KOMMENTARE/ COMMENTS The Arab Human Development Report – Envisioning an Arab Renaissance NADER FERGANY E ditor’s Introduction: The Arab Human Development Report( ahdr ) has had a noteworthy career. Within the Arab world, it has stimulated debate and controversy. In Europe and the United States, since its publication almost every discussion about development, democratization, and reform in Arab countries has made reference to the ahdr ’s findings. Furthermore, outside reform initiatives, such as those envisioned in the usa ’s Greater Middle East Initiative, have been linked to the report. The report is thus a prime example of the power of ideas and the difficult interrelationship between knowledge and politics, which is particularly relevant to the sensitive relations between the usa and the Arab world since September 11. The following contribution by the lead author of the ahdr explains the original idea behind the report, comments on the political reactions, and envisions a reform path which translates analytical insights into societal reform from within. Contents and Objectives of the Arab Human Development Reports The first ahdr (2002) presented a comprehensive but preliminary treatment of the current situation of the Arab nation from a human development perspective. The Report ended its diagnosis by concluding that three fundamental deficits impede human development in Arab countries:(i) in the acquisition of knowledge,(ii) in freedom and good governance, and(iii) in the empowerment of women. 1 Given that the first ahdr , by virtue of its comprehensive nature, was unable to investigate deeply the individual deficits, a need arose for more profound treatment. The Regional Bureau for Arab States of the United Nations Development Program therefore decided to produce at least three more annual issues of the ahdr : the ahdr has thus become a series of reports. 12 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

The second Report was dedicated to providing in-depth treatment of the deficit in knowledge acquisition in Arab countries and concluded with a strategic vision for the establishment of a knowledge-based society. The third Report is currently in preparation and focuses on»freedom and good governance«. Publication is scheduled for the end of 2004. This may be the most critical and sensitive of the trinity of deficits outlined by the first ahdr . The hope is that this Report will stimulate a broad-based discussion throughout Arab societies concerning ways of expanding the range of freedom and building good governance among the Arab nation. Preparation of the fourth Report, focusing on»The Advancement of Women«, has also begun and publication is planned for 2005. In addressing the dangers implicit in re-shaping the Arab region from the outside, the ahdr series seeks to act as a spur to the formulation of a strategic vision, to be crystallized by Arab elites through a process of societal innovation. This innovation would be aimed at re-shaping the region from within for the sake of its human development. There can be no dispute that reform from the inside, founded on rigorous self-criticism, is the right approach for confronting such dangers and ensuring success and sustainability. Mindful of the maxim that»the people of Mecca best know the city’s paths«, the ahdr are, nevertheless, reluctant to offer a»ready-made recipe« claiming to be appropriate for the promotion of human development in any or all Arab societies. 2 Building human development requires a level of societal innovation that the members of Arab societies can accomplish only for themselves and by themselves. Indeed, this is what human development is all about. 1. The ahdr is prepared by a team of more than 100 researchers and experts, male and female, from across the spectrum of Arab countries, generations, and intellectual tendencies, based both inside and outside the Arab world. Preparation of the Report is subject to a multi-step process of synthesis and rigorous review by a consultative council. Thereafter the Report is reviewed by two teams of readers independent of the Report preparation process. One reviews the original, Arabic version, while the other, which includes non-Arabs, reviews the English translation. The team is almost entirely composed of Arabs, with the exception of some non-Arab members of the second independent readers’ team, whose presence is justified by the fact that the Report seeks to address non-Arabs as well as its original Arab audience. 2. We deliberately use the term»Arab society« in this context in preference to»Arab country« or»Arab state« in order to stress that the»society« in question may be part of a state or of a collection of states or of the Arab world as a whole. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 13

The Report thus confines itself to indicating the main features of a proposed strategic vision 3 to illuminate the path towards human development. The vital forces in any Arab society are invited, first, to engage with it through serious discussion . Disagreement, where objectively justified, is as valuable as agreement, and diagnosis and recommendations have to be contextualized. Only then can societal forces determine their own path towards the goals of the strategic vision. Out of this process of social innovation, a societal movement may arise that depends on the release of human creative energies within the society in question and their efficient utilization in building human development. The last chapter of each Report therefore focuses on broad outlines to guide the future quest for human development, in the hope of stimulating debate. Knowledge and Human Development: The Important Messages of the Second AHDR A review of global, regional, and local developments since work on the first ahdr was completed led the Report team to conclude that the challenge to human development represented by the three deficits in knowledge, freedom, and the empowerment of women, remains very serious. Indeed, the challenge may have heightened, particularly in the area of freedom, largely because of adverse regional and global changes. These include the deterioration of civil and political liberties in the United States and the West after the events of 9-11, especially where Arabs and Muslims are concerned, and the subsequent tightening of restrictions on freedom in Arab countries. In addition, Israel has repeated its incursions into the Palestinian territories, leaving appalling scenes of destruction and devastation in its wake; and the coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom invaded and occupied Iraq in breach of international legitimacy. Concerning the state of knowledge acquisition at the start of the twentyfirst century, the second ahdr (2003) points to a weakness in the dissemination and production of knowledge in Arab countries despite the presence of significant Arab human capital. This human capital could, under different circumstances, constitute a strong infrastructure for a knowledge renaissance. 3. Which, by definition, does not seek to emulate the level of rigor of a»strategy«. 14 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

The Report concludes with a strategic vision for the establishment of a knowledge-based society in Arab countries, organized around five main pillars: 1. Full respect for the key freedoms of opinion, expression, and association, and their guarantee through good governance. 2. Ensuring high-quality education for all, with special attention given to the two ends of the educational spectrum, early childhood education and higher education, and to lifelong learning. 3. The institution of research and technological development in all societal activities and accession to the information age. 4. Rapid transition to a knowledge-based mode of production in Arab socio-economic structures. 5. Establishing a general Arab knowledge model that is authentic, open, and enlightened, based on: a return to true religion, salvaged from exploitation for tendentious purposes, and the encouragement and appreciation of independent religious scholarship; promotion of the Arabic language; appeal to and use of the best of the Arab knowledge heritage; enrichment of, support for, and celebration of cultural diversity within the nation; and opening up to other cultures. In conclusion, the Report points to the fact that knowledge acquisition is a sacred duty that goes unobserved in the Arab nation today. Religion, culture, history, and the future demand that Arabs seek knowledge. The only impediments to knowledge are man-made structures, in society, the economy, and, above all, politics. It is now incumbent on the Arabs to set these structures to rights so that their nation may assume the place in the world it rightfully deserves in the Knowledge Millennium. Responses and Criticisms The publication of the first and second Reports provoked a storm of reaction both for and against, and from inside and outside Arab borders. 4 In the Report team’s view, this is an indication both of the vital importance of the issues dealt with and of the need to bring them to the fore 4. In my estimation, the topography of the reaction to the second ahdr does not differ in essence from that of the first, despite the fact that the second Report turned out to be more mature in its attempt to avoid many of the justifiable criticisms directed against the first. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 15

during this critical era in the history of the Arab nation. The Report team welcomes serious and objective discussion of the issues raised and indeed considers this an essential component of the start-up process for societal innovation leading to the formulation of an authentic»Arab renaissance« project. In order to understand reactions to the ahdr it is important to understand a key aspect of the»Arab mentality« in relation to the anguish of self-criticism. In my estimation, the Arab intellectual identity is in essence an uneasy mixture of feelings of humiliation – which are understandable and have their origin in the continual thwarting of aspirations in the Arab nation – and of»transcendentalism« in the»Kantian« sense, in that it regards itself as being above self-criticism 5 as part of a desperate effort to protect the self, which is simultaneously both oppressed and violated. Reactions to the Report varied from one Arab country to another, as expected, according to the margin of freedom available. It is perhaps natural that a report critical of the current situation should meet with a measure of reserve on the part of the societal forces responsible for, or implicated in, the present crisis in the Arab world. Thus the reaction of governments, Arab official organizations, and certain intellectuals was lukewarm and in some cases even hostile. At the same time, reactions to the Report varied from one Arab country to another, as expected, according to the margin of freedom available, the vitality of debate on public issues, and the degree of enlightenment of the government. Thus, while public discussions of the Report benefited from official sponsorship in Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon, for instance, the authorities in one Arab country banned a public seminar planned to discuss the ahdr findings. It is also natural that such a report should meet with sympathetic reactions from forces of change critical of the status quo and hoping for a better alternative. This was the main reaction among civil society organizations and independent academic circles, though some of these provided objective – and welcome – criticisms of the report’s methodology or contents. 5. Mahdi Bunduq, Deconstructing Arab Culture (in Arabic), Policy Package 97–98 (Cairo: Higher Council for Culture, 2003). 16 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

What is not natural, however, is that some of those who might have been expected to stand shoulder to shoulder with a Report of this type should have made defamatory accusations: for example, that the Report was»treason« or an attempt to curry favor with the West at the expense of other Arabs. Other critics of the Report condemned it as going too far in highlighting the shortcomings of Arab countries. Personally, however, I find no exaggeration or embellishment of the negatives in the ahdr : on the one hand, the Report team attempted to be as objective as possible; on the other, in view of the fact that the Report was issued through undp , whose members are governments, the Report team was careful not to single out any Arab state for harsh criticism. The same logic applies with even greater force when it comes to the region as a whole, a region of which the team is extremely solicitous and for which it desires nothing but progress. In my opinion the Report may if anything have treated the negative aspects of the current Arab situation a little too leniently. The most foolish of the criticisms directed against the Report, however, were those which claimed that it was an attempt to curry favor with the West by focusing on the faults of Arab countries and exploiting the post 9-11 atmosphere, particularly in the United States. This led some to view it as a preparatory step for outside intervention by the West, particularly the United States in the context of its so-called War on Terror. One such critic even went so far as to demand that publication of the Report be prevented, reasoning that since»publication of the first report had led to the occupation of Iraq, the appearance of another might be construed as an invitation to the occupation of Syria!«. Appeal to reason and the information available reveals the incoherence of such criticisms. Work on the first Report began early in 2001 – even though it appeared after 9-11 – and the penultimate draft of the Report was completed before that date. Likewise, we know that Iraq had been suffering from an unjust embargo by the United States for almost a decade before work commenced on the first Report and that plans for the invasion of Iraq had been put in place years before its appearance. The first ahdr , despite being issued through undp , unequivocally condemned Israeli incursions in the Palestinian territories and the blockade of Iraq, incurring the rancor of both the United States and Israel; both went so far as to protest officially at the contents of the Report, although this did not prevent them from exploiting it later on, instrumentalizing the analysis given in the Report to justify their own policies. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 17

It is also indisputable that the factors that shape the policy of the United States and the West in the Arab region did not come into being with the ahdr . Similarly, there can be no doubt that among the most important reasons underlying the success of the hostile plans directed against the Arab region from the outside are the Arab weakness and disintegration that the ahdr seeks to overcome through the initiation of a historic process of Arab renaissance. The AHDR and US Interests The Report suffered abuse at the hands of forces outside the Arab nation, especially the current us administration which used it to further its own interests, both in the Arab region and globally, and in an attempt to acquire the credibility that, with its history of disregarding legitimate Arab aspirations and rights, particularly in Palestine and Iraq, it so obviously lacks. The us administration’s misuse of the Report was most blatant in its proposed»Greater Middle East Initiative«. Simultaneously, the current us administration sought to hinder the preparation of the third ahdr – whose topic is fundamental to a true renaissance in Arab countries – by penalizing one of the organizations sponsoring the Report for having published criticisms of Israel and the current us administration in the first and second ahdr . These actions are expressive of a fundamental contradiction, not to say a deep-rooted hypocrisy, in the current us administration’s position which makes a show of sympathizing with reform while at the same time attempting to obstruct one of the most significant contributions to the reform process to emerge from within the Arab nation. It is a source of further sorrow that the administration’s definition of »terrorism« was broadened to include any act of patriotic resistance to occupation or to foreign intervention in Arab countries, even though such acts are a legitimate right recognized in international human rights law, which considers them an exercise of the right to self-determination and the right to resist occupation. It would be surprising if this expanded definition of terrorism, and the measures based on it, had not nourished Arab negative feelings towards the current us administration, feelings that have become the greatest obstacle to achieving normal Arab–American relations, and one that mere propaganda campaigns can do nothing to overcome. People’s feelings are 18 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

a natural reaction to the course of events on the ground, and no amount of»popular diplomacy« aimed at»changing minds and winning peace«, will succeed in removing the agony Arabs feel at the sufferings of Palestine and Iraq and at the threat of intervention, by force if need be, in other Arab countries. From Analysis to Reform: Alternative Arab Futures The crisis of human development in the Arab nation has become so huge, complex, and multi-dimensional that no true reform of any particular aspect of Arab society is possible without reform of every other aspect if a human renaissance is to take place in the region. As is abundantly clear from the proposed strategic vision for the establishment of a knowledgebased society in Arab countries – a topic that might seem to be innocent of any political perspective – the required societal reform extends to the dominant culture as well as to current social and economic structures, and, before all else, to the political context at the national, regional, and global levels. In other words, partial reform is no longer enough, however many fields it may cover. Indeed, such reform may no longer be possible in any case, given its need for an enabling societal environment. It follows that delay or prevarication over comprehensive societal reform in Arab countries out of regard for existing interests – of whatever kind – can no longer be tolerated, the alternative bringing with it consequences that would be catastrophic. There is no civilized alternative for the Arab renaissance but to open up to the world and human culture at large. It has also become clear that the political shackles on human development in Arab countries constitute the most virulent and long-lasting factor in terms of delaying opportunities for a renaissance in the Arab nation. This calls for a radical reform of the power structure in Arab countries. While it is possible that if left to follow their own course events in Arab countries might lead to a violent social conflict, ending in a modification of the power structure, the cost to society would be too enormous for any patriot solicitous of the well-being of the nation as a whole to tolerate or accept. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 19

The majority of Arabs suffer, as a result of an imbalance in the distribution of power in terms of both authority and wealth, from manifold injustices in the form of growing poverty(a term that we use here to denote the antithesis of human development and which thus includes whatever undermines freedom, whether as a result of internal repression or intervention by force – in its cruelest form, occupation – from outside). The sole alternative capable of saving us from the unimaginable disasters that will inevitably come about if current trends continue is the initiation of an historic process of negotiation among the vital forces of Arab societies aimed at achieving a radical modification of the power structure and the exercise of power. Such a modification should lead to good governance, protect freedom, and enable human development. To this end, there is no alternative to reform from within founded on balanced self-criticism and an effective and authentic effort at innovation on the part of society at large in which all the vital forces in Arab countries participate. This should create a societal transition that is both universally acceptable and sustainable. In contrast, reform imposed from outside cannot possibly serve the interests of any but those who impose it; it cannot serve the interests of the Arabs, and would unavoidably result in a legitimate, and indeed sacred, resistance. This said, there is no civilized alternative for the Arab renaissance but to open up to the world and human culture at large. The Arabs have made a substantial contribution to the latter and must now regain the honor of effective participation in it. Obscurantism and isolationism can bequeath only stagnation and impotence. At the same time, the global system is itself indisputably in need of reform, and such reform, when carried out, will be reflected positively in improved opportunities for renaissance in the Arab region, which has suffered too much from the injustice of the current oppressive state of affairs. In the final analysis, the Arabs have a real opportunity to build a human renaissance and, as far as possible, to reform the global context. However, this opportunity is dependent on the strengthening of Arab cooperation, the weakness of which, specifically in respect of knowledge acquisition and generally in respect of human development, represents the irrevocable loss of a historic opportunity. In my judgment, the essence of an Arab renaissance in this critical era in the history of the Arab nation would be a shift towards a society of freedom and good governance. 20 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

Freedom is taken here in the comprehensive sense of eradication of all forms of infringement of human dignity . This comprehensive sense not only incorporates civil and political freedoms(in other words, liberation from oppression) but also adds to them the imperative that the individual be liberated from all means by which human dignity may be diminished, such as hunger, disease, ignorance, poverty, and fear. In human rights terms, this understanding of freedom extends to all realms of human rights, that is, to civil and political rights, as well as economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights. In this sense, freedom is synonymous with human development, and is perhaps the quintessential public good required in less developed countries. By»good governance« we mean governance based on the following seven principles: 1. Freedom in the comprehensive sense and especially the key freedoms of opinion, expression, and association(civil and political) in harmony with international human rights law. 2. Full representation of the people in governance institutions. 3. Governance strictly based on institutions and, above all, the separation of powers. 4. Institutions that work efficiently and with total transparency according to the principles of rational public administration. 5. Institutions subject to effective inter-accountability based on the separation of powers and direct accountability to the people via periodical, open, free, and honest elections. 6. Application of the law to all without exception in a form that is fair and protective of human rights. 7. A competent, honest, and totally independent judiciary to oversee the application of the law and implement its rulings efficiently vis-à-vis the executive authority. The society of freedom and good governance also requires a sturdy institutional structure in which three sectors function efficiently and in synergy: the state, comprising the government, elected representatives, and the judiciary; civil society; and the private sector, enhanced by the principles of rational public administration. It appears to me that this model of good governance should be considered the most general and useful form of democracy. The pursuit of such a system of good governance by way of society-wide innovation in Arab countries would guarantee that it would be implanted in the fabric of Arab society, thus ensuring its stability and sustainability. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 21

What May the Future Bring? The Probable Way Forward: The»Mixed Alternative« The harbingers of a future scenario are gathering, at both regional and global level. We refer to the possible outcomes of the G8’s»Broader Middle East Initiative« and its concomitants, an initiative that may push for a wave of internal reform in Arab countries but that is driven by outside forces and fundamentally serves their interests. Given their current makeup and susceptibility to outside influences, it is likely that the Arab states will strive to respond positively to these dictated reformist pressures while at the same time attempting to prevent them from achieving all-out societal reform, especially in the political sphere and specifically with regard to the distribution of power and its exercise – issues which, in my view, are essential to an authentic Arab renaissance. This»mixed alternative« will probably fall short of an»authentic Arab renaissance« in two respects fundamental to national liberation. First, it will probably disregard basic issues of Arab freedom, since it may involve subservience to foreign powers whose interests do not necessarily intersect with those of freedom and good governance in the sense adopted here, especially where national liberation and independence are concerned. Specifically, the»mixed alternative« may lead to a special position being carved out for Israel and continuing foreign influence in Iraq and throughout the region, under the cloak of the»Wider Middle East Initiative«. Second, and more broadly, the vitality of internal reform in the Arab countries may become muted, leading to continuing passive reception of the main features of the Arab destiny from the outside. Let us also note that the historic project for Arab reform started two centuries ago, gained momentum through the battles for national liberation, and continues today without regard to the forces that exercise internal and external hegemony over the Arabs’ trajectory and which have often served to slow it down. Being faithful to the Arab renaissance project requires, however, that we also acknowledge that the trajectory of Arab reform has remained distant from the Arab people’s aspirations to freedom, honor, and dignity. From another perspective, an opportunity exists to minimize the shortcomings of the externally driven reform project and to bring it closer to the ideal alternative or at least to divert its course towards a process of cumulative reform that approaches the»épanouissement humain« alternative, even if it does not go all the way. Whatever the case, it remains the 22 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

task of the forces of the Arab renaissance to realize that alternative to the utmost possible degree. Modifications to the»Greater Middle East Initiative« presented by the current us administration – for example, the German and British initiatives – have emerged. These show some interest in heeding legitimate Arab demands for liberation in Palestine and Iraq and stress the necessity of broad and active participation across society in the Arab countries in shaping the reform project. A European contribution, different from the »Greater Middle East Initiative« as originally presented by the current us administration, seems to have been incorporated in the G8 initiative. Such an initiative might form a strong foundation for Arab–European cooperation, based on mutual understanding and respect, that would support a genuine Arab initiative for renaissance. It may be that the most important way in which we may benefit from this alternative is through its provision of the necessary and fundamental condition for starting the historical process of transition towards freedom and good governance in Arab countries, to be outlined below. Arab Renaissance from Within – The»Épanouissement Humain« Scenario While this»realistic« alternative would not necessarily bring about the ultimate goal of a renaissance in the Arab nation, it may, in the best-case scenario, help open up a path to an historic process aimed at assuring the first peaceful transfer of power in Arab countries. The course that we think will avoid the miserable fate implied by perpetuation of current trends in Arab society is an historic process adopted by the Arab peoples and led by civil society institutions in Arab countries to bring about the first non-violent transfer of power . 6 The desired result of such a change would be the redistribution of power in Arab societies in such as way as to put it in the hands of its rightful owners, the mass of the people, as a transitional step to a system of good governance of the sort described above and one that would form a sound basis for a human renaissance in the Arab nation. What is required then is a historic shift, based on non-violent negotiation among all the vital forces of the various Arab societies, that aims to 6. Any transfer of power that does not reach the heart of the power structure, redistribution in favor of the masses, and institutional good governance does not qualify. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 23

redistribute power and organize its exercise along the lines described in the above definition of the good governance system. This shift requires an opening act that would widen to the maximum extent the scope of public space in Arab countries. It also requires an extended and interlinked society-wide struggle, in which the success of each stage would form the objective basis for the emergence of the next. Thus the best outcome for the path of reform as it is actually taking place and which is described above would perhaps be for it to lead to the realization of the initial legal and organizational reform needed for the historic path of transition towards freedom and good governance. Such reform would consist of a guarantee of full respect for the key freedoms of opinion, expression, and association. What is required is a historic shift, based on non-violent negotiation among all the vital forces of the various Arab societies, that aims to redistribute power. Such reform might guarantee the crystallization of a society-wide vanguard organized around the institutions of civil society that could lead the necessary society-wide struggle for the historic negotiation of a redistribution and reorganization of power in Arab countries. Once this initial desideratum is met, it will be necessary to clear the way completely for the vital forces in Arab societies to create their own path towards a society of freedom and good governance. The internal reform dynamic must be allowed to take its course freely so that a special Arab path to freedom and good governance can be determined. The bulk of the burden of bringing about this transition will fall on the shoulders of an elite of intellectuals and political and civil activists. They must carve out for themselves and for the nation a path that avoids both the prevailing submissiveness to the dominance of those with power and wealth, and the despair and violence to which many angry young people, to whom all avenues for positive action have been blocked, are drawn. This in turn will require a large measure of wisdom and solidarity across existing artificial borders, as well as many sacrifices. The role of the elite in the creation of the renaissance in the Arab nation is then critical, but what kind of elite do we have in mind? The elite in question is one that can transform itself into a societal vanguard that can give voice, transparently and with responsibility, to its society; that is 24 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance ipg 4/2004

committed to its renaissance, struggles for that renaissance, and is ready to take on the difficulties that that responsibility and commitment entail. These are the characteristics par excellence of a renaissance-oriented elite, characteristics which we fear the current Arab elites, and especially the intellectuals, have yet to rise to. The historic wager is that the atmosphere of freedom that guarantees absolute respect for the key freedoms of opinion, expression, and association will offer a fertile societal environment for the emergence of this elite. The AHDR’s Contribution: Invigorating Debate, Empowering the Elite The fundamental mission of the ahdr can be summed up as providing »intellectual ammunition« for an Arab renaissance through instigating debate on the salient issues of the crisis in human development and approaches to overcome them. In this respect the ahdr has probably succeeded. The issues brought to the fore by the successive editions of the report have got onto the agenda of all vital forces concerned with reform in the Arab world, regardless of the reaction to specific analyses or recommendations. In particular, certain reform actions that have been taken by Arab governments since the publication of the first volume, especially in the areas of empowerment of women and expansion of popular participation, are at least consistent with the recommendations of the Report. Many of the maxims – for example,»building the knowledge society« – have become a staple of official and civil society jargon in Arab countries. In addition, a multitude of reform initiatives have been proposed by civil society groups and the League of Arab States in the last three years. To be sure, a great deal more needs to be done, both by governments and civil society throughout the Arab world, to fully capture the reform vision of the ahdr and hopefully carry it forward toward a resplendent Arab renaissance. However, the ahdr is an unfolding process. The extent of its ultimate contribution to reform in the Arab world can be judged only by its comprehensive vision for renaissance, expected to coalesce in the publication of the third and fourth volumes of the series. The vitality of the debate it ends up generating and the extent of empowerment of civil society as a societal vanguard for deep reform in the Arab world should be the ultimate criteria for success. ipg 4/2004 Fergany, Envisioning an Arab Renaissance 25

KOMMENTARE/ COMMENTS Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen – von der Utopie zum Konzept ROLF MÜTZENICH A uf der XL. Münchener Konferenz für Sicherheitspolitik griff Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer die amerikanische Initiative für einen »Greater Middle East« auf und forderte seinerseits eine transatlantische Initiative für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Als ersten Schritt regte der Außenminister dabei einen»gemeinsamen Mittelmeer-Prozess der nato und der Europäischen Union« an, deren erster Schwerpunkt auf der Entwicklung einer engen politischen Kooperation und Sicherheitspartnerschaft liegen sollte. Dabei müssten, so der Außenminister,»die legitimen Sicherheitsinteressen aller Staaten in der Region(…) in einer auf Transparenz und Verifikation, auf Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle beruhenden regionalen Sicherheitskooperation beantwortet werden«. Eine neue Initiative für einen Friedensprozess im Mittleren Osten tut Not und die Zeit dazu ist reif. Die Region ist nicht zuletzt durch die Terroranschläge des 11. September 2001 wieder verstärkt in die öffentliche Wahrnehmung gerückt. Ihre gravierenden Sicherheitsprobleme, die nicht zuletzt in Form des Terrorismus zunehmend auch Europa und die usa bedrohen, haben besonders das Thema der Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen wieder in den Vordergrund treten lassen. Die internationalen Bemühungen zur Verhinderung der Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen können in jüngster Zeit auch eine Reihe von Fortschritten vorweisen: So gab die Führung des Iran im November 2003 dem internationalen Druck nach und unterzeichnete das Zusatzprotokoll zum Nichtverbreitungsvertrag( npt ). Weiterhin zeichnete die Regierung in Teheran eine Erklärung zur iranischen Atompolitik. Libyens Staatschef Muammar al Gaddafi verkündete im Dezember 2003 den Verzicht seines Landes auf Massenvernichtungswaffen und legte sein Atomprogramm offen. Diese Entwicklungen wirken sich zunächst positiv auf die regionale und globale Stabilität aus. Die Atomprogramme in Libyen und Iran haben allerdings auch deutlich gemacht, wie groß der Schwarzmarkt für Bauteile für Atomwaffen ist und welche Brisanz das Thema Proliferation 26 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen ipg 4/2004

in der Region hat. Nach Einschätzung des Generaldirektors der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde( iaea ), Mohammed al Baradei, war die Gefahr eines Atomkrieges daher»noch nie so groß wie heute«(Der spiegel 5/2004). In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass sich die Region Mittlerer Osten 1 durch ein hohes Konfliktpotenzial und – verstärkt nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges – durch massive Aufrüstung auszeichnet, besteht eine erhebliche Eskalationsgefahr, die durch die Präsenz von Massenvernichtungswaffen noch problematischer wird. Damit stellt sich erneut die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer atom- oder massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone als Beitrag zu einem Friedensprozess in der Region. Erfahrungen und Initiativen Es hat bereits seit 40 Jahren verschiedene Initiativen für eine nuklearwaffenfreie oder eine massenvernichtungsfreie Zone im Mittleren Osten gegeben, die jedoch nicht zum Erfolg geführt haben. 2 Die erste Initiative kam aus Israel, als 1957 sechs von sieben Mitgliedern der israelischen Atomenergiekommission aus Protest gegen die Nuklearwaffenambitionen der Regierung zurücktraten und zwei von ihnen das Committee for Denuclearization of the Arab-Israel Conflict gründeten, das 1962 erstmals öffentlich zur Errichtung einer nuklearwaffenfreien Zone in der Region aufrief. Seit 1974 verabschiedet die un -Generalversammlung jedes Jahr eine – ursprünglich von Ägypten und dem Iran eingebrachte – Resolution für eine nuklearwaffenfreie Zone( nwfz ) im Mittleren Osten, seit 1980 einstimmig, also mit israelischer Zustimmung. Nachdem der irakische Präsident Saddam Hussein im Jahr 1990 angekündigt hatte, Chemiewaffen zu besitzen und sie im Falle eines israelischen Angriffs auch 1. Unter dem sicherheitspolitischen Subsystem»Mittlerer Osten« sollen hier der üblichen Definition der Region entsprechend die Anrainerstaaten des persischen Golfes, also Iran, die Staaten auf der arabischen Halbinsel inkl. Jemen und Jordanien sowie die Anrainerstaaten des Mittelmeers(Syrien, Israel, Libanon und Ägypten) subsumiert werden. 2. Derzeit existieren weltweit fünf kernwaffenfreie Zonen(Antarktis, Mittel- und Lateinamerika, Südpazifik, Südostasien, Afrika). Die Mitglieder dürfen weder im Geltungsbereich noch anderswo Kernwaffen entwickeln, bauen, erwerben oder kontrollieren. Sie verzichten ferner auf die Stationierung, den Transport oder den Test von Nuklearwaffen und dürfen auch keinem anderen Staat vergleichbare Aktivitäten auf ihrem Territorium gestatten. ipg 4/2004 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen 27

gegen die israelische Zivilbevölkerung einsetzen zu wollen, startete Ägypten eine Initiative für eine massenvernichtungswaffenfreie Zone Mittlerer Osten(Mubarak-Initiative). Nach dem Golfkrieg 1991 griffen auch der Golf-Kooperationsrat und der un -Sicherheitsrat diese Idee auf. Trotz der bislang fehlgeschlagenen Initiativen besteht eine realistische Chance, dem Ziel einer massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone näher zu kommen. Die Frage von Massenvernichtungswaffen war folglich auch ein zentraler Gegenstand der sicherheitspolitischen Verhandlungen im Rahmen der Arms Control and Regional Security Gruppe( acrs ). Von 1992 bis 1995 fanden die acrs -Gespräche zwischen Israel, 13 arabischen Staaten und einer palästinensischen Delegation statt. Sie endeten schließlich in der Sackgasse, da sich letztlich zwei unvereinbare Positionen gegenüberstanden. Während Israel eine umfassende Friedensregelung als Voraussetzung für Gespräche über atomare Abrüstung forderte, vertraten die arabischen Staaten die genau umgekehrte Position: Sie wollten zuerst über das israelische Nuklearpotenzial sprechen, um erst dann über eine Friedensregelung zu debattieren. Dieses Dilemma spiegelt die fundamental unterschiedlichen Bedrohungsperzeptionen der Akteure: Während Israel sich durch seine Nachbarn nach wie vor existenziell bedroht sieht und nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund der geringen eigenen strategischen Tiefe an der Nuklearoption als Überlebensgarantie festhält, fühlen sich die arabischen Staaten, die Israel als aggressive, expansiv orientierte Hegemonialmacht sehen, durch das israelische Potenzial bedroht. Einige Akteure streben ihrerseits nach Massenvernichtungswaffen. Trotz der bislang fehlgeschlagenen Initiativen besteht eine realistische Chance, dem Ziel einer massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone näher zu kommen – wenn mit Realismus und Geduld an die Verhandlungen herangegangen wird. Der Mittlere Osten: eine Konfliktkonstellation sui generis Auch wenn für einen Rüstungskontrollprozess im Mittleren Osten die Erfahrungen aus dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und des Entspannungsprozesses von Nutzen sein können, so kann man die verschiedenen Initi28 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen ipg 4/2004

ativen und Schritte nicht einfach kopieren und Eins zu Eins auf die Region übertragen. Die Situation im Mittleren Osten wird durch mehrere Faktoren enorm verkompliziert und ist mit der des Ost-West-Konfliktes nicht vergleichbar: ̈ Der Konflikt ist nicht bi-, sondern multipolar. Auch wenn der israelisch-arabische Gegensatz eine Zweiteilung nahe legt, so darf nicht außer Acht gelassen werden, dass die arabischen Staaten und der Iran keinesfalls als geschlossener Akteur auftreten, sondern in einen Konflikt um die regionale Vorherrschaft verwickelt sind. Außerdem gibt es keine regionale Führungsmacht, die eine Einigung herbeiführen könnte. ̈ Das sicherheitspolitische System ist strategisch nicht ausbalanciert. Israel bildet die regional dominante Militärmacht und befindet sich als einziges Land im Besitz von Nuklearwaffen. Durch den Erwerb von U-Booten der Delphin-Klasse ist es zudem bemüht, eine seegestützte Zweitschlagskapazität aufzubauen. ̈ Massenvernichtungswaffen haben keinesfalls nur eine abschreckende Wirkung: C-Waffen etwa wurden in der Region bereits mehrfach eingesetzt. Unklar ist, ob die israelischen Atomwaffen allein der Abschreckung dienen. Das Streben nach Massenvernichtungswaffen erfüllt darüber hinaus in den arabischen Staaten und im Iran auch andere Funktionen: Sie bringen den auf Prestige angewiesenen, autoritären Staatsführungen ein für ihre Legitimation notwendiges Ansehen, verschaffen ihnen regionalen und internationalen Respekt und können – wie im Falle der Kurden im Irak unter Saddam Hussein – in internen Konflikten eingesetzt werden. ̈ Es gibt keinen territorialen Status quo, sondern nach wie vor ungeklärte Gebietsfragen sowie Versuche, die staatliche Souveränität der Nachbarländer zu untergraben. ̈ Es gibt bisher keine regionale multilaterale Institution, die vertrauensbildend wirken könnte. ̈ In Fragen der Sicherheit herrscht im Mittleren Osten nach wie vor eine»Nullsummenmentalität« vor, in der Sicherheitsgewinne der anderen Seite als relative Verluste der eigenen Sicherheit gewertet werden. Dieses Denken fördert ein Klima des Misstrauens und macht Kooperation im Bereich der Sicherheitspolitik nahezu unmöglich. ̈ Die Beteiligung nicht- bzw. substaatlicher Akteure am Konflikt sowie die massive Präsenz externer Akteure(in erster Linie der usa ) erschwert eine regionale, zwischenstaatliche Lösung. ipg 4/2004 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen 29

