Chapter 2 agreed rules to maximize their(short-term) interest, the assurance that victims can seek redress or obtain justice in cases of rule violation or cheating become very crucial for the sustainability of democracy. In the absence of this, a'tit-for-tat' situation arises where rule violations are responded to with other rule violations(Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). This situation, a clear outcome of institutional degeneration, can destabilize prevailing arrangements and lead to all-out violence and subsequent de-consolidation of the democracy. Therefore, while the revival of pre-existing democratic institutions – and the creation of new ones – which has been a marked feature of Ghana's transition to constitutional rule is refreshing, the level of violence that characterizes elections in Ghana suggests that the mediatory role of institutions is currently not being discharged adequately. This inadequacy appears to be chipping away actor confidence in the police and judiciary, for example, and correspondingly inspiring politicians and their supporters to take the law into their own hands. The corrosive effect of such a terrifying development on the rule of law, democracy and its stability cannot be overemphasized. The fundamental question that arises then is: why are formal institutions failing to function as intended? Answering this leads to a further question that relates to the nature of interactions between formal institutions and political actors: which of the two categories influences the other? As noted earlier, a fundamental determinant of the effectiveness ofinstitutional frameworks is the extent to which they succeed in the implementation of commonly agreed norms, rules and procedure of political exchange. 41