (%)*). What emerges is a clear inclination toward pragmatic solutions, consistent with more constrained and/or volatile contexts. This pattern is reflected in three non-mutually exclusive orientations: a preference for trade, a perceived pressure to align, and a limited willingness to condition external ties on political regime.

Despite the priority placed on international trade, Latin Americans clearly perceive an increasingly protectionist global environment: in eight of the ten countries surveyed, growing frustration is reflected in a broad-base decline in net agreement on the benefits of trade between 2022 and 2026 (5.8 *Net Agreement on the Benefits of Global Trade: 2022–2026 (%)*). Two exceptions are noteworthy: appreciation for trade increases slightly in Chile and more significantly in Colombia.

### Strategic Dilemmas in Latin America (%)

Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of the world?

Net agreement = (strongly agree and agree) – (strongly disagree and disagree)



### Net Agreement on the Benefits of Global Trade: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of the world?

Trade with other countries always benefits my country.

Net agreement = (strongly agree and agree) – (strongly disagree and disagree)




A defining feature of Latin America’s international engagement—deeply rooted at the societal level—is the rejection of nuclear weapons (5.9 *Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Latin America [%]*). Across all countries, there is majority opposition to nuclear proliferation in the region, along with a clear perception that its costs far outweigh any potential benefits. This strong anti-nuclear (for military purposes) stance is consistent with the region’s long-standing role as

a nuclear-weapon-free zone since the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and its active support for global disarmament efforts. Despite the robustness of this anti-nuclear (for military purposes) consensus, it is not uniform and varies in intensity. Rejection is particularly strong in Costa Rica and Uruguay; remains high in Colombia and Chile; reaches an intermediate level in Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico; and is comparatively lower in Guatemala, Brazil, and Bolivia.

### Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Latin America (%)

Q: In your opinion, is it very good, good, bad or very bad for Latin America to have nuclear weapons?

Net agreement = (Very good and good) – (Very bad and bad)



From the perspective of public opinion, Latin American foreign policy is guided primarily by considerations of economic well-being, security, and autonomy (5.10 *Latin America's Foreign Policy Priorities (%)*). The region appears to prioritize expanding trade, preserving sovereignty, and upholding normative commitments to democracy and human rights, yet these preferences do not translate into strong support for regional integration, military capacity-building, or alignment with major powers.

The hierarchy of foreign policy priorities identified by respondents reveals a new coherence adjusted to the current context. The ten priorities can be grouped into three tiers. The first, comprising the highest-priority issues, centers on trade and sovereignty. The second, intermediate level includes five issues: defense of democracy and human rights, migration control, ties with Europe, protection of nationals abroad, and regional integration. A third and final tier brings together three preferences that appear to be interconnected within a framework of a second “Cold War”: deepening ties with China, a national militarization agenda, and closer relations with the United States. While national sovereignty is highly valued, it is not associated with militarization and territorial defense—two attributes that were more prominent in Latin America’s past.


The relatively higher appreciation for relations with Europe, compared to ties with China and the United States, opens avenues for engagement, particularly in the area of trade. However, some subtleties and tensions appear. A deeper relationship with Europe goes hand in hand with the protection of the diaspora, just as the defense of the rule of law at home does coexist with concern over migration control. Notably, clear tension emerges between the importance attached to trade and the limited interest in regional integration.

When disaggregated by country, the data reveal distinct national profiles rather than a uniform regional pattern (5.11 *Latin America's Foreign Policy Priorities (%)*). Two cases are particularly noteworthy: Venezuela and Chile. Venezuela displays a distinct profile, with the importance attached to the protection of nationals abroad comparable to that of trade. In Chile, migration control ranks as the top priority, far exceeding all other issues. It is also worth highlighting the importance that Costa Rica assigns to the defense of democracy and that Uruguay attributes to regional integration. In Guatemala, the protection of the diaspora occupies a more prominent position than in other countries. Taken together, these emphases underscore the coexistence of shared priorities and national specific foreign policy logics.