Hinzu kommt, dass die Kapazitäten ungleich verteilt sind. Während Israel der einzige Kernwaffenstaat in der Region ist und als Einziger nicht dem npt -Regime beigetreten ist, wird von einigen weiteren Staaten der Region vermutet, dass sie über C-Waffen verfügen. Neben Israel sind dies insbesondere Ägypten, Syrien und der Iran. Ägypten und Syrien sind zudem der C-Waffenkonvention ferngeblieben. Libyen ist dem Vertrag erst vor kurzem beigetreten. Israel hat die Konvention zwar unterzeichnet, aber bis heute nicht ratifiziert. Der Irak besaß in der Vergangenheit Massenvernichtungswaffen und unterhielt ein Atomprogramm. Das Abkommen zum Verbot von B-Waffen wurde von allen Staaten bis auf Syrien und Ägypten ratifiziert. Es lässt sich also feststellen, dass die internationalen Regimes zur Eingrenzung von Massenvernichtungswaffen in der Region nicht greifen. Nicht zuletzt vor diesem Hintergrund ist es notwendig, den Unterschied zwischen einer atomwaffenfreien und einer massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone zu betonen. Während ersteres lediglich bedeuten würde, dass Israel seine Atomwaffen aufgibt und andere Länder von nuklearen Ambitionen – sofern vorhanden – Abstand nehmen, umfasst eine massenvernichtungswaffenfreie Zone auch die B- und C-Waffenbestände und-programme. Die Chancen nutzen: Schritte zur Abrüstung im Mittleren Osten Trotz widriger Voraussetzungen existiert im Mittleren Osten ein generelles Interesse an einer kooperativen Verbesserung der Sicherheitsposition und Konfliktvermeidung, an das sich anknüpfen ließe. Zur Entschärfung des israelisch-arabischen Konfliktes, zum Abbau von Massenvernichtungswaffen in der Region und zum Aufbau von Vertrauen kann daher Rüstungskontrolle einen Beitrag leisten. Darüber hinaus nähme eine Befriedung der Region den despotischen Regimes mit dem israelisch-arabischen Konflikt ein zentrales Argument, sich gegen Demokratie zu sperren. Eine Beschränkung der regionalen Aufrüstung und die politische Kontrolle bestehender Rüstungspotenziale könnte also den Weg in einen Mittleren Osten ebnen, der nachhaltig friedlich und demokratisch ist. Es geht dabei, wie oben gezeigt, nicht darum, das Szenario des Kalten Krieges direkt auf die Region zu übertragen. Ein solcher Vergleich spiegelt nicht die Realität des Mittleren Ostens wieder. Aber die Erfahrun30 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen ipg 4/2004

gen, die besonders in Europa während des ksze -Prozesses gemacht wurden, können auch im Mittleren Osten von Nutzen sein. Ein effektives Rüstungskontrollregime käme dabei nicht nur den mittelöstlichen Gesellschaften zugute, deren Haushalte durch Militärausgaben und regionale Rüstungswettläufe stark belastet werden, sondern es könnte auch die Chance zur Aufnahme von vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildenden Maßnahmen in der Region bieten. Die Chancen dafür stehen nicht gänzlich schlecht: Die sicherheitspolitische Situation Israels hat sich mit dem Ende der Herrschaft Saddam Husseins, der iranischen Unterzeichnung des Zusatzprotokolls zum Nichtverbreitungsvertrag und dem Verzicht Libyens auf Massenvernichtungswaffen deutlich verbessert. Ob noch eine existenzielle Bedrohung Israels durch die Aggression auswärtiger Staaten besteht, darf zumindest diskutiert werden, nachdem auch Syrien öffentlich von dem Ziel abgerückt ist, den jüdischen Staat zu zerstören und sich stattdessen auf die Forderung nach der Wiederherstellung der Grenzen von 1967 konzentriert. Aufgrund seiner Erfahrungen mit einer überwiegend feindseligen Umgebung, die zudem mehrfach versucht hat, die Existenz des jüdischen Staates auszulöschen, ist das Szenario eines Verzichts auf die Nuklearoption für die israelische Seite schlicht undenkbar. Israel befindet sich also in einer sicherheitspolitisch gestärkten Position wieder und hat nicht zuletzt aufgrund ökonomischer Probleme ein Interesse daran, den Rüstungswettlauf in der Region zu begrenzen. Zudem genießt Israel eine de facto Sicherheitsgarantie und die Unterstützung der Weltmacht usa . Allerdings sollten sich auch die arabischen Staaten und der Iran damit abfinden, dass das israelische Nuklearpotenzial vorerst nicht auf der Agenda von Rüstungsgesprächen zu finden sein wird. Eine solche, die Sicherheitsarchitektur der Region und die Situation Israels fundamental verändernde Entwicklung an den Anfang eines Prozesses zu setzen, der auf gegenseitiges Vertrauen angewiesen ist, wäre eher kontraproduktiv. Aufgrund seiner Erfahrungen mit einer überwiegend feindseligen Umgebung, die zudem mehrfach versucht hat, die Existenz des jüdischen Staates auszulöschen, ist das Szenario eines Verzichts auf die Nuklearoption für die israelische Seite schlicht undenkbar. Dennoch ist das israelische Bekenntnis zum Ziel einer massenvernichipg 4/2004 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen 31

tungswaffenfreien Zone sicherlich mehr als nur ein Lippenbekenntnis: Eine wirkungsvolle Kontrolle über die Militärbestände in der Region verbunden mit der Perspektive von Abrüstungsschritten würde letztendlich auch für Israel mehr Sicherheit bedeuten. Wie könnte der Weg zu einer Region Naher und Mittlerer Osten bestellt sein, die letztendlich frei von Massenvernichtungswaffen und den damit verbundenen Eskalationsgefahren ist? Zunächst sind vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen( vsbm ) auf multilateraler Ebene unerlässlich. Auf bilateraler Ebene sind sie teilweise schon durchaus erfolgreich umgesetzt worden: So enthält der Friedensvertrag Israels mit Ägypten Bestimmungen über demilitarisierte Zonen, Verifikationsmechanismen durch Dritte, Frühwarnsysteme und institutionalisierte Gespräche auf Offiziersebene. Auch der Friedensvertrag mit Jordanien beinhaltet vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und Kooperationsmechanismen, die zwar nicht reibungslos, aber insgesamt doch befriedigend funktionieren und zu einem Vertrauenszuwachs auf beiden Seiten beigetragen haben. Die Wasseraufteilung und der freie Zugang zu Plätzen von religiöser und historischer Bedeutung sind Beispiele hierfür. Auf multilateraler Ebene wären zunächst institutionalisierte Gespräche denkbar, die eine Bestandsaufnahme der Waffenarsenale zum Ziel haben. Die damit verbundene Einschätzbarkeit der jeweiligen Potenziale ist eine Grundvoraussetzung für gegenseitiges Vertrauen. Im Anschluss daran könnten bestimmte(konventionelle) Waffensysteme thematisiert werden, mit dem Ziel, sie zu begrenzen oder zu reduzieren. Hier müssten die arabischen Staaten von ihrer bisherigen Forderung abrücken, konventionelle Waffen erst nach dem Verzicht auf Massenvernichtungswaffen auf die Agenda zu setzen. Dabei ist es in der Tat wichtig, wie von israelischer Seite mehrfach betont wurde, dass ein zuverlässiges Verifikationsregime installiert wird. Die alarmierenden Nachrichten aus Pakistan oder dem Iran beweisen aus israelischer Sicht die Anfälligkeit des iaea -Kontollregimes. Hier besteht in der Tat dringender Reformbedarf. Ein weiterer Schritt könnte die Entmilitarisierung bestimmter Zonen sein – oder der Abzug offensiver Waffensysteme aus Grenzregionen, um Vertrauen zu schaffen. Wenn schließlich die Abschaffung von Massenvernichtungswaffen thematisiert werden sollte, so könnten Sicherheitsgarantien der usa diesen Schritt insbesondere für Israel erleichtern. Mit Vorsicht sollte man dagegen Plänen für eine kszno begegnen – einer der ksze analogen Institution für den Nahen Osten. Obgleich sich arabische Politiker bereits für ein solches Forum ausgesprochen und ob32 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen ipg 4/2004

gleich sich Israel und Jordanien im Friedensvertrag dazu verpflichtet haben, eine solche Institution einzurichten, genießt sie in der arabischen Welt nur wenig Ansehen. Zu deutlich verbindet man damit den ksze Prozess, der zu Transparenz, zur Öffnung und letztendlich auch zur Demokratisierung und zum Zerfall der Sowjetunion geführt hat. Die Eliten und autoritären Führer der arabischen Staaten wollen sich ein solches Schicksal naturgemäß ersparen. Ein großer Vorteil eines solchen Forums wäre jedoch sein genuin regionaler Charakter, der es von jedem Verdacht befreit, ein Versuch externer Akteure zu sein, die Region im eigenen Interesse neu zu ordnen. Letzten Endes kann ein solcher Prozess jedoch nur dann erfolgreich sein, wenn die Hauptakteure in der Lage sind, ihr gemeinsames Interesse an Rüstungskontrolle als ersten Schritt zum Frieden zu begreifen. Die Rolle Europas und der Sozialdemokratie Im Verbund mit den usa kann Europa diesen Prozess unterstützend begleiten. Die eu genießt bei den Arabern insgesamt ein höheres Ansehen als die usa , die gegenüber Israel als voreingenommen – teilweise parteiisch – gelten. Die Amerikaner wiederum können vor allem auf Israel einwirken, sich auf einen Abrüstungsprozess einzulassen. Auch das Nahostquartett( usa , eu , uno und Russland) sollte verstärkt in die Bemühungen eingeschaltet werden. Die usa und Europa können diese Entwicklung jedoch niemals steuern, sie muss sich vielmehr aus der Region selbst entwickeln. Europa kann dabei seine Erfahrungen mit den Rüstungskontrollgesprächen aus dem Kalten Krieg einfließen lassen. Dieser Ansatz ist im Wesentlichen ein sozialdemokratischer.»Wandel durch Annäherung« ging auch im ksze -Europa nicht von heute auf morgen. Seit den Anfängen der Arbeiterbewegung ist sozialdemokratische Politik durch die Bemühung um Abrüstung und Frieden geprägt. Auch in einer neuen Weltordnung muss die Sozialdemokratie diese Politik nicht nur verteidigen, sondern sie aktiv vorantreiben. Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle können trotz aller zweifellos vorhandenen Widerstände und Schwierigkeiten auch im Nahen und Mittleren Osten dazu beitragen, Konflikte einzuhegen und von einer aggressiven Nullsummenmentalität zu einem Verständnis von Sicherheit zu gelangen, das auf Kooperation und guter Nachbarschaft beruht. Einen Versuch ist es alle Mal wert. ipg 4/2004 Mützenich, Ein Mittlerer Osten ohne Massenvernichtungswaffen 33

KOMMENTARE/ COMMENTS Tradition und Revolution in der US-amerikanischen Außenpolitik – Plädoyer für historisches Verstehen* JÜRGEN KOCKA N icht erst seit dem Irak-Krieg wird in Wissenschaft und Politik eine intensive Debatte darüber geführt, ob die derzeitige, maßgeblich von der Administration George W. Bush geprägte außenpolitische Strategie der usa – von Michael Mann als»neuer amerikanischer Imperialismus« 1 bezeichnet – aufgehen kann. Zahlreiche Beobachter vertreten die Ansicht, dass die unilateralistische und auf Militär gestützte Machtpolitik im gegenwärtigen internationalen System selbst eine Supermacht wie die usa überfordern muss – sie letztlich gar zur»ohnmächtigen Supermacht« werden lässt. Die historische Genese der heutigen us -amerikanischen Außenpolitik – charakterisiert durch traditionelle Linien ebenso wie moderne, ja revolutionäre Elemente, die nicht immer widerspruchsfrei zueinander stehen – bleibt in dieser Debatte oft unterbelichtet. Dabei verspricht die historische Einordnung des amerikanischen Phänomens nicht nur wissenschaftliche, sondern auch politisch bedeutsame Einsichten. Denn die historische Erklärung bewahrt vor verständnisloser Verurteilung und begründet den nötigen Respekt auch vor Positionen, die man nicht teilt, sondern zurückweist. Tradition und Moderne in der amerikanischen Außenpolitik Die gegenwärtige amerikanische Außenpolitik steht zum einen in einer sehr langen Kontinuität. Seit Jahrhunderten haben sich Amerikaner ei* Bei diesem Kommentar handelt es sich um die gekürzte und bearbeitete Version einer Festrede, die der Autor anlässlich der Verleihung des Preises»Das politische Buch« der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung an Michael Mann in Berlin gehalten hat. 1. Michael Mann: Die ohnmächtige Supermacht. Warum die USA die Welt nicht regieren können, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.(Englische Originalausgabe: Incoherent Empire, New York: Verso.) 34 Kocka, US-Außenpolitik ipg 4/2004

nem ausgewählten Volk zugehörig gefühlt, einem Volk mit der historischen Mission, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit in der Welt zu fördern, wenn nötig auch mit Macht und Gewalt: von der Besiedlung der Ostküste durch puritanische Auswanderer und die Verdrängung der Indianer(to put it mildly) über die rapide Westwanderung des 19. Jahrhunderts – »manifest destiny« – und die Errichtung eines kontinentalen Imperiums –»Informal Empire« – bis zu den Siegen über das autokratische Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, über Hitlerismus, Faschismus und japanische Diktatur im Zweiten Weltkrieg und über das kommunistische»Reich des Bösen«(Reagan) bis Ende der 1980er Jahre. Amerikanische Politik war immer wieder höchst expansiv, von moralischen Grundsätzen, wirtschaftlichen Interessen und Machtbewusstsein getrieben, oft religiös motiviert, bisweilen geradezu manichäisch in der Unterscheidung von Gut und Böse, Freund und Feind. Das Verhältnis der Amerikaner zu Europa war immer ambivalent, natürlich nicht homogen. Die Mehrheit kam von dort, gehörte wie die Europäer zur westlichen Zivilisation mit gemeinsamer Geschichte in frühen Jahrhunderten und sprach europäische Sprachen. Die Gebildeten bewunderten europäische Kultur. Zu einem erheblichen Teil war es europäisches Kapital, das die amerikanische Industrialisierung finanzierte. Die Verflechtungen hielten sich. Über die Weltkriege und den Kalten Krieg des 20. Jahrhunderts blieb man mit Europa verbunden, ein Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit blieb, das in der Gesellschaft allerdings sehr ungleich verteilt ist. Aber parallel dazu und vermischt damit, gab es immer die Strömungen der Skepsis, ja der Verachtung gegenüber Europa. Von dort war man geflohen, dem hatte man den Rücken gekehrt. Das war die alte, teilweise verrottete Welt, undemokratisch(früher), weniger tapfer und tüchtig(dann), allzu säkularisiert, prinzipienlos und verweichlicht – ein häufiger Vorwurf der letzten Jahrzehnte und Jahre. Der Glaube an Freiheit, die Symbolik der Freiheit, die Rhetorik der Freiheit stehen im Zentrum der amerikanischen Zivilreligion wie nirgendwo sonst. Zugleich zeigen internationale Vergleiche: Nirgendwo sonst sind Patriotismus und Nationalismus weiter verbreitet und tiefer verwurzelt als in den usa , und sie sind besonders akut und zum Fieber gesteigert in krisenhaften Situationen wie nach dem Schlag vom 11. September 2001. Freilich gibt es besonders im großen Amerika zu allem, was man verkürzend sagt, immer auch das Gegenteil – das macht den Reiz dieses Landes aus. An Kritik und Widerspruch fehlt es nicht. Doch jene Traditionen ipg 4/2004 Kocka, US-Außenpolitik 35

sind stark, sie werden durch das Erziehungssystem, die Populärkultur, die Vereine und Kirchen, die staatlichen Organe immer wieder bekräftigt und neu belebt – auch als Mittel des Zusammenhalts einer ansonsten äußerst heterogenen Bevölkerung. In diesen Traditionen steht, diese Traditionen verschärft die Politik der gegenwärtigen amerikanischen Regierung. Der Glaube an Freiheit, die Symbolik der Freiheit, die Rhetorik der Freiheit stehen im Zentrum der amerikanischen Zivilreligion wie nirgendwo sonst. Doch zum anderen ist die Weltvorherrschaftsstrategie der gegenwärtigen us -Regierung modern und neu. Zunächst ist zu sagen, dass erst im 20. Jahrhundert die amerikanische Politik ihren globalen Radius gewann, vorübergehend im Ersten Weltkrieg unter Präsident Wilson, dann im Zweiten Weltkrieg unter Franklin D. Roosevelt. Der Rückzug auf den Status einer bloßen Regionalmacht war bis ins frühe 20. Jahrhundert möglich, theoretisch untermauert und vielfach empfohlen von Gründungsvätern wie George Washington. Seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ist dies keine Option mehr, und wer nach 1990 die Rückkehr der usa zum Isolationismus fürchtete, sah sich – angenehm? – enttäuscht. Zweitens wäre es ohne den Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion wohl kaum zu der neuen Politik des amerikanischen Unilateralismus gekommen, die sich manchmal mehr an Moral als an Recht orientiert. Denn wie »checks and balances« zur Einhegung innenpolitischer Macht beitragen, zwang die Existenz anderer Großmächte, zwang das Gleichgewicht des Schreckens im Kalten Krieg auch die starken Amerikaner zu mehr Vorsicht und rücksichtsvolleren Strategien der Hegemonie gegenüber ihren Bündnispartnern wie umgekehrt diese zur Anlehnung um fast jeden Preis. Der neue Unilateralismus wurde nach dem Untergang der Sowjetunion seit den frühen 1990er Jahren in dem Staat ausgedacht, der als einzige Supermacht übriggeblieben war – übrigens von Intellektuellen und Politikern, die man eigentlich nicht als»Neokonservative«, sondern besser als »konservative Revolutionäre« bezeichnen sollte. Denn so sehr sie die Sonderstellung und die besondere Mission Amerikas bewahren und verwirklichen wollen, so sehr plädieren sie für die Revolutionierung der Mittel, mit denen das geschehen soll. Sie sind die Verfechter einer gewaltsamen Utopie, gegen alle historische Erfahrung. Das ist nicht konservativ. 36 Kocka, US-Außenpolitik ipg 4/2004

Schließlich war es die neue Qualität des grenzüberschreitenden Terrors, der am 11. September 2001 diese lange vorher ausgedachte und von Teilen der politischen Klasse längst geplante Strategie in den usa durchsetzbar und mehrheitsfähig gemacht hat. Man mag sehr bezweifeln, ob der»War against Terror«, wie er von der Regierung innerhalb und außerhalb der Grenzen des Landes geführt wird, ein erfolgversprechendes Mittel gegen den Terror ist. Ich bezweifle es. Man mag überzeugt sein, dass der sog. Krieg gegen den Terror die Freiheit sehr viel mehr bedroht als der Terror selbst. Ich glaube es. Aber der bedrohliche Charakter des neuen Terrors – oft in den Verwerfungszonen im Überschneidungsfeld zwischen westlicher und islamischer Kultur erzeugt – ist zugleich unbestreitbar. Patentantworten darauf hat man nicht. Er wird nicht schnell wieder verschwinden und es ist wahrscheinlich, dass diese Legitimationsgrundlage der neuen amerikanischen Politik noch eine ganze Weile zur Verfügung stehen wird. Die andere amerikanische Tradition: kritische Öffentlichkeit und demokratischer Wandel Diese knappe Skizze der Entstehungsbedingungen und Ursachen der heutigen Weltvorherrschaftspolitik der Amerikaner sollten eines deutlich gemacht haben: So wichtig die Rolle einzelner Personen dabei ist, vor allem die des gegenwärtigen Präsidenten, so sehr sollte man sich davor hüten, die neue amerikanische Politik als die Sache einer kleinen Gruppe verbohrter Politiker und Ideologen zu sehen, als ein transitorisches Phänomen, das schnell vergehen würde, wenn die jetzigen Machtträger gingen. Die Bedingungen des Phänomens liegen tiefer, seine historische Ernsthaftigkeit ist nicht zu bezweifeln. Es könnte in der einen oder anderen Weise von längerer Dauer sein. Oder nicht? Michael Mann endet sein Buch über die usa als»ohnmächtige Supermacht« mit folgenden Sätzen:»Zum Glück sind die Vereinigten Staaten eine Demokratie, und eine politische Lösung bietet sich im November 2004. Jagen wir die neuen Militaristen aus dem Amt. Denn sonst wird die Welt die Macht Amerikas weiter mindern.« Könnte sein Optimismus berechtigt sein? Für ihn spricht, dass Amerika viele Gesichter hat, dass es ein, zwei, mehrere Amerikas gibt, die nicht identisch sind mit dem hier skizzierten. Insbesondere verfügt das Land über ein bewundernswertes Maß an ipg 4/2004 Kocka, US-Außenpolitik 37

Selbstkorrekturfähigkeit. Dahinter stehen klug erfundene, lange bewährte, liberale Institutionen –»checks and balances« klassischer Art, wenn sie auch manchmal nicht wirken. Dahinter steckt eine lange Tradition kritischer Öffentlichkeit, die zeitweise durch Selbstzensur stillgestellt werden kann, dann aber doch wieder funktioniert. Dahinter steckt viel »common sense« – zeitweise betäubt, aber nicht für immer. Große Fehlentwicklungen und Irrwege sind immer wieder durch Selbstkorrektur von innen, nicht durch Eingriffe von außen beendet worden. Man denke an die Beseitigung der Sklaverei durch den Bürgerkrieg, die Überwindung des McCarthyismus nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, an den(noch nicht perfekten) Abbau der rassischen Diskriminierung im dritten Viertel des 20. Jahrhunderts, an Watergate oder an die Beendigung des VietnamKriegs durch innere Proteste und den Verlust der Legitimation bei der eigenen Bevölkerung. Manches Anzeichen der letzten Monate und Wochen spricht dafür, dass sich auch diesmal in den usa die Gewichte wieder verschieben und Kurskorrekturen anstehen. Dass beispielsweise ein Buch wie das von Michael Mann geschrieben wird und erscheint, ist selbst so ein Zeichen. Es ist Ausdruck einer Kultur der Kritik, die in den usa tief verwurzelt und kraftvoll ist, in den Universitäten und außerhalb. Amerika und die europäische Identität Und was folgt für uns in Europa aus alledem? Erstens gibt es wenig Grund für europäischen Hochmut. Die amerikanischen Antworten auf drängende Probleme mögen falsch und langfristig kontraproduktiv sein. Aber man weiß nicht genau, welches die richtigen Antworten sind. Aussitzen allein reicht nicht. Für europäische Bescheidenheit spricht auch die Geschichte. Das Morden und die ethnischen Säuberungen auf dem Balkan in den 1990er Jahren wurden nicht primär durch die Europäer zum Ende gebracht, obwohl es eine europäische Sache gewesen wäre, sondern vielmehr unter maßgeblicher Teilnahme der Amerikaner, ohne die es kaum gelungen wäre. In den hier interessierenden Hinsichten, ist die Handlungsfähigkeit Europas erbärmlich gering. Sie ist durch die Erweiterung der eu nicht gewachsen. Sie nimmt überdies durch die sozialökonomische Krise weiter ab, in der sich die Bundesrepublik befindet und die sich auf den europäischen Zusammenhalt negativ auswirkt. Hochfliegende Visionen von der strategischen Begründung der europäischen Ei38 Kocka, US-Außenpolitik ipg 4/2004

nigung und ihrer Frieden stiftenden Wirkung bis weit in die muslimische Welt hinein entbehren fürs Erste der ernsthaften Grundlage, auch wenn sie vom deutschen Außenminister entwickelt werden. Aber zweitens ist es gut, dass die Mehrzahl der europäischen Staaten und die eu in Übereinstimmung mit der riesengroßen Mehrheit der Europäer den anglo-amerikanischen Krieg im Irak nicht mitgemacht haben und auch auf hiesigen Terror – beispielsweise in Madrid – viel bedachtsamer reagieren als die Amerikaner auf ihren, sei dieser tatsächlich oder imaginär. Auf die tiefen Einbrüche der europäischen Geschichte in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts reagiert Europa mit dem Versuch seiner Integration. Nach diesen Einbrüchen ist das Sendungsbewusstsein in unserem Weltteil bescheidener geworden. In vielerlei Hinsicht ticken die Uhren hier anders als in den usa . Beispielsweise fehlt es an dem utopischen Glauben, dass man mit dem Einsatz militärischer Gewalt eine Gesellschaft mit ganz anderen Traditionen zu einer Demokratie westlicher Machart verändern könnte. Gegen diese grandiose Selbstüberschätzung ist man in den hiesigen Ländern ziemlich gefeit. Dennoch wäre es falsch, europäische Identität im Gegensatz zu Amerika zu begründen. Dazu verbindet uns zu viel an Interessen, Geschichte und Werten. Es sind die gemeinsamen Interessen hoch industrialisierter Länder, beispielsweise an Rohstoffen. Es ist die gemeinsame Geschichte, die Europäer und Amerikaner, vor allem aber die usa und die Bundesrepublik miteinander verbinden und von der wir viel profitiert haben. Es sind, im Prinzip, die gemeinsamen Grundwerte mit ihrer Verwurzelung in der Aufklärungstradition. Das ist, zusammen genommen, als gemeinsame Basis nicht wenig, mehr als die Gemeinsamkeit Europas mit irgendeiner anderen Großregion der Welt. Aber diese Grundwerte gilt es zu verteidigen. Auch lebt Identität von Differenz. Auch europäische Identität braucht die Selbstunterscheidung von anderem. Die gravierenden europäisch-amerikanischen Differenzen zu benennen und auszutragen, in Auseinandersetzung und Dialog, ist somit nicht nur unvermeidlich, sondern überdies produktiv. ipg 4/2004 Kocka, US-Außenpolitik 39

