FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY David Deng, Sophia Dawkins, Tim Epple, Christopher Oringa and Jan Pospisil November 2024 i CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY The authors would like to express their deep gratitude to the many people who made this study possible, particularly the thousands of South Sudanese from across the country who graciously took the time to participate in the survey. ii This research is supported by the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform(PeaceRep), funded by UK International Development from the UK government. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform. We would also like to extend our appreciation to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) for the financial support that made this study possible. Copyright© 2024 All rights reserved. Contents About Us....................................................................... Key..................................................................... vii 1. Introduction................................................................... 1 2. Awareness and Impacts of Climate............................................ 3 3. Climate-induced...................................................... 5 4. Impacts on Food Security and.............................................. 7 5. Impacts on.............................................................. 9 iii 6. Institutional.......................................................... 12 7. Conclusion and Recommendations.................................................. 14 CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN About Us Detcro, LLC is a management, research, and advisory company with offices in Washington, D.C. and Juba, South Sudan. Our team has more than 50 years of combined experience serving as intermediaries between communities and international development partners across Africa. http://detcro.com PeaceRep is a research consortium based at Edinburgh Law School. Our research is rethinking peace and transition processes in the light of changing conflict dynamics, changing demands of inclusion, and changes in patterns of global intervention in conflict and peace/mediation/transition management processes. PeaceRep.org Acronyms CSO Civil Society Organisation CSRF Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FCDO Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung HDP Humanitarian, Development and Peace HLP Housing, Land and Property IDP Internally Displaced Person OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PeaceRep Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform POC Protection of Civilians SSRRC South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission UNDP United Nations Development Programme v CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN List of Figures Figure 1: Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions directly affect my community.’ x Location(2024)(N= Figure 10: Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have severely damaged the economy in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= Figure 2: How severely has climate change affected people in your area compared to other areas in South Sudan? x Location(2024)(N= Figure 3: What are the main impacts of climate change that your community has experienced? x Location(2024) (N= Figure 4: Have members of your community been displaced due to flooding and/or droughts in this area in the past three years? x Location(2024)(N= Figure 5: Have you yourself been displaced due to flooding and/or droughts in this area in the past three years? x Location(2024)(N= Figure 6: Individuals displaced by flooding/drought in the past three years x Perceived safety(2024)(N= Figure 11: Agree/Disagree:‘Disagreements about natural resources such as land and water have increased because of changing environmental conditions.’ x Location(2024) (N= Figure 12: Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have exacerbated violent conflict between farmers and cattle herders in this area.’ x Location (2024)(N= Figure 13: Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have exacerbated cattle raiding in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= Figure 14: Agree/Disagree: Climate change and changing weather conditions have exacerbated politically motivated conflict between armed movements in this area.’ x Location (2024)(N= vi Figure 7: Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing Figure 15: Agree/Disagree: The government is doing weather conditions have had a major impact on farming enough to address the impact of climate change in South practices in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= Sudan.’ x Survey Environment(2024)(N= Figure 8: Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have had a major impact on pastoralist activities in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= Figure 16: Agree/Disagree: International partners are doing enough to address the impact of climate change in South Sudan.’ x Survey Environment(2024)(N= Figure 9: Agree/Disagree:‘Food security is negatively impacted by flooding and/or droughts.’ x Location(2024) (N= Figure 17: Which are the most effective institutions that support your community in dealing with the impact of climate change?(2024)(N= FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY Key Findings and Recommendations • This policy brief presents data on perceptions of climate due to flooding or droughts in the past three years. security from the most recent wave of the South Fifty-three percent of respondents have personally Sudan Public Perceptions of Peace Survey. The 2024 been displaced, particularly in Rubkona, Malakal, round of this poll captured the views of 4,769 South Gogrial West, Bor South and Pibor. Displacement is Sudanese in 15 locations across all ten states and one also correlated with decreased feelings of safety. administrative area, encompassing urban, rural and internally displaced person(IDP) camp environments.