Israel Debates No. 9 28 August 2011 The Proclamation of a Palestinian State: Threat or Opportunity for Israel? The annual United Nations General Assembly opens in New York on 20 September this year. The most important item on the agenda is without a doubt the plan by the Palestinian leadership under Mahmud Abbas to request international recognition of the Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. Referring to the many years of standstill in the negotiation process with Israel and fruitless attempts to restart bilateral talks, the Palestinians emphasize that this political move is a last resort. If bilateral talks are not resumed – and there is nothing to show that they will – Mahmud Abbas is certain to take that step. Nor does he have any other options, having pursued the plan with great determination in the past few months. Back-pedalling now, without there being credible negotiations to underscore that move, would mean his political end. Israel rejects the Palestinians’ project. In May this year, in hi s speech before the American Congress, Prime Minister Netanyahu had emphatically rejected a solution to the conflict on the basis of the 1967 borders. The Israeli government’s central argument is that Palestinians taking the case for statehood to the UN would be a unilateral action, an infringement of the Oslo-agreements and an attempt to delegitimize Israel. The government argues that such a move is not the right way to achieve peace, since without the consent and collaboration of Israel nothing materially changes the facts. Instead, frustrated hopes and expectations on the Palestinian side might lead to violent provocations and the outbreak of a third Intifada. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned that the Palestinians were planning bloodshed in the West Bank for the day following the vote. He demanded the annulment of the Osloagreements and called for the termination of relations with the Palestinian Authority(PA). Other government ministers too called for drastic measures. The left-liberal daily Haaretz in an editorial attested growing signs of hysteria to the Israeli leadership. The Palestinians can only attain full membership of the UN upon the recommendation of the UN Security Council. Since the US has already announced its veto, Palestine will not become a full-fledged member; the 194 th UN member state after South Sudan. That explains why the Palestinian leadership have instead opted to request the recognition of the Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders by the General Assembly. They will need a two-thirds majority vote or 129 out of 193 member states of the UN. This would merely be a political recognition and not be binding under international law. Observers take the view that the Palestinians are likely to win at least 130 votes. 1

With regard to the Palestinian state recognition, the EU is politically divided. While all member states agree that bilateral negotiations are the best way to resolve the conflict, there is no common position beyond that. Four EU states(Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) have already spoken out against the recognition of a Palestinian state, at present 11 are in favour and the other member states have not yet adopted a position. Germany set out its position as early as April this year. On the occasion of a visit of Netanyahu to Berlin, Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Germany would not support Palestinian unilateralism. Israel looks upon the development with great concern. What it finds particularly worrying is that apart from the Arab, Muslim and non-aligned states, a number of European countries are also likely to vote against Israel. Defence Minister Ehud Barak described the international wave of recognition of a Palestinian state as a ―political tsunami‖ heading for Israel. This description has since then regularly come up in the Israeli debate. The majority of Israelis and the political commentators reject the Palestinian state recognition. They fear the outbreak of more violence, a new Intifada or even war. Those who do not see the entire process as a threat to Israel and those who even see it as an opportunity to for real progress in the peace process remain in the minority. In the present issue of Israel Debates two key actors in the debate present their analyses and share their views on this issue. Dr. Zvi Bar’el, Middle East correspondent of the daily Haaretz, views the Palestinian initiative to have their own state not only as a chance for the Palestinians but also as an opportunity for Israel to finally determine its borders and define its identity. He runs through various scenarios following the proclamation of a Palestinian state and points out that, should the process of acknowledging the state fail, this might spark violence and lead to a third Intifada. Israel might then use this response as a means to vilify the PA and discredit it as violent and terrorist. He believes that the basic course for the creation of a Palestinian state has been set, since the international community acknowledged its justification. In practice, he believes, there no longer is a status quo. He warns that the day will come when Israel can no longer avoid negotiations with a then acknowledged Palestinian State, adding that Israel will then have far less leeway than today. Dr. Yoaz Hendel of the Bar-Ilan University, who in August this year was appointed Director