ARTIKEL /ARTICLES Women in the Arab World: Reading against the Grain of Culturalism HODA ELSADDA A s someone who has worked on women’s rights issues in the Arab world for some time, I have always been concerned with the following dilemma facing many Arab women researchers and writers. If a woman novelist writes a novel criticizing patriarchal practices and ideas in Arab societies, she is obviously doing what novelists generally do, which is imaging her own society through her creative and observant eyes. If a female researcher is asked to give a talk on the status of Arab women and she is particularly critical of cultural and political practices, she, also, is doing what researchers are supposed to do. However, if the novel is translated into English, or if the researcher’s talk is delivered to a Western audience, they both run the risk of being accused of betrayal or worse, of flirting with the West. It is a tricky situation. We cannot simply say, from the perspective of a women’s rights activist, that these women are perfectly entitled to say what they want in whatever way they like and that their critics are totally misguided and have no business trying to silence them. Nor can we say that they are wrong and that they need to be more careful about what they say, given the tumultuous political situation in the Arab world, especially at present. What we need to acknowledge is that the meaning of stories, data, narratives and research articles is often determined or rather influenced by the geopolitics of production and reception. The status of women in the Arab world has always been a highly sensitive political issue and it is always a challenge to address it. This sensitivity has certainly been multiplied in the last two years, especially with the escalation of violence and turmoil in the Middle East. On the one hand, we have the Arab Human Development Report( ahdr ), published in 2002, which designated women’s empowerment as one of the three major deficits impeding development in the Arab world. Within the context of this report, and of many more produced by other local, regional and international bodies, the gender gap demonstrated by statistical figures on women’s political and economic participation, and their access to ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 41

health and education is compelling and self-evident. On the other hand, stereotypes of Arab women as victims of their oppressive societies which dominate the contemporary media are used to legitimize the neo-imperialist discourse of intervention and preemption against»rogue« Arab states. Hence, a discussion or analysis of the socio-political status of Arab women goes beyond the realm of social analysis and enters the arena of international relations and politics. It requires a kind of analysis that reads against the grain of biased assumptions, stereotyping and dismissive strategies of othering and marginalization and, most importantly, prejudice. Statistical data need to be contextualized and historicized. The Data According to the ahdr 2002, despite the considerable strides taken by Arab countries in the field of education, illiteracy rates remain extremely high for men(31 percent) but much higher for women(58 percent). The figures vary from one country to another but are nevertheless quite disheartening. In 1999, illiteracy rates in Jordan were 5.5 percent for men and 16.6 percent for women, in Saudi Arabia 16.5 percent for men and 34.1 percent for women, in Morocco 38.9 percent for men and 64.9 percent for women, and in Egypt 33.9 percent for men and 57.2 percent for women. Regarding women’s participation in economic activities, we discover that women’s share of non-agricultural wage employment is only 20 percent in Egypt, 27 percent in Morocco and 25 percent in Oman. As for the participation of women in political life, the picture is not very promising either. The percentage of women occupying seats in parliament is only two percent in Egypt, six percent in Algeria, ten percent in Syria, eleven percent in Morocco, and twelve percent in Tunisia. Women have no seats in parliament at all in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. According to the United Nations Development Programme( undp ) measure of women’s empowerment designed in 1995, the Arab region ranks last but one compared to other regions. The gender gap in the Arab world is substantial and requires serious attention. 1 1. See the Arab Human Development Report 2002 , undp and rbas , Jordan; and the Human Development Report 2003 , undp , New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 42 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World ipg 4/2004

In addition to statistical data, an assessment of women’s empowerment will also take note of significant actions and measures currently being implemented that have the potential to enhance the position of women and support their integration in socio-political life. The ahdr 2003 devotes a section to monitoring both negative and positive developments over the course of the year in respect of women’s empowerment. It mentions the failure of women in Bahrain to win seats in the elections for municipal and legislative assemblies, having just gained the right to vote and to stand for election. On the positive side, it notes the entry of 33 Moroccan women into parliament due to the introduction of a quota system. The Report also notes the appointment in Yemen of a woman as State Minister for Human Rights and another who entered parliament after the elections. Biased and stereotypical representations of Arab women have a long and complex history in both nationalist and colonial discourses. It is interesting how the reception of the ahdr is actually very similar to the reception of many women’s rights activists in both the Arab world and the West. The report was quoted repeatedly by Colin Powell and George W. Bush. It was also referred to extensively in the Greater Middle East Initiative proposed by the us administration. The attraction for the Bush administration was that this was a report produced by Arabs themselves exposing failures in their own societies.»What more proof do we [Americans, the ›international‹ community] need to justify taking action and intervening to bring democracy to these nations lagging behind the rest of the world?« On the other hand, the Report was welcomed in many circles in the Arab world as a solid document of self-criticism, but was also criticized by many for giving the Bush administration the justification to meddle in Arab affairs. 2 The arguments are pretty familiar. They are exact replicas of the kind of arguments made to celebrate or denounce women’s rights activists or women writers and researchers who dare to criticize Arab societies. Biased and stereotypical representations of Arab women have a long and complex history in both nationalist and colonial discourses. An awareness of this history and its contemporary reproductions in modern 2. Cf. the contribution by Nader Fergany in this issue. ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 43

media and international debates is crucial in any attempt to map the socio-political status of Arab women in the twenty-first century. An Old/New Problem An article entitled»The True Clash of Civilizations« published in Foreign Policy in 2003 about the findings of a World Values Survey conducted in 1995–1996 and 2000–2002 argued as follows:»Samuel Huntington was only half-right. The cultural fault line that divides the West and the Islamic world is not about democracy, but sex(…) Muslims and their western counterparts are still worlds apart when it comes to attitudes towards divorce, abortion, gender equality and gay rights – which does not bode well for democracy’s future in the Middle East(…) In other words, the values separating the two cultures have much more to do with eros than demos.« 3 When Samuel Huntington published his essay on the»Clash of Civilizations« in 1993, later elaborated in his book»The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order« in 1996, it became very popular among American policy-makers, but was dismissed as simplistic and superficial by many analysts working in the cultural field. The argument depended on superficial generalizations, resorted to outdated binary opposites, and did not hold up well at the level of plain logic. Nevertheless, it succeeded in triggering a heated debate in world politics. Written in the aftermath of the Cold War, the essay is an attempt to reconstruct international power relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its decline as a superpower. With communism as a competing ideology opposed to capitalism out of the way, Huntington’s theory constructs another public enemy to justify the expansionist designs of the only superpower left in the international arena. Future conflicts will not be triggered by ideologies but by the clash between civilizations. Focusing on Islamic civilization as the future»public enemy«, Huntington draws upon rigid colonial logic that pits»us« against»them«, essentializing both sides and disregarding diversity and various hybrid forms of identity. In another reading of Huntington’s theory, Edward Said saw it as a 3. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris,»The True Clash of Civilizations«, in Foreign Policy (March–April 2003), pp. 67–75. 44 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World ipg 4/2004

manifestation of anxieties of identity prevailing in the usa in the closing decades of the twentieth century. 4 Generalizations that lead to essentialist conclusions necessarily hide the diversity which exists in both the East and the West. Huntington’s aim of constructing fault-lines and marking essentialist differences between the Muslim world and the West draws upon a long history of Orientalist representations of the East. What is interesting, however, is that in the nineteenth century, as pointed out by Edward Said in»Orientalism«, the East, in the work of Flaubert and many other European writers and travelers, represented licentiousness and sexual freedom and was seen as the essential Other to Western institutionalized gender relations and proper morality. 5 The problem with the East then, or what marked it as essentially different from the West, was its excessive liberalism regarding sexual relations. More than a hundred years later, and according to a World Survey on Values, the problem is its lack of liberal attitudes towards sex. I think Said’s evaluation of Huntington’s theory as a manifestation of anxieties of identity holds up well when we are talking about gender. The point here is that an attempt to map the socio-political status of women in the Arab world without integrating a comparative perspective that acknowledges Western angst and processes of othering in defense of the self can only produce a distorted or, at best, a lop-sided picture. Generalizations that lead to essentialist conclusions necessarily hide the diversity which exists in both the East and the West. Participants in the Survey had to respond to statements such as»A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled« or to questions such as»If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?« The logic of the survey is grounded in the concept of individual freedom as a marker of liberal thinking and progress and disregards other systems of thought that seek to strike a balance between the needs of the individual and those of the community. This is not the place to get into a compli4. Edward Said,»The Clash of Definitions«, in Reflections on Exile , ed. Edward Said, London: Granta Books, 2001, pp. 569–90. 5. Edward Said, Orientalism , New York: Vintage Books, 1979, pp. 149–97. ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 45

cated debate, but suffice it to say that surveys of this kind often lack a basic degree of cultural background that would allow them to formulate questions to suit diverse audiences. What is really striking, however, is the statements intended to confirm the traditionalism and conservatism of Islamic societies with reference to their illiberal attitudes regarding the issue of abortion, for example. I am not going to suggest that abortion is by any means generally tolerated in the Arab world, but I cannot help pointing out that it is not exactly an issue that has been settled once and for all in the West either. We need only recall that George W. Bush’s recent ban on partial abortion and the restrictions he imposed on giving federal and state money to pro-choice groups was received with anger and protest by women’s rights groups in the usa . Furthermore, as recently as April 26, 2004 a huge rally was organized in Washington dc in support of abortion rights. How can attitudes on abortion be marked as the cultural fault-line between the Muslim world and the West, unless of course the usa by sending its troops to Iraq has joined the ranks of the East? It seems to me that things are a little more complicated and less simplistic than the»sexual clash of civilizations« theory suggests. Socio-Political Contexts of Change Again, how are data to be interpreted? The figures mentioned above on Arab women’s representation in parliaments certainly indicate their marginalization in politics. This is not unexpected considering the absence of democratic institutions in most Arab countries, a situation that is not conducive to citizen participation in political structures at all. In fact, it is this absence of democratic processes rather than gender that requires us to pause and to reconsider figures on the participation of social agents across the board, not just women. What do the figures say? Egypt, which had a history of democratic governance in the early part of the twentieth century only had two percent representation of women in parliament in 2003. Women’s representation in Morocco(11 percent) and Tunisia (12 percent) must be compared with that in some of the oldest democracies in the world where the figures are not significantly better: in France women hold 12 percent of the seats in parliament and in the usa only 14 percent(House of Representatives). This weak representation in democratic countries merits more attention and analysis, I would argue, than the situation in undemocratic regimes. 46 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World ipg 4/2004

There is no ready means for measuring gender bias, and contradictions exist everywhere. If we look at labor laws in different countries, particularly the maternity leave benefits given to women to support their working as well as reproductive roles, the picture is diverse, even erratic. Denmark stands out in the realm of gender equality as women get 18 weeks’ maternity leave on full pay, while France gives between 16 and 26 weeks of maternity leave on the same terms. Egyptian women get 12 weeks’ fully paid maternity leave, but in the usa women get 12 weeks of unpaid leave, making it extremely difficult for them to keep their job and have a family at the same time. Not granting women paid maternity leave is tantamount to telling them that if they want to have careers they must forget about being mothers and wives. The only explanation is blatant gender discrimination. Again, in most Arab countries women’s share of non-agricultural wage employment is low compared to most developed countries. But what does this mean? In Egypt, where the majority of women work in agriculture or in the informal sector, which accounts for a major part of economic activity, we can conclude that there is some kind of institutionalized bias, but that women do have access to the public sphere and can engage in economic activity. It is worth noting, however, that since the socialist era in Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s, the public sector has been the largest employer of women. Women have succeeded in reaching top positions in government bodies. A visitor to departments of languages in national universities, in which the majority of students are women, will notice that the majority of staff members are also women. This is not necessarily the case, for example, in American and European universities, where the ratio of female members of staff to male members is usually not proportionate to the ratio of men and women amongst students. Also, in the usa whereas women constitute 46 percent of the labor force, they occupy only 2.4 percent of top executive positions and receive 1.9 percent of high executive salaries. Institutionalized bias? Certainly! Let us now consider the issue of women judges in the Arab world. Recent news from occupied Iraq revealed the rise of a new wave of conservatism that threatens to curtail women’s rights. We hear of clerics and religious authorities declaring their refusal to accept the integration of women in the judiciary. Also, in 2003 Egypt announced the appointment of the first woman judge, indicating that until 2003, and throughout the twentieth century, women had not been allowed access to the judiciary. How was this news reported in the world? Against the background of theories on the sexual clash of civilizations and media stereotyping of ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 47

Arab cultures as oppressive of women, as well as notoriously racist antiArab statements by prominent American and European officials, the news was interpreted as just another indication of Arab despotism and oppression of women. By way of explaining to the public the reasons for this state of affairs, tv »experts« used a culturalist argument to give voice to opinions issued by Islamic religious authorities many centuries ago. Rarely does the public get a chance to listen to serious socio-political analysis of why things are the way they are and why it is simplistic to make the easy argument that it can all be explained with reference to culture. To understand what is happening as regards an issue such as the exclusion of women from the judiciary in some, not all Arab countries, we need to factor in the diversity that exists in the region, and the historical context of each country. To begin with, Iraq, together with other Arab countries – Syria, Morocco, Tunis, Algeria, Sudan – has had women judges for more than three decades. In Algeria, 50 percent of judges are women. Considering the long history of the women’s rights movement in Egypt, the Egyptian judiciary is in fact quite unique in the region in its resistance to the integration of women in the system. The situation is nothing less than disgraceful. All the cultural and religious justifications for this bias have been attacked many times. Many women are quite active in challenging the bias and have taken various forms of action to try to gain entry to the judiciary. As early as 1949, Aisha Rateb, who later became a professor of law and then Minister of Social Affairs, filed a lawsuit at the State Council when the prime minister refused to accept her application for appointment to the Council, a prerequisite for embarking on a career as a judge. She had passed all the required examinations and had gained the approval of the members, but he still rejected her application on the pretext that it was against state policy. Other law suits were filed but to no avail. In 1998, the appointment of women judges was put in the limelight as a campaign was launched to pressure policy-makers and the judiciary to appoint women. The campaign, organized by the Alliance of Arab Women, held a major regional meeting at the Club of Judges and invited prominent women judges from all over the Arab world. Simultaneous media programs and shows hosted women professors of law, lawyers and activists who demanded immediate action to redress the gender imbalance. The 48 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World ipg 4/2004

appointment in 2003 of Tahani el-Gebali as the first woman judge in the Supreme Court came in response to strong pressure from social activists. The situation is still far from satisfactory as the way is still blocked at the level of the preliminary courts, but a first step has been taken. The point here is that to understand what is happening as regards an issue such as the exclusion of women from the judiciary in some, not all Arab countries, we need to factor in the diversity that exists in the region, and the historical context of each country. The point is not to posit a culturalist analysis which over-simplifies complex socio-political struggles. Women’s Status in the Family: Contradictions and Contestation Another issue that merits careful consideration and analysis is the status of Arab women in the family. Family Laws or Personal Status Laws( psl ) in Arab countries vary quite significantly. Amongst the blatant contradictions that characterize women’s status in many Arab countries is the incongruity between their private and public rights. In 1956, Egyptian women got the vote, the right to be elected, and most equal opportunity rights guaranteeing fair and equitable access to the public sphere. The state encouraged women to join the labor market and to participate in the development of their country. Nevertheless, the legal modifications introduced in 1956 did not touch the psl which regulate relations between men and women in the private sphere. This led to a peculiar situation in which women felt empowered in the workplace but remained subordinate to the authority of male family members in the private sphere. Professional women who reached top positions would still worry and feel insecure regarding a number of issues, for example, their right to divorce, child custody, and legal guardianship over their children. These contradictions led to some bizarre situations: until only three years ago, for example, a woman minister of finance in Egypt could not travel on an official mission without obtaining the permission of her husband. He had the right to stop her at the airport and cancel her trip. And a university law professor could not deal officially with her children’s school, for example, in relation to money matters, because she is not their legal guardian. I will briefly attempt to explain the origins of these contradictions. I argue that the roots of the problem can be traced back to the nineteenth ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 49

century where we find that the introduction of»the woman question« to the Arab cultural scene coincided with the emergence of the modern state, and a very close link was established between the modern project of nation-building and the need to improve the status of women. From a colonial point of view, what was perceived as»the backward status of women« – in Egypt, for example – was both indication and proof of the backward status of the country, which therefore needed colonial rule. The same assumption was made by many early reformers, who made the goal of improving the backward status of women a prerequisite of the development of the nation and its entry into the modern world. This close link »Woman« became the symbol of the threatened cultural identity that needed protection from the onslaught of outside influences. between»the woman question« and the challenges facing the modern nation-in-the-making resulted in the transference or projection of all the problems of the modernization project onto women’s issues. For example, reformers at the turn of the twentieth century struggled with the question of how to modernize Arab societies, which immediately meant following the Western model of modernity, while dealing with the ugly face of Western colonialism, a tangible reality at the time. How do you fight and embrace something at the same time? For women this dilemma had serious consequences.»Woman« became the symbol of the threatened cultural identity that needed protection from the onslaught of outside influences. Her place was the private sphere, the home, which was to be governed by traditional laws and cultural practices that have not been touched by»modern« ideas and changes. Personal Status Laws or Family Laws in Arab countries stipulate that the Shari’ah is the main source of legislation, emphasizing the cultural/religious inclinations of the lawmakers. This claim has been the main reason behind the major obstacles put in front of all efforts to change or modify psl in Arab countries. But what does it really mean to have psl based on Shari’ah laws? Any discussion of Shari’ah laws regulating gender relations must acknowledge the diversity of principles and rules due to the differences between the various»madhahib«(schools of jurisprudence). It is not my intention to go into the details of these differences, and definitely not into the complicated field of religious hermeneutics; I only want to point out that when we talk about Family Laws in Arab Muslim countries, we must 50 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World ipg 4/2004

remember that these laws differ significantly from one country to another, with obvious implications for gender relations. One reason for the differences is the major»madhahib« followed in a particular country: for example,»Hanafi law« constitutes the main source of legislation in Egypt, while»Maliki law« is the dominant school in Morocco. The second point to remember is that these laws are modern Shari’ah laws that are not necessarily the same as those enforced by Islamic courts under Ottoman rule. As Amira Sonbol argues, Egypt, for example, essentially followed Hanafi law»except when it suited the hegemonic order, then Maliki law was used, plus a good dose of Western-inspired laws that were ›infused‹ under the pretext of making the laws fit with modern times«. She goes on to point out that, in accordance with modern codification, these laws were systematized, which meant»that not all the interpretations of these madhahib, with their founders, and the commentaries of their disciples and heirs, would be a source of law from which a judge can pick and choose given the specific context of the case and the general conditions of the time, which allowed for greater maneuverability depending on the details of the particular case.« 6 Also, more importantly, differences between Muslim Arab countries are largely due to their socio-political histories. As already mentioned, after independence in Egypt, the laws passed in 1956 guaranteed women many public rights but left the psl intact, disregarding the demands of women. This was not the case in Tunisia where modifications introduced in 1956 by the new independent nation-state were quite revolutionary as regards gender relations, and Tunisian Family Law became almost unique in the Arab world. Amongst many other changes, the law banned polygamy and extra-judicial divorce, and emphasized the principle of gender equality and equal rights within the family. In Egypt, efforts to change the psl continued throughout the twentieth century. It is noteworthy that the demand to reform the Egyptian psl was adopted by most pioneers of the reformist movement, both men and women. The Egyptian legislator introduced several changes between 1920 and 1950, such as Law 56 of 1923 regulating the minimum marriageable age, but no major provisions to ensure gender equality within the family were introduced. The 1970s witnessed a concerted effort to change 6. Amira E. Sonbol,»Law and Gender Violence in Ottoman and Modern Egypt«, in Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History , ed. Amira E. Sonbol, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996, p. 279. ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 51

the psl . The blatant injustice inflicted on Egyptian women due to discriminatory practices under the psl became the subject of one of the most popular films with a social message in the history of Egyptian cinema, namely»I Demand a Solution«, released in 1974. The film highlighted the everyday hardships and miseries of Egyptian women in pursuit of their rights in Egyptian courts. Three initiatives were undertaken in an attempt to change the law. In 1975, Aisha Rateb, the Minister of Social Affairs, set up a committee of experts to prepare a draft proposal for a more equitable psl . The law was defeated by conservative opponents and was not submitted for parliamentary review. In 1977, a number of women’s organizations launched a project to address the psl and also formed a committee of experts which eventually sent its recommendations to the government. What matters in this story is that the PSL is a controversial site that is subject to contestation and change. Finally, in 1979 Sadat issued an emergency decree introducing some major modifications to the psl , which angered conservatives, although it still fell short of guaranteeing gender equality. The law gave women the right to divorce, without having to prove harm, should their husband decide to take another wife. It also addressed a major social problem faced by divorced women who had to find a place to live in a country with a serious housing problem. The law gave these women a right to live in the marital home so long as they retained custody of their children. In 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court struck down the 1979 law on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. This setback led to action on the part of women’s groups and activists. A committee for the defense of the family and women was formed. Meetings were advertised in newspapers and members called upon women to unite against the conservative onslaught. Needless to say, members of the committee were severely attacked by conservatives but they still succeeded in turning the fight into a public issue. Moreover, the international scene was conducive to their demands as the International Conference on Women in Nairobi was approaching and the government was under pressure to address the issue. A new law was passed in 1985 and included many provisions similar to the 1979 law. Compromises were made to appease the conservatives, however, and the right of a wife to initiate divorce without proving harm if her husband took another wife was withdrawn. In January 2000, the law 52 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World ipg 4/2004

was modified and a number of significant provisions were introduced, notably the right of a woman to initiate no-fault divorce in return for giving up her financial rights. What matters in this story, though, is that the psl is a controversial site that is subject to contestation and change. Morocco provides a good example of successful strategies adopted by women’s rights groups in modifying Family Law. Supported by a political will to reform, a more equitable Family Law was approved by parliament in February 2004. The law gives adult women self-guardianship and wives are not legally obliged to obey their husbands. Strict restrictions were imposed on polygamy and on men’s right to unilateral divorce. Other measures were introduced ensuring gender equity and a promise of cultural and social transformation. It is probably worth noting that all modifications were inspired by liberal interpretations of Shari’ah. Conclusion I have tried to present a picture of diversity, social action and change. My experience of working on women’s issues in the Arab world is one of struggle, gains and defeats. It has nothing in common with the fixed, static images I see in the media of women frozen in time and of discussions that ask men about opinions produced five or six hundred years ago. An attempt to map the socio-political status of Arab women needs to beware of reducing cultural differences and diversity to an ideological culturalism, defined as an»ensemble of intellectual orientations that crystallize methodologically around the reduction of social and historical questions to abstract questions of culture.« 7 Women in the Arab world have a lot to do and a long way to go. The journey began a long time ago and will continue. 7. Arif Dirlik,»Culturalism as Hegemonic Ideology and Liberating Practice«, in Minority Discourse , ed. Abdul R. Janmohamed and David Lloyd, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 398. ipg 4/2004 Elsadda, Women in the Arab World 53

The Societal Sources of Change in the Middle East CHRISTIAN KOCH D espite the widespread opposition within the Middle East, throughout Europe, and in other parts of the globe against the us -led military invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, there was an underlying sense of anticipation that the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and the subsequent establishment of a more liberal political order in Baghdad would in fact serve as a catalyst to promote political change in the Middle East. While many argued that the war was fought on false premises and for the wrong reasons, there nevertheless existed a common minimum expectation that the forced removal of an authoritarian government at the heart of the chronically unstable Middle East would serve as a jolt for the aging Arab leaderships finally to deal more seriously with the numerous political, economic, and social deficits that today characterize large sections of the region stretching from Morocco to Iran. To be clear, few subscribed to the idealistic notion of the us administration, and particularly the proponents of so-called neo-conservatism, that, as President Bush stated,»the establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution«, 1 or that»a new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example for freedom for other nations in the region.« 2 Nevertheless, faint hopes were present that a post-Saddam environment would result in opportunities and more positive consequences for the region and propel the Middle East on a different path from the recurring violence of the past. 1. Remarks by us President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, November 6, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html. 2. Remarks by us President George W. Bush to the American Enterprise Institute, February 26, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ 02/20030226-11.html. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that »Iraq as the first Arab democracy … would cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran but across the whole Arab world«. 54 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

In the year or so that has passed since President Bush officially declared an end to the military hostilities in Iraq on May 1, 2003, that hope has dissipated. In terms of its future political development, the reference to Iraq as a soon-to-emerge full-fledged democratic nation has disappeared from official pronouncements. Instead, the focus has turned to limiting the current level of violence and strengthening the weak institutional capacity of the Iraqi interim government in the hope that somehow stability can slowly be re-established in different parts of the country. In the meantime, for other governments in the region the emphasis has shifted towards maintenance of the status quo rather than experimentation with and implementation of wide-ranging and meaningful reform measures. Status Quo Instead of Sea Change The argument to be pursued here is that in light of the situation in the middle of 2004, and in terms of the short- to medium-term developments to be expected, the Iraq war was certainly not a watershed as far as the Middle East is concerned. While the long-term geopolitical repercussions might prove significant in relation to Iraq and its immediate neighborhood, for the moment the us -led invasion that overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime can be characterized merely as the most recent in a series of events that over recent decades have illuminated the serious political, economic, strategic, and structural weaknesses of the Middle East. Coming on the heels of the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait of 1990 and Kuwait’s subsequent liberation in 1991; the periodic crises of the 1990s, in conjunction with the us dual containment policy of both Iraq and Iran; and finally September 11, 2001, Middle Eastern leaders appear by and large to be resigned to their current cycle of periodic violence, political nepotism, economic statism, and social decay. In this context, the status quo has been reaffirmed as the real winner in the Middle Eastern political landscape in the immediate post-Iraq era. Initially, leaders in the region must have taken the us seriously when the Bush administration showed its readiness to use military power to bring about change. However, the Iraq campaign soon made it unequivocally clear that the pursuit of a wide-ranging reform process along the lines of us wishes would in fact be highly counterproductive and lead only to a situation of mounting internal instability. With us attention being diverted elsewhere, the decision was thus taken in capitals throughout the ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 55

region to continue with the wait-and-see approach that had up to this point served Middle Eastern regimes so well. At the same time, the invasion opened up a Pandora’s box in terms of regional instability. In the Middle East today insecurity has been heightened, the main problems contributing to this insecurity lie unaddressed, and the gap with the rest of the world has grown to unprecedented proportions. Saudi Arabia is confronted by a direct challenge from al-Qa’idainspired elements whose pronounced goal is to overthrow the Saud ruling family and install a Taliban-like government in Riyadh. In Iran, the clerical establishment under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini has tightened its grip on power while at the same time pursuing its controversial nuclear program and broadening its interference inside Iraq. Seeing the us getting bogged down in Iraq has made the Iranian ruling clique confident that it can pursue a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis Washington, at a time when the region requires fewer rather than more tensions. 3 Iran could soon replace Iraq as principal regional headlinemaker. The status quo has been reaffirmed as the real winner in the Middle Eastern political landscape in the immediate post-Iraq era. In the meantime, the Arab–Israeli conflict is as far away from a solution as ever. Backed by the almost unconditional support of its American ally, the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon sees absolutely no need to engage with the Palestinians in a substantive dialogue or to rekindle the peace process. Rather, by creating hard facts on the ground in terms of settlement expansion and wall building, Israel awaits Palestinian self-destruction. The Palestinian Authority has helped this process along by being utterly unable to get its own house in order or to put forward the semblance of a coherent institutional machinery that genuinely represents Palestinian interests. Overall, it is a vicious cycle that breeds further hatred instead of promoting tolerance and confidence-building in the region. 3. This is evident from the decision of the Iranian leadership to resume uranium enrichment activities despite an announcement by Washington that the Iranian nuclear program is an issue of increasing concern. 56 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

Such developments, which are at least indirectly related to the Iraq invasion and its outcome, have also manifested themselves at the domestic level and have influenced the internal decision-making processes of existing regimes on three levels. First, in terms of their own standing and survival, the sense of confusion over the course of recent events and the accompanying frustration over the inability to influence that course have made the current regimes determined to avoid any kind of experimentation that could further rock the internal political boat. As far as present elites are concerned, what could occur as the result of a power vacuum was made painfully clear in Iraq. To avoid this, leaders made it clear that any effort at reform would only be piecemeal and gradual so as to allow anticipated changes to gain a firm root within society. Moreover, it was made clear that domestic opponents intent on pushing for too much change in too short a time would be pursued and sidelined. This applied to both individuals and groups carrying out violent acts against the state, for example, as in Saudi Arabia where security forces have been engaged in widespread and increasingly hard-line security sweeps against suspected Islamic militants or even those who advocate largely peaceful change. Again in Saudi Arabia, reform advocates were arrested in March 2004 for allegedly making statements»which do not serve national unity or the cohesion of society.« On August 10, 2004, it was announced that three of them would go on trial, accused of»calling for … a constitutional monarchy and using Western terminology.« In Syria, ten reform proponents were arrested and sentenced to jail terms of between two and 10 years during the period from March to August 2003. There have been similar cases in other Middle Eastern states. 4 Second, the indirect yet reiterated message directed towards the United States was that the present Middle Eastern leadership was the only force capable of preventing the region from declining into a feared and prolonged power vacuum and associated anarchy. It was made clear to the us that instituting reforms too quickly would endanger internal stability and ultimately plunge states into chaos. In an interview with the 4. For Saudi Arabia see the reports by the Financial Times , »Saudis detain reform advocates«, March 17, 2004, the Christian Science Monitor , »Saudis round up reformers«, from March 18, 2004, and»Three Saudi reformists go on trial in Riyadh«, Agence France Press( afp ), August 10, 2004. Most of those arrested were subsequently released after signing statements pledging not to engage in any political activity. For Syria, see the Human Rights Watch report for 2003, available at http:// www.hrw.org. ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 57

