Security Radar 2025 Europe – Lost in Geopolitics

Authors Christos Katsioulis Alexandra Dienes Elena Josten Sabrina Kaschowitz Benedikt Unkel Simon Weiß General Information Publisher FES Regional Office for International Cooperation Cooperation and Peace Reichsratsstr. 13/5, A-1010 Vienna Phone:+43 1 890 38 11 205 Responsible Christos Katsioulis Infographics& Cover Florian Müller Layout Shanna Danek Copy-editing James Patterson Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organisation for which the author works. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. holds the rights to the photographic material. Use of the photographic material is only permitted when reporting on the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Commercial use of the photographic material is not permitted. If you have any questions concerning the clarification of rights, please contact the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung e.V. The data set on which this study is based will be published through the Archive of Social Democracy once the analyses have been completed, unless contractual regulations or internal guidelines of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung prevent this. We publish research data at ↗ collections.fes.de February 2025 © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. ISBN 978-3-98628-676-7

February 2025 Security Radar 2025 Europe – Lost in Geopolitics

Table of Contents Foreword......................................................... 4 Introduction.................................................... 5 Key Findings................................................... 6 Overview...................................................... 8 Research Design................................................ 9 Perceptions of European security.................................. 11 People are worried.............................................. 12 Carried away by geopolitics...................................... 17 War against Ukraine............................................ 28 Wrong place, wrong time – the EU in geopolitics?.................... 38 From threat to trust: strengthening international organisations......... 42 Attitudes to climate change....................................... 45 Country Profiles................................................ 47 Germany................... 48 France...................... 52 Georgia.................... 56 Italy....................... 60 Kazakhstan................. 64 Latvia...................... 68 Poland...................... 72 Russia...................... 76 Serbia...................... 82 Sweden.................... 86 Türkiye..................... 90 Ukraine.................... 94 United Kingdom............ 100 United States............... 104 Conclusions.................................................. 109 About the authors.................................................115

Foreword Europe is in danger. Some 80 years after the Second World War, geopolitics have once more morphed into armed conflict on our continent, claiming lives daily in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale war has resurrected the ghosts of Europe’s past we hoped had been put to rest long ago. This year, another anniversary calls to mind lost opportunities. August 2025 marks 50 years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which established a European security settlement blending confrontation and cooperation based on shared principles. The finely woven web of international institutions and agreements that has ensured the peace on our continent is in existential crisis. Not only that, but farright forces are seeking to undermine the institutions, laws and norms carefully built up over decades from within. In these dangerous times, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Security Radar aims to convey the concerns, priorities, fears and hopes of those most affected by today’s geopolitical milieu. Our survey of 14 countries, including the two war ring parties, offers valuable insights. In a nutshell, people in all the surveyed countries are deeply afraid and concerned, with a grim outlook on peace. There is growing recognition that the world is undergoing significant changes, although the direction remains unclear. What is evident, however, is that Europe is increasingly perceived as a more and more dangerous place, afflicted by wars and conflicts, and with further challenges to come. Our countries, societies and decision-makers seem lost in geopolitics. Two only partially compatible reactions to this changing world are evident. On one hand, people are tending to look inward, concentrating on their own country and shying away from international affairs. Populist forces are driving this inward shift and it is fuelling them in turn. They promise easy solutions and are eager to dismantle democratic institutions. On the other hand, people retain a degree of trust and hope in international organisations, together with a fair amount of pragmatism. People remain open to cooperation even with countries that do not share their values, in pursuit of higher goals such as peace. This publication comes at a pivotal historical moment. The binding force of international law has been eroding for years. Russia is now openly pursuing an agenda aimed at dismantling it even further. In the United States, a new administration threatens to erode or even end Washington’s key role in European security, perhaps for good. International organisations or cooperation in general rank low on President Trump’s agenda. His open questioning of the very Martin Schulz Chairman of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung © FES/Reiner Zensen legitimacy of international law, as evidenced by claims to Panama, Canada and Greenland, signals a troubling trend of»negotiable principles«. Meanwhile, Europe’s major powers are embroiled in domestic challenges. Poland faces presidential elections, whereas in France successive prime ministers have been trying their luck in finding parliamentary majorities. Germany is in the midst of an election campaign, following the collapse of the previous government, partly due to disputes over how to finance support for Ukraine. Finding a way out of this conundrum is a task of historic proportions. Public priorities can and should guide decision-makers in this quest. Social cohesion and defence expenditure are both key to maintaining democratic stability. Strong international institutions and rules will be needed to cope with global challenges. Prioritising the end of the war against Ukraine, while securing Ukrainian sovereignty long term, must be the first step. The ultimate goal remains a European security order that transcends the zero-sum logic of current geopolitics and avoids repeating the mistakes of the past. After all, we have been here before. Fifty years ago, the Helsinki Final Act demonstrated that, even in times of deep division, cooperation and the pursuit of shared principles could lead to tangible progress and a more stable order. I sincerely hope that this survey receives the attention it deserves and that it resonates with both political leaders and the public loud and clear. 4 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Introduction Key Findings Overview Research Design

Key Findings 1 The world is entering an era of war and conflicts. The uncertainty is felt broadly throughout the OSCE area and people fear that new wars in Europe are likely. 2 The new»Cold War« between the United States and China is characterising the emerging world order for a majority of respondents. 53% 67% Agree 60% Agree ‘An era of wars and conflicts is emerging.’ ‘In view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, I think new wars in Europe are likely.’ 28% Agree Disagree ‘A new»Cold War« is emerging between China and the US, and all other states will have to choose sides.’ 3 The landscape of global security is changing rapidly and the European security order is becoming complicated. In most EU countries, Russia is perceived as the main danger, for Russians the Unites States remains the clear adversary, and Americans focus on China. EU United States Russia China 4 The role of the United States in European security is contested among US citizens. Providing unconditional support for European security is no longer favoured by a majority of US citizens. Should the US continue providing security for Europe? Under which conditions? If Europe pays its fair share. Dem Rep US citizens If Europe contributes to our defence 48% expenditure, too. ‘Yes, under certain conditions’ If Europe strengthens its own military. If Europe supports our course on China. 15 16% 14% 11 9% 11% Total 33% 31% 42% 30 31% 29% Policy recommendations Strength starts at home Strengthening social cohesion represents a sustainable investment in a society’s ability to navigate the looming challenges emerging from the polarised and rather hostile international environment. Resilient democracies, trust in institutions and a vision of the future are therefore as important as armaments when it comes to upholding security in Europe. 6 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Take Europe seriously A united European Union is far better equipped to deal with international challenges than individual member states. Playing economic hardball with the US and China, deterring Russia and maintaining living standards are more likely to succeed in an EU based on cooperation. 5 In Russia we can still observe a diversity of opinions. 52% of those below 40 years of age deem it acceptable for Russia to recognise Ukrainian sovereignty. 6 Balancing defence expenditure and social spending will be the key question for upholding societal cohesion in an era of increasing military spending. Innovative measures need to be taken. 48% of all respondents prefer a special levy on the rich to finance growing defence spending. Spending on economic and social affairs Spending on defence 56% 29% 62% of Russians believe that their country has become stronger through the war against Ukraine. 8 Europeans want more independence from the US, but feel vulnerable without them. 63% of the polled Europeans agree that the EU should become increasingly independent from the US. 7 A majority of people expect either a diplomatic solution to Russia’s war against Ukraine, with both sides agreeing on a compromise, or do not believe that the war is going to end soon. In Russia and Ukraine, there is a clear desire for negotiations. How do you believe this war is going to end? 38% A diplomatic solution with both sides agreeing on a compromise. 26% I do not believe this war is going to end soon. 31% of the polled Europeans believe they could defend themselves without US support. Cooperative security is a necessary stabiliser Cooperative security might not be in vogue currently, but it remains a necessary stabilising element in a world close to coming off the rails. The prevalent geopolitical logic of competition and confrontation needs to be stabilised with pragmatic cooperation. Prioritise ending the war against Ukraine Policymakers need to take steps towards ending the war and commence a negotiation process. Two elements can guide this: a broader international coalition for negotiations can be built by focussing on Russia’s breaches of international law. The key issue for negotiations needs to be Ukraine’s long-term sovereignty. Security Radar 2025 7

Overview Security Radar 2025 is the fourth edition of a survey first conducted in 2019, then again in 2021 and also in 2022 in selected countries across the OSCE space. It is a representative public opinion survey aimed at capturing citizens’ attitudes on a broad array of foreign and security policy issues. The focus of this year’s edition is clearly the war against Ukraine and its repercussions for European security. This year’s Security Radar revisits the last 14-country editi on, which was presented in 2022 at the Munich Security Conference just days before Russia invaded Ukraine. We wanted to see how attitudes have changed three years on, and thus included almost the same set of countries: Germany, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and the United States. Only three countries are»new«, featuring in the Security Radar for the first time: Sweden, a country that recently joined NATO in response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine; the Central Asian state of Kazakhstan, which is a close ally of Russia, but condemns its war against Ukraine; and Georgia, a South Caucasian nation that was granted EU candidate status in December 2023 and has been rocked by mass protests since the current government’s reversal of the decision to hold accession negotiations. We added these three countries because Europe’s reach and agency(»actorness«) is visible not only internally and in its alliances, but also outside its borders. Security Radar 2025 builds on a representative public opi nion poll conducted in 14 countries. The poll takes stock of mutual threat perceptions and attitudes to domestic and multilateral institutions, and foreign policy priorities, as well as to a range of instruments, such as diplomacy and military and economic sanctions. It highlights core issues for European security, such as the ongoing war against Ukraine, which is overshadowed by Russian threats of escalation, relations with Russia and questions about cooperation and confrontation. The report appears at a time of alarming instability on the European continent. Russia has been waging war on Ukraine for nearly three years, and has even corralled North Korean soldiers to serve as boots on the ground. The polarisation between Russia and the»West« has produced tensions not seen since the end of the Cold War, with subversion and sabotage resurfacing, threatening the arteries of the globalised economy. A confrontational order seems to be developing, forcing countries and societies to make hard choices. Georgia and Moldova have been showcases for such choices. The most recent elections in both countries polarised societies and deepened existing societal fractures. And to Europe’s southeast, Hamas’s 7 October 2023 as sault on Israel led to a sharp escalation in violence and significant shifts in power dynamics within an already fragile and fragmented regional order. Many societies in the OSCE area are struggling to navigate this new and dangerous international environment. Prospects for the future seem gloomy, fears of wars and conflicts are rising. Russia’s war against Ukraine has magnified many of the upcoming challenges. Questions and possible solutions regarding the future of the European security order centre on this war. The survey shows how the war is perceived, the stances of different parts of society towards it and how it is intertwined with broader questions concerning the international system. Our data highlight the different coping strategies, whether it be an inward-turn sometimes bordering on isolationism, a focus on narrowly defined national interests or, paradoxically, a strengthening of international organisations. The political recommendations incorporate these views. Despite the current trend towards competition and confrontation, we maintain the importance of cooperative approaches in international security. Including such thinking within the framework of confrontational approaches will be needed for the prevention, as well as the resolution of conflicts, and for tackling planetary challenges affecting us all, first and foremost climate change. Citizens’ perspectives are central and important. Ordinary people deserve some say in the running of their countries and politicians need input from public opinion to make informed decisions, particularly in times of alarming instability and high uncertainty. Results from different editions of the Security Radar map the shifting landscape of European security policy. Decision-makers across all polled countries have to cope with the emergence of new fears and anxieties among the public. At the same time, they can build upon broad public support for a pragmatic policy geared towards limiting the repercussions of the war, and prioritising peace and security in Europe. The report has four parts. The first part provides an overview of the research design. The second part presents the cross-country data in a comparative matter. Wherever possible, it shows the evolution of public opinion over time (comparison of attitudes in 2021, 2022 and 2024). The third part zooms in on the 14 polled countries and draws atten tion to their idiosyncrasies. The final, analytical part distils the key patterns and arguments emerging from the data, takes a closer look at the prospects for peace and cooperation, and offers some policy recommendations. 8 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Research Design Public opinion may have a substantial impact on political decision-makers facing security issues, particularly at a time of high tensions and major uncertainty. The aim of Security Radar 2025 is to explore changes in public opinion since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To this end, we compare two surveys: Security Radar 2022, con ducted in 14 countries in autumn 2021, and so before the beginning of the war, and published at the Munich Security Conference just a few days before the invasion; and the present Security Radar 2025, conducted three year later. We thus compare people’s attitudes directly before the invasion with attitudes almost three years into the war. For four EU members – France, Germany, Latvia and Poland – we have three data points to compare(as these four countries featured in the follow-up Security Radar 2023, which explored changes in public attitudes nine months into the war, in autumn 2022). Security Radar 2025 is a representative public opinion poll conducted in September 2024 among the resident popula tions in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States. Survey The aim of the survey is systematically to investigate people’s attitudes, opinions and values in relation to the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, with a particular focus on the war against Ukraine. By»Europe« we understand the space covered by the members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In certain obvious cases, however, we use»Europe« interchangeably with»the EU«. When we use the term»the West«, we mean the EU together with the USA. The pollster Ipsos Public Affairs in Berlin was assigned to carry out the fieldwork in twelve of the fourteen countries; in Georgia, the fieldwork was carried out by Caucasus Research Resource Center(CRRC). In Russia, the fieldwork was conducted by an independent pollster, whose name we decided not to disclose because of the risk of criminal liability. The survey is based on the Security Radar 2023 question naire, adapted and extended in line with developments related to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overall, we explore and compare public opinion on the current security and foreign policy situation in Europe, focusing on seven aspects: 1. perception of the current threat situation; 2. attitudes towards foreign and security policy; 3. attitudes towards international organisations; 4. attitudes towards national identity; 5. attitudes towards the EU, the United States, NATO, Russia and China; 6. perception of Russia’s war against Ukraine; 7. perception of climate change and its effects on security in Europe. Polling during wartime Conducting polls during wartime presents significant challenges, requiring cautious interpretation of the results. In Ukraine, ongoing hostilities in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions prevented their inclusion in the sample, affecting the survey’s representativeness. The war has also altered Ukraine's demographics, with millions of people, particularly women, leaving the country and many men serving at the front. Wartime conditions also increase the likelihood that people will provide what they perceive to be socially desirable responses, potentially skewing results. This may especially be the case in Russia, where repressive laws exacerbate this tendency. Despite these challenges, including Russia and Ukraine in the Security Radar survey remains crucial because of their significant roles in European security. The survey was last conducted in Russia and Ukraine in 2021, a few months before the full-scale invasion. In Ukraine, Ipsos gathered data via online questionnaire. To gather data in Russia, an independent polling company was commissioned, although its identity is withheld to protect it from potential prosecution, given the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's»undesirable organisation« status in Russia. The poll was conducted via telephone, with a shortened questionnaire and some terms adapted to ensure respondents’ safety and from political considerations(for instance, the term»special military operation« was used instead of»Russia's war against Ukraine«). These adaptations and precautions highlight the complexity of conducting polls in conflict zones and under restrictive regimes. While the data provide valuable insights, it's crucial to consider these limitations when interpreting the results, understanding that they offer a snapshot of public opinion under challenging circumstances rather than a comprehensive view. Security Radar 2025 9

Sample Overview Country Germany France Georgia Italy Kazakhstan Latvia Poland Russia Serbia Sweden Türkiye United Kingdom Ukraine United States Survey mode CAWI CAWI CATI CAWI CAWI CAWI CAWI CATI CAWI CAWI CAWI CAWI CAWI CAWI N 2,054 2,071 2,009 2,001 2,045 2,089 2,021 1,003 2,090 2,072 2,011 2,087 2,112 2,086 Age Range 18–75 18–75 18+ 18–75 18–65 18–75 18–65 18+ 18–65 18–65 18–65 18–75 18–65 18–75 Additionally, descriptors were collected, including on sociodemographic issues, interest in foreign policy and perceived overall priority of foreign and security policy for the respondents. The survey uses Likert-scaled, binary and open-ended questions. The objective of Likert-scaling is to measure the extent of agreement or disagreement with a question or statement. In most cases, the extent is measured on a four-point scale, encompassing‘strongly agree’,‘somewhat agree’,‘somewhat disagree’ and‘strongly disagree’. Howe ver, five-point and ten-point scales were also deemed necessary to ensure subject-appropriate differentiations. The respondents could also decline to agree or disagree with the question or statement. In this case, the answer was coded as‘don’t know’. If a respondent declined to answer at all it was coded‘no response’. Data collection in twelve of the 14 countries was conducted among the resident population via Computer Assisted Web Interviewing(CAWI, Ipsos Online Access Panels, Sampling: Quota Selection). During an online interview, the participant sees the text of the question and the response options on the screen(computer or a mobile device) and clicks on their preferred response. A typical interview in our survey lasted around 20 minutes. Because of the different levels of telecommunications accessibility for different age groups in particular countries, the age ranges of the targeted population varied. During data collection, quotas were applied for gender, age, region and education. Respondents who took less than half the median amount of time to answer the questionnaire were excluded from the data set to ensure data quality. In two of the surveyed countries, Georgia and Russia, data were collected using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing(CATI). We opted for telephone interviews in these countries because high quality data could not be ensured via online survey. The telephone questionnaire had to be shortened in comparison with the online one because telephone interviews take longer(for instance, interviewers read out not only the questions, but also all response options). As a result, not all questions could be asked in Georgia and Russia(see also the box»Polling during wartime«). The structure of the resulting raw sample was adjusted to official data by weighting. The iterative»rim weight«(also known as»iterative proportional fitting«) procedure supplied by Quantum Software® was applied. The variables gender, age and region were used to calculate the weighting factors to ensure that the resulting data sets of the respective countries were representative concerning gender, age and region. Weighting targets were derived from Eurostat and the official statistics of the different countries. What? Who? Security Radar 2022 Representative public opinion poll in 14 countries: Armenia, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States 27,500 respondents surveyed in 14 countries Representative samples in each country Security Radar 2023 Representative public opinion poll in four countries: France, Germany, Latvia and Poland 8,063 respondents surveyed in four countries Representative samples in each country When? How? September-October 2021 CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) in Armenia CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) in the 13 other countries carried out by Ipsos on behalf of FES October 2022 CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) carried out by Ipsos on behalf of FES Security Radar 2025 Representative public opinion poll in 14 countries: Germany, France, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom, Ukraine and the United States 27,751 respondents surveyed in 14 countries Representative samples in each country September 2024 CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) in Georgia and Russia CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) in the 12 other countries carried out by Ipsos on behalf of FES 10 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Perceptions of European security People are worried Carried away by geopolitics War against Ukraine Wrong place, wrong time – the EU in geopolitics? From threat to trust: strengthening international organisations Attitudes to climate change

People are worried Societies are clearly worried. Even though most people feel safe in their immediate surroundings(except in war-ridden Ukraine), they are concerned about their personal future and economic situation. People are most afraid of wars and conflicts and can imagine a war breaking out between Russia and the West. Although most do not expect a new world war, they worry about possible escalation in the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Pessimism drives the day Large majorities in all countries are concerned about their personal future. Ukrainians are most worried(92%), a sad but unsurprising result in a country fighting a war against an aggressor. People are a bit less concerned only in some western European countries, namely the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy(below 70%). Most people feel safe in their immediate surroundings, again with the exception of Ukrainians. Substantial shares of respondents worry that their economic situation will deteriorate in the future, including more than half of respondents in Türkiye and Ukraine, but also in prosperous Germany and France. Georgian and Kazakh respondents are least pessimistic, while opinion in Russia is evenly split. This mood goes along with the widespread worry about economic crises and inflation, which feature among the top three concerns across the poll. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia are the most optimistic about their countries' developments. Regarding the future situation with regard to peace and security in their own country, clear optimists are found only in countries outside the EU or NATO: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia. In the USA, optimists outweigh pessimists but are not a majority. All others have a rather gloomy outlook. French and Germans(and to a lesser extent Italians) are extremely pessimistic, and pessimism has increased notably since 2021. Respondents in all other coun tries are undecided, with a slight tendency towards pessimism. A similar picture, but with a stronger degree of pessimism overall, pertains to the outlook for peace and security in Europe. It becomes even gloomier with regard to peace and security in the world. Germans and French stand out, with close to 70% thinking the situation will deteriorate. Thinking about your personal situation, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Countries ranked in ascending order. Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% ‘ Personally, I feel safe in my immediate surroundings(town, neighbourhood, etc.).’ 48 73 76 79 82 87 90 93 UKR ITA RUS TUR DE LVA USA GEO 80 84 88 FRA SWE KAZ, 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% SRB, UK ‘If I think about the various developments in my country and the world, I am concerned about my personal future.’ 69 79 64 66 FRA, 72 74 LVA, 85 UK DE ITA SRB SWE KAZ TUR 91 POL 92 UKR 70 73 USA POL 80 86 RUS GEO 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% ‘I think that my economic situation or that of my family will deteriorate in the future.’ 50 40 44 47 DE, 58 63 66 GEO LVA SWE UK FRA UKR TUR 30 KAZ 40% 46 48 ITA, SRB, POL, USA RUS 60% 70% 80% 90% Agreement 12 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 100% 100% 100%

... in the world Ø total average 47 Germany 69 France 69 Kazakhstan* Italy ia* Georg ... in Europe How to read the Infographic Country 49 value ... in my country 2021 value for comparison 27 38 16 22 25 14 31 39 38 59 56 19 30 53 55 Thinking about the next five years, I expect that the situation in peace and security will deteriorate... Combined responses‘will deteriorate’ and‘will somewhat deteriorate’ All figures in% 0% 75% 17 13 44 32 11 24 29 37 32 61 25 46 25 44 42 34 30 52 38 Latvia Poland Unit Ukraine 54 ed Kin gdom 46 62 Türkiye 45 58 Sweden* 46 55 Serbia 34 Russia *Georgia, Kazakhstan and Sweden were not polled in 2021. United States A notable observation concerns the two warring parties: both in Russia and Ukraine optimism about peace and security in their own country increased markedly between 2021 and 2024, despite the war. In Ukraine, this may reflect public resistance and strong morale in the face of the aggressor, coupled with defiant official rhetoric; in Russia, this may rather be the fact that most Russians do not feel directly affected by the war, or have been lulled into a sense of security by state propaganda. As priorities for foreign policy, people name terrorism and extremism, followed by human rights violations, geopolitical tensions and conflicts, and climate change. Terrorism as a global problem features first in most countries, apart from Georgia and Italy. Human rights violations are a bigger priority for Sweden than for other countries. Geopolitical tensions are of particular concern for Ukrainians and Latvians. Climate change is named as a priority in Italy ahead of all other states. International migration, though not a major concern on average, is among the top priorities in Germany and Türkiye. Security Radar 2025 13

War feels close Wars and conflicts are people’s primary concern(84% on average, ranging from 74% in Sweden to a whopping 98% in war-torn Ukraine). The level of concern has increased markedly throughout the sample since 2021; only in Türkiye has it remained the same. Germany experienced the biggest change, from just below 70% to 82%. In almost every country a majority believe that we are entering an era of wars and conflicts(from 42% in Georgia to 62% in Latvia and Poland and almost 80% in Italy, Tür kiye and Sweden). However, this does not translate into an expectation of a new world war nor in changed priorities for foreign policy, as shown above. Only in one country, Türkiye, does an absolute majority(56%) expect a new world war. In all other countries opinion is split, sometimes evenly, between‘no’ and‘don’t know’. A confident majority who think that there won’t be another world war are found only in Russia(61%), followed by Georgia(58%) and Germany(43%). German concerns about wars and conflicts increased from 70% in 2021 to 82% in 2024. Solid absolute majorities across the board fear that wars and conflicts will affect their country in the future. Latvia, Serbia, Poland and, somewhat surprisingly, the US are among the most worried(around 77%). A direct mili tary confrontation between Russia and the West is considered likely by absolute majorities in Latvia, Sweden, Poland, Türkiye, Ukraine and Russia(all above 50%). People in other countries consider a Russia-West military confrontation less likely(around 40% and above, yet below 50%). Asked about the likelihood of new wars in Europe in view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, the picture is gloomier. In all countries bar Italy and Kazakhstan(just below 50%) absolute majorities agree with such a likelihood. Do you think there will be a new world war? Countries ranked by agreement. All figures in% POL 28 34 37 UK 34 32 30 32 33 20 35 39 36 28 31 37 FRA 28 40 RUS 61 10 31 29 29 26 22 22 43 36 20 40 58 41 30 27 56 20 23 Yes Don’t know No Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ 21 42 28 20 35 41 SRB UKR SWE KAZ LVA GEO ITA DE TUR USA 14 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

I am worried about a nuclear escalation in the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Countries ranked in descending order. All figures in% 100% 80% 76 69 67 66 65 65 65 64 63 62 61 60% 59 40% 53 51 20% 0% GEO LVA SRB UKR RUS ITA UK KAZ TUR SWE USA DE FRA POL Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ To what extent are you personally concerned about the following current events? Top 3 responses for each country. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% Most 2 nd most 3 rd most concerning concerning concerning Germany France Georgia Italy Kazakhstan Latvia Poland Serbia Sweden Türkiye United Kingdom Ukraine United States Cyber attacks Economic crises Inflation and rising cost of living International terrorism Wars and conflicts Which of the following global foreign and security policy problems do you think should currently be given top priority? Respondents were asked to select and rank three items out of nine. Average across all polled countries(bar Russia). 53% 40% Human rights violations Terrorism and extremism 38% Geopolitical tensions and conflicts 35% 20% Climate change Military build-up 20% 29% International migration 18% Pandemics Global inequality 12% Trade wars Security Radar 2025 15

If Russia declared war tomorrow, could my country defend itself? Countries ranked in descending order. All figures in% United States Türkiye Ukraine United Kingdom Poland Kazakhstan Italy Yes 70 59 53 34 31 25 19 27 26 46 47 41 57 No 12 Sweden Yes 18 Georgia 17 Germany 16 France 9 Serbia 8 Latvia 8 No 66 74 69 78 71 74 Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don't know’ and ‘no response’ Majorities in most countries do not believe their country could defend itself if Russia declared war. Latvia and Georgia border Russia and lack strategic depth, which makes defence objectively challenging. By contrast, respondents’ lack of confidence in their country’s defence capabilities in Germany and especially France is noteworthy. Ukraine, Türkiye and the US are the only countries that consider themselves strong enough to defend themselves against Russia. The‘don’t know’ ratio in this question does not stand out compared with other questions. The exception of 28% in Kazakhstan indicates that the scenario of a Russian attack is perhaps disconcerting for respondents. Fear of nuclear escalation in the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine is a universal concern in all polled countries. The level of worry ranges from 51% in Poland to over 60% in the US, Ukraine and Russia and 76% in Georgia. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% I fear that wars and other conflicts will affect my country in the future. In view of increasing tensions between Russia and the West, I think new wars in Europe are likely. I consider a direct, military confrontation between Russia and the West to be likely. 100% 80% 75 72 72 77 79 62 56 65 61 61 45 48 48 57 55 40 38 40 78 76 64 66 74 62 62 61 57 64 61 53 50 52 50 How to read the graph: 2021 2024 value value 77 71 70 58 59 47 Agreement 20% 0% DE FRA ITA KAZ* LVA POL RUS SRB SWE* TUR UK UKR USA *Not polled in 2021. 16 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Carried away by geopolitics The world seems to have become more geopolitical, dangerous and polarised, according to our survey responses. People are more inclined to approve cooperation only with like-minded partners and see the world increasingly in black and white. Stronger emphasis is being put on the military than three years ago. New polarisation Many people perceive the emergence of a new Cold War between China and the US, with all other states forced to choose sides. This sentiment is stronger outside NATO than inside the alliance. The figure is close to 50% in al most all NATO states. In the group of EU candidate countries Türkiye, Serbia and Ukraine people are much more likely to anticipate a new Cold War-like division(60% and more). Only in Georgia do the majority disagree. Most people perceive a decline of American hegemony in international affairs, even though only in Russia, Türkiye, Serbia and Kazakhstan is the figure over 50%. Even American allies tend to agree that the era of American supremacy is over. Even in closely allied states such as the UK and Germany (or in Sweden, which recently joined NATO) more people agree than disagree that the era of American supremacy is over. Opinion in the US itself is almost evenly divided. Only Ukrainians, Georgians and Poles are not prepared to say that the age of American hegemony is over. The perception of new divisions is underscored by perceived differences in interests between major powers and blocks: the US and the EU on one side and China and Russia on the other. The interests of these countries are in principle contradictory. ‘Yes’ responses. Average across all polled countries(bar Georgia). 61% European Union Russia 47% 66% 27% 22% United States 57% China Security Radar 2025 17

Little contradiction of interest is perceived within the blocks, but a strong contradiction is felt between them. There are some notable outliers, though. Almost twice as many Turkish and Russian respondents perceive a contradiction of interests between the EU and the US(over 40%) than respondents in the six EU countries and the US(24% on average). Turks are also much more in clined to believe that Russian and Chinese interests are contradictory(37% compared with 22% on average). Ukrainians are convinced much more than others that Russian interests contradict those of the US(76%) and the EU(73%). Only perceptions within Russia itself are similar. Noteworthy, 57% of Americans see less contradiction between the US and Russia compared with all other respondents, including the Russians. Americans are also least convinced that Russian and European interests contradict one another(49%, compared with 61% on average, 68% among Russians). This points to widespread pragma tism in America, a recurrent pattern in the poll. Russian respondents themselves see the biggest clash of interests with the US(84%) and the smallest with China(14%). In all countries except Russian allies Kazakhstan and Serbia, overwhelming majorities believe that Russia is a threat to European security. Across all countries without exception, the feeling of threat emanating from Russia has intensified compared with 2021, in some cases dramatically. Many respondents across countries also name Russia as a threat to their country. Even in Türkiye, with its pragmatic policy towards Russia despite the invasion of Ukraine, 56% think Russia is a threat to European security(2021: 49%). Connected with this, most respondents disagree with the statement that Russia is emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West. Only in Russia, Serbia and Kazakhstan, as well as in Türkiye, do people agree. Do you believe that China, the USA or Russia represent a threat to peace and security in Europe? How to read the infographic The closer the countries are located in the corner, the higher the relative threat perception Primary threat The sector in which the country dot is located shows the country most perceived as a threat. USA USA Want to know more? Get the detailed figures per country starting page 47. CHN ‹ RUS USA › CHN CHN › ‹ USA RUS RUS Secondary threat Depending on which half of the sector the dot is placed, the second-ranked threat can be identified Changed perception change 2021 2024 SRB KAZ TUR ITA LVA DE SWE FRA UK POL USA UKR ‹ RUS CHN › 18 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

