Foreign Policy Associa on together with FriedrichEbert-S ung o ﬀ er you a newsle er on foreign policy and European integra on issues of the Republic of Moldova. The newsle er is part of the “Foreign Policy Dialogue” joint Project. NEWSLETTER MONTHLY BULLETIN DECEMBER 2019 NR.12 166 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates The newsle er is developed by Sorina Ș tefâr ță, editor-coordinator TOPICS OF THE EDITION: 1. Angela Gr ă mad ă, director of Experts for Security and Global A ﬀ airs Associa on(ESGA), Bucharest:„We should look at the Republic of Moldova in a much wider regional context” 2. Editorial by Andrei Popov:„Three Governments- three foreign policies or a di ﬀ erent review of the year?” 3. Dirk Wiese, member of the Bundestag, coordinator of the German Federal Government for inter-societal coopera on with Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Partnership states:„Reforms are done for the ci zens, so it is logical to listen to what these people have to say” 4. Expert opinion. Dionis Cenu șă:“Trauma zed European perspec ve in the EU neighbourhood and the Moldovan echoes” News in brief In December this year, the EU Council formally endorsed the agreement concluded on 11 July 2019 with the Moldovan Government, which broadens the degree of trade liberalization for specific agricultural products under the DCFTA. The Republic of Moldova will be granted additional duty-free tariff rate quotas to export table grapes(of double the current amount) and plums(of a 50% increase on the current volume), as well as a new duty-free quota for cherries(of 1.500 tonnes). As part of the agreement, EU producers will also have more export opportunities, as the EU will gain additional duty-free access to the Moldovan market. Moreover, the thresholds triggering the anti-circumvention mechanism for wheat, barley, maize, sugar and processed cereals have also been raised, taking into account the trade patterns over the last few years. The agreement is part of the EU’s commitment to citizens and businesses and the opportunities and benefits offered by the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).These revisions are in the context of the third year review of the EU-Republic of Moldova Association Agreement. The EU completed this review in response to the sustained efforts made by Sandu’s government to implement reforms under the DCFTA. The EU encourages the Republic of Moldova to continue the implementation of these needed reforms in the spirit of the Association Agreement. Before it can enter into force, the agreement will have to be approved by the EU-Republic of Moldova Association Committee in Trade Configuration(ACTC). Aspects of bilateral political and economic cooperation, the intensification of the efficient interaction of the police at cross-border level, as well as the regional and global developments were addressed during the working visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Aureliu Ciocoi, in Berlin on December 16-17. The head of the Moldovan diplomacy had meetings with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Chancellery, the Office of the Federal President, and members of the Bundestag from various parties. The main topics discussed with the German interlocutors referred to the political situation in the Republic of Moldova, the problems and challenges of regional security, the Moldovan-German political and social-economic relations, the implementation of the Association Agreement, the Moldova-EU cooperation, the possibility of increasing the bilateral trade. The Minister thanked the German side for the political and economic support offered to our country and mentioned the need for its extension. The priorities of the Government Action Plan for 2020-2023 was the key topic of the meeting that the Prime Minister Ion Chicu had with the accredited ambassadors in Chisinau on December 17. The chief executive mentioned as priorities the justice reform, the public investments in infrastructure, the modernization of the economy, and improved welfare of the people.“The government will act in a transparent manner. The implementation of the Association Agreement is a priority and we will keep an open dialogue with all the partners”, said Ion Chicu. He thanked the representatives of the diplomatic corps for the constant support offered to the Republic of Moldova and stressed that, in fact, the assistance is provided to the citizens of the country, not to the Governments. The priorities in the field of European integration, implicitly the determination of the current Executive to continue and boost the European course of the Republic of Moldova were also addressed at the meeting of the Governmental Commission for European Integration, convened by Prime Minister Ion Chicu later this year. Moldova 2019: a tragicomedy with an uncertain... ending Photo: Moldova.org Turkeys in the presiden al building yard, a symbol photo of the year Sorina Ș tefâr ță This last text of 2019 happened to be wri en a er a show. I had been to the “Love with the fool”- a tasty comedy, played for several years with the full room at the Na onal Theater“Eugene Ionesco”. And as a good show always inspires, I realized that I am dividing the year that is coming to an end into acts. How many were they? Who were the prompters and who were the real actors? And what happens when the curtain falls? We started in JanuaryFebruary with a poli calelectoral reality that resulted in a Parliament as fragmented as the whole country, with depu es that descended from the Kroll Report directly into the plenary session room and with a deep sense of fatality. There was a ping-pong of statementsaccusa ons-nego a ons etc. Then we found ourselves at the beginning of June which was marked by“pro” and “against” protests; with one week in which we Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

2 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates had two Governments and many other “two”; with some poor turkeys thrown over the fence of the presiden al building by other poor turkeys; and with the shameful, but healthy escape of the one who seemed to have put the country in his pocket for a long me- and with the escape of more than a dozen rats that le the“ship” together with the man... Today, it is s ll unclear whether we have actually got out of the famous pocket or not – or worse – have landed into another, just as dark and s nky. But the ﬁ ve months of the Maia Sandu Government- a real 15-minute intermission in a Republic of Moldova engaged in a theatre of the absurd - have shown that freedom and dignity are not so impossible if there is determina on. Only you are asking yourself looking around, who s ll needs determina on today? I also doubt we need freedom looking at how fast we are giving it all out. And this is how we are entering a new act/ year with a new Government, invested with an envious speed for a poli cal class that can nego ate for months some tri ﬂ es; with new risks of interna onal isola on due to the new openly pro-Russian government; with new apocalyp c projects- compared to the future airports, the Chisinau Arena will look like an insigni ﬁ cant thing, including from a cost perspec ve; and with new plots of a president ready to do anything just to become president again. And that’s not a big deal in a country where everyone is watching TV and you replace one media holding with another. And where you can’t do anything, you just try it with sherry... Only in any good show, there is a proper denouement. The“Love with the fool” that served as a star ng point in wri ng this text is no excep on and, in the end, the fool is the one who thought himself supersmart. Because it is known that he who laughs last, laughs well... Our show, for the moment, is a tragicomedy, and the end is s ll uncertain- a fact con ﬁ rmed also by the protagonists and authors of the 2019 last edi on newsle er. But it is going to happen sooner or later. Un l then, happy New Year to everyone! Read our newsle er and... go to the theatre! We should look at the Republic of Moldova in a much wider regional context We don’t really believe in coincidences in the region, especially when it comes to Russia Angela Grămadă, director of Experts for Security and Global Affairs Association(ESGA), Bucharest F or this interview, Angela Gr ă mada had to take a break from her work on a policy paper in the last days of 2019, that she decided to dedicate to the Republic of Moldova and the events that