a rear base. In recent years, support for these groups by the Sudanese government has not only exacerbated the regional security situation but also contributed to a weakening of the Chadian regime itself. Furthermore, Sudanese militia groups have been crossing the border and attacking the civilian population since 2005. Although these raids have somewhat subsided in the meantime, they have led to a dramatic escalation of the third factor, namely violent conflicts between ethnic groups in the region. The Sudanese strategy of destabilising Chad, however, is for its part a reaction to Chad’s support for the rebel groups in Darfur. This support for armed opposition in the respective neighbouring country has led to such a close interrelation of the crises in both countries that a lasting peace in the region can only be brought about if both conflicts are addressed simultaneously. Sudan: Centre-Periphery Conflict On the Sudanese side of the border the process of fractionalisation of rebel movements has accelerated following the collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement in the spring of 2006. In view of the endless number of tiny splinter groups, the chance of a common rebel position for possible peace negotiations has further plummeted. To grasp the full complexity of Sudan’s crisis, the focus of analysis has to be extended beyond Darfur to include the nationwide conflict between the small elite in the centre of the Sudan and numerous marginalised groups throughout the country. The experience with the peace Agreement concluded with the southern Sudanese rebel group SPLM(Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) and the simultaneous outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur clearly demonstrates that an isolated solution of individual sub-conflicts cannot resolve the issues at the core of Sudan’s overall problems. The SPLM, which at least occasionally advocated a holistic solution, however faces the dilemma that in such a framework it would have to give up parts of its hard-won privileges set out in the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Then again, given that the implementation of the CPA has come to a virtual standstill, these privileges are themselves in jeopardy. The crucial factor deciding the future of the Sudan will therefore be whether the SPLM maintains its coalition with the NCP(National Congress Party) or whether the Government of National Unity unravels – which in all probability would lead to a renewed outbreak of the civil war. Central Africa: Disappointed Mercenaries The Central African Republic has also seen an escalation of violence over the last few years. However, this is primarily due to internal conflicts in the wake of the military coup in 2003. In addition to supporters of the former president, the very soldiers who originally helped the new President Bozizé seize the reigns of power are now fighting him. These mercenaries feel insufficiently rewarded for their services and are trying to settle the score by way of rebellion. It is scarcely surprising then, that rebel groups have cropped up not only in the region bordering on Darfur, but in the north-western part of the country as well. In spite of sporadic points of tangency with conflicts in the neighbouring countries such as, for instance, Chadian rebels passing through the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic in their attempted coup d´etat in April 2006, the problems besetting the Central African Republic can still be analyzed and solved largely separately from the problems in its neighbouring countries. International Efforts: Learning from Past Mistakes? The attempts of the international community to help find a solution in the region have not been very successful, particularly since the outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur. The no doubt serious will of politicians as well as the public pressure to“do something” to end the conflict in view of the humanitarian suffering have all too often led to hasty measures being taken without any prior, realistic analysis of their probable efficacy. The development of future strategies must therefore also be based on a critical assessment of measures taken in the past. An analysis of these measures indicates three main shortcomings that should henceforth be avoided. First of all, the isolated view on individual hot spots, secondly the lack of cooperation between the numerous actors involved and, finally, the primacy of military solutions. Accordingly, the first step along the route to a more promising strategy would be to acknowledge the interrelations between the various conflicts and to carefully analyse these linkages. On this basis, an overall strategy for the region needs to be developed which simultaneously addresses the various hot spots – the implementation of the CPA, the search for a peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict, the consideration of other marginalised regions and groups in the Sudan and, finally, an analysis of the structural problems afflicting the political system in Chad. One of the advantages of a comprehensive strategy for the conflicts in the region is that it ensures that the groups involved in the various localised conflicts do not receive contradictory 2