08. 2014 EDITORIAL Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung! As the most recent hopefully comes to an end, it is most likely that the outcome will be another negotiated ceasefire, meaning that the situation for the Palestinians will return to the status quo. When taking a look at the recent escalation of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the question arises how the cycle of violence and de-escalation can be broken. The most widespread opinion on a solution to this dilemma remains the two-state solution, a model that has been negotiated for years and still not achieved. The Palestinian Authority is its main proponent on the issue and has its 20th anniversary this year. At this crucial point where the national governments and the international community ask itself again when this conflict will and can end, it seems to be neces sary to take a look back and evaluate the performance of the PA since its founding. Seyasat Magazine, a quarterly product of the partnership between FES Palestine and the Institute of Public Policies(IPCC), tackles national, regional as well as international issues by providing analyses and viewpoints from across the spectrum of economic, social and political fields. Hence, Seyasat’s 28th Edition sheds light on the future of the Palestinian Authority on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of its founding(1994-2014). With the provided articles it wants to give a better understanding for the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to build up a state. Therefore the current edition starts with the question “The Palestinian Authority: Failure or Mission accomplished?” and looks back on the efforts of the last twenty years as well as reviewing the development of the PA in a critical manner. Meanwhile the performance of the current government of Dr. Rami Al-Hamdallah isn’t disregarded but rather analyzed regarding its obstacles and achievements. However this edition of Seyasat not only deals with the PA itself, it also focuses on the components and future of the Palestinian security establishments and outlines the evolution and development of the security and police services. Beside of the inner development of Palestine the 28th edition of Seyasat also takes a look at the international development regarding Palestine and analyses the U.S. Policy towards the changing Middle East. The full access of Seyasat Magazine in Arabic and its summaries in English are available on www.ipp-pal.ps Wishing you an enjoyable read! Design: ery foto Seite 1

This edition has been published in cooperation with the Institute for Public Policies(IPP) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) The responsibility for the publication's content solely lies with its authors. It does not necessarily reflect the views of IPP and FES 2

Contents: Subject Name of writer Introduction The Palestinian Authority: Failure or Mission Accomplished Dr. Ibrahim Abrash The National Authority at the Age of Twenty: What Has it Accomplished and Where Has it Failed? Mr. Abdul Ghani Salameh Twenty Years of the Authority: Palestine the de facto Dr. Atef Abu Seif State. From the Revolutionary Approach to the Sovereignty Major General Ahmad of the State … The Constant and the Variable in the Qarmout Military Doctrine The Palestinian reconciliation(Roundtable) Performance of Dr. Rami Al-Hamdallah Government: Dr. Ahmad Abu Dayyeh Obstacles and Achievements The U.S. Policy toward a Changing Middle East Mrs. Amani Al-Qiram Book Review:“The memoires of Salim Az-Za’noun” Page 4 4 6 9 11 15 15 18 18 3

Seyasat Magazine Edition(28): English Summary Introduction: Seyasat shed light in its 28 th issue on the future of the Palestinian National Authority on the occasion of the 20 th anniversary of its founding(1994-2014). In doing so, Seyasat attempted to understand the extent to which the Palestinian Authority succeeded in approaching the state aspired for by the Palestinians in order to develop a better understanding of its future and the prospects of transforming it into a state. Title of Article:“ The Palestinian Authority: Failure or Mission Accomplished?” Author: Dr. Ibrahim Abrash Seyasat opens its 28 th issue with a study for Dr. Ibrahim Abrash, Political Science Professor at AlAzhar University and former Minister of Culture, entitled“The Palestinian Authority: Failure or Mission Accomplished?”. Abrash argues that any attempt to understand the present reality of the Palestinian Authority which was founded in 1994 and to analyze the extent to which it achieved the Palestinian national goals or got closer to them should not hinge only on the first moment the Palestinian Authority was founded and the extent of its realization of the aspirations for the sake of which it was founded. Such attempt, Abrash argues, should also take into consideration the developments that occurred since the founding of the Authority and their implications, whether internally, regionally or internationally, that were not accounted for in the first place. The researcher digs in the Palestinian national consciousness, searching for the historic roots of the idea of the National Authority. He concludes that the current Authority is not only a product of the Oslo settlement, but also a late application of the idea of the National Authority as an interim goal, which was adopted in 1947, and a step viewed as the prelude to establishing the desired state. After that, the researcher evaluates the performance of the current authority and its future, not only functionally – as a limited self-rule authority – as specified in the Oslo Accords, but also nationally 4