marked the country in 2019. According to our interlocutor, the paper is going to set the tone for the next year at ESGA, the think tank that she created in Bucharest in 2014. This is because in 2019, Ukraine was in the focus of her organisa on. So in 2020, the a en on of this pla orm that brings together experts, representa ves of academia and civil society from Romania, the Euro-Atlan c area, the Middle East and the former Soviet area, will look also at the Republic of Moldova. It will happen not only because its founder, who has master degree and PhD in Interna onal Rela ons, both with SNSPA/ Na onal School for Poli cal and Administra ve Studies in Bucharest, comes from the le bank of the Prut, but also because, as she says, Chisinau is s ll in the cards... Whether this is good or bad, the next year is going to show. For now, let’s see what the 2019 poli cal year was like. Dear Angela, is the Republic of Moldova s ll important- as a poli cal case study, but also as a geographical area? Or is this policy paper a simple tribute at the end of the year? The document I am working on is, above all, my personal challenge. I set out to assess how the year 2019 was for the Republic of Moldova so as to have a clearer and more objec ve picture of the events- a necessary thing also because we, at ESGA, want to dedicate the next year to the Republic of Moldova. It so happened that in 2019, we focused all our e ﬀ orts on Ukraine and have realized that, in this regional landscape, we pay too li le a en on to the seemingly small things, but which have quite a big impact on Ukraine as well. And Kiev is more a en ve and sensi ve than Chisinau or Bucharest to everything that happens in the region. How and why? They understand it much be er that certain processes that are taking place in Chisinau, Tiraspol or Comrat can have quite a big impact on how certain forces are imposed and their interests are promoted. That is why we understand that we have to look at the Republic of Moldova in a wider regional context, much wider than the Black Sea, for example. Unfortunately, in Bucharest, many people are convinced that they know everything about the Republic of Moldova and that no further explana on is needed. De facto, however, we have only a few analysts knowledgeable of the subject, and their grasp on Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

3 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates reality is limited to a few experts or representa ves of poli cal groups from Chisinau with whom they discuss. At the same me, the same poli cal channels are used for communica on between certain businessmen in Bucharest and Chisinau, and also it is through the same poli cal channels that the investments, social and infrastructure ini a ves with the Republic of Moldova are promoted - only to the extent that the party allows them or within the limit of their interests. I was surprised to see that the new socialist mayor of Chisinau was received in Bucharest, even though those representa ves of the sector town halls are exponents of certain poli cal forces, in par cular, of the PSD... It was surprising also for us to see Ion Ceban in Bucharest, taking into account that, tradi onally, the socialists deny everything that is related to Romania or everything is Romanian. Well, their patrimonial interests say a di ﬀ erent thing... It is true that I do not even understand how this transfer of discursive support from the PDM to the PSRM took place here in Bucharest, given that, by the statements from June 2019, the MFA, President Iohannis, the Romanian o ﬃ cials in Brussels have expressed concern about the“unnatural” PSRM-ACUM alliance, and have respec vely set condi onali es. This went unno ced in Chisinau- for them it was important that Bucharest recognize the new Power and no one looked at the ﬁ rst paragraphs. However, they referred to serious things, such as regional security, threats and challenges for Ukraine and the way Russia is trying to interfere with the Chisinau poli cal decisions- with backup from the EU, of course. It is obvious that this alliance was also supported by the Europeans. And we don’t really believe in coincidences in the region, especially when it comes to Russia. The presidential elections are not the most important here How and where does the Republic of Moldova end the year- more to the East, more to the West? It has not moved geographically, but poli cally and even spiritually, where are we? It is important to dis nguish between the good and the least good things the country has gone through this year, and to draw lessons. From the point of view of the democra c exercise, the Republic of Moldova took a step forward in 2019: the change of power took place within the limits of certain democra c parameters and they did not resort to force; the par es and authori es are trying to take into account certain recommenda ons from the development partners; we went through two electoral exercises that both na onal and interna onal observers described as generally free and fair. We also note the improvement of the image of the Republic of Moldova abroad- and this strictly refers to the ﬁ ve-month Government of Maia Sandu; the a empt to reform certain public ins tu ons and the decomposi on of illegal schemes, through a much greater openness to the press. We had more independent journalism and more inves ga ons, more informa on on the corrupt nature of the ac ons of certain decision-makers from the public sphere. It is also posi ve that many experienced people have returned home and have tried to contribute to the development of certain areas, while the civil society- what was le of it a er many had been co-opted in the government sector- has become more proac ve and more vocal, because it understands that things can return on the same track they were before June 2019... At the same me, what happened in November 2019 is very serious – the no-con ﬁ dence vote against the Sandu Government and the way the socialists managed this crisis they nominated a new prime minister and quickly invested a new government with the PDM vote. So, apparently, today everything works well in the Republic of Moldova, but, in fact, it is not so and I saw it on Monday, December 23 rd , in the situa on related to the concession of the Airport, when it nobody seems to know what happened and does not take responsibility. In the same way, no one sees that reforma on-cleaning of the PDM, which is awaited by everybody. Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md In fact, they rather talk about the fact that the PDM is going to split... It can’t be ruled out as we have witnessed before such“reinven ons” on the poli cal scene of the Republic of Moldova. But the renewal of some poli cal par es cannot be done with old people, by spli ng or by taking over old poli cal par es that have not produced results. And I’m not just referring to the PDM here - let’s not forget that the Socialist Party was taken over by Igor Dodon a few years ago through similar ac ons that are not necessarily honest... What do you think the poli cal spectrum will look like, when it is clear that ACUM is no longer what it used to be- there will be two candidates in the presiden al elec ons in addi on to a dozen of unionist par es. And that’s just on the right-wing segment... First of all, par es should understand that the presiden al elec ons aren’t the most important thing. Yes, they are important because they iden fy leaders, and in the Republic of Moldova, it is s ll believed that a party has to be led by an iron hand while the leader should take decisions by himself/ herself. But the parliamentary elec ons are more important. As for the fact that today PPDA and PAS are more separate than together, this is neither regre ul nor tragic. On the contrary, it is a chance for both to reinvent themselves, so that they become stronger later. And if they decide to cooperate on certain topics, on public policy projects, each party may come up with an addi onal vision. For this, however, they should pass through an honest process of internal selfevalua on, to focus on developing the party organiza on chart, to strengthen its human capital and to coagulate its electorate, and to come up with as many posi ve messages. People are red of this imaginary ﬁ ght with various dragonoligarchs, when one sees it with the naked eye that power has passed from one oligarch to another… But posi ve messages run the risk of failing in populism...