• Climate extremes are having far-reaching impacts on food security and livelihoods across all the 15 • For the first time, this survey has been able to locations surveyed. Eighty-nine percent of respondents show that across South Sudan, people are not just agree that climate change has severely impacted aware of climate change, but that they have also farming practices, while 79 percent note its impact experienced adverse effects of climate change on on pastoralist activities. Eighty-nine percent of livelihoods, displacement, and conflict. There is a respondents believe food security has been negatively need for coordinated action by the government and impacted by flooding, and 86 percent report significant international partners to strengthen climate security, damage to the local economy. adaptation, and disaster preparedness. • A majority of survey respondents, and particularly • South Sudan faces a unique climate challenge in men, report that climate change affects conflict. that its population already grapples with acute Sixty-seven percent of respondents link increased humanitarian needs driven by violent political conflicts, disagreements over resources like land and water vii hyperinflation and forced displacement, exacerbated to climate change. Seventy percent believe climate by the war in neighbouring Sudan. Climate extremes change has exacerbated violent conflicts between interact with these humanitarian conditions to produce farmers and herders. Climate change is also seen an ever-more complex crisis. as a factor in increased cattle-raiding and politically motivated conflicts. • There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between climate change and conflict. On the one hand,• Levels of satisfaction with institutional responses to armed conflict, particularly through its impact climate change vary. Fifty-four percent of respondents on food security and displacement, increases the feel that the government is doing enough to population’s vulnerability to climate extremes. On the address climate change impacts, while two-thirds other hand, climate extremes reinforce conditions of believe international partners are sufficiently active. marginalization, exploitation, and social disintegration Dissatisfaction with the government’s response that are conducive to intercommunal violence. is higher in IDP camps, while dissatisfaction with international partners is higher in rural areas. • South Sudanese are very familiar with climate change. Eighty-six percent of respondents are aware of climate• Except for a few questions, there is a gender difference change, and 87 percent agree that their community in how men and women perceive the impact of climate understands its impacts. Ninety-three percent of change. Most female and male respondents broadly respondents believe climate change directly affects share the view that climate change is affecting their their community, with significant impacts felt in lives, but men are somewhat more likely to report locations such as Rubkona, Malakal, Gogrial West, negative impacts of climate change, particularly on Bor South and Pibor. conflict, displacement, the economy, and pastoralism. Women are less likely to report that governmental • People across the country have firsthand experiences and international actors are doing enough to address of the impacts of climate change. 67 percent of climate change. Further scrutiny is required to explain respondents report community members displaced these differences. CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN Recommendations The following recommendations are primarily targeted at the government of South Sudan and international actors working across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus: Climate-informed conflict analysis and early warning • Place local knowledge and locally-collected data front and centre in conflict analysis. • Investigate further the varied impact of climate change, including across gender, age and location. • Use existing analytical frameworks to assess climate security risks. • Enhance data collection, analysis, and research capacities of South Sudanese institutions and actors working on climate security. • Foster interdisciplinary dialogue on climate security between researchers, governmental and nongovernmental actors, and international stakeholders. • Ensure that new early warning and environmental risk platforms are complementary and integrate local perspectives on climate change. • Conduct long-term analysis of climate change trends to inform strategic forward-planning and resourcing. viii Climate security and programming across the HDP nexus • Address the interplay between climate change, displacement, resource scarcity, political transition and conflict. • Mainstream climate change considerations into humanitarian, development and peace activities, where appropriate. • Think and work politically when responding to climate security risks. • Explore opportunities for environmental peacebuilding in situations where intercommunal natural resource management can create incentives for cooperation. • Ensure that efforts to strengthen South Sudan’s food security and climate resilience are gender- and conflictsensitive, including the recently announced$33 million Watershed Approaches for Climate Resilience in Agro-pastoral Landscapes Project. • Formulate long-term responses to chronic climate change-induced displacement. 1. Introduction FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY South Sudan is among the most vulnerable countries to flood-induced migration of cattle-herders, and responses climate change and ranks second globally for being at to climate change are deeply intertwined with elite political risk of humanitarian crises and disasters. 1 For the past five interests and the wider conflict system. 3 years, South Sudan has experienced record-breaking floods and extreme heat in parts of the country due to climatic This policy brief presents data on perceptions of climate changes. The floods in 2020 and 2021 reached especially security from an opinion poll conducted by Detcro Research devastating levels, eliminating entire villages. The flooding and Advisory and the Peace and Conflict Resolution has displaced hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed Evidence Platform(PeaceRep) and funded by the United farms and killed livestock across South Sudan. Pastoralist Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office communities are forced to venture further afield in search(FCDO). The poll, conducted between March and June of water and pasture, where they often come into conflict 2024, just before the onset of the rainy season, captured with other cattle-herding communities or with farmers. the views of 4,769 people in 15 locations across all ten Flood-induced displacement is also giving rise to housing, states and one administrative area, encompassing urban, land and property(HLP) disputes as displaced populations rural and IDP camp environments. 4 In addition to questions often have no option but to settle on land that does not about climate change and its impacts in their communities, belong to them. 2 The impacts of climate change, including respondents were asked about their daily experiences of safety, drawing on indicators of‘everyday peace’ developed through qualitative research during the project’s inception South Sudan has experienced recordphase. 