of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Media and Information office, believes – contrary to Zvi Bar’el – that it is the proclamation of a Palestinian state that is likely to trigger a third Intifada. In his opinion, the proclamation of a state isn’t worth a penny because it wouldn’t contribute to solving any of the issues. Instead it is more likely to raise the tensions, and the prospect of a solution to the conflict would move even further away. If it should come to an outburst of uncontrolled violence, Abbas, Fayyad and the PA would have a lot to lose: economic growth, political calm, a stable flow of funds, investments, security cooperation with Israel against Hamas. He claims that Abbas would then, if he could, prefer to abandon the demands to which he was encouraged by Obama’s Middle East policy and the latter’s unsparing position towards Israel, and return to the status quo. This, according to Dr. Hendel, is also in the interest of Israel. From there, the author believes, one could slowly and calmly work towards progress in the peace process. Dr. Ralf Hexel, Director FES Office Israel Herzliya, 28 August 2011 2

The Status Quo – the best option at this stage By Dr.Yoaz Hendel On November 15, 1988 the Palestinian National Council issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in Algiers. This mainly symbolic declaration was immediately recognized by the Arab League. Exactly a month later, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution 43/177 recognizing Yassir Arafat's"proclamation of the State of Palestine" in Algiers. One hundred and four nations voted for the resolution, thirty-six abstained and only two voted against it(Israel and the United States). Ostensibly, this was a significant break-through for the Palestinians: world-wide recognition of their rights to a state and a concrete step towards realizing the dream. And now, twenty-three years later, we are on the eve of an additional United Nations declaration regarding the Palestinians. There is still no Palestinian state despite widespread support of the Arab bloc— and an additional declaration is in the offing for discussion by the international community. Throughout the period that has transpired ever since the Algiers declaration, many attempts have been made to advance the peace process. Some of these attempts were based on wishful thinking rather than political logic. All have failed. The Palestinian identity has been consolidated; governmental autonomy has been created in the Judea-Samaria region; economic and semimilitary power hubs have been formed— yet all these trends were reversed due to violent outbreaks. The al-Aqsa intifada that began in 2000 by conscious decision of Yasser Arafat symbolized the dream and its demise. The current Palestinian reality was not formed by the United Nations declaration of 1988, nor by the Oslo Agreements of the 1990s and not even by the Israeli willingness for compromises— instead, it was created by the Palestinian choice to go for broke, all or nothing. The violent struggle of the al-Aqsa intifada and its brutal suicide-bomber terrorist attacks led to cutbacks in the international credit extended to the Palestinians, curtailing of the PA's very ability to govern, and finally— to dissolution and schism within Palestinian society itself, between Gaza and JudeaSamaria. We must examine the present Palestinian declaration on the background of changes that have taken place since the conclusion of the Second Intifada(al-Aqsa Intifada). The Israeli defense system succeeded in vanquishing suicide-bomber terror and bringing the Palestinian leadership to the conclusion that the use of terror could not cause real progress. At the beginning of 2009, the IDF Central Command(whose jurisdiction includes Judea and Samaria) decided to add the following words to their list of military objectives: "strengthening of the Palestinian Authority." According to the military arrangement, this goal became the objective of the military ranks under the Central Command and especially for the Judea-Samaria Division. This decision was the result of the relative quiet created on the ground. Many in the IDF spoke highly of the reform programs of the Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad. One highly placed intelligence man said that"He[Fayyad] sees himself as a Ben Gurion." Ben Gurion first created state institutions, and only afterwards declared the establishment of a state. Fayyad has carried out reforms in government ministries and municipal systems and, with the help of the Americans, he also tried to organize the security apparatus. Entire battalions were trained by Lieutenant General[Keith] Dayton, the US Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, five hundred soldiers in each battalion. One of the battalions was deployed in Jenin, another in Nablus— a city that was once an embattled terror stronghold 3