4 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates Not if they are accompanied by responsibility for a dra law, which they concrete ac ons. To come up with public knew from the beginning they would fail. policy projects, to solve problems, to bring Thus, consciously, they drew upon them poten al investors, to communicate what the no-con ﬁ dence vote, and subsequently, you want to do, based on the data- then they gave up, for various reasons, on all you become credible, and credibility costs levers they held in the public ins tu ons and helps you to get popular support they managed, such as the parliamentary much easier and with much less money commi ees. It doesn’t seem fair to the than in the case of populists. It’s ok to voters, ﬁ rst of all. build an electoral programme based on the ﬁ ght with Plahotniuc, maybe even two The conscious withdrawal in opposi on programmes. But people are wai ng also of the PAS/ PPDA has been no ced for construc ve messages and for some admi ed by many people. But it was hope. jus ﬁ ed by the“right me” and the fact that, if they had remained in government, Maia Sandu’s team left the Chicu Government many yielding more and more, their image would have been irretrievably damaged. advantages It is an opinion that has the right to Which of the mistakes of the current Opposi on could have been avoided? I’m asking about them, because, they say the winners should not be subject to judgment... life. Only in June 2019 they were trying to convince us that they came to the government for at least a year and that they will face the challenges, with all the risks arising out of such an alliance of temporary convenience. Thus, they should I have seen a lot of excuses from the ACUM, that they don’t do one thing or another because they are busy with the government. And I do believe they were busy... but being so busy they allowed Igor Dodon to go to the UN to support his view on the Transnistrian se lement and the need for interna onal recogni on of the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova. Also, the socialists went from house to house to present their candidates for the local elec ons. Zinaida Greceanii alone visited some 20 communi es from North to South and from East to West. For comparison, the Maia Sandu’s message in support of Galina Sajin – the ACUM candidate for the West cons tuency no 50 on October 20 about whom nobody knew almost anything- came just before the polls. Not to men on the general feeling have assumed their failure to organize the contest for the elec on of the A orney General, and then they should have tried to communicate di ﬀ erently with the Socialists. In parallel, they should have implemented social projects, organized public debates on the 2020 budget, shown e ﬃ ciency in other areas and shouldn’t have le free space for the coali on partners. But they le consciously and, also consciously, le many advantages to the current government. Today the Chicu Government capitalises on what has done /planned well, including on the external dimension, the Sandu Government and the people who came from abroad to work in her cabinet. I saw, indeed, how the current Government has already undertaken many of the social projects announced by the previous execu ve... that Andrei Nastase did not really want to win the mayoralty in Chisinau and that he ran for mayor out of necessity. This has played a nasty trick on him, because his messages were about something else, not about the City Hall. And you cannot get the people’s vote if you are not convincing ... At the same me, I would men on that the Sandu Government almost exclusively engaged in the act of government- the PSRM had only three representa ves in the Execu ve-, a er which it assumed How realis c is for Maia Sandu to team up with PDM in order to get Igor Dodon ashore this me? It might be realis c, especially if we take into account the recent statements of the PAS MPs, who asked directly the Democrats for support of the nocon ﬁ dence vote against the Government that they to ﬁ le. But such an alliance should necessarily be condi oned with the internal reform of the PDM. Without further guarantees, without the certainty that the new alliance will not bring major damage to the PAS image, it is unlikely that Maia Sandu will accept such a poli cal construc on. Kiev is watching attentively what is happening in Chisinau You said earlier that Ukraine is more a en ve to what is happening in the region, that they are more prepared and organized to respond to the dangers. Where are we failing – are we failing because we don’t know or because we simply don’t want to react? First of all, we got used to the Transnistrian problem and we think very li le about it. Excep ons are certain events, such as the recent OSCE mee ng in Bra slava, which reminded us that this was again about signing documents that o ﬀ ered new bene ﬁ ts to the Transnistrian leaders. The Ukrainians, however, are in an ac ve phase of the war, the people die almost daily, and the civil society, a er November 2013, fully understood its role and purpose, having closely monitored the poli cal and the decision-making processes. De facto, Kiev understood that the Russians are tes ng a poten al model in the Republic of Moldova to be later applied in Ukraine. The fact that since January 2019, so much has been discussed about a possible federaliza on of the country is not accidental- the Russians just want to do this in Eastern Ukraine and the model will be much easier to apply, if a precedent is created in the Republic Moldova. Finally, Kiev is closely watching how Moscow takes over assets, ﬁ nances par es, controls and manages economic processes in Chisinau, as well as deals with strategic objec ves, such as the Airport. These are very important and revealing things for Ukraine, things that keep them vigilant. Unfortunately, we cannot speak of the same vigilance in the case of the Moldovan authori es. On a scale from one to ten, where are we in terms of security? Somewhere on Four, if we admit that one is the lowest posi on. The drawbacks Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

come from how we understand our need for security; how we manage the ﬁ eld in terms of investments, including in human resources in the Ministry of Defense; how we discuss with the development partners about the se lement of the Transnistrian con ﬂ ict and how we transact, with the help of Tiraspol, na onal economic interests. In addi on, we should take into account the fact that some poli cal groups from Chisinau have encouraged polls such as the referendum held on 2 February 2014 in Gagauzia. So, we are in a rather ungrateful posi on with regard to our na onal security and this is especially so because we are trading poli cal interests with it… Regarding the foreign policy, which are the forecasts for the 2020? There are certain risks in this area that have to be emphasized. They refer, above all, to the condi onali es about which the Republic of Moldova has been warned by both the European Union and Romania. It is also very important to see how the discussions on the Transnistrian ﬁ le will take place, in order to be able to assess the further developments in the bilateral dialogue with Ukraine. The messages transmi ed by the current government, managed by Igor Dodon- about the need to introduce neutrality as a priority on the interna onal agenda, about deepening the processes of