ANALY TI CAL REP ORT Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 MAPPING BELARUSIAN ONLINE PROPAGANDA Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 Marat Lesnov Alesia Rudnik December 2024 The Belarusian authorities continue to implement creative tools for promoting the regime's agenda. On Telegram, content about the war in Ukraine dominates, while on TikTok and Instagram, the focus is on the achievements of the Belarusian regime. The war in Ukraine and criticism of the West are central themes in progovernment sources. Attention to Belarus's domestic political agenda is significantly lower. 1

MAPPING BELARUSIAN ONLINE PROPAGANDA MAIN THEMES, EMPHASES AND TRENDS IN 2024

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 Table of Contents SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................................................................... 6 2 ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 2.1 Telegram is the main platform for online propaganda.................................................................................... 8 2.2 Focus on the war in Ukraine and problems of the aggressive West............................................... 8 2.3 Attacks on the opposition during the elections and emphasis on the regime’s achievements before the All-Belarussian People’s Assembly(ABPA).......................................... 9 2.4 Poor attention to international co-operation, including with Russia................................................. 10 2.5 and individual sources are thematically specific....................................................................... 10 2.6 Relatively high“originality” in content................................................................................................................................ 11 2.7 Checking the objectivity of the findings.......................................................................................................................... 11 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 A List of themes and subthemes for analysis................................................................................................................. 16 B List of sources for analysis............................................................................................................................................................. 18 3

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 SUMMARY NOT JUST STATE CHANNELS AND PROPAGANDISTS FOCUS ON THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE WEST’S PROBLEMS Belarusian propaganda on digital platforms continues to evolve, with authorities involving citizens in flash mobs to support the regime, developing a network of new speakers on TikTok and Telegram, and using creative tools to promote the regime’s agenda. A study called Mapping Online Propaganda conducted by the Centre for New Ideas ana lysed nearly 2600 publications on popular platforms such as Telegram, YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram(human cod ing) to see how pro-government sources discuss Western countries, the Belarusian opposition, the achievements of the government, and the war in Ukraine. THE THEMES OF PRO-GOVERNMENTAL CONTENT VARY BETWEEN PLATFORMS The study found a connection between platforms and the “thematic preferences” of the channel’s authors. For exam ple, pro-government sources on Telegram primarily focus on the war in Ukraine or the situation in Western countries. TikTok and Instagram, on the other hand, emphasise the achievements of the current Belarusian regime, often praising Lukashenka. Meanwhile, YouTube often features criticism of Western countries. The analysis found that Belarusian pro-government online resources are particularly interested in military action in Ukraine, the economy, and the domestic and foreign pol icies of Western countries. The internal political agenda of Belarus receives much less attention, with little priority given to the achievements of the regime or criticism of opposition democratic forces even early in the year, during the parliamentary campaign. ANALYSES ON SMALL SAMPLES ARE PROBABLY QUITE OBJECTIVE The study also compared the results of qualitative manual analysis and quantitative-­qualitative analysis using auto mated MediaIQ monitoring in Telegram(continuous keyword analysis). MediaIQ data on two important topics(the West and the opposition) give a preliminary conclusion that shows that the results of manual analysis of online propaganda on a small sample of publications in Telegram are comparable with the findings of quantitative-­qualitative analysis of all posts in these channels. From a methodological standpoint, this means that qualitative content analysis of online prop aganda can be done with relatively low resources. 4

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 INTRODUCTION The Belarusian pro-government segment on digital platforms continues to evolve. The political crisis in Belarus and the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine prompted pro-governmental speakers to expand the range of topics and increase presence in social networks and messengers. At the same time, ahead of the presidential elections of 2025, democratic actors and opinion leaders rely on work ing with undecided neutral audiences. As voting day ap proaches, it is all the more important to understand what pro-government sources discuss, the emphasis such content creators place on their communications, to what extent and how they cover the war in Ukraine, events in Western countries, and their opponents. of society is still relevant. It is therefore crucial to take the experiences and tactics of opponents into account. The authors of the study— Marat Lesnov, Doctor of Political Science and Senior Researcher at the Centre for New Ideas, and Alesia Rudnik, Director of the Centre for New Ideas, and a doctoral candidate in Political Science— would like to thank Aliaksei Piatrenka, the research assistant for the project, and the MediaIQ project for their assistance with data collection. Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda is the next step in studying Belarusian propaganda with a focus on the infor mational role of non-state content producers. It examines content from 2024 on four digital platforms— Telegram, YouTube, TikTok and Instagram. The mapping reveals the main themes covered by pro-government sources and the degree to which the war in Ukraine, the situation in Western countries(including protests and the welfare of ordinary citizens), as well as criticism of the Belarusian opposition and promotion of the themes of unity and brotherhood with Russia are represented on these resources. The findings will be useful not only for researchers of Be larusian online propaganda, but also for stakeholders such as independent media, who are looking for ways to coun ter pro-governmental narratives. Analysing the tactics em ployed by pro-government sources and finding the pos sibilities and formats to compete with them on various platforms remains an key priority when engaging with the Belarusian audience. Democratic politicians would also benefit from this re search. We assume that messages in pro-governmental sources are frequently consumed by the“politically neutral” audience, which, according to Chatham House estimates, comprises about one-third of Belarusian urban residents. While it is difficult to change the minds of those who have already decided on their political position because of po larisation(“rejection of the other side”), which in Belarus is one of the highest in the world(according to the Varieties of Democracy Institute), the struggle for neutral segments 5