in terms of its ability to strive, within the logic of the settlement and the Oslo Accords, to remain close to the Palestinian aspirations on the level of maintaining the national identity and building the institutions of the promised state. Finally, the researcher moves on to analyzing the Authority in terms of its relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah Movement, then the impact of the division on the Authority before concluding by viewing the future of the Authority in light of the variables, stoppage of the negotiations, going to the United Nations and moving forward with the reconciliation file. The Authority was and became a reality. When we say the Authority, we do not talk only about the Authority’s agreements with Israel, which are viewed by many as unfair and they undoubtedly are, but we also talk about an Authority as it is today: with ministries and administrations that provide employment for approximately 180 thousand citizens. The Authority also means dozens of agreements signed with the outside world in all spheres – economic, social, administrative and scientific – with the aim of securing support, funding and livelihood for more than four million citizens of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Authority is a collective term including the three authorities: the legislative, executive and judicial. Abrash concludes that the problem is not within the Authority, but in its functions, and strongly suggests devising new functions for the Authority that would transform it into a state. For two decades, the Palestinian National Authority was subject to a lot of internal criticism to the point of accusing it of treason and serving Israel’s plots. This was a stereotypical judgment based on individual behaviors or ambiguous approaches by some of the Authority’s components. This does not mean that the Authority was up to the ambitions and aspirations of the Palestinian people, or that it achieved what was hoped of it even by its founders and owners. There is no doubt that the existence of the Authority was marred by the exacerbation of settlement and Judaization, the division, and the surge of unemployment and poverty rates. However, the flaw was not in the principle of existence of a National Authority to manage the Palestinians’ affairs, but in Israel, which made every possible effort to strip the Authority of its patriotism and prevent it from being responsive to the Palestinians who waged on it as a means to attaining statehood. There was also a problem in its mismanagement and absence of a national strategy regarding it. 5

Consequently, what is needed today is to employ what has been accomplished under the Authority in terms of its institutions, cadres and external relations in moving directly toward transforming the Authority into a state through practices on the ground with or without Israel’s consent. This requires not only reevaluating the commitments imposed on the Authority as a result of the settlement such as the Oslo Accords and the Paris Economic Protocol, but also deposing those members of the Authority’s elite who exploited the Authority to serve their personal interests. Title of Article:“The National Authority at the Age of Twenty: What Has it Accomplished and Where Has it Failed?” Author: Mr. Abdul Ghani Salameh Researcher Abdul Ghani Salameh wrote a study entitled“The National Authority at the Age of Twenty: What Has it Accomplished and Where Has it Failed?” Salameh wrote:“Today, twenty years after the establishment of the Authority, there is a need more than any time in the past to review its experience in a critical manner and evaluate its performance in light of the results and facts that have been achieved on the ground.” Salameh does just that by evaluating the paths taken by the Palestinian Authority throughout the past twenty years in an attempt to identify what was accomplished and diagnose its mistakes, failures and obstacles in accordance with a set of determinants that have governed its paths and approaches. He summarizes those paths as follows: 1. The path of direct engagement with Israel, which bifurcates into two distinct tracks: the track of the armed resistance which was characterized by violence, and the track of the peaceful popular resistance. 2. The political path, which also bifurcates into the direct negotiations track and the track of the diplomatic struggle in the international arena. 3. The institution-building path and public management of the daily lives of the Palestinian people. In criticizing the path of direct engagement with Israel, Salameh wrote that from a practical standpoint,[Palestinian] security services have very limited resources, simple capabilities, and are subject to an Authority that is subject in itself to political and legal considerations. It is bound by 6