By contrast, respondents in Poland, Ukraine and Latvia strongly disagree. But the figures are close to 40% in west ern European countries Germany, France, Italy and Sweden, underlining that there is a perception of new divisions in the world. The perception of Russia as a threat to peace and security in Europe is widespread(68%). This is felt most intensely in Ukraine(89%), followed by Sweden(84%). In distant second place, China is viewed as a threat by an average of 43% of respondents, with notably high concern in Sweden and the US(both at 59%). The US ranks third, seen as a threat by 34% on average. This perception is low est in Ukraine(15%) and highest in Serbia(70%). While per ceptions of a US threat have remained largely stable since 2021, they have risen significantly in Italy(from 21% to 35%) and Germany(from 24% to 30%). In your opinion, is there a country that constitutes a threat for your country? All figures in% Russia 18 30 Germany 36 8 4 USA Other 8 Israel 1 Middle East 2 China 2 10 33 Russia 7 5 Kazakhstan 41 Other 3 Middle East 1 China 5 USA 7 Russia 21 34 4 France 5 32 Other 5 Middle East 2 China 2 USA 4 21 Latvia 51 23 3 USA Russia 2 Other 16 16 Georgia 6 5 55 Russia 5 USA 2 Middle East 6 Other 11 25 Poland 53 7 Russia 3 Ukraine 1 USA 7 Other Other 6 Middle East 1 China 1 USA 2 Russia 8 8 6 37 Italy 45 10 18 4 Russia 4 4 10 55 USA 10 UK 4 Ukraine 4 China 4 Other 14 34 9 Serbia 9 33 Other 9 Russia 1 USA 9 Albania/Kosovo/Croatia 14 Russia 28 30 27 Sweden Russia 38 26 Other 3 China 1 Middle East 2 USA 3 China 25 25 18 22 USA Türkiye 32 8 Other 8 Russia 3 Middle East 2 10 8 Israel 12 7 5 Ukraine 74 1 USA 1 Belarus 5 Other Russia No Yes, namely …: Combined responses‘don’t know’ and‘no response’ United Kingdom 27 Other 3 Israel 1 Middle East 2 USA 2 7 China United States 24 4 Other 4 USA 1 North Korea 2 Middle East 2 17 Russia For‘Yes, namely...’ respondents could name a country of their choosing. *In Russia, some respondents named more than one country, thus the total exceeds 100%. Due to rounding, totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures. Security Radar 2025 19

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the state of the world? Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% The era of American (Western) supremacy is over. A new Cold War is emerging between China and the US, and all other states will have to choose sides. An era of wars and conflicts is emerging. We are entering an era of»my country first« and everyone is looking out for themselves. Russia is emerging as a new leader of the countries outside the West. Laws and rules in international relations are no longer relevant. Middle powers (such as Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa) are emerging as new centres of power. DE 46 51 67 60 41 35 39 FRA 47 49 72 73 38 57 45 GEO 28 30 42 73 30 31 27 ITA 43 56 79 65 45 41 51 KAZ 53 50 49 58 50 50 41 LVA 40 48 63 48 26 44 28 POL 34 51 62 56 25 37 32 RUS 62 57 58 45 69 64 37 SRB 56 60 72 74 65 60 48 SWE 47 54 78 66 39 39 42 TUR 51 68 79 83 57 68 57 UK 46 52 74 71 39 37 37 UKR 33 63 72 64 14 63 31 USA 43 54 70 66 40 38 34 20 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

My country should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Countries ranked in descending order. All figures in% 86 76 70 68 66 65 62 57 56 56 56 55 55 50 SRB TUR GEO KAZ UKR USA LVA DE RUS FRA POL UK Strongly agree Somewhat agree ITA SWE In some countries, like Germany or Kazakhstan, no clear majority identify a single nation as a direct threat to their own. This is different in Russia, where 55% name the US as their main threat, as well as in Ukraine(74%), Georgia(55%) or Poland(53%), where Russia figures as the main threat. Ukraine. Poland, at 62%, is the staunchest supporter of promoting values abroad. The undecided group includes Sweden and Kazakhstan(a five-percentage point difference or less between‘at home’ and‘abroad’). Trend towards isolationism Isolationism is another trend in a world marked by polarisation and rivalries. Majorities across all countries agree that their country should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. While this trend might be understandable in non-aligned countries such as Ukraine, Georgia or Serbia, it is disquieting in NATO members Türkiye(76%), Germany, France, the UK or Poland(all around 56%). Most notably, respondents in the US overwhelmingly want to reduce international involvements(65%), underlining the potential upcoming changes in US foreign policy. The tendency towards isolationism is coupled with a strong perception that international relations are entering a phase of »my country first«. Again, this is strongly felt not only in countries outside the EU, such as Türkiye(83%), Georgia and Serbia (around 73%), but also in France and the UK(over 70%). Only in Russia are people undecided. In the US, where the term was (re-)introduced by President Trump during his first term, 66% think we are entering an era of»my country first«. These trends go along with widespread status dissatisfaction. Only the US and the UK(and to a lesser extent Germany and France) are satisfied with the status of their countries in the world compared with other countries. The French are undecided, while all others think that their countries do not enjoy the status they deserve. Absolute majorities express status dissatisfaction also in Italy and Poland, while in Poland the share of people has even grown over time(from 57% in 2021 to 64% in 2024). Among the most dissatisfied are Türkiye, Ukraine and Serbia(70–80%). When asked whether foreign policy should promote values abroad, countries seem to fall into three uneven groups. Germans most clearly opt for promoting values at home (65%) instead of abroad(25%). The US, the UK and France follow a similar pattern, although the focus on values at home is less pronounced than in Germany. The second group, who lean towards promoting values abroad, is diverse, comprising Italy, Poland, Latvia, Serbia, Türkiye and My country does not have the status in the world it deserves in comparison with other countries. Countries ranked in descending order. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. 80% TUR 74% UKR 68% GEO 63% ITA 80% 76% SRB 70% 64% POL 60% Agreement 54% RUS 47% LVA 44% SWE 40% DE 36% UK 50% 44% KAZ 41% FRA 40% 38% USA Security Radar 2025 21

Which of the following two statements do you agree with more? All figures in% ‘The foreign policy of my country should be committed to promoting our own values abroad.’ 62 59 57 54 53 48 41 39 38 36 35 25 POL SRB ITA UKR TUR LVA KAZ SWE UK USA FRA DE 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% ‘My country should be committed to our values at home but not try to promote them abroad.’ 26 33 26 37 38 41 44 44 46 49 49 65 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Deviations from 100% result from:‘don't know’ and‘no response’ To what extent do you agree with the following statements? All figures in% ‘My country should cooperate with any country, even those that do not share our values, if it promotes peace and security in the world.’ 57 51 77 64 68 62 60 78 74 58 68 54 65 56 DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA 80% 60% 40% 20% Strongly agree Somewhat agree 0% 0% ‘My country should reduce dependence on countries that do not share our values.’ 69 76 60 68 65 64 68 80 74 70 72 73 82 71 20% 40% 60% 80% 22 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Cooperation rather with the like-minded In a world characterised by polarisation,»my country first« policies and isolationism there is a trend towards cooperation with like-minded partners. Most respondents across the sample prefer to reduce dependence on countries that do not share the same values(71% on average). This sentiment is strongest in Ukraine, a country at war and in need of reliable allies(82%). The value is very similar in Russia(80%). The prosperity of my country is in many respects linked to the well-being and positive development of other countries. Countries ranked in descending order. All figures in% 79 71 68 64 63 63 63 GEO 61 UKR 60 LVA 59 ITA 57 POL 56 UK 54 SRB 52 USA KAZ DE SWE TUR Strongly agree Somewhat agree FRA RUS The trend is reinforced by a relatively low appreciation of interdependence, even in countries strongly dependent on exports and trade. Agreement with the statement the ‘ prosperity of my country is in many respects linked to well-being and positive developments in other countries’ is fairly low in Germany(59%), France(54%) and Russia (52%). The trend has been decreasing(or stable) since 2021 in all countries except the US, the UK and Ukraine, where appreciation of interdependence has increased markedly. In Ukraine it is highest, at 71%. Most respondents also wish to reduce dependence on Russia and China, even if it has negative economic implications. The wish to decouple from Russia is generally stronger than from China, but opinions differ across countries. People in Sweden, Poland(around 73% each) and es pecially Ukraine(85%) are the staunchest proponents of re ducing dependence on Russia, regardless of the cost. By contrast, most Kazakh and Serbian respondents disagree. This attitude is mirrored in the issue of more cooperation with Russia: people in all NATO members(bar Türkiye) overwhelmingly reject it; Ukraine leads the poll with 85% rejecting it. By contrast, majorities in Serbia(64%), Kazakh stan(62%) and Türkiye(58%) favour enhancing cooperation with Russia. A notable case is Georgia, where despite strong negative sentiments towards Russia, 43% neverthe less favour cooperation. Overall,»Western« countries(UK, US, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, but also Türkiye) tend to be wary of dependence on China, with US respondents being most critical (68%), again underscoring that Trump’s stance on China resonates with American citizens. The proportion of Germans wishing to reduce dependence on China notably decreased from 64% in 2022 to 57% in 2024.»Eastern« coun tries are less sceptical of economic ties with China. Ukrainians believe their country's prosperity is most tied to the well-being and positive developments in other countries. My country should collaborate more with... Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Russia 25 21 43 26 62 20 15 64 13 58 19 7 31 China European Union United States 31 29 60 39 68 38 43 67 22 64 30 49 40 61 54 85 65 51 73 65 60 62 64 66 86 61 46 44 76 43 37 55 75 42 50 44 56 81 n/a Security Radar 2025 23

My country should reduce its dependency on... even if this has a negative impact on the living standards of the population of my country. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% ... reduce dependency on Russia ... reduce dependency on China Germany 64 57 France 67 62 Georgia 58 51 Italy 61 53 Kazakhstan 39 41 Latvia 60 38 Poland 73 46 Serbia 37 39 In Poland and Georgia, there is no absolute majority for decoupling from China. In Kazakhstan, opinion is almost evenly split. In Latvia and Serbia, more people oppose decoupling than endorse it. The same trend is reflected in the question of whether countries should cooperate more with China. Germany, France, Sweden and the UK oppose more cooperation, while Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Serbia (and, interestingly, again Türkiye) endorse more cooperation with China. Opinion in the US is split, indicating a fairly pragmatic stance on the part of the population. Questions about more cooperation with the EU and more cooperation with the US reveal a preference for the EU across the sample(with the notable exception of Poland). Respondents show a stronger wish to increase collaboration with the EU(64% across all polled countries) than with the US(52% across the sample). Among those least enthusiastic about increasing cooperation with the US are Kazakhstan (37%) and Serbia(42%), but also fellow NATO members Tür kiye, Italy, France and Germany(close to 45% each). Ukraini an reliance on allies is again conspicuous, with more than 80% desiring more cooperation with both Europe and the US. Even in Ukraine, the EU scores better than the US. People across our 14-country sample show a remarkable pragmatism, framed as cooperation with non-likeminded states. Absolute majorities, on average 64%, endorse the statement‘My country should cooperate with any country, even those that do not share our values, if it promotes peace and security in the world’. Just like in 2021, pragmatism seems to be stronger in»the East« than in»the West«. This applies even to the EU, where»new« member states(Latvia, Poland) gravitate towards more pragmatism than founding members. The staunchest supporters of this are found in Russia(78%), Georgia(77%), Serbia(74%), Kazakhstan and Türkiye(68% each). Less supportive are people in France(51%) and in the US and the UK(around 55% each). Sweden 74 Türkiye 58 United Kingdom 74 Ukraine 85 United States 71 Stronger emphasis on the military 64 Times of international turbulence, conflict and uncertainty are good times for the military. The year 2024 broke anoth er record with regard to military spending world-wide. Pub58 lic sentiment reflects the increased salience of the military. Majorities in our polled countries support increases in military spending. A notable and very stark exception is Italy, the only country in which people resolutely oppose increas62 ing military spending(62%), a figure that has remained un changed since 2021. Italy generally sticks out in the poll as a country that did not undergo the same changes as its European neighbours in the wake of 24 February 2022. Al 54 though threat perceptions regarding Russia and fear of war have markedly increased in Italy since the beginning of the invasion, Italians do not seem to have drawn the same conclusions in terms of military and defence enhancement. 68 A culture of restraint, once a German trademark, now seems prevalent in Italy. 24 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

My country should increase its military spending. Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. All figures in% 77 77 75 +19 +22 67 67 60 +6 +35 56 54 52 52 51 49 48 +11 +16 +7 -2 +12 +8 26 +2 UKR GEO* POL TUR RUS SWE* UK DE FRA KAZ* SRB LVA USA ITA *Not polled in 2021. The only exception is Italy, where 62% oppose increased military spending. Germany presents itself as a country undergoing a Zeitenwende. Public endorsement of increased military spending outweighed decades-old rejection only after Russia invaded Ukraine full scale. But the issue remains divisive, as both agreement and disagreement have increased compared with 2021(indicating the increased salience of the issue), with 54% endorsing and 36% opposing higher military spending. The Latvian public is similarly split, although supporters of higher military spending outweigh its critics. In the US, the group favouring more defence spending is 10 percentage points ahead of its opponents, albeit short of an absolute majority(48%). This may reflect either the sense that the US already spends enough or the widespread wish to reduce international entanglements. The majority of respondents continue to prioritise economic and social affairs over defence spending. In Ukraine, a country embroiled in war, 61% would prefer de fence compared with 20% who favour social spending. In Russia, public opinion is nearly evenly divided, with 45% favouring social spending and 44% prioritising defence. The Polish case stands out. If you had to choose, where you would rather spend the limited government budget? All figures in% ‘My country should prioritise spending on economic and social affairs over defence.’ ‘My country should prioritise spending on defence over economic and social affairs.’ 56% Ø across all polled countries 44 20 POL UKR 45 54 RUS 55 FRA DE 60 60 LVA 68 55 TUR 57 USA SWE 60 63 UK 67 GEO 72 SRB ITA KAZ 29% Ø across all polled countries 25 FRA 31 TUR 44 RUS 12 KAZ 17 23 ITA UK 21 22 SRB LVA 25 28 24 SWE DE GEO 61 UKR 38 29 POL USA Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don't know’ and‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 25

Almost as many people in Poland want to spend more money on defence(75%, well up from 53% in 2021) as in Ukraine and Georgia, who have ongoing experience of Russian aggression. This societal consensus underscores a deeply entrenched Polish fear of Russia and the feeling of insecurity, despite already spending 4% of GDP on defence. Poland is also the only country besides Georgia in which most people think that the increase in the defence budget should be financed by cuts in other budgets, such as social security. In all other countries, majorities would prefer a special levy on the rich instead. Higher taxes to fi nance defence are universally opposed. Respondents in most countries oppose military interventions. Disagreement with the statement‘my country should, if necessary, pursue military intervention in conflicts’ is strongest in Italy(74%, a ten-percentage point in crease since 2021). Opposition has also increased in Germa ny and France and has remained high and stable in Latvia and in Serbia. Even in war-battered Ukraine opponents of military interventions outweigh supporters by a large margin, although the figure has declined since 2021 from 63% to 52%. In Russia, disapproval of military interventions has remained stable since 2021(45%), but the share of those approving has increased by 10 percentage points to 47%. This may reflect a more assertive stance in the Russian population. This polarised view of military interventions in Russia is rather similar to four other countries in which approval and disapproval of military intervention in conflicts are not far apart(and have hardly changed since 2021): the US, the UK, Poland and Türkiye. Your country is increasing its defence budget. How do you think it should be financed? Average across all polled countries. All figures in% Special levy on the rich 48 Savings in other budgets such as social spending 22 Higher taxes 6 New debt 4 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don't know’ and‘no response’ My country should, if necessary, also pursue military intervention in conflicts. Countries ranked in descending order. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% 47 44 17 ITA RUS SWE 20 19 GEO KAZ UK POL 35 39 41 41 USA TUR DE SRB 21 21 LVA FRA UKR 21 25 35 Respondents in these»interventionist« countries have fewer reservations about the use of military force and are up to twice as likely to approve military interventions than their NATO peers. Even in war-torn Ukraine, opponents of military interventions in conflicts greatly outnumber supporters. Military interventions as an effective instrument of foreign policy are viewed with scepticism in Italy, Germany and Serbia(and to a lesser extent in Latvia). Opinions in France, Poland and the UK are split. People in the US, Ukraine and Türkiye clearly see military means as effective (agreement has even increased since 2021). Asked about the legitimacy of military interventions, the trend is similar, but the group of those who doubt or oppose is bigger. Disenchantment in France is noteworthy: perception of the legitimacy of military interventions has fallen from 48% in 2021 to 37%. Military support for Ukraine ranks high among those who think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine in general. Military support is the undisputed first option, far above economic and humanitarian support, for respondents living in countries allied with Ukraine: Germany, France, Latvia, Sweden, Poland, the UK and the US. 26 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

In which case is the use of nuclear weapons acceptable? All figures in% States with nuclear weapons Nuclear sharing USA UK FRA RUS DE ITA TUR Never 57 67 63 67 84 84 69 GEO KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE UKR 90 77 88 76 85 79 88 As a last resort 36 27 27 16 As a means to enforce vital 7 interests 5 10 17 13 13 23 3 3 8 4 15 10 22 14 19 7 5 8 3 3 1 2 4 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don't know’ and‘no response’ Only in Italy and in countries outside this formal»support coalition« does humanitarian support rank higher(Serbia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, but also Türkiye). Respondents in Ukraine itself want military support above all other types of assistance(84%, compared with 12% economic support and 3% humanitarian). Want to know more? Get the detailed figures per country starting page 47. Despite the increased acceptance of military means within the framework of foreign policy, the use of nuclear weapons remains taboo for absolute majorities in every polled country. However, it is disquieting that substantial minori ties(between 16% and 36%) in nuclear states – Russia, the US, the UK and France – consider the use of nuclear weapons acceptable as‘a last resort’. Alarmingly, this figure is by far the highest in the US. Smaller, but still considerable minorities share this opinion in countries that host American nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement(Germany, Italy, Türkiye), together with a worrisome 22% in Poland. This is a troubling picture at a time of nu clear sabre-rattling and a looming fear that Russia might strike Ukraine with a nuclear weapon. Even more disturbing, in Russia 17% even think a nuclear bomb can be used as a’means to enforce vital interests’. How effective and legitimate do you believe the following means are for solving foreign policy crises? All figures in% 80% 78 70% 65 60% 58 50% 46 40 40% 32 30% 20% 10% 0% Military intervention Diplomatic negotiations Economic sanctions Usually effective Always effective Average across all countries (bar Russia and Georgia). Usually legitimate Always legitimate Average across all countries (bar Georgia). The use of nuclear weapons remains a taboo for absolute majorities in each polled country. Security Radar 2025 27

War against Ukraine There is hardly another place in Europe where current geopolitical confrontation, with all related fears and concerns, manifests itself more than in Ukraine. Three years since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, opinions within Ukraine and its support coalition display both a remarkable resilience and emerging doubts and war fatigue. Unity is still being maintained… Within the EU and NATO, there is still a remarkable unity in several respects. They are viewed similarly within Ukraine, too. Most people share the perception that it is a war for territorial expansion(rather than a proxy war or a conflict between democracies and autocracies); that Russia started the war because it is an imperialist state (rather than because it was defending its interests or had disagreements with Ukraine; only Italy is an exception); and that the end of the war is a prerequisite for improving security in Europe. Majorities view Russia as the aggressor and endorse widening of sanctions against it. Turkish attitudes diverge from this, reflecting the unique positioning of Erdogan’s government. The picture outside the support coalition is different. In Kazakhstan, Serbia, Georgia and Türkiye the war is viewed through a geopolitical lens. Most people in these countries say it is a proxy war on Ukrainian soil between Russia and the West, each vying for global influence. In Kazakhstan, Serbia and Türkiye people believe that Russia invaded Ukraine because it was defending its interests, not because of imperialist ambitions. Most respondents in Kazakhstan and Serbia do not view Russia as responsible for the war and oppose sanctions(see graph on page 34). … but what course of action? Despite the shared analysis of the situation within Ukraine’s support coalition, people seem to lack a common understanding of further courses of action. Take the statement‘ the war in Ukraine is a war between Russia and Ukraine, in which no third country should intervene’. It was posed already in 2021, before the full-scale invasion, and thus allows for a comparison over time. Respondents fall into three unequal groups. Respondents in Germany and Türkiye endorse the statement and support a non-interventionist stance; agreement there has even increased What effect, if any, does Russia’s war in Ukraine have on the following organisations or countries? All figures in% Affected countries USA DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA 16 45 15 46 20 43 21 33 13 42 12 37 34 47 24 37 16 40 21 36 15 49 14 35 18 39 23 20 20 18 25 37 9 21 24 30 18 36 27 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA NATO 19 38 27 30 24 41 22 32 14 30 15 31 39 39 30 35 12 24 25 37 18 37 20 32 19 32 27 19 17 16 37 39 13 16 46 23 24 33 25 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA RUSSIA 33 24 26 40 19 21 28 28 26 23 18 35 45 19 16 43 23 18 16 18 62 21 25 39 46 20 15 30 23 34 43 21 19 56 15 12 34 22 25 Weaker Neither stronger nor weaker Stronger 28 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

since 2021. People disagreeing and thus wishing for an in ternationalisation of the conflict are found in Ukraine itself and also the UK, Poland, Latvia and France. Opinion is divided in Italy and the US. Within Ukraine’s support coalition, people seem to lack a common understanding of further courses of action. There is also no common understanding regarding the effect of the war on NATO, the EU and respondents’ own country(whether it has become stronger or weaker). People in Latvia, Poland and Sweden(»new« members of NATO) are much more positive than people in Germany, France and Italy(»old« members of NATO). People in Ukraine demonstrate defiance and are even more positive. However, our comparative data for Germany, France, Latvia and Poland show that the longer the war drags on, the stronger the disillusionment. Respondents in all four countries demonstrate a lower confidence in 2024 than in 2022 that the EU, NATO, the US or their own country have become stronger as a result of the war. Conversely, the sense that China and Russia have been strengthened by the war has increased in all four countries. Overall, the assessment that the war has had a detrimental effect will make it harder for governments to rally support for further aid to Ukraine, especially when budgets are strained. This may be particularly the case for Germany, Ukraine’s biggest European supporter. The way forward once the fighting stops remains opaque, too. The most divisive issue is Ukraine’s potential membership of the EU and NATO. Again, respondents fall into different camps, mostly congruent with the policy of the respective state. Germans and French people oppose EU membership for Ukraine. Latvians, Poles and Swedes, as well as Brits and Americans, support it by a wide margin. Opinion in Italy is divided. The issue of NATO membership is even more contentious. Germans, French and Italians clearly oppose it; Latvians, Poles, Swedes, British people and Americans endorse it; Turkish opinion is split. A notable trend can be observed in Germany, France, Latvia and Poland – the four countries that were included not only in the poll in autumn 2021, but also in autumn 2022, nine months into the war. While in all four countries support for Ukrainian EU and NATO membership increased between 2021 and 2022, it dropped again in 2024. Overall, support in 2024 is still higher than back in 2021, before de bates about Ukrainian EU and NATO membership intensified after the full-scale invasion(and before Ukraine was awarded EU candidacy status in summer 2022). But the fact that support has fallen throughout the war, between 2022 and 2024, is a worrisome signal of declining public backing for these steps. In Germany, France, Latvia, and Poland, support for Ukraine's EU and NATO membership is higher than back in 2021 but lower than in 2022. DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA 31 38 36 28 24 23 48 46 19 29 23 21 21 EU 34 21 27 16 37 11 30 13 32 27 34 29 32 8 27 9 31 30 34 22 38 19 29 34 34 20 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA China 9 40 7 43 7 36 3 36 4 38 10 36 3 36 4 38 10 36 7 35 7 40 10 37 10 38 34 29 39 35 32 36 54 41 28 42 32 32 31 My country DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA 34 36 37 34 35 45 9 53 27 35 22 31 16 18 20 56 21 36 18 43 19 48 23 7 17 39 17 11 5 13 24 34 62 9 27 27 16 60 27 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. Security Radar 2025 29

War fatigue Waning support for Ukrainian EU and NATO membership in key European states reflects a general sense of war fatigue and a wish to keep it at a distance. There is no sense that an end to the war is in sight. Most of those surveyed believe that the war will not be over within the coming 12 months. In Germany, France, Latvia and Poland the shares of those who believed that the war will end within the next 12 months nearly halved between 2022 and 2024, indicating a sense of fading hope. People feel that the war is here to stay. The general public mood favours continuing to support Ukraine, but majorities are not stable everywhere. When asked whether it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine, the strongest majorities are found in Latvia, Sweden and the UK. But the lack of absolute majorities in crucial states such as Germany(48%) and Italy(42%), as well as fairly low numbers in Poland(53%) and especially the US(50%) are cause for concern. In the United States support clearly follows partisan lines, with Democratic voters(70%) more than twice as willing to keep supporting Ukraine as Republican voters(33%). Military support is chosen as the pri mary mode of support in polled EU and NATO countries. In your opinion, when will the war between Russia and Ukraine come to an end? Within the coming 6 months Don’t know 12% Agreement 19% 29% 37% Within the coming 12 months Not within the coming 12 months Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’. Only in Italy and Türkiye do relative majorities cite humanitarian support. Economic support ranks a distant third. Within the EU, Poland has a relatively high share of opponents of further support for Ukraine(30%), despite positio ning itself as a staunch supporter. Among the opponents, almost half cite the high cost as the reason. In comparison, among German and French opponents of further support for Ukraine, overwhelming majorities offer‘the war needs to end’ as their reason. People feel that the war is here to stay. Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? All figures in% Means of support: And how should Ukraine be primarily supported? Through... Humanitarian support Military support UKR GEO SWE UK 0% 20% 74 71 67 40% 92 60% 80% 4 100% 3 6 13 15 18 15 16 LVA POL FRA USA DE 53 52 50 48 62 14 15 22 19 13 36 30 28 19 25 ITA TUR KAZ SRB 14 25 42 36 30 35 22 29 48 34 31 34 Reasons against support: And why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? ‘The war needs to end.’‘It is too costly.’ Yes Don’t know No The means or reason with the highest support are depicted(choice from three). Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ 30 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

The most important thing is to... Respondents were asked to choose the statement that came closest to their view. All figures in% Members of the EU and NATO DE ... stop the war as soon as possible, even if it means Ukraine losing 53 control of some areas to Russia. FRA ITA LVA POL SWE 44 62 34 42 37 TUR UK USA 52 36 36 ... restore territorial even if it means that integrity of Ukraine, 27 29 20 21 30 31 the war is prolonged. 27 35 31 Other countries KAZ SRB UKR 59 81 30 10 4 21 ... make Russia lose the war, even if it means a 8 11 5 30 16 17 risk of escalation. 5 12 12 8 2 39 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. When asked directly about military support, the wish to avoid getting embroiled in the war is striking. Sending one’s own country’s troops to Ukraine is a clear red line for citizens of every country, without exception. The proportion of‘strongly disagree’ is conspicuous in every country and is among the highest values in the entire poll. Coupled with a low‘don’t know’ rate, it indicates that people have a clear and strong opinion on the issue. Even in outlier Sweden, the unusually high 27% in favour of sending troops are pitted against 58% opposing it, most of them strongly. Sending troops to Ukraine is a clear red line for citizens of every polled country. With regard to providing more weapons to the Ukrainian military, in no country except Sweden, the UK and the US do proponents outweigh opposers. Opposition is particularly clear in Germany, Italy and Türkiye, where absolute majorities are against sending more weapons. In France and even Poland, the opposition is close to an absolute majority(both 47%). Notably, opposition to sending troops in Germany, France, Latvia and Poland has increased markedly since the question was first asked in 2022. In a similar vein, support for providing more weapons has decreased in all four states. What position should your country take in the war in Ukraine? All figures in% Members of the EU and NATO DE FRA ITA LVA POL SWE TUR UK USA My country should support Ukraine until it 24 28 18 51 35 50 wins the war. 8 42 31 GEO Other countries KAZ SRB UKR 18 8 3 71 My country regarding the war should be neutral 26 25 25 14 30 17 in Ukraine. My country should support diplomatic 44 37 49 28 29 26 efforts to end the war. 38 15 19 40 24 37 1 47 33 37 38 55 49 23 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. Security Radar 2025 31