Italian La Repubblica in March 2004, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak warned that the imposition of us reform plans on the Arab world would result in»a vortex of violence and anarchy« and that the lessons of violence-ridden Algeria should serve as a clear warning in this regard. 5 And if that was not enough, regional leaders continuously emphasized to us officials and anybody else who would care to listen that the holding of free elections in the current regional political climate would result only in a takeover by Islamist parties, a scenario that, the argument goes, surely nobody would want. In light of the mounting difficulties that the us has encountered in Iraq, this was a message that apparently caught the attention of at least some within Washington’s corridors of power, who subsequently decided to take a more low-key approach in terms of advocating radical change. Thus, what was initially an ambitious plan for broad-based democratization under the Middle East Partnership Initiative( mepi ) turned into a more general and watered down Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa, adopted during the G-8 Sea Island Summit meeting in early June 2004, with the emphasis turning to more collaborative efforts between the us and its European allies rather than a direct unilateral course of action on the part of the us . In essence, what was highlighted once again was the strategic dilemma faced by us policy in terms of promoting reform and opening up the political process versus maintaining stability and supporting existing authoritarian governments. Third, rulers began to effectively use the rising anti-Americanism within their own societies and within the region as a whole to delay political reforms, arguing that to do so would be to follow an American agenda. us efforts for political and economic reform were effectively characterized as outside interference that would unnecessarily complicate and disrupt the domestic political process and the efforts at establishing a reform movement with strong internal roots. The well-practiced refrain put forward was that reforms should not be imposed from outside and that change must occur at its own pace and in due time. 6 5. La Repubblica, March 5, 2004. 6. For example, in a joint statement following their meeting in Egypt in February 2004, President Mubarak and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah»affirmed that Arab states are proceeding on the path of development, modernization and reform in keeping with their people’s interests and values« and that Arab states»do not accept that a particular pattern of reform be imposed on Arab and Islamic countries from outside.« See Arab News, February 25, 2004. 58 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

In this context, Middle Eastern governments used the arguments of the us to disarm their own domestic political opponents by arguing that the implementation of the proposed reforms would be nothing more than an imposition of the Western agenda for change. Reformers in the region subsequently found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, they felt the need to argue for a sustained reform effort as a means of stemming the tide of increasing Islamist militancy or at least to provide an alternative path to the radicalization of the region. On the other, by supporting reform initiatives they became identified as agents of the West intent on carrying out the agenda of foreigners. This is a dichotomy with which liberal-minded reformers throughout the region continue to struggle. The lead author of the Arab Human Development Report, Nader Fergany, has in this context argued that the us should basically keep out of the internal debate within the Arab world as their interference is skewing the terms of debate and doing more harm than good. 7 On all three levels mentioned so far, the end result has been a consolidation of the status quo, with the power elites able to exhibit their competence and agility in playing the balancing game, in turn canceling out the advantages of each of their opponents. Looking back over the crises of the past two decades, Middle Eastern leaders must feel reassured over their remarkable ability to weather the numerous regional crises that have engulfed the region. From that perspective, even an event as dramatic as the Iraq war associated with the invasion of an Arab state by over 150,000 foreign soldiers became compartmentalized as something whose repercussions could be dealt with and ultimately overcome. It must be granted at this stage that the line of argument we are pursuing is a broad generalization that does not necessarily correspond to the policies of every individual Middle Eastern state. In fact, countries such as Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar have taken significant steps over recent years to institute political reforms that are bound to have far-reaching consequences. King Abdullah in Jordan has been at the forefront, calling for wide-ranging reforms and arguing for the Middle East to break out of its stalemate. This, in turn, has resulted in a widespread modernization program in Jordan since 1999. In Bahrain, a parliament was reconstituted after a break of almost three decades in October 2002, with both men and 7. According to Fergany,»Intervention from outside deprives Arabs of their fundamental right to self-determination.« Quoted from Cairo Times, December 25, 2002. See also the contribution of Nader Fergany in this issue. ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 59

women being given the right to stand as candidates and cast their vote in elections. In Qatar, the Emir has promulgated one of the most far-reaching constitutions that, once ratified and in force in 2005, will grant an unprecedented level of personal freedom and protection for a Middle Eastern state. In fact, throughout the Gulf region, the concept of reform and associated measures has gained a respectable level of support, at least to a stage where the leadership acknowledges the need to close the current accountability and legitimacy gap between the rulers and the ruled, if only in terms of guiding a process of change from above. The degree to which these measures are really meant to bring about real change, however, remains to be seen. In fact, for the moment reform initiatives are largely part of a package to maintain internal control and power, and to substantiate the leadership’s status. As such, pronouncements are more a means of paying lip-service to reform demands, the real intent being to shore up an increasingly shrinking legitimacy rather than to enact broad participation rights. The primary motive of power holders remains the maintenance of control over the reform process as such so as, on the one hand, to ensure that the interests of the present elites are taken care of and, on the other, to counteract the possibility that a reform movement might eventually spin out of control and lead to unintended consequences. As a result, the status quo is confirmed while the structural deficiencies accounting for the present Middle Eastern malaise remain unaddressed. Light at the End of the Tunnel? If the above description of a stagnant, status quo-oriented Middle East is substantiated, the question has to be posed why Arab leaders are currently contemplating a political reform process at all at a time of widespread regional instability and coming on the heels of a major upheaval like the us invasion of Iraq. The answer lies in the fact that the reform initiatives currently being contemplated and articulated are not so much a response to the implications of the Iraq conflict as a direct reflection of societal transformations taking place in every Middle Eastern country. The proposed measures are aimed at combating and correcting the deficiencies within Middle Eastern state structures that have combined to produce continued economic decline, increased rates of poverty and social dislocation, a failing educa60 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

tion system, and in general a growing alienated and disillusioned population. By themselves, such factors would not converge to force ruling elites to respond with the outlines of a reform program. However, in light of such developments as an increasingly globalized and networked local environment, and a rising educated and politically conscious young population, the inevitability of such a reform effort becomes clear. Moreover, and also related to the fact that the domestic environment now confronting the regimes is not the result of the Iraq war but the culmination of a number of factors that have developed over many years and which are slowly but increasingly coming together, the reform measures being considered cannot be viewed as occurring within a vacuum or as a singular response to an isolated phenomenon. Instead, what is happening in the Middle East – what is beginning to engulf the population and the regimes as a whole – is a dynamic transformation process that over the coming years will fundamentally alter the way the region conducts its political, economic, and social affairs. The forces of globalization are reaching the Middle East just as they are every other part of the globe and are demanding ever greater openness, accountability, and personal freedom. In that perspective, the notion of a prevailing status quo manifesting itself throughout the Middle East is short-sighted and not rooted in regional realities. Notwithstanding the minor direct impact of the Iraq war, the Middle East is a region undergoing significant and far-reaching transformation. As ground-breaking reports from the United National Development Program( undp ) in both 2002 and 2003 made clear, the region as a whole – and the population within it – finds itself confronted by a fast-changing environment that has produced deep cleavages between governments and their citizens and within society itself. The different pulls being exerted are reflected in blatant contradictions. For example, while ruling regimes pursue policies aimed at consolidating the status quo or offering only piece-meal reform, the forces of globalization are reaching the Middle East just as they are every other part of the globe and are demanding ever greater openness, accountability, and personal freedom. In terms of the general population, it is increasingly, albeit slowly, becoming clear that governance arrangements in their present state are simply insufficient to meet rising public expectations. However, this ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 61

trend towards a more participatory order is being resisted by ruling elites who fear eventually being swept from power or provoking a heightened period of instability, or both. To understand the geopolitical and socio-economic path that the Middle East is likely to follow in the coming years, the analytical magnifying glass should thus not be held up to Iraq and its immediate regional environment but rather to underlying social developments. Only by adopting this point of departure will it be possible for the West – and particularly Europe – to prepare itself adequately for the coming shifts and to propose realistic and appropriate policy alternatives to ensure that the stirrings within Middle Eastern societies are routed in a direction in which they begin to promote stability instead of pulling the region into another cycle of lasting violence and insecurity. Three developments will have a particular impact on Middle Eastern states and societies in the coming years: 8 (i) population increase, particularly young people;(ii) rising educational standards and their impact on the population as a whole; and(iii) increasing political consciousness, supported by the spread of communications technologies and the inability of national government to control the information flow. As far as population projections are concerned, Table 1 provides a brief glimpse of the projected situation in the Middle East on the basis of current statistics. Here, two items stand out. First, a population explosion is occurring in the region, with the total population expected to double from its current 341.9 million to over 723 million by 2050. For the years 2000–2005, three Arab countries – Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and Oman – are among the top 10 in the world in terms of population growth rates. While currently only Egypt and Iran from the Middle East are among the top 30 most populous countries in the world(numbers 15 and 16 respectively), by 2050 this number will have increased to five, with Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan joining the list. Yemen will move from its current position at 52 to 18 as the population increases from 18.3 million to over 100 million. Similarly, there will be almost 60 million Saudis in 8. For an extensive discussion of the political, economic, and social dynamics that are fundamentally altering the Middle Eastern landscape, see the Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 and 2003 published by the United Nations Development Program( undp ), available at www.undp.org, as well as the recently published series of World Bank reports on governance, employment, women, and trade and investment in the Middle East and North Africa( mena ), available at http://lnweb18. worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf. 62 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

Table 1 Selected Middle East Country Population Statistics Country Total population 2000 Projected population 2050 Algeria 30 291 000 51 180 000 Bahrain 640 000 1 008 000 Egypt 67 884 000 113 840 000 Iran 70 330 000 121 424 000 Iraq 22 946 000 53 574 000 Jordan 4 913 000 11 709 000 Kuwait 1 914 000 4 001 000 Lebanon 3 496 000 5 018 000 Libya 5 290 000 9 969 000 Morocco 29 878 000 50 361 000 Oman 2 538 000 8 751 000 Palestinian Territories 3 191 000 11 821 000 Qatar 565 000 831 000 Saudi Arabia 20 346 000 59 683 000 Sudan 31 095 000 63 530 000 Syria 16 189 000 36 345 000 Tunisia 9 459 000 14 076 000 United Arab Emirates 2 606 000 3 709 000 Yemen 18 349 000 102 379 000 Total 341 920 000 723 209 000 Source: United Nations Population Division. % of population below age 24 2000 56.5 43.7 55.7 59.3 61.7 61.0 54.5 49.8 57.6 55.3 63.4 65.1 39.3 62.2 59.8 63.0 50.8 41.3 68.3 56.2 2050 compared to just over 20 million now. Countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Oman, and the Palestinian territories will move up more than 10 places in terms of total population ranking. The effects of this tremendous population explosion will be compounded by the large percentage currently(2000) under the age of 24. Overall, young people make up between 50 and 65 percent of the total ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 63

population in the Middle East, with Yemen at the upper end of the spectrum with 68.3 percent(median age 15.0 years), followed by Iraq, Jordan, Oman, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, all over 60 percent. To put such figures in perspective, the population of Germany will decline in the period 2000–2050 by approximately 14 percent, the current percentage of those under 24 is 26.8 percent, and the median age is 40.1 years. Spain will see its population drop from 39.9 million to 31.3 million, while its percentage of under 24s is currently 29.8 percent, and its median age is 37.3 years. This surge in real numbers and the large percentage of young people will in themselves put a great strain on governance systems in the Middle East in terms of the required expansion of social services, particularly in education and health care. This is already an area in which Middle Eastern governments are failing to meet expectations and the sense of discontent will only increase as competition over limited public resources intensifies. However, the true significance of this phenomenon only becomes clear when combined with the likely developments that will occur in terms of education and the related impact of the spread of communications and information technology. The current young generation is generally more literate, has greater access to educational opportunities(including university studies), a greater awareness of regional and international events due to the spread of resources like the Internet, and, as a result of the spread of communications technologies, increased exposure to possibilities and opportunities in other parts of the world, particularly the West. The result is a general rise in the level of political consciousness throughout the region which in turn is bound to translate into a greater determination to take part in political debate. As far as the ruling regimes are concerned, the combination of youth, education, and IT is a key problem area, and one which will invariably mean some devolution of power. A glance at the statistics presented in Table 2 also proves very informative. Throughout the region, literacy rates have continued their steady improvement, even within the span of a few years(1998–2002). As a result, the majority of Middle Eastern states now have literacy rates well above 70 percent. Similarly, net secondary school enrollment rates have improved, reaching 80 percent and above in countries such as Jordan, 64 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

Bahrain, and Qatar. In this context, it has to be acknowledged that the overall quality of the education system in the Middle East remains poor and lags behind those of other regions in the world. At the same time, the very fact that exposure to continued education is expanding is directly reflected in a segment of the population that is more aware of developments taking place around them and more willing to engage in political discourse. Regarding the key problem of women’s status in the region, similar positive developments are visible, although gender disparities remain high. In terms of secondary school enrollment, literacy rates, and labor market participation, the trend for Middle Eastern women has been towards increased access and greater opportunities. In Oman, for example, literacy among women increased from 57.1 percent to 65.4 between 1998 and 2002, while for Syria it went from 57.9 percent to 74.2 percent. In almost all the countries in the region, women now have net secondary school enrollment percentages above 60 percent, with Jordan and Bahrain showing figures over 80 percent. Furthermore, while overall female labor participation rates remain low, the percentage of women entering the labor market is increasing steadily, having doubled and even tripled in the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In Kuwait alone there has been an increase of 7.3 percent in the female workforce since 2003. Also in the Gulf states women have slowly gained access to the political system, being able to vote and stand as candidates in municipal or parliamentary elections in Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. There is no doubt that these trends are contributing to the overall transformation taking place throughout the Middle East. The real impact in this regard will probably come about due to the expansion of information technologies throughout the Middle East. The increase in the number of Internet users within a four-year period from 757,000 to over 11 million is astounding, especially because this is an area in which the government’s monopoly over information is being broken and people are having increasing access to more independent sources of data. The movement towards greater exposure to it is clearly being driven by the youthful population and therefore it can be expected that such expansion will continue at quite a high rate. With the status of the ruling regimes as arbiters of truth no longer guaranteed, governments are finding themselves under mounting pressure to provide real policy solutions and to take the concerns and aspirations of their populations more ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 65

Table 2 Selected Middle East Country Education and Technology Statistics Country Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Total literacy% Net secondary school enrollment rate% Fixed lines and mobile telephones(per 1 000 people) 1998 2002 1999 2001 1998 2002 (% of women) 64.2 69.0 58.5 62.0 50.7 73.8 (64.0) 86.7 88.5 81.6 81.0 413.3 846.4 (86.0) 54.6 a – 79.0 81.0 66.2 177.2 (79.0) 73.6 77.1 b – – 125.3 220.1 – – 33.0 – 29.8 28.7 (26.0 a ) 88.5 90.9 75.9 80.0 124.7 355.4 (81.0) 80.6 82.9 49.7 77.0 334.1 722.9 (79.0) 85.6 a – 70.2 – 335.7 425.8 (73.3 a ) 77.8 81.7 – – 94.4 127.2 b 46.9 50.7 29.9 – 54.5 (27.0 a ) 247.1 68.4 74.4 58.5 68.0 135.6 (68.0) 255.4 80.8 a – 78.0 78.0 373.5 727.4 (80.0) 74.2 77.9 – 53.0 138.5 (51.0) 361.0 55.2 59.9 – – 6.0 26.5 72.6 82.9 37.6 39.0 94.7 146.7 (37.0) Internet users 1998 2002 6 000 500 000 20 000 165 000 100 000 1 900 000 65 000 – 3 200 000 25 000 60 000 307 500 60 000 250 000 100 000 400 000 20 000 b 40 000 125 000 700 000 20 000 180 000 20 000 70 000 20 000 1 400 000 2 000 10 000 84 000 220 000 66 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

Country Total literacy% Net secondary school enrollment rate% Fixed lines and mobile telephones(per 1 000 people) Internet users 1998 2002 1999 2001 1998 2002 1998 2002 (% of women) Tunisia 68.5 73.2 67.9 68.0 84.8 168.9 (69.0) 10 000 505 500 uae 75.0 77.3 67.5 72.0 598.6 1009.7 200 000 1 200 000 (74.0) Yemen 43.9 49.0 37.0 – 15.7 48.9 (21.1 a ) 4 000 100 000 Total – – – – 170.9 331.6 757 000 11 300 000 Source: World Development Indicators Database, April 2004; unesco , Global Education Statistics 2004; International Telecommunications Union 2003; Arab Human Development Report 2002 and 2003. Note: a Data for 1999; b Data for 2001 seriously. It is in this context that the Iraq war might have lasting consequences as it was a conflict that almost everyone in the Middle East could observe on their television screens through media outlets like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyya or through the Internet. And while in the long term the spread of it is probably a positive development in the sense that access to information is more widespread and outlets for political expression are multiplied, in the short term it can also lead to greater instability as the ruling arrangements of the present will be subject to increased scrutiny and people vent their frustrations over their current predicament. As far as the ruling regimes are concerned, the combination of youth, education, and it is a key problem area, and one which will invariably mean some devolution of power. The Challenge for External Actors In this context, Europe and the United States will have an essential role to play. Although the us has, not only in terms of Iraq but also the Palestinian issue, severely undermined its ability to promote a course of ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 67

democratic reform, one must not think that the role of outsiders will be negligible, ineffective, or both. In fact, done carefully and based on a constructive set of assumptions, their role should not be underestimated. It is true that the widespread reform debate being initiated in Western capitals and spreading through Western intellectual and policy circles has only limited applicability to the realities of the region. Their impact will therefore be restricted in the direct sense: for example, the accusation of interference can lead to outright rejection. However, globalization and widespread communication also mean that outside debate inevitably seeps into domestic discourse, providing these debates with additional parameters around which to orient themselves. Equally important is the fact that by focusing on the various elements of reform and its associated strategies, outsiders themselves gain a greater appreciation of the intricacies and substance of the issues. As a result, the realization emerges that true political development and reform in the Middle East can in the end succeed only if grounded in local realities and structured from within. If one takes this long-term view, an essential point of departure for democratization and the restructuring of societies, the linkages being established between reform advocates on both sides are bound to bear fruit. Western governments should therefore focus on pragmatic initiatives rather than ideological principles. For the countries of the European Union, this means following a number of key parameters. First, eu –Middle East and eu –Gulf relations must be constructed on their own merits and cannot be seen primarily as a substitute for us policies. Second, a European approach must strike a proper balance, avoiding both uncritical support and exclusive criticism of us policies. A good starting point is the realization that with Saddam Hussein removed from power, there is a real opportunity for regional progress and cooperation. This opportunity can, however, be taken advantage of only if the security approach being applied to overcome the insurgency within the country is supplemented with a political course that begins to tackle the root causes of the present instability. Thus, whereas a us and nato role should be limited to security, peacekeeping, and military crisismanagement efforts, the eu needs to step out of its shadow and openly promote a political agenda that has as its basis regional cooperation grounded in and supported by various political, economic, and social reform initiatives. Such initiatives have to be guided by both a European vision of what a future Middle East and Gulf should look like and an open dialogue with the Arab world to jointly define targets and common 68 Koch, Change in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

projects. At bottom is the unique European vision that builds on the continent’s history and experience in overcoming conflicts and divisions. Conclusion The Iraq war has both exposed the resistance of the region to immediate change and confirmed trends and indicators that existed prior to the latest crisis, that is, the overall weakness of the state in dealing with its mounting social and internal challenges and the inevitability of reform. What is clear is that change will be driven by the need to provide educational and employment opportunities for the growing youth population rather than by decisions being made on the future development of Iraq. No regime in the region will be able to maintain what is left of its present legitimacy if it does not provide concrete solutions for its population. In the meantime, Iraq is at best primarily an internal issue for Iraqis, and at worst a diversionary opportunity for leaders to assert the existence of an external threat when the real challenge is domestic. If anything, the war in Iraq is an issue not because of its geopolitical reverberations but primarily because the inept us effort at post-war reconstruction has made the country a magnet for extremist elements and has added fuel to the flames of frustration and impotence that are already consuming the region’s youth. This is unfortunate because, when looked at in terms of the real issues defining the future of the Middle East, the picture is not as bleak as it is often made out to be. More on the Middle East in international politics and society ̈ Herbert Kitschelt: Origins of International Terrorism in the Middle East(1/2004) ̈ Jochen Müller: Das islamische Argument. Warum sich so viele Araber von Feinden umringt sehen(2/2002) ̈ Andrä Gärber: Die politische Lage im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika nach dem 11. September 2001(1/2002) ipg 4/2004 Koch, Change in the Middle East 69

Transformation without Democratization? Egypt’s Political Future EBERHARD KIENLE* F rom a distance, the Egyptian parliamentary elections in autumn 2000 appeared to bring to an end the period of political deliberalization and therefore the erosion of political and civil liberties that had marked much of the 1990s. This time no more than 87 percent of the seats went to members of President Mubarak’s National Democratic Party( ndp ), compared to more than 94 percent in the assembly(s)elected in 1995. Accordingly, 56 seats in the 454-seat assembly went to representatives of opposition parties and unaffiliated candidates, compared to only 27 seats previously. More strikingly, 17 seats went to declared Islamists, most of them closely linked to the otherwise still outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, only one oppositional Islamist had managed to enter the outgoing assembly before being stripped of his parliamentary immunity. Roughly at the same time President Mubarak’s son Gamal, widely seen and publicized as a young, dynamic modernizer, became active in the ndp , presented himself as an economic and political reformer, and left many observers with the impression that the sclerotic regime was perhaps open to change after all. These expectations seemed further confirmed when he became chair of the ndp ’s Policy Secretariat and began to advocate the abolition of some of the country’s special tribunals, the removal of sentences of hard labor from the penal code, and the creation of a national human rights council. Leaving aside the troubling but currently receding possibility of semimonarchical succession, Egypt could appear to be back on the track towards political liberalization and democratization that it seemed to have abandoned in the early 1990s. The standard argument – or rather belief – developed or held by the enthusiasts of globalization seems to have been rehabilitated: the spread of models of good practice and governance, the * The author thanks Asya El-Meehy for her valuable comments and suggestions. This contribution was written before the last change of government in Egypt and before the National Democratic Party congress in September 2004. These events do not affect the basic line of argument of this analysis. 70 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

support of civil society, democracy promotion, and in particular economic reform in the sense of economic liberalization ultimately prove to be irresistible and, despite temporary blockages, lead to the transition from authoritarian rule in the»Third World«. At the same time, the increase in the number of Islamist deputies after the 2000 elections could indicate the renewed rise of what is commonly – but often inappropriately – called»political Islam«. In other words, the other main preoccupation – alongside democracy – that has kept Egyptwatchers busy in the past seems to have reappeared as the largely alternative vanishing point of political change in the country. Having little sympathy for Islamists, European and American promoters of democracy have reason to rejoice, but also to worry(recent claims by representatives of the current us administration that Islam is compatible with democracy are hardly meant to apply to Islamists). Enhanced opportunities for political participation could even benefit Islamist forces that are often considered enemies of democracy. Consequently, the widely assumed positive nexus of economic reform, improving standards of living, democracy, and its consolidation through the concomitant demise of Islamist forces allegedly thriving on poverty could be thrown into question. We shall argue that developments in Egypt represent neither a transition to democracy nor a transition to an Islamist regime – or, to be more precise, to a regime more Islamist than the present one; we shall also argue that the(relative) rise of Islamist forces is not necessarily incompatible with democracy. At the same time, we question the simplistic links that are frequently postulated between economic reform, political reform, and Islamism. 1 The Transition to Democracy that Never Was Three Decades of Half-Hearted Reforms Those who detect signs of democratization endorse, though perhaps unwillingly, the official narrative of the country’s recent history according 1. Democracy will be defined as the possibility for the ruled to replace the rulers peacefully and at regular intervals in accordance with clearly established procedures. Islamists will be defined as actors who, whether in government or in opposition, seek to(re)organize public and private life in accordance with values and norms that they themselves consider as Islamic. ipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 71

to which Egypt has been in transition to democracy since 1977 when President Anwar al-Sadat dissolved the old single party, the Arab National Union, and in 1979 held the first pluri-party elections after the fall of the monarchy. For them the 2000 elections and other elements, including Gamal Mubarak’s reform program, confirm that the dark years of the 1990s were nothing but a temporary setback due to particularly unfavorable circumstances. Depending on whether they emphasize the role of actors or of structures, they are convinced that either the democratic convictions of the rulers or the march of history, which may even open up new opportunities for grassroots actors, will inevitably and ultimately transform the country into a true democracy. Reinforced by regime changes in the successive»waves« of democratization that hit first Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, and then Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, mainstream evolutionist and teleological visions of history indeed leave little choice when it comes to making sense of political change in Egypt. However, a closer look at Egypt’s history should lead to different conclusions. What under Sadat appeared to be a process of political liberalization and democratization was indeed a far more complex attempt to moderately enhance liberties in ways that could not harm the regime. The changes were not simply rhetorical, but real in the sense that some new people could enter parliament and new fora for discussion and debate were opened up. Also, the creation of the Supreme Constitutional Court ( scc ) in 1979 ultimately strengthened the rule of law. Simultaneously, however, mechanisms were put in place that restricted the new liberties. Regime control of most of the media, the active creation of inherently weak and mutually suspicious opposition parties, new but discreet repressive legislation, and more heavy-handed methods of vote rigging guaranteed the ndp the two-thirds majority necessary to fix presidential elections and to amend the constitution. Consequently, the regime’s survival in power was never at stake. To the contrary, one could argue that, as in numerous other countries, limited political openness and controlled opposition gave additional support to the authoritarian regime. Controlled openness gave a certain amount of leeway to a population that, as a result of the simultaneous selective economic liberalization known as»infitah,« was increasingly questioning the old partly socialist, partly statist Nasserist consensus and articulating conflicting interests. Controlled openness also provided an opportunity for new constituencies, in particular the crony capitalists 72 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

produced by the infitah, to ingratiate themselves with the regime, that was eager to find new allies in the attempt to redefine its social base. Sadat’s successor, Husni Mubarak, soon after assuming the presidency attempted to develop a more coherent policy of regime-supporting political decompression. The showcase event was the 1984 parliamentary election, although the regime party garnered 87 percent of the seats, just one percent less than in 1979. Given significant advance publicity at home and abroad, closely followed by the international press who could cover the elections without restriction, they were generally considered and reported as free and fair. However, while flagrant fraud and vote rigging were limited or relegated to less visible parts of the electoral process, a set of factors that may be called the structural supremacy of the regime continued to force competitors of the ndp to fight an impossible uphill struggle on a less than level playing field. Such structural supremacy – in some ways even hegemony – derived from the support of the armed forces, control of the media, and control over an economy in which partial economic liberalization had created regime-dependent capitalists. A legislature packed with regime-dependent deputies enabled Mubarak to tolerate an opposition which, precisely because of its own structural inferiority, remained unable to challenge the regime seriously or to cross the red line that had been drawn around its activities. Contrary to widespread belief, the oppositional Islamists posed a threat to the regime not because they were Islamists but because they were oppositional. The conflict was less about ideology than about power and the spoils associated with it. However, the regime was not uncontested. In 1987 and in 1990(and again in 2000), the scc declared unconstitutional legislation that had governed the preceding parliamentary elections. Consequently, on each occasion parliament had to be dissolved and new elections had to be called under amended legislation that gradually reduced regime control over the election process and, ultimately, over the results. The regime was threatened not only by the courts, that whittled away its structural superiority, but also – and far more directly – by oppositional Islamists who, depending on the narrative, either challenged the existing order or resisted attempts by the regime to reconquer the geographical and metaphorical territory that it had previously lost or left to ipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 73

them. Contrary to widespread belief, the oppositional Islamists posed a threat to the regime not because they were Islamists but because they were oppositional. The conflict was less about ideology than about power and the spoils associated with it. Indeed, Islamists could easily be found in the regime and in the ranks of its supporters, if by Islamists one designates political actors who seek to reorganize public and private life in accordance with norms they consider as Islamic. In addition, the 1990s were marked by economic reforms that at least in the short run threatened the living standard of numerous Egyptians and indeed entailed material losses for many of them. In 1991, agreements with the International Monetary Fund( imf ) and the World Bank put in place programs of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment inspired by what was then known as the Washington Consensus. In the longer run growth was to be fostered through increasing productivity and competitiveness based on deregulation, including the gradual liberalization of foreign trade, the privatization of public sector companies, and an increase of the role of the market in resource allocation. Socially, the reduction of employment and wage levels or even the closure of companies were the likely – and indeed actual – consequences. The conflict between the regime and oppositional Islamists, the distributional effects of the economic reforms, and regime attempts to neutralize the more liberal and participatory amendments to the electoral law imposed by the scc resulted in a process of political deliberalization that began in 1991 and marked most of the decade. Political opponents were prosecuted, 2 parliamentary elections were rigged as never before, professional organizations were put under regime tutelage, trade union rights were curtailed, and strikes put down by the police. By the end of the decade the regime had defeated the oppositional Islamists involved in armed resistance and terrorism; in the process it had also managed to contain the Muslim Brothers, who sought to bring about change without resorting to violence. Also, the worst initial effects of macroeconomic stabilization had been overcome and the economy 2. The penal code was substantially modified and included far harsher sentences than in the past for political crimes. Increasingly, sensitive cases were referred to special tribunals, civilians were tried by military courts, countless death sentences were handed down and executed, the practice of administrative detention without trial under emergency legislation was generalized, and torture and extra-judicial killings became a standard feature of repression. 74 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