has been developing in recent years at an taken place in Gaza. Israel wanted to exponential rate. strengthen Abu Mazen to secure relative quiet. Investments in infrastructure are also clearly evident: educational systems, schools, roads, and sophisticated water systems that we have not seen in the mountainous region for years. Renewed prosperity is evident in the authority's territories. From the internal Palestinian viewpoint, these are assets that are likely to disappear as a result of the declaration The only way to enjoy the best of both possible worlds was to assist the Palestinians in strengthening their security battalions, supporting them economically with the help of donations from around the world, and most important of all-striking at the terror infrastructures and Hamas financing in Judea and Samaria. process. In order to understand the potential The status quo did not have a clear prognosis for damage, we have to understand the political for a declared Palestinian state, but did spell approach of the heads of the Palestinian progress and development for the Palestinian Authority. Authority and its citizens. It should be noted in Abu Mazen and Fayyad, regarded as proponents of a political solution, argued on behalf of achieving a state via positive persuasion of the world even in the bad old days of Arafat who talked peace but used terror. However, this was not their only path; throughout the entire rehabilitation period, both leaders preserved the option of popular resistance. In a kind of strange mélange, youths were sent to"non-violent demonstrations" and among the this context that during Ehud Olmert's office as Prime Minister, a far-reaching agreement was extended to Abu Mazen to resolve the conflict (according to Olmert's recollections). Abu Mazen never returned with a positive answer. From Mazen's point of view, core issues such as Jerusalem and[Palestinian] refugees were too far-reaching— a Rubicon that he could never cross. Instead Abu Mazen worked on making headway in constructing a state from the bottom up. demonstrators-- many of whom were paid for The great change in Palestinian policy can be their participation— were radical far-left activists traced to Obama's rise to power. The automatic from Israel and around the world. The IDF backing that the State of Israel had always called these"violent demonstrations" and received, dissipated all at once. The Cairo viewed it as a Palestinian strategy of scattering Address and the coldness exhibited by Obama their eggs among several baskets: instead of to Netanyahu's government expressed a new creating only quiet and advancing the state world-view and the message was quickly under construction, the Palestinians created an assimilated by the Palestinians. The apparatus of deterrence against Israel and construction freeze even in settlement blocs maintained a youth militia— stone throwers for that had been authorized by Bush's a possible day of judgment in the future. government was the last nail in this coffin. With Israel decided to tolerate this double-sided approach of the Palestinian Authority and judge the process by its results. Recent years have seen significant, strong cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Both sides the termination of the freeze and Obama's weakening, Abu Mazen called the freeze "climbing up a tall tree." Abu Mazen claimed that"Obama put me up there but didn't leave a ladder[to get down]." shared the same interest: fighting the Hamas. The change in the Palestinian approach led to Abu Mazen and his people feared a fighting a hardening of their positions, to raising the opposition that would take over the Palestinian level of their demands and distancing Authority at a moment of weakness, as had themselves from any practical proposal for 4

conducting negotiations. With the lack of symbolic(similar to what took place in 1988), dialog, the connection to Israel became a then we will be able to return to the familiar struggle in the diplomatic arena whose status quo: security cooperation, economic culmination is marked by a declaration of Palestinian prosperity and slow, quiet progress independence in September. on the negotiation axis. Abu Mazen will have In Israel's eyes, the declaration itself lacks all meaning. General Yaakov Amidror, head of the National Security Council(NSC), has stated that the United Nations can pass a resolution gone through the motions in his determination to declare a state and the Israelis will go through the motions of opposing that same state. tomorrow that the sun rises in the West and Yet there is a second option— one that is worst sets in the East as long as enough countries of all for both sides: transforming the are willing to go along. The United Nations has declaration into a match that sets the territories always exhibited a one-sided bias against on fire. The Palestinian Authority has no Israel, thus any resolution opposed by Israel interest in finding itself conducting a third will pass in the United Nations— no matter what intifada and losing its many achievements the content of the resolution. The Palestinian since the conclusion of the Second Intifada. state will be declared with a large majority, as But unfortunately, they are not the deciding happened in 1988— even if that means factor in the reality of the Middle East today. additional damage to the chances for a political The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria solution. While Israel has some ability to have proved that political interests and influence the numbers of opposers and governmental rationale carry only partial weight abstainers to the proposal, it is clear that with in upheavals. the link of the Arab States to the unaffiliated nations and automatic voting, chances are very high that a Palestinian state will be declared. Thus we reach the final question: What happens on the day after? When Abu Mazen chose the path of frontal diplomatic attack and de-legitimization campaigns against Israel, he chose a dangerous rhetoric. The two-headed sword that chips away at the Israeli