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 1 METHODOLOGY The research is based on four broad and complementary research questions. To answer them, we used qualitative-­ quantitative content analysis of the main resources of Be larusian propaganda on four platforms. Table 1. Research questions RQ1a: To what extent do pro-government online resources in Belarus focus on themes related to the war in Ukraine? RQ1b: Do these themes, in aggregate, dominate their content? RQ2a: To what extent are the“collective West” and individual Western countries criticised by pro-government online resources? RQ2b: What are the main themes on which such attacks and defamation are carried out? RQ3a: To what extent do pro-government online resources in Belarus criticise the Belarusian opposition and its supporters? RQ3b: Is such content more prevalent than materials highlighting the achievements and merits of the current government? RQ4: To what extent do pro-government online resources in Belarus promote narratives of unity, co-operation and brotherhood with Russia? institutions and state media. The researchers refined the sample by including only sources that cannot be unambiguously attributed to the channels of the au thorities  2, pro-governmental organisations and associations  3, or state media. Similarly, the sample exclud ed accounts and channels of individual journalists directly linked to state media or to government offi cials, such as governors or mayors. While it cannot be claimed that journalists from state media or officials have no connections with the sourc es selected, they position themselves as“grassroots” initiatives or“independent” bloggers. Therefore, the study focuses on pro-governmental speakers who are not affiliated with state bodies or me dia, as these content producers are still studied little. Meanwhile, the Belarusian researchers conducted regular monitoring, content analysis and messages of the official pro-government media in Belarus  4. This approach to sample formation ensures the novelty of the research results and makes it possible to compare how the same themes are covered by state media on the one hand and speakers and pro-government channels that position themselves as independent on the other. The mapping covered three stages. The full sample includes 15 Telegram channels, 15 TikTok accounts, 7 Instagram accounts, and 4 YouTube channels(see Appendix B for a list of sources). 1) In the first stage, the researchers selected the most popular pro-governmental sources(sources of online propaganda) on four platforms— Telegram, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram  1. Such sources included accounts and channels that published materials in support of the current Belarusian authorities more than twice a week. The underrepresentation of pro-government resources on Instagram and YouTube can be explained by the blocking of content due to complaints from opposition-­minded users. In addition, the government and its supporters can focus on more popular platforms in Belarus— Telegram and TikTok. HowevA major contribution of this study, one that distinguish es it from others, is its focus on individual content producers rather than on channels and accounts of state 1 More detailed information on the frequency of use of these and other platforms in Belarus can be found here, here or here. 2 The sample also excluded channels administered by law enforcement agencies, such as individual police and army units. 3 For example, channels like the Belarusian Republican Youth Union were not included in the sample. 4 For example, such monitoring is conducted by MediaIQ(a pro ject of the Belarusian Press Club), while the Centre for New Ideas conducted a study of pro-governmental media, as well as channels of state agencies and institutions in 2023. 6

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 er, given the time and human resources of the research team, the samples on Telegram and TikTok were narrowed down to the 15 most popular channels and accounts. 2) In the second stage, the researchers selected the main themes for content analysis and specified them using subthemes. In selecting the themes, the team was guided by previous studies(see here, here and here) and the literature on how autocracies use digital platforms to legitimise themselves in the eyes of vot ers and to consolidate political elites. To achieve these goals, autocratic regimes use the tactics of discrediting political opponents, focusing on domestic achievements, glorifying the role of the leader, and emphasising the country’s participation in international alliances and organisations. Thus, the researchers formulated seven themes and several dozen subthemes for analysis: the West, new world order, integration with Russia, achievements of the Lukashenka regime, Belarusian opposition, war in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s internal situation. 3) The third stage involved qualitative-­quantitative con tent analysis(manual collection and categorisation) of the sources selected on specific themes and sub themes. Based on human and time resources, the monitoring period was limited to four even-numbered months in 2024 with two randomly selected dates in each(randomiser of numbers). If the source did not post anything on the selected dates, the analysis in cluded materials for the day closest to the selected date. In total, 2,593 posts were analysed. Table 2. Sample of posts for analysis Telegram TikTok Instagram YouTube 6, 9 February 606 41 17 9 17, 28 April 491 31 15 8 24, 25 June 648 50 23 7 6, 18 August 566 42 31 8 7

