SPOTLIGHT Sabrina Kaschowitz Climate cooperation in a divided world About Security Radar 2025 For Security Radar 2025, the FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe polled 14 countries in September 2024 on public attitudes towards foreign policy and security questions. FES surveys countries under the aegis of Security Radar at regular intervals. More information can be found on our website. Key messages: → Public opinion on climate action is contradictory: respondents are deeply concerned about climate change, but their views reflect growing tensions between ideology and pragmatism. → Respondents strongly support international climate cooperation, but almost as many prioritise border security and resource competition, revealing confusion about the right approach in a world driven by national self-interest and zerosum thinking. → A balanced approach between strategic autonomy and international cooperation is essential to tackle climate change in today‘s challenging geopolitical landscape. Political leaders must counter polarisation and nationalist rhetoric to prevent public fears from being exploited. → Strong public support for international and regional organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and the EU shows their potential for promoting international climate action. International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 1

Introduction International cooperation has been a key element of inter national relations in recent decades as a means of manag ing cross-border challenges. Specifically, efforts to mitigate climate change have been organised globally, as the cross-border character of this development is self-evident. Today, climate change is still universally recognised as a global threat, but responses to it are increasingly linked to wider geopolitical dynamics, foreign policy priorities and national security concerns. While many agree that global challenges such as climate change require collective action, there is a growing shift towards»my country first« policies, focusing on a narrowly defined national interest, economic decoupling and the securitisation of climate change. This is evident in efforts to secure borders and compete in the global market for natural resources and new technologies, reflecting a larger trend to frame climate change and inter national cooperation through the lens of national security, geopolitical advantage and rivalry. This narrative has seeped into the public debate and leaves citizens confused about whether cooperation and joint action might mean that they lose out in the global competition for resources and thus restrict their country‘s ability to adapt to climate change in a zero-sum geopolitical context. These trends are embedded in a landscape of rising global insecurity, fears of a new era of conflict, perceptions of declining Western influence, and growing public scepticism about in ternational norms. Despite these challenges, support for in ternational and regional institutions such as the United Nations and the OSCE remains high. This demonstrates that multilateralism is still a viable approach to tackling both climate change and broader geopolitical instability, provided that international cooperation and these organi sations are reframed within a narrative that emphasises mutual benefit and collective action. Climate change as a global threat In our survey, climate change is widely recognised as a global threat, with concern spread evenly across age and gender. It ranks fourth out of nine global foreign and secu rity policy problems that should be given priority, after ter rorism and extremism, human rights abuses and geopoliti cal tensions and conflicts. Respondents from Northern and Central European coun tries are relatively less concerned about climate change than others, with Sweden, Latvia and Germany expressing the lowest levels of concern(just above 60%). The United States follows at 64%. Italy, Serbia, Türkiye, Georgia and France are the most concerned(76–80%). The fact that, generally, those who are most concerned about climate change are also those who are least satisfied with current climate change measures and policies suggests that cur rent climate policies at the national and international level are not viewed as sufficient to tackle climate change. Con fidence in EU climate policy is on average higher than in national and international efforts. Only 26% express satis faction with government action, the lowest levels being in Serbia, followed by Ukraine and Italy. Satisfaction with EU efforts, in the EU Member States, is slightly higher at 29%, with respondents less critical of the EU than of their re spective governments, which score an average of 25%. Across all countries surveyed except Russia, where the question was not asked, only 24% express satisfaction with the actions of the international community. We thus have a considerable level of concern and a quite low level of ap proval with current policies. When it comes to the details of climate action, however, differences emerge. Approaches to combating climate change A relative majority(47%) prioritise mitigation measures to halt climate change, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, compared with 35% who prefer to focus on ad aptation measures to adjust to climate change. Latvia and Russia are notable exceptions, where adaptation is strongly preferred. In Russia, this public attitude is in line with the government’s strategic focus on responding to the negative impacts of climate change rather than tackling its root causes and introducing mitigation measures. A worrying 26% of respondents in Russia also believe that no action is needed, well above the average of 8% in the other coun tries surveyed. The second highest rate after Russia is in the United States, where 12% of respondents hold this view. However, there are strong partisan differences: only 2% of Democrats share this view, while 26% of Republicans be lieve no action is needed. International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 2