Eurasian integra on, plus the lack of vision, but also of levers in the dialogue with Kiev and Bucharest – don’t contributes to improving the content of foreign policy. On the contrary, these messages highlight the dissensions, but also the fears of external partners. Therefore, in 2020, we will have to get used to the fact that the external partners treat the decisionmaking process in Chisinau not only with concern, but also with a dose of suspicion that the Moldovan authori es are promo ng foreign interests. As a result, they will limit their support to discursive encouragement and promises of technical and ﬁ nancial assistance for be er mes… Thank you for the interview and I wish you success! Sorina Ș tefâr ță 5 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates Editorial Three Governments three foreign policies or a different review of the year Andrei Popov, president of the Ins tute for Strategic Ini a ves(IPIS) I t is not the ﬁ rst me that three execu ves have changed in Chisinau during a single year(this happened in 1999 and 2015), but it is the absolute premiere that each of these three governments- Filip, Sandu and Chicu- got invested by three completely di ﬀ erent combina ons of parliamentary majori es. In its 28 years of independence, the Republic of Moldova has not had another year to be segmented so clearly into three dis nct stages. Even the only element of con nuity- President Igor Dodon – has played three completely di ﬀ erent roles in each of these three phases: from the junior informal and vulnerable partner in the rela ons with Vlad Plahotniuc to the cofounder of the PSRM-ACUM majority and, ul mately, star ng with the investment of the Chicu Government, to the undisputed leader of a new power ver cal. The depth of the ruptures that occurred in June and November between the three phases of poli cal life is also underlined by the fact that, for the ﬁ rst me in our history, none of the former ministers retained his/ her posi on in the three successive governments. This happened despite the previous prac ce of ensuring at least a minimum con nuity in the governments. Even in the case of profound changes in the parliamentary majori es(1994, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2016), at least a few“old” ministers were kept in the new cabinet. For instance, although the year 2001 marked the beginning of a new poli cal era, the Tarlev-1 Government took over six key ministers from the Braghi ș Cabinet (Economy, Finance and Foreign A ﬀ airs). Moreover, as a rule, the change of Governments did not a ﬀ ect the posi on of the Minister of Foreign Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

6 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates A ﬀ airs, a fact that symbolically transmi ed a certain reassuring signal of con nuity of the foreign policy course. Only three mes did the new government come with a new Foreign Minister- in 1994, 2009, and 2016. In 2019, however, the excep on became a rule and for the ﬁ rst me, in only one year, three Foreign Ministers took turns at the helm of the Moldovan diplomacy: Tudor Ulianovschi, Nicu Popescu and Aureliu Ciocoi. But certainly not the ﬁ gure of the foreign ministers was the reason why the year 2019 was so clearly segmented into three stages so dis nct not only for the internal poli cs, but also(almost equally) for the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova. The main reason was the type of government and its degree of credibility in rela ons with our main partners. Thus, the ﬁ rst half of 2019 has passed under the sign of Vlad Plahotniuc and his a empts to maintain and strengthen his power by establishing, a er the February parliamentary elec ons, a new cabinet of ministers, in which the Democra c Party would play the dominant role. Faced with a profound crisis of internal legi macy and external credibility, the last months of the Plahotniuc/ Filip’s government were probably the darkest and most ungrateful period for our foreign policy and diploma c endeavor. The government found itself- in par cular, a er the abusive and de ﬁ ant cancela on of the elec ons results for the Chisinau City Hall in July 2018 - in a very unreliable and even hos le external environment, and in a quasiisola on interna onally. Plahotniuc managed the counterperformance to set up against him not only Russia, but also the European Union and the United States. Despite the irreconcilable divergences between Brussels, Washington and Moscow on most international files, their interests reached a denominator in Moldova. All the three of them saw maintaining the Plahotniuc regime as the worst option for their interests. The only tool of Plahotniuc’s elimination was to support the creation of a parliamentary majority and a joint government between the PSRM and the ACUM Block. I do not agree, however, with those who say Plahotniuc’s removal was possible only due to the external factors- first and foremost, the premises of change existed in the Moldovan society. But we have to admit that without the decisive contribution from the outside, it is most likely that the premises created internally would not have been sufficient to bring about the change. Naturally, the Sandu Government, invested by the PSRM-ACUM majority, was from the ﬁ rst days welcomed and supported by the EU, Russia and (a er a few days of re ﬂ ec on) the USA, as well as by Kiev and Bucharest (which ini ally had also manifested certain concerns regarding the risk that the change could be capitalized to strengthen the posi ons of the“proRussian forces”). However, although it had one of the shortest mandates in history(exceeding only the Gaburici and Strele ț Governments in dura on), during the record me of only ﬁ ve months, the Cabinet led by Maia Sandu managed to relaunch the rela ons of the Republic of Moldova with both the West and Russia. The gates of the big capitals got almost immediately wide open for our country, and Prime Minister Sandu, in the very ﬁ rst month of her term, was received at the highest level in Bucharest, Brussels, Berlin and Kiev. Chisinau was visited by the EU Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Nego a ons, Johannes Hahn, and the High Representa ve for Foreign A ﬀ airs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. Maia Sandu paid two more visits to Brussels, in which she signed several EU ﬁ nancing agreements. A er a two and a half year break, also President Igor Dodon went to Brussels. In June, President Dodon, boyco ed un l then by Bucharest, met in Chisinau with the adviser on foreign a ﬀ airs to the Romanian President, Bogdan Aurescu, and with the State Secretary Dan Necul ă escu. Then, in September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly Session, he had his ﬁ rst mee ng with his Romanian counterpart Klaus Johannis, apparently crea ng the premises for overcoming the deadlock between the President of the Republic of Moldova and Romania. On July 23 rd , ﬁ ve ministers from the Sandu Government a ended, in Bucharest, the mee ng of the Republic of Moldova-Romania interministerial working group, agreeing on the promo on of several priority assistance projects, while in August, the Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu was invited to the annual mee ng of the Romanian diplomacy. At the beginning of November, Chisinau and Bucharest almost completed the nego a ons for a preferen al loan. The rela onship with the United States was also ﬁ lled with content through a whole series of mee ngs and visits to Chisinau, Washington and New York. In fact, this was the most intense period in the history of our bilateral rela ons: Nicu Popescu’s visit to Washington; the visits to Chisinau of the USAID Deputy Administrator Brock Birman; of the Under Secretary of State for Poli cal A ﬀ airs David Hale, the fourth person in the hierarchy of the State Department, and the Na onal Security Advisor to the U.S. President John Bolton. Then Maia Sandu’s visit to Washington and her mee ng with U.S. Vice President Mike Pence followed. Despite the modest publicity, the visit was full of substance, Prime Minister Sandu becoming the ﬁ h leader of the Republic of Moldova received at the White House, a er Snegur, Voronin, Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