Wish for a diplomatic solution Opinions on ending the war are remarkably clear in most cases. Majorities, sometimes strong absolute majorities(as in Italy, Germany and Türkiye) believe that‘ the most important thing is to stop the war as soon as possible, even if it means Ukraine losing control of some areas to Russia’. This is congruent with a possible peace formula»territory for peace«, increasingly discussed in political circles in the US but also Ukraine. The second-most frequently named option is‘ the most important thing is to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine, even if it means that the war is prolonged’. It features prominently, though less than the first option, in the US, the UK, Poland and Sweden, countries whose governments often cast themselves as representatives of the so-called»justice camp«. In Ukraine itself, most people(39%) opt for the third possibility, namely ‘the most important thing is to make Russia lose the war, even if it means a risk of escalation’. This opinion is partially shared only in Latvia(30%). When asked about the likely outcome of the war, most people do not believe there will be a military victory on either side. Opinion in all countries, including Ukraine, is split between‘a diplomatic solution with both sides agreeing on a compromise’ and‘the war is not going to end soon’. In Italy and countries outside the EU(Georgia, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Türkiye) opinion is even tilted in favour of a diplomatic solution. In Ukraine proper, only 23% believe that Ukraine is going to win; more people believe in a diplomatic solution(30%) but even more doubt that the end is in sight(35%). Most people do not believe there will be a military victory on either side. The wish for a diplomatic solution is mirrored in opinions on the appropriate position of one’s country in the war in Ukraine. Only citizens of countries in the»justice camp« wish their countries to support Ukraine until it wins the war(the UK, Latvia, Poland, Sweden). Most people in countries that are Ukraine’s main supporters, namely Germany and the US, as well as France, Italy and Türkiye, wish to support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Substantial shares in Germany, France, Italy(all around 25%) and Poland(a surprising 30%) wish their countries to be neutral in the war. How do you believe this war is going to end? All figures in% DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Russia is going to prevail 15 11 6 19 17 5 militarily. 8 36 28 9 18 8 3 10 Ukraine is going to prevail 6 militarily. 5 10 4 5 15 11 0 1 12 5 8 23 11 A diplomatic sides agreeing on solution with both 33 32 48 41 42 33 34 41 40 35 47 37 30 35 a compromise. I do not war is going believe this 34 36 16 22 17 31 35 18 19 30 19 32 35 25 to end soon. Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. 32 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Attitudes to the war against Ukraine 90 Sanctions against Russia should be widened. 72 74 Countries ranked in ascending order. All figures in% 67 60 60 61 64 60% 2021 value for 51 53 comparison* 45 40% 22 20% 12 Serbia Kazakhstan* Türkiye 39 54 Italy Germany Georgia* Latvia 33 36 Strongly agree 25 25 Somewhat agree France 24 United States Sweden* United Poland Kingdom 0% Ukraine 0% 5 16 16 14 14 20% 40% Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree *Georgia, Kazakhstan and Sweden were not polled in 2021. Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. 72 How would you assess the following statements against the background of Russia’s war in Ukraine? Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% 34 11 54 79 Germany 11 6 71 79 Kazakhstan 29 57 27 58 Sweden 34 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Agree Disagree Agree Disagree ‘My country should provide more weapons to the Ukrainian military.’ ‘My country should send troops to Ukraine.’ 36 47 14 70 France 41 44 12 74 Latvia 23 16 62 73 Türkiye The war in Ukraine is a war between Ukraine and Russia in which no third country should intervene. All figures in% 2021 value for comparison* Want to know more? Get the detailed figures per country starting page 47. 41 DE 46 49 FRA 36 44 GEO* 44 41 ITA 42 28 KAZ* 52 55 LVA 31 48 POL 37 18 RUS 67 54 SRB* 30 28 SWE 59 52 TUR 31 77 UK 14 42 USA 41 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Strongly agree Somewhat agree 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% *Georgia, Kazakhstan and Sweden were not polled in 2021. Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree 20 13 72 80 Georgia 38 47 15 71 Poland 31 22 49 61 United Kingdom 23 7 44 12 62 76 Italy 5 80 85 Serbia 38 23 62 United States Security Radar 2025 35

In your view, who is responsible for the war in Ukraine? All figures in% DE FRA GEO* ITA KAZ* LVA POL RUS SRB SWE* TUR UK UKR USA Ukraine 20 16 24 21 30 16 16 30 36 9 22 11 12 15 Russia 70 72 58 64 35 72 81 22 26 82 50 82 84 70 The European Union 10 9 15 7 22 8 7 32 30 7 26 7 15 8 The USA 20 13 33 26 47 22 10 73 60 14 47 11 26 12 Country value 73 2021 value for comparison* *Georgia, Kazakhstan and Sweden were not polled in 2021. Multiple answers possible, thus the total exceeds 100%. Why do you think Russia invaded Ukraine? All figures in% DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Because it is an imperialist state. 31 32 37 25 9 37 40 n/a 4 30 10 32 51 25 Because it is defending its interests. 14 16 20 22 34 12 11 37 41 17 34 15 5 14 Because it had some long-standing disagreements with Ukraine. 28 27 9 27 18 17 20 3 27 19 30 21 8 22 Because it attempts to be a global player on 17 12 19 15 11 18 19 8 equal footing with the US and China. 9 20 15 19 29 21 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. 36 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. How would you characterise Russia’s war in Ukraine? All figures in% DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA This is a war between Russia and Ukraine aimed at expanding 56 62 36 47 23 42 63 11 66 30 64 53 56 Russia’s territory. This is a war between democracies and autocracies aimed at 12 8 defending the liberal system of values. 5 11 10 10 10 10 8 15 8 12 14 This is a proxy war on Ukrainian soil, in which Russia and the 21 18 42 28 40 31 19 60 15 42 16 30 14 West(USA and NATO) vie for global influence. Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. The end of Russia’s war in Ukraine is a pre-requisite for improving security in Europe. Countries ranked in descending order. All figures in% Ukraine 90 Sweden 82 Poland 81 Germany 78 Latvia 77 Serbia 74 United Kingdom 74 France 73 Italy 73 Türkiye 67 United States 67 Russia 62 Kazakhstan 61 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% Strongly agree Somewhat agree Security Radar 2025 37

Wrong place, wrong time – the EU in geopolitics? In a more polarised world, in which the currency of hard power and military might is gaining ground, respondents in all 14 countries seem to have difficulties finding a place or a role for the EU. Notably, there is not a single question in our survey on which citizens of the six analysed EU member states show a distinctive response pattern compared with the other countries. Thus, EU membership is not a factor explaining how populations regard the world in general or the EU’s role in it. The image of the EU emerging from our poll is one characterised by lack of military power, as well as internal differences. Nonetheless, the EU is generally viewed quite positively, and outside the Union even more so than within. Generally there is a high degree of support for the European Union. A majority of respondents in all countries(bar Russia) want it to play a bigger role in the future. This number is even higher in the six EU members included in the poll. However, when looking at relative standing and resources, the picture becomes more nuanced. The EU is not perceived as on the way to becoming a global power, taking a distinct position from China and the US. Here the perspective from inside is even more pes simistic than from outside(with the exception of Sweden, where 11% more believe that the EU is becoming a global power than those who do not). To illustrate this point, Germans(24%) are even less convinced about the EU becom ing a global power than Russians(26%). Interestingly, Americans regard this development considerably more optimistically than the French and Poles, among whom a relative majority are pessimistic about the EU becoming a global power. The European Union is becoming a global power, taking a distinct position from China and the US. All figures in% 56 50% 46 40% 37 34 33 32 30% 24 20% 44 44 36 35 34 26 23 10% 0% SWE POL FRA ITA LVA DE Members of the EU TUR UKR GEO USA KAZ UK RUS SRB Non-members of the EU Strongly agree Somewhat agree Which of the organisations mentioned should play a bigger role in the future? Response‘Yes, it should play a bigger role’. Germany France Italy Kazakhstan Latvia Poland Russia Serbia Sweden Türkiye United Kingdom Ukraine United States UN United Nations 48 60 61 65 61 66 51 60 63 67 62 70 57 NATO North Altantic Treaty Organization OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe EU European Union 47 47 49 48 43 56 39 52 63 27 50 42 62 52 67 76 57 57 14 48 30 9 53 42 49 46 51 56 54 61 53 42 53 77 63 79 53 36 46 The question was not asked in Georgia. 38 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

When asked whether EU policies regularly conflict with their country's interests, respondents in most countries tend to agree rather than disagree. The highest levels of agreement are observed in Russia(77%), as well as in Ser bia and Türkiye(over 65%). The EU average stands at 43%, with Poland notably higher at 51%. Accordingly, there is lit tle confidence in the EU’s ability to defend itself without the US. In all EU countries a relative majority believe that this is not possible, whereas from outside the EU, even in the UK and the US, the perception is slightly more positive. In Russia a surprising 68% believe in the EU’s defence ca pabilities, in marked contrast to the official propaganda there that ridicules the Union as weak and disoriented. Adding the views from accession candidates such as Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Kazakhstan and Türkiye, reveals mixed picture. The EU seems to be held in rather high regard in Türkiye, as well as in the new candidate countries Georgia and Ukraine, both of which are in need of international support, while in Serbia and Kazakhstan the assessment is more modest. In Russia a surprising 68% believe in the EU’s defence capabilities without the US. Looking forward, there is a sense of how to deal with this suboptimal situation. Building up a European Army is supported by relative majorities in the polled EU member states and even in the US agreement with this has risen since 2021. The same goes for the independence of the EU from the US. This was supported by significant majorities inside and outside the EU, even before Donald Trump won the presidential election in 2024. These numbers show a clear sense of the shortcomings of the EU and potential remedies to deal with that. It might, however, be quite difficult to translate this societal support into political action. The politics of the European Union is regularly in conflict with the interests of my country. Countries ranked in ascending order. All figures in% in conflict not in conflict 65 66 77 26 34 35 39 43 43 43 44 46 47 51 KAZ USA SWE LVA UKR DE GEO ITA UK FRA POL SRB TUR RUS 45 38 45 45 43 43 44 42 37 34 35 26 24 17 60% 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 40% Strongly agree Somewhat agree Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Deviations from 100% result from:‘don't know’ and‘no response’ Politically, respondents preferring a more independent EU from the US are politically rather diverse. Voters of far-right parties and leftist parties alike agree with this statement as do some voters in the political centre. How do you think the European Union should position itself? Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% Members of the EU DE FRA ITA LVA POL SWE In order to be on an equal footing with other great powers, the European Union 49 56 42 50 54 45 must build up its own powerful European Army. Defence policy should be a matter of individual member states of the Union and not 38 49 31 29 44 47 the job of the European Union. The European Union should focus on ensuring international peace through other means, 64 59 71 58 57 66 such as diplomacy, instead of building up a European Army. USA Non-members of the EU KAZ SRB TUR UK UKR 52 37 42 44 43 75 44 48 51 51 50 27 63 69 79 73 70 51 Security Radar 2025 39

In your opinion, is the EU able to defend itself without the USA? Countries ranked in descending order. All figures in% Members of the EU Sweden France Germany Italy Yes 38 32 31 30 No 48 52 57 52 Latvia 29 53 Poland 28 56 Poland shows a Janus-faced position, aligning on some issues with the Weimar Triangle, and on others with its Baltic neighbours. Diverging popular positions have also been translated into different policies of the member states, undermining the EU’s ability to agree on common positions and strategies towards Ukraine. Two internal problems affecting a global role for the EU The second issue, leadership, offers a rather complicated can be observed in our poll: unity and leadership. First, on perspective on resolving this disunity in the future. When unity: the six countries included in our sample show signifiasked about countries that might potentially lead the EU cant coherence on a number of matters. Notably the perin security policy, there is no one country on which reception of Russia as a threat to European security is shared spondents inside the EU can agree. French and German reamong all EU members in the survey. Following from that, spondents would prefer their own country to take the lead, there is broad agreement on the question of cooperation but trust in both of these countries is rather low in the othwith Russia, as well as the necessity of decoupling from er polled EU members, and even lower in Poland. Russia. But rifts are already visible when the same questions are asked about China, especially concerning decoupling. Here, Latvia is a clear outlier, with Polish respondents also more reluctant than people in the other four countries. However, the real split occurs in all matters regarding Ukraine. Here, even in our sample of six, a division between north-eastern Which country would you trust to be a leader in a common EU security policy in the future? Countries are placed according to the most popular answer. All figures in% Germany EU member states and south-western members can be observed, even though Poland shows an interestingly ITA DE Janus-faced position, aligning on some issues with the Weimar Triangle, KAZ TUR and on others with its Baltic neighbours. In France, Germany and Italy, SWE fatigue concerning Ukraine has set in, and there are no clear majorities for continued support, nor for its membership of the EU and NATO. In Sweden, Latvia and Poland, on the other hand, All POL three of LVA them together things are mainly different, reflecting UKR UK the Nordic-Baltic Summit in November 2024, at which stronger and continued FRA USA Poland France support for Ukraine was discussed. In SRB our sample this group of EU states is closest to the UK, and is a constellation of countries that has also been gaining influence in NATO. 40 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Russia 68 26 Türkiye 64 26 Kazakhstan Non-members of the EU United Kingdom 45 42 Serbia 41 United States 41 Ukraine 31 31 39 43 39 53 Deviations from 100% result from:‘don't know’ and‘no response’ The only constellation that garners trust in nearly all of the polled EU member state is the Weimar triangle of Germany, France, and Poland. However, in Italy even this garners little trust: only 14% would prefer it, in contrast to 21% who prefer German leadership. A potential silver lining is the fact that in Italy, France, Germany and Poland respondents support a stronger leadership role for their own country, as well as a strengthening of the EU institutions. This could offer at least a medium-term prospect with regard to filling the leadership vacuum in the EU. The combination of an EU divided and leaderless in the current situation may fuel the Union’s rather bleak prospect of becoming a serious player in geopolitics. How would you assess the following statements against the background of Russia’s war against Ukraine? Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% SWE SWE Ukraine should become a member of the European Union. FRA 34 DE 36 42 59 54 LVA 45 POL ITA SWE Ukraine should become a member of NATO. 52 55 FRA 35 DE 32 35 LVA 47 POL ITA SWE My country should support Ukraine until it wins the war. 50 51 FRA 28 DE LVA 24 35 POL 18 ITA My country should provide more weapons to the Ukrainian military. FRA 36 DE 34 23 ITA 57 41 LVA 38 POL My country should send troops to Ukraine. SWE 27 FRA 14 DE 11 12 LVA 15 POL 12 ITA Security Radar 2025 41

From threat to trust: strengthening international organisations At a time when conflicts and confrontation are on the rise, cooperation between countries is brittle and the role of international organisations in coping with common challenges more important than ever. Despite the trends outlined above towards isolation and polarisation, in all the countries surveyed, international organisations are still seen as key instruments for promoting international peace, second only to diplomatic efforts. Despite the above-described trends towards isolationism and cooperation with the like-minded, people are still open to pragmatic cooperation when it serves a higher purpose. A majority agree that their countries should cooperate with others, even those with different values, if it promotes global peace and security. A majority also believe that their country should pursue an active foreign policy and play a significant role in solving international problems, crises and conflicts. This underlines the ongoing relevance of elements of cooperative security. At the same time, scepticism about the basis of such cooperation is visible. Over 50% of respondents in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Türkiye and even France express doubts about the importance of laws and rules in international relations today. Less than 50% want their country to take on more international responsibilities and help other states, including if there are no direct benefits for their own country, with the lowest levels of agreement in the UK, Italy and Kazakhstan. International organisations A closer look at four different international organisations reveals an interesting picture. In most of the surveyed countries, approval or disapproval concerning the future role of the respective organisations is closely linked to the national foreign policy profile. The UN has the highest approval rating of all international organisations. First, when asked which organisations should play a bigger role in the future, the United Nations(UN) enjoys the highest approval, with 61% in favour. Germany is the outlier at the lower end of the spectrum on 48% in favour, followed by Russia(51%). Nonetheless, in Russia, the UN has the highest approval rating of all international organisations, which is telling considering the overall standing of international cooperation in the country. The United States follows with 57%, while support in other regions is close to 70%. What are the most important elements to promote international peace? 31% 2 nd 43% 1 st 29% 3 rd Strengthening international institutions (for example, the United Nations) Intensifying diplomatic efforts Improving our defence capabilities Average across all countries(bar Georgia and Russia). Multiple responses allowed. Türkiye and Ukraine show particularly high levels of trust in the role of the UN. Ukraine is generally at the higher end of the spectrum concerning all organisations, highlighting its need for international support. Second, the European Union receives 53% approval for a bigger role in future, with respondents from the surveyed EU member states showing a rate of 57% in favour. Germany is the only EU country showing low support, below 50%, and the country with the highest rate with regard to‘should not play a greater role’(35%) among all EU members. Latvia and Italy show the highest levels of approval of the EU among EU countries. Outside the EU, clear rejection of a bigger role for the EU is found only in Russia(54%). In non-European countries, support is above 40% in Kazakhstan(42%), Serbia (where opinion is divided at 42% in favour and 46% against) and the United States(46%). Türkiye(61%) and Ukraine (79%) are the non-EU countries that want the European Un ion to play a greater role, while in Russia support is at a mere 30%. These differences, specifically between the EU candidate countries Serbia and Türkiye, highlight the challenges the EU faces in gaining trust beyond its borders. 42 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements? All figures in% ‘My country should pursue an active foreign policy and play a significant role in solving international problems, crises and conflicts.’ ‘My country should take more international responsibility and help other states, even if there are no direct benefits for my country.’ 61 71 68 60 69 62 53 49 49 DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE 41 41 54 47 47 32 40 40 49 73 TUR 48 60 UK 47 79 UKR 43 57 USA 42 60% 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% Strongly agree Somewhat agree The OSCE enjoys considerable support in countries in which it has been present with a mission. Third, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) receives 49% approval for a bigger role in future. It is also the least known organisation, with high rates of‘I am not familiar with this organisation’ responses, specifically in the US(30%), France and the UK (around 25% each). Support is particularly low among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, ranging from 36% in the United States to 48% in Russia, with France and the UK in between. The OSCE, however, enjoys considerable support in countries in which it has either been directly present with a mission or at least in the immediate neighbourhood, with over 50% support in Kazakh stan, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine. In particular, 63% of re spondents in Ukraine support a stronger role for the OSCE, despite the linking of the organisation to the widely unpopular Minsk agreements. The highest NATO support is found in Ukraine, even higher than among NATO members. Fourth, approval for a bigger role for NATO stands at 47% on average. There are distinct differences in the sample, however. The highest approval, unsurprisingly, is found in Ukraine at over 77%. On the other end we find approval of just 9% in Serbia, even lower than the 14% in Russia. Among NATO members, support is lowest in Italy, at 39%, and highest in Poland, at over 76%. There is moderate sup port in the United Kingdom, Türkiye and the United States, where approval is just over 50%, with lower support in the other non-NATO countries surveyed. Security Radar 2025 43

Kazakhstan Italy How satisfied are you in general with climate change measures and policies... Combined responses‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘not quite satisfied’. The question was not asked in Russia. All figures in% ... by the international community of states ... by the European Union ... by the government in your country Ø total average 56 53 58 Germany 60 France 60 57 58 68 63 62 65 68 41 38 46 Latvia United States Poland Ukraine 52 n/a 48 56 n/a 51 64 49 n/a n/a 52 United Kingdo m 63 Türkiye 50 46 51 59 71 54 51 54 n/a n/a 71 52 Serbia Sweden Taken together, what should people in your country do to respond to climate change? All figures in% DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA We should do everything we can to stop climate change. 47 49 62 45 30 46 28 56 47 58 53 44 49 We should adapt to climate change, so that we can live well 37 38 25 34 49 36 42 30 35 28 33 40 29 with a changed climate in the future. We do not need to do anything, because climate change is 10 6 6 8 11 11 26 6 9 5 8 7 12 not a big issue. Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. 44 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Attitudes to Climate Change All figures in% Climate change represents a challenge to global peace and security. Disagreement 28 18 37 17 28 26 23 26 24 20 15 26 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 59 69 45 62 56 59 65 59 64 65 73 59 If my country acts early and decisively, climate change can be a unique opportunity to completely transform our lifestyles towards a fairer, healthier society. Disagreement 35 24 19 17 27 24 20 26 20 20 16 22 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 50 60 66 59 52 57 66 55 67 65 66 61 I trust that investment in new technologies in my country can sufficiently tackle climate change. Disagreement 52 38 23 23 30 29 24 43 35 34 16 32 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 33 46 61 54 53 54 63 39 52 48 70 50 International collaboration is key to address global climate change beyond rivalries in other areas. Disagreement 19 12 14 12 16 19 14 15 17 10 10 16 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 68 76 74 64 67 65 75 71 71 75 74 68 With climate change leading to instability, my country should prioritise securing its borders and competing in the global market for natural resources and new technologies. Disagreement 25 20 25 13 21 16 24 26 17 20 10 21 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 55 61 55 62 57 64 58 48 71 57 74 59 Rich countries should protect poor and vulnerable countries from the impacts of climate change. Disagreement 26 21 17 12 23 22 11 21 16 18 11 25 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 59 65 67 67 58 60 78 64 73 67 78 57 Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. Security Radar 2025 45

Perceptions of climate change International organisations are a means of dealing with global challenges. To obtain a fuller picture of international cooperation, we included a set of questions on climate change in the survey(not included in full in Georgia and Russia due to the length of the questionnaire). Climate change is widely recognised as a global threat, with concern spread evenly across age and gender. It ranks fourth out of nine foreign policy objectives, after terrorism and extremism, human rights abuses and geopolitical tensions and conflicts. Northern and Central European countries are relatively less concerned regarding climate change than others. Northern and central European countries are relatively less concerned than others, with Sweden, Latvia and Germany expressing the least concern(just above 60%). The US fol lows at 64%. Italy, Serbia, Türkiye, Georgia and France are the most concerned(76–80%). There is a consensus that current climate policies, whether at the national or the international level, are not sufficient to tackle the problem. Confidence in EU climate policy is, on average, a bit higher than in national and international efforts. Only 26% ex press satisfaction with government action, the lowest levels being in Serbia, followed by Ukraine and Italy. Satisfaction with EU efforts is slightly higher inside the Union, at 29%, with EU respondents less critical than with their respective governments. Globally, only 24% express satisfaction with the actions of the international community. We thus have a high level of concern and quite a low level of approval with the policies currently being implemented. Additionally, there is widespread recognition that climate change cannot be addressed in isolation. Broad majorities in all countries view international collaboration as key to addressing global climate change beyond rivalries in other areas. Approaches to tackling climate change The devil lies in the detail, however. A majority(47%) prior itise mitigation measures to stop climate change, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, compared to 35% who prefer to focus on adaptation measures to adjust to the current and future impacts of climate change. Exceptions to this trend are found in Latvia and Russia, where adaptation is favoured by a wide margin. In Russia, a worrying 26% believe no action is necessary, compared with only 8% on average in all other countries bar Georgia, where no climate-related questions were asked. The US has the second-highest rate, at 12%. While there is broad consensus that climate action is essential, the specifics vary. New technologies are not widely embraced as effective tools for combating climate change. However, in all countries except for Russia and Georgia, in which the detailed question was not asked, there is broad approval for prioritising the security of borders and competing in the global market for natural resources and new technologies(60%). This is almost as high as the approval for climate cooperation(71%). This shows that public attitudes in this area also reflect the tension between isolationism and cooperation in addressing global challenges. A tendency to pursue one’s own interests can also be detected, when respondents are asked about solidarity between rich and poor countries. When it comes to helping countries to cope with climate change, Germany, alongside the US and Latvia, stands out as one of the three nations least willing to assist vulnerable countries, in contrast to the high approval for such measures observed in non-EU countries, such as Kazakhstan, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine. The securitisation of climate change has left its mark on public perceptions. People clearly see the need for cooperation. But people also seem unsettled and feel that international collaboration could mean losing out in a perceived zero-sum game, undermining their willingness to cooperate. Broad majorities in all countries view international collaboration as key to addressing global climate change. 46 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Country Profiles Germany France Georgia Italy Kazakhstan Latvia Poland Russia Serbia Sweden Türkiye Ukraine United Kingdom United States

Germany [hedging and risk-averse] Germany, one of the leading EU member states, is navigating a complex mix of challenges. Historically cautious about embracing a dominant global role because of the legacy of Nazi rule and post-war division, the country has nonetheless grown more assertive in pursuing its political and economic interests. It increasingly acknowledges the need to contribute to peace and stability in Europe. However, Germany faces significant economic challenges that threaten its ability to maintain an influential economic position within the EU. The collapse of the»traffic light« coalition, coinciding with Donald Trump's re-election, set the stage for early federal elections in February 2025. This development has introduced a period of uncertainty until the formation of a new government. Self-perception Germans’ primary concerns are wars and conflicts(82%), inflation(79%) and international terrorism(76%). The pro portion of respondents worried about uncontrolled immigration has grown from 61% in 2021 to 73% in 2024 and the level of concern increases with age, opening up a 27 per centage point difference between those aged 18–29(56%) and 60–75 year olds(83%). The dynamic of worries about one’s personal future(2021: 57%, 2022: 71%, 2024: 66%) indicates a growing sense of in stability after the outbreak of war and a subsequent stabilisation two years later. However, fears of a worsening person al economic situation have grown(2021: 43%, 2024: 50%). 57% Germany should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Germans rank among the most satisfied with their status on the international stage. On the international stage, about 40% believe that Germa ny lacks the status it deserves, but Germans rank among the most satisfied with their standing in the survey. Nearly 60% of Germans, consistent with the previous survey and the poll average, believe their prosperity is linked to the well-being of other nations. However, this figure is relative ly low for an export-dependent economy. Perception of the world Germany is an active participant in numerous international organisations, but this engagement is only partially reflected in public attitudes. Support for a larger role for the UN remains low, with only 48% in favour, significantly below the 61% survey average. Support remained steady for an expanded role for the EU(49%), for NATO(47%) and for the OSCE(47%). Key pillars of German foreign policy include a commitment to the EU, with a majority of respondents(61%) supporting closer cooperation within the Union. However, opinion is split on whether there are conflicts between EU policies and Germany’s interests(43% on each side). This is value up on 2021(35%). EU–US cooperation strengthened under the Biden administration, but collaboration with the US receives mixed support, with 46% in favour and 42% opposed. The results reflect hardly any increase compared with 2021(51% in favour). The interests of the US and the EU are seen rather as aligned (47% do not think that their interests are contradictory). 48 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

52% of Germans perceive the media reporting as objective, one of the highest figures in the poll. Since the onset of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia’s image has changed significantly. It is now seen as Europe's biggest threat, with threat perception rising from 51% in 2021 to 73% today. Closer collaboration with Russia and China is widely rejected. Majorities support reducing ties with both countries, even at the cost of a lower standard of living(64% for Russia, 57% for China). Germany has also adopted a»derisking« approach towards China, now perceived as Europe’s second-biggest threat(46%). Nearly 70% agree with reducing dependence on countries that do not share Germany's values. The perceived divergences of interests between the US and Russia(63%) and the US and China(58%), are seen as most contradictory, higher than those between the EU and Russia(60%) or the EU and China(51%). The picture sug gests that the US is viewed as acting within a more tense geopolitical context than the EU. Germany's media is generally recognised as relatively objective, free and diverse. Indeed, it enjoys one of the highest levels of trust(52%) with regard to objective reporting among the surveyed nations, while only a smaller share (37%) perceive the German media as biased. Perception of European security Germans exhibit a defensive, risk-averse approach, reflected in their historically cautious policies in military affairs and emphasis on dialogue. The vast majority view the end of the war against Ukraine as crucial for improving European security. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +6 30% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +22 73% Russia 46% +3 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Think of the role that your country currently has in the EU. What should be the course of action? All figures in% My country GER should assume a stronger FRA leadership role in the EU. ITA POL 25 27 33 42 My country GER should promote stronger FRA European institutions(e.g. EU ITA Commission and EU Parliament). POL 37 32 40 25 My country should GER 28 FRA 27 engage less in the EU and ITA 14 concentrate on itself. POL 21 Don’t know GER 8 FRA 13 ITA 11 POL 12 0% 10% 20% 30% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ A large majority foresee an upcoming era marked by wars and conflicts, accompanied by»my country first« approach. Germans are increasingly worried about being directly affected by wars and conflicts in the future, with the proportion of those concerned rising from 47% in 2021 to 75% in 2024. The perceived risk of wars in Europe surged from 33% in 2021 to 56% in 2024. However, the perception of the like lihood of military confrontation between Russia and the West has declined in the course of the war against Ukraine, dropping from 48% in 2022 to 40% in 2024, below the aver age of polled European countries(48%). Additionally, 69% believe Germany could not defend itself against a Russian attack, a figure significantly higher than the NATO average of 53%. This is reflected in the stance of the Olaf Scholz government, which has been following a cautious path in supporting Ukraine with reference to potential Russian threats and the danger of escalation. On security matters, Germans prioritise diplomacy(64%) over the build-up of an EU Army(49%). Some 57% believe that the EU would be unable to defend itself without US support. At the same time, 68% express a desire for more independence from the US. When asked about a potential leader in EU security, Germany is the only country in the Weimar triangle that is more likely to envision leadership alone(30%) rather than together with France and Poland (28%). Although cooperation between France and Germany remains essential, differences in defence, trade and energy policies are increasing. Although Germans are the most confident in their country's ability to take on a leadership role in EU security, paradoxically, survey respondents express the highest support, compared with France, Italy and Poland, for Germany to engage less in the EU(28%, but only 18% among those aged 18–29). Security Radar 2025 49

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Germany take in the war in Ukraine? Germany should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Germany should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Germany should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 4 24 26 44 0 10 20 30 40 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 48 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 36 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 72 57 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 24 13 5 18 8 1 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 36% ... NATO 32% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Germany? Did it become... 34 36 17 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 50 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Germans are neither as strong supporters of Ukraine as Latvians or Swedes, nor as opposed as Italians. Instead, they remain cautious. Their support for a stronger leadership role ranks lowest(25%). Germany's leadership posi tion has diminished on the European stage due to internal divides in the governing coalition, a trend also reflected in the poll. However, the largest share(37%) would prefer to strengthen EU institutions. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine A trend of disillusionment and war fatigue is evident. Some 46% believe that the war against Ukraine is not going to end within the next 12 months, the third-highest value among the surveyed countries. Russia is overwhelmingly seen as the aggressor (70%), while Ukraine and the US are blamed by 20% each. In common with most EU member states, except Italy, 31% of respondents attribute Russia's invasion to its imperialist ambitions, while 28% cite long-standing tensions with Ukraine. Few respondents cite as a reason defence of Russia’s interests or an attempt to act as a global player. Germans are neither as strong supporters of Ukraine within the EU as Latvians or Swedes, nor as opposed as Italians. Instead, they remain cautious, with support declining since the 2022 survey, similar to France. The highest share of German respondents(44%) favour diplomatic efforts. About a quarter support a neutral stance or backing Ukraine until victory, respectively. While 48% support contin ued assistance to Ukraine(below the EU average of 55%), 36% oppose further support. This is due mainly to a desire for the war to end(72%) or concerns about its cost(18%). A narrow majority (53%, higher than the NATO average of 44%) be lieve the war should end as soon as possible, even if it results in territorial losses for Ukraine. Only 27% support restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even if it is at the cost of prolonging the war.