had recovered, with growth rates rising from around zero in 1991/92 to some five percent in 1996/97, entailing some degree of statistical growth in per capita income as well. Under these circumstances the regime felt partly able – partly compelled by its allies abroad – to proceed to a degree of political decompression. In the 2000 elections oppositional forces did slightly better, avoiding an embarrassingly large majority for the regime. Simultaneously, administrative detainees were released(though others were arrested after September 2001) and repression was slightly eased. The first woman judge was appointed and women can now obtain divorce more easily. In early summer 2003 the reforms advocated by Gamal Mubarak were translated into law. However, in the same period the Ibn Khaldun Center was closed by the regime and its staff, including its director, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, were arrested on fabricated charges. Newly elected members of parliament quickly lost their seats to more regime-friendly ones in heavily rigged byelections. Representatives of opposition forces, in particular the Muslim Brothers, continue to be arrested and tried for dubious reasons. In the economic sphere, structural adjustment has been less successful than macroeconomic stabilization and the pauperization of large parts of the population, starting with the reforms, has continued in a period of decreasing economic activity and growth. More recently, the regime was forced to devalue the Egyptian pound, a decision that heavily increased the cost of living in a country in which imports account for a large part of food consumption and basic commodities. Trade liberalization under wto rules and the new association agreement with the eu will further test an economy whose international competitiveness is far from being established. Policing the losers(and the winners, who might get too strong and become challengers from inside) therefore remains a key concern of the regime. Thus, on balance, political decompression has not gone very far. Sometimes change has been proposed or announced but not implemented, and what has been implemented remains easily reversible. None of the changes affect the structural superiority or hegemony of the regime. The Absence of Alternative Power Centers Most critically, the changes are far too limited to allow the emergence of power centers independent of the regime that could become strong ipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 75

enough to effectively challenge the latter and force it to enter into powersharing arrangements. Processes of that sort were crucial to the kind of transformation that produced the political systems that today we consider established democracies. In Egypt, the oppositional political parties are far too weak and restricted in their activities to play such a role. Civil society defined as it is today as non-profit associations and organizations independent of the state, is no stronger. The most effective mediators between the state and the individual are still the more communally-based ones. Certainly, the latest Egyptian law on non-profit associations(commonly referred to, to some extent inaccurately, as non-governmental organizations or ngo s) makes them independent of the regime in the sense that the latter no longer appoints up to half their board members. However, their creation and activities remain severely restricted and policed. Transgressions entail stiff penalties, including dissolution of the association. Moreover, they are too diffuse to confront the regime effectively, and even if they formed a united front they would have little material clout. Financially, the more political ones largely depend on foreign funding which often delegitimizes them in the eyes of Egyptians who remain staunch nationalists, especially when it comes to relations with»the West«. It is indeed one of the more serious misconceptions of our times that the growth of civil society necessarily brings democracy. Historically, it has certainly been associated with processes of democratization but largely as a by-product of the wider socio-economic transformations that led to the emergence of competing power centers representing corporate, class, regional, or ethnic(including religious) interests. The private sector has not emancipated itself from the regime or turned into one or more competing power centers either. It no doubt grew significantly as a result of the economic reforms that started timidly in the late 1980s and gained momentum after the 1991 agreements with the imf and the World Bank. The changes were far more substantial than those prompted by the infitah of the 1970s that merely added a dependent private sector to what was still a public-sector-dominated economy. Since the late 1990s the private sector has accounted for some 60 percent of gross domestic fixed investment, compared to some 25 to 33 percent in the early 1980s. Every year since the early 1990s new private investment has outpaced new public investment. Private consumption now amounts to some 80 percent of gdp , compared to less than 70 percent in the 1980s. However, the vast majority of private sector companies remain small and 76 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

medium-size enterprises with a workforce of no more than a dozen or two, with similarly small market shares. With a few exceptions business organizations are either non existent, state-dependent, or of a local nature. Very few entrepreneurs have managed to create large companies, which by and large remain family enterprises. So far, none of them has openly challenged the regime in any way. Material advantages granted especially to large businesses, particularly in terms of taxation, may indeed have been sovereignly granted from above without concerted and sustained demand from below. On the contrary, President Mubarak has repeatedly reminded business people of their duties, both individually or collectively, to the country and the regime. Those who failed to listen discovered that social mobility could work not only upwards but also downwards. To date, the judiciary – with the obvious exception of special and military tribunals – remains the most active and effective countervailing power in relation to the regime. Though ultimately part of the state, the courts have, to varying degrees, escaped regime control. This is not to say that they cannot be influenced, that their rulings are technically flawless, or that they are based on values one might like to sign up to. Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his colleagues at the Ibn Khaldun Center had to wait three years for the Court of Cassation to quash earlier rulings confirming their initial condemnation. Nonetheless, judges cannot be removed from the bench and their selection, promotion, and transfer to other courts are entirely in the hands of a committee made up of their most senior representatives. The Supreme Constitutional Court is the only court other than special and military courts in which the regime – in fact, the president himself – is formally in a position to influence the appointment of the judges; however, his influence is limited to a choice between candidates proposed by the other judges of the court. Authoritarian Rule Reconfigured Rather than force political change in Egypt – and in numerous other countries – into the conceptual straightjacket of an inevitable transition to democracy we should interpret it as the reconfiguration of authoritarian rule. There is no reason why authoritarian rule today should present the same features as authoritarian rule in the past or in the days when the concept was forged by authors such as Juan Linz. For instance, why not assume that authoritarianism may be combined with limited participaipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 77

tory elements, in particular in a period in which political legitimacy is almost entirely defined in terms of electoral democracy? In Egypt, positive and negative liberties have sometimes shrunk or been reduced, while in other periods they have grown or been expanded. Never, however, have they been allowed to grow sufficiently to enable us to call the political system a democracy. Obviously, things may change in the future, but without the emergence of independent power centers – whether formal or informal – such a future seems remote. 3 The Sources of Regime Resilience The claim that Egypt is not in transition to democracy obviously raises the question of why its political system is resistant to such change. We have noted the absence of power centers independent of the regime and able to compete with it, as well as with each other. Explaining the continuity of authoritarian rule indeed means explaining the absence of such power centers and why they have not emerged or been consolidated. It also means explaining why the regime largely(but not exclusively) through the state that it inherited, rebuilt, and reproduced has been able to acquire such a dominant position vis-à-vis other actors and to maintain its control not only over the physical means of coercion but also – in spite of satellite television – over the media, minds, civil society, and the economy. Part of the answer certainly lies in the dominant role played by the state and therefore the regime in the Egyptian economy ever since the agrarian reforms and nationalizations decreed by Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s. Private sector growth in the 1970s failed to weaken the position of the state, partly because of the lack of concentration of private ownership, partly because of crony capitalist arrangements in which the private sector remained the junior partner of an unaccountable regime monopolizing 3. The description of Egypt as a country in transition to democracy is further thrown into question by the possibility of a semi-monarchical succession, should Mubarak’s son, Gamal, be elected president. No doubt he would be elected in accordance with the constitution, but the election procedure lends itself well to paternal filiation. Gamal Mubarak is considered by many an agent of modernization, but reforms proposed by a candidate whose rise was due entirely to the existing authoritarian system are at least questionable. 78 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

the means of physical coercion. At the same time, economic liberalization carried out by an authoritarian regime obviously entailed not deregulation but regime-friendly reregulation and thus failed to affect state control over the economy. Under these conditions civil society cannot rely on autonomous domestic sources of support, nor can independent media easily mobilize the resources necessary to confront state-controlled radio and television. Another part of the answer lies in the military foundations of the regime, permanently consolidated by external threats, alleged or real, readily accepted by a deeply nationalist population as policy constraints. Imperialism is still lurking; Israel remains suspect in spite of the peace treaty; Sudan and countries further up the Nile threaten the country’s water supplies; and Islamist terrorists are ready to strike throughout the Middle East. These threats have been partly sublimated into the claim that Egypt needs to play the role of a regional power and maintain order in a disorderly part of the world. Thus successive Egyptian regimes have managed to justify a national security state with all the restrictions on liberty that go with that. Indeed, even the role of the state in the economy and limits on economic liberalization are officially justified with reference to security concerns. A third part of the answer lies in external material and diplomatic support, to which we shall return in greater detail below. Under Sadat and Mubarak, Egypt has been generously rewarded by the United States and Europe for recognizing Israel and fighting Islamists. More generally, such support was supposed to ensure the country’s stability and the longevity of its friendly rulers. It encouraged the regime’s regional ambitions and thus the repression of domestic challengers. It also repeatedly allowed the regime to ignore demands for economic reform formulated by the Bretton Woods institutions that might have weakened crony capitalism. The fragmentation of the state apparatus is actively used to maintain the balance of power among its various segments. The mechanisms of control and repression that these factors made possible to put in place and to maintain could have been affected by the notorious internal divisions of the state apparatus. Similar to other large organizations, the Egyptian state consists of numerous elements, including ministries, government agencies, corporatist solidarity groups, clienipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 79

teles, and networks that have carved out for themselves a degree of autonomy and try to ingratiate themselves with the president and vie for budgetary favors and administrative responsibilities. The state apparatus remains divided. Censorship is a case in point as various agencies, including the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Information and relevant departments at al-Azhar University seek to ban or promote different opinions. Another example is the ndp whose leadership is notoriously unable to impose its candidates against challengers from within the party. Nonetheless, the regime has managed to contain both divisions and ambitions. High-ranking army officers are regularly moved from post to post to prevent them from building up their own support base, while the police have been strengthened to keep the armed forces in check. Within their respective forces, the defense and the interior minister are encumbered by their deputies or chiefs of staff, and the secret services watch each other. The fragmentation of the state apparatus is in fact actively used to maintain the balance of power among its various segments. As the regime has successfully managed the internal divisions of the state apparatus non-regime actors were unable to ally themselves with challengers to the status quo from within. This is not to say that the various components of the state apparatus were insulated from»society« in ways we(sometimes naively) assume characterize»modern« Weberian states. Many state agencies and officials in Egypt connive with non-state actors or are colonized by them. However, in its effects such porosity remains limited to the pursuit of material interest, circumvention of the law, and promotion of norms considered as Islamic; even in these areas repression tends to strike when matters get out of hand and the»wrong« people make unacceptably large gains. Thus the regime has acted against corruption when privileged interests were at stake or pretenders had to be put in their place. Similarly, the armed forces – except for the assassins of President Sadat – have remained largely immune to subversion by oppositional Islamists. Obviously, the regime’s ability to control its various agencies is to a considerable extent a question of resources. Human and material resources are needed to feed the steady flow of legitimating propaganda via print and electronic media, to operate the technical means of surveillance, and to maintain the generous entitlement programs which enable officials to buy, at cheap rates, holiday flats overlooking the Mediterranean or the Red Sea. As a matter of course, opponents must not be in a posi80 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

tion to mobilize similar resources, an objective not too difficult to attain as long as the regime enjoys structural superiority. The Role of Outside Actors: Complicity or Interference? As in other third-world countries, outside actors are key providers of the material resources which enable the regime to maintain its structural superiority at home. Consequently, these actors are – at least in principle and within the limits of their own calculations – in a position to put pressure on the regime. Controlling access to a large market for Egyptian products and disbursing various sorts of aid as they do, the European Union and its member states could activate human rights and democracy clauses in the new association agreement based on the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Alternatively, the European Union could replace or combine these rather vague forms of political conditionality with new instruments that actively encourage political change: for instance,(additional) aid and access to markets could be granted, subject to increasing political participation, easing repression, and strengthening the rule of law. As the major international backer of the Egyptian regime the usa could have even greater leverage. The us administration and Congress could reduce or cut military and civilian aid(currently 1.3 billion and 0.6 billion us dollars per annum, respectively), although civilian aid is in fact to be phased out over time anyway. Furthermore, us influence over the imf and the World Bank could block or delay stand-by loans and funding for structural adjustment measures. Until recently President Mubarak had managed to defeat such initiatives or temptations in their early stages, largely by stressing his commitment to peace with Israel and his track record in fighting Islamism. Matters changed after September 11, 2001, when the advocates of speedy global democratization in and around the Bush administration established an explicit link between terrorism and authoritarianism. The argument was most forcefully developed with regard to Saudi Arabia, the home country of most of the suicide hijackers. However, the involvement, alleged or real, of Egyptian nationals such as Ayman al-Zawahiri in al-Qa’ida and other international terrorist networks brought the Egyptian regime into us sights. More or less vocal depending on the shifting balance of power within the administration the anti-terrorist democratizipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 81

ers seemed to gain ground again when President Bush himself in early November 2003 asked the Egyptian regime to show its neighbors the road to democracy. Nonetheless, others in the administration, some of them pointing to the demise of neoconservative projects for Iraq, continue to argue that authoritarian regimes keep in check Islamists who otherwise could come to power through the ballot box and pose a yet more powerful threat to American, Israeli, and other»Western« interests. They point out that the Mubarak regime has managed to defeat terrorism at home, although its victory came at a very high price in terms of lives and liberties. Support from other Arab states ceased in 1979 when Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. Even when relations improved again and the Arab League moved back to Egypt, official aid never reached its former peaks. From the mid-1980s the oil price declined and so did the revenues of the major oil producing states. As a result there was less to give away to poorer neighbors such as Egypt. Though also declining, remittances sent home by the millions of Egyptian migrant workers in the Gulf and in Libya remained one of the major balance of payment items; this income of course largely escaped the state, even though it did try to tax it. There was also a degree of Arab investment and allegedly large amounts of money were paid by various private and public sources in the Gulf to oppositional Islamists in the country. Given their own vested interests the majority of Arab donors would hardly link finance to political reform. And when Egyptian remittances were put into the then growing Islamic banks the regime stepped in and closed down institutions which it feared would strengthen oppositional Islamists. Past experience and the acute awareness of present vulnerability combine to reinforce communitarian reflexes and identity politics that manifest themselves in the defense of the indigenous against the alien and thus of existing political arrangements. A more complex question is whether open external pressure for political reform or even regime change would be helpful or counter-productive. In the eyes of key constituencies and the wider public in Egypt any such pressure would be a sign of interference by basically hostile imperialist powers who dominated their country in the past and now seek to dominate it in new, more up to date ways. Democracy and human rights 82 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

frequently appear suspicious because they are advocated by the actors and forces that dominate the global scene and, from an Arab point of view, fail to defend the human rights of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. Past experience and the acute awareness of present vulnerability combine to reinforce communitarian reflexes and identity politics that manifest themselves in the defense of the indigenous against the alien and thus of existing political arrangements. Indeed, the old semi-parliamentarian regimes that governed Syria, Iraq, and Egypt before the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s were created by the imperialist powers and largely remained under their influence, sometimes formalized by special treaties of an entirely unequal nature. It therefore comes as no surprise that European funding for the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo and its political reform initiatives – such as the strengthening of civil society, the protection of minority and women’s rights, or the monitoring of parliamentary elections – seem highly suspicious in the eyes not only of the Egyptian rulers but also of the ruled, including even intellectuals critical of authoritarian rule. In Egypt and elsewhere the promotion of democracy from outside can be successful only if it is based on an understanding of how the transition from authoritarian rule unfolded in those states that we consider consolidated democracies today. Of course, the historic experience of Europe and North America cannot just be repeated in other countries, such as Egypt. Politics at the periphery differ from politics at the center and so do political conditions in different centuries. Nor should it necessarily be repeated if one takes into consideration the countless victims of revolutions, counter-revolutions, coups and counter-coups that marked the conflicts between power centers and the frequently arrested and reversed process of democratization in the uk , France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere. One may even claim that the democratization of Britain took several centuries before universal suffrage was finally established in 1928. In France, one could argue that the process came to a conclusion only with the end of the Vichy regime, possibly only when President De Gaulle succeeded in thwarting the coup attempt by officers opposed to Algerian independence. In Germany, only the liberation from Nazi rule – after more than a century of struggle and with the exception of the brief Weimar interlude – marked the beginning of democratic rule, at least in its Western parts. The promotion of democracy from outside depends on whether or not external actors are able to favor the emergence of competing power cenipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 83

ters, so to speak»in vitro«, more speedily than in the classic cases of democratization and with less human cost. Even leaving aside the disturbing questions of the moral right to interfere from outside and the potentially perverse consequences of such interference, the matter is by no means simple. As a matter of course, any such attempt should strengthen existing centers, even if they exist in nuce rather than in actual fact. The past failure of civil society and of the private sector to develop into such power centers does not preclude them from playing a role in the future, provided the former is seen as no more than a contributory factor, and the latter – or parts of it – manage to emancipate themselves from the regime. The complete emancipation of the private sector depends on guarantees of property rights and therefore on legislation implemented by a non-partisan bureaucracy, backed by a judiciary yet more independent than the current Egyptian courts. Such independence is in turn conditional on the complete separation of powers, both de iure and de facto, itself unfortunately dependent on the emergence of competing power centers. In the meantime, more modest objectives would have to be identified, such as mechanisms to monitor privatization and prevent it from strengthening crony capitalism, without, however, dispersing assets among too many owners who would be unable to coordinate their action. Any such move would have to be accompanied by measures to make the trade unions fully independent of the regime and to strengthen them in terms of membership and organizational capacity. The established democracies also owe much to conflicts between labor and capital. A third possibility would be cuts in foreign aid and other income from external rent that would weaken the state economically vis-à-vis other domestic actors and forces, reduce its distributional capacities, and force it to increase taxation. Hopefully, taxation would result in more sustained demands for representation and participation. Every one of these options may still be seen as open interference, but at least they would have an impact on the internal balance of power. Obviously, they would be more complex than simply dishing out financial aid or organizing democracy training programs for the police; they depend on a detailed understanding of the ways in which the regime’s structural superiority works. 84 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

An Islamist Democracy? Once the playing field has been leveled and a more egalitarian distribution of politically relevant resources has been achieved, the resulting possibilities for oppositional Islamists to freely organize and compete for influence would certainly strengthen them in various ways. So far, the regime has prevented oppositional Islamists from establishing effective political organizations or winning too many seats in parliament and other assemblies. What today is latent and repressed would become manifest. Many Egyptians and foreign observers fear that Islamists who today are in opposition would not play by the rules, and ultimately would try to establish a new authoritarian regime. Such an outcome cannot be altogether excluded. However, more or less informed guesses as to their popularity put their prospective electoral scores at no more than 30 or 40 percent of the votes. Probably their overall score would be divided between competing Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood itself and its dissidents who, in their attempt to form the»Wasat party«, came close to creating the Muslim version of a European Christian Democratic party. Many voters, convinced of the need to respect values and norms that they consider Islamic, could well continue to throw in their lot with the regime and its party who, since the days of Sadat, have contributed to the growing»Islamization« of Egypt, without calling themselves Islamists. The split of the Islamist vote would ipso facto favor a degree of pluralism: the competition between the various Islamist forces would allow or even necessitate alliances with non-Islamist forces. As the unfortunately aborted experience of the Wasat shows, the rise of hitherto marginalized Islamists may be compatible with democratization and democracy. The overall proportion of the Islamist vote is unlikely to rise or fall with poverty or per capita income alone. Neither in Egypt nor in other Muslim countries is there a contradiction between private business success and Islamist attitudes. The Muslim Brothers draw much of their support from smaller owners of capital and professionals. The leaders of violent groups such as the Islamic Jihad and the Jama’a Islamiyya were also – largely young – professionals. Poverty and income play a role priipg 4/2004 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future 85

marily because they are determinants of exclusion. However, social or societal exclusion is a consequence not only of local income differentials within a given country but also of perceived inequalities, material and symbolical, on a global scale and therefore intimately linked to globalization and its avatars. As long as Egyptian business people need to queue for hours in the sun in front of European consular services, and as long as legitimate Palestinian concerns remain ignored, the world will remain unequal, characterized by the sort of exclusion that fuels identity politics. The question of whether the legalization and rise of Islamist parties would simultaneously result in the Islamization of social practices and regime policies and legislation remains open. On the one hand, this trend is already under way under the present regime; on the other, many oppositional Islamists and Islamists outside the regime seem to be rather pragmatic, in particular those who sought to establish the Wasat Party. The case of Turkey, where the Islamist Refah Party was first refounded as the Fazilet Party and then as the akp (Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi), illustrates a scenario also possible in Egypt. Transformation without Democratization Ultimately, the democratization of Egypt’s political system could result in no more than limited gains for presently outlawed Islamist organizations; nor would it necessarily reinforce what is rather loosely called the Islamization of public or private life. More importantly, as the unfortunately aborted experience of the Wasat shows, the rise of hitherto marginalized Islamists may be compatible with democratization and democracy. The real question remains that of democratization itself, a process that remains hypothetical as long as no competing counter powers to the regime emerge and of course survive even after a possible change of regime. In the foreseeable future the Egyptian political system will certainly continue to adapt and to change, as most political systems continuously, though perhaps slowly and reluctantly, do. However, such transformations are unlikely to entail a transition to democracy in the definition adopted above or to liberal democracy in the sense of a regime that reconciles majority rule with guarantees for those who are not part of that majority. 86 Kienle, Egypt’s Political Future ipg 4/2004

Transatlantische Initiativen für den Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika – eine unvollständige Agenda ANDRÄ GÄRBER D as Timing hätte nicht besser sein können, die Botschaft an die Welt nicht froher: Endlich wieder vereint will man gemeinsam die großen Probleme – Irak sowie den Entwicklungs- und Demokratiestau in der Krisenregion – bewältigen und einen neuen Irak in der Region des Nahen/Mittleren Ostens und Nordafrikas aufbauen. Am 8. Juni 2004 nahm der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen die Resolution 1546 einstimmig an, die das Ende der Besatzung des Irak bis zum 30. Juni 2004 begrüßt, der Bildung einer souveränen irakischen Interimsregierung zustimmt und demokratische Wahlen bis spätestens Ende Januar 2005 vorsieht. 1 Am 9. Juni 2004 beschlossen die führenden Industrienationen der Welt auf dem G-8-Gipfel die Partnerschaft für Fortschritt und eine gemeinsame Zukunft mit der Region des Nahen/ Mittleren Ostens und Nordafrikas. 2 Die Ernsthaftigkeit dieser Partnerschaft wird mit einem umfassenden G-8-Plan für die Unterstützung von Reformen unterstrichen. 3 Auf dem eu us -Gipfel am 26. Juni 2004 in Dromoland Castle, Irland, und dem nato -Gipfel am 28. und 29. Juni 2004 in Istanbul wurden diese gemeinsamen transatlantischen Ansätze für den Nahen/Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika bestätigt und ergänzt. 4 Nach dem tiefen transatlantischen Zerwürfnis über die Völkerrechtswidrigkeit des Irak-Kriegs ist dieser Schulterschluss zunächst durchaus ein Beweis dafür, dass man auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks Lehren aus der jüngeren Vergangenheit gezogen hat. In den usa ist die Erkenntnis gewachsen, dass sie als entscheidender externer sicherheitspolitischer Akteur in der Region zwar weiterhin die»unentbehrliche Nation«, aber gleichzeitig ihre Partner in Europa ihre»unentbehrlichen Alliierten« sind. So jedenfalls formuliert es Richard Haass, Präsident des us -ameri1. Vgl. hierzu www.un.org./news/press/docs/2004/sc8117.doc.htm. 2. Vgl. hierzu www.g7utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/partnership.html. 3. Vgl. hierzu www.g8usa.gov/d_060904b.htm. 4. Vgl. hierzu www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 87

kanischen Think Tank Council on Foreign Affairs in seinem Vorwort zum Strategiepapier»Renewing the Atlantic Partnership« im März 2004 in schlichter Sachlichkeit. Ausschlaggebend für diese Erkenntnis ist die Tatsache, dass die Welt nach der jüngsten, völkerrechtswidrigen militärischen Intervention der Koalition der Willigen im Irak nicht sicherer geworden ist. Im Gegenteil, das Bedrohungspotential durch den islamistischen Terror hat global signifikant zugenommen. Aus Befreiern waren Besatzer geworden, deren Glaubwürdigkeit in der Region angesichts der aufgedeckten, systematischen Misshandlungen und Folter irakischer Häftlinge in Abu Ghraib zusehends erodiert. Darüber hinaus hat sich in den usa die Überzeugung verfestigt, dass das Besatzungs-Chaos im PostSaddam-Irak ohne gemeinsame transatlantische Kraftanstrengung politisch und finanziell nicht mehr in den Griff zu bekommen ist. In Europa, seinerseits der bedeutendste externe zivile Akteur in der Region, wächst die Erkenntnis, dass die vielen – bislang meist nebeneinander laufenden – Initiativen 5 Angebote sind, die in den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten kaum nachgefragt werden und wenig zum Stabilitätstransfer beitragen. Vor allem der nato wird in der Region unterstellt, sie sei nur auf der Suche nach neuen Feindbildern, um ihr eigenes institutionelles Überleben zu sichern. In der»Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region« bringt die eu sehr deutlich zum Ausdruck, dass auch das Herzstück ihrer Mittelmeerpolitik, der Barcelona-Prozess(seit 1995), politisch durch die Krisen im Nahostfriedensprozess extrem störungsanfällig ist und damit in seiner Wirkung deutlich hinter den Erwartungen zurückgeblieben ist. 6 Die Beziehungen der eu zu den arabischen Golfkooperationsstaaten( gcc ), zum Jemen, zum Iran und die Rolle der eu im Nahostfriedensprozess werden seit Jahren in anderen Konsultations-, Entscheidungs- und Handlungsstrukturen geson5. Wie die Mittelmeerinitiative der Westeuropäischen Union( weu ), die seit 1992 mit Mauretanien, Algerien, Tunesien, Ägypten und Israel läuft, der Mittelmeerdialog der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa( osze ), der seit 1994 mit Marokko, Algerien, Tunesien, Ägypten, Israel und Jordanien geführt wird, und der nato -Mittelmeerdialog, der seit 1994 mit Marokko, Mauretanien, Algerien, Tunesien, Ägypten, Israel und Jordanien gefördert wird. 6. Die politische und wirtschaftliche Kooperation, die durch den Barcelona-Prozess initiiert wurde, soll ein bestimmender Faktor für die Ausgestaltung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit sein, nachdem ein Frieden im Nahen Osten erreicht wurde. Vgl. hierzu Official Journal of the European Communities, L 183/5,»Common Strategy of the European Council of June 19, 2000, on the Mediterranean Region«(2000/458/ cfsp ). 88 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

dert behandelt, mit den entsprechenden Reibungsverlusten, Duplizierungen, Inkonsistenzen und nicht abstimmbaren Politikansätzen. 7 Die jüngsten transatlantischen Initativen bringen nun einige neue Impulse für die Beziehungen mit dem Nahen/Mittleren Osten, bieten aber – wie im folgenden zu zeigen ist – keine hinreichenden Antworten auf die vielschichtigen Herausforderung in der Region. Die Vorgeschichte Die transatlantische Freude während des G-8-Gipfels wurde nur unwesentlich durch den Umstand getrübt, dass nur wenige Freunde aus der Region – und nicht unbedingt ihre Schwergewichte – am Gipfeltreffen teilnahmen: König Abdallah II von Jordanien, König Hamed von Bahrain, Präsident Bouteflika aus Algerien, Präsident Salih aus dem Jemen und Präsident Karzai aus Afghanistan. Überraschend war das Fehlen von Repräsentanten wichtiger Länder aus der Region – wie Ägypten und Saudi-Arabien – jedoch nicht, wenn man die Entstehungsgeschichte dieses neuen transatlantischen Schulterschlusses chronologisch und inhaltlich nachzeichnet. Präsident Bush hielt am 6. Dezember 2003 während des Festaktes zum 20-jährigen Bestehen des National Endowment for Democracy in Washington eine für die Arabische Welt äußerst beunruhigende Rede. Er erklärte den neuen strategischen Ansatz der usa im Nahen/Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika, der mit dem unzureichenden Engagement in dieser Region Schluss machen und eine neue Ära der politischen Reform und Demokratisierung – vor allem der Arabischen Welt – einleiten sollte. In der Tat investierten die usa bislang neben der klassischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nur geringe Mittel 8 in die Bereiche, die ursächlich für die 7. Hierzu nur ein Beispiel: Die Harmonisierung von Bestrebungen der Arabischen Liga, eine arabische Freihandelszone(Greater Arab Free Trade Area, gafta ) bis zum Jahre 2007 aufzubauen, und bilateralen euro med -Assozierungsabkommen, die bis zum Jahre 2010 zu einer euro med -Freihandelszone führen sollen, ist deutlich erschwert, weil nicht alle im gafta -Prozess beteiligten arabischen Staaten im euro med -Prozess berücksichtigt sind. 8. Seit 2002 wurden pro Jahr weniger als 100 Mio. us -Dollar für Demokratieförderung im Rahmen der u.s. -Middle East Partnership Initiative veranschlagt. Vgl. hierzu Fact Sheet: U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative , u.s. Department of State, May 12, 2003. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 89