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 2 ANALYSIS 2.1. ELEGRAM IS THE MAIN PLATFORM FOR ONLINE PROPAGANDA of posts found on Telegram yields roughly the same re sults  8 . The study analysed 2,593 posts  5 in the sample sources over the eight days chosen for the study. One or more themes formulated for content analysis were found in 1,222(47%) of these posts. This rather high figure indicates that the deductive approach to the study of online prop aganda made it possible to reflect the most important trends. Most of the publications analysed were posted on pro-gov ernmental Telegram platforms. TikTok was a distant second. Even fewer posts were found on the YouTube  6 and Instagram resources analysed. This distribution confirms the widespread belief that pro-governmental narratives are mainly promot ed on Telegram, which in 2020 became the key source of information for Belarusians(see, for example, here)  7 . 2.2. OCUS ON THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND PROBLEMS OF THE AGGRESSIVE WEST The content of pro-governmental sources, excluding the February dates(6 and 9 February), was dominated by the events in Ukraine, including the theme of the war itself and its consequences. In all periods, excluding the August dates(6 and 18 August), at least 50% of all content about hostilities in Ukraine touched on two subthemes. One concerned mobilisation into the Armed Forces of Ukraine(AFU) within the country  9 , and the other included posts about supplies of military aid and weapons to Ukraine. Table 3: Distribution of posts with the selected themes(n= 1,222) by platform Telegram TikTok Instagram YouTube n 1106 67 33 16 % of all posts 90.5 5.5 2.7 1.3 The first of these two“war” themes received particular at tention in June(n= 34). This can be explained by the amend ed Ukrainian law on mobilisation coming into force at the end of May, which, among other things, abolished certain types of deferments from service. Pro-government speak ers sought to portray this event as a sign of Ukraine’s weak ness, which supposedly had to conscript literally everyone in order to continue the war. In August, posts(n= 20) about the Ukrainian army’s military failures  10 came to the forefront. This was probably the on line propaganda’s“response” to the AFU operation in the The analysis below is based on data collected on all four platforms. However, analysing a sample consisting only 5 The raw data(xlsx, R) can be accessed on request at info@ newideas.center. 6 Almost 40% of the posts(n= 424) on Telegram that had at least one of the themes selected for analysis contained videos. 7 Low figures for TikTok, Instagram and YouTube do not mean that pro-government content is absent on these platforms. It may be distributed here from time to time by certain users. This study covers accounts and channels where such content appears regularly. 8 The exception is the number of posts about the achievements of the current government: on pro-government Telegram resources there are about 4% fewer of them than on average on all the platforms analysed. 9 Accordingly, the analysis separately considered claims about “internal” mobilisation and posts about actions that would encourage Ukrainians who had left the country to enlist in the AFU. This distinction seems necessary due to ongoing discussions in some EU countries and Ukraine about how to incentivise the return of Ukrainian men. However, contrary to expectations, these discussions were not sufficiently covered in the content selected for analysis. 10 7 posts were found on the June dates selected for analysis, while the average number of such posts for the selected dates in February, April and August was 12. 8