5 breaking floods and extreme heat in 1 parts of the country due to climatic A key line of analysis in this brief concerns climate security. In changes forcing pastoralist communities this brief, climate security is broadly understood to describe forced to venture further afield in search conditions under which individuals and communities have of water and pasture, where they often the capacity to manage the climate change-related risks come into conflict with other cattleto their physical safety and the realization of their human herding communities or with farmers. rights. 6 1 2025 INFORM Risk Index , Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Risk, Early Warning and Preparedness and the European Commission, available at https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Results-and-data. 2 This is giving rise to a host of humanitarian challenges. For example, Nuer communities displaced due to flooding in northern Jonglei in 2021 have taken up residence in an old fire station in Malakal Town. Due to their status as flood victims from another state, they are ineligible to receive humanitarian assistance and have not been permitted to resettle in Malakal Town. 3 James Kunhiak Muorwel, Jan Pospisil, Veronica Igale Monoja, Caught Between Crises in South Sudan: Flood-Induced Migration of Dinka Bor Cattle Herders in the Equatoria Region , Friedrich Ebert Stiftung(FES)(Dec. 2023), available at https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/FES-Climate-security_Caughtbetween-crises-in-South-Sudan_Dec-2023.pdf. 4 While the survey is not statistically representative for all of South Sudan, a convenience sample of 15 counties was selected to represent the principal regions and conflict theatres in South Sudan. The research team used an approximately self-weighting stratified random sampling approach to select households, and then individuals within households. This method centered on a randomization strategy implemented using ArcGIS and the GRID3 South Sudan Settlement Extents, Version 01.01 dataset. For each workday, enumerators began at randomly drawn map coordinates and followed a random walk guided by smartphone apps. Enumerators recorded responses using KoboToolbox smartphone software. See Center for International Earth Science Information Network(CIESIN), Columbia University and Novel-T. 2021, GRID3 South Sudan Settlement Extents, Version 01, Geo- Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development (GRID3), available at https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-khpa-pq09. 5 The study drew from the Everyday Peace Indicator(EPI) methodology to develop measures of everyday safety through interviews and focus groups across five of the survey locations in January and February 2020. This process produced five questions which were asked in each survey. The responses were then translated into an aggregate index of daily safety. See Pamina Firchow and Roger Mac Ginty, Measuring peace: Comparability, commensurability, and complementarity using bottom-up indicators , International Studies Review(2017). 6 Drawing on existing literature dealing with the conceptualisation and definition of‘climate security’, including in Karen O’Brien, Are we missing the point? Global environmental change as an issue of human security , Global Environmental Change 16:1(2006), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.11.002 and Matt McDonald, Climate change, security and the institutional prospects for ecological security , Geforum 155(2024), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j. geoforum.2024.104096 CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN Climate security is a significant concern in South Sudan given the way climate extremes exacerbate existing political, social and economic vulnerabilities, and increase political competition, thereby contributing to violence and conflict. The survey data suggests that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between climate change and conflict, confirming earlier studies that pointed to a ‘vicious cycle’ between climate extremes and conflict. 7 On the one hand, armed conflict, particularly through its impact on food security and displacement, increases the population’s vulnerability to climate extremes. On the other, climate extremes reinforce conditions of marginalization, exploitation, and social disintegration that are conducive to intercommunal violence. The brief starts by presenting survey data on awareness of climate change and its impacts, followed by a discussion of data on displacement, food security, livelihoods, conflict, and institutional responses. Gender differences in survey responses are highlighted where relevant. 2 7 See, e.g., Grazia Pacillo, Leonardo Medina, Theresa Liebig, Bia Carneiro, Frans Schapendonk, Alessandro Craparo, et al., Measuring the climate security nexus: The Integrated Climate Security Framework , PLOS CLIM 3:10, p.3(2024), available at https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000280 FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY 2. Awareness and Impacts of Climate Change The opinion polling data reflect widespread familiarity with the term‘climate change’ and the impacts that changing weather conditions are having on populations across South Sudan. Eighty-six percent of respondents said they know FIGURE 1 Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions directly affect my community.’ x Location (2024)(N= 4,769) what climate change is and 87 percent agreed with the statement,‘My community is aware about climate change and its impacts’. 8 Ninety-three percent of respondents said Yirol West Yei Yambio that climate change directly affects their community(see Wau& Jur River Figure 1), with virtually no difference between responses Torit from female and male survey participants. A majority of Rumbek Centre respondents in Rubkona, Malakal, Gogrial West and Pibor Rubkona felt that climate change has impacted their area more than Renk other areas in South Sudan(Figure 2). In general, the data Pibor reflects communities’ exposure to climate-related events, Malakal with locations in the Equatorias – especially Yambio and Juba Yei, to a lesser extent Juba – showing lower awareness than Gogrial West areas in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile. Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 3 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents The opinion polling data reflect widespread familiarity with the term ‘climate change’ and the impacts that changing weather conditions are having on populations across South Sudan. Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Not answered 8 The main outlier was Yambio, where 78 percent of respondents did not know what climate change means and just 35 percent said their community was aware about climate change and its impact. This is consistent with Western Equatoria being among the states that have had the least exposure to flooding over in recent years. CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN FIGURE 2 How severely has climate change affected people in your area compared to other areas in South Sudan? x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Less severe More severe About the same Not answered Figure 3 shows the types of climate change impacts that communities have experienced across the survey locations. The most prevalent impact was flooding(33%) followed by hotter conditions(30%) and drought(27%) with little to no difference between responses by female and male participants. It should be noted that data collection took place during a heat wave in South Sudan, which caused schools to be closed for a period of two weeks. This may have caused respondents to gravitate towards this response more than they otherwise would have. It should be noted that data collection took place during a heat wave in South Sudan, which caused schools to be closed for a period of two weeks. FIGURE 3 What are the main impacts of climate change that your community has experienced? x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) 4 FLOODING Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre DROUGHTS UNPREDICTABLE RAINFALL 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 CHANGING INTENSISTY OF RAINFALL Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre HOTTER CONDITIONS OTHER NOT ANSWERED 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY 3. Climate-induced Displacement Among the most severe impacts of climate change in South Sudan is displacement. 2024 has proven to be another difficult year for the country. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA) estimated in October 2024 that flooding affected more than 1.3 million people and displaced about 327 thousand individuals. Another flood assessment from 2022 estimated that more than 2 million people across South Sudan were affected by flooding. 9 Floods add to the already acute displacement crisis caused by conflict in the country and the influx of returnees and refugees fleeing the war in Sudan. displacement(60% of male respondents compared 47% of female respondents). The most acute displacements were reported in Rubkona, Pibor, Bor South and Malakal, where more than 90 percent of respondents said that they had personally been displaced by flooding within the past three years. FIGURE 4 Have members of your community been displaced due to flooding and/or droughts in this area in the past three years? x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) The current historic levels of flooding and projections of Yirol West increased Nile streamflow in Uganda over the coming Yei decades are of significant concern in South Sudan. 10 Lake Victoria experienced record water levels earlier this year and the Government of Uganda was forced to release surplus water into the Nile, reaching South Sudan in September 2024. 11 The record water levels in some localities are Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk prompting discussions around whether the climate-induced Pibor 5 displacement of some populations may be permanent. 12 Malakal Juba Sixty-seven percent of respondents said that members of their community had been displaced by flooding or droughts Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre in the past three years(see Figure 4), with male respondents Full Sample being more likely to report displacement in their community 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 – 74 percent of male respondents answered‘yes’ compared Proportion of respondents to 61 percent of female respondents. Fifty-three percent of respondents said that they personally had been displaced Yes No Unsure Not answered (see Figure 5). Men were again more likely to report 9 An assessment that the University of Juba, South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission(SSRRC) and United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) conducted in 2022 found that 2.6 million people had been affected by flooding throughout South Sudan. See Flood Assessment in South Sudan , Juba University, SSRRC, UNDP(Nov. 2022), available at https://www.undp.org/south-sudan/publications/flood-assessment-report-south-sudan#:~:text=More%20than%20 2%20million%20people,devastation%20wrought%20by%20the%20floods. 10 Solomon H. Gebrechorkos, Meron T. Taye, Behailu Birhanu, Dawit Solomon, and Teferi Demissie, Future Changes in Climate and Hydroclimate Extremes in East Africa , Earth’s Future 11:2(2023), available at https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2022EF003011. 11 South Sudan Situation Report#323, World Food Program(WFP)(31 May 2024), available at https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/wfp-south-sudan-situationreport-323-31-may-2024#:~:text=Major%20flooding%20is%20expected%20in,is%20expected%20from%20June%20onwards. 12 Liz Stephens and Jacob Levi, South Sudan floods: the first example of a mass population permanently displaced by climate change? , The Conversation(10 Sep. 2024), available at https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-floods-the-first-example-of-a-mass-population-permanently-displaced-by-climate-change-238461. CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN FIGURE 5 Have you yourself been displaced due to flooding and/or droughts in this area in the past three years? x Location (2024)(N= 4,769) Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 0 Yes No 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Unsure Not answered indicators of‘everyday peace’ as those who had not been displaced by flooding in the past three years(see Figure 6). FIGURE 6 Individuals displaced by flooding/drought in the past three years x Perceived safety(2024)(N= 4,628) In the past three years, I personally have been displaced due to flooding and/or droughts in this area. N= 4628; Year= 2024 Yes 2% 17.9% 9.5% 0.6% No 4%15.7% 44.4% 37.7% 25.9% 40.3% 0.77% Full 6% 16.9% Sample 41.4% 32.4% 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents The opinion polling data also shows a correlation between climate-induced displacement and perceived safety. Very safe Unsafe Safe Very unsafe Neither safe nor unsafe(nus-nus) Respondents who had been displaced by flooding were 6 twice as likely to report a lack of safety in response to the FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY 4. Impacts on Food Security and Livelihoods Climate change is disrupting farming practices and people’s ability to secure pasture and water for their cattle and livestock. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), flooding in South Sudan in 2021 FIGURE 7 Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have had a major impact on farming practices in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) destroyed more than 37 thousand tons of crops and killed nearly 800,000 livestock. 13 Eighty-nine percent of respondents‘agreed’ or‘strongly agreed’ that climate Yirol West Yei Yambio change and changing weather conditions have had a major Wau& Jur River impact on farming practices in their area(see Figure 7), and Torit 79 percent said that it had a major impact on pastoralist Rumbek Centre practices(see Figure 8). Male respondents were slightly Rubkona more likely to report impact on farming(91% of male Renk respondents compared to 87% of female respondents), Pibor but significantly more likely to report impact on pastoralist Malakal practices(86 percent of male respondents reporting impacts Juba compared to 73 percent of female respondents). The latter Gogrial West may be explained by the more prominent role men play in Bor South 7 pastoralism in the country and their higher exposure to Aweil Centre pastoralism-related climate change impacts. Full Sample 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents 89% of respondents ‘agreed’ or‘strongly agreed’ that climate change and changing weather conditions have had a major impact on farming practices in their area, and 79% said that it had a major impact on pastoralist practices. Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Not answered According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), flooding in South Sudan in 2021 destroyed more than 37 thousand tons of crops and killed nearly 800,000 livestock. 13 Flood Impact Report: South Sudan , FAO(Dec. 2021), available at https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/faoweb/South-Sudan/FAOSS-Flood-Impact-ReportDec-2021.pdf. CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN FIGURE 8 Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have had a major impact on pastoralist activities in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) FIGURE 9 Agree/Disagree:‘Food security is negatively impacted by flooding and/or droughts.’ x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Disagree Strongly disagree Not answered Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 0 Strongly agree 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Agree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Disagree Strongly disagree Not answered 8 The consequent impact of these disruptions to food security, livelihoods and the broader economy was acutely felt by respondents. Eighty-nine percent of respondents agreed that food security was negatively impacted by flooding (see Figure 9), and 86 percent agreed that climate change and changing weather conditions have severely damaged FIGURE 10 Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have severely damaged the economy in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) the local economy in their area(see Figure 10). Male Yirol West respondents were more likely to report negative impacts in Yei both cases, with 90 percent of male respondents reporting Yambio impact compared to 83 percent of female respondents Wau& Jur River when asked about the economy, and 91 percent of male Torit respondents reporting impact compared to 86 percent of Rumbek Centre female respondents when asked about food security. Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal 89% of respondents agreed that food security was negatively impacted by flooding, and 86% agreed that climate change and changing weather conditions have severely damaged the local economy in their area. Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Disagree Strongly disagree Not answered FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY 5. Impacts on Conflict Climate change has complex and concerning impacts establish mediating conditions of marginalization and on patterns of violence in conflict-affected countries. social disintegration that are conducive to intercommunal Across contexts, researchers find consistent correlations violence. between climate extremes and armed conflict and violence, but do not agree on why and how they relate. 14 Some Competing elite interests and flooding have clearly studies link climate extremes to intercommunal violence increased competition for access to land, pasture and through resource competition, and, at the extreme, claim water in South Sudan. 21 However, this only translates into to have found a‘biological mechanism’ governing the conflict in situations where social processes for equitable relationship. 15 sharing of natural resources have broken down, and where forced displacement has unsettled social networks and Other studies highlight that political institutions mediate the undermined their resilience to conflict. Migratory routes for relationship between climate and conflict, and that there pastoralists have been disrupted, forcing them to venture is no direct link otherwise. 16 In particular, climate extremes farther afield for water and pasture for their animals. In increase the likelihood of violence under conditions the absence of effective intercommunal mechanisms for of political and social marginalization, limited mediating the relationship, they are brought into conflict intercommunity dialogue, and political competition. 17 with other pastoralists and with farming communities in One study asserts that‘a focus on resources is superficial, those areas. In cases where it is in the interest of national as these[intercommunal] struggles reflect broader elites for cattle-herders to compete for resources further social tensions.’ 18 This latter view squares with literature afield, climate-induced migration becomes entangled on the politics of famine, which debunks the idea that with the political economy of South Sudan’s conflict 9 populations faced with resource stress will annihilate system. Flood victims often have no choice but to settle each other. 19 Instead, mass starvation and violence hinge on land belonging to other people, and institutions of land on political calculations. 20 Civil wars give rise to political administration lack the capacity to address the longer-term dynamics that both make populations more vulnerable to issues associated with HLP rights of host and displaced climate change, and, in the presence of climate extremes, populations, sowing the seeds of future conflict. 