international agreements in accordance with which it was established and to which it must be committed, adding that whoever takes part in the Authority must realize these facts. On the other hand, Salameh wrote, all Palestinian parties agree that the mission of these security services must be limited to end the state of chaos, imposing the rule of law and providing security to the Palestinian citizen from internal violations. As far as confronting the plots of the occupation and its expansionist schemes is concerned, this must be the mission of the comprehensive popular resistance with all its forms. Self-defense from aggressive aggressions waged by Israel must be the mission of the resistance factions and their armed battalions because the security forces cannot undertake such task and should not be asked to wage a lost battle and suffer useless bloodshed as they are simply defenseless with their locations, equipment and personnel. Salameh reminded that the security services have paid a steep price at the beginning of the second Intifada when they fought in an unequal confrontation with the aggressive Israeli war machine, which led to the destruction of their headquarters and obliterating all of their resources. With regard to the path of the negotiations, Salameh wrote that tying the negotiations with the resistance and arming the resistance for a political goal makes the later an excellent political process. In the current Palestinian state of affairs, the civic popular resistance is considered the only resistance pattern that is capable of coexisting with the concept of the negotiations since undertaking negotiations and armed struggle simultaneously is considered impossible under the current political circumstances. Negotiations are not utterly rejected in principle, but they have been taking place over the past twenty years in a way that requires review. They have not yielded any results for the Palestinians, while they misled the international public opinion and contributed to improving Israel’s image on one hand, and where exploited by Israel as a cover for proceeding with its settlement policies on the other. Hence, the Palestinian leadership must devise a new attack strategy that starts with stopping the negotiations first and then raising the ceiling of the Palestinian demands. 7

Such strategy should strengthen the Palestinian leadership’s position and allow it to get out of the tunnel of negotiations for the sake of talks, and rather engage in serious negotiations through which Israel would be forced to carry out the commitments and obligations required of it. Such strategy would ultimately correct the negotiations path and stop internal losses as a result of Israel’s use of the negotiations as a cover for its aggressions against the Palestinian people while portraying the Authority as a silent partner in them. By the same token, disagreeing to resume the negotiations and abandoning them indefinitely without devising a new alternative strategy would deepen the Palestinian predicament and put the Palestinians in a position of lack or even loss of options and alternatives. The most important criticism of the diplomatic path lies in the Palestinian leadership’s concentration of its attack on the political side while abandoning the legal side of the Palestine Question. In spite of all the comments on and criticism of the Authority’s performance, the existence of the Authority in itself and in principle is a national necessity dictated by the current stage. Nonetheless, it is necessary to set limits for the functional role it has been playing; twenty years are more than enough to determine that continuation of the Palestinian Authority in the same fashion no longer serves the Palestinians, but has in fact led them to appalling conditions. In spite of the successes and accomplishments made by the Palestinians during the years of the Authority, which must be preserved, building institutions, trained national cadres, legal systems, a Palestinian educational system, relations with many countries of the world and trained security services—although they need to change their military ideology—are all accomplishments that should help them to transition into the state-building stage. Events have proved the difficulty of combining state-building tasks and resistance tasks. The Authority tried to set the stage for transition to the reality of the state, but was forced at the same time to engage in direct confrontations with Israel, which were characterized by violence in most cases. Nonetheless, the Authority has no choice other than moving forward with its struggle and liberation project in order to seize the Palestinians’ right of self-determination and transition to a 8