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 Figure 1. Key themes: distribution by dates 10 February | 356 April | 306 June | 298 August | 262 War in Ukraine West and Western countries Government’s achievements Belarussian opposition New world order Ukrainian politics Integration with Russia Table 4: Key themes: distribution by relevant posts with at least one theme n% of all posts War in Ukraine West and Western countries Government’s achievements Belarussian opposition New world order Ukrainian politics Integration with Russia 501 41 500 41 217 17.8 215 17.6 84 6.9 82 6.7 81 3.3 Note: the sum of percentages does not equal 100, as posts could contain multiple themes. The foreign and internal policy of Western countries is an other regular theme in pro-governmental sources. However, relevant posts had no subthemes that were repeated from month to month. The most widespread themes in the aggregate content about Western countries(n= 500 for all dates) included military build-up directed against Belarus, primarily by Poland and the Baltic states(n= 56, 11.2%); the deteriorating welfare of ordinary citizens(8.2%); and deg radation of the economy(7.8%). In addition, in February, online propaganda actively focused on EU-wide protests by disgruntled farmers(n= 32, 6.4%), from Spain to Poland. 2.3. TTACKS ON THE OPPOSITION DURING THE ELECTIONS AND EMPHASIS ON THE REGIME’S ACHIEVEMENTS BEFORE THE ALL-­ BELARUSSIAN PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY(ABPA) Kursk region of Russia, which began in the same month. In the totality of posts about the Ukraine war(n= 501 for all dates), these three subthemes were the most significant, featuring in about 50% of such publications. Pro-government sources frequently addressed the theme of the Belarusian opposition and its supporters, and also highlighted the government’s achievements. As can be seen from Figure 1, online propaganda particularly target ed the opponents of Lukashenka’s regime in February, probably because of the parliamentary elections held in Belarus in late February. 11 Figure 1 shows how often the posts touched on one of the themes selected for analysis, depending on the time period. On the one hand, the authorities might have feared protests in the country. On the other, they could seek to increase 9

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 the legitimacy of the voting by channelling negative rhet oric towards the opposition forces that did not recognise the elections. Meanwhile, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was mentioned only 27 times in all opposition-­related posts (12.6% of 215 such posts). Instead, the online propaganda focused on the following issues: the 2020 protests and their consequences(n= 56, 24% of opposition-­related 215 posts), the bias of independ ent media(14%) and coverage of repressive measures against opponents of Lukashenka’s regime inside Belarus. As one can see, the incumbent authorities still“spin” the theme of 2020, presenting those protests as an attempted coup and external interference in Belarus’s internal affairs  12 . In April, the sources analysed actively posted about the government’s achievements(see Figure 1). This probably coincided with the seventh All-­Belarusian People’s Assembly at the end of April. The current regime presents the ABPA as the highest body of“people’s power” in the coun try, allegedly determining the key priorities for national development. Such posts typically emphasised the allegedly high rates of Belarus’s economic development(n= 47/ 217, or 21.7%), the development of new economic ties with the“far arc” countries(11.5%) and the army’s high defence capability in the face of the threat from the West(10.6%). Lukashenka was mentioned in about 50% of all posts about the regime’s achievements. es— that is, the domestic political agenda— did not become a priority for pro-government sources even in early 2024, during the parliamentary campaign. This conclusion is further supported by the list of the top ten subthemes covered in online propaganda. The data presented in Table 5 shows that eight of these key sub themes were related to the events in Ukraine, and the economy or politics of Western countries(including in re lation to Belarus and Russia). Table 5: Top 10 subthemes in posts with at least one key theme(n= 1,222) n% of all posts Mobilisation into the AFU in Ukraine 112 9.2 Military aid to Ukraine 88 7.2 The AFU’s military failures 56 4.6 Military build-up of Western countries 56 4.6 directed against Belarus 2020 protests and their consequences 52 4.3 Belarus's progress in economic development 47 3.8 Economic degradation of Western 41 3.4 economies Low welfare of people in Western 39 3.2 2.4. OOR ATTENTION TO countries INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, Military build-up of Western countries 39 3.2 INCLUDING WITH RUSSIA directed against Russia Finally, the platforms being studied devoted the least at tention to foreign policy themes— integration with Russia and formation of a new world order in opposition to the “collective West”  13 . The increased attention to the latter theme in June(see Figure 1) was probably linked to the visit to Belarus by a representative delegation from Chinese universities, and the country’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation(SCO) in early July  14 . Summing up the analysis of the main themes in online propaganda, one can state the following. The pro-government online resources primarily talk about hostilities in Ukraine and the economy, as well as domestic and foreign policy of Western countries. On the other hand, the regime’s achievements and criticism of opposition democratic forc12 It was the events of 2020 that were the focus of posts about the opposition in February, during the parliamentary campaign. 13 This theme includes Belarus’s interaction with the countries of the former Soviet Union and the Global South, including China. 14 This organisation’s main areas of activity include security and economic cooperation. With the exception of India, there are no democratic states among the members of the SCO. Repression, suppression of dissent in 38 3.1 the West 2.5. AND INDIVIDUAL SOURCES ARE THEMATICALLY SPECIFIC The above results are general and do not reflect the situa tion for individual platforms and sources. Figure 2 shows that that themes related to war and Western countries are typical of the content on Telegram. As for TikTok and Ins tagram, they are more likely to emphasise the achievements of Lukashenka regime,“ignoring” the opposition actors. It is difficult to explain this variation. One can assume that pro-governmental resources on Telegram are more connected in organisational terms to state media and therefore tend to follow their agenda in a more centralised manner. In addition, these sources are more likely to func tion as media outlets and even employ professional staff, as they have tens of thousands of subscribers and content posted with high frequency. On the other hand, pro-gov 10