22 14 Solomon M. Hsiang, Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel, Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict , Science 341:6151(2013); Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel, Climate and Conflict , Annual Review of Economics 7:1(2015). 15 Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa , Journal of Peace Research 49:1(2012); Jean-François Maystadt, Margherita Calderone, and Liangzhi You, Local Warming and Violent Conflict in North and South Sudan , Journal of Economic Geography 15: 3(2015). 16 Katharine J. Mach, et al., Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict , Nature 571:7764(2019); Vally Koubi, Climate Change and Conflict, Annual Review of Political Science 22(2019). 17 Hanne Fjelde and Nina von Uexkull, Climate Triggers: Rainfall Anomalies, Vulnerability and Communal Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa , Political Geography 31:7 (2012); Andrew M. Linke, et al., Rainfall Variability and Violence in Rural Kenya: Investigating the Effects of Drought and the Role of Local Institutions with Survey Data , Global Environmental Change 34(2015); Ole Magnus Theisen, Climate Clashes? Weather Variability, Land Pressure, and Organized Violence in Kenya, 1989–2004 , Journal of Peace Research 49:1(2012). 18 Clionadh Raleigh and Dominic Kniveton, Come Rain or Shine: An Analysis of Conflict and Climate Variability in East Africa , Journal of Peace Research 49:1, p. 53 (2012). 19 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population: Or, a View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness , Ward, Lock and Company(1890). 20 Alex de Waal, Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine , John Wiley& Sons(2017). 21 Nihal Tiitmamer, Ranga Gworo, and Tim Midgley, Climate change and conflict in South Sudan: Community perceptions and implications for conflict-sensitive aid , Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility(2023), available at https://www.csrf-southsudan.org/repository/climate-change-and-conflict-in-south-sudan-communityperceptions-and-implications-for-conflict-sensitive-aid/ and Bodhi Global Analysis, Environment, conflict and peace in South Sudan: Implications for conflict sensitive aid , Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility(2024), available at https://www.csrf-southsudan.org/repository/environment-conflict-and-peace-in-southsudan-implications-for-conflict-sensitive-aid/. 22 In some places, host communities have accused wealthy elites of using flood-related displacement as a pretext to grab communal lands, further exacerbating already existing trends towards land concentration and fueling intercommunal tensions. See David K. Deng, Conflict Sensitivity Analysis: Considerations for the Humanitarian Response in Mangalla , Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility(CSRF)(28 Oct. 2020), available at https://www.csrf-southsudan.org/repository/ conflict-sensitivity-analysis-considerations-for-the-humanitarian-response-in-mangalla/. CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN Survey data shows that South Sudanese are keenly aware of this relationship between climate change and conflict. Two-thirds of respondents – including every single respondent in Bor South – said that disagreements about natural resources such as land and water have increased FIGURE 11 Agree/Disagree:‘Disagreements about natural resources such as land and water have increased because of changing environmental conditions.’ x Location(2024) (N= 4,769) because of changing environmental conditions(see Figure Yirol West 11). Seventy percent of respondents said that climate Yei change has exacerbated violent conflict between cattleYambio herders and farmers(see Figure 12), 63 percent said it exacerbated cattle-raiding(see Figure 13), and 53 percent said it exacerbated politically motivated violence(see Figure 14). Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk There are some outliers in the survey data, including with regard to responses from Renk where a clear majority of respondents disagreed with statements relating to climate change-related increases in disagreements about natural resources, cattle-raiding, and politically motivated conflict. These responses may be explained by the more developed nature of Renk’s local economy as compared to other surveyed locations, but Renk and other outliers deserve further scrutiny. In particular, it is worth exploring why certain locations are less likely to report negative impacts of climate change on conflict dynamics despite being affected by climatic changes. Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Not answered 10 The gender differences in responses to conflict-related FIGURE 12 survey question is striking. Across all four questions Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather (Figures 11 to 14), men were significantly more likely to conditions have exacerbated violent conflict between report a negative impact of climate change on conflict farmers and cattle herders in this area.’ x Location dynamics. Seventy-seven percent of male respondents (2024)(N= 4,769) reported an increase in disagreements about natural resources due to environmental changes as opposed to 61 percent of female respondents. Male respondents were significantly more likely to report negative impact of climate change on conflict between farmers and cattle-herders (79% of male respondents compared to 61% of female respondents) and instances of cattle raiding(68% of male respondents compared to 58% of female respondents). Male respondents were also significantly more likely to report an increase in politically motivated conflict due to climate change(61% of male respondents compared to 45% of female respondents). Male respondents’ proximity to violence resulting from gender norms and their dominant Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample role in cattle-herding may partly explain these results, but further analysis is required to fully understand the reasons 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents and implications of these findings. Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Disagree Strongly disagree Not answered FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY FIGURE 13 Agree/Disagree:‘Climate change and changing weather conditions have exacerbated cattle raiding in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) Yirol West FIGURE 14 Agree/Disagree: Climate change and changing weather conditions have exacerbated politically motivated conflict between armed movements in this area.’ x Location(2024)(N= 4,769) Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre Full Sample Yirol West Yei Yambio Wau& Jur River Torit Rumbek Centre Rubkona Renk Pibor Malakal Juba Gogrial West Bor South Aweil Centre 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Proportion of respondents Full Sample 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Not answered Strongly agree Proportion of respondents Agree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Disagree Strongly disagree Not answered 11 CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN 6. Institutional Responses A little more than half(54%) of respondents felt that the followed by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan government was doing enough to address the impacts of (27%), and international civil society organisations(CSOs) climate change in South Sudan(see Figure 15), considerably (25%)(see Figure 17). Only 19 percent of respondents less than the two-thirds of respondents that felt that found the national government to be the most effective international partners are doing enough(see Figure 16). institution in supporting communities to address climate Interestingly, male respondents were more likely to report change. There were only marginal differences in the that governmental(57% of male respondents and 50% responses from female and male participants, with female of female respondents) and international actors(72% of respondents being slightly more likely to consider state male respondents and 61% of female respondents) were governments and churches as more effective, and male doing enough on climate change than female respondents. respondents finding national and international CSOs marginally more effective than female respondents. Discontent with the government’s response was most pronounced in IDP camps, where 42 percent of respondents The respondents’ favourable view on international actors’ felt that the government was not doing enough to address effectiveness relative to others may partly be explained climate change. These viewpoints may be affected by the significant humanitarian assistance international by the transitioning of the protection of civilian(POC) actors delivered over the last decade. This may particularly sites, the shifting of responsibility for these sites from be the case where flooding and other climate extremes the United Nations to the Government of South Sudan, have contributed to communities becoming reliant on food and dissatisfaction with the reductions in humanitarian and livelihood support from international actors. The less 12 assistance and other services that has ensued. Dissatisfaction favourable view on domestic entities, however, may be with international partners was most pronounced in rural concerning to those trying to bolster national ownership areas, where one in four respondents felt that international and the government’s own capacity to assist communities partners were not doing enough – this may partly be due as they adapt to climate change. to the limited and uneven footprint of international actors in the country. FIGURE 15 When asked which institutions were most effective at helping their community to deal with the impacts of climate change, the top three entities were international, with UN Agree/Disagree: The government is doing enough to address the impact of climate change in South Sudan.’ x Survey Environment(2024)(N= 4,769) agencies being considered the most effective by far(43%), 19.9% 22.3% 19.3% 15.8% Proportion of respondents A little more than half of respondents felt that the government was doing enough to address the impacts of climate change in South Sudan, considerably less than the twothirds of respondents that felt that international partners are doing enough. 33.7% 38.0% 28.8% 34.3% 12.1% 19.5% 11.8% 3.0% Full Sample 10.9% 15.4% 9.8% 3.6% Urban 15.9% 7.2% 19.2% 28.9% 13.2% 3.6% Rural 13.1% 0.8% IDP Camp Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Not answered FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY FIGURE 16 Agree/Disagree: International partners are doing enough to address the impact of climate change in South Sudan.’ x Survey Environment(2024)(N= 4,769) FIGURE 17 Which are the most effective institutions that support your community in dealing with the impact of climate change?(2024)(N= 4,769) Proportion of respondents 25.1% 27.1% 23.9% 23.2% 41.2% 40.7% 33.0% 58.7% 12.2% 12.7% 6.4% 2.5% Full Sample 12.5% 11.6% 5.3% 2.8% Urban 15.2% 15.1% 9.9% 3.0% Rural 5.3% 10.3% 1.6%0.6% IDP Camp Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree(nus-nus) Not answered UNMISS UN agencies International civil society organisations National civil society organisations Churches Traditional authorities Security services Local government State government National government Other Not answered 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 Proportion of respondents 13 CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN 7. Conclusion and Recommendations Climate change is having profound impacts on communities is an urgent need for coordinated action by the government across South Sudan, as evidenced by the widespread and international partners to address the interplay between experiences of flooding, displacement, food insecurity, climate change, displacement, resource scarcity, political and conflict reported in this survey. For the first time, this transition and conflict. The current conditions call for a survey has been able to show that the communities in South holistic and conflict-sensitive approach. Stakeholders Sudan are not just aware of climate change, but that they will need to think and work politically as they address link extreme climatic and weather events, such as flooding, immediate humanitarian needs and strengthen disaster to conflict and displacement. preparedness and long-term community resilience and adaptation. If these measures are not implemented at scale, South Sudan faces a unique climate challenge in that its the increasing and mutually reinforcing negative impacts of population already grapples with acute humanitarian needs climate change and conflict are all too predictable. driven by violent political conflicts, hyperinflation and complex forced displacement, exacerbated by the war in These recommendations are primarily targeted at the neighbouring Sudan. Climate extremes interact with these government of South Sudan and international actors humanitarian conditions to produce an ever-more complex working across the humanitarian, development and peace crisis. The survey data presented here underscores the(HDP) nexus: 14 importance of