Germany's historical military restraint is evident in its continued reluctance, on top of war fatigue among the population. The majority oppose further weapons deliveries(54%) and strongly reject sending troops(79%). Support for Ukraine’s NATO membership(50% opposed, 32% in favour) and EU membership(49% opposed, 36% in favour) has de clined since 2022. However, 53% now support expanding sanctions against Russia, up from 37% in 2021. As broader effects of the war, NATO, the US and China are seen as largely unaffected, while Russia is perceived as weakened(33%). The EU and Germany are seen as either unaffected or weakened. The way forward There is a prevailing belief that global developments over the next five years will worsen, which has largely remained unchanged since the last survey: globally(69%), in Europe (59%) and in Germany(53%). This positions Germany, alongside France, as the two most pessimistic countries in the poll. Germany, alongside France, ranks as the most pessimistic in the poll. Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism(62%, 2022: 42%) and international migration (44%, 18–29: 24%), and tackling climate change(43%). There has been a clear inward turn in public sentiment. Since 2021, concerns about the decline in social cohesion have grown. Some 65% oppose promoting German values abroad, the highest figure in the poll. Nevertheless, 61% are in favour of pursuing an active foreign policy and playing a significant role in tackling international problems. Internationally, Germans tend to believe that rules and laws in international relations remain relevant. Promoting peace is seen primarily in terms of diplomatic negotiations, considered the most effective and legitimate tool. Key methods include diplomacy(54%, 35% among 18-29 year-olds), disarmament initiatives and strengthening international organisations(about 30% each). Scepticism to wards military interventions has risen sharply(from 56% in 2022 to 69% in 2024) and they are perceived as the least legitimate option. The majority oppose nuclear weapons, but 26% of 18-29 year-olds consider them a last resort, twice the 14-country average. In your opinion, how should the German government deal with debts and investments? All figures in% 40% 45 40 30% 40% 20% 0% Reducing national debt should be a priority for the government in Germany. Otherwise, future generations will suffer from debt payments for a long time. It is better for the government to borrow money today and to invest into the future than to leave the next generation coping with upcoming challenges. 12 Don’t know Deviations from 100% result from‘no response’. German respondents express general dissatisfaction with current climate policies, while the EU's measures receive the highest approval(32%, with 42% among those aged 18– 29). A strong majority(68%) still believe that international collaboration is crucial. However, despite Germany's wealth, it shares with the US and Latvia the lowest support for protecting poor and vulnerable countries(59%). Regarding the government’s approach to new public borrowing and investments, a contentious issue in Germany since the»debt brake« was enshrined in the constitution in 2009, Germans are fairly divided: 45% oppose new debt for future investments, while 40% support it. Notably, support for new debt is lower among those under 40. Support for increasing military spending is high, with 54% in favour, a 16% increase from 2021. However, 55% reject prioritising defence spending over social expenditures. The preferred method of financing defence is a special levy on the rich(47%), while 24% support cuts in other areas. New borrowing is supported by only 11%, which is the highest proportion in the poll. Scepticism towards military interventions has risen sharply, from 56% in 2022 to almost 70% in 2024. Security Radar 2025 51

France [pragmatic and disillusioned] France, a nuclear power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has historically been a major military and colonial force. For decades, the Franco-German duo was the main driver of the European Union, but more recently their leadership has slowly dissipated as a result of domestic developments in both countries. Nevertheless, President Emmanuel Macron still envisages a»sovereign Europe«, based on aspirations regarding a strategically autonomous EU capable of tackling complex challenges on an equal footing with other global players. France is experiencing significant political instability following the ousting of Prime Minister Barnier in December 2024, the first successful no-confidence vote in over 60 years. This government crisis compounds existing challenges, including growing support for the right-wing Rassemblement National, and widespread protests over pension reforms and rising living costs. These factors have constrained President Macron, raising concerns about the emergence of a power vacuum. Self-perception The biggest concerns of French respondents are inflation and the rising cost of living(86%), economic crises(81%), and the impact of wars and conflicts(78%). A large major ity(80%) feel safe in their immediate surroundings, but this is slightly below the average in the poll, probably because of recent riots and violent disturbances, as well as terrorist attacks in recent years. Although fears of a worsening personal economic situation have declined, the majority are concerned about their personal future(2022: 71%; 2024: 58%). Perceptions of France's global standing have hardly shifted. Some 41% believe the country doesn't receive the status it deserves(2021: 45%). Still, the French are among the least dissatisfied with their country's status in our poll. Perception of the world French public opinion underscores the significance of multilateralism in global governance. France supports a greater UN role(60%), although this has declined slightly(2021: 64%). Public sentiment mirrors the French government's rather reserved stance towards NATO, with 48% supporting a greater role and 26% opposing it. The French believe that the coming era will be marked by a »my country first« mentality(73%), although this is less pro nounced among those under 40. A substantial 57% believe that laws and rules in international relations are no longer relevant, significantly more than in other polled European countries, such as Germany or Poland(both around 35%). Opinions about the likelihood of a new world war are split, with most people saying‘don’t know’(40%) or‘yes’(31%). 56% France should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. 57% of the French believe that laws and rules in international relations are no longer relevant, significantly more than in Germany or Poland. French public opinion reflects a shift towards multipolarity. The French do believe the era of American supremacy is rather over(47%). While 44% still favour increased coopera tion with the US, a notable 39% oppose it. A growing role for middle powers, such as Brazil or Türkiye, is expected by 45%, and 38% view Russia as a potential leader of the countries outside the»West«. Only a third view the EU as a global power. Nonetheless, the majority support a larger role for the EU, with opinion divided on the extent of France’s disagreement with the EU. French respondents reject greater cooperation with Russia(65%) and China(54%), coupled with a desire for reduced dependence(67% for Russia, 62% for China). 52 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

44% of the French favour increased cooperation with the US, but 39% oppose it. The strengthening of alignment between the USA and the EU is evident from the French perspective, with the perceived divergence of interests at 29%. In contrast, the per ceived divergence between the US and Russia(60%) or China(56%) remains higher than that between the EU and Russia(55%) or China(49%). These perceptions suggest that the US is positioned within a more complex and tension-filled geopolitical context than the EU. Over 50% of French people do not find media coverage ob jective, consistent with previous years. This perception may be driven by the fact that the media landscape is owned by a small group of billionaires. Perception of European security A large majority in France see an era of wars and conflicts emerging, with 74% seeing Russia as a threat for Europe and 43% China. The US is viewed as a threat for European security by 23%. A majority, as in other polled countries, view ending the war against Ukraine as key to improving European security. About half see the EU as unable to defend itself without the US. An overwhelming majority of 78% see France as vulnerable in case of a Russian attack. This is the highest figure in the poll, despite France's history as a military power and its battle-tested deployments. Disillusionment with interventionism is growing, with opposition to military interventions increasing from 37% in 2021 to 61% in 2024. Also, military interventions are perceived as less effective(2021: 50%, 2024: 41%) and less legitimate(2021: 48%, 2024: 37%). This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +4 23% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +28 74% Russia 43% +3 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Think of the role that your country currently has in the EU. What should be the course of action? All figures in% My country GER should assume a stronger FRA leadership role in the EU. ITA POL 25 27 33 42 My country GER should promote stronger FRA European institutions(e.g. EU ITA Commission and EU Parliament). POL 37 32 40 25 My country should GER 28 FRA 27 engage less in the EU and ITA 14 concentrate on itself. POL 21 Don’t know GER 8 FRA 13 ITA 11 POL 12 0% 10% 20% 30% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Reflecting Macron’s(futile) efforts to promote European strategic autonomy, France shows the highest support among European countries for an EU Army(56%). Paris advocates a unified EU foreign policy and a European Defence Fund. This position helps to explain its desire to become more independent of the US, with 64% in support, slightly higher than the average across the surveyed EU countries. Still, almost half believe that defence should be handled nationally. Asked about a potential leader in EU security, 29% name France either alone or as part of the revived Weimar triangle, together with Germany and Poland. While France and Germany's cooperation remains key, differences in defence, trade and energy policies are growing. In any case, France is nearly equally divided on its future role in the EU: 32% fa vour promoting stronger European institutions, 27% support taking stronger EU leadership, while 27% favour focusing on national interests. Divergent EU priorities are emerging, with Germany envisioning a similar role, Poland seeking a more prominent leadership position, and Italy focusing on strengthening European institutions. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine In France, 72% of respondents identify Russia as the prima ry aggressor in the war. Regarding motives for Russia’s invasion, 32% attribute it to Russia’s imperialist ambitions, while 27% cite the long-standing tensions with Ukraine. Concerning France's stance, the highest share(37%) favours diplomatic efforts, despite Macron’s unsuccessful efforts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Some 28% back sup porting Ukraine until victory, with stronger support among older respondents. Security Radar 2025 53

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should France take in the war in Ukraine? France should support Ukraine until it wins the war. France should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. France should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 10 0 10 28 25 37 20 30 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 52 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 25 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 53 48 38 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 22 18 7 12 1 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 34% ... NATO 35% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on France? Did it become... 37 34 11 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 54 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Opposition to military interventions increased from 37% in 2021 to 61% in 2024. But France shows the highest support among European countries for an EU Army. The gap between the desired outcome and its perceived feasibility is highlighted, as only 5% of respondents anticipate a military victory for Ukraine. Overall, about half favour continued support for Ukraine. Among those, 53% back military and 22% humanitarian aid. Among those opposed to further aid, 48% believe the war must end, and 38% claim that it’s too expensive, the sec ond-highest share after Poland. A majority would welcome more sanctions, while only around a third support increased weapon deliveries, a notable decline(2022: 40%). Macron’s suggestion of deploying ground troops in Ukraine faced widespread criticism, as reflected in our survey, with only 14% in favour. French opinion on possible EU and NATO membership for Ukraine is mixed, but rather negative. This stance became apparent as early as 2008, when Merkel and Sarkozy opposed Ukraine's Membership Action Plan at the NATO Bucharest summit, leading to the alliance's decision to withhold support for Ukraine's NATO membership. This historical position is now intertwined with war fatigue. The French are neither as strong supporters as the Latvians or Swedes, nor as opposed as the Italians. Support exists, similar to that in Germany, but it remains cautious and has waned compared with the 2022 survey. As for the broader effects of the war, French respondents largely view it as aimed at expanding Russia’s territory, slightly higher than the average of polled NATO countries. As a result of the war, the US, China and NATO are perceived as stable. Russia and the EU are regarded as having diminished influence. France is viewed as marginally weaker.

The way forward There is a prevailing belief that developments over the next five years will worsen: globally(69%), in Europe(56%) and in France(55%). This places France, together with Germany, as the most pessimistic country in the poll, although the younger generations have a slightly more optimistic outlook. The top foreign policy objectives are combating terrorism and extremism(54%, higher among older respondents), tackling climate change(44%) and addressing human rights violations(37%). While 49% support all possible measures to combat climate change, 38% emphasise adap tation. President Macron emphasises France’s potential for climate leadership, but dissatisfaction with climate policies is widespread. Still, France and Italy remain the most satisfied with EU climate policies in the poll. Many view climate change actions as an opportunity for transformation, but also as a source of protectionism amid uncertainties. Almost half of French respondents oppose promoting values abroad, while 35% agree. The value-centred approach demonstrates the strongest reluctance to cooperate with countries with different values, even if they contribute to peace and security. With regard to conflict resolution, diplomacy is seen as the most effective and legitimate measure. Some 42% view intensifying diplomatic efforts as an France, together with Germany, is the most pessimistic country, though younger generations are more hopeful. important priority. Development aid receives the least support(22%), even though it should remain important due to France’s colonial past. A majority are deeply concerned about the potential for nuclear escalation. Some 27% of French respondents sup port global nuclear disarmament, but 23% view nuclear weapons as central to their foreign policy. While 63% op pose their use, the third-lowest figure after Russia and the US, 27% support deploying them as a last resort, a worry ingly high proportion. Public opinion on military spending has shifted due to the ongoing war. Support for a higher military budget has risen from 45% in 2021 to 52% in 2024. Still, about half favour spending on economic and social affairs over defence, with only 25% the other way round. A narrow majority(44%) fa vour a special levy on the rich, while 28% favour cuts in oth er budgets. Only 5% support increased borrowing for de fence spending. However, France has significantly increased its debt, reaching historically high levels that surpass the European Union's fiscal thresholds, putting it among the countries with the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the EU. Thinking of the French defence policy, what role do you think nuclear weapons should have in the near future? All figures in% France should encourage global nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons are a fixed part of French foreign policy and everything should be left as it is. France should expand its nuclear arsenal. 27 23 13 France should expand its own nuclear shield to cover all EU member states. 9 France should reduce its nuclear arsenal. 5 Don't know 18 None of these/other 0% 4 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 55

Georgia [forward-looking and balancing] Georgia has a complex blend of influences from both Europe and Asia. Since gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has pursued closer ties with Western institutions, including aspirations to join NATO and the European Union, while maintaining relations with Russia. In 2008, escalating tensions erupted into a five-day war, after which Russia recognised the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict ended with an EU-brokered ceasefire agreement. Taking a broader view, geopolitical influences from both Russia and the European Union are crucial in shaping Georgia's fortunes. Georgia has strengthened its Western alignment, signing an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 and applying for EU membership in March 2022, a move accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The path towards Europe has become the main domestic conflict in late 2024, however. Self-perception Georgians feel most secure in their immediate surroundings compared with other countries(93%). This feeling of security is accompanied by the second-lowest level of concern regarding a decline in personal economic situation(40%). Some 90% of Georgians are concerned, along with Turks and Ukrainians, about inflation, the cost of living and economic crises. This mood is also influenced by high unemployment(youth unemployment stands at 30%) and wide spread informal employment. These components collectively account for the observed outcome that 86% express concerns about their personal future, the second-highest level in the poll after Ukraine. Georgians are conscious of global interdependencies, and 79% feel that Georgia’s well-being is linked to positive de velopments in other countries. However, 68% feel that Georgia does not receive the status it deserves, 13% higher than the poll average. 70% Georgia should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world Their prevailing sentiment is that an era of a»my country first« is dawning. Georgians still very much believe in the Western-dominated security order, having the lowest rate of agreement that the era of American supremacy is over (28%). They also have the third-highest approval that Eu rope is becoming a global power(44%). Among 18–29 year olds, this percentage rises to nearly 60%. Georgians are least convinced that middle powers such as Türkiye or Brazil are emerging as new centres of influence. In contrast to Russian respondents, Georgians show the lowest agreement that laws and rules are no longer relevant. Georgians believe in the Westerndominated security order: 44% think that Europe is becoming a global power and only 28% agree that the era of American supremacy is over. The overwhelming majority in Georgia prefer stronger cooperation with the EU(85%), the highest support in the poll, next to Ukraine. At the same time, opinion is split on whether EU politics are regularly in conflict with the interests of Georgia(43% each agreeing and disagreeing). EU membership has been supported by a majority of Georgians for many years. When asked about the reasons for EU membership, most people choose higher living standards (49%). They also cite EU funding, as well as security from Russia. Diving deeper into the findings suggests that young Georgians are more pro-Western, particularly in terms of foreign policy and international alliances. This generational shift could have significant implications for Georgia’s future direction, possibly with regard to closer ties with the EU. Georgia's relations with the EU soured after controversial laws were introduced in 2024 curbing LGBTQ+ rights and targeting foreign-funded civil society groups. 56 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

What do you see as the most compelling reasons for Georgia to join the EU? All figures in% Higher living standards Security from Russia Access to more EU funding Functioning system of the rule of law Democratic governance Stronger influence of Georgia in international affairs Less corruption 12 9 17 16 24 21 Freedom of expression 8 Environmental protection 4 Multicultural open society 2 LGBT and minority rights 1 Don’t know 17 0% 10% 20% 30% 49 40% Multiple answers possible. Young Georgians are more pro-Western than older generations. The EU paused its accession process, and the internal Georgian conflict about the European perspective has intensified since. However, an either-or framing oversimplifies the situation. An absolute majority of Georgians(58%) support a bal anced approach between the EU and Russia, rather than aligning with one side at the cost of deteriorating relations with the other. Nonetheless, 43% of polled Georgians de sire more cooperation with Russia(50% oppose closer ties), although only a quarter of those aged 18–29 support this. At the same time, there is also a wish to reduce reliance on Russia, even if it has a negative impact on living standards in Georgia(58%). Outside the narrow Russia-versus-the-West framing, Georgians support enhanced cooperation – 76% with the USA and 60% with China. At the same time, they want to re duce dependency on China(51%). In contrast to Ukraine, they show relatively low support for reducing dependency on non-like-minded states, which reflects a distinctive and pragmatic stance on this issue. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Georgians suffered from Russian aggression in the 2008 five-day war. Afterward, Russia recognised the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These became more dependent on Moscow. Russia continues to maintain bases and troops there. Against this backdrop, Georgians avoid taking a strong position on the war against Ukraine. Instead, they favour a neutral stance(40%), the highest en dorsement for that in the poll, and support diplomatic efforts to end the war(38%). A majority(58%) hold Russia re sponsible for the ongoing war, while 33% point to the US and 24% to Ukraine. Notably, among younger people per ceptions of responsibility on the part of both Russia and Ukraine are higher, while blame toward the US is lower. Moreover, the war is mostly(42%) perceived as a proxy war between the West and Russia. This stance is shared only in Serbia and Türkiye. Some 36% view the war as an attempt by Russia to expand its territory. This perception is even more pronounced among those aged 18 to 29(43%). Notably, it is lower than in western European nations such as France, the UK and Sweden, where it exceeds 60%. Less than 5% lean to wards the third characterisation, namely that it is a war between democracies and autocracies. Security Radar 2025 57

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Georgia take in the war in Ukraine? Georgia should support Ukraine until it wins the war. 18 Georgia should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Georgia should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 3 0 10 20 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 40 38 30 0% 74 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 69 18 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 57 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is not important for us It is too costly Don’t know 20 8 3 22 18 3 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 72% ... NATO 64% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia When will the war between Russia and Ukraine come to an end? 20% The war will come to an end within the coming 6 months. 11% The war will come to an end within the coming 12 months. 28% The war will not be over within the coming 12 months. 40% Don't know 58 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 58% support a balanced approach between the EU and Russia, rather than aligning with one side at the cost of deteriorating relations with the other. However, the geographical proximity to Russia is reflected in the fact that most people are worried about nuclear escalation(76%). This is not sur prising given Russia's recent nuclear exercises and threats to use nuclear weapons. The Georgian government maintains a neutral, possibly defensive stance. Still, a large majority (74%) advocate continued support for Ukraine, the second highest in the poll. Georgian respondents are the strongest proponents of humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, they reject the idea of sending troops, the second-highest level in the poll. When it comes to increased weapon deliveries, people are also sceptical, but women support this slightly more than men(23% vs 18%). Geor gians support Ukraine becoming an EU member (72%) and a NATO member(64%). Regarding an end of the war, Georgians express more optimism for a diplomatic solution than people in any other polled country(48%). This might stem from experience with a ceasefire in their own country, which was brokered by the EU in 2008. The ceasefire neither set tled the conflict nor returned occupied territories, but it stopped the fighting and safeguarded Georgia’s independence. The way forward Georgia's further course is dependent largely on internal political developments. The contested October 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia drew international attention amid allegations of fraud and irregularities. The ruling Georgian Dream party secured a fourth consecutive term. This sparked protests in Tbilisi, demanding new elections. Many see the unrest as part of a broader geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West. Still, Georgians express the most optimistic views in the poll about developments regarding peace and security over the next five years – in Georgia, Europe and globally. Women are overall more positive.

Georgia seeks to play a more engaged role, with nearly 71% supporting a proactive foreign policy to address international problems, crises and conflicts. They show the highest levels of agreement to take on more international responsibility and to cooperate with any country if it is conducive to peace. Foreign policy priorities should include concerns about human rights violations(36%), geopolitical tensions(33%) and fighting terrorism and extremism(25%), while trade wars and global inequality play a minor role. However, Georgia’s commitment to international responsi bility is somewhat limited: almost 70% indicate that Geor gia should focus on its own well-being and avoid international involvement. Only 20% are in favour of military inter ventions in conflicts. Together with Ukraine, united by the Russian aggression, they have the highest approval rate for increasing military spending(77%). However, about twothirds(67% women, 59% men) prioritise economic and so cial over defence spending. Notably, among 18–29 year olds, 34% support prioritising military spending, compared with a total of 24%. In your opinion, how should Georgia position itself regarding Russia and the West to improve its security? All figures in% Find a balanced position between the West and Russia. Align more with the EU, even if it means worse relations with Russia. 26 58 3 Align more with Russia, even if it means worse 6 relations with the West. Neither the alignment with the West nor with Russia will improve Georgia’s security. Deviations from 100% result from:‘Don’t know/ No response’ Georgians express more optimism for a diplomatic solution in the war against Ukraine than people in any other polled country. Security Radar 2025 59

Italy [conflict-averse and diplomatic] Strategically located in the Mediterranean, Italy is a founding member of both NATO and the European Union. Its post-war recovery was driven by a strong commitment to multilateralism, and today it plays a key role in Europe politically, economically, militarily and culturally. Despite being the third-largest economy in the Eurozone, it was hit particularly hard by the 2008 financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, exacerbating the divide between the richer North and the poorer South. In 2022, Giorgia Meloni’s election marked a shift toward right-wing policies. While her government has positioned itself officially as pro-European, it has also adopted critical views on the EU and called for constitutional changes. These moves signal a shift towards a stronger nationalistic approach, contrasting with Italy's traditional democratic and multilateral values. Italians prioritise peaceful cooperation more than other polled EU and NATO countries. Italy is more restrained in military spending and interventions, not due to idealism but because of a commitment to peace and non-violence, despite shared security concerns. Self-perception A majority of 69% are concerned about their future. Ital ians’ biggest concerns are wars and conflicts, inflation and economic crises(over 80%). Uncontrolled migration(with 63%) ranks low, despite Meloni's pivotal role in shaping Eu rope's migration agenda. Italy’s status dissatisfaction(63%) has improved slightly since the survey in 2021(68%). But it still remains among the EU's highest, alongside Poland. Only 34% believe that the current government has improved Italy’s international reputation. Some 64% view Italy’s prosperity as linked to the well-being of other countries, similar to other polled EU countries. 55% Italy should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world Italy's rightward shift has led to an ambivalent strategy: pragmatic and opportunistic. Despite Meloni’s Eurosceptic roots, she balances nationalist priorities with increased influence in European decision-making. Italians reveal mixed sentiments about the EU's role and Italy's position within it. Italian respondents are least likely to believe that the EU will emerge as a major global power (33%). However, regarding Italy's current role and future course of action in the EU, 40% believe it is Italy's duty to strengthen European institutions, the highest value among polled countries(Poland, France and Germany). Additionally, 33% support a stronger EU leadership role, second only to Poland. Only 14% favour less EU engagement, lower than Germany(28%) and France(27%). At the same time, Italian public opinion shows growing ambivalence. Although the EU is the most valued organisation(63%), support for deep er cooperation has declined, and concerns over internal conflicts have risen(67%, above the EU average). Italians re main committed to European integration but are wary of the EU's cohesion and global influence. Italians show commitment to international institutions, as support for the OSCE has risen to 52%, reflecting a desire for peace. Italians are divided on NATO, with 43% opposing a bigger role, particularly among older generations, and 39% favouring it. Support for cooperating with Russia dropped from 45% in 2021 to 26%, and for the US from 54% to 43%, and remained stable in relation to China. Italy demonstrates a strong sense of pragmatism, adapting to benefit itself while avoiding taking sides. 60 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Think of the role that your country currently has in the EU. What should be the course of action? All figures in% My country GER should assume a stronger FRA leadership role in the EU. ITA POL 25 27 33 42 My country GER should promote stronger FRA European institutions(e.g. EU ITA Commission and EU Parliament). POL 37 32 40 25 My country should GER engage less in the EU and FRA concentrate on itself. ITA POL 28 27 14 21 GER Don’t know FRA ITA POL 0% 8 13 11 12 10% 20% 30% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Nearly half disagree that the EU and the US have contradictory interests. Italians perceive a notable contradiction with regard to US–Russia relations(59%). Italy has one of the lowest perceptions of EU-Russia contradictions(50%) and the highest support among EU countries(64%) for co operation with non-like-minded countries if it promotes peace and security. Some 61% support less dependence on Russia, 53% on China. Media reporting is seen as lacking objectivity(54%); only 29% consider it objective. Nevertheless, concerns over press freedom have risen due to government control plans. Perception of European security Italians advocate for peace and have a relatively subdued perception of threats. Italians foresee an emerging era of wars and conflicts but they do not appear to be too worried by recent events, as a new world war or a direct military confrontation between Russia and the West is not widely perceived as likely. Russia is identified as the greatest threat for Europe, with concerns rising sharply from 36% in 2021 to 67% in 2024. Unlike in other NATO countries, concerns about the US as a threat have grown from 21% to 35%. This places the US nearly on a par with China(37%). Changes in the security situation are regarded with scepticism. NATO enlargement is seen as a major threat by 52%, higher than in other NATO countries, while 45% express concerns about EU enlargement towards the East. Only about a third believe Italy should increase support for the EU-accession of Western Balkans countries. Only a third see defence as an EU responsibility, and approval for a European Army ranks at 42%, a low figure compared with other EU members. Only 17% favour mili tary interventions. Half believe the EU can't defend itself without the US. Some 57% doubt Italy's ability to defend against a Russian attack, below the European average. As a leader in EU security, most respondents favour Germany (21%) or joint leadership by Germany, France and Poland (14%). Over two-thirds of Italians desire ensuring interna tional peace through other means, such as diplomacy, an expression of multilateralism. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +14 35% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +31 67% Russia 37% -1 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Security Radar 2025 61

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Italy take in the war in Ukraine? Italy should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Italy should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Italy should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 6 18 25 0 10 20 30 49 40 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 42 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 34 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 68 Humanitarian support Military support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 41 36 18 5 20 10 2 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 42% ... NATO 35% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Italy? Did it become... 35 45 5 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 62 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Only 18% of Italians back supporting Ukraine until it wins the war – in contrast to 50% in Latvia or Sweden. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Italy’s defensive, peace-oriented approach contrasts with the more assertive stances of Sweden and Poland. Under Meloni, Italy supports NATO and EU measures against Russia but is among the least enthusiastic EU supporters of Ukraine. Over 70% see an end to the war as a precondition for peace in Europe and express concern that it will impact Italy’s future. Only 64% hold Russia accountable, lower than most EU countries, and nearly half see the war as expanding Russian territory, below EU and NATO averages. Some 68% of opponents of increasing Ukraine’s support believe that ending the war is crucial. Only 18% back supporting Ukraine until it wins the war, by far the lowest value of all EU countries(in Sweden and Latvia: around 50%). A no table 19% of Italians, double the rate in Sweden or Poland, believe Russia might prevail on the battlefield. War fatigue, particularly among older generations, contributes to a willingness to consider territorial concessions for peace. Additionally, 53% of Italians believe the EU is shift ing its focus away from challenges in the southern neighbourhood. Regarding Italy’s position on the war against Ukraine, 49% favour diplomatic efforts to end the war, 25% support neutrality. Just over half sup port more sanctions. Italians are more sceptical than other EU nations about Ukraine joining the EU(42% in favour) and NATO(35% in favour). Only 42% of Italians support further aid to Ukraine, while 34% oppose it. Unlike the trends towards strengthening the military in most NATO countries, half of Italians favour humanitarian aid, followed by military support. Accordingly, 42% oppose third-country intervention. The EU is most affected by the war, with 37% of Italians perceiving it as unchanged and 36% as weaker. Some 26% believe Russia has gained in strength. Italy is seen as unchanged by 45%.