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 Figure 2. Key themes: distribution by platform Telegram | 1106 TikTok | 67 Instagram | 33 YouTube | 16 War in Ukraine West and Western countries Government’s achievements Belarussian opposition New world order Ukrainian politics Integration with Russia ernment accounts on TikTok, Instagram and YouTube may be run by genuine“fans” of the regime who, lacking re sources and time, prefer to simply post content praising the authorities and reposting state media publications. Finally, Figure 3 shows that the themes of online propa ganda also vary from one source to another. The figure presents an analysis of this variability for the six most pop ular sources(according to the number of subscribers) on Telegram. The increased attention“Yellow plums” give to the Belarusian opposition, as well as posts praising the authorities that were published by the odious“opposition” MP Aleh Haidukevich during the parliamentary campaign in February, deserve special attention. To sum up, pro-government sources on Telegram mainly focus on the Ukraine war or the situation in Western countries. TikTok and Instagram are more likely to discuss the achievements of the ruling regime, including attributing Lukashenka with particular merit. YouTube channels also often criticise Western countries. 2.6. ELATIVELY HIGH“ORIGINALITY” IN CONTENT More than 30% of the analyzed posts were direct reposts (i.e., identical copies) or to some extent included previous ly published content. Nearly half of these posts referenced Belarusian state media  15 . 15 We considered the“Pul Pervogo”(Pul 1) Telegram channel, which is run by Lukashenka’s press service to cover his activities, as a state media. The highest percentages of reposts were recorded in pro-government sources on Instagram(over 50%) and Tel egram(about 33%). As for TikTok resources, which, as men tioned earlier, actively highlighted the achievements of the current Belarusian authorities, reposts accounted for approximately 25% of all analyzed content on the platform. However, all of them referenced state media. Finally, about 5% of all reposts linked to Russian sources, most common ly related to content about the war in Ukraine(10% of all posts on this topic). In other words, the content of pro-government online sources should not be viewed as merely borrowing from state television propaganda. The analyzed resources often prefer to cover events independently or rely on other online sources rather than Belarusian state media. 2.7. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE FINDINGS Given that this study used data from a small sample, this could give rise to justified doubts regarding the objectivity of the findings. To confirm this, an additional check was carried out using data from the MediaIQ project. Among other things, the aim of this project is to collect relevant content in Belarusian information spaces using keywords with automated search. For this study, MediaIQ provided data from 15 previously selected Telegram channels on keywords for“The West”(one of the two most popular themes) and“Belarusian opposition”(a less popular theme). This data collection covered all relevant posts published in four even-numbered months of 2024— February, April, 11

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 Figure 3. Key themes: distribution by main pro-government Telegram channels Белорусский силовик Объективный Евген February April June August ЖС Premium February April June August Западные зайчики February April June August ЭТО ДРУГОЕ February April June August Олег Гайдукевич February April June August War in Ukraine West and Western countries Government’s achievements Belarussian opposition February April New world order Ukrainian politics Integration with Russia June August 12