7 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates Filat and Leanc ă. And that’s a er only four months of mandate! The mee ng of President Igor Dodon with the Under Secretary of State Hale in New York, as well as the mee ng of the MoldovanU.S. Intergovernmental Commission, on October 28 th , were also part of the new dynamics of the Moldovan-American rela ons. Thus, for the ﬁ rst me a er the establishment of the MoldovanAmerican strategic dialogue in March 2014 and its formal relaunch in June 2017, from episodic mee ngs and ac ons, it began to become rhythmic and structured, while the no on of “strategic” began to take shape and acquire real substance. A er a glacial period in Chisinau’s rela ons with the Russian Federa on, characterized by tensions and freezing of contacts on the Government’s line star ng with March 2017, the Moldovan-Russian dialogue also entered a rapid normaliza on. The Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Kozak, who had been in Chisinau on June 3 rd -4 th , playing a decisive role in convincing Igor Dodon to form, in the last minute, a parliamentary majority with the ACUM bloc, made two more visits to our country(on June 24 th and on September 20 th -21 st ). The Minister of Economy Vadim Brânzan accompanied Igor Dodon to the mee ngs with Kozak and the head of“Gazprom” Alexei Miller, and, a er a three-year break, the Moldovan Foreign Minister’s visit to Moscow took place, followed by the mee ng of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Commission and the Moldovan-Russian Economic Forum. The climax that would have symbolically marked the complete normaliza on of the Moldovan-Russian poli cal dialogue was to be the visit of Prime Minister Maia Sandu to Moscow. However, she did not rush to honour the invita on- invoking the importance of ensuring substan al results as a condi on for going to Moscow, Maia Sandu was obviously thinking about the possible poli cal repercussions such a visit might have in the context of local elec ons and of the specula ons that the Government was giving in to Russia. However, at the beginning of October, it was preliminarily agreed, through the diploma c channels, that the visit and the Sandu-Medvedev mee ng will take place at the end of the ﬁ rst decade of November. However, a few weeks before that date, the Russian side announced that the previously agreed period was no longer available, but no alterna ve dates, as provided in such cases by the diploma c prac ce, have been proposed. In parallel, the Russian interlocutors asked Chisinau to elaborate a detailed ac on plan on how the MoldovanRussian Joint Commission Protocol was implemented, a document presented as “indispensable” for a good prepara on of Mrs. Sandu’s visit to Moscow... The retrospec ve analysis of this episode, especially in the context of the ﬂ ying visit made to Moscow by the new Prime Minister Chicu, in the ﬁ rst week a er swearing into o ﬃ ce(so without having me for thorough prepara ons), o ﬀ ers su ﬃ cient arguments to advance the hypothesis that, at the end of October, the Russian side was already evalua ng the possible(or even probable) dismissal of the Sandu Government shortly. Or, once in opposi on, Sandu would immediately become Dodon’s direct compe tor. And if her resigna on had followed her visit to Moscow, this could have strengthened her posi ons on the center and, at the same me, could have deprived President Dodon’s next loyal government of the possibility of carrying out a major PR ac on. Moreover, it is almost unimaginable that the decision to dismiss the Sandu Government and to install, immediately, the Chicu Cabinet, with the votes of the PDM depu es, could be taken without coordina ng it with Moscow. The contribu on to the disembarking of Plahotniuc represented for the Kremlin not only an image boost among certain segments of the Moldovan society, but also a step forward in trying to become credible as a poten al partner capable of construc ve coopera on with the West. Thus, for Moscow, the investment in the debarking of Plahotniuc and maintaining the majority of the PSRMACUM exceeded, as a stake, the framework of the Republic of Moldova. An important side e ﬀ ect was to provide arguments to the European poli cians (President Emmanuel Macron, ﬁ rst of all) interested in and willing to reengage Russia. The dismissal of the Government(even though Prime Minister Maia Sandu chose the moment of departure by herself and forced the situa on) would have inevitably been interpreted in the West as evidence that Russia(again) cheated, using the“credulity” of its partners to capitalize in a sel ﬁ sh way in its own interest. Thus, the natural conclusion:“If it is not possible to build, together with Russia, common solu ons in a rela vely peripheral ﬁ le such as the Republic of Moldova, how can you trust it when discussing the situa on in Ukraine, Syria, etc.?”. Certainly, Dodon could not expose his main external employer to such a risk without coordina ng with it ﬁ rst. Moreover, he had to make convincing arguments that he keeps the situa on under control and that the alterna ve he will build with the Chicu Government in 2019-2020 is be er - including from the perspec ve of Russia’s interests- than con nuing the cohabita on in government with Maia Sandu. But about this and about the foreign policy of President Dodon and the Chicu Government we will con nue in the next edi on. Already in 2020. Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

8 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates Reforms are done for the citizens, so it is logical to listen to what these people have to say Dirk Wiese, member of the Bundestag, coordinator of the German Federal Government for inter-societal cooperation with Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Partnership states Union have not been visible enough, then we may have to communicate more. But most important is to include the Moldovan civil society. Their contribu on will be necessary if Moldova wants to work towards sustainable, successful reforms. “I n order for Germany to con nue to support the Republic of Moldova, it is very important that the rule of law is felt by the ci zens and that there are changes in areas such as jus ce, an-corrup on, public administra on, policies for the young genera on. We will monitor not only what is wri en, but what will be achieved for people...”