Taken together, what should people in your country do to respond to climate change? All figures in% DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA We should do everything we can to stop climate change . 47 49 62 45 30 46 28 56 47 58 53 44 49 We should adapt to climate change , so that we can live well 37 38 25 34 49 36 42 30 35 28 33 40 29 with a changed climate in the future. We do not need to do anything, because climate change is 10 6 6 8 11 11 26 6 9 5 8 7 12 not a big issue . Deviations from 100% result from:‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. There is scepticism about whether new technologies will be capable of alleviating the impacts of climate change. However, across all countries except Russia and Georgia, where the detailed question was not asked, there is broad support(60%) for prioritising the security of borders and focusing on competition in the global market for natural resources and new technologies. The level of this support almost matches the 71% in favour of international coopera tion on climate change. The populations of Germany, the United States and Latvia are also less willing to support climate-vulnerable countries, while there is greater support for such measures in non-EU countries Kazakhstan, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine, but also in Sweden. This tension between»my country first« and cooperative approaches to combating climate change is embedded in a general, non-climate related trend in which majorities in all countries agree that their country should concentrate on its own well-being and try to avoid international entangle ments. This sentiment is strong in Türkiye(83%), Georgia and Serbia(73%), as well as in France and the United King dom(both over 70%) and the United States(66%). Less than half of all respondents agree that their country should take more international responsibility and help other states when there are no direct benefits for their own country. When this is broken down into groups defined by their de gree of concern about climate change, however, the picture is slightly different. Of those most concerned about climate change, 53% agree that their country should take interna tional responsibility, even if there are no direct benefits for their own country. Some 68% of this group even support cooperation with countries that do not share the same val ues, a significantly higher rate than among less concerned groups. Turning again to climate action, among those who are most concerned about climate change, the most promi nent approach to tackling climate change is for rich coun tries to protect poorer countries from the effects of climate change, closely followed by seeing climate change as an opportunity to bring about positive social change. Con versely, among those who are not concerned about climate change, the highest levels of support are for securing bor ders and competing in the global market for natural re sources and new technologies. International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 3

Attitudes to Climate Change All figures in% Climate change represents a challenge to global peace and security. Disagreement 28 18 37 17 28 26 23 26 24 20 15 26 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 59 69 45 62 56 59 65 59 64 65 73 59 International collaboration is key to address global climate change beyond rivalries in other areas. Disagreement 19 12 14 12 16 19 14 15 17 10 10 16 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 68 76 74 64 67 65 75 71 71 75 74 68 If my country acts early and decisively, climate change can be a unique opportunity to completely transform our lifestyles towards a fairer, healthier society. Disagreement 35 24 19 17 27 24 20 26 20 20 16 22 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 50 60 66 59 52 57 66 55 67 65 66 61 With climate change leading to instability, my country should prioritise securing its borders and competing in the global market for natural resources and new technologies. Disagreement 25 20 25 13 21 16 24 26 17 20 10 21 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 55 61 55 62 57 64 58 48 71 57 74 59 I trust that investment in new technologies in my country can sufficiently tackle climate change. Disagreement 52 38 23 23 30 29 24 43 35 34 16 32 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 33 46 61 54 53 54 63 39 52 48 70 50 Rich countries should protect poor and vulnerable countries from the impacts of climate change. Disagreement 26 21 17 12 23 22 11 21 16 18 11 25 DE FRA ITA KAZ LVA POL SRB SWE TUR UK UKR USA Agreement 59 65 67 67 58 60 78 64 73 67 78 57 Deviations from 100% result from: ‘don’t know’ and‘no response’. International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 4