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 June, and August. The resulting posts were further processed using repeated manual analysis(human coding) to exclude possible errors in the automatic categorisation. In total, 4,232 posts initially found by the MediaIQ were ana lysed, including 2,919 on“The West”, and 1,313 on“Belaru sian opposition”. The data presented in Tables 6 and 7 show that some subthemes may indeed have been under- or over-represent ed in the sample for this study. However, analysing the indicators in their globality, there are reasons to assume that the results of manual analysis of online propaganda on a small sample of publications in Telegram are compa rable with the findings of the quantitative-­qualitative anal ysis of all posts on these channels. From a methodological standpoint, this means that qualitative content analysis of online propaganda can be done with relatively few resourc es. Of course, these assumptions need further confirmation in future research. Table 6: Comparison of results of quantitative-­qualitative and qualitative analyses: theme“The West” (1)(2) Military build-up of Western countries directed 11.2 13.3 against Belarus Economic degradation of Western economies 8.2 5.1 Table 7: Comparison of the results of quantitative-­qualitative and qualitative analyses: theme“Belarusian opposition” (1)(2) The 2020 protests and/or their consequences 24.2 34 Bias/ lies in independent media 14.9 5.2 Persecution and arrests of opposition supporters 14 11.5 in Belarus Problems with legalisation of Belarusians who 9.3 6.6 have left(such as refusals of residence permits or visas) Problems with the work and financing of the opposition, initiatives, independent media 9.3 12.3 The West’s control of the actions of the opposition 5.6 7.6 Conflicts within the opposition and between structures 5.6 10 Leaks/ sale of personal information 4.2 4 Persecution and arrests of opposition supporters abroad 3.3 6.2 Preparation of armed seizure of power by the opposition 3.3 7.3 Low welfare of people in Western countries 7.8 4.2 Military build-up of Western countries directed 7.8 9.1 against Russia Repression, suppression of dissent in the West 7.6 7.7 People’s dissatisfaction with domestic policy (decisions) of their countries 7.2 6 Nazi legacy, neo-Nazism 5 11 Notes: (1)— percentage of posts with the listed themes in the content analysis results for 8 dates(qualitative). (2)— percentage of posts with the listed themes in the content analysis results for 4 months(quantitative-­qualitative). Subthemes that ranked top 10 in both analyses are highlighted in grey. The subtheme“Leaks/ sale of personal information was ranked 11th in the quantitative-­qualitative analysis. Western sanctions against Belarus 4.6 3 LGBT propagation, LGBT ideology 4.6 5.4 West’s interference in other countries’ internal affairs 4.2 0.4 Notes: (1)— percentage of posts with the listed themes in the content analysis results for 8 dates(qualitative). (2)— percentage of posts with the listed themes in the content analysis results for 4 months(quantitative-­qualitative). Subthemes that ranked top 10 in both analyses are highlighted in grey. The subtheme“Economic degradation of Western econo mies” was ranked 11th, and the subtheme“Low welfare of people in Western countries” was ranked 13th in the quantitative-­ qualitative analysis. 13

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 CONCLUSIONS The Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda study revealed that in 2024, the war in Ukraine, the achievements of Western countries and the government were the central themes of propaganda. In the context of the war in Ukraine, more than half of the pro-governmental sources touched on the issues of mobilisation into the AFU, and military aid supplies to Ukraine. When covering Western countries, pro-government content producers were most interested in the alleged military build-up by Poland and the Baltic states in preparation for an attack on Belarus, the“degradation” of Western economies, and the alleged deterioration of the welfare of ordinary citizens in the West. Portraying the situation in other countries negatively com pared to Belarusian“well-being” is one of way of legitimis ing the existing regime. This decision to discredit Western countries and Ukraine, rather than the opposition, suggests that the current Belarusian authorities and their supporters view external actors as the main threat. The war in Ukraine and the Belarusian opposition were frequently linked to significant events, such as the mobili sation law taking effect in Ukraine, military actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region, the All-­ Belarussian People’s Assembly, and parliamentary elec tions. In other words, pro-government speakers not only aim to promote regime narratives but also to connect them to current events. Interestingly, while pro-governmental sources mentioned Lukashenka in at least 50% of the posts about the regime’s achievements, the name of Tsikhanouskaya was rarely mentioned when covering the Belarusian opposition. this probably means that the authorities do not see Tsikha nouskaya as either a leader of the opposition or a direct threat. On the other hand, the main opponent’s name may simply be silenced: for example, in their speeches, Putin or Trump avoided directly mentioning Navalny and Harris, respectively. The study also found that the thematic focus of pro-gov ernment content producers is similar to the main narratives of the state media. This conclusion follows on from the comparison in other studies(see here, here and here) of the most popular themes on the channels being studied with the leading themes of state agencies and the media identified. On the one hand, this similarity can suggest the existence of formalised but non-public connections between the Belarusian regime and pro-government bloggers, channels and communities in social media. On the other, this can testify to the(ideological) unity among government supporters. Speaking of various platforms, the data suggests that Telegram is the most popular platform for online propaganda. As noted, pro-government speakers may prefer this plat form because of its structure and interface, which determine the format of content. Longer and more analytical texts, to which online propaganda creators tend to gravitate, look more“organic” on Telegram. The choice in favour of Telegram can also be explained by an infrastructural factor: state media are primarily present on this platform, making it easier for pro-government content creators to re-post their messages without extensive content processing. However, our study for the first time found a connection between the platform chosen by pro-government authors and the themes of their posts. Although the central themes on Telegram are the war in Ukraine, and the politics and economy of Western countries, then the TikTok and Instagram platforms are much more likely to showcase the Belarusian regime’s achievements. As this study has shown, pro-governmental resources, formally not affiliated with the authorities, mirror the state’s agenda: from economic crises in Western countries to praising Lukashenka’s role in national development. However, unlike the well-known propagandists on state TV, these anonymous social media channels and accounts are more likely to attract neutral audiences and to change their political views. With their digital skills rising, the authorities can try to ex pand their narratives on social networks and messaging platforms, relying on individual content creators, including during the current election campaign. This trend is already evident in the initiatives such as the“Nado!” flash mob. By studying the network of actors in pro-government informa tion segments, researchers aim to predict the main narratives and platforms chosen by pro-government speakers. The analysis also indicates that TikTok, the most popular platform among Belarusians, is still relatively“free” from 14