climate security and immediate action. There Climate-informed conflict analysis and early warning • Place local knowledge and locally-collected data front and centre in conflict analysis. Empirical data and evidence on the local impact of climate change in South Sudan is growing, but still scarce. Data collection efforts should be widened and steps taken to triangulate locally-collected climate change perception data with earth observation data, including on droughts, floods, and average temperatures, and conflict and peace data. Practitioners should feed these insights into their conflict analysis cycle. • Investigate further the varied impact of climate change, including across gender, age and location. This survey data shows variation in how local communities perceive climate change impact across localities. Renk is one of those outliers, for example. There are also notable differences in how men and women report about the impact of climate change on conflict, underscoring the need for gender-sensitive analysis. • Use existing analytical frameworks to assess climate security risks. Adapt these methodologies to local needs, as required, and ensure uptake of locally-collected data in assessments. Existing frameworks, such as the Integrated Climate Security Framework 23 , the Weathering Risk methodology 24 , or the approaches and toolkits developed by the UN Climate Security Mechanism 25 , can support actors in understanding pathways through which climate change affects peace and security. 23 Grazia Pacillo, Leonardo Medina, Theresa Liebig, Bia Carneiro, Frans Schapendonk, Alessandro Craparo, et al., Measuring the climate security nexus: The Integrated Climate Security Framework , PLOS CLIM 3:10(2024), available at https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000280. 24 Lukas Rüttinger, Janani Vivekananda, Christian König, Barbora Sedova, Weathering Risk Methodology Paper , Adelphi and Potsdam institute for Climate Impact Research 2021, available at https://weatheringrisk.org/sites/default/files/document/Weathering%20Risk%20Methodology%20Paper_0.pdf. 25 United Nations Climate Security Mechanism, Toolbox: Conceptual Approach , 2020, available at https://dppa.dfs.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_toolbox-2conceptual_approach.pdf. FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY • Enhance data collection, analysis, and research capacities of South Sudanese institutions and actors working on climate security, particularly relevant line ministries, civil society and non-governmental actors, and research institutions, such as the University of Juba Center for Peace, Development and Security Studies, and the Institute of Water Studies. • Foster interdisciplinary dialogue on climate security between researchers, governmental and non-governmental actors, and international stakeholders. Bridge the gap between natural and social scientists working in South Sudan and support the development of common research agendas. Connect researchers with policymakers and practitioners to support evidence-based decision-making. • Ensure that new early warning and environmental risk platforms are complementary and integrate local perspectives on climate change, for example those to being developed by the South Sudanese Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the UN Development Programme, the UN Environment Programme, and International Crisis Group. • Conduct long-term analysis of climate change trends to inform strategic forward-planning and resourcing, taking into account the wider political transition in South Sudan and the country’s National Adaptation Plan and Nationally Determined Contributions. Climate security and programming across the HDP nexus • Address the interplay between climate change, displacement, resource scarcity, political transition and conflict. The current conditions call for a holistic and conflict-sensitive approach to 15 climate security. There is an urgent need for coordinated action by the government and international partners to address immediate humanitarian needs and strengthen disaster preparedness and long-term community resilience and adaptation. • Mainstream climate change considerations into humanitarian, development and peace activities, where appropriate. Carefully assess the context-specific relevance of climate change to the area of intervention and critically reflect if linking peacebuilding and adaptation activities is sensible. Community-driven and area-based approaches to programming that are based on evidence and survey findings will help ensure that interventions respond to the specific local needs. • Think and work politically when responding to climate security risks. The survey data clearly shows the potential for climate change to exacerbate politically motivated conflict in South Sudan, particularly in Pibor, Bor South, and Malakal. Cattle migration-related conflict needs to be assessed for possible linkages to elite political interests. Governmental actors need to be held to account for transparent natural resource management and climate-informed action across the HDP nexus. • Explore opportunities for environmental peacebuilding in situations where intercommunal natural resource management can create incentives for cooperation. Ensure local peace agreements, and cattle migration agreements, are climate-informed and flexible enough to accommodate changing climatic conditions. Learn from past efforts, including in other contexts such as Mali or Nigeria, where local peace agreements have specifically addressed agro-pastoralist conflicts. CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN • Ensure that efforts to strengthen South Sudan’s food security and climate resilience are gender- and conflict-sensitive, including the recently announced$33 million Watershed Approaches for Climate Resilience in Agro-pastoral Landscapes Project. This survey underscores the gendered impact of climate change and the significant role climate change plays in livelihoods, farming, and pastoralism. • Formulate long-term responses to chronic climate change-induced displacement. Sixtyseven percent of survey respondents stated that members of their community had been displaced by flooding or droughts in the past three years. Given the current historic levels of flooding and projections of increased Nile streamflow in Uganda over the coming decades, the South Sudanese government and citizens will have to begin difficult conversations about solutions to permanent displacement where persistent flooding will prevent return of IDPs indefinitely. 16 CLIMATE SECURITY IN SOUTH SUDAN FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE SURVEY