Agreement to the following statements by concern about climate change. All figures in% Not at all worried about climate change My country should take more international 28 responsibility and help other states , even if there are no direct benefits for my country. Very worried about climate change My country should cooperate with any country , 55 even those that do not share our values , if it promotes peace and security in the world. My country should increase its 55 military spending . My country should r educe its dependency on 46 China even if this has a negative impact on the living standard of the my country population. 60% 40% 20% 0% Agreement 0% 20% Agreement 40% 53 68 58 60 60% At the same time, there is a strong desire among those most concerned about climate change to reduce depend ence on countries with differing values: 73% of them favour reducing dependence on countries that do not share our values, with a similar trend among the somewhat con cerned(70%). This desire for decoupling is particularly strong in relation to China and Russia, even if it means economic sacrifices. For example, 60% of those most wor ried about climate change favour economic decoupling from China, compared with 46% of the least worried. There is a similar pattern for Russia, with 68% of those most worried in favour of decoupling, compared with 49% of the least worried. Strikingly, 58% of those most con cerned about climate change also support an increase in military spending. This suggests that for some, both prag matism and idealism are not fixed principles but vary de pending on the issue at hand. We look at this group more closely in the following section. Between ideology and pragmatism What has been said so far points to conflicting priorities in terms of ideological values on one hand, and pragmatic considerations that should guide the foreign policy of re spondents’ respective countries on the other. Respondents prioritise cooperation with states perceived as ideologically aligned within a binary framework of»us versus them« and would like to isolate themselves from perceived adversaries through economic decoupling. At the same time, they rec ognise the need for pragmatic cooperation on climate change, acknowledging that effective action requires the involvement of non-aligned countries. The high level of awareness of climate change and the urgency of address ing it also contrasts with their push to increase military spending, as militarised states cause significant environ mental damage even in peacetime, for example, through the fossil fuel demands of operations, the chemical-inten sive maintenance of equipment, and the destructive envi ronmental impacts of military research and testing. This contradiction reveals a blind spot in respect of which de fence capabilities and climate change are treated in isola tion from each other, ignoring the impact of one on the other. The current trend to put»my country first« and, more broadly, to work almost exclusively with»the good guys« against»the bad guys« has spilled over into the question of how to tackle climate change. This is reflected in the con tradiction between recognising the need for collective ef forts to address climate issues and simultaneously seeing competition and border security as solutions to climate challenges. This contradiction reflects a broader trend to wards the securitisation of climate change, in terms of which the issue is framed through the lens of national se curity, geopolitical advantage and rivalry. Public confusion is exacerbated by mixed messages from political leaders who increasingly portray international cooperation – in cluding on climate change – as a zero-sum game. This is evident in the geopolitical rivalry for access to natural re sources and critical minerals to secure competitive position and supply chain resilience, and in protectionist policies in the race to develop green technologies. These dynamics are reflected in policies such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and Western countries‘ attempts to reduce their de pendence on Chinese supply chains. The latter creates a paradox, as efforts to decarbonise economies clash with the reality of China‘s dominance in the refining and pro cessing of critical minerals needed for green tech supply chains. Similarly, international climate cooperation has been hampered by the strategic use of climate change agendas as a geopolitical tool. The EU‘s CBAM initiative has been criticised for acting as a de facto trade barrier dis International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 5

guised as environmental protection, while Azerbaijan has weaponised environmental activism as a pretext for its blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh before militarily reclaiming the region. These trends fuel the perception that an openness to col laboration in general risks marginalisation in a world in creasingly defined by confrontation and competition. This sentiment is underscored by survey results, as 65% of re spondents across countries believe we are entering an era of»my country first«, with nations prioritising their own particular interests over collective action. International organisations: a stabilising factor in an unstable world? The shift towards confrontation and competition described above, which has started to shape public perceptions, is driven by a sense of a general increase in insecurity, with new devastating wars – including one in Europe – height ening global polarisation and shifts in global and regional power dynamics. Indeed, 45% of respondents globally be lieve that the era of American(or Western) supremacy is over, with over 50% agreement in Kazakhstan, Serbia, Russia and Türkiye, and 46–47% in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Even in the United States, 43% share this view. Some 67% of respondents agree that an era of wars and conflicts is emerging, with nearly 80% agreement in Italy, Sweden and Türkiye. Meanwhile, 53% overall think there will be a new Cold War between China and the United States, in which all other nations will be forced to choose sides. In the United States, 54% agree with this view. This growing uncertainty also affects the perception of in ternational and regional organisations, raising questions about their role and effectiveness. Established in the after math of the Second World War to prevent future wars and maintain global peace, these institutions have in many cas es played a key role in conflict prevention and mediation. However, scepticism about the relevance of international relations is growing. More than 50% of respondents in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Türkiye and even France express doubts about the importance of laws and rules in contemporary international relations. Nevertheless, and this is a crucial point, support for inter national and regional organisations remains strong across the sample. Among such organisations, the United Nations enjoy the highest level of support, ahead of the EU, the OSCE and NATO, even in Russia and the United States. Only in Germany does support for the UN dip just below 50%, possibly because of a loss of credibility as an out come of the rather dismissive depiction of the United Na tions in the German debate about Israel‘s actions in Gaza. The OSCE enjoys considerable support in all countries, and particularly in those where it is directly active or operates in the immediate neighbourhood: support exceeds 50% in Kazakhstan, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. The question was not asked in Georgia. Overall, 71% agree that international cooperation is crucial in tackling global climate change, over and above rivalries in other areas. Among this group, a greater role for the UN is particularly favoured(70%), but also for the OSCE(56%) and the EU(62%). This indicates a strong belief that global cooperation through international organisations is essential to tackle climate change effectively, and that climate change is an issue which has not yet been fully subordinat ed to the binary thinking triggered by the war on Ukraine. There still seems to be room for more cooperative ap proaches. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the state of the world? Combined responses‘strongly agree’ and‘somewhat agree’. All figures in% Laws and rules in international relations are no longer relevant. DE FRA GEO ITA KAZ LVA POL RUS SRB SWE TUR UK 35 57 31 41 50 44 37 64 60 39 68 37 We are entering an era of »my country first« and everyone is looking out for themselves. 60 73 73 65 58 48 56 45 74 66 83 71 An era of wars and conflicts is emerging. 67 72 42 79 49 63 62 58 72 78 79 74 A new Cold War is emerging between China and the US, 51 49 30 56 50 48 51 57 60 54 68 52 and all other states will have to choose sides. The era of American (Western) supremacy is over. 46 47 28 43 53 40 34 62 56 47 51 46 UKR USA 63 38 64 66 72 70 63 54 33 43 International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 6