### Latin America's Foreign Policy Priorities (%)

Figure 5.10

Q: From the following list, which should be your country's foreign policy priorities?



Latin America’s Foreign Policy Priorities (%)

Q: From the following list, which should be your country’s foreign policy priorities?

	LATAM	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Uruguay	Venezuela
Promote trade	45	54	50	44	44	50	42	39	45	48	36
Defend national sovereignty	40	56	34	41	38	40	45	40	45	30	32
Protect democracy and human rights worldwide	32	25	30	34	22	34	42	36	31	34	34
Control migration	31	28	14	16	70	33	37	33	36	16	27
Strengthen ties with European countries	27	19	35	26	25	26	31	21	25	33	29
Protect nationals abroad	24	21	22	21	13	21	17	37	26	25	36
Foster integration with countries in the region	21	26	28	16	14	18	22	21	14	30	20
Deepen ties with China	18	13	17	22	18	20	15	19	22	27	13
Improve military and territorial defense capabilities	17	18	16	21	20	20	9	22	23	12	10
Deepen ties with the United States	16	18	16	28	14	17	12	10	14	10	20
DK/NA	14	13	16	19	12	12	13	10	11	15	18

The valuation of relations with Europe is particularly notable, as it significantly surpasses China and the United States in Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Indeed, it is striking that relations with the United States rank last among the region’s list of priorities. It is also noteworthy that, among the ten countries surveyed, this relationship holds a relatively stronger position in Venezuela and Brazil. In the latter case, given limited salience of foreign policy within the domestic agenda, the proportion of respondents who selected “don’t know” or “no answer” is especially high. This raises an important question: does this reflect a broader pattern of public disengagement from the country’s diplomacy? The relevance of this question increases when considering the link between foreign policy and democracy, particularly in the context of Latin America’s 2026 electoral cycle, which is set to reshape political dynamics across several key countries in the region.

In contrast to perceptions of global democratic decline between 2022 and 2026, at the regional level the survey reveals a picture of democratic continuity, albeit with specific setbacks and advances in individual countries (5.12 *Assessment of Democracy within the Country: 2022–2026 [%]*). At the regional average, the evaluation declines only

marginally, suggesting stability rather than erosion. This pattern aligns with broader evidence indicating that despite persistent worries about democratic performance, democracy remains firmly rooted in Latin America, albeit with varying degrees of dissatisfaction. The first notable feature in this comparison is the persistent gap between countries. At the top of the ranking, Uruguay and Costa Rica remain in place, countries that have demonstrated clear continuity in their commitment to the rule of law. Among democracies with intermediate scores, mixed dynamics can be observed. Chile consolidates its position as one of the best-rated systems. Argentina remains stable, indicating perceptual resilience in a context of political polarization. Conversely, Brazil and Mexico show declining assessments, pointing to a deterioration in public perceptions of their democratic systems. A striking development is the improvement in Colombia’s evaluation of its democracy, which may reflect more favorable expectations or a shift in the national political climate. In contrast, Venezuela—both in this survey and the previous one—ranks as the lowest-rated country. Finally, Guatemala and Bolivia remain in the lower tier, with minor difficulties that reflect a perception of institutional fragility.

Assessment of Democracy within the Country: 2022–2026 (%)

Q: On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates “not a democracy” and 10 indicates “a full democracy,” where would you score your own country?

Variation = (2026 – 2022)





# Main Takeaways

For Latin Americans, the **world** is not distant. It is perceived as a complex and consequential landscape characterized by:

- a hegemonic vacuum and growing anomie fueling deep uncertainty about the future;
- neglected global problems that directly threaten their well-being and elicit empathy;
- a gradual shift in centers of power toward the East;
- mounting risks from armed conflicts, reinforcing calls for reaffirming Latin America's denuclearization;
- deep distrust toward "strongmen," notably Trump and Putin;
- and by rejection of a new "Cold War" dynamic between the United States and China.