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 pro-governmental content creators. This presents an opportunity for independent media and stakeholders to en gage with neutral audiences through individual content creators on TikTok. The research findings will also provide Western and Ukrain ian stakeholders with insight into the pro-government narratives shaping the Belarusian information field, particular ly concerning politics and events in Ukraine and the West. In the long run, some consumers of such content can contribute to deteriorating attitudes in Belarusian society to Western countries and Ukraine. Therefore, if the West is still interested in preserving the friendly attitude of Be larusians to Western countries, our study will help develop strategies for counteracting damaging pro-governmental narratives. 15

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 ANNEXES  OF THEMES AND SUBTHEMES FOR ANALYSIS 1. The WEST, including the EU and NATO or individual countries 1.1. Paedophilia 1.2. LGBT propagation, LGBT ideology 1.3. Breakdown of family traditions and gender roles 1.4. Deterioration of people’s welfare(wages, prices) 1.5. Problems in the countries’ socio-­economic development(industry, infrastructure, energy, GDP level, etc.) 1.6. Dissatisfaction of(a significant group of) the population, including protests: a) welfare, economy; b) politics; c) non-­Ukrainian migrants; d) Ukrainian migrants; e) support for Ukraine; f) other 1.7. Repression and suppression of dissent(including police violence) 1.8. Problems related to migrants(crime, overfunding, other values): a) non-­Ukrainian migrants; b) Ukrainian migrants 1.9. Nazi legacy of the West, neo-­Nazism 1.10. Corruption in ruling circles(elites) 1.11. Dissatisfaction of individual countries with EU and/or NATO policies 1.12. Militarisation, military build-up(weapons, exercises, etc.): a) for war with Belarus; b) for war with Russia; c) without reference to any country 1.13. Decay, immorality, military weakness(including unwillingness of citizens to serve in the army) 1.14. The West’s interference in other countries’ internal affairs(politics) 1.15. The West uses sanctions against other countries: a) against Belarus; b) against Russia; c) against another country or countries 1.16. Migrant crisis on the border between Belarus and EU countries 2. NEW WORLD ORDER 2.1. Eurasian political-­economic integration in the post-S­ oviet space(CIS, EAEU): a) Belarus mentioned; b) Belarus not mentioned 2.2. Eurasian military integration in the post-S­ oviet space: a) Belarus mentioned; b) Belarus not mentioned 2.3. Condemnation of countries that refuse(against) Eurasian integration(e. g. Armenia) 2.4. Integration of non-­Western countries(Global South)— BRICS, SCO, etc. 2.5. Co-operation(any) between Belarus and China 3. INTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA 3.1. Economic co-operation and arrangements: a) in general; b) visits of Russian governors; b) joint handling of sanctions/ import substitution 3.2. Political co-operation and arrangements 3.3. Military co-operation and arrangements 3.4. Emphasising historical brotherhood and unity 4. LUKASHENKA REGIME’S ACHIEVEMENTS 4.1. Socio-economic development(industry, infrastructure, energy, GDP level, etc.) 4.2. Welfare of the population(high salaries, low prices, etc.) 4.3. Development of healthcare 4.4. Development of education 4.5. Development of science and technology: a) civil technology; b) military technology 4.6. New export routes to the“far arc” countries 4.7. Popular support for the regime/ Lukashenka 4.8. High defence capability/ readiness to repel attack: a) by Western countries; b) by Ukraine; c) by the Kalinousky Regiment; d) in general 4.9. Willingness to use nuclear weapons 4.10. Immigration to Belarus: a) the West— Europeans, Americans; b) other countries 5. BELARUSSIAN OPPOSITION 5.1. 2020 protests and/ or their consequences 5.2. Preparation of new protests in Belarus by the opposition 5.3. Preparation of an armed seizure of power by the opposition 16