drei zentralen Demokratie- und Entwicklungsdefizite der arabisch-islamischen Welt sind. Und diese Defizite lauten auf eine kurze Formel gebracht: Unfreiheit, Ungleichheit(was Frauen anbetrifft), Unwissenheit. 9 Mit seiner»Forward strategy of freedom« wollte Bush in Zukunft nicht nur den regionalen Ansatz der usa ausdehnen, verstärkt auf kurzfristige Transformation und weniger auf jahrzehntelange Evolution setzen und den Krieg gegen den globalen Terror mithin in vitaler und visionärer Art ergänzen, sondern diese Region auch dauerhaft ganz oben auf der Welttagesordnung halten, um die grundlegenden Sicherheitsinteressen der usa nachhaltig zu wahren. 10 Im gleichen Atemzug kündigte er eine umfassende Initiative der usa in dieser Region an. Nicht nur die EU musste – wie so oft – auf einen US-amerikanischen Vorstoß reagieren, sondern auch die Arabische Welt. Am 13. Februar 2004 veröffentlichte die englischsprachige arabische Tageszeitung Al Hayat mit Sitz in London den ersten Entwurf dieser vollmundig angekündigten us -Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative, die als Arbeitsvorlage für den G-8-Gipfel in Sea Island, Georgia, dienen sollte. Die Überraschung in Europa war groß: In inhaltlicher Hinsicht kopierte der Entwurf ziemlich ungeniert den Barcelona-Prozess, mit deutlich weniger Finanzmitteln ausgestattet und vorwiegend bilateral ausgerichtet. Die Region umfasste in diesem Entwurf die Arabische Welt, Israel, Iran, Türkei, Afghanistan und Pakistan. Die Entrüstung in der Arabischen Welt war aber nicht minder groß. Der Entwurf setzte ausschließlich auf die Demokratisierung und blendete Sicherheitsfragen – vor allem den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt – vollständig aus. Damit folgte dieser Entwurf einer abstrakten Logik und nicht der politischen Re9. Von arabischen Fachleuten im Arab Human Development Report 2002 des Entwicklungsprogramms der Vereinten Nationen identifiziert als:(a) der weltweit geringste Freiheitsgrad, gemessen an bürgerlichen und politischen Menschenrechten, (b) die weltweit geringste Berücksichtigung der Frauen im Hinblick auf ihre politische, gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Beteiligung und(c) weltweit eine der am wenigsten fortgeschrittene Integration in die Weltinformationsgesellschaft, Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft. 10. Vgl. hierzu u.a. International Crisis Group, The Broader Middle East And North Africa Initiative: Imperilled At Birth, Middle East and North Africa Briefing, Brussels/Amman, June 7, 2004. 90 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

alität in der Region. Entsprechend wurde er von Europa als wirklichkeitsfremd und von der arabisch-islamischen Welt als paternalistisch, unglaubwürdig und als Kampfansage an die Islamische Welt kritisiert. Dennoch hatte dieser Entwurf einen entscheidenden Vorteil: die Überwindung der künstlichen Trennung der Region des Nahen/Mittleren Ostens und Nordafrikas, die bisherigen Initiativen – vor allem eu -Initiativen – innewohnt, und die konzeptionelle Erfassung all jener Staaten, die sicherheitspolitisch die Region des Größeren Mittleren Ostens und Nordafrikas ausmachen. 11 Als Antwort auf den Entwurf einer» us -Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative« lancierte die eu am 22.3.2004 den ersten Entwurf einer »Strategischen Partnerschaft der eu mit dem Mittelmeer und dem Mittleren Osten«. Dieser Entwurf war aber noch weit davon entfernt, strategisches Neuland zu betreten. Er zählte nur die bestehenden Kooperationsarten und Kooperationsländer auf. Der Entwurf betonte den Partnerschaftsgedanken und das Bestreben, ein»shared ownership« aufzubauen mit dem Ziel eines gemeinsamen Raumes des Friedens, des Wohlstandes und Fortschritts. Er kündigte auf der Grundlage der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie 12 die Vertiefung der Europäisch-Mediterra11. Ohne Einschränkungen zählen hierzu die Arabische Welt und die Staaten, die ihre Stabilität direkt beeinflussen: Israel und der Iran. Mit Einschränkungen zählt noch die Türkei dazu. Die Türkei ist aus vielen Gründen ein wichtiger regionaler Akteur. Gleichzeitig ist die Türkei nato -Mitglied und potentielles eu -Mitglied und muss entsprechend unter Berücksichtigung ihrer wichtigen Brückenfunktion zwischen der westlichen und arabisch-islamischen Welt politisch behandelt werden. Argumente, auch Afghanistan und Pakistan in dieser Region zu verorten, lassen sich eher aus dem Kampf gegen den globalen, nicht-staatlichen Terror ableiten: Afghanistan kann bestenfalls als»best practice« transatlantischer Kooperation mit Hinblick auf den Stabilisierungsprozess im Irak dienen. Darüber hinaus sind natürlich die bestehenden Querverbindungen durch Drogenhandel und islamistische Terrornetzwerke zu berücksichtigen. Nicht zuletzt spielt Pakistan, was die Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen anbetrifft, eine nicht zu übersehende Rolle. Dennoch sollten Afghanistan und Pakistan nicht zu dieser Region gezählt werden. Zum einen sind sie kulturell und geografisch schon zu weit von dem Nahen/Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika entfernt. Zum anderen beeinflussen diese Staaten nicht direkt die Stabilität und Sicherheit der Arabischen Welt, die das Herzstück dieser Region ausmacht. 12. Das sog. Solana-Papier vom Dezember 2003 formuliert die globalen Herausforderungen wie folgt: Sicherheit ist die Voraussetzung für Entwicklung. Diese Sicherheit ist gefährdet durch Terrorismus, Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen, Regionale Konflikte, Staatszerfall und organisierte Kriminalität. Vgl. hierzu A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strategy , Brussels, December 12, 2003. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 91

nen Partnerschaft durch die neue Nachbarschaftspolitik an und hielt scheinbar unbeirrt an der Fokussierung auf die Mittelmeerländer fest. 13 Nicht nur die eu musste – wie so oft – auf einen us -amerikanischen Vorstoß reagieren, sondern auch die Arabische Welt. Wie schwierig es für die Arabische Welt aber ist, sich überhaupt auf eine Rangordnung zu behandelnder Konfliktlinien und struktureller Probleme zu einigen, hat wieder einmal die Arabische Liga demonstriert. Gefangen zwischen der offensichtlichen Notwendigkeit, politische und wirtschaftliche Reform in der arabischen Welt anzugehen sowie der weiteren Eskalation des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts und der Verschärfung der Irak-Krise blies Tunesien das für Ende März anberaumte Gipfeltreffen kurzerhand ab. Es wurde zwar Ende Mai 2004 nachgeholt. Die am 25. Mai veröffentlichte Tunis-Deklaration der Arabischen Liga hat aber einmal mehr bestätigt, wie zerstritten und damit handlungsunfähig die Arabische Welt ist. Herausgekommen ist ein Dokument, dass außer den üblichen Solidaritätsbekundungen für die leidenden arabischen Bruderstaaten – vor allem Irak und Palästina – und Reformlippenbekenntnissen keine arabische Strategie zum Abbau ihrer strukturellen Entwicklungs- und Demokratiedefizite erkennen lässt. 14 Neue Impulse – und alte Probleme Mit dem Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa ist es in der Tat gelungen, die us -Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative und die Strategische Partnerschaft der eu mit dem Mittelmeer und dem Mittleren Osten sprachlich, inhaltlich und regional zu einer gemeinsamen transatlantischen Initiative zu verknüpfen. Zweifelsohne ist diese Initiative unentbehrlich, um den neuen strategischen Herausforderungen, die der Nahe/Mittlere Osten und Nordafrika darstellen, angemessen, aber mit sichtbar eigenständigen us - und eu -Strategien zu begegnen. Deutlich geworden ist auch, dass diese Initiative von den gemeinsamen transatlan13. Die im Juni 2004 vorgestellte Endfassung dieses eu -Strategiepapiers weicht nur unwesentlich von diesem Entwurf ab. Vgl. hierzu http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/euromed/publication.htm. 14. Auf der offiziellen Homepage der Arabischen Liga in englischer Sprache ist diese Deklaration bezeichnenderweise im August 2004 noch nicht zu finden. Dafür aber unter: www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=2&id=273. 92 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

tischen Interessen – wie vor allem die Aufrechterhaltung und Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Wertegemeinschaft – getragen wird, die im seit Mitte 2002 anhaltenden transatlantischen Gewitter verloren gegangen zu sein schienen. Auf der Grundlage dieser wiederentdeckten gemeinsamen Interessen war es auch möglich, die gemeinsamen Ziele in der Region zu definieren: Sicherheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Lebensqualität. Die neue Partnerschaft ist weit hinter den Erwartungen zurückgeblieben und schreibt grundsätzlich nur die bestehenden Ansätze mit den bekannten Instrumenten fort. Der us -amerikanische Impuls hat gleichzeitig dazu geführt, dass die eu endlich den seit Jahren vor sich hin dümpelnden Barcelona-Prozess hinterfragt und zumindest angefangen hat, die durch diesen Prozess forcierte künstliche Trennung der arabisch-islamischen Welt als Problem anzuerkennen. Ebenso wichtig war die erfolgreiche Überzeugungsarbeit der eu : Die Initiative verbindet inhaltlich Sicherheitsfragen und Reformanstrengungen, baut auf den Partnerschaftsgedanken und die langfristige Unterstützung nationaler, länderspezifischer Demokratisierungs- und Modernisierungsbestrebungen der Staaten in der Region. Neu ist auch das Forum for the Future, ein jährliches Treffen zwischen G-8 und Vertretern aus der Region auf Ministerebene, angereichert mit Vertretern aus der Wirtschaft und der Zivilgesellschaft, das die transatlantische Zusammenarbeit mit der Region verstetigen und transparenter machen soll. Während dieses Treffens sollen die Bedürfnisse und Herausforderungen der Region diskutiert und entsprechend gemeinsame, sich ergänzende transatlantische Maßnahmen im politischen, sozialen und kulturellen sowie wirtschaftlichen Bereich zur Unterstützung der Region in ihren Reformbemühungen festgelegt werden. Dennoch ist die neue Partnerschaft weit hinter den Erwartungen zurückgeblieben und schreibt grundsätzlich nur die bestehenden Ansätze mit den bekannten Instrumenten fort. Darüber hinaus wurde der Partnerschaftsgedanke nur transatlantisch wiederbelebt. Die Einbindung der Akteure aus der Region blieb bei diesem Prozess auf der Strecke. Entsprechend stößt dieser transatlantische Schulterschluss bislang auf breite Ablehnung in der Region. Der israelisch-palästinensische Konflikt wird zwar erwähnt, neue Ansätze zu seiner Lösung wurden aber nicht einmal angedeutet. Ein ernstipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 93

hafter und glaubwürdiger Versuch der transatlantischen Partner, diesen Konflikt beizulegen, ist aber eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung für die Liberalisierung und Demokratisierung der arabisch-islamischen Welt. Erst dann können sich die arabischen Regimes nicht mehr hinter dem»double standard« des Westens und der potentiellen Bedrohung durch den Atomwaffenstaat Israel verstecken. Die Glaubwürdigkeit und Legitimität westlicher Nah- und Mittelostpolitik können nur wiederhergestellt werden, wenn das internationale Quartett( usa , un , eu und Russland) den vorgesehenen Friedensfahrplan oder die»peace road map« nachweisbar umsetzt und international durchsetzt(vgl. auch den Beitrag von Muriel Asseburg in diesem Heft). Drei weitere Aufgabenfelder, deren Herausforderungen im folgenden genauer analysiert werden, werden in der G8-Partnerschaftsinitiative ebenfalls vernachlässigt: Erstens macht die Initiative keinerlei neue Lösungsangebote für den Irakkonflikt. Zweitens bleiben wichtige Akteure – wie der Iran – vollkommen unberücksichtigt. Damit hat man wieder einmal die Chance verspielt, Instrumente zum Aufbau einer regionalen Sicherheitsstruktur zu entwickeln. Drittens werden entscheidende strukturelle Fragen zur wirtschaftlichen und politischen Reformfähigkeit und bereitschaft der Staaten in der Region – wie z.B. der Umgang mit dem politischen Islam – gänzlich ausgeblendet. Das Ziel, einen neuen Irak in einem reformbereiten Nahen/Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika zu schaffen, kann nur dann erreicht werden, wenn man den lieb gewonnenen Pfad der politischen Kosmetik verlässt und neue Wege in der Bekämpfung der Entwicklungs- und Demokratiedefizite der Krisenregion zu beschreiten wagt. Lösung der Irak-Krise Nach dem Krieg Nachdem Präsident Bush im Mai 2003 die Hauptkriegshandlungen der Koalition der Willigen im Irak für beendet erklärt hatte, begann offiziell die Besatzung des Irak. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt lief alles nach Plan. 15 Seit Besatzungsbeginn hat sich die Sicherheitslage im Irak jedoch verschlech15. Der Plan, auf dem Reißbrett neokonservativer Vordenker wie Richard Perle und Paul Wolfowitz bereits Mitte der neunziger Jahre entwickelt, war genial, zumindest in der Theorie. Gemäß einer doppelten»Domino-Theorie« sollte die irakische Diktatur – völkerrechtswidrig zwar – hinweggespült und die erste wirkliche Demokratie in der arabischen Welt installiert werden. Die Strahlkraft des irakischen Mo94 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

tert. In jüngster Zeit ging der Irak sprichwörtlich im Besatzungschaos unter. Die Besatzungsmächte haben jegliche Glaubwürdigkeit verloren. Von den vielen Kriegsbegründungen – vor allem die Existenz von Massenvernichtungswaffen und die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Al Qaida und dem Regime von Saddam Hussein – blieben schließlich nur noch die strategischen Öl-Interessen der usa und die Sicherung des us -Dollars als Weltreservewährung übrig. Die Sicherheitslage ist mittlerweile durch Aufstände, Anschläge, Selbstmordattentate, Überfälle und Entführungen katastrophal. Sicherheit ist aber die unabdingbare Voraussetzung für jegliche politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Folgenschwere politische Fehler der usa und ihrer Koalition der Willigen, die mit extrem negativen wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einhergehen, haben zu dieser Situation geführt. Die vorzeitige und unnötige Auflösung der irakischen Sicherheitskräfte, der irakischen Armee und Polizei – ca. 400 000 Personen – hatte nicht nur negative Folgen für die allgemeine Sicherheitslage, sondern ließ das Heer der Arbeitslosen im Irak innerhalb kürzester Zeit sprunghaft ansteigen. Die umfassende, ungezielte Deba’thisierung ermöglichte zwar eine»Verschlankung« des Staates, gleichzeitig fehlte nun allerorten das für den Wiederaufbau notwendige Know-how in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Die von den usa handverlesene Auswahl der 25 Mitglieder des irakischen Interimsrates nach einem strikten religiösen und ethnischen Verteilungsschlüssel(13 schiitische Araber, fünf sunnitische Araber, fünf Kurden, ein Turkmene, ein Assyrer) beschleunigte die Erosion der irakischen Identität und die Libanisierung der irakischen Gesellschaft sowie die Förderung wirtschaftlicher – ethnisch und religiös begründeter – Partikularinteressen. Gleichzeitig wurde die irakische Wirtschaft, die über Jahrzehnte durch Kriege und Sanktionen zerstört bzw. isoliert wurde, durch eine beispiellose Schocktherapie dem Markt der»Koalition der Willigen« geöffnet. Im offensichtlichen Widerspruch zu internationalem Recht – insbesondere der Haager Landkriegsordnung von 1907 und der Genfer Konvention von 1949 – wurde das geltende irakische Landesrecht und Wirt15. dells würde die gesamte arabische Welt in ihren Bann ziehen und zwangsläufig zum Zusammenbruch der arabischen Despotien führen. Blühende demokratische Landschaften würden in der arabischen Welt entstehen. Aber nicht nur in politischer Hinsicht sollte der Irak das Modell für die weitere Entwicklung der Region sein. Nach mehr als 40 Jahren staatlichen Wirtschaftsdirigismus sollte der neue Irak gleichzeitig – einen langgehegten kapitalistischen Traum erfüllend – zur liberalsten Wirtschaft in der arabischen Welt werden. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 95

schaftssystem durch eine Vielzahl von Dekreten des us -amerikanischen Pro-Konsuls, Paul Bremer, massiv verändert, nämlich hemmungslos liberalisiert. Mit Ausnahme des Rohstoffsektors wurde die gesamte irakische Volkswirtschaft für Auslandsinvestitionen geöffnet. Ohne behördliche Genehmigung, ohne lokalen Partner, ohne die Pflicht, Teile des Gewinns im Irak zu reinvestieren, kann man im Irak ein Unternehmen gründen. Fast 200 Unternehmen wurden zur Privatisierung freigegeben. Eine neue Arbeitsgesetzgebung erlaubt den uneingeschränkten Arbeitskräfteimport – und dies bei grassierender Arbeitslosigkeit. Die Steuern wurden auf 15 Prozent begrenzt. Einfuhrzölle wurden abgeschafft. Dafür gibt es jetzt eine fünfprozentige Wiederaufbauabgabe. Diese Abgabe reicht natürlich bei weitem nicht aus, das von Krieg und Sanktionen zerstörte Land wiederaufzubauen. Nach Schätzungen der Weltbank werden allein in den nächsten vier Jahren 56 Mrd. us -Dollar benötigt. Die internationale Madrider Geberkonferenz spülte im Oktober 2003 aber nur ein wenig mehr als die Hälfte dieser Summe(ca. 33 Mrd. us Dollar) in die Wiederaufbaukasse. Deshalb forderte die us -Regierung nur wenige Monate später einen deutlichen Erlass der irakischen Auslandsschulden, die sich auf mindestens 130 Mrd. us -Dollar(ohne ausstehende Kriegsreparationsforderungen) belaufen sollen. Die Schulden – so die Argumentation – wurden nämlich von einem Despoten angehäuft, sind daher als»verabscheuungswürdig« zu betrachten und dürfen nicht dem irakischen Volk auferlegt werden. 16 Die internationale Staatenwelt hat sich dieser Initiative angeschlossen und wird einen deutlichen, aber noch weitgehend offenen Schuldenerlass mittragen. Nur kurze Zeit später wurde sie aber wieder von den usa durch die us -amerikanische Vergabepraxis von Wiederaufbauaufträgen für die Ausrüstung der irakischen Armee, die Rehabilitierung der Ölförderanlagen, die Instandsetzung von Strom- und Wasserversorgung sowie der Telekommunikation vor den Kopf gestoßen. Gegen geltende wto -Abkommen gingen die bisherigen Wiederaufbauaufträge in Höhe von bislang ca. 15 Mrd. us -Dollar ausschließlich an Unternehmen aus den 63 Ländern der Koalition der Willigen. Die lukrativsten Aufträge gingen ohne öffentliche Ausschreibung an 16. Und dieser Schuldenerlass ist in der Tat notwendig. Der Irak ist schlicht zahlungsunfähig. Im Vergleich zu Argentinien, das mit einem Verhältnis zwischen Auslandsschulden und Bruttosozialprodukt von 1:1 als zahlungsunfähig gilt, hat der Irak bereits ein entsprechendes Verhältnis von mindestens 8:1. Die Öleinkommen des Irak werden über Jahre hinweg allein nicht ausreichen, diese Finanzierungslücke zu schließen. 96 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

us -Unternehmen, die – wie Haliburton(mit seiner Tochter Kellog, Brown& Root) und Bechtel – über besonders enge Kontakte zur us -Administration, insbesondere zum Vize-Präsidenten und ehemaligen Boss von Haliburton, Dick Cheney, verfügen. Nachweislich sind diese Verträge auch in der Regel überteuert und reduzieren deutlich – zum Schaden der irakischen Volkswirtschaft – das potentielle Volumen der Wiederaufbauleistungen. Aber nicht nur das: Von den ca. 18,4 Mrd. us -Dollar, die der us -amerikanische Kongress im Oktober 2003 als Hilfspaket für den Wiederaufbau des Irak genehmigt hatte, wurden bis zum 22. Juni 2004 nur magere 366 Mio. us -Dollar ausgegeben. Ganz anders wurden mit den Mitteln des Development Fund for Iraq, der sich aus den irakischen Öl-Einnahmen zusammensetzt, umgegangen. Die Coalition Provisional Authority( cpa ) verausgabte bereits 19 der ca. 20 Mrd. us -Dollar bis Ende Juni 2004 17 – und dies in wenig transparenter Form. Der Handlungsbedarf der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft wurde insofern immer akuter. Gleichzeitig waren die Handlungsoptionen beschränkt. Die early-exit-Option, die in den usa angesichts der immensen militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Kosten 18 der Irak-Intervention immer populärer wurde, wurde angesichts ihrer enormen Risiken für die Sicherheit im Irak und die Stabilität in der Golf-Region vorerst verworfen. Auch die zweite Option – eine Verlängerung der Besatzung – wäre nur mit einer weiteren und deutlichen Aufstockung der Besatzungstruppen möglich gewesen, wozu die usa aus finanziellen Gründen nicht bereit waren. Außerdem war mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit davon auszugehen, dass sich das Chaos im Post-Saddam-Irak weiter verschärfen würde. Eine weitere Destabilisierung im Irak und damit in der Region wäre durch die massiv zunehmende Einmischung der Nachbarstaaten Türkei, Iran und Saudi-Arabien bei anhaltender Besatzung auch nicht mehr auszuschließen. Und die Schwächung der einst erfolgreich gebildeten internationalen Koalition»Enduring Freedom« gegen den globalen nicht-staatlichen Terror, der im Irak eine neue Drehscheibe gefunden hat, würde sich unvermindert fortsetzen. 19 17. Vgl. hierzu Rajiv Chandrasekaran,» u.s. Funds for Iraq are largely unspent«, Washington Post, July, 3rd, 2004. 18. Nach Berechnungen des Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy belaufen sich die bisherigen Kosten auf über 150 Mrd. us -Dollar. Vgl. hierzu www.ips-dc. org/iraq/costsofwar/costsofwar.pdf. 19. Die Besatzung des ölreichen Irak ist hauptsächlich – aber natürlich nicht ausschließlich – Wasser auf die Mühlen der gewaltfähigen und-bereiten islamistischen, weltipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 97

Allen Beteiligten war deshalb klar, dass die gemeinsamen Ziele der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft – Sicherheit im Irak, die territoriale Integrität des Irak, das Einsetzen einer stabilen und legitimen irakischen Regierung, und der umfassende Wiederaufbau des Landes – nur erreichbar sind, wenn es den usa und ihrer sich bereits in Auflösung befindlichen Koalition der Willigen gelingt, eine un -Resolution im Sicherheitsrat so schnell wie möglich durchzubringen, die den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbauprozess im Post-Saddam-Irak – mit der expliziten Zustimmung der irakischen Akteure – international legitimiert und damit der völkerrechtswidrigen Besatzung des Irak ein Ende macht. Allen Beteiligten war ebenfalls klar, dass natürlich auch mit dieser internationalen Legitimierung nicht alle Risiken ausgeschaltet werden können. Gleichzeitig war man aber davon überzeugt, dass ohne internationale Legitimierung alles nichts ist. Die Übergangsregierung Mit der einstimmigen Annahme der un -Resolution 1546 hat die internationale Staatenwelt dem Stabilisierungsprozess im Post-Saddam-Irak nach langem diplomatischen Ringen internationale Legitimität verliehen. Von einer Machtübergabe an das irakische Volk bzw. von einer Wiederherstellung der vollen Souveränität des Iraks kann man aber in keinem Fall sprechen. Auf der Basis der irakischen Übergangsverfassung vom März 2004 und der un -Resolution 1546 soll die neue irakische Interimsregierung zwar volle Autorität und Verantwortung genießen, gleichzeitig aber alle Maßnahmen unterlassen, die die weitere Entwicklung des Irak über die begrenzte Interimsperiode hinaus beeinflussen könnte. Und diese Interimsperiode wird gemäß der un -Resolution 1546 im günstigsten Fall bis zum 15. Dezember 2005 andauern. 20 weit vernetzten Gruppierungen wie Al Qaida. Der Irak-Krieg hat die Janusköpfigkeit des Westens aus der Sicht der islamistischen Gruppierungen wieder einmal bewiesen. 20. Nach der bereits erfolgten Einsetzung der Übergangsregierung zum 30. Juni 2004 sollen spätestens bis zum 31. Januar 2005 freie Wahlen stattfinden. Spätestens bis zum 15. August 2005 soll das künftige Parlament den Entwurf einer Verfassung ausarbeiten. Ein Referendum soll bis spätestens 15. Oktober 2005 über diesen Entwurf entscheiden. Auf der Grundlage der gebilligten Verfassung sollen bis spätestens 15. Dezember Wahlen abgehalten und bis spätestens 31. Dezember 2005 eine irakische Regierung gebildet werden. Diese Fristen können laut Übergangsverfassung bis zu 6 Monate verlängert werden. 98 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

Vor diesem Hintergrund wäre es für den neuen Premierminister, Iyad Allawi, sehr schwer, die über 100, von Paul Bremer erlassenen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Dekrete substantiell zu verändern. Aber das war ohnehin – so jedenfalls kritische Stimmen im Irak – nicht zu befürchten. Iyad Allawi ist ein säkularer Shiit, der nach 30-jährigem Exil in den Irak zurückgekehrt ist. Im Exil war er einer der wichtigsten Oppositionsführer gegen das Regime von Saddam Hussein und Mitbegründer des Iraqi National Accord( ina ), einem Zusammenschluss von ehemaligen Ba’thisten, Militärs und Geheimdienstleuten, die bei Saddam Hussein in Ungnade fielen. Er ist der neue starke Mann der usa mit sehr guten Kontakten zur cia und britischen Nachrichtendiensten im Irak, aber bislang ohne Verankerung und Popularität in der irakischen Bevölkerung. Solange der gesamte politische Prozess während der Interimsperiode nicht wirklich multilateralisiert wird, d.h. den Vereinten Nationen – dem einzig denkbaren neutralen»broker« – überantwortet wird, kann auch das Misstrauen der irakischen Bevölkerung gegenüber den Institutionen nicht abgebaut werden. Ohnehin ist die neue irakische Interimsregierung nur eine erweiterte Kopie des aufgelösten Irakischen Regierungsrates. Die Schlüsselpositionen gingen an dessen ehemalige Mitglieder und ihre Repräsentanten. Iyad Allawi und sein Stellvertreter, der den usa sehr nahe stehende Kurde Barham Saleh, Vertreter der Patriotic Union of Kurdistan( puk ), führen ein Kabinett von 31 Ministern an. Die eher zeremonielle Präsidentschaft teilen sich der sunnitische Stammesführer Ghazi al Yawer und seine beiden Stellvertreter: Der Schiit Ibrahim Al Jaafar, Führer der islamistischen Da’wa-Partei, und der Kurde Rowsch Shaways, Vertreter der Kurdistan Democratic Party( kdp ). Das Ziel des un -Sonderbeauftragten für den Irak, Lakhdar Brahimi, eine»unpolitische« Übergangsregierung mit Technokraten zu bilden, scheiterte aber nicht nur am Widerstand der irakischen Führung, sondern natürlich auch der usa . Schon jetzt ist davon auszugehen, dass die neue Übergangsregierung denselben Problemen ausgesetzt sein wird wie die alte: wegen mangelnder Unterstützung in der Bevölkerung wird sie kaum in der Lage sein, den vorgesehenen umfassenden nationalen Verfassungs- und Wahlvorbereitungsprozess durchzuführen. Entsprechend wird es auch sehr schwer sein, eine breite Anerkennung der neu entstehenden staatlichen Institutionen zu gewinnen. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 99

Die Vereinten Nationen steuern nicht, wie angestrebt, den politischen Übergangsprozess, sondern spielen laut un -Resolution 1546 nur eine führende Rolle. Damit wurde die zwingend erforderliche klare Aufgabenverteilung zwischen der irakischen Interimsregierung, den Vereinten Nationen und den Vereinigten Staaten nicht erreicht. Solange der gesamte politische Prozess während der Interimsperiode aber nicht wirklich multilateralisiert wird, d.h. den Vereinten Nationen – dem einzig denkbaren neutralen»broker« – überantwortet wird, kann auch das Misstrauen der irakischen Bevölkerung gegenüber den Institutionen, die jetzt die cpa ersetzen, nicht abgebaut werden. Die Arbeit der Vereinten Nationen im Irak wird auch nicht von einer gesonderten internationalen Schutztruppe, wie in der un -Resolution vorgesehen, geschützt werden können, da sich kein einziger Staat der internationalen Gemeinschaft bislang dazu verpflichten will. Entsprechend werden die von den usa geführten Koalitionstruppen den Schutz der un Mission unter Leitung des neuen un -Gesandten Ashraf Jehangir Qazi übernehmen. Qazi hat seinen Posten noch vor der wegen mehrerer Terroranschläge mehrfach verschobenen, schließlich am 15. August 2004 konstituierten irakischen Nationalversammlung angetreten. Diese möglichst breit angelegte Nationalversammlung, die dem afghanischen Loya Jirga-Modell folgt, soll einen Konsultativrat bestimmen, der die Interimsregierung im Wahl- und verfassungsgebenden Prozess im Irak beraten soll. Natürlich bleiben auch die ehemaligen Besatzungstruppen – ca. 158 000 Soldaten, davon 138 000 us -Amerikaner – auf explizitem Wunsch der irakischen Regierung als us -geführte»multinational force« im Land. Unter den gegebenen Umständen würde eine mögliche Beteiligung der nato ohnehin nur als Fortsetzung der us -amerikanischen Herrschaft unter neuer Flagge interpretiert werden. 21 Der rechtliche Status der ehemaligen Besatzungstruppen ist darüber hinaus nicht klar definiert. Es wird nur vage von einer Sicherheitspartnerschaft zwischen der irakischen Interimsregierung und dieser»multinational force« gesprochen. Die Entscheidungshierarchien bleiben wohl während der Interimsperiode die alten Besatzungshierarchien. 21. Entsprechend wird sich die nato vornehmlich auf die Ausbildung irakischer Sicherheitskräfte in den Nachbarstaaten des Irak konzentrieren. Vgl. hierzu www.nato.int /docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm. 100 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