. These are just a few statements made by the German Social-Democra c MP Dirk Wiese, coordinator of the Federal Government for inter-societal coopera on with Russia, Central Asia and the Eastern Partnership states, on December 16, during a public event organised by the Friedrich-EbertS ung in Chisinau. What the Berlin, but also the EU expecta ons are from the Eastern Partnership countries, and how the future of the MoldovanGerman rela ons is seen, read in the following interview. Mr. Wiese, you have a ended recently, in Chisinau, a public event en tled“European integra on of the Republic of Moldova and the current poli cal context”. How would you describe this context for our readers? Is there s ll European Integra on? It is in our strong interest that Europe grows further together. Not only within the European Union: for Moldova, the current framework for this is the Eastern Partnership. Foto: h ps://dirkwiese.de/ How do you assess the poli cal developments in our country at the end of 2019 and, respec vely, what will Berlin focus on in the MoldovanGerman bilateral dialogue? It was a very even ul year in Moldovan poli cs. I do not want to assess it yet. We have seen some fresh impetus for reforms a er the forma on of the coali on government in summer. Now we have a new government which has also expressed its commitment to the implementa on of the Associa on Agreement. The focus in our bilateral rela ons will be to support this process. The contribution of the non-governmental sector is indispensable for sustainable reforms You have had mee ngs with the poli cal leaders and government decision-makers, but also with representa ves of the civil society. What are the conclusions that you have le Chisinau with? All poli cal leaders agreed that reforms are important, not as an end in themselves, but for the people. If some mes the bene ﬁ ts of reforms and of the support from the European The incoherence that the Republic of Moldova has regularly shown in promo ng and implemen ng reforms has caused serious ﬂ uctua ons and even turbulence in the dialogue with the EU and with the member states. At the same me, more and more representa ves of civil society believe the European assistance should be strictly condi oned, and the ful ﬁ lment of commitments- closely monitored, in consulta on with the civil society. What do you think about this opinion and how do you see the coopera on with the civil society in this regard? Do you think the current Government is de facto willing to“report” to the nongovernmental sector? As a parliamentarian, I can say from my own experience: to include civil society serves both sides. In a democra c society, ci zens must have the possibility to promote the public good, their own personal views and interests. The government gets their exper se and must act in a transparent way and be able to explain how and why decisions are being taken. Prac cally everybody I talked to in Chisinau agreed: reforms must be implemented not for the European Union, but for Moldovan ci zens. Therefore, it is only logical to listen what they have to say. In your speech during the public event in Chisinau you emphasized the need to con nue with the jus ce reform, ﬁ rst of all. Do you think the current Government has the poli cal will to Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

9 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates advance with the jus ce system reform that the previous Cabinet and the current one have declared as a priority? Foreign Minister Aureliu Ciocoi himself has emphasized how important jus ce reform is for Moldova, as have representa ves in the parliament. So, everybody agrees in principle, but even more important will be to agree on concrete measures and their implementa on. I can strongly recommend to make full use of the exper se which the Venice Commission provides in this crucial area. The authorities should work constructively, for the country and for the benefit of the people The 10 th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership was an important topic on the European agenda in 2019. How do you assess these EaP years at the level of successful and less successful results? Will we get to talk about the second decade? I wholeheartedly believe that the Eastern Partnership is a success story. If you look at where we started and where we stand today there is a lot which we and especially our Eastern partners have achieved. We signed ambi ous Associa on Agreements and DCFTAs with Moldova, Georgia and the Ukraine and CEPA with Armenia. Trade increased substan ally as have people-to-people contacts. Where more progress is needed is in the ﬁ eld of human rights, good governance, rule of law, independence of media and the ﬁ ght against corrup on. The implementa on of agreed reforms in these areas needs to be a key priority for the coming years. How does Germany see the coopera on with the EaP countries? What are the Berlin expecta ons from the EaP partners, and in par cular from the Republic of Moldova? What needs to be done to strengthen the rela ons and streamline the reform processes in the member states? Naturally we are looking forward to broaden our rela ons with all six partner countries- both bilaterally as well as in the framework of the Eastern Partnership. Encouragement and support for the implementa on of agreed reforms will need to remain an essen al element of our rela onship- for the sake of the ci zens in the European Union and its neighbourhood. And these expecta ons apply also to the Republic of Moldova- the authori es should work construc vely together with us, for the bene ﬁ t of the people of Moldova. As a coordinator of the German Federal Government on the inter-societal coopera on with Russia, Central Asia and the EaP countries- so as a good connoisseur of the reali es in the area - how do you assess the situa on in the region? What are the biggest challenges and, if any, the most viable solu ons? The biggest challenges for most of the countries are their rela ons to Russia. We always emphasize that the Eastern partnership is not directed against Russia. In our civil society coopera on, we explicitly include Russia. This is especially important since there are unresolved territorial con ﬂ icts. It is important to keep nego a ons up, like we do in the Normandy format or the 5+2-nego a ons. But at the same me, we have to bring people together in order to maintain an understanding what values we share in Europe, East or West. Ensuring freedom and democracy is the mission of the state, but also of the society How do you see, in general, the developments and the solu ons for the Transnistrian con ﬂ ict with Berlin making considerable e ﬀ orts in the regulatory process? Germany supports the 5+2 nego a ons. Germany has contributed to the process by organizing the conference in Murnau and remains very interested. Unfortunately, the Bra slava memorandum was not signed un l now. In Chisinau, I have also spoken to Mr Neukirch about the recent developments. Germany will con nue to support the OSCE in its e ﬀ orts to make progress possible. In November 2019, there were 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in 2020 Germany will mark the 30 th anniversary of reuni ﬁ ca on. What is the main lesson learned in this period of me? And what lessons could we learn from the Germans, so that- possibly- we don’t repeat your mistakes? In Germany, a new genera on has grown that does not even remember the Cold War and the Berlin Wall. But history remains present in many ways. The main lesson is that freedom and democracy must be guaranteed by the state, its cons tu on and ins tu ons, but at the same me society must remain ac vely engaged in order to have a stable and living democracy. According to the statement issued a er the mee ng you had with Aureliu Ciocoi, Minister of Foreign A ﬀ airs and European Integra on, you assured that“Germany will pay greater a en on to our country during its rota ng Presidency of the EU Council from the second half of next year”. What will this be about? Germany will take over the rota ng presidency in the second half of 2020. There will be important decisions to be taken, for example on the budget. A er the summit of the Eastern partnership in the ﬁ rst half of the year, we will con nue to put an emphasis on the future of the Eastern partnership. This will include Moldova, since we see great poten al for our coopera on. Thank you for the interview. Sorina Ș tefâr ță Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