image can do the Declaration of a state, without a real agreement same to the one holding the weapon. The and partition of additional territory, will not Palestinian public, like the Israeli public, is well change a single fact on the ground. Even the connected to the media and to Facebook. The Palestinian Authority itself has no real interests same means that led to revolutions in the Arab in fanning the fires, as explained above. The world are also likely to lead to an uprising of reality— that the large cities are developing, youths who expect the declaration of a contributions are flowing and investors are Palestinian state to contain functional aspects investing— this suits the world-view of Abu as well. If nothing happens in the short-term Mazen and Fayyad. after the declaration, disappointment is likely to Thus the first, most convenient possibility for the Palestinians(and also Israel) is to put an end to the conflict with the very act of declaration. In other words, to supply a ladder take the masses out to the streets. The fact that the social protest movement has even taken root in Israel only strengthens this hypothesis. to both sides on which to descend from the While Abu Mazen and Fayyad may September tree and thus dissipate the current emphatically resist transforming words to tension. Theoretically, if international and actions, this may not be true of the Palestinian internal Palestinian responses to the public. In this age of the Arab Spring, we have declaration of independence will remain only no way of knowing whether Mazen and 5

Fayyad's opposition can prevent what they question: Would Mazen have been able to would consider a disaster. squash a larger number of leaderless A number of attempts have been made to date protestors, if their war-cry had been heard? by civilian bodies in the Palestinian Authority to In contrast to Nakba Day that takes place every drag the masses to the streets via social year(though this year it held additional networks on the internet, with only partial meaning due to the Arab Spring), an event success. Only few emerged to demonstrate, such as the declaration of Palestinian and initially shrill war-cries faded into silence. independence takes place only once every One could argue that the low turnouts show that Abu Mazen's political interests are clear to the street protestors. However, we must remember that the events behind the cries to take to the streets, were memorial days. Let us generation. The first time was in 1988 when the PLO still resided outside the territories of Judea and Samaria; this time, there is a close connection between territory under control of the Palestinian Authority and the declaration. take the example of the events related to the Israel keenly remembers the events leading up recent Nakba Day(literally day of catastrophe), to the eruption of the two intifadas in the 1980s the day that symbolizes the establishment of and 2000s. Minor events, ostensibly the State of Israel. Initially(a few weeks into controllable, turned into long-term wars of 2011) Abu Mazen favorably viewed the attrition. Popular uprisings or, alternately, internet-based call for popular revolution violence in the age of social networks and against Israel on Nakba Day; this suited his protests in the Arab world have generally political world-view— to maintain security and bypassed traditional leadership channels. ties to Israel while fighting Israel in the realm of While we can analyze and evaluate the international public opinion. But then, the Israeli intentions of the Palestinian Authority, we have and global media began to evince interest in no way of understanding or predicting the this call to arms; almost half a million people trends of the masses. signed the internet-based petition. The Israeli defense system estimated that at least a hundred thousand of the signers were from the Palestinian Authority. In addition to the possibility of unplanned violence we must take into account the strained relations between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Although a Fatah-Hamas In response, IDF's Central Command-- Reconciliation Agreement was signed between responsible for the territories of Judea and the sides a number of weeks ago, it failed Samaria-- recruited large forces that were before the ink dried on the paper. Abu Mazen similar to deployments during the intifada days has been waging an all-out war against Hamas of the suicide bombers. The fear was of human ever since the revolution was carried out in masses overrunning isolated settlements. Gaza; he has acted resolutely against[Hamas'] Abu Mazen saw the numbers and deployment of forces, and was concerned. He transmitted a message to Israel via the Palestinian security apparatus that he intended to maintain tight control over the protests and ensure that the protestors would not leave the territories of the PA. The end result was that the number of protestors was small and the demonstrations ended quickly. But we are left with the economic infrastructure and activists. Meanwhile, Fatah loyalists in the Gaza Strip have been subjected to great violence under Hamas rule. Abu Mazen was dragged into the Reconciliation Agreement out of his desire to present a united front before the Palestinian declaration of independence. But the fact is that despite the agreement, the disputes between the sides have not been resolved. This means that mass protests and even 6