Die nächsten Schritte Die cpa hat es nicht geschafft, Sicherheit, Recht und Ordnung im Irak herzustellen. Damit ist im ganzen Land ein Sicherheitsvakuum entstanden, das von pilzartig wachsenden Milizen teilweise ausgefüllt wird und zu einer erhöhten Unsicherheit und Instabilität geführt hat. Darüber hinaus überziehen das Land Gewalttaten, die von mindestens drei unterschiedlichen Gruppierungen ausgeübt werden: Organisiertes Verbrechen, Überreste der ehemaligen Sicherheitskräfte des Ba’th-Regimes und islamistische schiitische und sunnitische Gruppierungen nationaler und/ oder internationaler Provenienz. Die dringlichste Aufgabe für die Interimsregierung ist es, dieses Sicherheitsvakuum aufzulösen. Wie schwer diese Aufgabe sein wird, verdeutlicht ein Vergleich. In Nord-Irland, einem bipolaren Konflikt, gab es zum Höhepunkt der Krise ein Verhältnis von 20 britischen Sicherheitskräften zu 1000 Zivilisten. Im Irak, wo der Konflikt multipolar entlang von ethnischen und religiösen Trennlinien verläuft, wären ca. 500 000 us -amerikanische Truppen notwendig. 22 Weniger als ein Drittel dieser Zahl ist aber tatsächlich verfügbar. Eine deutliche Erhöhung der internationalen Truppenpräsenz ist nicht zu erwarten. Das Gegenteil ist wahrscheinlicher: Spanien und die Philippinen haben sich bereits aus der Koalition der Willigen verabschiedet. Angebote von den arabischen Nachbarstaaten(Jordanien, Saudi-Arabien) wurden von der irakischen Interimsregierung dankend abgelehnt. Im Gegensatz zu den offiziellen Verlautbarungen des Pentagon, das von über 200 000 Irakern in unterschiedlichen Sicherheitsdiensten spricht, sind es aber kritischen Schätzungen zufolge bestenfalls ca. 38 000 voll- und teilausgebildete Iraker, die in der neuen irakischen Polizei, Armee und Grenzpolizei derzeit tätig sind. 23 Nur wenn es gelingt, diese Zahl in kurzer Zeit deutlich – auch und vor allem mit nato -Ausbildungsunterstützung – zu erhöhen, kann sich die Situation im Irak stabilisieren. Die Aussichten dafür sind jedoch angesichts der systematisch verübten(Selbstmord-)Bombenattentate vor Rekrutierungsstellen für irakische Sicherheitskräfte nicht die besten. Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt der irakischen Nationalversammlung, die im August 2004 zusammengetreten ist, größte Bedeutung zu. Die fehlende Legitimität der irakischen Interimsregierung kann nur abgebaut 22. Vgl. hierzu den Artikel»No easy options« in Time, April 19, 2004. 23. Vgl. hierzu www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=New_Iraqi_Army. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 101

werden, wenn in dieser Nationalversammlung alle relevanten Akteure im Irak vertreten sind. Hierzu zählen nicht nur Milizen wie die des jungen radikalen Schiitenführers Muqtada Al Sadr, die für die Aufstände in Nadschaf und Kerbala verantwortlich sind, sondern auch bislang vom politischen Prozess unzureichend berücksichtigte Stämme, Regionen(sunnitisches Dreieck), politische Gruppierungen und religiöse Autoritäten wie der aus dem Iran stammende irakische Großayatollah Ali as Sistani. Gleichzeitig muss auch der Prozess der ungezielten»Deba’thisierung«, den die cpa verfolgte, umgekehrt werden. Erste Anzeichen hierfür sind bereits durch die von der irakischen Interimsregierung unterstützte Rückkehr von Bediensteten im öffentlichen Sektor – vor allem Lehrer, Hochschullehrer und Polizisten – an ihre Arbeitsplätze erkennbar, die nur wegen ihrer einfachen Ba’th 24 -Mitgliedschaft von der cpa entlassen wurden. Auch das Thema der dezentralen Gewaltenteilung wird bei der langfristigen staatlichen Ausgestaltung des multi-ethnischen und multi-konfessionellen Post-Saddam-Irak von herausragender Bedeutung sein. Ziel der irakischen Verfassungs- und Wahlrechtsreform muss es sein, dem tribalen Charakter der irakischen Gesellschaft Rechnung zu tragen, den Schutz von ethnischen und konfessionellen Minderheiten zu verbriefen und die repräsentative Partizipation der unterschiedlichen Bevölkerungsgruppen auf lokaler, regionaler und nationaler Ebene im Irak zu gewährleisten. Im Irak gibt es keine demokratische Tradition, nur die Erinnerung an die Monarchie und das Leiden unter der autoritären Präsidialdiktatur. Mittelfristig wird der Aufbau einer irakischen Zivilgesellschaft – vor allem der Aufbau pluralistischer politischer Strukturen, Interessenverbände und Parteien – im Rahmen einer breit angelegten Demokratisierung des Post-Saddam-Irak von herausragender Bedeutung sein. Angesichts der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit im Irak kann diese Demokratisierung nur eine sehr langfristige, in einem evolutionären Prozess zu 24. Die irakische Ba’th-Partei, die ein wesentlicher Baustein der Diktatur Saddam Husseins war, definierte sich pan-arabisch, säkular und sozialistisch und war ein Amalgam aus autoritärer renten-finanzierter Herrschaft und Tribalismus. Ziel sollte es sein, die natürlich immer noch bestehenden Ba’th-Strukturen nicht vollends zu zerstören, sondern grundlegend zu reformieren, um sie dem neuen Herrschaftsapparat im Post-Saddam-Irak dienlich zu machen. 102 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

erreichende Aufgabe sein. Im Irak gibt es keine demokratische Tradition, nur die Erinnerung an die Monarchie und das Leiden unter der autoritären Präsidialdiktatur. Es gibt nicht einmal ein theoretisches Wissen über die Demokratie im ehemals gleichgeschalteten Irak. Bestenfalls im autonomen Kurdistan im Nord-Irak hat sich ein gewisser Grad an Partizipation sowie Medien- und Meinungsfreiheit herausgebildet. Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass auch die neue Regierung im Post-Saddam-Irak ihre Staatseinnahmen fast ausschließlich aus der Öl-Rente beziehen wird. Um die Produktivkraft der irakischen Bürger dennoch für den staatlichen Modernisierungsprozess nutzbar zu machen, muss diese Öl-Rente nicht nur nach einem Schlüssel, der die relative Bedeutung der unterschiedlichen Bevölkerungsgruppen im Irak widerspiegelt, verteilt werden, sondern auch ein Prozess der wirtschaftlichen Diversifizierung und Dezentralisierung eingeleitet werden. Nicht zuletzt ist die konstruktive Einbindung der sechs regionalen Nachbarn in diesen Prozess sicherzustellen. Diese Einbindung findet im Kern bereits statt. Mittlerweile finden regelmäßige Treffen auf Ministerebene zwischen dem Irak, seinen direkten Nachbarn und Ägypten statt. Diese ersten Ansätze von multilateraler Zusammenarbeit in der Region können von der eu unterstützt werden, da sie im Vergleich zu den usa über gute Kontakte mit allen beteiligten Staaten verfügt. 25 Annäherung an den Iran und Aufbau einer breit angelegten Entspannungspolitik Der Iran ist ein extrem wichtiger Akteur in der Region. Er spielt eine mitentscheidende Rolle in der Lösung des Irak-Krieges und eine indirekte Rolle im Nahostfriedensprozess. Die Zukunft des iranischen Nuklearprogrammes wird sich auch direkt auf die Stabilität in der Region auswirken. Zwischen der eu und dem Iran gibt es anstehende Verhandlungen über ein Handels- und Kooperationsabkommen und ein paralleles politisches Abkommen. Darüber hinaus führt die eu mit dem Iran einen »umfassenden Dialog« und einen Menschenrechtsdialog. Die vier Verhandlungskernpunkte zwischen der eu und dem Iran(Menschenrechte, 25. Jordanien, Ägypten und Syrien(Barcelona-Prozess), Türkei( eu -Beitrittskandidat), Iran( eu -Iran-Dialog) sowie Kuwait und Saudi-Arabien( eu gcc -Kooperationsabkommen). ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 103

Nahost-Friedenprozess, Terrorismus und Massenvernichtungswaffen) entsprechen mittlerweile den us -amerikanischen Hauptanliegen, die einen abgestimmten transatlantischen Ansatz möglich machen sollten. Dieser Ansatz muss berücksichtigen, dass sich der Iran – wie Syrien – von den usa umzingelt sieht und eine offenkundige Wagenburgmentalität aufgebaut hat. Nach dem jüngsten Wahlsieg der Konservativen ist davon auszugehen, dass der Iran das chinesische Modell(dosierte wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Öffnung bei gleichzeitiger Unterdrückung der Opposition sowie verstärkte Bemühungen, seine auswärtigen Beziehungen zu normalisieren) vorantreiben wird. Um den Iran auch aus der regionalen Isolierung zu führen, reicht ein isolierter eu -Iran-Dialog aber nicht aus. Der Iran sollte auch in den regionalen Programmen der eu aufgenommen werden. Angedacht werden kann, dem Iran z.B. einen BeobachterStatus in den Regierungsforen entsprechend angepasster Programme (des eu gcc -Dialogs und des Barcelona-Prozesses) anzubieten und iranische zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen in Euro-mediterrane Netzwerke einzubinden. Der Iran wird – mit Verweis auf Staaten wie Pakistan, Indien, NordKorea und Israel – an seinem nationalen Recht festhalten, ein eigenständiges(ziviles) Nuklearprogramm zu entwickeln. Mit der Unterzeichnung des Zusatzprotokolls zum Atomwaffensperrvertrag hat der Iran zunächst die Auflagen der internationalen Atomenergiebehörde( iaea ) akzeptiert. Bislang hat der Iran auch den Atomwaffensperrvertrag respektiert und sein Urananreicherungsprogramm eingefroren. Diese Haltung des Iran war gebunden an das im Oktober 2003 gegebene, gleichzeitige Versprechen Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Großbritanniens, im Gegenzug Technologie zur Entwicklung eines friedlichen Nuklearprogramms zu Verfügung zu stellen. Anfang August 2004 hat der Iran diese Verhandlungslösung mit der Ankündigung, Zentrifugen für sein Urananreicherungsprogramm zu produzieren, wieder in Frage gestellt. Dieser Kurswechsel ist nicht nur Ausdruck des Unmuts des Iran, der sich zuletzt zu Unrecht in Resolutionen der iaea kritisiert fühlte. Er spiegelt auch die Teheraner Einschätzung wider, dass die usa nach der Irak-Intervention politisch geschwächt und militärisch gebunden sind und kurzfristig keine akute Bedrohung darstellen. Der Iran nimmt damit auch die Gefahr in Kauf, dass die iaea den Sicherheitsrat auffordert, gegen den Iran aktiv zu werden – auch mit Sanktionen. Iran hat gleichzeitig einen Forderungskatalog für einen erneuten Kurswechsel in seiner Politik auf104 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

gestellt. Die wohl wichtigste Forderung – mit eindeutigem Bezug auf Israel – ist die nach einem nuklearfreien Nahen/Mittleren Osten und internationalen Sicherheitsgarantien gegen einen Nuklearangriff. Die Annäherung an den Iran ist – neben der Lösung des Nahost-Konflikts und der Stabilisierung des Irak – die Voraussetzung für eine breit angelegte regionale Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik im Nahen und Mittleren Osten mit dem Ziel einer massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone, die vergleichbar dem ksze -Prozess zu mehr Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in dieser Region führen muss(vgl. auch den Beitrag von Rolf Mützenich in diesem Heft). Auch andere Modelle – wie die Association of Southeast Asian Nations( asean ) und die Organization of American States( oas ) – können hilfreiche Impulse für eine regionale Sicherheitsstruktur geben. Die Rolle der externen Spieler wird sich aber auf eine Vermittlungsrolle konzentrieren. Um ein»regional ownership« zu entwickeln, muss diese Initiative natürlich aus der Region selbst kommen. Und es gibt bereits eine Vielzahl von Ansätzen: die Mubarak-Initiative, die Initiative des saudischen Kronprinzen Abdallah und nicht zuletzt die Initiative des ehemaligen jordanischen Kronprinzen Hassan. Dieser Prozess kann langfristig nur erfolgreich sein, wenn es gelingt, einen gemeinsamen tragfähigen Verhaltenskodex aufzubauen. Der Prozess muss dynamisch verlaufen und alle Akteure – die Arabische Welt, Israel, Iran und die Türkei – einschließen, um einen Dialog zwischen den Staaten der Region und zwischen den Staaten und ihren(Zivil-)Gesellschaften in der Region zu ermöglichen. Nicht zuletzt ist es notwendig, den Sicherheitsbegriff möglichst breit zu definieren, um ihn an die äußerst heterogene Staatenwelt in der Region anpassen zu können. Die strukturellen Ursachen angehen: Rentenökonomien, Tribalismus, Islamismus Auch wenn es gelingt, signifikante Fortschritte bei der Lösung der großen regionalen Konflikte zu erzielen, bleiben immer noch wesentliche Probleme bestehen, die ursächlich für die zentralen Demokratie- und Entwicklungsdefizite der arabischen-islamischen Welt sind. Die Ursachen dieser Defizite sind vielfältig und struktureller Natur. Generell wird die Hoffnung geäußert, dass sich die Staaten in der Region wegen mehrerer objektiv feststellbarer Entwicklungen demokratiipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 105

sieren und wirtschaftlich öffnen müssen. Dazu zählen vor allem die demographische Entwicklung, die Bildung und die Informationstechnologie(vgl. auch den Beitrag von Christian Koch in diesem Heft). Auch stehen die Länder in der Region vor einem flächendeckenden politischen Generationswechsel, da die Alleinherrscher in die Jahre gekommen sind. Die Hoffnung, dass sich mit diesem Generationswechsel auch signifikante Fortschritte in der Demokratisierung einstellen, hat sich aber bislang nicht erfüllt. Die junge Garde um König Mohammad VI von Marokko, König Abdullah II von Jordanien und König Hamed von Bahrain hat im Gegensatz zu Präsident Bashar al Assad von Syrien durchaus politische Reformen eingeleitet. Diese Reformen kann man aber bestenfalls als politische Liberalisierung bezeichnen. In diesen Ländern ist eine offenere gesellschaftspolitische Auseinandersetzung, größere Medienfreiheit, breitere zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung und zunehmender Wettstreit zwischen Parteien feststellbar. Diese dosierte Öffnung ist durchaus eine notwendige Bedingung für die Demokratisierung, aber natürlich keine hinreichende. 26 Ähnliches gilt auch für die Informationstechnologie. Zweifelsohne wird die politische Liberalisierung durch die schnell wachsende weltweite Informationsdichte(Internet, Satellitenfernsehen) gefördert, da autoritäre Systeme ein wesentliches Element ihrer Stabilisierungsfähigkeit, nämlich ihr Informationsmonopol, einbüßen. Bislang gibt es aber in der Region immer noch weniger als ein Prozent Internet-Nutzer in der Gesamtbevölkerung, und darüber hinaus ist der Internetzugang auch häufig staatlich kontrolliert. Die Verfügungsmasse»Renteneinkommen« bleibt über Jahre groß genug, um den politischen Öffnungsprozess sehr»dosiert« zu gestalten. Gleichzeitig werden aber entscheidende Ursachen für den Entwicklungs- und Demokratiestau in der Region oftmals ausgeblendet. Und dies sind vor allem die Rentenabhängigkeit der Staaten in der Region, der vorherrschende Tribalismus in den Gesellschaften und der Umgang mit dem Islamismus, die sich nur langfristig überwinden lassen. Die Diskus26. Vgl. hierzu auch Daniel Brumberg, Liberalization versus Democracy, Understandig Arab Political Reform, working paper No. 37, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, May 2003. 106 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

sion über eine wirtschaftliche und politische Reform bzw. Transformation der Region kann daher nur vor diesem Hintergrund geführt werden. Auf der Arabischen Welt und dem Iran lastet ein segensreicher Fluch: Die Länder im Nahen/Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika sind mit großer Mehrheit Rentier- oder Semi-Rentier-Staaten, die ihr Einkommen zum größten Teil aus Renten generieren – hauptsächlich aus Öl- und Gas-Renten, aber auch aus Finanzhilfen oder Gastarbeiterrücküberweisungen. Die Staaten – insbesondere die politischen Schwergewichte in der Region: Algerien, Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien, Syrien und Iran – waren seit Beginn des Öl-Booms kaum auf die produktive Tätigkeit ihrer Bürger und Bürgerinnen angewiesen und erkauften sich grundsätzlich ihre Legitimität über die Verteilung von Renteneinkommen gemäß dem Credo»no taxes – no participation«. Entsprechend unterwarfen sie auch die Entwicklung ihrer Zivilgesellschaften nicht partizipativen, sondern nationalen politischen und Sicherheitskonzepten. Es ist zweifelsohne richtig, dass der relative Anteil von Renten am Staatseinkommen dieser Länder langfristig fallen und die Verteilung der Renteneinkommen angesichts der demographischen Entwicklung in der Region wohl nicht mehr ausreichen wird, das Volk ruhig zu halten. Gleichzeitig bleibt die Verfügungsmasse »Renteneinkommen« über Jahre groß genug, um den politischen Öffnungsprozess sehr»dosiert« zu gestalten. 27 In den traditionellen Gesellschaften der Region dominiert nach wie vor der Tribalismus, der Politik und Wirtschaft über die Zugehörigkeit zu männerdominierten Großfamilien(»hamula«) definiert. Demokratisierungsstrategien, die sich ausschließlich an westlichen Demokratiemustern orientieren und den Tribalismus ausblenden, haben naturgemäß wenig Chancen auf Erfolg. Ein weiteres Problem, das auf der Hand liegt, aber in keinem offiziellen us -amerikanischen oder europäischen Strategie-Papier bislang zu finden ist, ist der Umgang mit dem Islamismus in der Region. Eine diffuse Angst des Westens vor diesem Phänomen verhindert es bislang, geeignete Strategieansätze zu entwickeln. Diese diffuse Angst basiert auf der weder wissenschaftlich noch mit repräsentativen Meinungsumfragen 27. Dahinter stecken die sich anbahnenden strukturellen Veränderungen auf dem Weltölmarkt: Staaten wie China und Indien schließen mit großen Schritten zu den industrialisierten Nationen auf und erhöhen entsprechend die Ölnachfrage. Zwar sind die Weltölreserven auch auf lange Sicht gesichert. Was aber fehlt, sind Förderund Raffineriekapazitäten, um das Ölangebot dieser gestiegenen Nachfrage kurzund mittelfristig anzupassen. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 107

begründbaren Annahme, dass die Islamisten –»die Anti-Imperialisten, Anti-Amerikaner, Anti-Zionisten, Anti-Semiten, Anti-Demokraten, Anti-Modernisten« – die absolute Mehrheit bei freien Wahlen in der Region gewinnen und die lieb gewonnenen Regierungen der autokratischen Systeme einfach wegspülen würden. Klammert man aber diese Überlegung aus, bleibt die Forderung nach Demokratisierung reine Augenwischerei. Die Angst des Westens gibt den Regimes in der Region eine carte blanche, im Namen der Bekämpfung des Islamismus auch gleichzeitig flächendeckend alle systemkritischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteure massiv zu unterdrücken. Beste Beispiele hierfür sind die autoritären Präsidialregime: Tunesien, Ägypten und Syrien. Die Erfahrung in diesen Ländern hat auch gezeigt, dass islamistischer Extremismus durch massive Repression und Ausgrenzung in Gewalt, in islamistischen Terror umschlagen kann. Nur wenn es gelingt, einen differenzierten Umgang mit islamistischen Gruppierungen zu verfolgen, können auch politische Öffnungsprozesse gelingen. Auch hier genügt nur ein kurzer Blick auf einige Länder in der Region: Jordanien, Marokko, Jemen, Libanon und jüngst auch Algerien, deren Erfahrungen man genau studieren sollte. Diese Erfahrungen könnten auch den autoritären Präsidialregimes und Königshäusern auf der Arabischen Halbinsel durchaus hilfreich sein. Auf der Grundlage dieser Erfahrungen ist es durchaus möglich, eine Strategie zum Umgang mit islamistischen Bewegungen zu entwickeln. Diese Strategie kann aber nur dann erfolgreich sein, wenn gleichzeitig eine glaubwürdige Lösung des Nahostkonflikts und der Irak-Krise erreicht wird, ohne die die islamistischen Bewegungen beständig Wasser auf ihre Mühlen erhalten. Der Islamismus(politische Islam) ist kein monolithischer Block, sondern ein äußerst heterogenes Phänomen. Er ist ein wichtiger Akteur in den Gesellschaften der arabisch-islamischen Welt. Er befindet sich bereits in Regierungsfunktion wie in der Türkei, im Iran, in Saudi-Arabien und im Sudan. Er findet sich im parlamentarischen Parteienspektrum in den Staaten der arabisch-islamischen Welt wieder, und zwar in Jordanien(Islamic Action Front), in Marokko(parti du justice et développement), im Jemen(Al Islah) und in Algerien(Al Islah). Er ist ein Schwergewicht in berufsständischen Vereinigungen(Rechtsanwälte, Ingenieure) und in sozialen und karitativen Organisationen. Er definiert sich als gewaltbereite und zum Teil terrorbereite Widerstandsbewegungen gegen Dritte (Israel) – wie die Hamas und die Hizbullah – mit einer starken gesell108 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

schaftlichen Verankerung in ihren jeweiligen Ländern, als islamistische Terrorbewegung gegen das eigene Regime wie die gia (groupes islamiques armés) in Algerien oder als flüchtiges internationales Terrornetzwerk wie Al Qaida. Der politische Islam kann sozialrevolutionär wie im Iran sein oder konservativ wie in Saudi-Arabien. Nur wenn es gelingt, einen differenzierten Umgang mit islamistischen Gruppierungen zu verfolgen, können auch politische Öffnungsprozesse gelingen. Ziel muss es sein, integrationsfähige und-bereite Teile der islamistischen Bewegungen, die sich eindeutig zum Gewaltverzicht, zur Friedfertigkeit und zur Achtung der demokratischen Spielregeln in ihren Ländern bekennen, in den politischen Prozess einzubinden. Auch hier kann der Westen eine Vermittlungsrolle übernehmen und Foren für den nationalen, an Sachthemen ausgerichteten und auf gemeinsame Projekte zielenden Dialog zwischen säkularen und islamistischen Gruppierungen anbieten. Keinesfalls dürfen islamistische Bewegungen in einen Topf geworfen werden und in toto als»staatsgefährdend bzw. terroristisch« stigmatisiert, marginalisiert und massiv unterdrückt werden. Die Teilnahme an der parlamentarischen Arbeit bzw. die Regierungsmitarbeit dient ja nicht nur der Einbindung, sondern führt auch zwangsläufig zur Entzauberung der islamistischen Bewegungen und ihrer Heilslehren, die sich am besten mit dem islamistischen Credo»Al Islam wa al hall«(Der Islam ist die Lösung) beschreiben lassen. Es lassen sich nämlich keine einfachen Antworten mehr auf komplexe politische Probleme finden. Lösungen – wie z.B. zur kommunalen Abwasser- und Abfallwirtschaft – können nur gemeinsam, mit politischen Kompromissen erarbeitet werden. Entsprechend ist es auch möglich, gewaltbereite, auf radikale Systemveränderung drängende Zweige der islamistischen Bewegungen zu identifizieren, sie ihrer Legitimationsbasis zu entziehen, zu isolieren und entsprechend zu verfolgen. Das ist aber nur der eine Teil der Strategie. Gleichzeitig muss die Förderung einer solidarischen, säkularen, demokratischen politischen Alternative in den Ländern intensiviert werden. Es geht hierbei um die langfristige Schaffung der notwendigen rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen, die an die landesspezifischen Charakteristika angepasst werden müssen. ipg 4/2004 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen 109

Von zentraler Bedeutung ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Parteien- und Wahlgesetzgebung: Wo politische Parteien generell verboten sind(u.a. in den gcc -Staaten), geht es darum, politische Parteien zu legalisieren. Wo nur ausgewählte Parteien erlaubt sind, andere aber verboten, geht es um die Ausweitung der politischen Einbindung(u.a. in Ägypten und Tunesien). Wo es keine nationalen Wahlen gibt, geht es um die Einführung von Wahlen(u.a. in Saudi-Arabien und Oman). Wo bereits nationale Wahlen regelmäßig abgehalten werden, aber nicht-gewählte Teile der Regierung den Großteil der Macht haben, geht es um die Machtbegrenzung der Nicht-Gewählten. Nicht zuletzt müssen konkrete Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, um die legislative Macht auszuweiten und die Unabhängigkeit der Judikative zu stärken. 28 Vor allem der internationalen politischen und finanziellen Unterstützung der säkularen, demokratischen Bewegungen in der Region kommt hierbei besondere Bedeutung zu, um die sozialen Felder und Sektoren zurückerobern zu können, die von den islamistischen Bewegungen so erfolgreich besetzt wurden. Ausblick Die Überwindung der zentralen Entwicklungs- und Demokratiedefizite in der Region des Nahen/Mittleren Ostens und Nordafrikas ist eine langfristige Aufgabe, die von den Gesellschaften in dieser Region getragen und gelöst werden muss. Dieser Transformationsprozess kann von externen Akteuren inhaltlich unterstützt sowie finanziell und politisch gefördert werden. Der transatlantische Schulterschluss kann in dieser Hinsicht neue Impulse liefern. Von Bedeutung wird er aber nur dann sein, wenn er seine Glaubwürdigkeit bei der Lösung der zentralen regionalen Konflikte – insbesondere des israelisch-palästinensischen und des Irak-Konflikts – zurückgewinnt und gemeinsame Antworten auf die bislang ausgeblendeten entscheidenden Fragen hinsichtlich der Demokratisierung und Modernisierung der Region – insbesondere zum Umgang mit dem politischen Islam – findet. 28. Vgl. hierzu Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a false start, policy brief no. 29, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, March 2004. 110 Gärber, Transatlantische Initiativen ipg 4/2004

European Democracy Promotion in the Middle East RICHARD YOUNGS I n the aftermath of the Sea Island G8 summit that took place on 8–10 June 2004, democracy promotion in the Middle East is firmly on the agenda of international donors. The G8 meeting agreed on a new Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative( bmei ), elaborated by the United States. The bmei purports to establish»partnership« with the Middle East, with the aim of supporting democratic reformers. The initiative is built around a»Forum for the Future«, a regular dialogue to include governments, civil society and business representatives. Observers have highlighted the extent to which the bmei has been watered down from the us ’s initial proposals for a Greater Middle East Initiative, the Bush administration influenced by hostile reaction in Europe and the Middle East. Beyond the idea of new dialogue on reform, the bmei is so far bereft of concrete democracy policy instruments. The only new projects agreed under the Initiative relate to literacy and micro-credit, with European governments resisting a new common democracy foundation for the Middle East. While most attention has focused on us strategy, recent deliberations around the bmei may also mark a modest increment in European democracy policies in the Middle East. Seeking to build on their existing reform efforts, European governments have recently sought to strengthen eu strategies, not least in order to respond to new us activity. This paper assesses the nature of these European policies, and suggests a number of ways in which they should be changed. 1 1. This paper is a version of a presentation given at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, in Berlin December 2003. The paper synthesises a more detailed account of European policies found in Youngs R.(2004) Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper 45), while its recommendations draw on Youngs R.(2004) European Policies for Middle East Reform: A Ten Point Action Plan(London, Foreign Policy Centre). ipg 4/2004 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion 111