10 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates Expert opinion T he year 2019 has been disconcer ng not only for the Republic of Moldova. There have been transforma ons in countries where transforma ons, as a rule, happened just“formally”; violent protests broke out in quiet and prosperous areas; and the facts of the ma er that the poli cians promised to solve in the electoral campaign have changed on the way not just once, becoming even more complex. Also the dynamics of the EU and its neighbourhood is changing on the way and this is the situa on that the new European Commission, which started its ac vity on 1 December 2019, will have to cope with. What are its challenges on the Eastern dimension and what are the solu ons to them? These are the ques ons that the researcher Denis Cenusa is trying to answer in his analysis for the Info-Prim Neo-about the developments and involu ons in Ukraine and Georgia, about the“Moldovan case” and the e ﬀ ects of tolera ng oligarchic elements, and about the almost imminent readjustment of the Russian factor. The inten ons of the European Union to integrate its eastern neighbourhood into a func onal, qualita ve and democra c norma ve-ins tu onal model accumulate new sources of Dionis Cenușă: “Traumatized European perspective in the EU neighbourhood and the Moldovan echoes” unpredictability. The condi ons under which the new European Commission, headed by Ursula Von from Layen, from December 1, 2019, must operate are fragile and hos le. Fragility consists of scattering democratic standards within the EU. Political regimes similar to those in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria or Malta weaken the rule of law at national level, but are also legitimize that further through the affiliation with the pan-European parties. The hos lity of the European context seems inevitable due to the elements of disintegration(«Brexit»), the anti-European nationalist rhetoric and the competition of integrationist projects hosted by regimes with«vertical power»(IPN, November 5, 2019). The la ers will compete for the a en on of the European Commission along with issues of commercial(disputes with the US inside WTO), environmental (“Green European Deal”) or security (applica on of the 5G technology) nature (Poli co.eu, November 29, 2019). Three almost parallel processes... Three parallel poli cal processes, each of them with uncertain consequences, impose a nuanced look on EU’s rela ons with the Euro-op mis c countries that belong to the Eastern Partnership. The ﬁ rst impulse with inevitable political effects is the re-conceptualization of the conditions of EU enlargement, which devalues the attractiveness of the European perspective. Actually, the revision of the enlargement mechanism, suggested by France at President Emmanuel Macron’s indica ons, could trauma ze the European perspec ve, making it a hardly achievable objec ve. Raising the requirements, branching the(re-)evalua on criteria and inser ng a disquali ﬁ ca on and suspension mechanism upon the accession nego a ons diversify the poli cal costs for the pro-European forces in the Western Balkans, but also from the Eastern Partnership(Euroac v, November 2019). The second process derives from the attempt to facilitate a constructive dialogue with Russia, without applying conditionality and remedying measures dedicated to the international law and/ or the European security architecture. On the contrary, with the support of France, Russia returned to the General Assembly of the Council of Europe, previously excluded for its actions against Ukraine(IPN, 7 October 2019). Similarly, Paris is calling for the elimina on of NATO’s concerns about Russia, which in reality constantly proliferate threats regionally and globally (Bloomberg, November 28, 2019). Viewed as a gesture of capitula on in the face of the Russian military, informa onal and an democra c aggressions, restoring dialogue Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

11 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates with Russia for the me being remains outside the walls of EU ins tu ons. With a neutralized resistance because of its own appe te for the Russian gas, Germany manifests a rather permissive approach to the“Macronian” goodwill towards Russia. The normaliza on of rela ons with Vladimir Pu n’s regime, once injected into the bloodstream of the European structures, carries the risk of trivializing the pro-European discourse in the associated countries- Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The third conglomerate of processes originates from the internal political inconsistencies in the proEuropean parts of EU’s eastern neighborhood. Party-based and individual egoism obstructs the na onal strategic interests, but also prevails over the commitments to the European integra on in the rule of law ﬁ eld. Inside the Eastern neighbourhood The Ukrainian governing elite under the presidency of Volodymyr Zelenesky selec vely ﬁ ghts against the oligarchic in ﬂ uences. Thus, the ex-president Petro Poroshenko is targeted in more than 10 criminal cases, while Igor Kolomoisky, who le Privatbank with costs for the public budget accoun ng for$ 5 billion, a acks the state ins tu ons, such as the Na onal Bank of Ukraine(Intellinews, November 28, 2019). Moreover, the underes ma on of the Russian plans in Donbas aggravates the strategic posi ons of Kiev, already undermined by the US internal poli cal in ﬁ gh ng(“outward Trumpian tra ﬃ c of in ﬂ uence”) and ignored by France (implementa on of“Steinmeier Formula”) and Germany(“Nord Stream 2”). The a empts to renew the Georgian poli cal system consume ins tu onal paths and resort to measures to solve governance problems through“street power”(Agenda.ge, November 30, 2019). The protests of the united opposi on (about 30 poli cal par es) seek to break the legi macy of the poli cal regime, dependent on the oligarch Bidzina Ivanshvili, by democra zing the vo ng system for the 2020 elec on (GeorgiaToday, November 29, 2019). In Moldova, the governing alliances easily disintegrate under the pressure of the structural reforms, which are then o ﬀ set by an ac ve juggling with geopoli cal vectors (3DCFTAs, November 18, 2019). As a result, the linearity of the reforms needed to strengthen democra c ins tu ons and protect them from poli cal corrup on are endangered(NewEasternEurope, November 27, 2019). Readjustments of the Russian factor in the EU Eastern neighbourhood The Russian presence is re-launching in Eastern Europe, even if part of the region is involved