To what extent do you agree with the following statements? All figures in% The war in Ukraine is distracting the EU from dealing with the challenges emanating from the Southern neighbourhood of the EU. 23 22 The current Italian coalition government is improving Italy’s international reputation. 47 18 Italy should support the Balkan countries more in becoming members of the EU. 37 28 Germany is the closest ally of Italy within the EU. 40 27 53 34 32 31 France is the closest ally of Italy within the EU. 48 26 25 Strongly disagree, somewhat disagree Don’t know Strongly agree, somewhat agree Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ The way forward Italians expect worsening developments over the next five years, maintaining a bleak outlook since 2021. The Italian foreign policy outlook is not monolithic, though, and has some contradictions. The defensive stance described above sits alongside strong endorsement of an active foreign policy and support for spreading values through foreign policy(57%). This may reflect Meloni’s as sertive stance geared towards boosting Italy’s visibility. Nearly 70% of respondents support reducing dependency on countries with different values, similar to EU peers. This contradicts Italian pragmatic stance regarding cooperation with non-like-minded states, mentioned earlier. Italians’ top foreign policy priorities remain climate change, with a significant rise in support for human rights and geopolitical tensions since the last survey. About half support stronger diplomacy and 37% back global disarmament ef forts, the highest share in the poll, and an increase in opposition to military interventions. Confidence in the effectiveness and legitimacy of diplomatic, military and economic measures has declined. This reflects disenchantment with regard to foreign policy, which is unlikely to achieve desired peace scenarios. Unsurprisingly, diplomacy receives the highest approval, particularly from older people. Opposition to military interventions in conflicts increased and is the highest in the poll(74%). At 26% Italians show by far the lowest support for increasing military spending, 72% prioritise social spending over defence. Italians are very aware of the risks that climate change poses, even though only 45% of Italians see climate change as a threat to peace, substantially lower than the average. Some 62% favour doing everything to fight cli mate change, the highest share in the poll. Most Italians are dissatisfied with climate action, with the EU efforts regarded as the most satisfying(23%). Italian respondents show an overall decline in support for cooperation, but 74% see international partnerships as key to combating climate change. A majority also believe that wealthy nations should support poorer ones. Amid broader trends of rising defence budgets across NATO, Italy has taken a divergent path. Italy has the lowest support for increased military spending among NATO countries, at 26%, well below the 57% average. Resistance to higher de fence budgets reflects longstanding Italian attitudes, rather than war fatigue, as the support level in 2021 was nearly identical at 24%. Defence spending has steadily declined, dropping from 1.59% of GDP in 2020 to 1.46% in 2023, with further reductions projected. Italians overwhelmingly favour prioritising social and economic spending over defence (72%), the highest rate in the survey. As a result, if military spending rises, 52% favour a special levy on the rich. Security Radar 2025 63

Kazakhstan [neutral and distanced] Kazakhstan, strategically located between Europe and Asia, is rich in natural resources, such as oil, gas and uranium. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in December 1991, the country focused on modernising its economy and consolidating power around the long-time ruler Nursultan Nazarbayev, who in 2019 passed on the reins to his successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. In early 2022, widespread unrest erupted over rising fuel prices, economic inequality and calls for political reform. The government imposed a state of emergency, and the protests were suppressed with the decisive help of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, of which Kazakhstan is a member. President Tokayev thus managed to preserve his power and promised political reforms and anti-corruption measures to address public dissatisfaction. A constitutional referendum introduced reforms to strengthen the lower house of parliament(Mazhilis), implement a mixed electoral system, establish a constitutional court, and abolish the death penalty. These reforms consolidated the existing authoritarian regime. Self-perception Kazakhs’ biggest concerns are inflation(89%), wars and conflicts(87%) and international terrorism(82%). Around 80% are worried about their personal future, while con cerns about a worsening of their own economic situation ranks lowest in the poll(30%). A majority(60%) believe that Kazakhstan’s prosperity is linked to the well-being of other countries. Kazakhs feel rather satisfied with Kazakhstan’s status in the international arena: just 44% feel that the country lacks the glob al status it deserves. This figure aligns with Sweden(44%) and is considerably lower than those of Poland(64%), Georgia(68%) and Türkiye(80%). 68% Kazakhstan should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world Kazakhstan has skilfully navigated geopolitical changes to transform its relative isolation into a strategic advantage. By maintaining equidistance between Russia and Ukraine, it preserves ties with Russia, while avoiding overt alignment. Kazakhstan does not implement sanctions against Russia and so it has to take care not to become a target of secondary(US) sanctions. Kazakhstan is a member of several international organisations and served a second term on the UN Human Rights Council(2022–2024). Its foreign policy focuses on global nuclear disarmament and strengthening EU ties through the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. However, respondents show ambivalence towards interna tional organisations, supporting a stronger UN(65%) and OSCE(50%), slightly higher than the poll average. They oppose a larger NATO role(50%), although younger re spondents are less reluctant(18–29 years old: 33%). Half of respondents believe that international laws and rules are no longer relevant. Kazakhs support a stronger UN and OSCE, but oppose a larger NATO role. Kazakhstan’s pragmatic approach balances competing interests while capitalising on its geographic and political positioning. This applies particularly to China and Russia, two of its largest trading and investment partners. A notable majority of 62% support stronger cooperation with Rus sia, which is the second-highest level of support in the poll, similar to that of Serbia(64%). Closer cooperation with China(68%) and with the EU(51%) is also desired. Respondents exhibit a mixed stance, with the lowest agreement that EU policies conflict with Kazakhstan's interests, but also the second-lowest support for a larger EU role (42%, tied with Serbia). EU High Representative Kaja Kallas reaffirmed support for Kazakhstan's reforms and strengthening EU ties. Only 37% favour closer ties with the US. 64 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

This strategic pluralism underscores Kazakhstan’s desire not to commit to a single bloc. Regarding preferred alignment, 70% support balanced relations between the West, Russia and China. Only 24% advocate aligning exclu sively with two sides, namely Russia and China. Kazakhstan leverages geopolitical momentum to assert its influence, but remains uncertain about how the emerging power dynamics will settle. Russia is perceived as emerging as a dominant power, while the EU is not regarded as becoming one. However, younger respondents see the EU as gaining influence and Russia as losing it. But regardless of age and power dynamics, 41% of Kazakh respondents see the country as vulnerable to a Russian attack. About 61% fear that future wars could directly affect Kazakhstan, but only 20% believe that a new world war is likely. Contradictory interests in relations between the US and Russia(66%), and between the US and China(57%) are widely recognised. About half fear a new Cold War. Aligning interests are perceived between the EU and the US (37%), and especially between Russia and China(53%). Kazakh respondents would prefer greater sovereignty in security matters. Most Kazakhs would like the EU to become more independent of the US and lean towards more diplomacy. However, the EU appears to have limited salience in Kazakhstan as almost 40% replied‘don’t know’ when asked who should lead EU security policy. Security threats to Europe they regard as emanating from the US(52%) rather than from Russia(29%) and China(22%). This con trasts with the polled EU countries, who perceive Russia to be the biggest threat. Perceptions of the media are fairly evenly split, with 39% viewing reporting as objective and 38% seeing it as bi ased. Younger respondents are more likely to trust media objectivity. Kazakhstan is positioned between the West, Russia and China. How should it align itself? All figures in% Kazakhstan should align with one side . Kazakhstan should align with two sides. Kazakhstan should find a balanced position between the West, Russia and China. 6 24 70 Kazakhstan is positioned between the West, Russia and China. How should it align itself? All figures in% All respondents in Kazakhstan who think their country should align with one side All respondents in Kazakhstan who think their country should align with two sides All respondents in Kazakhstan who think their country should align with West, Russia and China West 28 13 16 Russia 41 68 63 China 13 75 62 This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. 52% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% 29% Russia Don’t know 14 18 17 Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ 22% China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Security Radar 2025 65

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Kazakhstan take in the war in Ukraine? Kazakhstan should support Ukraine until it wins the war. 8 Kazakhstan should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. 24 Kazakhstan should support diplomatic efforts to end 55 the war. Don't know 12 0 10 20 30 40 50 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 25 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 34 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 82 Humanitarian support Military support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is not important for us It is too costly Don’t know 38 29 28 3 13 4 1 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 26% ... NATO 21% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Kazakhstan? Did it become... 9 53 13 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 66 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 70% support balanced relations between the West, Russia and China. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Kazakhstan's response to the war reflects a position of neutrality, maintaining good relations with both Russia and Ukraine. Accordingly, Kazakhs demonstrate a particular stance, differing from other respondents in the poll. For instance, blame for the war against Ukraine is attributed almost evenly to Russia(35%) and to Ukraine (30%). The US is seen as the primary aggressor, at 47%(although younger respondents attach far less blame to the US, at 26%). Only Serbs share this view. Some 40% view the war as a proxy war between Russia and the West, vying for global influence, ten points higher than the poll average. Consistent with their preference for non-alignment, 35% answered‘don’t know’ when asked whether support for Ukraine should continue. Kazakhs show strong opposition to third-party intervention in the war. Further support for Ukraine is limited(25%, 18–29 year-olds: 37%), and if so, mainly through humanitarian aid (38%). They strongly oppose sending more weapons or ground troops to support Ukraine. Among those rejecting further support(34%), the vast majority cite the necessity of ending the war. Kazakhstan’s role in helping Russia to circumvent Western sanctions is seen primarily as economically driven(29%). About a quarter re plied‘don’t know’ or cited attempts at independence from Western influence(22%). Kazakhs express high support(42%) for resolv ing the conflict through diplomacy. One reason for that could also be the possibility of an enhanced role for their country. The president’s diplomatic experience and his good ties to China may allow Kazakhstan to play a constructive role in ending the war against Ukraine. Kazakhs view Russia as strengthened by the war, while opinions on China are more mixed, with many seeing it as either strengthened or unchanged. Their own country is perceived as unchanged(53%), and least weakened(9%) in the poll. This aligns with respondents’ perceptions of the momentum of geopolitical change.

The way forward Optimism about Kazakhstan's future is particularly pronounced and ranks among the highest in the poll. Respondents expect improvements for Kazakhstan(66%), the world(49%) and for Europe(46%). Younger respondents are particularly optimistic. Foreign policy priorities focus on combating terrorism (59%), addressing human rights violations(43%), and man aging geopolitical tensions(38%). Regarding climate change, about one-quarter are satisfied with the current policies of their own government, the EU and the international community of states. Among respondents under 30, however, Kazakhstan exhibits some of the highest values in the poll. Kazakhs emphasise the need for international cooperation and assistance from wealthier to poorer nations. Kazakhstan has significant potential in terms of critical raw materials, making it a sought-after partner. In this context, a majority prioritise securing borders and competing for natural resources in response to potential instability caused by climate change, reflecting a pragmatic view of national interests. Kazakhs view diplomacy as the most effective means of promoting international peace. They show one of the highest approvals that their country should assume more international responsibility. Affected by Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk site in the Kazakh steppe, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons in 1992 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, 77% op pose nuclear weapons, although younger respondents exhibit a slightly higher tolerance for their use. Noticeable shifts in attitudes emerge among those aged between 18 and 29, driven by a more critical stance to wards Russia. Younger Kazakhs see Russia as a greater threat to Europe(39%, overall: 29%), but still maintain a positive stance on cooperation with Russia. Younger people would be more willing to reduce dependency on Russia and China, even if this had a negative impact on living standards. They show more interest in developing ties with the EU and the US. Their lower level of support for diplomatic efforts(40%, overall: 55%) and lower readiness to cooperate with non-like-minded states(58%, overall: 65%) may sug gest a preference for a distinctive, more pro-European foreign policy course. This could significantly impact Kazakhstan's traditional balancing act. Increasing the defence budget is supported by half of the population. Regarding future investments, around 68% of Kazakhs prioritise social and economic investments over military spending. As in other polled countries, the majority favour funding defence expenditure through a special levy on the rich. Younger Kazakhs have a more critical approach towards Russia but still maintain a positive stance on cooperation. Kazakhstan is helping Russia to evade Western sanctions. In your opinion, what is the primary reason? All figures in% Economic benefits 29 Kazakhstan has an independent foreign policy from the West 22 Solidarity with Russia 20 Don’t know 25 0% 10% 20% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 67

Latvia [supportive and cautious] Latvia’s independence and democratic transition after the fall of the Iron Curtain and its 2004 EU and NATO accession marked its return to the European community after Soviet occupation. In response to growing threats from Russia, Latvia, along with Estonia and Lithuania, introduced a new defence strategy in 2023, focusing on deterrence and strong defence capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank. Latvia advocates for a stronger NATO presence, including a permanent combat brigade. Domestic debates are still ongoing about its substantial Russian minority. As part of its efforts to reduce Russian influence, from 2026 Latvia will require public media to be in Latvian and another European language, excluding Russian. Self-perception Latvian concerns about the future are substantial. Almost 80% express apprehension about what lies ahead. The pri mary concerns are wars and conflicts, inflation, and economic crises, while climate change ranks lowest. Only 44% worry that their economic situation will deteriorate. Some 68% of Latvians perceive that the well-being of their country is linked to positive developments in other nations. In terms of global standing, just 47% believe that Latvia does not have the status it deserves, a comparatively low figure, consistent with 2022. 62% Latvia should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world Latvians emphasise their country’s strategic dependence on alliances and have a generally positive view of international institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. Support for most institutions has diminished since the 2021 survey, ex cept for NATO, which has remained stable. The Latvian government supports a stronger NATO presence and the foreign policy focus includes gaining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council(2026–2027). The focus on collective security is reflected in the lowest approval in our poll of a»my country first« approach(48%). Some 64% favour reducing dependence on countries that do not share their values. Some 82% seek stronger ties with the Baltic and Nordic States and 73% with the EU. Fewer than 40% view Latvian interests as being in conflict with EU policies. Around half of respondents favour stronger cooperation with the US, while 38% support closer ties with China. Notably, only 38% prioritise reducing reliance on China, the lowest level in the poll. Latvia seeks to achieve a balanced trade relationship with China while also seeking China's support in efforts to resolve the war against Ukraine. Perceptions of China as a threat to Europe have remained stable, rising only slightly from 32% in 2021 to 35% in 2024. In light of the Russian threat, only 20% favour closer ties with Russia, while 60% seek to reduce dependence. The perception of divergence between global powers has decreased since the last survey in 2022. Still, EU–Russian and US–Chinese interests are seen as most contradictory. Relatedly, 63% expect a new era of wars and conflicts, al though most people answer‘don’t know’ when asked whether there will be a new world war. Overall, media perceptions are divided(48% non-objective, 39% objective), but have been improving in recent years. Since the war broke out in Ukraine, Latvia's ethnic Russian population has become more isolated, in a media landscape that has been divided for years, with Russian-language media becoming rare. Accordingly, perceptions differ: 45% of Latvian speakers see it as objective, compared with 15% of the Rus sian-speaking minority. Overall, the perception of the Russian-speaking minority tends to be more pro-Russian, showing less support for Ukraine and limited engagement with the US. Latvians show the lowest approval of a»my country first« approach. 68 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Perception of European security Half of respondents see Russia as a threat for Europe. Around 53%, above the average, see the EU as vulnerable without US support. Furthermore, 74% believe that Latvia lacks sufficient defensive capabilities and could not defend itself if Russia declared war, the second-highest figure in the poll alongside Georgia. Both are comparatively small countries directly neighbouring Russia. A majority(77%) view the end of the war against Ukraine as essential for improving European security. Concerns about Russia as a threat to European security remain high at 71%. By stark contrast, the Russian-speaking minority’s perception is just 8%. What’s more, within this minority, per ceptions of a US threat rise significantly to 52%, compared with 28% of the total population. Perceptions of NATO enlargement towards the Russian border and of the EU towards the East diverge from those of the other polled countries. Latvians tend not to view them as a threat to European security, while concerns are rising in other surveyed countries. Support for diplomacy as a means of resolving foreign policy crises has decreased, from 69% in 2021 to 58% in 2024. Reluctance toward military interven tion in conflicts remains high, with 67% rejecting it, the same level as 2021. For leadership in EU security, the trio of Germany, France, and Poland is most commonly seen as the leading force (36%), although 21% responded‘don’t know’. Support for an This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. -2 28% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +12 71% Russia 35% +3 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ EU Army remains consistent at 50% and has not increased since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Nearly 70% ex press a desire for greater independence from the US. To stabilise European security after the war, 38% advocate that Latvia should foster channels of communication with Russia. Russian-speaking minority tends to be more pro-Russian, sees media reporting as not objective and shows less support for Ukraine. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about foreign policy of Latvia? All figures in% Latvia should strengthen cooperation with the Baltic and Nordic States. 7 8 82 Military deterrence in the Baltic Sea should be a priority for Latvia. 23 21 50 Refugees from Ukraine bring an added value to Latvian society. 37 Latvia should support Ukraine militarily even if key players like the 40 US and Germany stop doing this. To stabilise European security after the war, Latvia should prepare channels of 35 communication with Russia. Strongly disagree, somewhat disagree Don’t know 15 44 12 42 19 38 Strongly agree, somewhat agree Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 69

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Latvia take in the war in Ukraine? Latvia should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Latvia should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. 14 Latvia should support diplomatic efforts to end 28 the war. Don't know 5 0 10 20 30 51 40 50 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 62 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 19 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 66 53 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 28 14 3 23 10 1 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 54% ... NATO 55% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Latvia? Did it become... 27 35 24 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 70 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 51% of Latvians are in favour of sustaining support for Ukraine until victory, but only 15% believe Ukraine can achieve it. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Latvian attitudes reflect opposition to aggression and a strategic dependence on alliances. Respondents identify Russia as the aggressor (72%) and as an imperialist state(37%). The in vasion is seen mainly as a quest for territory (42%) rather than a proxy war or a fight between democracies and autocracies. Latvians show strong support in the poll for continued aid to Ukraine(62%). However, only 18% of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia share this view. Furthermore, 51% in Latvia are in fa vour of sustaining support until victory. Howev er, only 15% believe Ukraine can achieve a mili tary victory, which is the second-highest level of confidence in the poll. This discrepancy underscores a disconnect: while there is substantial support for continued assistance, confidence in a successful outcome is limited. The strong pro-Ukrainian stance is reflected in the fact that 30% of respondents believe it is necessary that Russia lose the war, even at the risk of escalation. If Germany or the US stopped their support, Latvian opinion is evenly split on whether to continue their support. This reflects their reliance on strong allies. Support is desired mainly through military aid. Latvians also express strong backing for sanctions against Russia. However, 74% oppose de ploying troops, with only 12% in favour, less than the average of polled NATO states, perhaps due to fears of potential Russian aggression. Around 44% oppose increased weapons deliveries, per haps because Latvia’s own military aid to Ukraine has depleted its weapons stocks.

Most Latvians are in favour of Ukraine joining NATO and the EU(both around 54%). The war is seen as strengthening NATO(37%) and weaken ing Russia(45%). The US(42%), China(38%) and Latvia (35%) are perceived as neither stronger nor weaker as a re sult of the war. However, these strong stances are predomi nantly held by the Latvian-speaking population; the Russian-speaking minority tends to adopt a more pro-Russian perspective, opposing sanctions against Russia and Ukraine's membership of NATO or the EU. The war against Ukraine has affected domestic policy. This includes reintroducing compulsory military service and emphasising the Latvian language as a symbol of national identity, aiming to reduce Russian-language media content. The majority(37%, 18–29: 30%) believe that the debate is too much focused on Russian influence, detracting from other issues. This view is shared by 33% of the Rus sian-speaking minority and 54% of Latvians. Notably, 30% of all respondents(35% of Latvians and only 5% of Rus sians) consider the Russian-speaking minority a major issue. At the same time, 16% do not see any societal division and advocate for a greater focus on social cohesion, a worry shared by 67% of respondents. Furthermore, only 44% of respondents view Ukrainian ref ugees as an added value. Agreement is even lower among younger respondents. The way forward The Latvian public remains predominantly pessimistic about future developments, although younger Latvians display more optimism. The nation prioritises national security and sees limited value in cooperation beyond its core aspirations and principles. Latvian respondents are willing to reduce dependencies on countries that do not align with their values(64%). International engagement without direct benefits ranks relatively low(32% approval). Given the country’s defensive position, there is a slight decline in Latvia's stance on pursuing an active foreign policy and playing a significant role in solving international problems(2021: 54%, 2024: 49%). Therefore, 50% declare that military deterrence in the Bal tic Sea should be a priority for Latvia's foreign policy. Climate change ranks low among Latvian priorities. Only 30%, below the poll average, support taking all possible measures to combat it, while nearly half favour adaptation Here are some statements about the situation in Latvia. Choose one statement that you agree with most. All figures in% No response Don’t know 7 11 Our society 16 is not divided, and politics should focus more on social cohesion. 30 The debate is too much focused on Russian influence and distracts from other problems. 37 The Russian minority is a big problem, which is quite rightly discussed at length in politics and the media. strategies. Latvia’s relatively low approval of international cooperation on climate change may reflect its focus on domestic challenges. Diplomatic efforts are viewed as legitimate, but their perceived effectiveness is lower than in 2021. Overall, Latvia's defensive posture aligns with its growing regional significance within NATO and the EU. Latvia's top priorities are combating terrorism(53%), addressing geopolitical ten sions(51%) and military build-up(37%). Latvia's military spending has risen, accelerated by Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The government plans to in crease defence spending, with a target of 3% of GDP by 2027, ranking it among NATO's top four contributors by share of GDP. Approval for higher military spending has risen from 37% in 2021 to 49% in 2024, while 40% remain opposed. Overall, Latvians favour social and economic spending over defence(60%). If defence spending is neces sary, they prefer a special levy on the rich(47%) over cut ting social or economic funds(18%). Approval for higher military spending has risen from 37% in 2021 to 49% in 2024. Security Radar 2025 71

Poland [aspiring and hesitant] Poland historically has been caught between Eastern and Western powers. It endured partitions in the eighteenth century, occupation during the Second World War, and decades as a Soviet satellite until the Solidarity movement restored its independence. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, planting itself firmly inside the Western alliances. Now, it has emerged as a key player in European security, investing heavily in defence and supporting Ukraine. The recent change of government, headed by Donald Tusk, has brought a pro-European focus and efforts to address rule of law concerns. Tusk's administration has also advocated for stronger EU cooperation in security areas such as border control and cybersecurity. This reflects Poland’s historically security-centred foreign policy, shaped by its location and past experiences with the Soviet Union. Poland's central but vulnerable geographical position has compelled its population consistently to assert their sovereignty, while fostering a persistent desire for robust alliances. Self-perception Poles’ biggest concerns are inflation(91%), wars and con flicts(89%), economic crises(84%) and uncontrolled mi gration(81%). Some 63% of respondents view Poland's prosperity as linked to the well-being of other countries. Having said that, 64% believe that Poland does not have the status it deserves, a similar number to Italy. This figure is significantly higher than in other polled European countries, such as Germany or France(around 40%), and emphasises Po land’s desire for greater recognition. 56% Poland should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world People’s personal situations improved slightly compared with 2022: the proportion of people expressing concerns decreased from 83% to 73%, and fears of economic decline dropped from 67% to 46%. Some 62% believe an era of wars and conflicts is emerging. A large majority fear they will affect Poland in the future. Poland desires strong support for international institutions and robust transatlantic relations. The majority are open to a greater role for the UN, the OSCE and the EU, with NATO receiving the second-highest support in the poll(76%). Some 65% of those surveyed favour more collaboration with the EU. Even with the current pro-European course of the Tusk government, however, half of the respondents perceive their country to be regularly in conflict with the EU, a 10 percentage point increase since 2021. Poland's course of action within the EU should focus on strengthening its leadership(42%), the highest level of support among the surveyed countries, including Italy, Germany and France. A quarter advocate stronger European institutions, a figure notably lower than in Italy(40%) or Germany(37%). Poland sees the US as a key partner, with 75% favouring more collaboration. Poland sees the US as a key partner, prioritising security cooperation over calls for greater autonomy. A large majority of 75% favour more collaboration with the US. Just 15% of Poles favour increased cooperation with Russia, compared with 43% in relation to China. Correspondingly, the proportion of people desiring reduced dependence on Russia(73%) is much greater than with regard to China(46%). 72 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Poland’s priority remains countering Russian influence, while China is viewed more favourably but still with some caution. Perceptions of media reporting have become more balanced, with the same proportions viewing it as objective and as non-objective(43%). Younger people are more likely to perceive reporting as biased. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +1 19% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +7 82% Russia Perception of European security A broad majority in Poland believe that ending the war against Ukraine is a prerequisite for improving security in Europe. Russia is seen as the primary threat for Europe (82%), followed by China(44%). Concerning Russia, there is a keen awareness of potential conflict. Poland views EU and NATO enlargement as a potential threat to European security(44%). This concern is not significantly higher than in EU countries farther from the eastern flank. Support for a European Army has increased(from 49% in 2022 to 54%). Some 57% still support ensuring peace through non-military means, a 10-point drop compared with 2021. This shift highlights the growing trend towards militarisation. Poland envisions the EU becoming an active security actor, focusing on regional stability and strong partners. Polish respondents show the lowest support in the poll for becoming increasingly independent of the US in security affairs. Tusk announced an improvement in relations with Germany, and 63% of those surveyed support this. Poland is also improving relations with France, as the three countries resumed the Weimar Triangle format. 44% +8 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Some 42% of Poles prefer the trio as leaders in EU security compared with 24% for sole Polish leadership. 63% think Poland should improve relations with Germany. 42% want the Weimar Triangle to lead the EU, more than in any other country. In the event of a Russian attack, only 31% believe Poland can properly defend itself. Over half(56%) see the EU as unable to defend itself without the US. Younger respondents are more confident, showing greater resolve and trust in EU defence capabilities. Think of the role that your country currently has in the EU. What should be the course of action? All figures in% My country GER should assume a stronger FRA leadership role in the EU. ITA POL 25 27 33 42 My country GER should promote stronger FRA European institutions(e.g. EU ITA Commission and EU Parliament). POL 37 32 40 25 My country should GER engage less in the EU and FRA concentrate on itself. ITA POL 28 27 14 21 GER Don’t know FRA ITA POL 0% 8 13 11 12 10% 20% 30% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 73

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Poland take in the war in Ukraine? Poland should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Poland should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Poland should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 4 0 10 35 30 29 20 30 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 53 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 30 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 63 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know It is too costly The war needs to end It is not important for us Don’t know 24 10 3 45 36 17 2 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 45% ... NATO 47% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Poland? Did it become... 22 31 34 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 74 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. War fatigue has set in Poland, with the focus shifting to national interests. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine War fatigue has set in Poland, especially among younger respondents, with the focus shifting to national interests. Although Polish support for Ukraine remains robust within the EU and NATO, public support for Ukraine is declining. Some 35% back Ukraine until victory, 30% sup port neutrality and 29% favour diplomacy. Sup port for Ukraine's membership of the NATO (47%) and EU(45%) has also declined since 2022. Nonetheless, Poles see their country as strengthened by the war(34%). Russia is clearly identified as the aggressor by 81%, although the share of people putting the blame on Ukraine has doubled since 2022(from 8% to 16%). Asked for the reasons behind the Russian invasion, some 40% cite Russian imperi alism, the second-highest figure in the poll after Ukraine. Consequently, 63% view it as territorial expansion(and not as a proxy war or contest between democracies and autocracies). Opinion on continuing support is split, with war fatigue contributing to a decline. Only about half of Polish respondents, in line with the average of other polled NATO countries, support continued aid to Ukraine. Support is still desired mainly through military means(63%). The wish to send Polish troops has decreased from 21% in 2022 to 15% in 2024. This highlights a growing division on how to balance support with the risk of escalation. There is no majority for more weapon deliveries, although discussions are progressing between Poland and Ukraine on joint arms production. However, only 39% would con tinue support if the US or Germany stopped their aid. Among the 30% who decline further support for Ukraine, most respondents say it is too expensive(45%, the highest percentage in the poll). Another 36% just want the war to end. The highest share(42%) believe it is most im portant to end the war even at the cost of territorial losses for Ukraine, while 30% favour re storing territorial integrity.