state without abandoning its daily duties toward the Palestinian people. It must wage on justice of the cause and vigor of the people. Salameh reaches the same conclusion reached by Abrash in the previous study: the fault lies not in the principle of the existence of a national authority, but in its current functional role, symbols, leadership, terms of reference, as well as administration. He also concludes that there is an urgent need to review this experiment in a comprehensive objective manner and undertaking practical steps toward transitioning to a Palestinian state. Title of Article:“Twenty Years of the Authority: Palestine the de facto State” Author: Dr. Atef Abu Seif Dr. Atef Abu Seif, Editor of Seyasat, authored a study entitled“Twenty Years of the Authority: Palestine the de facto State.” He stated that as must as the Palestinians’ acceptance of an Authority with limited and incomplete powers raised concerns, some people view it as an incomplete realization of the idea of a national authority that was adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organization within the framework of its interim program. Twenty years after the Authority’s formation, this discussion seems much deeper, with the existence of new political facts on the ground, most notably: First: The peace process has not succeeded to extract a Palestinian state from the negotiations, and the Authority, which was supposed to be an interim one for five years, has not transitioned to a state as expected. Second: Israel made every possible effort to transform the West Bank into a new focal point for Jewish settlement, and consequently turned the West Bank into separate disjointed cantons, depriving the Authority in the process of the geographic continuity required for the existence of any independent political entity. Third: The Authority realized on the practical level some steps that gave it some of the characteristics of the state and painted it with many of the colors of the state. 9

Fourth: On the political level, major successes achieved by the Authority made it closer to transforming to a state. The most important success is probably gaining membership of the United Nations General Assembly and accession to international treaties. Fifth: The Palestinian division constituted a major obstacle in the face of uniting the Palestinian efforts. As much as it has been an obstacle, and as it approaches its end in the wake of formation of the national reconciliation government, it is giving another opportunity to give the state-building process a new push and collective strength not enjoyed by the Authority in the past. Abu Seif presented the reality of transformation to statehood in Palestine over the past twenty years by analyzing the consciousness that has founded this transformation. He argued that three basic ideas have contributed to translating this consciousness:(1) centrality of the state as an idea in developing the Palestinian national consciousness and liberation struggle and setting it as the main goal for the Palestinian national movement;(2) duality of the unity and the division as levers in developing the Palestinian identity; and(3) the Palestinian policy of imposing facts on the ground and the gradual accomplishments it has achieved. After reviewing what Abu Seif referred to as the Palestinian policy of facts on the ground, he concluded that twenty years into the life of the national authority, the unilateral steps taken by the Palestinian leadership, not the negotiation steps taken in agreement with Israel, have certainly made the Palestinian dream of establishing a Palestinian state closer. This conclusion reinforces the premise of his profound study: the Palestinian policy of facts on the ground is useful, and the characteristic of politics during the past two decades or more is that facts are imposed. However, there is another observation, or maybe fact, that the success of the policy of facts on the ground required a new realism that has proven itself. While the Palestinians take unilateral steps and impose political facts in the international arena without agreement with Israel but in affirmation of their right, they are not burning the bridge with Israel. Rather, they are continuing to negotiate with it regardless of how unfair negotiations may be. In doing so, they are protecting themselves and ensuring the international community’s support for the policy of gradual steps on the ground, which they have been following. 10

Title of Article:“From the Revolutionary Approach to the Sovereignty of the State … The Constant and the Variable in the Military Doctrine” Author: Major General Ahmad Qarmout Major General Ahmad Qarmout discussed in his study the components and future of the Palestinian security establishment. He entitled his study“From the Revolutionary Approach to the Sovereignty of the State … The Constant and the Variable in the Military Doctrine” This discussion seems important in light of our realization that unifying the security services is the stumbling block that hinders realizing a national reconciliation. Hence, the suggestions made by Qarmout, which are drawn from his vast experience in the leadership of the Palestinian police, and before that in the military establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, are important. Qarmout presented an outline of Palestinian military’s evolution and development since the sixties of the past century until the establishment of the Authority. Qarmout then reflected on the experience of the security and police services during the past twenty years of the Authority’s existence. He recommended the necessity of: • Recognizing that these services operate within the framework of defining agreements and do not operate on liberated lands but in territories vacated by the enemy in accordance with redeployment of its forces. • Recognizing that the primary contradiction for these services is with the occupation in spite of some actions carried out in confrontation of terrorism and prevention of hostile actions. The proof is that at certain junctures the occupation waged wars and destroyed the infrastructure of these services. • Recognizing that despite the agreements, the enemy resists any manifestation of sovereignty that leads to buil state institutions. • Recognizing that these services are for all Palestinians and must be built on a professional, institutional democratic basis isolated from partisanship, political disputes and the domination of any political party. 11