in more advanced exercises of European integra on. Embraced by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the European agenda was ini ally confronted by Russia(2013-2014). Today the la er is in a stage of adjus ng its interests to the local reali es that are in a di ﬃ cult transi on towards the European model. The permea on of the European norms, reshaping of the trade ﬂ ows and the demographic changes are seen by Russia as an opportune me to re-enter the game. The aim does not seem to be the de ﬁ ni ve exclusion of the European element; the readjustment for cohabita ng with it counts more. The ac ons of the Russian factor in EU’s eastern neighbourhood produce at least three behaviours within the poli cal elites, which increase the predisposi on towards Russia or predisposes to diminishing of the rival factor’s posi on- the European one: The intensi ﬁ ca on of the aggressiveness of the separa st regions(“South Osse a”) in Georgia allows moving away the a en on of Georgians from the deteriora on of the democra c climate. At the same me, the governors close to the oligarch Ivanishvili use the insecurity caused by Russia to so en the cri cism of the European partners against the defects of the rule of law. Thus, the quality of reforms declines, and the public energy is channelled towards ensuring security and public order, which may s mulate authoritarian thinking if the role of democra c ins tu ons decreases. The exploita on of peace aspira ons in areas exposed to Russian military interference characterizes precisely the overlapping between the political Monthly Bulle n, Nr. 12(166), December 2019 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md

12 DECEMBER 2019 Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates objectives of the Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky and Russia’s strategy of freezing the con ﬂ ict in Donbas. Indirectly, the Russian factor becomes useful for the new Ukrainian poli cal force, but also for the Europeans who priori ze rela ons with Moscow. However, in reality, both sides are losing because technically speaking they surrender to Russia aiming a“peace at any cost”. Thus, the Ukrainian governing elite ruins the legi macy necessary for the reforms associated with the advance towards European standards. At the same me, the European actors validate Russia’s geopoli cal superiority and contribute to the undermining of the European integra on’s authority in the eastern neighbourhood. The valoriza on of poli cal crises, such as Russia›s participation in the peaceful transition of power in Moldova, has propelled the pro-Russian forces into government(3DCFTAs, September 1, 2019). This balanced the pre-exis ng European aspira ons in the decisionmaking process with an open interest to interact with the exponents of the Eurasian integra on. That cons tutes a signi ﬁ cant investment in promo ng the idea that comforts Russia concerning the cohabita on of the two geopoli cal vectors. The Moldovan example may inspire other similar opera ons of Russia in the region. But before that, the minority government backed by the pro-Russian Socialists needs internal and external resources to stabilize the budget(3DCFTA, November 27, 2019), while Igor Dodon must win a second term in 2020. The echoes of the Moldovan case The situa on in Moldova highlights the poli cal turning points that can impact the European agenda, and which are applicable, to some extent, in other countries in the region. More speci ﬁ cally, there is a causal rela onship between the presence of the oligarchic factor and its destruc ve nature for internal poli cal dynamics, the“whitening” of the proRussian forces and, ﬁ nally, the benevolent balancing of geopoli cal orienta on in favor of Russia. The oligarchic element results from the disturbance of the democra c system, which, if not removed, produces nega ve e ﬀ ects for the power alterna on and the vitality of the ins tu ons. The oligarchic regime has discredited the EU’s presence in Moldova and can do the same in Ukraine and Georgia, if that does not become the subject of EU’s poli cal condi onality and sectoral reforms, par cularly in the ﬁ eld of jus ce. The EU’s discredi ng in the Moldovan case resulted from tolera ng the poli cal forces associated with both the oligarchic in ﬂ uence and the European vector. The la er’s image has been ul mately degraded in a grave and irrecoverable way. Against the background of disappointment in the old pro-European forces, the poli cal system requires me to regenerate and produce new poli cal par es, which will become credible to the more Westernoriented public, which also is more demanding of reforms. In such circumstances of poli cal confusion, the forces with a conserva ve a tude towards reforms, close to the desirable poli cal pro ﬁ le for Russia, become more a rac ve to the electorate. Consequently, although the European integra on is maintained in force, it is rela vized and balanced by normalizing rela ons with Russia, including with the Eurasian vector. Instead of conclusions... The EU’s ac ons, as well as its inac ons, in its neighbourhood, not only weakens its posi ons and those of the pro-European forces, but also represents an open invita on for geopoli cal actors, with strategic objec ves con ﬂ ic ng with the European integra on. Trauma zing the European perspec ve is a wrong answer to the problem of the e ﬃ ciency of the European integra on, which can have long-term(geo-)poli cal costs. At the same me, the failure to take measures to prevent the for ﬁ ca on of the oligarchic factors in the eastern neighbourhood contains threats to the sustainability of proEuropean sen ments in the society. Given the e(in)volu ons in Ukraine and Georgia, we can deduce that the EU has learned very li le from the Moldovan case regarding the e ﬀ ects of tolera ng oligarchic elements. Therefore, the re-adjustment of the Russian factor, similar to the Moldovan model, acquires the nuances of an increasingly real scenario. The opinions expressed in the newsle er are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-S ung(FES) or of the Foreign Policy Associa on(APE). Foreign Policy Associa on(APE) is a non-governmental organiza on commi ed to suppor ng the integra on of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union and facilita ng the se lement of the Transnistrian con ﬂ ict in the context of the country Europeaniza on. APE was established in fall 2003 by a group of well-known experts, public personali es and former senior o ﬃ cials and diplomats, all of them reunited by their commitment to contribute with their exper se and experience to formula ng and promo ng by the Republic of Moldova of a coherent, credible and e ﬃ cient foreign policy. Friedrich-Ebert-S ung(FES) is a German social democra c poli cal founda on, whose purpose is to promote the principles and founda ons of democracy, peace, interna onal understanding and coopera on. FES ful ﬁ ls its mandate in the spirit of social democracy, dedica ng itself to the public debate and ﬁ nding in a transparent manner, social democra c solu ons to current and future problems of the society. Friedrich-Ebert-S un M g on h th a ly s Bu b lle ee n, n Nr a . 1 c 2(1 v 6 e 6), i D n ec t e h m e ber 2019 Republic of Moldova since October 2002. 64, Sciusev str. MD-2012, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Tel-Fax:+373 22 21 09 86 Website: www.ape.md E-mail: o ﬃ ce@ape.md