The 16% who prioritise Russia losing the war, even at the risk of escalation, is similar to the figure in Sweden and relatively high in the poll. However, many expect the war to end with a diplomatic solution(34%) or not at all(35%). Poland has become a major destination for Ukrainian war refugees, but less than 40% see added value in their pres ence. Support among the younger generations is even lower. Additionally, 81% wish to protect Polish farmers, particu larly on issues related to grain. The way forward Despite a bleak outlook for the next five years, Polish respondents are slightly more optimistic than the poll average. About a fifth expect improvements. A strong majority support an active foreign policy for Poland. Some 62% back the promotion of values abroad, in marked contrast to Germany(25%). However, only 40% want Poland to take more international responsibility if there are no direct benefits. Regarding climate change, respondents are largely dissatisfied with current measures. They are most satisfied with EU policies among all respondents to the poll. While 46% sup port all possible measures to combat climate change, 36% emphasise adaptation. Climate change is seen as a global challenge for peace and security(59%). However, 64% think Poland should prioritise securing its borders and competing for natural resources in the global market. Poland’s foreign policy focuses on security, but reluctance towards military interventions is growing. Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism (58%), addressing human rights violations(41%, 48% wom en and 34% men), and managing geopolitical tensions (40%). There is also a focus on improving defence capabili ties(43%). Strengthening international institutions and in tensifying diplomatic efforts have less support. Diplomatic measures are considered the most effective(56%), followed by economic measures(49%) and then military action (42%). Military actions are viewed as the least legitimate by 30% of respondents. However, Poland has one of the highest approval ratings(39%, an increase on previous years) for pursuing military intervention in conflicts, alongside the US, Türkiye and Sweden. Current defence spending for 2024 is 4.2% of GDP, project ed to rise to 4.7% in 2025. Our survey reflects that 75% fa vour higher military spending, with approval increasing in recent years(2021: 53%, 2022: 69%). While 44% prioritise social and economic spending, 38% favour military spend ing, the highest share in the poll after Ukraine. Higher mili tary spending should be financed by cuts in other budgets such as social spending(remarkable 38%, the highest fig ure in the poll) or a special levy on the rich(34%). Poland advocates higher military spending, but considers financing Ukraine to be rather costly. This has led the country to prioritise its own defence, with the goal of asserting military leadership in Europe. With 39% , Poland has one of the highest approval ratings for pursuing military intervention in conflicts. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about foreign policy in Poland? All figures in% Polish farmers need to be shielded from agricultural imports from Ukraine. 10 8 81 Poland should improve relations with Germany. 22 14 63 Refugees from Ukraine bring an added value to Polish society. 47 Poland should support Ukraine militarily even if key players like the US 48 and Germany stop doing this. Strongly disagree, somewhat disagree Don’t know 13 39 12 39 Strongly agree, somewhat agree Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 75

Russia [assertive and entrenched] Russia re-emerged when the Soviet Union fell apart 30 years ago. During that period it has sought status parity with other global powers, especially the United States. A constitutional reform in 2020 enabled Putin to remove the limitations on his eligibility for election, allowing him to rule until 2036. On top of that the Russian political and legal systems are characterised by staged elections, politically motivated trials and repression. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, relations with Ukraine and EU countries deteriorated. The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in violation of international law, led to Western military and economic support for Ukraine, deepening the divide. In response, Russia has increasingly strengthened economic and military ties with China, while facing sanctions from the EU and the US. These sanctions are aimed at weakening Russia’s economy and military, but are being partially circumvented with the complicity of third countries. Until very recently Russia was also able to maintain a strategic presence in the Middle East, where it supported the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad. After being ousted from power, Assad sought asylum in Russia. Self-perception Concerns about one’s personal future are pervasive in Russia(80%). Opinions on one’s personal economic situation are divided: 47% don’t expect a deterioration, while 46% do, with younger respondents expressing higher levels of concern. Although the Russian economy has proved remarkably adaptable and resilient in the face of the war and ensuing sanctions, the rouble has been tanking, making imports more expensive and putting a strain on Russia’s economy. When it comes to Russia’s global standing, 54% of re spondents believe it lacks the status it deserves globally, while 38% think it receives the status it merits, slightly above the poll average(32%). Half of Russians see their well-being linked to the prosperity of other countries, even amid the sanctions in response to the war against Ukraine, aimed at isolating Russia. 56% Russia should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. While the West in general is seen as an enemy, the US is seen as much more of an adversary than the EU. Perception of the world Russian perspectives differ from others in the survey, but shared concerns persist. Russian respondents' views are therefore distinct, but not as much as might be assumed. Russian public opinion reveals a significant hostility towards a greater role for international organisations. The UN is viewed most positively with regard to taking on a larger role, with 51% approval, slightly higher than in Ger many(48%) but below the global average. The OSCE fol lows closely with 48% support. Not surprising, a bigger role for NATO meets overwhelming disapproval(70%). Russian views on global power dynamics indicate their belief in the end of Western dominance. While the West in general is seen as an enemy, the US is seen as much more of an adversary than the EU. This is mirrored in perceptions of contradictory interests between Russia and the US(84%) and Russia and the EU(68%). Notably, both values have nearly doubled since the last survey in 2021, reflecting a new climate of confrontation. The US remains the main adversary in the eyes of respondents. A majority believe that the era of American supremacy is over. Relatedly, cooperation with the US is anathema, rejected by almost 70%. 76 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Russians overwhelmingly cite the US(55%) as a threat to their country, followed a long way behind by the UK(10%). Ukraine and China are perceived as threats by only 4% of re spondents, while NATO and the EU are mentioned by negligible percentages. About 1% mention‘Russia is its own enemy’. The EU retains a generally positive image, although opinion is divided. Interestingly, despite the EU's increasing distancing from Russia because of the war against Ukraine, identification with European culture in Russia has endured(69%, compared with 65% in 2021). While 77% see EU policies as conflicting with Russian interests, attitudes towards increased cooperation are mixed(48% opposed and 45% in favour). Russians don’t believe that the EU is becoming a global power, and a bigger role for it in the future is rejected(54%). However, Russians attrib ute military strength to the EU, as 68% believe the EU can defend itself without US support, more than double the average of polled European countries(32%). Here they fol low the trend that the EU is perceived to be stronger by outside countries than by its own members. In response to international sanctions, Russia has increasingly turned eastward. Russian respondents favour further collaboration with China, and almost 80% perceive Russian and Chinese interests as not contradictory. Notably, nearly 70% of Russians see their country emerging as a new leader among non-Western countries, the highest percentage in the poll, coupled with a»my country first« approach. However, fewer Russians anticipate this com pared with the poll average(45% vs 64%). Russians expect an era of wars and conflicts(58%). A nota ble majority(62%) fear that wars and conflicts will impact Do you think that the media’s reporting in Russia on foreign and security policy is factual and objective? All figures in% 40% 42 20% 30 18 0% 4 10 20 20% 23 40% 34 2021 Very objective Quite objective 2024 Not at all objective Not very objective Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ and‘no response’ Perceptions of Russia towards the EU and the USA Figures display agreement. All figures in%. Russia EU* The interests of the EU and the interests of Russia are 68 60 contradictory to each other. Naming each other as a threat** 2 34 The EU and Russia should collaborate more with each other than before. 45 50% 0% Russia The interests of the US and the interests of Russia are 84 contradictory to each other. 20 0% 50% USA 57 Naming each other as a threat** 55 17 The US and Russia should collaborate more with 24 31 each other than before. 50% 0% 0% 50% * average of Germany, Italy, Poland, France, Sweden, Latvia ** Is there a country that constitutes a threat to your country?(open question) Russia in the future, though this is ten points lower than the poll average(72%). Only 29% of Russians fear a new world war, however. Their concerns focus on tensions between Russia and the West, as 64% believe new wars in Europe are likely because of these growing tensions. About 61% predict a direct military confrontation between Russia and the West. This is much higher than the 48% average of the EU, UK and US, showing stronger concerns in Russia. Additionally, 57% foresee a new Cold War, a view shared by 54% of respondents in the US. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a violation of international law. This disregard for international rules is shared by 64% of respondents, the highest proportion in the survey, who believe that international law is no longer relevant. Russians under 30 maintain a slightly stronger belief in inter national law(39%). 70% of Russians see their country emerging as a new leader among non-Western countries. Security Radar 2025 77

Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Russian perceptions of the war contrast sharply with international viewpoints. Only Serbians display similar attitudes. Russia annexed Crimea in violation of international law in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Russian disin formation and propaganda include attempts to discredit Ukraine. When asked about reasons for the war, respondents cite protection of Russian interests(37%), the fight against fascism(23%), and protection of the Rus sian-speaking population in the Donbas(21%). Some 73% of Russians blame the US for the war, well up from 51% in 2021. This aligns with Russian propaganda, which portrays the West as the aggressor. This is followed by almost the same shares for the EU(32%) and Ukraine (30%, although this has fallen substantially from 55% in 2021). However, only 22% attribute responsibility to Russia, in stark contrast to the Western perspective, although this figure rises to 44% among respondents under 30. Similarly, only slightly lower than their European peers, a majority (62%) believe that ending the war is crucial for improving European security. 44% among Russians under 30 attribute responsibility for the war against Ukraine to Russia. As expected, a majority of Russians oppose Ukraine's membership of NATO or the EU, reflecting longstanding concerns. Only Serbians share this view, while all other polled nations take more favourable stances. Some 69% of Russians see NATO enlargement as a threat to European security, while 51% hold similar concerns about EU expansion. This highlights a consistent view: NATO(or the US), not the EU, is seen as the primary adversary. Putin’s propaganda shapes public opinion in Russia, although Russian respondents share some perceptions with other polled nations, offering a glimpse of potential common ground. For example, concerns about nuclear escalation are widespread(65%). About 45% of Russians do not believe the war will end within the next 12 months, even higher than the poll average of 37%. Remarkably, even in Russia only 36% of respondents believe that Russia is go ing to prevail militarily. They also believe that the war will end with a diplomatic solution. If Ukraine were to start negotiations with Russia, which conditions should be fulfilled from your point of view? All figures in% Ukraine releases all prisoners of war. 89 56 Ukraine ceases hostilities. 82 7 11 Russia releases all prisoners of war. Ukraine recognises Russia’s sovereignty over the new regions. Ukraine ceases attacking critical infrastructure. Negotiations should start without preconditions. Russia ceases attacking critical infrastructure. 80 73 61 54 51 8 9 10 7 13 12 14 31 37 38 Russia recognises the sovereignty of Ukraine. 45 15 39 Russia ceases hostilities. No direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but an international mediating process. Russia withdraws all forces. 42 9 41 10 27 9 49 50 63 No negotiations at all. Acceptable 19 5 Don't know Unacceptable 76 Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’. 78 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Only 36% of respondents believe that Russia is going to prevail militarily. Majority believe in a diplomatic solution and support negotiations without preconditions. There is growing acceptance in Russia that it is time to start negotiations. Some 76% see it as unacceptable not to start negotiations at all. Over half(54%) would accept ne gotiations without preconditions. The most acceptable conditions for negotiations include Ukraine releasing all prisoners of war(89%) and ceasing hostilities(82%), and Ukraine’s recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over the annexed regions(73%). However, a majority find it unac ceptable for Russia to withdraw all forces(63%). Opinions are mixed regarding internationally mediated negotiations (50% unacceptable, 41% acceptable), which is notable giv en Russia’s traditional resistance to external involvement in its security affairs. Nonetheless, this partial openness to diplomatic engagement could serve as a basis for future peace efforts. The way forward Looking ahead over the next five years, Russians remain optimistic about their own country(57%), a view that has risen significantly compared with 2021(18%, up from 39%). They are notably more pessimistic about Europe, while their outlook on global developments is mixed(34% fore see deterioration, 33% improvement). Russian respondents display a pragmatic and interventionist stance. This is coupled with a focus on their well-being and a desire to avoid international involvements(56%). They show the highest support for cooperation with any country, even those that do not share their values, if they promote peace(78%). Approval for military interventions has risen from 37% in 2021 to 47%, but 45% remain opposed. Diplomatic negotiations are widely viewed as legitimate by an overwhelming majority(87%). Only 34% view economic sanctions and 29% military interventions as legitimate. The rejection of sanctions is expected, given the impact of the current sanctions regime on people’s everyday lives. Putin's new doctrine has lowered the nuclear threshold, using threats and nuclear deployments to signal a readiness to escalate, and correspondingly, respondents' attitudes toward nuclear weapons are particularly concerning. While 67% reject their use, 16% consider them a last resort, and a notable 17% see them as a means of defending vital inter ests, the highest proportion in the poll. Support for increasing military spending has surged, with 67% in favour, making it one of the highest rates in the poll, more than double the figure in 2021(32%). However, respondents are nearly evenly split when asked to prioritise social and economic(45%) or defence spending(44%). This is a notable difference from Ukraine, where defence spending has the highest priority. A majority support funding defence through a special levy on the rich, while only 9% back cuts to social and economic spending, the lowest figure in the poll. 67% support increased military spending, more than double the figure in 2021. Media reporting Media in Russia are tightly controlled by the state, undermining space for independent journalism. The invasion of Ukraine intensified this, forcing many independent journalists and outlets to flee. Notably, public perceptions of media objectivity have shifted significantly. The percentage viewing the media as biased has dropped from 54% in 2021 to 34%, while the perception of media objectivity rose from 33% in 2021 to 60%. Regarding news consumption, 47% of Russians cite television as their primary source of information. Meanwhile, 40% rely on social networks, with Telegram being especially popular among younger respondents. Respondents who consume online media view media reporting as more biased(about 85%), while those who rely on TV, radio or print see it as more objective(about 80%). Perceptions of social media are more balanced. The data reveal stark differences in how Russians perceive the conflict based on their view of media objectivity. Those trusting»objective« media cite Russia's protection of its interests, fighting fascism and defending the Russian-speaking population in the Donbas as reasons for the invasion. Those who perceive the media as biased often state‘don’t know’ or suggest motives such as seeking global power. Regarding the war's outcome, respondents who trust in an objective media believe in Russia's military victory, while others foresee no resolution or a diplomatic settlement. In short, state propaganda is working, but it has limits: those who trust state-controlled media narratives tend to align with the government's views on the invasion and predict a Russian military victory. Conversely, those who view the media as biased are more sceptical. Security Radar 2025 79

Why do you think Russia invaded Ukraine? All figures in% ... to protect its interests ... to fight facism ... to protect the population of the Donbas 3 ... to become a global player ... because of longstanding disagreements 1 7 with Ukraine 16 13 17 33 39 28 26 How do you believe this war is going to end? All figures in% A diplomatic solution with both sides agreeing on a compromise Russia is going to prevail militarily I do not believe this war is going to end soon 01 Ukraine is going to prevail miliarily 0% 18 14 35 29 51 49 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Agreement believe that media is not objective believe that media is objective 80 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Serbia [recalcitrant and idiosyncratic] Serbia is trying to maintain a delicate balance between East and West. While it continues to engage with the EU, its strategic partnerships with Russia and China, particularly in energy, remain vital. This is a thorn in the side of the EU, which would like to see Serbia, an EU candidate since 2014, tone down its alignment with Russia. Historically, Serbia’s geostrategic position has made it contested ground, something that persists today. It is being courted by both East and West in the broader struggle for influence in the Balkans. Serbia’s EU accession process is stuck and faces significant obstacles. Chief among them are Serbia’s refusal to recognise Kosovo’s independence due to an insistence on what it regards as territorial integrity and a lack of enthusiasm for NATO, rooted in anti-Americanism. The EU continues to press Serbia to normalise relations with Kosovo and to align more closely with European standards. Self-perception Serbs express significant concerns about their personal futures(72%). The biggest concerns are inflation(92%), wars and conflicts(2021: 77%, 2024: 86%) and economic crises (86%). Almost half of the population believe that their eco nomic situation will deteriorate in the future. A majority(63%) view Serbia’s prosperity as linked to the well-being of other countries. The overwhelming majority(76%) believe that Serbia does not have the interna tional status it deserves. The strength of this sentiment remains among the highest in the poll and expresses deep-seated dissatisfaction. 86% Serbia should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world There is a growing belief among Serbian respondents that the world is entering an era dominated by»my country first« policies(74%, above the overall average of 64%) and wars and conflicts(72%). Serbia has consistently expressed scepticism toward international organisations, which has intensified since the last survey. Nevertheless, 60% favour a greater role for the UN and 53% for the OSCE. The position towards the EU is di vided, with 46% opposing a stronger role and 42% support ing it. NATO faces the strongest opposition, with 78% re jecting an expanded role. In March 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia to halt the bloodshed and the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority. This event was a defining moment in recent Serbian history and underpins a negative attitude towards NATO. Serbs are even more opposed to NATO today than they were in the years after the bombing campaign of 1999. This anti-NATO stance is re flected in the perception of NATO enlargement as a threat by 75%, by far the highest number in the poll, even sur passing Russia. Probably also connected to the bombing, Serbs largely reject the use of nuclear weapons(85%), while 14% accept them as a last resort. They also clearly re ject military interventions. 75% perceive NATO enlargement as a threat, by far the highest number in the poll, even surpassing Russia. 82 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Serbs seem to support a pragmatic stance and a multi-vector foreign policy. Collaboration with different players is desired across the board: 67% with China, 64% with Russia (the highest value in the poll) and 60% with the EU. In con trast, cooperation with the US(42%, dropping to 30% among those aged 18–29) is less welcome, and the majori ty disapprove(49%). Accordingly, Serbian respondents show the highest disapproval for economic decoupling (around 50% disapprove reducing dependence on Russia and China). Ties with Russia and China have indeed deepened since the fraudulent December 2023 elections, which brought President Aleksandar Vučić renewed victory. The Free Trade Agreement of 2023 strengthened relations with China, which are focused mainly on projects such as infrastructure investments and mining. Serbian respondents perceive a potential reordering of global power dynamics, in which traditional Western dominance is called into question and the Russia-China block gains prominence. They also discern an end of the Western-dominated security order and express doubts about the EU rising as a global power(only 23%, 18–29 year olds: 30%). Russia's global leadership role is expected to grow (65%), the second highest figure in all surveyed countries after Russia itself. The US and Russia are viewed as having the most conflicting interests, more so than US–China, EU–Russia or EU–China relations. Meanwhile, Russia–China relations are considered the second least contradictory, implying relatively greater alignment and cooperation. Serbian respondents are convinced that the EU should focus on diplomacy and ensure international peace through other means than building a European Army(79%, highest figure in the poll). A significant majority(78%) advocate for the EU to become less dependent on the US, though opinions are divided on the EU's ability to defend itself without US support(43% disagree, 41% agree). In line with their an ti-American sentiments, Serbs overwhelmingly view the US as the greatest security threat to Europe(70%), the highest figure in the poll, compared with an average of just 28% in polled European countries. Russia(33%) and China(18%) are rather not seen as threats. 65% of Serbs expect Russia's global leadership role to grow. The perception of the objectivity of media reporting is the lowest in the poll(68% think it is biased), even though it has improved slightly since 2021(77%). This is largely due to pro-government media dominance, which has grown to exceed 90% since Vučić came to power in 2012. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +4 70% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +12 33% Russia 18% -3 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ At the end of 2009, Serbia applied for membership in the EU. Serbia has been holding accession negotiations with the EU since 2014. What do you think of the accession process? All figures in% The accession process is just an illusion, the EU does not want to 38 have Serbia as a member. The accession process will take a long time and it is uncertain whether Serbia will actually join the EU at some point. Serbia should terminate the EU accession process because membership in the EU will not bring any benefits. 26 18 Even if the accession process takes a long time, Serbia has a 9 real chance of joining the EU. Don’t know 7 0% 10% 20% 30% Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 83

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Serbia take in the war in Ukraine? Serbia should support Ukraine until it wins the war. 3 Serbia should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Serbia should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 7 0 10 20 37 49 30 40 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 14 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 48 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 76 57 Humanitarian support Economic support Military support Don't know The war needs to end It is not important for us It is too costly Don’t know 26 14 3 17 4 1 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 24% ... NATO 10% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Serbia? Did it become... 20 56 9 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 84 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Only 3% want to support Ukraine until it wins the war. 60% view it as a proxy war and 28% expect Russia to win. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Serbian respondents are overwhelmingly pro-Russian with regard to the Ukraine war. Ukraine is blamed by 36% of respondents, the highest share in the poll, followed by the EU (30%) and the US(60%), only in Russia this val ue is higher. Only 26% consider Russia the ag gressor, the lowest figure outside Russia itself (22%). Almost half, the highest share in the poll, think that it is not necessary to keep supporting Ukraine. The main reason people give is that»the war needs to end«(76%). A small share of 14% is in favour of supporting Ukraine, mainly focused on humanitarian aid. Serbs display the lowest support for helping Ukraine until it wins the war(a mere 3%, compared with the overall average of 30%). Instead, on a par with Italy, they are strong supporters of diplomatic efforts to end the war(49%). Together with Türkiye and Georgia, Serbia is also most amenable to a neutral stance(37%). The country’s anti-NATO and anti-Western attitude is in line with Belgrade’s pro-Russia policy. This resonates with Serbians. Russia’s actions in Ukraine are widely seen as defence of its own interests(41%), surpassing even perceptions within Russia(37%). Serbs are least likely to identify Russia as an imperialist state(4%). They strongly believe it to be a proxy war between Russia and the West, vying for global influence(60%). Regarding the war’s impact, 39% see Russia as strengthened. China is viewed as stronger(41%) or unaffected(38%), the EU as weakened(46%). Serbia is viewed as rather un affected(56%). Serbia’s pro-Russia stance is highly visible in its rejection of Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership. While 40% believe diplomacy will end the war, 28% expect Russia to achieve military victo ry, by far the highest share in the entire poll (with the exception of Russia, where 36% believe Russia will prevail).

The way forward Serbs are cautiously optimistic about Serbia's future(36%) but notably pessimistic about Europe and the world, with majorities expecting deterioration. Notably, their outlook is more pessimistic than average, though the share of optimism increased slightly to 2021. The optimism does not extend to EU accession, as Serbia has been negotiating with the EU since 2014. A majority (38%) believe the process is only an illusion and the EU does not want Serbia as a member. Some 26% still believe that it will happen, just the timing is uncertain. The unresolved Kosovo issue remains a significant obstacle, as the EU does not want to accept new members with unresolved territorial issues. However, 25 years after the Kosovo war, the majority(66%, thereof 70% men and 61% women) believe that Serbia should maintain its position on Kosovo. Only a mere 11% favour recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Remarkably, these perceptions are consistent across generations and haven’t changed over time. Serbia’s foreign policy emphasises self-interest, with 86% focusing on domestic well-being and efforts to avoid international involvement. The desire for an active foreign policy is the second-lowest in the poll and has been decreasing (2021: 58%, 2024: 49%). Still, almost 60% want to promote values abroad. Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism(51%), addressing human rights violations(48%), and managing climate change(46%). Regarding climate change, respondents are largely dissatisfied with current policies. They strongly support the idea that rich countries should protect poor and vulnerable countries and that international collaboration is key. To promote peace, the respondents mention diplomatic efforts and international institutions. Overall, the perception of the effectiveness of all foreign policy means – diplomacy, military, sanctions – has decreased since 2021. Serbia has invested heavily in its military, becoming the Western Balkans' leading force. About half of respondents support more military spending, just like in 2021. A large majority(67%) favour social and economic investments over defence. As in most other polled countries, a majority support funding such investments through a special levy on the rich(61%). Savings in other budgets are rejected. 25 years after the Kosovo war, what is your position on Kosovo? All figures in% No response Don’t know I don’t care, Kosovo is not important for me. 5 10 9 11 Serbia should 66 recognise Kosovo’s independence. Serbia should maintain its position on Kosovo. Security Radar 2025 85

Sweden [resolute and committed] Sweden, a parliamentary monarchy in Northern Europe, has a rich history, marked by its commitment to neutrality and diplomacy. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, Sweden abandoned its 200-yearlong policy of neutrality and non-alignment and applied for NATO membership. This shift resulted in a significant change in Sweden's defence policy and to its admission as NATO’s latest member in 2024. As an EU member since 1995, Sweden has emphasised human rights and sustainability on the global stage. The conservative Kristersson government, formed in 2022 with support from the right-wing Sweden Democrats, reflects a changing political landscape and has adopted stricter immigration policies, raising concerns about Sweden’s commitment to climate protection and value-based foreign policy. Self-perception Swedes appear to be among the least worried respondents in the poll. Their main concerns pertain to inflation(74%), wars and conflicts(74%), and international terrorism(69%). This sense of security reflects Swedes' strong support for international engagement and their lower prioritisation of national interests. Despite abandoning its feminist foreign policy, its potential reintroduction enjoys majority support only among those under 30. The principle of reducing Swe den’s dependence on countries that do not share similar values continues to have widespread support, especially among older respondents. 50% Sweden should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. Despite Sweden's wealth, 74% of peo ple express concerns about their personal future. Nearly half fear a decline in their economic situation, which is on a par with less affluent countries. Swedes show general satisfaction with the country's current standing in the global community. Only 44% of respondents perceive a lack of international status, one of the lowest figures in the poll. Perception of the world Swedes foresee a new era of conflict, marked by a»my country first« mentality. Despite these concerns, Sweden ranks the lowest overall with regard to fears of war. The perception that future conflicts will impact the country are the third lowest in the poll and the lowest among NATO and EU members. Half of the respondents expressed con cerns about a direct military confrontation between Russia and the West. This suggests that while Swedes recognise global instability, they are comparatively less anxious about direct consequences for their nation. Sweden ranks the lowest with regard to fears of war. While Swedes recognise global instability, they are less anxious about direct consequences for their nation. The prevailing belief, as in Germany and France, is that American supremacy is rather over. A strong respect for international laws and norms persists, underscoring their commitment to a rules-based global order. Some 62% of Swedes support greater cooperation with the EU. Swedes see the third lowest rate of conflict of interests between their country and the EU(35%), with women even less conflict-sensitive(28%) than men(43%). Also, half pre fer greater cooperation with the US. Only 22% favour in creased collaboration with China, the lowest rate in the poll. Second only to Ukraine, a mere 13% favour more co operation with Russia, showing a notable gender gap, with 19% of men versus 7% of women in favour. That means that 74% want to reduce dependency on Russia, and 64% on China. When asked about contradictory interests between different players, the discord between the EU and Russia is viewed as greatest, followed by the United States and Russia. The EU and the United States, as well as China and Russia, are not perceived to have conflicting interests and rather as aligning(both at 43%). Swedish perceptions of media reliability on foreign and security policy are rather positive. Next to Germany and Russia, Swedes put most trust in media reporting(51%). 86 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Only 22% favour increased collaboration with China, the lowest rate in the poll. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. 34% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% 84% Russia Perception of European security Sweden's integration into NATO has been accelerated by the invasion of Ukraine, strengthening the perception of Russia as the primary security threat for Europe(84%), the second-highest figure in the poll. This is well above concerns regarding China(59%) and the US(34%). NATO ex pansion is seen as a security threat by 46%, on average with other polled NATO countries, while 38% disagree. Similarly, 42% view EU enlargement as a risk, with 36% op posing. The United States is viewed as posing the lowest security threat. Sweden seeks to enhance its security in partnership with allies, as a significant portion of Swedes(66%) doubt their own defence capabilities in the event of a Russian attack. But even though Swedes regard themselves as vulnerable, nearly 47% still regard national defence as a domestic responsibility. The EU's defence capability without US support receives the highest confidence rating among EU member states, at 38%. At any case, a majority of respondents(54%) express support for reducing de pendence on the US. 59% China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Reflecting Sweden’s historically neutral policy, the large majority favour maintaining peace through non-military means. Around 45% are in favour of establishing an EU Army, notably lower than in France(56%) or Poland (54%). When asked about EU security leadership, a com bined Germany, France and Poland or a solo German leadership is preferred(21%), although nearly a third an swered'don't know'. Swedes rank third in the poll for trust in media reporting. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the foreign policy of Sweden? All figures in% Sweden should intensify the cooperation with the Baltic and Nordic partners. 12 17 70 Military deterrence in the Baltic Sea should be a priority for Sweden. 19 16 Being member of NATO, Sweden is not recognised as an honest broker in 35 19 international affairs anymore. Sweden lost its credibility as a leader in climate issues. 38 18 63 44 42 Sweden should pursue a feminist foreign policy again. 41 19 36 Strongly disagree, somewhat disagree Don’t know Strongly agree, somewhat agree Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Security Radar 2025 87

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Sweden take in the war in Ukraine? Sweden should support Ukraine until it wins the war. Sweden should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Sweden should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 6 17 26 0 10 20 30 50 40 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 71 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 15 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 65 49 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 23 20 8 20 13 1 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 59% ... NATO 52% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Sweden? Did it become... 21 36 27 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 88 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 17% prioritise Russia losing the war against Ukraine, even at the risk of escalation. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Sweden is aligned with countries that emphasise a proactive and robust approach to security, prioritising strong defence policies and strategic deterrence in addressing potential threats. A majority, as in other polled countries, view ending the war against Ukraine as key to improving European security. The war itself is seen by 66% as territorial expansion and Russia as the major aggressor. Swedish respondents take a strong position. Half of respondents advocate for continued support until victory. Another 26% favour further diplom atic efforts. Meanwhile, 17% – the second-hig hest value among NATO countries – agree that the top priority is to ensure that Russia loses the war, even with the risk of escalation. In line with this, support for Ukraine is desired mainly through military(49%), rather than humanitari an(23%) or economic(20%) means. Sweden is, just behind Poland, the second-strongest supporter in the EU of expanding sanctions against Russia(67%). Concerning the effects of the war, Sweden expresses cautious optimism about a stronger role for NATO and the EU. Similar to most strong supporters of Ukraine, Russia is widely perceived as having been weakened by the war, indicating a decline in its influence. The way forward Thinking about the next five years, the outlook is rather bleak, with anticipated adverse developments for peace and security globally(58%), in Europe(45%), and in Sweden(34%). Swedes now support an active and assertive stance, but the concept of neutrality still garners support. Half of the respondents seem to en dorse greater international responsibility, even with no direct benefits(49%).