• Recognizing that mistakes have definitely accompanied the process of building these institutions in terms of their structure, leadership and decision making mechanism. • Recognizing plurality of the backgrounds of the members of these services, which necessitates finding a unified approach for preparation and training that leads to a unified Palestinian will stemming from the unified flag, national anthem, military salute and military system and expressed in a unified decision making and task implementation mechanism. • Recognizing that acts of resistance do not contradict with the existence of the security services because acts of resistance respond to the occupation’s crimes and violations and must be approved by all Palestinians who have the right to determine the time and place and choose the appropriate form of resistance which serves the ultimate national interests of the Palestinian people. • Recognizing that the financing of the security services must not come except through legitimate and known channels away from the collection of royalties, levies and similar illegal fees(gravel, stolen vehicles, tunnels, etc.). This should close the door for corruption in these services whose leaders and cadres must focus their attention on the process of professional building of the security establishment and fulfilling its mission. • Recognizing that the mission of the military wings of the Palestinian national factions is to carry out acts of resistance and not to confront the security services or seize power in the Authority. Qarmout proposed developing a national program for rebuilding the security and military establishment, whose most important element is reviving the National Security Council and restructuring it in a manner that ensures participation of the Palestinian factions in order to achieve the following tasks: 1. Defining the Palestinian military/ security doctrine as defending the state and protecting its borders, facilities, resources and institutions, aligning with the people, enforcing the law and imposing security and safety. 2. Devising strategic and tactical policies for the security services. 12

3. Taking measures that guarantee building professional, institutional and democratic security services. 4. Agreeing that the basic contradiction is with the occupation. At the same time, resisting the factions’ interference in the operation of the security services while not reaching the point of contradicting with them and resolving all conflicts that may arise. 5. Prohibiting political treason. No faction is a traitor and no ideology is a traitor. Treason and collaboration are associated with those who provide services to the enemy. They are adjectives describing individuals, not a party, a class or an ideology. 6. Seeking funding for building the security services while guaranteeing their independence and immunizing them from any mistakes in this field. 7. Defining the structure of the security services in a manner that serves the national interests and responds to the necessities of the statehood phase. This includes unifying the internal security services affiliated with the Ministry of Interior under a unified leadership that includes the Police, the Preventive Security Service and the Civil Defense. This also includes the necessity of identifying means for the National Security Service to be independent. This issue requires resolution. 8. Subordination of the Intelligence Service and the Presidential Security Service to the Presidency directly and defining their duties accurately in order to avoid interference with the tasks of other services. 9. The National Security Council forms a committee of specialized professionals and experts to prepare for implementing the articles above and commission the concerned competent parties with their implementation. Qarmout underscored the important roles that must be entrusted to the Palestinian judiciary, the Palestinian Legislative Council, civic organizations, the civil society and the political parties and outlined them in detail. 13