Which of the organisations mentioned should play a bigger role in the future? Response‘Yes, it should play a bigger role’. Germany UN United Nations 48 NATO OSCE North Organization for Altantic Security and Treaty Cooperation in Organization Europe EU European Union 47 47 49 France 60 48 43 56 Italy 61 39 52 63 Kazakhstan 65 27 50 42 Latvia 61 62 52 67 Poland 66 76 57 57 Russia 51 14 48 30 Serbia 60 9 53 42 Sweden 63 49 46 51 Türkiye 67 United 62 Kingdom Ukraine 70 United 57 States 56 54 61 53 42 53 77 63 79 53 36 46 The question was not asked in Georgia. The way forward In an era of increasing competition and confrontation, pragmatic cooperation will be needed, especially to cope with cross-border challenges such as climate change. Polit ical leaders must understand and communicate to their populations that»my country first« and polarisation are not the only avenues to pursue. Failure to do so risks strength ening populist movements that offer simplistic solutions ill-equipped to deal with today‘s complex geopolitical chal lenges. Cooperative security may not be in vogue globally at the moment, but a balanced approach that combines strategic autonomy for nation states with international co operation offers a more viable long-term path. Pursuing such an approach could enable political leaders to alleviate widespread fears and confusion within societies. Achieving peace in Europe and tackling climate change and its cas cading effects are two urgent, interlinked challenges that require overcoming divisions and finding common ground. International and regional organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE, can play a key role in identifying and ad vancing such a common agenda. By managing communi cation and promoting pragmatic cooperation on climate action, international organisations can help to mitigate the growing trend towards the geopoliticisation and securitisa tion of climate change. This would not only enhance their legitimacy and capacity to drive global climate action, but also contribute to stabilising relations between non-aligned states in areas of common interest, despite differences in other areas. For this to happen, leaders need to adopt a clearer and less confrontational approach to climate issues, as well as to other priorities that lend themselves to structured interna tional cooperation in the service of national interests. This is important to prevent public perceptions that climate co operation could put their countries at a disadvantage in the global competition for resources or weaken their ability to adapt to climate change in a zero-sum geopolitical context. Ensuring this would allow international organisations to advance the key interests of participating states, even in a world shaped by national self-interest, while fostering con ditions for sustainable, long-term climate solutions. International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 7

Authors Sabrina Kaschowitz Senior Researcher at FES ROCPE General Information Publisher FES Regional Office for International Cooperation Cooperation and Peace Reichsratsstr. 13/5, A-1010 Vienna Phone:+43 1 890 38 11 205 Responsible Christos Katsioulis Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organisation for which the author works. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. holds the rights to the photographic material. Use of the photographic material is only permitted when reporting on the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Commercial use of the photographic material is not permitted. If you have any questions concerning the clarification of rights, please contact the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung e.V. The data set on which this study is based will be published through the Archive of Social Democracy once the analyses have been com pleted, unless contractual regulations or internal guidelines of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung prevent this. We publish research data at ↗ collections.fes.de February 2025 © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. ISBN 978-3-98628-697-2 International climate cooperation – Somewhere between idealism and pragmatism 8