Some 62% plead for an active foreign policy and diplomat ic negotiations are perceived as the most effective means of pursuing foreign policy. To maintain international peace, Sweden continues to prioritise the strengthening of international institutions, their commitment to multilateralism and dedicated diplomatic efforts. Swedes show the highest approval for enhancing these institutions among respondents. Over two-thirds support the idea of expanding cooperation with the Baltic and Nordic partners. Swedes support a combination of assertiveness and neutrality. The foreign policy priority is combating terrorism and extremism(66%, the highest value in the poll). This could be linked to the debate on NATO accession, as Sweden's agreement with Türkiye is linked to the»fight against terrorism«, driven by Erdoğan's concerns over Sweden's al leged support for Kurdish groups deemed threats to Türkiye’s security. Another priority is to address human rights violations(50%), while this percentage is even higher(59%) among those aged 18-29, and women are more concerned than men. Climate change is in the top three(42%) and still almost half advocate taking every possible measure to combat it. Sweden is widely recognised as a key advocate of multilateralism and collaborative efforts to address global challenges, to strengthen its national resilience to ensure preparedness for various crises. While only a third of respondents express satisfaction with the Swedish government's climate policy, this figure is among the highest for national climate policies, alongside the UK, Kazakhstan and the US Sweden’s traditional role is reflected in the fact that 71% of respondents support greater international collaboration, while prioritising domestic borders during instability receives the lowest approval in the poll. Furthermore, 64% of respondents express support for poorer countries. Since Sweden joined NATO recently it is not a neutral country anymore. Please choose one statement that you agree with most. All figures in% Don’t know Joining NATO was a 17 mistake and Sweden should go back to being neutral. No response 12 1 34 Neutrality offered advantages for Sweden and we should try to maintain some of them. 35 Sweden should adapt all aspects of its foreign policy to being part of the NATO Alliance. As Sweden navigates the new geopolitical landscape, there is almost an equal split between adopting all NATO foreign policy directives(34%) and maintaining neutrality for its intrinsic benefits(35%). Moreover, there are some uncertainties regarding its military stance. Opinions are divided, with 44% supporting military intervention and 50% advocating a stance of non-involvement. In any case, Swedes express a clear rejection of the use of nuclear weapons(79%). Military spending has increased since 2018 and is supposed to reach almost double that of 2023 by 2030. Meanwhile, in line with the average for all coun tries included in the poll, over half of respondents prefer increased investment in social and economic programmes to military expenditure. If military spending is deemed necessary, however, 44% would prefer a special levy on the rich to fund it. Security Radar 2025 89

Türkiye [independent and self-centred] After declaring Türkiye an independent state Kemal Atatürk took the country in a more liberal direction. Secularism was adopted in 1928, and in 1950 Türkiye held its first free elections. Over the following decades, Türkiye aimed to strengthen international ties, joining NATO in 1952 and signing an association agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963. EU accession talks, ongoing since 2005, have stalled amid concerns over human rights abuses, restrictions on press freedom and democratic backsliding. EU membership now appears to be a very distant prospect. Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2003, an economic rollercoaster ride, including boom periods as well as mismanagement and high inflation, has further unsettled the population. Türkiye has also been involved in international conflicts, such as those in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Türkiye has taken a more assertive stance in foreign policy, positioning itself as a key force within the region and the broader Muslim world. Self-perception Turkish respondents generally display strong opinions, often ranking among the most or the least supportive of particular statements in the poll. Turks are plagued by concerns, with a notable 85% expressing worries about their personal future. The biggest concerns of Turkish people are inflation (87%), economic crises(87%), and wars and conflicts(83%). A staggering 80% of Turks feel that their nation does not have the status it deserves, the highest level of dissatisfaction of all the countries polled. This level of dissatisfaction has hardly changed since 2021. However, Turks feel rather independent and autonomous, as only 56%(the third-low est score among the poll) are convinced that Türkiye’s prosperity is linked to the well-being of other countries. Perception of the world Türkiye's foreign and security policy is characterised by a plurality of institutional alignments. A greater role is desired for international organisations such as the UN(67%), the EU(61%), NATO(56%) and the OSCE(54%). 76% Türkiye should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. 80% of Turks feel that their nation does not have the status it deserves – the highest level in the poll, unchanged since 2021. Türkiye’s geopolitical outlook is shaped by its complex relations with major powers. Opinions on greater cooperation with the US are almost evenly split at 44%. While 64% de sire greater cooperation with the EU, almost the same share see a conflict of interests between the EU and Türkiye. In their view the relationship is unbalanced. A large majority(60%) perceive the EU as the primary beneficiary with only 22% seeing Türkiye in this role. Similarly, Turks perceive their NATO membership as benefiting primarily NATO(51%) rather than Türkiye(30%). However, Türkiye holds a unique position within NATO giv en its peculiar relationship with Russia. It supplies the Ukrainian Army with weapons, but at the same time it is the only NATO member that does not implement sanctions against Russia. It has also not banned Russian aircraft from landing in Türkiye, having become a gateway for travel between Europe and Russia. Türkiye seeks to broaden its partnerships beyond the West. With its application to join the BRICS, it could become the first country to be part of both alliances. Instead of adopting a de-risking strategy toward China, like many European countries, 64% of Turks favour stronger cooperation with Beijing. A majority(58%) favour closer relations with Rus sia, the third-highest share in the survey. Somewhat contradicting this, the same percentage(58%) would prefer re duced dependence on Russia and China, even if this has a negative impact on living standards. 90 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Türkiye is a member of the NATO. Who benefits more from this membership? All figures in% NATO 51 Türkiye 30 Türkiye and the EU have a close relationship. Who do you think benefits more from this relationship? All figures in% Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’,‘no response’ EU 60 Türkiye 22 Turks see their country as a centre of gravity. More than in any other polled country, they believe that middle powers such as Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa are emerging as new centres of influence(57%). This aligns with President Erdoğan's call for a»Century of Türkiye«, which is also mir rored by strong agreement(83%) that the world is entering an era of»my country first«. But Turkish respondents acknowledge other centres of power, too. Unlike anywhere else, they see potential for the EU to achieve the status of a global player(56%) and for Russia to assume leadership of the countries outside the West(57%; only in Serbia do more people agree). 57% believe that middle powers such as Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa are emerging as new centres of influence. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. ±0 55% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +7 56% Russia 44% -4 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’,‘no response’ The emergence of new powers is more likely to spark competition than to foster cooperation. Turks express significant concerns about the possibility of a new Cold War (68%) and a new world war(56%), higher than the polled average. Some 74% fear a direct impact from wars and conflicts in Türkiye. Turkish perception of risks to Europe differs notably from other NATO countries. They show less agreement that ending the war against Ukraine is a prerequisite for peace in Europe. Notably, Russia and the US are seen equally as threats(55%), followed by China(44%). Turkish respond ents strongly perceive risks in the conflicts of interests between great powers: the US and China, the US and Russia, and the EU and Russia. Turkish perception differs from other NATO countries. Russia and the US are seen equally as threats. A majority(73%) believe that the EU should focus on diplo macy rather than build up a European Army. Türkiye has the highest trust among the polled nations in Germany as a leader in European security(33%), even slightly more than the Germans themselves(30%). In contrast to Po land’s scepticism(28%), Turks trust Europe’s ability to de fend itself without US support(64%). Almost 60% of Turks see their country as well prepared to defend itself in case Russia declared war. Security Radar 2025 91

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should Türkiye take in the war in Ukraine? Türkiye should support Ukraine until it wins the war. 8 Türkiye should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. Türkiye should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 5 0 10 20 38 47 30 40 50 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 36 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 31 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 65 46 Humanitarian support Military support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is not important for us It is too costly Don’t know 27 23 3 20 13 2 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 41% ... NATO 38% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Türkiye? Did it become... 18 43 27 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 92 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 64% of Turks trust Europe’s ability to defend itself without US support. Turkish respondents express significant distrust in media reporting. Only 25% view it as objec tive, while 67% perceive it as biased, the sec ond-highest level of mistrust in the poll. Howev er, the ratio has improved since 2021, when only 15% considered media reporting to be objective. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Türkiye’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine stands apart from other NATO countries. Some 42% view the war as a proxy war between the West and Russia, a sentiment shared only in countries outside the EU. Turks also view Russia’s invasion as driven by long-standing disagreements between Russia and Ukraine(30%), the highest value in the poll. While 50% blame Russia for the war, a signifi cant proportion holds the US(47%) and the EU (26%) to blame. Consistent with Türkiye's unique positioning, 47% of respondents endorse diplo matic efforts to end the war. Some 38% advocate for a neutral stance, the second-highest share in the poll. Accordingly, the majority(46%) advo cate for humanitarian aid, while only 27% sup port military aid(among 18–29 year olds: 36%). This figure is significantly lower than the average of 48% among polled NATO countries. However, in line with other NATO partners, the majority of Turks oppose troop deployment(73%). On other issues, Turks are rather divided. Amid tensions with the EU over Türkiye's refusal to join sanctions on Russia, 45% support sanctions and 39% oppose them. Similarly, there is no de cisive majority in favour of Ukrainian membership of the EU(41% support, 35% oppose) and NATO(38% support, 39% oppose). During the last NATO enlargement, Türkiye notably blocked Sweden's membership for months. Among the 31% who believe that no further sup port should be provided to Ukraine, 65% believe that the war needs to end.

About half consider it most important to stop the war, even if it means that Ukraine loses control of some areas to Russia. This aligns with the survey results from 2021, when 60% of Turkish respondents agreed that borders have al ways changed as a result of wars. Still, the majority of Turks believe in a diplomatic resolution to the war. Regarding the effects of the war, China(42%) and Russia (34%) are perceived to have been strengthened by it. In this context, Türkiye stands out once again, as other NATO countries perceive Russia as having been weakened. Next to Türkiye only Russia itself, Serbia and Kazakhstan think that Russia has become stronger. The way forward The prevailing belief for developments over the next five years is rather bleak. Around 62% of Turks fear that the global situation will worsen, with those 18-29 years of age somewhat more optimistic. Reflecting the»Türkiye first« approach, a notable majority prioritise focusing on the country's own well-being. Accordingly, only about half support assuming more international responsibility and helping other states if there are no direct benefits to Türkiye. Nevertheless, over 70% support an active foreign policy. Foreign policy priorities include combating terrorism and extremism(50%), addressing international migration(45%), and tackling human rights violations(41%). For conflict res olution, Turks see diplomatic efforts as most important (46%), as these are viewed as the most effective and legiti mate means. Regarding current involvements, a majority (58%) prioritise focusing on the conflict in Gaza, while only 6% choose war against Ukraine. Only a quarter of Turks are satisfied with their country’s and the world’s climate policy efforts. Nearly 60% support taking all possible measures to address climate change. A broad majority support wealthier nations aiding poorer ones and emphasise international collaboration. However, if climate change leads to instability, around 71% favour border protection. 51% oppose military intervention in conflicts, up from 37% in 2021. Support for interventionist foreign policy is rather declining, in contrast with the reality of assertive Turkish foreign policy. Turkish respondents tend towards restraint, with 51% opposing military intervention in conflicts, up from 37% in 2021. At the same time, belief in the effectiveness of mili tary intervention as an instrument of foreign policy is by far the highest in the poll(64%), which appears contradic tory. Almost 70% oppose the use of nuclear weapons, 23% consider them acceptable as a last resort. A majority(67%) support increased military spending. Still, 60% prioritise social and economic spending over defence, though this figure is higher among those aged 18–39. Most respondents believe that higher military spending should be financed by a special levy on the rich(62%). This repre sents one of the highest levels of support among the surveyed countries and reflects Türkiye’s high inequality. In your opinion, which of the two conflicts should be more in focus of Turkish foreign policy? All figures in% War in Gaza 58 No response 11 6 Don’t know 26 War in Ukraine Security Radar 2025 93

Ukraine [disappointed and defiant] Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has undergone a profound transformation. The 2004 Orange Revolution marked the first major uprising against entrenched political elites, while the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests firmly aligned the country with the West, ushering in sweeping political, economic and social reforms. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea in violation of international law, and in 2022 it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Ukraine, with support from the West, has been defending itself against the Russian onslaught. There is currently no prospect of a significant improvement. Ukraine has been a candidate for EU membership since June 2022. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO allies agreed to strengthen Ukraine’s defence sector, helping it transition to full interoperability with NATO. Self-perception Ukrainians, grappling with the harsh realities of war, express the highest level of concern in the poll, up on the previous survey. Ukrainians’ primary concerns are wars and conflicts(overwhelmingly at 98%), inflation and the rising cost of living(95%), and economic crises(90%). Concerns about one’s personal future are utterly pervasive(over 90%), far exceeding the poll's 75% average. Economic con cerns follow, with 63% worried, compared with the 49% survey average. While respondents in other countries largely feel secure in their immediate surroundings, Ukrainian opinion is evenly split: 48%(62% of those aged 18–29) feel safe, while 47% do not. Significant regional differences are evident. In areas close to the frontline, such as Kherson, 83% of people report feeling unsafe, as do 64% in Sumy. In Kyiv, the perception of insecurity stands at 52%, slightly above the national average. Concerning the international stage, about 74% believe that Ukraine lacks the status it deserves, which ranks Ukrainians among the most dissatisfied with their standing. About 71% view their well-being as closely tied to that of other countries, up from 62% in 2021. 66% Ukraine should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Ukrainians express the highest level of concern in the poll. The perception of insecurity is higher in areas close to the frontline, such as in Kherson and Sumy. Perception of the world Ukrainians are the strongest supporters of an expanded role for international organisations in the survey, demonstrating their heightened reliance on international collaboration. They support an expanded role for the EU(79%), NATO(77%, significantly above the NATO members' aver age of 54%), the UN(70%) and the OSCE(63%). About 90% of Ukrainians regard the end of the war as a fundamental prerequisite for improving security in Europe, highlighting the role of the country as a central focus of European security concerns. This interdependence is evident in the growing collaboration with Western powers and alliances. A significant majority of Ukrainians express a strong desire to join the EU(83%, up from 71% in 2021) and NATO(81%, well up from 62% in 2021). In line with their membership aspirations, Ukrainians do not view either NATO or EU expansion to the East as a threat. The enthusiasm for closer ties is particularly pronounced regarding the EU: 86% of Ukrainians support closer cooper ation. Opinions remain divided on whether the EU is emerging as a global power or whether its interests regularly conflict with those of Ukraine. Ukrainians demonstrate remarkable support for a European Army(75%, up from 56% in 2021). This level of support is significantly higher than the average among polled European countries (49%). It fits the perception of the EU’s current defensive capability, as 53% of Ukrainians believe that the EU is not able to defend itself without support from the US. 94 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

If Ukraine were to start negotiations with Russia, which conditions should be fulfilled from your point of view? All figures in% Russia ceases hostilities. 91 43 Russia releases all prisoners of war. 90 43 Russia withdraws all occupying forces. Russia ceases attacking critical infrastructure. Russia recognises the sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia changes its political leadership. Negotiations should start without preconditions. No direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but an international mediating process. No negotiations at all. 11 90 90 89 77 57 43 25 16 28 56 53 44 53 13 5 23 24 Acceptable Don't know Unacceptable Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’. Regarding EU leadership in security policy, Ukrainians prefer a trio of Germany, France and Poland(32%), or Germany alone(19%). The US is another key partner, and 81% of Ukrainians ex press a desire for increased cooperation. They remain confident in the continuation of American supremacy(only 33% believe it is over). This aligns with the essential role of US support under President Biden in providing weapons and leading efforts to assist Kyiv. As a result of the invasion, there is widespread opposition (85%) to any closer cooperation with Russia. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. -8 15% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +19 89% Russia 52% +27 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ A significant 85% advocate reducing dependencies on Rus sia, even if it negatively impacts living standards. Unsurprisingly, 78% do not agree that Russia is taking a leader ship role among non-Western nations. Russia is also viewed by 89% as the greatest threat to Europe, followed at some distance by China at 52%. Attitudes toward China are mixed. Although China is one of Ukraine's largest trading partners, it is a key ally of Russia. Support for closer cooperation is waning, although 49% still favour closer cooperation(down from 69% in 2021). Over half back reducing dependence on China, even if it has a negative impact on living standards, while 31% oppose this. Perceived divergences of interest are considered most pronounced between Russia and the US(76%) and the EU (73%). These levels are notably higher than those observed between China and the US(64%) and the EU(49%). Ties between the EU and the US, as well as between China and Russia are not perceived as contradictory. The war shapes perceptions considerably. Ukrainian respondents believe that a new era of wars is emerging(72%), also marked by a»my country first«(64%) mentality. Ukrainians are uncertain about the likelihood of a new world war; 39% answered‘don’t know’, while 36% lean to ward‘yes’(respondents under 30: 45%). Above the survey average, 70% of Ukrainians believe that new wars in Eu rope are likely as a result of increasing tensions between Russia and the West and almost 60% see a direct military confrontation as probable. Security Radar 2025 95

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. Preferred stances on the war in Ukraine Continue support until Ukraine wins the war. 71 Be neutral. 1 Support diplomatic efforts to end the war. 23 Don't know 3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 92 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 84 3 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 86 Military support Economic support Humanitarian support Don't know The war needs to end It is not important for us It is too costly Don’t know 12 3 1 4 2 3 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 83% ... NATO 81% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on Ukraine? Did it become... 23 7 60 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 96 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Ukrainians under 30 are more likely to anticipate a new world war( 45% ) than the national average( 36% ). About 63% believe that laws and rules are no longer relevant in international relations, on exactly the same level as in Russia and notably higher than the poll average(47%). Around 50% of Ukrainians perceive media coverage as biased, but a considerable number(41%) view it as objective. It is unclear how much these attitudes are influenced by the»United News« television programme, which has been broadcasting since the war began, featuring government-endorsed content. Perception of the war against Ukraine In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, violating interna tional law, and in February 2022, it escalated into a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the time of the poll the Ukrainian military faced intense pressure in the east and southeast and Ukrainian forces had advanced into Russia's Kursk region to step up the pressure on Moscow. An overwhelming 84% of Ukrainians hold Russia re sponsible for the war, followed by 26% who blame the US and 15% the EU. About 12% believe that their own country is responsible. Considering the causes of the invasion, about half attribute it to Russia’s imperialistic ambitions, followed by 29% who point to Russia's desire to assert itself as a global power. Only 8% see longstanding disagreements as a factor. In the characterisation of the war, 53% believe the invasion is aimed at ex panding Russia’s territory, in line with the respondents in most other polled countries, while 30% view it as a proxy war. Not surprisingly, Ukrainians demonstrate the strongest support in the poll for continued defence assistance. Regarding their own position, 71% fa vour continuing aid until Ukraine wins the war, while 23% advocate diplomatic efforts to end the war. About 92% advocate further assistance. Asked about the means of support, Ukrainians predominantly favour military means(84%), ahead of eco nomic and humanitarian aid. In a similar vein, an overwhelming majority back increased sanctions against Russia(90%, up dramatically from 67% in 2021), as well as weapons supplies(90%).

In line with President Zelensky’s calls for international support and troop deployments, only a very small proportion of respondents(14%) oppose third-country intervention. About 66% of respondents fear nuclear escalation, fuelled by Russia’s threatening rhetoric. Ukrainians’ determination is evident in their stance on ending the war, as almost 40% prioritise ensuring a Russian loss, even at the risk of escalation(the highest proportion in the poll). However, just 23%, albeit still the highest propor tion in the survey, believe Ukraine will prevail militarily. In sharp contrast, just 3% think that Russia will prevail militari ly, a figure that is significantly lower than the NATO average of 11% and markedly below the 38% of Russians. About 30% are willing to accept territorial losses to end the war (lower than the NATO average of 44%); and 21% support re storing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even if it prolongs the war. However, 35% don’t believe that the war is going to end soon, while 30% foresee a diplomatic solution. 30% are willing to accept territorial losses to end the war, lower than the NATO average. The continued desire for a Russian defeat is coupled with a growing acceptance of negotiations, as majorities accept starting them even without preconditions(57%) and op pose the notion of no negotiations at all(56%). Nearly all proposed conditions for negotiations receive strong support, with approval rates of over 90%, including if Russia ceases hostilities and attacks on critical infrastructure, and releases prisoners of war. Similarly high approval is seen for conditions such as Russia recognising Ukraine's sovereignty or withdrawing all occupying forces. The condition of Russia changing its political leadership receives comparatively lower support, although still large, with 77% in fa vour. There is also a mixed response toward international mediation versus direct negotiations, with 43% in favour of mediation and 24% opposed. 57% support negotiations without preconditions and 56% oppose the notion of no negotiations at all. The openness to negotiations is tied to firm expectations regarding the conditions under which an end to the war is acceptable. Over 80% approve the conditions that Russia withdraws from all territories occupied since 2014, agrees never to strike Ukrainian land again and contributes substantially to the reconstruction of Ukraine, as well as that Kyiv receives credible security guarantees from the West. Unacceptable conditions include a reduction of Ukraine's military capabilities(rejected by 78%), or halting hostilities at the current frontline(by 71%). The following conditions are widely rejected: Ukraine refraining from reclaiming the four occupied oblasts(73% oppose), Russia withdrawing from all territories except Crimea(64% oppose), or withdrawing only from those occupied since 2022(61% oppose). These opinions are even more pronounced among younger people. Opinions on Russia receiving security guarantees from the West are split, with 39% of Ukrainians opposing and 34% supporting. 60% of Ukrainians believe that their country will emerge stronger as a result of the war. Despite ongoing losses of terrain on Ukrainian territory over the past 12 months, 60% of Ukrainians believe that their country will emerge stronger as a result of the war. Only Russians perceive their country as even stronger (62%), while 56% of Ukrainians view Russia as weaker. The way forward A growing sense of hope is becoming apparent in response to the war. Some 66% express optimism about the future of their country, 52% for Europe and 46% for the world. Nota bly, younger generations are even more optimistic. Among the global security problems that should be given priority, Ukrainians name terrorism(58%), closely followed by geopolitical tensions(53%, the highest value in the poll and a 12% increase since 2021). Human rights violations rank third(46%). Military interventions are still rather opposed(52%), but the position has weakened(in 2021 63% were against). Russia’s repeated threats of using nuclear weapons are met with strong opposition in Ukraine, with 88% rejecting their use. Ukrainians are the most ambitious with regard to pursuing an active foreign policy(79%, the highest value in the poll). However, this seems to have the clear purpose of serving national interests as their stance on taking on international responsibility even if there are no direct benefits is more divided, with 43% in favour and 40% opposed. A strong ma jority of Ukrainians(82%) support reducing dependencies on countries that do not share their values. Nonetheless, 65% are willing to cooperate with any country, even those that do not share their values, if it promotes peace and security in the world. Diplomatic negotiations are viewed as the most effective and legitimate foreign policy tool. While military interventions and economic sanctions are seen as similarly effective, economic sanctions are considered legitimate by twice as many people(75% vs 36%). To promote international peace, the most favoured approach is the improvement of defence capabilities(65%, the highest value in the poll), followed by intensification of diplomatic efforts(40%). Security Radar 2025 97

65% of Ukrainians advocate strengthening defence capabilities as a means to promote international peace. Ukrainian respondents express general dissatisfaction with the current policies of their country and the international community on climate change. While 44% favour taking all possible actions to combat climate change, 40% would pre fer a focus on adaptation. The vast majority see climate change as a challenge to global peace and security and prioritise border security and international cooperation on climate change. About 78% support the idea that rich countries should protect poor and vulnerable countries from the impacts of climate change. As a country at war, perhaps unsurprisingly they show the highest support among the polled countries(77%) for in creased military spending. This is evident in the fact that 61% prioritise defence spending over economic and social expenditures(20%), in contrast to the Russian side, where opinion is almost evenly split. A majority support funding defence through a special levy on the rich, while only 15% back cuts to social and economic spending. At some point, the Russian war against Ukraine will end. Under which of the following scenarios do you find ending the war acceptable? All figures in% Russia withdraws troops from all territories it occupied after the start of the war in 2014. Ukraine receives credible security guarantees from the West. Russia agrees never to strike Ukrainian territories. Russia contributes substantially to the reconstruction of Ukraine. Russia receives credible security guarantees from the West. 34 Ukraine agrees never to strike Russian territories. 29 Russia withdraws troops only from the territories occupied since 2022. 25 10 Ukraine agrees never to have nuclear weapons. 24 Russia withdraws troops from all territories except Crimea. 22 10 Ukraine no longer seeks NATO membership. 16 15 Hostilities are ceased and the war is stopped at the current frontline. 14 11 Ukraine refrains from trying to recapture the four oblasts occupied by Russia. 13 11 Ukraine no longer seeks EU membership. 12 12 Ukraine reduces the capabilities and size of the Armed Forces. 9 10 Acceptable Don't know 83 83 83 80 21 18 20 Unacceptable 7 7 8 6 7 6 9 8 39 47 61 51 64 65 71 73 73 78 Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’. 98 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

United Kingdom [re-orienting and engaged] The United Kingdom has a long colonial history and is a nuclear power with global influence. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and a founding member of NATO. It joined the European Economic Community(EEC) in 1973, later than many European neighbours, due to internal divisions and disagreements with France. In the wake of EEC accession, the United Kingdom faced internal and external challenges, including the Falklands War, the conflict in Northern Ireland and a fundamental financial and economic restructuring under Margaret Thatcher. The United Kingdom has taken on significant international responsibilities, particularly in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya. UK policies have been defined by its 2021 departure from the EU as a consequence of the 2016 Brexit referendum. In 2023, the UK updated its security strategy to adapt to a changing global order, signalling a more pragmatic foreign policy. The newly elected Labour Party is expected to have a positive impact on UK–EU relations. Self-perception The United Kingdom seems one of the most confident and secure countries in our sample. UK citizens seem to worry less: nearly half of respondents are not worried about their personal future, the lowest percentage in the survey. The overall level of concern is relatively low compared with other polled nations. Main issues that cause concern are inflation(83%), economic crises(78%), and wars and conflicts (78%). One outcome of Brexit seems to be that British peo ple are the least worried about disagreements within the European Union. A strong sense of security prevails, with 88% reporting feel ing safe in their immediate environment. This figure is above average and is noteworthy in light of the new governments declared focus on safer streets. British respondents feel most satisfied with the status of their country in the international arena. British people feel most satisfied among the poll respondents with the status of their country in the international arena. Only 36% of respondents feel that the UK lacks the global status it deserves, the lowest percentage among the surveyed nations. This probably reflects the United Kingdom’s historical influence as an imperial power with global reach. British people feel most satisfied among the poll respondents with the status of their country in the international arena. Only 36% of respondents feel that the UK lacks the global status it deserves, the lowest percentage among the surveyed nations. This probably reflects the United Kingdom’s historical influence as an imperial power with global reach. 55% The United Kingdom should concentrate on its own wellbeing and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. Perception of the world A greater role is strongly desired for the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the EU. This willingness to engage in cooperation is even stronger among British men and younger people. The effects of Brexit were evident in the 2021 survey, but there has been a gradual shift towards rapprochement, driven in part by Russia's war against Ukraine. The EU is increasingly seen as a key partner and perceptions of conflicts of interest are diminishing(2021: 54%, 2024: 46%). The US remains central to the UK's foreign policy in the eyes of respondents, emphasising the special relationship between the two nations. Nevertheless, if the US were to withdraw from European security, many Brits would favour closer alignment with Europe. 100 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

How has Brexit affected the international role of the United Kingdom? All figures in% Brexit has substantially weakened the economy of the United Kingdom. 27 11 61 Brexit has weakened our alliances. 27 12 59 The UK can follow an independent foreign policy. 25 The UK can cope in a more nimble way with international challenges. 37 The UK can more easily be pressured by China, Russia and other major powers. 36 Brexit has strengthened the relations with the US. 45 Strongly disagree, somewhat disagree Don’t know 18 55 20 41 21 41 23 29 Strongly agree, somewhat agree Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ Strong opposition to Russia is evident, with 67% expressing reluctance towards cooperation. This sentiment is less pronounced among younger respondents. Opposition to China is less evident(50%), but has increased slightly in recent years. Under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the United Kingdom has adopted a more cautious stance towards China, aligning with the EU’s de-risking approach. Amidst uncertainties about the future and an unclear power balance, Britons foresee a new era of conflict, marked by a»my country first« mentality. Such an approach apparent during the Brexit period presents several challenges. Most respondents state that Brexit weakened UK alliances and the UK economy. Although 55% of respondents believe that the UK can follow an independent foreign policy, only 41% think the UK can react more nimbly to international challenges. However, most Britons reject the idea that the UK can be more easily pressured(41%). Most respondents state that Brexit weakened UK alliances and the UK economy. The perception of media reporting has improved. In 2021, the ratio of objective to non-objective reporting was 34% to 48%. By 2024, it had shifted to 45% to 35%, with young people increasingly perceiving media reporting as more objective. Perception of European security A shift is observable in the UK’s defence strategy. Under the previous Conservative government’s»Global Britain« approach, the EU was largely shunned as a security partner. However, the Russian war against Ukraine has demon strated the need for a closer UK–EU relationship. The Labour government advocates for a new security pact between the UK and the EU, including enhanced collaboration with Germany, France and Joint Expeditionary Force allies. The UK has also joined the EU’s military mobility project under PESCO. This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +3 29% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +13 82% Russia 57% -2 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Security Radar 2025 101

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should the United Kingdom take in the war in Ukraine? The UK should support Ukraine until it wins the war. The UK should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. The UK should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 15 8 42 33 0 10 20 30 40 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 0% 67 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 16 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 55 48 Military support Humanitarian support Economic support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 26 17 8 26 15 2 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 56% ... NATO 58% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on the United Kingdom? Did it become... 19 48 16 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 102 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 73% agree on reducing UK dependency on countries with differing values. Public opinion reflects this evolving stance: support for defence policy as a nation-state matter has decreased slightly to 50%, while approval for a European Army has risen to 43%. Leadership in European security is most entrusted to the trio of Germany, France and Poland. Russia is seen as the primary threat for Europe(82%), followed by 57% for China. In the event of a Russian attack, only 34% be lieve the UK can properly defend itself. The EU is perceived as not too vulnerable: 42% agree and 39% disagree that the EU could defend it self even without US support. Maybe because of its so-called»special relationship« with the US, the UK shows comparatively low support for EU independence from the US(50%). NATO and EU enlargement towards the East are perceived as a threat by 43% and 41% of respond ents, respectively. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine The UK has long maintained a security partnership with Ukraine, providing NATO-standard training and military upgrades since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia is therefore seen as the clear aggressor. This reflects the willingness to push the boundaries in providing military aid, often ahead of other nations. Support for Ukraine remains high at 67%, mainly through military aid(48%, thereof 60% men and 36% women), and for sending more weapons to Ukraine(49%). Younger respondents are more likely to favour economic and humanitarian aid. Support for sending troops is low, but ranks third highest in the poll at 22%. Approval for Ukraine joining the EU and NATO has notably risen, with a stable majority now for both memberships. Despite this strong relationship and widespread approval of sanctions against Russia, there is no clear majority in the UK backing Ukraine until victory(42%), though the number is higher than the NATO average(32%). About a third prefer a diplomatic approach.