To begin all of this, Qarmout proposed: First: Speeding up formation of the security committee in accordance with a presidential decree. This committee should be comprised of professional experienced officers and should function under Egyptian and Arab supervision in accordance with the Cairo Agreement. Second: The process of rebuilding the security services should be carried out with Egyptian and Arab help, and all of its requirements should be guaranteed and met through this Arab support. Third: After this committee convenes, devises its program and distributes tasks among its members, it is necessary to divide it into two subcommittees: 1. The first committee will oversee the mission of restructuring the security services affiliated with the Ministry of Interior. Qarmout proposed having a Minister of Interior only, not a Minister of Interior and National Security, for a basic consideration, which is that the Minister of Interior and his services has tasks that are different in nature from those of the National Security Services and must devote himself to those tasks because they are more important, especially in light of the fact that what is required of them is to ensure security and safety of the citizen and enforce the law. 2. The second committee whose mission will be building and restructuring the National Security Service. The author proposed subordinating everything related to the military to this Service under one leadership, except for the Intelligence and Presidential Security Services. Fourth: Forming subcommittees surrounding the two committees mentioned above, whose members should be qualified professional senior officers with vast experience in the fields they are entrusted with Examples of such subcommittees include: 1. A committee to study the required number of members of each service and determine the number of officers, cadres and professionals needed and their qualifications in the fields they will serve in. To maintain professionalism, the issue of the members of the military wings of the factions must not be resolved at the expense of the military and security services, but outside those services and institutions. 14

2. A committee for administrative affairs, whose task should be to check the inventories of the former services and forces and redistribute them in accordance with the new services’ tasks and needs, as well as to also prepare a study of the future needs of the security services and forces. 3. An armament committee whose task should be to check the inventories of weapons under the custody of all forces and services and redistribute them, as well as identify needs in this area. 4. The Council of Ministers should form a committee of judges and specialists from the security services and forces to draft the necessary laws for organizing the responsibilities and rights of the security services and forces. Roundtable title:“ The Palestinian reconciliation” Seyasat focuses in its seminar for this issue on the Palestinian reconciliation. It debates separately each of Azzam Al-Ahmad, who oversees the National Relations file in Fatah Movement, Dr. Mousa Abu Marzouq, who oversees the Reconciliation file in Hamas Movement, Khaled Al-Batsh, who oversees National Relations in the Islamic Jihad Movement, Kayed Al-Ghoul, who oversees Media and Information in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Nasser Abu Nasser, who oversees National Relations in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Title of Article:“Performance of Dr. Rami Al-Hamdallah Government: Obstacles and Achievements”. Al-Hamdallah headed the government for almost a year(June 6, 2013 – May 6, 2014)” Author: Dr. Ahmad Abu Dayyeh With the end of the caretaker government headed by Dr. Rami Al-Hamdallah and formation of the Conciliation Government, Seyasat found it appropriate to present in the public policies corner a performance evaluation of the former Al-Hamdallah government. Researcher Ahmad Abu Dayyeh undertook this task, writing a study entitled“Performance of Dr. Rami Al-Hamdallah Government: Obstacles and Achievements”. Al-Hamdallah headed the government for almost a year(June 6, 2013 – May 6, 2014). After studying the environment under which the government operated and deducing its approaches and priorities, Abu Dayyeh searched for the most significant features of the 15

performance of this government in various spheres—the political, economic, financial, social, service and legislative, as follows: 1. The Political Sphere: The political approaches and vision of the government and its role in internal and external politics. 2. The Economic and Financial Sphere: Includes the economic and financial policies of the government and its strategic plans and performance in this field. 3. The Administrative and Service Sphere: Includes the administration of public facilities and civil service as well as health and education services and social affairs. 4. The Legislative Sphere: Includes devising bills submitted to the President to be issued as laws, and preparing regulations and executive orders. Abu Dayyeh adopted a methodology based on an overall view of the government’s performance through the collective outputs, decisions, plans and programs emanating from the Cabinet. His methodology did not include following up the individual efforts and outputs of each ministry separately. The most important conclusions reached by Abu Dayyeh were: 1. The government succeeded in devising and approving several plans and policies pertaining to the various sectors(such as the strategy of the revenues system for the years 2014-2016, the national development plan for the years 2014-2016, and the General Budget Law for FY 2014). However, these plans and approaches lacked coherence and coordination among them. The budget, for example, often did not reflect the content of the development plan and most of it was devised within the frame of an optimistic vision concerning the peaceful settlement plan between the Palestinian and Israeli sides and the International Quartet’s plan for reviving the Palestinian economy, and did not take into consideration the possibility of achieving the reconciliation and ending the division. 2. The political role of the government is almost non-existent, whether on the level of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process or on the level of the efforts to end the division. These files 16