governmental anarchy can be in the interests In summary we can characterize the of the Hamas movement. anticipated declaration in September as Another possible scenario that the State of Israel must take into consideration is the possibility of a diplomatic-legal onslaught that might accompany the declaration of Palestinian independence. Although such a declaration has no legal validity as cited above, the assertion of rights over Judea and Samaria may turn into diplomatic and legal lawsuits. Even if their legal basis is extremely flimsy at best, such proceedings can have an adverse effect on the Israeli image. another step in the Israeli-Arab struggle for world opinion. Abu Mazen does not want to realize a state because he knows that the political process involved would force him to wrestle with painful core issues. From his point of view, it would be best to wrap up everything in token, hollow statements. The State of Israel also has no real interest in escalating the tension with the Palestinians. Thus, the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems as remote as ever. Israel faces three disparate diplomatic frontlines: the United States, Europe and the Arab world. On the first front, the relationship between Israel and the United States is strong despite past friction. Obama's government is turning increasingly inward to domestic concerns while foreign affairs issues such as upheavals in the Arab world and IsraeliPeace initiatives are not realistic so long as there is no attempt to educate the masses toward peace and compromise on the Palestinian side as well. Behind the declarations and proclamations, both sides are interested in managing the conflict— improving quality of life without searching for magic solutions of peace now. Palestinian relations remain outside the Nevertheless the potential for conflagration American sphere of interest. The United States exists, if only due to Abu Mazen's inflammatory will continue to support Israel and even rhetoric and the self-imposed constraints of the announced that it will oppose a unilateral Palestinians that do not allow them to Palestinian declaration of statehood. backtrack from the rhetoric. Thus, the fate of The European diplomatic front features countries with clear positions both for and against Israel, without connection to the peace is sealed; the only question is how the disappointed masses will determine the fate of war on the Day After. Palestinian declaration. True, the anti-Israeli Dr. Yoaz Hendel is a columnist for the daily trend within some European countries is likely newspapers Yedioth Ahronoth and Makor to receive tail-wind backing from the United Rishon. He is also a researcher and a lecturer Nations declaration but this does not signal a at the Begin-Sadat(BESA) Center for Strategic significant change for the worse. Regarding the Studies at the Bar Ilan University. Hendel is coArab world in Israel's immediate vicinity, the author of two books: Let the IDF Win: The SelfArab States are likely to maintain their tradition Fulfilling Slogan (Hebrew, Yedioth Ahronoth, of flexing their muscles in vehement 2010) and of Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War declarations against Israel without resorting to(English version, Potomac Books, November actual deeds. The Palestinians never 2011). interested the Arab States except as a political weapon with which to further their domestic interests. And in the current environment of actual threats to local rulers in an era of revolution, these rulers are not likely to take real risks. 7

A State for Negotiations By Dr. Zvi Bar'el In 1980, thirteen years into the occupation, MP Moshe Dayan had promulgated his plan for a Palestinian autonomy. It was a unilateral proposal, which aimed at transferring civil authorities to the Palestinians as an introduction for further negotiations with Jordan."The Palestinians in the occupied territories would not need to announce publicly their acceptance of the plan," wrote Dayan and the"sovereignty will stay with Israel". The plan, had it been accepted by the Israeli government, meant to last for five years after which, new negotiations will start. Twenty-one years later, it is the Palestinians' turn to promote their unilateral plan: an internationally recognized independent state "one that the Israelis will not need to announce their acceptance", to paraphrase on Dayan's suggestion. It is not known yet if and how the plan is going to play out, how many states will indeed grant their recognition and, most importantly, will it go through the Security Council for voting. The Palestinian Authority, lead by its President Mahmud Abbas is adamant to proceed with the initiative, whatever may be the results. So far, Israel and the United States are vehemently against it, and the obvious dilemma is what will be the implications once a resolution to recognize a Palestinian state will have. The other important question is what will be the implications if such a resolution is denied. Between the US and a Palestinian State "The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. …The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law". Such is the language of articles 1 and 3 of the Montevideo Declarations of 1933, which phrases the declarative theory of statehood. Neither the Palestinians nor Israel have to dig that far in history in order to acknowledge the Palestinians' right for their own state. Suffice is to recall Obama's speech from June 2009 which was followed by Netanyahu's speech only some days later to realize that the mutually accepted solution by the two antagonists of the current Palestinian initiative is a"two states for two people" solution. The combination of the Montevideo declaration with Obama's vision laid the basis for the Palestinian claim. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of an independent Palestinian state is not only, and not even primarily about its legality nor about its viability. It is about feasibility. Can it overcome the American and the Israeli objection? While the American position that demands a "negotiated solution" has merit, it is not clear yet how Obama is going to face an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly that may support the Palestinians' initiative. For an administration that has already been internationally criticized for its veto vote on the anti-settlements resolution, and for a president that faces now a new reality in the Middle East, one that empowers peoples' call for democracy and self determination, it looks almost impossible to reject the Palestinians' call. A call that is supported by all Arab regimes and peoples. It is not just a moral question; it 8

affects the US' status in the evolving Middle East and its ability to maintain its influential position in an area that is already suspicious of the American intentions. Hence, Israel's attitude may put the US in a difficult corner where it will have to choose sides. This is a dangerous bet for both Israel and the US. This is why it is imperative to weigh Israel's objection against the possibility that it may remain alone in the international arena. Negotiating with a State Prior to any analysis it is necessary to remember that the Palestinian initiative stemmed from the paralyzed negotiations with Israel. Farther, the Palestinians have realized that Israel regards the negotiations as a substitute for a solution, thus, negotiations have become a permanent state of affairs, "negotiations for the sake of negotiations" with no tangible solution in the horizon. Can a new status change that equation for the Palestinians? China and friendly European countries. Moreover, Israeli sanctions on the PA may entail sanctions on Israel by those countries who would support an independent Palestinian state. Palestinian statehood may mean also that states will establish official representation in East Jerusalem, thus recognizing de-facto the status of the city as the Palestinian capital. Israel will be put than in a difficult position where it will have to decide how to handle those states that on one hand have friendly and strategic relations with Israel while on the other hand undermine its Policy towards the Palestinians. A Palestinian state will also have a formal status in international forums and organizations, and it will be able to join the international criminal court in The Hague, and file suits against alleged Israeli'war crimes', it could ask Israelis on occupied land to become Palestinian citizens or leave and it could seek extra rights as'prisoners of war' Palestinians currently in Israeli jails. Given that the political scene in Israel will not change soon, it is conceivable that Israel will try to toughen its position towards the In short, a Palestinian State may have more power to persuade Israel to accept what the US failed to convince it to do. Palestinian authority if statehood is recognized. Most probably, it may expand building plans in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. It can also bloc money transfer to and from the PA. If Hamas will be part of the PA, Israel can also tag it as a"terrorist authority" like it did at the time of the second Intifada, and impose partial siege on cities and areas in order to disrupt its Ostensibly these are bad news for an Israeli government that has no"peace policy" and that managed to evade meaningful negotiations. However, eventually, Israel might find itself isolated from the rest of the world and forced to conduct negotiations with a recognized state with a much narrower maneuvering space. functions as a state. In other words, Israel will A State of Two Organizations? have to turn to sanctions policy against the PA. Should the PA proceed with its initiative it will However, these measures could instigate a have first to put its own house in order. The third Intifada which Israel would want to biggest challenge is to translate the prevent, since this time the Intifada may involve reconciliation agreement with Hamas into active interference of those states who had practice. Although an international recognition supported the Palestinian statehood. Israel is not about granting it to the political body that may find itself confronting not only a lame Arab runs the Occupied Territories, but to a state, League, but also direct pressure from Russia, the PA cannot afford to appear on the 9