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Latin Americans view **Europe and the European Union**

- with a mix of nostalgia and expectation, yielding relatively high levels of hope, confidence, and admiration;
- through an economic lens emphasizing trade, financing, and investment, balanced with human rights concerns and humanitarian aid;
- with understanding of Europe's stance in Ukraine.

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Yet, with

- discontent over perceived indifference toward Gaza;
- expectations of greater European commitment to combating inequality and poverty;
- disappointment in its development and integration model;
- a more blurred normative power with weakened leadership.

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Latin Americans view **their own region:**

- with greater self-esteem and willingness to defend sovereignty;
- with future relevance comparable to Europe's;
- facing concerns about poverty, economic stagnation, unemployment, and insecurity linked to drug trafficking and organized crime;
- under pressure to choose sides between the United States and China;
- with a positive disposition toward deepening ties with both Europe and China.

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Yet, with

- limited interest in strengthening relations with the United States;
- a fragmented international and regional agenda that hampers coordination of national and foreign policies;
- a similar range of concerns across countries that do not always translate into convergent foreign policies.

# **6. Final Reflections: Dilemmas Beyond the Data**

## 6.

# Final Reflections: Dilemmas Beyond the Data

Data do not speak for themselves. They require context and interpretation, especially in times of global turbulence and transition. Latin American perspectives provide a fairly accurate mirror of changes in the global environment. These final reflections offer a cross-cutting analysis of the results, examining them from a different angle to explore what public perceptions reveal about the current context and the central dilemmas confronting Latin American and European societies and governments, both in their mutual relations and in how they navigate global uncertainty with resilience.

One of the most notable findings in the AMLAT Radar 2026 results is the high level of social disapproval of Donald Trump, precisely at a time when several governments in the region have actively aligned with Washington. This reputational damage to the United States in Latin America across all spheres opens both dilemmas and opportunities to rethink preferred avenues of international engagement.

We believe this erosion reflects the costs of the Trump administration's abrupt and aggressive approach to impose a US sphere of influence. However, there is no sign of deference or subservience toward Washington in Latin American public opinion. Instead, there is a resilient attitude, underpinned by a sovereigntist consensus that sends a signal to multiple actors. Undoubtedly, this resilient sovereigntism will create dilemmas for governments as they define and pursue their strategic options.

Indeed, what emerges is a clear opportunity for other global actors, particularly from Europe, Asia, and the Global South, which often enjoy more stable perceptions and more favorable images. Significantly, Latin Americans view China not as a threat, but as a pragmatic option valued for its advances in education, science, and technology. For Europe, this scenario represents an opportunity to establish itself as a partner grounded on political dialogue, economic and social cooperation, technology transfer, and the defense of international law. Latin American societies prioritize strategies that preserve sovereignty while diversifying and balancing relationships without preferential ties.<sup>6</sup> This presents significant avenues for European paradiplomacy, as it will find receptive civil society and subnational actors in Latin America that are open and interested in broadening their international horizons.

A notable finding is the gradual fading of Europe and the European Union in Latin American perceptions, a trend mirrored globally. Over the past four years, a sense of gradual distancing has taken hold, without an abrupt fracture. Europe remains recognized, but stagnant with an image anchored in the past, lacking dynamism or offering no clear innovative vision for the future. In an increasingly competitive international environment, this combination of historical familiarity and diminishing visibility risks gradual erosion of European influence on Latin American radar unless Europe acts decisively to reinforce its presence and strategic role.

Several dilemmas emerge from this process. Europe is ceasing to be an aspirational model, a troubling signal of the eclipse of its civilizational role and soft power. In this climate of opinion, relations with Latin America would require a shift away from the asymmetrical logic underlying the projection of ideal models, as occurred with regional integration. Pontifical posturing has little constructive effect on issues such as climate change, the digital economy, and human rights, where mutual interests exist and demand pragmatic cooperation.