UK respondents perceive the war as being about territorial expansion(64%, 49% among those aged 18–29). Only a minority (16%) view it as a proxy war between Russia and the West, but men and people under 40 are twice as likely to choose this interpretation than women and older respondents. Russia is perceived to have been weakened by the war, while the other actors are rather seen as unaffected. The way forward Looking ahead, the UK’s outlook is rather pessimistic, especially among women and increasing with age. A majority believe that global(54%) and European(39%) conditions will worsen in the next five years. Perceptions of the UK are more balanced, with 31% expecting a decline and 30% an improvement. Given Britain’s imperial past, citizens support enhancing UK’s influence less than expected. For instance, while 60% of Britons support an active foreign policy, only 47% favour taking on greater international responsibility. The majority oppose promoting the country’s own values abroad, with stronger resistance among older generations. An overwhelming majority(73%) agree on reducing UK dependen cy on countries with conflicting values. The respondents’ top foreign policy priorities are combating terrorism and extremism(57%), followed by addressing climate change(44%) and resolving geopolitical tensions and conflicts(38%). Notably, concerns about geopolitical tensions and human rights violations have risen sharply since 2021. Diplomacy is seen as the most effective and legitimate approach to resolving international crises. Support for international institutions is viewed as key to promoting global peace. As one of the five nuclear powers, the UK has a broad majority against the use of nuclear weapons, though it follows the US with the highest support for their use as a last resort(27%). Only about one-third of Britons favour military interventions in conflicts. Amid growing militarisation, it is noteworthy that 70% of the respondents still pre fer to seek peace through diplomacy. The UK has been a leader in international climate policy. While the Conservative government scaled back efforts, the incumbent Labour government aims to refocus on climate protection. Besides this, respondents are very satisfied with the policies in their country, particularly high Imagine the US under a future president withdraws from European security. In this case, which future alignment would you choose? All figures in% 50% 50 40% 30% 40% 22 25 20% 0% UK should always align more with Europe. UK should always align more with the US. Don’t know Deviations from 100% result from:‘no response’ among people under 30. A narrow majority believe that the UK needs to take all possible actions to combat climate change. The UK shows the third-greatest support for the view that international collaboration is key to addressing global climate challenges. The UK recognises its international responsibilities, with a majority supporting the protection of poorer countries. Overall, 56% of respondents support higher military spend ing, though 60% prioritise economic and social expendi ture. Support for funding the military includes a special levy on the rich(42%) or cuts to social and economic spending(24%). Surprisingly, younger people endorse budget cuts most(33% among those under 30). New bor rowing is very unpopular(5%). The UK meets NATO's 2% defence spending target but has not significantly increased its budget despite strong support for Ukraine since 2022. Therefore, the Labour government has committed to raising defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, though it has not yet specified a timeline for this increase. However, reducing the UK's debt relative to its economy and securing additional resources for defence and foreign affairs will be difficult without tax hikes or spending cuts. Britons are very satisfied with the climate policies in their country. Security Radar 2025 103

United States [confident and introverted] The United States plays a pivotal role in European security, primarily through NATO and Article V of the NATO Washington Treaty. The latter guarantees that, should they come under attack, the United States will come to the European signatories’ assistance. Alongside strong bilateral ties, the US also engages in the OSCE. Transatlantic cooperation faced strains under Donald Trump’s first administration. His so-called»America First« agenda weakened trust among US allies. President Joe Biden sought to rebuild that trust, focusing on supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression and containing China through allied cooperation. The upcoming Trump administration will probably revert to more transactional policies, including a reduced commitment to multilateral alliances. This raises serious concerns for Ukraine’s defence and broader European security, as Trump could impose a joint China policy as a possible condition of security. With rising tensions involving China, a fractured US-Europe relationship would leave Europe more vulnerable. Self-perception Americans appear more secure, as their overall level of concern is relatively low compared with other polled nations. Having said that, their prevailing concerns are eco nomic crises(76%), wars and conflicts(75%) and cyber-at tacks(at 71%, higher than the survey average of 64%). Americans appear most satisfied regarding their country’s international standing. Only 38% feel that their country does not have the status it deserves, while 47% believe it does. Some 61% perceive their well-being as linked to the prosperity of other countries, showing an increased understanding of interconnected global prosperity(2021: 54%). Perception of the world Americans exhibit moderate support for multilateralism, a slight improvement on the last survey. A majority support a stronger role for the UN(57%), NATO(53%, but only 42% among those aged 18–29), and the EU(46%). But al though 36% support a bigger role for the OSCE, 16% an swer‘don’t know’ and 30% admit to being unfamiliar with the organisation. 65% The United States should concentrate on its own wellbeing and try to avoid international involvements. Combined responses ‘strongly agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’. 71% of Americans wish to reduce dependence on China, compared with 53% on average in polled EU countries. Americans believe that the age of American supremacy may be over(43% agree, 39% oppose). Most polled coun tries agree, except for outliers such as Georgia(54%) and Ukraine(52%), who still believe in it. Americans appear to anticipate an era defined by wars, conflicts and a»my country first« approach. Confidence in laws and rules in international relations persists, with only 38% professing to believe that they are no longer relevant(much lower than the 47% survey average). In the international context, the US compared with the EU sees itself as engaged in a broader conflict with both Russia and China. US–Russia(57%) and US–China(53%) rela tions are perceived as characterised by contradictory interests, followed by EU–China(43%). However, Americans’ perceptions of these contradictions appear to be less pronounced than those of other respondents. Russia perceives the US as its main adversary. These days, however, the US does not reciprocate this view, instead focusing on China, particularly in economic terms. For instance, there is a strong US desire to reduce dependence on China, even if it negatively impacts living standards(71%, one of the highest values in the survey). The av erage of polled EU citizens is much lower at 53%. At the same time, support for closer cooperation with China increased among American respondents, rising from 30% in 2021 to 40%. Tensions and structural challenges define US– China relations: on average, 54% of Americans and 53% of respondents in our 14-country sample fear a new Cold War. 104 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Should the US continue providing security for Europe? All figures in% 7 9 34 Democratic voters 50 23 14 22 15 Average of all US 48 respondents 14 11 Republican voters 52 Yes, definitely Yes, under certain conditions No Don't know/ no response Under which conditions? All figures in% Total 33 If Europe pays its fair share. Democratic voters 31 Republican voters 42 30 If Europe contributes to our 31 defence expenditure, too. 29 15 If Europe strengthens its own military. 16 14 11 If Europe supports our course on China. 9 11 10 12 Don’t know 4 1 1 No response 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% The Biden administration has struggled to rally European allies behind its China policy, and as already mentioned, the Trump administration may link support on this issue to American participation in European security. When it comes to Russia, Americans demonstrate a more pragmatic perception. Closer cooperation is rejected by 53%, but 31%(above the NATO average of 25%) favour it. Never theless, 68% desire to minimise dependence on Russia. Fears that broader global conflicts may impact the US remain high. Some 77% of Americans express concern about a direct impact of wars on their country, and 41%(above the 32% survey average) are worried about a new world war. Americans view themselves as highly capable of defence in the event of a Russian attack, with 70% express ing confidence, much higher than the 28% average. 70% of Americans view their country as highly capable of defence in the event of a Russian attack. Perceptions of media reporting are split, with 39% seeing it as biased and 37%(2021: 31%) as objective. America’s me dia landscape is politicised and polarised. Media outlets have long reflected partisan divides, including greater influence of billionaires. This is partly reflected in perceptions of objectivity, which are significantly stronger among Democrats(48%) than among Republicans(31%). This country is a threat to peace and security in Europe. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. +5 20% United States 6 80 0%% 40% 20% +10 73% Russia 59% +4 China Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’ Perception of European security With President Biden fostering closer ties, the US and the EU have strengthened their transatlantic security partnership. Public opinion reflects broad support for closer cooperation with the EU. However, future dynamics under presi dent Trump remain uncertain. When it comes to European security, Russia is seen as the primary threat(73%). But US respondents’ perception of the Chinese threat(59%) is significantly higher than the 44% EU average. Some 40% of Americans view NATO en largement as a potential threat to European security, a substantially higher proportion than before Russia started its full-scale war against Ukraine(2021: 28%). Only 36% per ceive EU enlargement towards the East as a threat. Security Radar 2025 105

War against Ukraine All figures in%. Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ or‘no response’. What position should the United States take in the war in Ukraine? The USA should support Ukraine until it wins the war. The USA should be neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. The USA should support diplomatic efforts to end the war. Don't know 19 10 0 10 20 Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? 31 37 30 0% 50 yes How should Ukraine be primarily supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should be supported) 28 100% no Why do you think Ukraine should not be supported? (Respondents who answered that Ukraine should not be supported) 50 45 Military support Economic support Humanitarian support Don't know The war needs to end It is too costly It is not important for us Don’t know 25 24 7 33 14 2 Should Ukraine become a member of...? ... EU 53% ... NATO 54% 48%* 45%* *average all countries bar Russia What effect, if any, does Russia’s war against Ukraine have on the United States? Did it become... 17 39 27 ... weaker... neither stronger nor weaker... stronger 106 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. 44% endorse providing additional weapons to Ukraine, thereof 60% Democrats and 35% Republicans. The US has long advocated that Europe should step up its responsibility for its own defence. In line with that, Americans have more confidence (41%) in Europe's defence capabilities without US involvement than the European average (31%). Notably, however, 71% still support contin uing US provision of security for Europe. Some 48% cite conditions, such as a fairer financial contribution from Europe(33%) and direct Euro pean support for US defence expenditures(30%), but a mere 11% cite European support for US China policy as a condition. Support for an EU Army has also surged, increasing from 39% in 2021 to 52%. This may reflect the wish that Eu rope take care of its own defence. Support for the EU's role in promoting international peace through non-military means, such as diplomacy, has risen from 56% in 2021 to 63%. In EU securi ty policies, Americans favour leadership by the Weimar Triangle of Germany, France and Poland (35%), but a notable 25% answer‘don’t know’. Perception of the Russian war against Ukraine Since February 2022, Washington has led sup port for Kyiv and strengthened NATO's deterrence capabilities. The US has been the major provider of military aid to Ukraine and crucial in coordinating NATO’s response. The majority of Americans hold Russia responsible for the war, which over half believe is aimed at expanding Russia’s territory. Overall, in accordance with the NATO average there is support for further aid to Ukraine, with 50% of Americans in favour(although while 70% of Democrats are on board, only 33% of Republicans follow suit). Fur thermore, 37% of Americans would prefer a dip lomatic solution, 31% favour aid until victory for Ukraine, and 19% favour a neutral stance. Providing additional weapons to Ukraine is endorsed by 44%(60% Democrats, 35% Republi cans), the third-highest value among polled NATO countries. Notably 23% are in favour of sending troops, a level of support surpassed only by Sweden(27%).

Do you think it is necessary to keep supporting Ukraine? All figures in% 70 33 Democratic 15 voters 15 21 Republican voters significantly(2021: 51%). Although 65% prioritise their own well-being over international involvement, 57% support an active foreign policy. Foreign policy priorities are fighting terrorism and extremism(57%), addressing human rights violations(43%), tack ling climate change(39%) and resolving geopolitical ten sions(31%, well up from 18% in 2021). When asked about strategies for promoting peace, Americans favour international institutions(38%), diplomatic efforts(36%) and pro motion of economic interdependence(33%, the highest val ue in the poll). Isolationist sentiments are reflected in preferences regarding the future focus of US foreign policy, but without significant changes compared with 2021. Most re spondents prefer limitations on US involvement(29%), fol lowed by a focus on China(15%), Europe(14%) and the Middle East(12%). However, a significant portion(23%) re sponded‘don’t know’. 45 Yes, definitely No Don't know/ no response Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’ Economic and humanitarian aid each receive support from just under 25%. Support for Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU has increased significantly, with approval for NATO membership rising from 38% in 2021 to 54%, and for EU membership from 37% to 53%. Diplomacy is seen as the most likely path to ending the war, with 35% expecting a negotiated settlement, while 25% foresee no end to the conflict. However, 36% believe it is most important to stop the war even if it means Ukraine losing control of some areas to Russia. Some 31% support continuing the war to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, 12% consider it most important that Russia lose the war, even if it means a risk of escalation. Among Americans, there is notable optimism that the war will end within the next 12 months, second only to Russia. The way forward The outlook for the next five years appears less bleak than in 2021, with expected improvements in the US(41%) and in Europe(31%). Only regarding global developments does pessimism(38%) exceed optimism(30%). The main thrust of public sentiment is towards domestic affairs. Americans therefore remain cautious about taking on more international responsibilities, with only a slight increase in support under Biden from 38% in 2021 to 42%. However, support for reducing dependency on states with different values is notably high at 71% and has increased A worrying 12% believe that no action is needed on climate change, secondhighest value in the poll after Russia. Diplomatic measures are seen as effective and legitimate, though the US has the lowest legitimacy rating. Public opinion is divided on military interventions(43% opposed, 41% in favour), with support higher than average(30%), similar to Sweden and Türkiye. Attitudes towards nuclear weapons are concerning: 57% oppose their use, the lowest among polled countries, while a worrying 36% would agree to their use as a last resort. Climate change remains a critical concern, especially because the Trump administration seems intent on withdrawing from the Paris Agreement once again. The majority are dissatisfied with domestic and international climate policies, but more satisfied than average. Almost 50% favour doing everything possible, while 29% prefer adaptation. However, a worrying 12% believe that no action is needed on climate change, the second-highest value in the poll after Russia(26%). While 68% view international collabora tion as essential to address global climate change, 59% pri oritise securing borders amid potential instability. Despite their national wealth, Americans are among the least approving of support for poorer nations. Raising military spending has gained stronger endorsement, from 40% in 2021 to 48%. Some 55% would prefer to fund social and economic affairs over defence(29%). Fund ing preferences include a special levy on the rich(36%). An other 32% favour cuts in other budgets, one of the highest figures in the poll, raising concerns about social programmes and services. Security Radar 2025 107

Where should the main focus of US foreign policy involvement lie? By party preference. All figures in% Democratic voters China/Asia 15 Average of all US respondents 15 Europe 21 14 Middle East 14 12 Latin America 4 4 None of the regions: the US should instead limit its foreign policy 21 29 involvement Don’t know 24 23 No response 1 3 108 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Republican voters 20 9 13 3 39 14 2

Conclusions

Conclusions We are currently immersed in a time of constant sorrow, and people feel dogged by misfortune. This is true of all the 14 countries surveyed. The ongoing polycrisis, which has been with us for roughly a decade, has made a deep impression. People across the OSCE area are extremely worried about the future. Inflation, general economic insecurity, wars and conflicts are their main concerns. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine is the culmination of this era so far, adding fears of new wars in Europe, as if there wasn’t enough to contend with already. This sense is shared throughout our sample. These common worries go hand in hand with the perception of a world characterised by zero-sum logic, great power competition and an increasing focus on national interests. Existing fractures along great power lines, with the US and China being the main poles and the EU and Russia playing second fiddle, are part and parcel of this worldview. People almost inevitably feel an urge to concentrate on national affairs and decouple from countries with differing values. Dangerous world Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has led to a perception in Europe of a shift in the tides of international politics. The Russian attack in February 2022 added open war in Europe to the geopolitical mix and a Rubicon was crossed for Europeans. From a broader perspective, the war came on top of other developments affecting all 14 sur veyed countries: growing tensions between China and the US, attempts at de-globalisation in the wake of the pandemic, the rise of influential international actors such as the BRICS countries or Türkiye, the growing influence of populists and complex dynamics in the Middle East. For some countries in Western Europe, the Russian war has been a belated wake-up call. Great powers struggling for influence are clearly back on Europe’s agenda. The evolving conflict between the US and China, sometimes referred to as a new»Cold War«, serves as the new ordering principle in this world, gradually replacing US hegemony. The relative loss of US power is perceived quite strongly in the US itself, although some of its staunchest allies still take a different view. This generates even more uncertainty, however, as Washington is not expected to give up influence without a fight. The return to power of the MAGA camp can be interpreted as a doubling down on reclaiming the United States’ unique position. In fact, the early statements of President Trump on Canada, Greenland or Panama could be read as a US adaptation to raw power politics and a rather blunt attempt to maintain relative superiority over China. In comparison to the more cautious and incremental steps of the Biden administration with its focus on allied unity and stopping Russian violations of international law in Europe, this has the potential to lead to further conflicts. The Russian war against Ukraine is perhaps the starkest manifestation of these developments in Europe and impossible to ignore. It is the time of monsters as Antonio Gramsci described it. The old order is dead, the new yet unborn. In this interregnum the fundamental changes taking place evoke a sense of danger. Many decision-makers in this situation reach for the current default option of competition or even confrontation, seemingly oblivious to the possibility that this could be a slippery slope to more conflict and turmoil in the long term. It remains to be seen whether guardrails or stabilising elements can be established in an environment characterised by uncertainty, fear and polarisation. Three observations stand out in relation to Russian’s war against Ukraine: First, the polarisation between Russia and the West is entrenched. The countries that form part of the»support coalition« for Ukraine perceive Russia as a threat and aim to distance themselves from it. This is not the case for the rest of our sample, however. And even inside the»support coalition«, as well as inside every country individually, particular patterns may be observed. The five camps we identified in relation to Russia’s war against Ukraine – the» Determined«, the»Reluctant«,»Russia’s Friends«, the»Opportunists«, and the»Unaffiliated« – have quite different strengths in the respective survey countries and have shaped their policies in the past three years. The different composition of the camps inside the respective countries underline why the narrative concerning support for Ukraine needs to be country-specific and idiosyncratic, addressing the specific issues that characterise national discourses. Second, the Russian government is on a confrontation course with»the West« and both sides tend to perceive one another as enemies. Nonetheless, public sentiment concerning security, fears and concerns in Russia is quite similar to that in the other OSCE countries. Unifying elements between Russians and their peers persist, as Russians continue to see themselves as part of 110 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

The Determined Some 24% support weapons deliveries to Ukraine and are opposed to cooperation with Russia. These respondents are most numerous in Sweden, but also in Latvia and the United Kingdom. The Reluctant Around 24% of all respondents oppose both closer collaboration with Russia and weapons deliveries to Ukraine. These people represent considerable minorities in most countries and are particularly prominent in Italy, Poland and Georgia, and to a lesser degree in Germany and France. The Opportunists Some 6% of all respondents support, somewhat counterintuitively, closer cooperation with Russia and weapons deliveries to Ukraine. These people represent only a small minority in all countries, but are quite prominent in the United States and Türkiye. Russia’s Friends Around 24% of all respondents would like closer collaboration with Russia and oppose weapons deliveries to Ukraine. These people are found mainly in Serbia, Kazakhstan and Türkiye, but also in Georgia. Unaffiliated Some 21% responded‘don't know’ or did not respond to one or both of the questions in the matrix and were coded as unaffiliated. This cluster is equally present in each of the 12 countries; it is markedly smaller in Georgia, probably because the survey was conducted via telephone. 18 20 29 GER 29 4 24 6 52 4 KAZ 14 18 6 20 SWE 6 50 24 14 27 FRA 29 5 23 16 21 LVA 37 2 20 8 39 TUR 14 18 11 15 36 5 GEO 33 9 23 33 POL 31 5 9 27 18 UK 8 37 25 19 ITA 16 34 5 17 4 3 SRB 56 20 26 14 20 USA 26 15 Don't know/ no response Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree 1 2 9 10 Russia’s Friends 1 3 Somewhat agree Strongly agree 1 3 The Opportunists 1 1 2 5 6 8 The Reluctant 4 6 4 11 The Determined 1 8 How do respondents relate to Russia and Ukraine? 6 To answer this question we put responses from 24,636 respondents from 12 countries(14 countries minus Russia and Ukraine) in a 3 matrix. It depicts a cross-tabulation of two issues: whether to provide more weapons to Ukraine and whether to collaborate more with Russia. Respondents fall into five 2 clusters. Four of them are almost even, each covering slightly less than a quarter of respondents; one is very small. 1 Due to roundings, figures may not add up exactly. All figures in% 0 Strongly agree Somewhat Somewhat agree disagree Strongly disagree Don't know/ no response My country should collaborate more with Russia than before. My country should provide more weapons to the Ukrainian military. Security Radar 2025 111

the European cultural sphere. This does not mean that they agree on key questions of European security, especially the war against Ukraine, however. Here even the parts of the Russian society that are more critical of their own government have positions significantly different from those of their peers in other countries. Interestingly, the Russian public still makes a difference inside»the West« between the United States(seen as the»main adversary«) and the EU(regarded much more benevolently). Third, and most worrying: In the countries in Ukraine’s support coalition the war has become somewhat normalised. This implies that war in Europe has lost its»exceptionality«, evolving to become an element of sometimes cynical domestic political struggles, as seen in the US elections. As a result, there are low expectations of a Ukrainian victory, sinking public support for continued assistance, and a sense of numbness with regard to the atrocities taking place on a daily basis in Ukraine. Analysis of the different camps inside the respective societies shows that the »Determined« camp is in a minority position even in some NATO states, while the»Reluctant« and»Russia’s Friends« taken together are generally in a majority. Consequently, there is a uniform desire for negotiations, albeit with different motivations and aims. Related to these observations three more fundamental questions arise: 1. How can countries and societies adapt to an era charac terised by war and violent conflict? Most governments have decided to boost their defence budget, with broad public support. How does this affect the availability of funds for social spending, burden-sharing between different parts of society, people’s sense of fairness and social cohesion? This affects mainly countries with a high living standard, where people are afraid of losing out. 2. What is the current salience of international law and rules? How can these be upheld under the circumstanc es of war and great power struggles? The tension between the ideal and the achievable becomes painfully obvious in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Many people would like Ukraine to win the war, but they don’t want to become directly embroiled in it and potentially compromise on their own security. How, in a time of scarce resources, can this circle be squared? 3. Is there an ideal balance between confrontation and cooperation? Can decoupling from the non-aligned and collaborating with the like-minded offer a solution? And what effects might this have on common challenges such as the climate crisis or nuclear proliferation? This question is even more pressing for countries such as Kazakhstan and Georgia, which are geographically located on geopolitical fault lines. Contradictory coping strategies People’s ideas on how this geopolitical world should be navigated are at least partly contradictory. Perceptions of an ever more competitive and dangerous world tend to make people more inward-looking, especially in richer countries that are members of the EU and/or NATO. In tandem with this, there is an impetus to decouple from countries that are deemed inimical or out of line with common values. Pragmatism or even opportunism are complementary to this, resulting in foreign policy and international relations guided by a clear transactional agenda focussed on very narrow national interests. On the other hand, although to some extent incompatible with the other coping strategies, the strengthening of international organisations is also deemed useful. Cooperation between states to pursue a higher goal, whether it be peace and security or planetary challenges such as the climate crisis, is still seen as necessary. There is an expectation that international organisations can alleviate some of the pressures of the current situation. In the cases of the EU and NATO this entails cooperation among the like-minded, at least on paper. But although in theory these organisations’ member states share the same basic values, differences between governments prevent them from acting more effectively. The focus on narrow national interests thus leads to an organisational impasse. This phenomenon of»enforced organisational inertia« is even more pronounced in organisations that include member states that are not like-minded, such as the OSCE or the United Nations. The gap between these organisations’ capabilities and people’s hopes about their role is thus widening. The United States at a crossroads The decisive role the United States has played in Europe could change fundamentally in the coming years. A popular desire to withdraw from international affairs and concentrate more on American interests has been apparent for a number of years. With the second Trump administration, the most isolationist and»America First« political faction has come to the fore in US society. Bearing the costs of being the global hegemon is more and more contested in the US. Nonetheless, the advantages of this position are still highly attractive. Maintaining an edge against key competitors, specifically China and to some extent also Russia, remains part of Washington’s foreign policy agenda. This is nothing new, but what might represent a major break with the past are the tools used to achieve hegemonic status. Previous administrations have acted more or less as primus inter pares, taking a multilateral approach, acting at least partly within international organisations and applying gentle persuasion to allies. President Trump is set to deviate from that, using mainly bilateral, sometimes even coercive approaches, demanding blind support and side-lining international organisations, thereby rendering them impotent. 112 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

The EU –»a Schrödinger’s great power« The European Union as an international organisation sui generis is in a particularly difficult position. Its economic weight and the combined military resources of the EU member states make it objectively a great power, and it is often regarded as such from the outside. In a more globalised world, the EU is perceived as a union of the like-minded, potentially on a par with the US, Russia or China. From the inside, however, the picture is starkly different. The EU is not a nation-state and thus is not experiencing the turn inwards taking place in many countries at national level. Differences between member states have led to a number of conflicts and fissures in the recent past, underlining the perception that the EU is currently unable to act decisively in critical circumstances. Europeans themselves are therefore rather sceptical about the ability of their own union to navigate successfully a world marked by geopolitical competition. What to do? Policy recommendations The times they are a-changing. The maelstrom of geopolitics, the logic of zero-sum games, power struggles and competition threaten to take Europe down a dangerous path. Decision-makers therefore need to tread carefully to maintain what is left of European security and lay the basis for improvements without delay. Such actions are needed at different policymaking levels and have differing timelines. Strength starts at home The basis for successfully managing the current crises lies within. However, the framing of inter national relations as»democracies vs autocracies« risks losing the substantial parts of European electorates who are disenchanted with democracy and feel it has delivered little for them lately. Security encompasses not only defence, but also democratic resilience and economic security. It is built on strong and cohesive societies. Strengthening social cohesion thus represents a sustainable investment in societies’ ability to navigate the upcoming challenges that go hand in hand with a polarised and even hostile international environment. Resilient democracies, trust in institutions and a vision of the future are therefore as important as military equipment when it comes to upholding security in Europe. Current efforts to increase defence budgets are supported, but still met with concern by broad swathes of society who fear for their livelihoods. Populists have been able to exploit such concerns in recent elections. Social cohesion should thus also become the main avenue for strengthening democracies and winning back the disenchanted parts of the electorate by showing them that democracy still delivers for them in practice. The necessary strengthening of defence capabilities in democracies thus requires a careful calibration so as not to throw out the baby with the bathwater and undermine democratic foundations from within. A first step towards fairer burden-sharing could be the introduction of an EU-wide special levy on the rich to finance defence spending. Such a measure is widely popular across our polled countries. Take Europe seriously The European Union still has enormous soft power. This gives it a promising foundation on which to play a stronger role even in more hostile international surroundings. The EU’s appeal is very high, especially with young people in Europe’s broader neighbourhood. This needs to be nurtured by doubling down on programmes aimed at building relations, such as Erasmus Plus. Additionally, the EU is far better able than single member states to play economic hardball, when it comes to erecting(or counteracting) trade barriers or setting standards. However, the EU’s main strength lies in its unity. If the logic of competition and confrontation spills over inside the EU, it could lead to the paralysis of the union and consequently an even weaker position for its member states. Therefore, any action the EU takes should be used in a coordinated manner. Otherwise member states risk being outplayed, while still trying to outfox their direct EU neighbours and partners. More specifically, current combined EU defence expenditure already puts it far ahead of Russia in the global top three. Better European cooperation and coordination in defence matters can serve multiple purposes for European security. Spending together in Europe will strengthen defence without constantly putting a strain on budgets. Moreover, allocating defence contracts to European producers can generate growth within the EU, contribute to economic development and ease dependencies on foreign producers. Finally, in the current environment of ever-increasing defence budgets and related risks of an arms race, a prudent EU policy could pave the way to re-establishing elements of arms control and decelerating the current spiral of defence expenditure. Cooperative security is a necessary stabiliser As the example of the EU shows, there is enormous potential in international cooperation as a means of coping with current challenges. However, the idea of cooperation runs counter to the current Zeitgeist, which favours competition and even confrontation. Nonetheless, cooperating even when interests only partially overlap is the essence of international organisations. This applies even more to organisations that bring together non-likeminded states. Cooperative security might not currently be in vogue, but it remains a necessary stabilising element in a world on the brink of disorder. Security Radar 2025 113

The prevalent geopolitical logic of competition and confrontation needs to be stabilised with pragmatic cooperation. The establishment of peace in Europe, as well as fighting climate change and its consequences are two aims for which it would be well worth overcoming our differences. Common ground might be shaky, fragile and even potentially explosive. Nonetheless it’s necessary to explore overlapping interests. For this purpose, all participating states sometimes need to bite the bullet, try to find common denominators and address common topics. Cooperative security crucially requires a shared understanding of what security means for all parties involved. Organisations such as the OSCE or the UN can serve as vehicles for working out such a shared agenda and may even be able to find their purpose again. Prioritise ending the war against Ukraine The war against Ukraine is mired in a period of attrition. Both sides still seem to be pursuing maximalist agendas. Escalation is still a danger, although some in the support coalition for Ukraine seem fairly content with the continuation of the war. However, this will only lead to further bloodshed and dee pen the hostility between the two countries. It could also feed into existing war fatigue in the West and thus tip the balance in Russia’s favour. The danger of a socalled»forever war« in the EU’s direct neighbourhood looms, with more and more countries tiring and cutting support as a result either of changes of government or a failure to muster the necessary resources. We already see that a considerable proportion of citizens of countries in the support coalition, when asked, declare they are against sending more weapons to Ukraine. Current momentum provides an opportunity for change. There is considerable popular support for negotiations within Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, the position of the United States would seem to have shifted significantly as Donald Trump returns to the White House. In addition, both war parties have incentives to negotiate. Russia and Ukraine are both»losing the war«, although Ukraine more quickly than Russia. Ukraine is losing ground, has huge difficulties in recruiting enough personnel and faces obstructions in the continuation of weapons supplies. Having said that, Russia may have reached the peak of its military power as sanctions bite ever deeper and recruitment becomes increasingly an uphill struggle. This does not mean that Putin is likely to give up, however. Policymakers need to take steps towards ending the war and commencing negotiations. Two elements can guide this process. First, the Western support coalition should abstain from overloading its approach with grandiloquent narratives such as»democracy vs autocracy« or»a fight against imperialism«. This approach has failed to win broader global support. Indeed, it has even induced many countries outside the Western coalition to criticise such rhetoric as»double standards« or even»hypocritical«. Instead of trying to find a rather tenuous moral high ground, the focus should be on the most obvious consideration, shared by far more countries than the support coalition, namely the fact that Russia is breaking international law. This can be a rallying call for countries beyond the Western coalition and bring a more diverse group of states into the process, thereby increasing pressure on both parties to come to the negotiating table. Second, the key issue in the negotiations should be Ukraine’s long-term sovereignty. The definition of victory, on which hitherto different parts of the coalition have been at odds, needs focus. It should concentrate on the fact that Ukraine has withstood Russia’s onslaught and has asserted itself as a sovereign state. Our poll shows that this condition is potentially acceptable even to a sizeable portion of the Russian public. Maintaining and securing this sovereignty in the long term needs to become the common agenda of Kyiv and its partners. It encompasses Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and deter further Russian attacks, to govern the country independently of outside influence, and, if it so chooses, to integrate into the European Union. 114 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

About the authors Christos Katsioulis Head of FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe Alexandra Dienes Senior Researcher at FES ROCPE Elena Josten MA Graduate in International Development, University of Vienna Sabrina Kaschowitz Senior Researcher at FES ROCPE Benedikt Unkel BA student in Political Science, University of Mannheim Simon Weiß Senior Researcher at FES ROCPE Acknowledgements Many colleagues and institutions were involved in the exciting process of preparing and carrying out this study. We would like to thank our implementing partner Ipsos Public Affairs, in particular Robert Grimm, Armgard Zindler and Alina Dippel, who conducted the public opinion survey on our behalf and consulted on many related matters. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to Florian Müller, who designed all graphs and visuals for this report and consulted on all matters related to the creative presentation of our findings. We also thank Shanna Danek, who came up with such an attractive layout in which to present all our ideas. This publication would not have been possible without our colleagues Julia Zöllner, who coordinated everyone involved and facilitated a smooth process, and Margarete Lengger, who skillfully helped us refine our key messages and sharpen our arguments. We also thank our meticulous copyeditor James Patterson.

Security Radar 2025 → Security Radar 2025 builds on a representative public opinion poll conducted in 14 countries. It takes stock of threat perceptions, attitudes to domestic and multilateral institutions, foreign policy priorities, as well as to foreign policy instruments, highlighting core issues for European security, such as the ongoing war against Ukraine. → Europe is in danger. People feel afraid. Some 80 years after the Second World War, geopolitics have once more morphed into armed conflict on our continent, claiming lives daily in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale war has resurrected the ghosts of Europe’s past we hoped had been put to rest long ago. The logic of confrontation seems to be the new normal. → Despite the current trend towards competition and confrontation, we maintain the importance of cooperative approaches in international security. Including such thinking within the framework of confrontational approaches will be needed for stabilising European security, as well as for tackling planetary challenges affecting us all, first and foremost climate change. For further information visit: ↗ fes.de