international stage as two rival entities. One Shiite rivals in Iraq. Will Hamas and the PA act that recognizes Israel and strives to have a differently? It seems unlikely given the situation peace treaty with it, and another entity, Hamas, in Syria that may leave Hamas without an Arab that does not recognize Israel and has not custodian. denounced terror as a means to achieve its goals. This divide plays not only into the hands Towards a Third Intifada? of the Israeli argument; it serves also the American and the European opposing approach. The PA may certainly argue that the US and the EU are having normal relations with Lebanon in spite of Hezbollah's participation in its government, and that they recognize Syria and Iran in spite of their abhorring policies. However, there is a fundamental difference between states that are already recognized and a state-candidate, which has to prove its good intentions in order to be recognized. Israeli scenarios, especially those that are marketed by the right wing, prophecy a violent outburst of the Palestinians' streets, leading to a third Intifada. It is not entirely a wild guess; however, one should also consider the logic behind such an intifada. If it aims at convincing the international community to recognize the Palestinian state, this support had been already granted even without any violent acts on the part of the Palestinians. If it aims at pressuring Israel to adopt the Palestinian initiative, it may well achieve the contrary. Abba's initiative puts Hamas in a chalking dilemma. Recognizing Israel may entail its adoption as a legitimate organization and a political partner by the international community, however such recognition will undermine its ideological foundation and grant Abbas a huge political victory. However, Hamas, one has to notice, is not entirely ideological, after all it had participated in the general elections in 2006 which were based on the Oslo Agreements. As an off spring of the Egyptian Muslim Israel will use the third intifada as evidence to the righteousness of its policy. Once again, Israel will use the intifada to tarnish the PA as a violent and even a terrorist gang, and it will serve as an excuse to claim that not only statehood for such"bandits" is out of question; even negotiations should not start before the PA imposes calm in the streets. And, if negotiations are to take place, it is the intifada, and not the peace process, that should be the focus of those negotiations. Brotherhood, it may find the adequate interpretation that will allow it to imitate its mother-movement and to participate in the political scene. In fact, it was Khaled Mashaal, who had suggested,"giving negotiations between the PA and Israel another chance", a statement which infuriated Mahmoud al-Zahar, Hamas'"foreign minister" of Gaza's government. This Israeli"logic" is no secret and the Palestinians are very well aware of it. Accordingly, while a new intifada may push indecisive states to support the Palestinian initiative, it may as well have some bad implications. It may have its effect on the Israeli public who still lives through the horrors of the second intifada, and it may even anger the Arab publics who are struggling now to While it is difficult to guess what will be Hamas' position, some similar cases teach us that in time of historic opportunities, rivals tend to unite even if they may split later. Such was the case of the Kurdish rival clans in Kurdistan, the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular movements on the eve of the revolution, or the establish new futures for themselves, and would not like a Palestinian intifada to draw their attention to the old Palestinian cause. A Palestinian intifada will have to compete with the situation in Syria, Yemen and Libya, while in 1987 and 2000 they had all the Arab attentions for themselves. In addition to these arguments, one should not ignore the 10

economic situation in the West Bank that, although far from being satisfying, it is still better than the traumatic years of the intifada. Hopefully this factor will play a role in the Palestinians' considerations whether or not to start an intifada. While the Palestinians' struggle to achieve international recognition in their state may restrain plans for a third intifada and promote peace negotiations, failing to achieve such recognition may ignite a new violent round of clashes. Unfortunately, this scenario is widely ignored by Israel and the US who assume that lack of recognition will not change the stale status quo, and that the Palestinians will return humbly to the negotiating table. An Inevitable State In conclusion, I would argue that a Palestinian state is not a matter of choice anymore. The international community has already adopted the idea that a Palestinian state is inevitable. If there are hesitations concerning its materialization, they refer to the appropriate way to achieve it, not about its validity. Israel must also realize that there is no status quo anymore. That the change in the international community's approach, the American pressure and the isolation that Israel is experiencing now, are part of a dynamism that Israel cannot control any longer. Although experience teaches us that Israel had declined any suggestion to initiate new policies, it would be wise on her part not to adhere to that modus operandi. Israel, who is in a permanent search to define its identity, must define its borders and to adopt the Palestinian state initiative is an opportunity for herself and her identity as much as it is for the Palestinians. Dr. Zvi Bar'el is Haaretz' analyst for Middle Eastern Affairs, a member of its editorial board and previously its managing editor. He is a senior fellow at the Center of Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University and a lecturer at Sapir Academic College. Responsible: Dr. Ralf Hexel, Head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel Authors: Dr. Yoaz Hendel Dr. Zvi Bar‘el Homepage: www.fes.org.il Email: fes@fes.org.il 11

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