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 5.4. Control of the West/ Western structures over the opposition’s actions 5.5. Corruption/ embezzlement of funds and grants 5.6. Leaks and/ or selling of information 5.7. Conflicts within the opposition and between structures/ initiatives 5.8. Distortion of information by opposition media 5.9. Problems with the functioning and funding of the opposition, initiatives and media 5.10. Low level of popular support of the opposition and its structures 5.11. Persecution of opposition supporters and leaders: a) in Belarus; b) outside Belarus 5.12. Pardon of political prisoners 5.13. Problems with legalisation of Belarusians who have left Belarus, refusals of residence permits (visas) 5.14. The opposition has no influence inside or outside Belarus 6. WAR IN UKRAINE 6.1. Ukrainian failures on the front/ advance of the Russian army 6.2. Casualties in the war 6.3. Mobilisation: a) in Ukraine; b) Ukrainians abroad 6.4. Ukraine’s war crimes against civilians or POWs 6.5. Ukraine’s use of prohibited weapons(chemical, biological) 6.6. Attempts by Ukraine to commit nuclear sabotage or use a“dirty bomb” 6.7. Denial of Russian war crimes 6.8. Ineffectiveness of Western military aid/ weapons 6.9. Issues of supplying military aid/ weapons 6.10. Plundering of military aid/ weapons 6.11. Issues related to the use of military aid/ weapons 6.12. West’s control over Ukraine’s actions in the war 6.13. Neo-­Nazis in the AFU, neo-­Nazi ideology of the AFU 6.14. Ukrainians’ war fatigue, desire for peace at any cost 6.15. Belarus’s peacekeeping statements/ initiatives 6.16. Denial of Belarus’s participation in the war 6.17. Casualties, unprofessionalism of Belarusian units fighting for the AFU 6.18. Statements/ allegations about the presence of troops from Western countries in Ukraine 6.19. The issue of sending troops from Western countries, in particular instructors, to Ukraine 6.20. Financial assistance to Ukraine from Western countries(non-military assistance) 7. UKRAINE’S INTERNAL SITUATION 7.1. Corruption 7.2. Trafficking of children, sale of children abroad 7.3. Sale of human organs 7.4. Illegitimacy of President Zelenskyy 7.5. Illegitimacy of the Verkhovna Rada 7.6. Dissatisfaction with the authorities, their actions 7.7. Manifestations of neo-­Nazism, extreme nationalism in the actions of the authorities 7.8. Conflicts within the government, elites 7.9. Dominance of Western companies/ capital 17

Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 B. LIST OF SOURCES FOR ANALYSIS Telegram TikTok YouTube Instagram Manual data collection Х Х Х Х Analysis period 6, 9 February; 17, 28 April; 24, 25 June; 6, 18 August 2024 Themes The West; new world order; integration with Russia; achievements of the Lukashenka regime; Belarusian opposition; war in Ukraine; Ukraine’s internal situation Automated data collection Х Analysis period February, April, June, August 2024 Themes The West; Belarusian opposition List of sources Белорусский силовик; prostoalik74; Объективный Евген; belarusseychas; ЖС Premium; uggla2001; Западные зайчики; prostopervy; ЭТО ДРУГОЕ; nostalliak; Гайдукевич Олег; evgenbelorus; БелВПО; novostibelorusa; Невольфович; newsinbelarus; Земля наша; political.channel.live; -Живёт же Беларусь!; belarusnews.by; Шпаковский. По существу; lukashenko_top; Шкварка 2.0; ostro.news; ДОСТОВЕРНО; caretakerofwaterways; Дзермант; alena..74; Говорит Гомель| userjucyig3iz5 Гомельщина Системная правозащита; Виталий Баковец— Полесский партизан; БЕЛРУСИНФО; Слыхали Новость? gaidukevich77; moladz.by; talai_fond; a.lebedev.official; za_mirnuiu_belarus; zhivet.zhe.belarus; by_nv_volovichofficial 18

AUTHORS: Authors: Marat Lesnov Alesia Rudnik Design: Roman Marchishin Mapping Belarusian Online Propaganda: Main Themes, Emphases and Trends in 2024 CONTACTS The Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine/ Project Belarus Christopher Forst| FES Representative for Belarus St. Borysohlibska 15A, Kyiv, 04070, Ukraine Tel.:+ 38–044–234–10–38| Fax:+ 38–044–234–10–39 All texts are available on the website: https://belarus.fes.de Orders/ contacts: belarus@fes-dee.org Reproduction of material in this information product for commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. 19

MAPPING BELARUSIAN ONLINE PROPAGANDA: MAIN THEMES, EMPHASES AND TRENDS IN 2024 The Belarusian authorities continue to implement creative tools for promoting the regime's agenda. On Telegram, content about the war in Ukraine dominates, while on TikTok and Instagram, the focus is on the achievements of the Belarusian regime. The war in Ukraine and criticism of the West are central themes in pro-government sources. Attention to Belarus's domestic political agenda is significantly lower.