were handled exclusively by the Presidency institution, and the role of the government was limited to supporting the President’s efforts and his political positions concerning the negotiations and ending the division as well as renouncing and condemning the positions and policies of the Israeli occupation. 3. The government exerted huge efforts in the fields of civil service and managing public services. The government concluded several agreements and memoranda of understanding with the vocational unions and syndicates, which entailed additional financial commitments on the government’s shoulder. These agreements raised serious doubts about the government’s ability to fulfill its commitments in light of the difficult financial situation as well as the Israeli government’s punitive measures of suspending or deducting all or parts of the reconciliation money owed by Israel. As such, many of those syndicates are threatening to strike again in the case of the government’s failure to fulfill its commitments. 4. The government took several decisions and measures pertaining to the prisoners and liberated prisoners with the aim of guaranteeing their rights and ensuring that they live in dignity. The government took similar decisions with regard to compensating farmers for losses caused by natural disasters and settlers’ attacks and supporting marginalized areas and areas threatened by settlement and the wall. All of these decisions entailed enormous financial commitments on the shoulder of the government, which require additional efforts to fulfill them. 5. Pressure on governmental health and social services increased in light of the increased levels of poverty and employment and continuation of the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip. This pressure reflected on the government’s ability to provide such services. 6. In spite of the government’s limited involvement in the legislative sphere(preparing bills and submitting them to the President to be issued as laws) and in comparison with former governments, several controversial bills were submitted to the President to be issued as laws such as a bill amending the income tax law and the water bill as well as the general budget bill which had several comments on it by members of the Legislative Council but none were taken into consideration. 17

Title of Article:“The U.S. Policy toward a Changing Middle East” Author: Mrs. Amani Al-Qiram The international politics corner included a study for Amani Al-Qiram, researcher and PhD candidate at Cairo University, entitled“The U.S. Policy toward a Changing Middle East.” Al-Qiram briefly studied the features of the U.S. policy under President Obama vis-à-vis the Middle East, especially in the wake of the revolutionary waves that have toppled regimes allied with the United States, focusing on several cases in the region such as Egypt and Syria, as well as the peace process, in an attempt to answer a number of questions including: how has the United States dealt with the changing environment in the Middle East? Is there a strategy toward the Middle East in accordance with which the U.S. policy under President Obama operates? How has the vision of President Barak Obama influenced the formulation of his policy toward the Middle East? Does the region have priority on his agenda? And what is President Obama’s position on the Arab revolutions which erupted in the beginning of 2011? The researcher starts from the premise that the U.S. policy toward the Middle East under President Barak Obama has witnessed relative decrease of attention to the issues of the region due to absence of a clear strategic vision and adoption of policies on a case-by-case basis. Book Reviews:“The memoires of Salim Az-Za’noun” Seyasat offers a presentation of the memoires of Salim Az-Za’noun, Chairman of the Palestinian National Council and one of the most prominent contemporary leaders of the Palestinian national movement, entitled“The Process and the March.” Seyasat also reviews a number of books recently released from Palestinian and Arab publishing houses. Information about the Authors: 1. Dr. Ibrahim Abrash: is a Political Science Professor at Al-Azhar University and former Minister of Culture 2. Abdul Ghani Salameh: is a researcher and author in political affairs 18

3. Dr. Atef Abu Seif: is an Editor of Seyasat 4. Major General. Ahmad Qarmout: is a Police Brigadier 5. Mr.Imad Ghayadah: is a Science Professor at Birzeit University 6. Dr. Ahmad Abu Dayyeh: is a Science Professor at Birzeit University 7. Mrs. Amani Al-Qiram: is a researcher and PhD candidate at Cairo University 19