The current complex juncture offers a fertile opportunity to advance an agenda with tangible benefits for the region, exemplified by the recently signed EU–Mercosur Agreement. Latin American public opinion firmly opposes militarization and categorically rejects nuclearization, so it would be costly and disappointing for Europe to attempt to involve the region in any of its crusades. Strategic autonomy is a challenge that Europeans themselves must address.

We consider it a significant observation that there is greater dispersion in the Latin American agenda and a decline of social interest in regional cooperation, which aligns with and reinforces trends at the governmental level. This manifests as multiple tensions: prioritizing trade versus indifference toward integration with neighboring countries; protecting nationals abroad versus controlling regional migration; combating violence, drug trafficking and organized crime versus marginalizing concerns about terrorism, among others. These tensions reveal societies deeply ambivalent on key issues, constraining governmental capacity to set coherent public policy

<sup>6</sup> For a detailed analysis of the shift in perceptions toward the United States, see Guadalupe González and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian: "El desconcierto latinoamericano frente al (previsible) acoso de Donald Trump" in *Nueva Sociedad* N° 321, 1-2/2026, available at <[nuso.org](http://nuso.org)>.

priorities and enable regional dialogue. Dispersion can translate into a lack of focus and limited interest in certain issues, becoming particularly evident in foreign policy matters. Climate change exemplifies this kind of gap: a leading global concern that receives little attention in their foreign policy agenda. Four emblematic cases in this survey are Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Colombia. In Brazil, the high visibility of its diplomacy contrasts with a society that is largely disengaged and uncertain about the country's foreign policy. Chile's notably restrictive public opinion stance on migration may partly explain the current governing coalition's electoral success. Finally, Mexican and Colombian societies strongly reject being treated as the "backyard" of the United States, a stance that likely reinforces approval ratings for the leaders of those countries.

The most important message conveyed by Latin American society to Europe and the world in this survey is the reaffirmation of its unwavering commitment to domestic democracy and international peace. Yet this message raises questions. Is Europe genuinely interested in engaging with a citizen-driven Latin America? Is Europe capable of recognizing the role that it shares with Latin America amid the upheaval that Washington is generating in global

governance? Can European democratic voices leverage Latin America's resilience to the values of the rule of law as political capital to become influential and constructive actors in an emerging international order?

For Latin American women and men who engage with—or participate in—the wide range of activities connecting our countries to the world, we leave more than questions: we raise a concern. We draw attention to an issue that is critical when it comes to an informed public sphere on international affairs. Our data reveal a troubling gap between public opinion and the dominant narratives circulated by government, media, and social networks. By showing that citizens are both engaged and worried about global issues, the results of this survey underscore the need to narrow the distance between the narratives about global matters disseminated across communication channels and the actual facts. In our region, engaged societies deserve high-quality information to sustain authentic public debate. We have, in essence, a citizenry attuned to the world, increasingly aware that global events affect their daily lives. In democratic contexts, such awareness represents a collective asset, not a burden.

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## AMLAT Radar 2026: Latin American Views on Europe and the World

This is the second edition of a joint initiative by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the magazine *Nueva Sociedad*, the Diálogo y Paz group, and Latinobarómetro, aimed at producing rigorous information as a public good to understand perceptions in Latin America. Based on ten national contexts, the survey constructs a regional perspective on key contemporary issues, building on a first edition conducted in 2021 and published in 2022.

This new edition of AMLAT Radar presents opinions gathered between October and November 2025 in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In a global context marked by rapid transformations, this report offers an updated snapshot of how the region perceives its place in the world, as well as the tensions and shifts in the international landscape, the assessment of global actors, and expectations regarding leadership and cooperation on a global scale.

Data visualization and more information about this project at:  
➔ [amlatradar.org](https://amlatradar.org)