European Democracy Promotion: State of the Art Democracy promotion has gradually established itself as a central component to European foreign policy, expressed through an array of different instruments: Support for political reform process is an aim formally enshrined in eu objectives; eu third country agreements include a standard sanctions-triggering democracy and human rights clause; a Commission-managed European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights provides over 100 million euros a year for political aid projects; and member states have significantly increased governance and human rights funding under their bilateral aid programs. Democracy policy in the Middle East was expressed most clearly within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership( emp ), created in 1995 with Maghreb and Mashrek states; has now assumed significant magnitude within Turkey’s pre-accession agreement; and has slowly become a topic of more systematic dialogue and some funding in relations with Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council( gcc ) and Yemen. In practice, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 European democracy assistance in the Middle East was relatively limited in scale and extremely cautious. The Middle East received just under ten million euros per year between 1996 and 1999 from the European Commission’s new democracy budget, but the region was conspicuously underrepresented in the political aid profiles of national governments and European foundations. Politically relevant work that was supported targeted relatively technical governance reforms or basic human rights issues. Commitments have been made to revitalize democracy promotion policy. Countless ministerial statements have committed European governments to prioritizing support for political reform in the Middle East, in claimed recognition of the extent to which Western backing for autocratic regimes have fostered resentment against the West. Many donors have introduced new initiatives or expanded budget lines aimed at intensifying democracy assistance in the Middle East – this applying to the German, Swedish, Dutch, Danish, British and French governments. Democracy promotion is a more prominent feature of both the Wider Europe initiative and the eu ’s new guidelines for»Partnership with the Middle East«. 2 More formalized dialogue on political reform and initia2. Joint Strategy Document of the European Commission and Council Secretariat (2003) Strengthening the EU’s Relations with the Arab World, December 2003. 112 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion ipg 4/2004

tives for new political aid projects have been witnessed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. New eu guidelines for democracy and human rights promotion were agreed in 2003, committing the eu to elaborating national plans for human rights to be agreed with emp Arab states. The eu ’s pre-accession partnership with Turkey has produced significant increases in political aid to support prime-minister Erdogan’s apparently genuine commitment to democratization. A new eu -Iran human rights dialogue has commenced and a number of European states have commenced reform-oriented programs on the ground in Iran. The eu also appears finally to have become more serious about trying to democratize the Palestinian Authority. The Occupied Territories have become the favored destination for European political aid in the Middle East, while increasing shares of eu aid has been made conditional on governance, judicial, civil society, security sector and electoral reforms. Yemen has similarly established itself as a prominent political aid destination for European donors, with new projects prioritizing judicial reform and parliamentary training. Even in Saudi Arabia, a modest opening is seen as having appeared for political aid and European donors have offered support for proposed governance reforms and the commitment to hold partly competitive municipal elections. Democracy assistance in more politicized spheres – elections, parties, parliaments and civil-military relations – continues to be disproportionately limited in the Middle East. Despite progress, the European focus on democracy promotion in the Middle East is still relatively limited. Democracy assistance amounts are still modest. While contrasting definitions of different types of funding make it impossible to compile reliable figures – some projects supported from»democracy« budgets stretch that definition, while other funding that is relevant to democratic reform flows from mainstream budgets – it can be reckoned that little more than 2–3 percent of European aid in the Middle East is devoted to political reform. Many in development ministries have resisted funds being diverted into middle-income Middle Eastern states for foreign policy rather than poverty-reduction reasons. Much European political aid relates only indirectly to democracy, aiming, for example, at small business development, environmental and service delivery ipg 4/2004 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion 113

associations or cooperation in the cultural sphere. European donors have supported national human rights committees, for example, most of which have highly compromised positions in the Middle East. Most European »reform« support is orientated notably towards cultural, education, development and governance projects. In the region’s most closed societies – Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia – European governments have failed to establish a significant foothold for political aid work. In many states – Algeria, several Gulf states – the largest share of European aid still goes to security forces with highly questionable human rights records. The main significant change on the part of most European donors has been away from self-standing development projects towards programs that aim to encourage reform within particular sectors. So, instead of just building and equipping schools or training teachers, now European donors aim at broader reform of the education system. This is the kind of approach often meant when governments refer to their commitments to»Arab reform«. Women’s rights have become a particularly strong focus of European funding: support for women’s human rights groups has been one of the largest categories of funding in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; parliamentary training programs for women have been provided by a number of European donors in countries like Yemen and Jordan; while the issue of gender rights is one whose»mainstreaming« has been most strongly promoted within eu development assistance. Democracy assistance in more politicized spheres – elections, parties, parliaments and civil-military relations – continues to be disproportionately limited in the Middle East. While in other regions donors have increasingly sought to link civil society work to parties and parliaments, this new focus has remained largely absent in the Middle East. Nearly all parliamentary work takes the form of training for actual or would-be women parliamentarians. European approaches remain highly economistic, based heavily on the assertion that cooperation on new market regulations, economic decision-making capacities and trade-related governance reforms represent the most fruitful routes towards political change. European polices have laid heavy emphasis on the cultural dimensions of Middle Eastern transformation, in particular through the Dialogue on Cultures and Civilizations established under the rubric of the emp ; Romano Prodi’s convening of a»Groupe des Sages« to recommend new avenues for enhancing cultural cooperation and understanding; and the new Euro-Mediterranean Foundation. However valuable, it is not clear how the plethora of new cultural fora link into the democracy agenda. 114 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion ipg 4/2004

There have been few obviously political dimensions to such cultural initiatives. Indeed, several member states have advocated a focus on cultural cooperation as a softer and more palatable alternative to muscular democracy promotion. Many aspects of this cultural dimension have had a defensive feel, focusing less on the prospects for spreading democracy in the Middle East than on the need for better respect for Islam within Europe. A particular challenge for European democracy promoters has been the us ’s new high profile initiatives aimed at»democratizing the Middle East«. The apparent direction of us policy in recent months has encouraged European policy-makers to become if anything even more insistent on a gradual approach to political change. All European donors have stressed the need to work in partnership with actors in the Middle East, and to draw on the recent reform initiatives created by civil society activists in the region, such as those that took place in Sana’a and Alexandria in early 2004. The us has been accused of overplaying the link between 9/ 11 and democracy promotion in the Middle East, to the detriment of the reform agenda. European governments have sought to avoid this danger. Yet, while the eu admonishes the us for its hard-headed direct security approaches and claims that its approach is far more oriented towards targeting the roots of terrorism, the eu has itself also prioritized defensive measures most notably since 9/11. The most dramatically expanding area of eu activity since 9/11 has been the strengthening of defensive approaches to security through new»justice and home affairs cooperation«. Funding for border controls and anti-terrorist cooperation with Middle East governments has far outstripped new democracy promotion resources. The focus on securing non-proliferation commitments from Iran, Syria and Libya has been bought at the cost of diminished focus on these states’ internal reforms. Ways Forward: A Reform Agenda Against this background, a number of improvements to European democracy promotion are called for in the Middle East: A European Democracy Fund Funding for democracy assistance projects needs to be increased, and organized at the European level. The current lack of consultation between ipg 4/2004 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion 115

donors risks duplication and excludes opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences between different donors. The Commission’s new Country Strategy Papers have failed to deliver the promised detailed overview of member states’ national policies or any analysis of evolving political challenges impacting upon European interests. Setting up a common European democracy fund would not only increase available funds and facilitate coordination, but also send a clear message to both governments and reformists in the Middle East. At present, European funding has been so fragmented and low profile that its existence often barely registers in the region. Such a fund would not need to undermine national bilateral initiatives. Different donors have developed different strengths in the field of political aid and such a division of labor would continue, with respective areas of expertise drawn on rather than suppressed. The aim would be to increase the visibility of overall eu efforts and to coordinate these within a more comprehensive and better-planned general strategy. Balancing Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches A better balance is needed between top-down and bottom-up approaches. Many analysts have cautioned that change in the Middle East is unlikely to emerge solely from bottom-up civil society dynamics, but must necessarily involve more top-down approaches. European donors have been too imprecise in conceptualizing how their focus on bottomup process relates to reforms at the political-institutional level. A focus on the institutional products of formal democracy should be developed in a way that sustains and furthers the bottom-up process dynamics that European donors seek to strengthen. There is still concern that civil society’s transformative potential has been over-estimated and the essential aggregative role of political institutions unduly overlooked. Tentative efforts to train political society actors have fallen short of expectations, as government authorities have prevented these projects from gaining adequate political backing. This represents a failure to move beyond isolated civil society initiatives to an appropriately political approach to democracy building. The social and political domains should thus be harnessed within single cross-cutting projects and initiatives. 116 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion ipg 4/2004

Responding to»Windows of Opportunity« European approaches are good at focusing on the gradual underlying processes that generate long-term change, but bad at responding politically to reform opportunities. One effect of the eu ’s preference for highly formalized and institutionalized partnerships is that initiatives tend to work to their own internal momentum, in a complete vacuum from outside events. A striking arbitrariness pervades European funding decisions and these consequently often bear little relation to changing international priorities. For precisely this reason, at the beginning of 2004 the European Parliament launched a legislative process aimed at strengthening political control over the Commission’s democracy funds. Policy aimed at the gradual conveyor-belt of underlying change needs to be complemented by more dexterous and nimble political interventions targeting visible change when break-through opportunities present themselves. Linking Governance Work and Political Reform European policy has been weak in making the leap from gradual changes in economic process to the tangible results of political reform. The relationship between Europe’s extensive range of governance work and broader political reform has been worryingly under-conceptualized. Most judicial reform or public administration reform carried out under a democracy label has in practice focused on enhancing the capacity of particular institutions and has not touched on the fundamental nature of political process. Many eu governance projects appear in this sense simply to have strengthened the policy-making capacity of ruling elites and helped shore-up incumbent regimes. The paucity of decision-making linkages between the eu ’s relatively large»good governance budgets« and its more modest»democracy and human rights« funds remains debilitating. Thus, better assessment is required of the precise political effects of European strategies aimed at general social and economic development. Joined-up Policy Making More joined-up policy-making is urgently required – including between government and European party foundations. Decision-making processes are at present simply too incoherent to produce a well-thought out and sustained commitment to generating new policy-making process. ipg 4/2004 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion 117

Separate pockets of policymaking currently tend to work away on their own efforts in acknowledged ignorance of how these relate to any grand design. eu democracy and human rights officers have no link to aid officials in national capitals. The process-oriented approach requires fundamentally restructured decision-making processes – if gradualism is not to equate to little more than ad hoc muddle. There is little or no coordination in terms of overall direction, either vertically between different ministries in capitals, or horizontally between member states. No common European-level assessments have been drawn up of democratic conditions in individual states or of the security implications of political reforms. Coordination has developed at the local level between in-county missions, on implementation issues and individual funding decisions rather than over-arching strategic questions. The whole justification of the process-oriented approach is that it embodies a sophistication absent in short-termist top-down policies. But this requires fundamentally restructured decision-making processes – if gradualism is not to equate to little more than ad hoc muddle. Engaging with Moderate Islam Despite the commitments made by countless ministerial statements and policy documents, in practice little new engagement with moderate Islam has been forthcoming. European donors have proceeded no further than including general discussion on»Islam and democracy« in some civil society forums. A plethora of initiatives have aimed at»cultural understanding« between Islam and the West, but concrete support has been lacking for moderate Islamists concerned to widen political participation within their own societies. It is widely recognized that this is the single most important area in which European approaches must change, but so far little has been done. There should be a concerted commitment on the part of European donors to support grass roots Islamist welfare organizations, where the latters’ work might overlap with eu social development programs. Such concrete support would be more valuable than any number of»Islam and democracy« workshops. It would provide a first tentative step towards establishing mutual trust between European donors and Is118 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion ipg 4/2004

lamists, so that relations could then move on to more political issues. A key challenge would be to design such cooperation in a way that helped demonstrate the link between effective social policy and the need for open politics. Assessing the Impact of Democracy Promotion Policies More sophisticated indicators for assessing the impact of democracy funding should be devised. The effects of democracy assistance have been notoriously difficult to ascertain. Up to now, judgments have revolved around donors’ own need to demonstrate tangible, quantitative shortterm results. Democracy projects have often been assessed in a very topdown, elite-focused way, with little local input – this invariably more notable than the generation of genuinely local-level legitimacy. 3 This has been compounded by the shift towards funding bigger ngo s, invariably based in Europe – this the result of tighter audit rules agreed in the aftermath of the Commission’s 1999 financial scandal. More qualitative assessment indicators should be developed, oriented to the longer term and revolving around concepts such as participation, access to policy-making and actors’ effective autonomy from the executive. Mainstreaming Democracy Promotion Better linkages are needed between democracy assistance and mainstream development assistance.»Democracy assistance« has been understood in restrictive terms, and has failed to draw on the potential of projects run under far larger standard development aid budgets. For example, a number of large judicial reform projects have been introduced in Middle Eastern states in the last two years, but it remains unclear how the strengthening of judicial capacity in these cases relates to broader political reform. The need for complementarity has been recognized, with increased consultations between departments running the eu ’s meda budget(for cooperation with Mediterranean countries) and the unit in Europe Aid responsible for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights ( eidhr ). Links are still weak, however, particularly in a number of member states. The inception of systematic coordination between mainstream 3. Crawford G.(2003)»Promoting Democracy from Without – Learning from Within(Part I)«, Democratization 10/1: 77–98. ipg 4/2004 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion 119

Overseas Development Assistance( oda ) and democracy assistance objectives could significantly strengthen the impact of overall eu efforts. Rewards and Conditionality While European donors are right to stress the need for partnership and for reforms to be driven from within the Middle East, they should consider modest forms of conditionality. There is a case for ensuring a tighter correlation between very specific political reforms and the potential benefits that partnership with the European Union bestows. Political conditionality does not need to be used in a dramatic fashion, completely breaking off relations if immediate and far reaching political change is not implemented. But, conditions should be developed that are linked in a very specific way to particular programs. The specific aim should be to secure a change in institutional processes to allow for greater autonomy and access in the area of work covered by each individual eu aid project. More generally, the eu needs to make available far larger rewards linked to political reforms that are attainable and narrowly defined. It must have the political will to spell out more clearly what kinds of reforms are expected in return for aid increases. These should be modest political liberalization measures that have a reasonable chance of being successfully implemented. Recent European Commission plans do focus on the notion of more effective positive conditionality, providing aid and trade rewards for those Middle Eastern states that do cooperate with the eu on human rights issues. This is the kind of approach that should be made more systematic, and extended to national donors. Supporting the Private Sector A share of economic aid should be set aside for»democracy-assisting« funding for private sectors in the Middle East. The Middle East still lacks prominent and organized private sector support for democratic reform. No other region has reached similar levels of economic development with such modest autonomous political activism on the part of private sector actors. While concerned over corruption and economic mismanagement, private sector organizations in the Middle East have invariably accepted autocratic regimes as a necessary bulwark against Islamists. But, there has so far been little European effort directly to encourage the emergence of a more politically independent and pro-democratic private sector. Euro120 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion ipg 4/2004

pean aid channeled to private sector organizations has rarely been provided for purposes that would assist the development of political activity. This feature of European policy should be revisited. Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation A final issue relates to the need for better transatlantic cooperation. In the run up to the June G8 summit, the eu resisted us overtures to combine democracy funds in the Middle East, and the extent of transatlantic coordination that will be forthcoming under the new Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative remains uncertain. The eu has gained presence and purchase in many parts of the Middle East by virtue of not being the us and by not presenting its policy as part of a»Western« project. One of the most valuable contributions the EU might make to democracy promotion could be seen in its ability to effectively influence the direction of US strategy. Where differences with the us are over-stated, however, genuine opportunities for joining forces may be lost, and the danger arises of Middle Eastern states being able to play the us and European states off against each other – to the benefit of neither the eu nor us . Differences can easily be overplayed. Recent years have witnessed some convergence between European and us approaches to democracy assistance. Notwithstanding European criticisms of the current Bush administration, both the eu and us could learn more from each other. The eu needs to spend more time on considering how cooperation with the us might add to the efficacy of its own work, and what division of tasks might be envisaged between the eu and us in the democracy assistance field. Conclusion: European Added Value? These changes would help create a more effective and distinctive European approach to the broader Middle East. There has been understandable concern with European policies being adversely effected by overweaning us agency in the region. Certainly, one of the most valuable contributions the eu might make to democracy promotion could be seen in ipg 4/2004 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion 121

its ability effectively to influence the direction of us strategy. At the same time, the positive potential in stronger transatlantic coordination of democracy promotion should not be lost from sight, if eu and us policies can galvanize each other in the development of more assertive reform efforts. Existing, institutionalized dialogue, social development initiatives, women’s rights, governance and cultural cooperation can all serve as useful foundations for a European»added value« in debates over Middle East reform. Their resonance could, however, be enhanced by a strengthening of the so-far weaker aspects of eu policies. For this to happen, a »more of the same« philosophy still needs to be supplanted by a deeper reassessment of Europe’s role in the broader Middle East. More on Democracy Promotion in international politics and society ̈ Peter Burnell: Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies(3/2004) ̈ Carlos Santiso: Promoting Democracy by Conditioning Aid? Towards a More Effective eu Development Assistance(3/2002) ̈ Michael Dauderstädt/André W.M. Gerrits: Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion(4/2000) 122 Youngs, European Democracy Promotion ipg 4/2004

Aqaba, Geneva, Gaza – Approaches to Peacemaking in the Middle East MURIEL ASSEBURG I n late April 2003 the so-called»road map« was officially presented to the parties of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by representatives of the Middle East»quartet«( usa , eu , un and Russian Federation). The road map envisages a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by 2005 through a two-state solution to be achieved in three stages. 1 At the June 2003 Aqaba summit us President George W. Bush, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, and Palestinian prime minister Mahmud Abbas committed themselves to implementing the plan, although Israel had expressed reservations. After almost three years of violent confrontations the formal reentry to a new peace process was achieved. However, the renewed escalation of violence only one week later signaled the lack of serious commitment on all sides to implementation of the plan. Consequently, the road map process has not proved to be a way out of the cycle of violence, let alone to a renewal of official peace negotiations. Nevertheless, in early December 2003 a draft of an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement was publicly unveiled in Geneva. The so-called»Geneva Accords« had been worked out by Israeli and Palestinian politicians, civil society representatives, and experts under the auspices of Oslo architect and former Israeli justice minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian information minister and Arafat intimate Yasir Abed Rabboh. It is a blueprint for a final status agreement that details solutions to the outstanding complex issues of Israeli–Palestinian relations. The momentum triggered by the Geneva Accords, mounting criticism of Israeli government policies – in Israeli society as well as by the security establishment – and growing international pressure on the Israeli prime minister to fulfill his country’s obligations under the road map, led Ariel Sharon to announce his own 1. A performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by the quartet( eu , usa , Russian Federation, un ), April 30, 2003, http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/declarations/75591.pdf. ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 123

way of dealing with the crisis:»unilateral disengagement«, that is, a longterm interim solution not negotiated with the Palestinians, in which Israelis and Palestinians are separated from each other through a limited evacuation of settlements and the continued construction of a security barrier. Without a much more intensive and sustained engagement on the part of the international community, building on the initiatives emanating from the region, an end to violence and the renewal of a meaningful peace process are unlikely to be achieved. International engagement is becoming ever more urgent as developments on the ground lead fast to a situation that will effectively prevent the realization of a viable two-state solution. The Middle East Quartet’s Plan: on the Road Again? The road map envisions a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by 2005 through a two-state solution to be achieved in three stages. 2 In each of these stages, both parties will have to take steps towards: improving the economic and humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories; comprehensive reform of Palestinian government and security institutions; security cooperation and the fight against terrorism; and negotiations about final status. Progress on the Israeli–Palestinian track should also enable the revival of the multilateral peace process, the relaunch of the bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria, as well as Israel and Lebanon, and thus the early achievement of comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The road map is based on a comprehensive approach containing three main elements: simultaneousness, parallel steps, and international monitoring. This approach makes the road map different from earlier initiatives – such as the Mitchell Report and the Tenet Ceasefire Plan – that aimed first at a ceasefire and only later, following a cooling-down phase, at a relaunch of the diplomatic process. The road map envisages that both parties comply with their respective requirements at the same time and without preconditions( simultaneousness ). This aims to break the pattern according to which both sides have time and again justified their own fail2. Phase 1: ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions(up to May 2003); Phase 2: transition(June 2003–December 2003); Phase 3: permanent status agreement and end of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict(2004–2005). 124 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

ings in terms of the failings of the other side. Also, progress in all areas of Israeli–Palestinian relations will occur at the same time( parallel steps ) as it has become obvious that a durable ceasefire cannot be reached without a realistic prospect of conflict settlement and an end to occupation. Critically, the international community will judge the progress made and decide whether to enter into the next phase of the process( international monitoring ). The quartet has established four committees to monitor and evaluate progress in different areas. Deficits in the Plan’s Architecture The quartet initiative claims to be embarking on a»goal-oriented« process. In reality, it focuses strongly on the first phase while important questions regarding the second and third phases remain unanswered: Where will the»provisional borders« be established? Who will control them? What is meant by»some attributes of sovereignty« that the Palestinian state would acquire in phase two? Above all, the destination of the road is not spelled out clearly enough; the principles on which a permanent solution should be based are not revealed. Referring solely to relevant un Security Council resolutions is inadequate as they remain subject to differing interpretations. This is particularly true of issues related to the territory of the future Palestinian state, Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees. The plan neglects the populations of both sides. The road map’s timetable was already outdated by the time it was handed over to the parties concerned. In any case, the dates mentioned should be regarded as guidelines rather than binding deadlines. Entry into subsequent phases of the process hinges on the unanimous assessment of the quartet that the parties have fulfilled the demands of the previous phases. Given the expected attempts to derail the process on the part of the enemies of peace on both sides, the peace plan effectively gives potential trouble-makers enormous veto power – ignoring the lessons of the failure of the Oslo process – because it does not provide for any mechanism guaranteeing implementation of the agreement in the face of attempts to sabotage it. The only sanction is to delay or break off the process, something feared least of all by those interested in preventing progress towards a two-state solution. ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 125

In general, the role of the international community is not spelled out clearly enough. The quartet is to monitor, accompany, and assess progress made by the parties, but it is so far limited to a role as a facilitator. There is no provision for arbitration by a third party to resolve disputes. Nor has the international community made any political or military guarantees for a final solution. In addition, the plan neglects the populations of both sides: confidence building between the peoples, the handling of war crimes, and the treatment of individual and collective trauma are not part of the plan; nor is adherence to the rule of law in the fight against terrorism. Obstacles on the Road to Implementation Severe problems surfaced while the process was still getting under way. The Israeli government announced 14 reservations with regard to the road map. 3 Most significantly, Israel has since insisted that it will reenter diplomatic negotiations only if, on the one hand, the Palestinian leadership fights terrorism effectively and dismantles Palestinian»terror groups« and, on the other, it recognizes Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State, renouncing the right of return of Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel. In addition – and contrary to the road map text – Israel wants the question of settlements and of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem to be addressed only in the negotiations on a final settlement. Finally, Israel has said that the us should be the sole party responsible for the peace process and its monitoring. The American administration signaled to Israel that its reservations would be taken into account while implementing the road map. Thus, the demands of the road map process on both sides were altered and its three main principles watered down, so that practically we find ourselves brought back to a»security first« approach. The Israeli side engaged in security cooperation with the Palestinians and some confidence-building measures, such as a(limited) troop redeployment(in the Gaza Strip and in Bethlehem), the evacuation of some unauthorized settlement outposts, and the release of some Palestinian prisoners. It did not, however, stop its military incursions into Palestinian cities, its raids, arrests, and killings of suspected militants, and its house demolitions, nor did it lift the closure of the Palestinian territories and the siege on Palestinian cities and villages. On the Palestinian side, prime 3.»Israel’s road map reservations«, in Haaretz Internet Edition (May 27, 2003). 126 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

minister Abbas committed himself to putting an end to the armed Intifada and to disarming Palestinian militant groups, but neither had the means nor the necessary backing of the population to do so. The Geneva Initiative: Blueprint for a Two-State Solution In mid-October 2003 a draft for an Israeli–Palestinian peace accord was leaked to the press which had been worked out by both parties’ experts and politicians over the course of roughly two years. 4 In this, they had started out from the December 2000 Clinton Parameters and the state of negotiations reached in Taba in January 2001. 5 For the first time, the Geneva Accords present a draft that settles all the contentious issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict hitherto deferred to a later stage: territory and status of the Palestinian entity, Israeli settlements, Jerusalem, the refugee question, and mutual security arrangements. In early December 2003, the unofficial document was presented to the public in Geneva. Simultaneously, a campaign was initiated aimed at a broad discussion of the Accords in both societies, based on distribution of the text to households and its publication in local newspapers. 6 Main Points of the Accords ̈ A two-state solution: The draft foresees the settling of the conflict through the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to 4. For a more detailed analysis see Muriel Asseburg, Die Genfer Vereinbarung. Blaupause für eine Zwei-Staaten-Lösung in Nahost, Berlin(November 2003), http:// www.swp-berlin.org/pdf/swp_aktu/swpaktu_43_03.pdf. 5. After the break-down of negotiations in Camp David in July 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September that year, us President Bill Clinton in December 2000 presented the parties with a bridging proposal for a final status agreement. See»President Clinton’s Proposals«, in Le Monde Diplomatique, http://MondeDiplo.com/focus/mideast/a3271. On this basis, in January 2001, the parties went back to negotiations on a final status in Taba and achieved a narrowing of the gaps, particularly with regards to the territorial question. However, due to the imminent Israeli elections, the Israeli prime minister broke the talks off. For an account by the European Union peace envoy Miguel Moratinos see the so-called»Moratinos Document«, first published by Akiva Eldar in Haaretz Internet Edition (February 14, 2002), http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/ mepp / prrn /papers/moratinos.html. 6.»The Geneva Accord«, in Haaretz Internet Edition (October 20, 2003). ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 127

Israel. The Palestinians, for their part, recognize not only the de facto existence of Israel, but also the Jewish people’s right to self-determination in the State of Israel. ̈ Territory and settlements: Borders between the two states will in principle be based on the situation of June 4, 1967, and border corrections on equal land swaps. Israeli settlers finding themselves outside Israeli territory after border adjustments will be resettled inside Israel. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be connected by a permanently open corridor. ̈ Jerusalem: The draft aims at preserving the special character of the Holy City and at guaranteeing freedom of religion. At the same time, Jerusalem will be the capital of two states, with sovereignty being territorially divided. As set out by the Clinton Parameters, Israel will have sovereignty over the neighborhoods mainly inhabited by Jews, Palestine in those areas with a majority Palestinian population. With regard to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, the plateau will be under Palestinian sovereignty, while the Western(»Wailing«) Wall will be under Israeli sovereignty. There will be a multinational presence on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. ̈ Refugees/right of return: The agreement will constitute a final settlement of the refugee problem, without the possibility of any further claims. In principle, refugees will be compensated for loss of property, as well as for their refugeedom. Independently of any compensation, each refugee will be able to choose between five options for his or her permanent place of residence: 1) inside the Palestinian State; 2) in areas that will be part of the Palestinian State after the land swap; 3) in third countries; 4) inside Israel; and 5) in the current host state. While all refugees will have the right to settle in the future Palestinian State, permanent settlement in third states is subject to the sovereign decision of the host state. This arrangement can be seen as a pragmatic formula for a settlement to the refugee question that aims at improving the living conditions of refugees without endangering the»demographic balance« in Israel. The question remains, however, whether such a compromise, which neither makes Palestinians explicitly renounce the right of return, nor makes Israelis acknowledge their responsibility in the creation of the refugee problem, can form the basis of a process of reconciliation between the two societies. Characteristically, the compromise on the refugee issue has drawn most of the criticism from both sides. 128 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

̈ Security and international presence: Palestine will be a non-militarized state with restricted and internationally supervised weaponry. There will be a multinational presence on Palestinian territory in order to protect the state’s integrity and to oversee the(staged) withdrawal of Israeli troops. ̈ International monitoring, mediation, and arbitration: The draft foresees the establishment of a so-called»implementation and verification group« that will oversee implementation of the Accords. The group will establish a mechanism for mediation and will actively mediate in case of conflict. There will be a process of conflict resolution involving several stages. In this, lessons from the failure of the Oslo process have been drawn with regard to the necessity of procedural safeguards and the involvement of a third party. The Relevance of the Geneva Initiative The Geneva Accords do not constitute a formal, official agreement, but rather a blueprint for a peaceful settlement. In this way the negotiating teams have presented a concrete and constructive proposal against a backdrop of ongoing violence and widespread lack of prospects and hope in both societies. They have offered a realistic alternative to the claims of extremists that are often religiously or ideologically legitimized. The Geneva Accords neither contradict the vision of two states formulated by us President Bush in June 2002 nor clash with the road map. To the contrary, they complement the road map with the political perspective that is lacking in the plan by detailing what a final status could look like. There are still open questions and missing paragraphs on such questions as the sharing and management of water resources, border regimes, and economic cooperation. Particularly concerning Jerusalem, many issues remain unresolved, and other details and procedural questions to be contained in the annexes need to be worked out. However, already at this stage the draft outlines a viable settlement to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Unilateral Disengagement: A Step towards Peace or the End of the Two-state Solution? Ariel Sharon accused the Geneva Initiative’s Israeli participants of»collaborating with the enemy« in order to undermine the Israeli government ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 129

and of endangering the imminent victory over Palestinian terrorism, as well as the implementation of the road map. At the same time, the Israeli government came under pressure to show Israeli society and the international community that it had a strategy of its own. Consequently, in December 2003 Israel’s prime minister announced his intention of unilaterally disengaging from the Palestinians. In April 2004, Sharon presented a disengagement plan that envisaged an Israeli withdrawal from those areas in which no Israelis would be living anyhow after the signing of a final status agreement. According to the plan, Israel will continue construction of the separation barrier in the West Bank, evacuate all settlements and military installations in the Gaza Strip by the end of 2005, and evacuate four settlements(Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh), as well as military installations located in the northern West Bank. 7 Existing Israeli–Palestinian agreements will in principle remain in place. Israel will also continue to supply electricity and water. At the same time, Israel will retain control of all land and maritime borders, as well as the airspace above the Gaza Strip, and asserts its right to carry out military operations in all evacuated areas. Initially, Israel intends to retain control of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt(the»Philadelphi Route«) and to widen the border strip if deemed necessary. Neither the Gaza seaport nor the airport will be reopened in the short term. The Gaza Strip is to be a demilitarized area, and an international presence can be deployed only with Israeli consent. After the withdrawal, Israel will regard its occupation of the Gaza Strip as terminated and will reject any further responsibility for the local population. In return for these withdrawals, as it were, the disengagement plan announces Israel’s intention of holding on to certain areas in the West Bank, even after a final agreement has been signed. These areas include large settlement blocs and security zones, as well as areas of particular interest to Israel. In May 2004, Likud members rejected the plan in a referendum. However, Sharon – backed by a strong majority of the population 8 – was still able to push the plan through the cabinet. After fierce controversies, the Israeli government adopted a modified version of the disengagement 7. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Disengagement Plan. General Outline(April 18, 2004), http://www.mfa.gov.il/. 8. Polls indicate 60–70 percent support among the Israeli population. See Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, Peace Index May 2004, Tel Aviv(June 2004), http:// www.tau.ac.il/peace. 130 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

plan and agreed to start preparations for its implementation. According to the modified plan, settlements in Gaza and the northern West Bank will be evacuated(and housing consequently destroyed) in four phases – if, and only if, the cabinet votes in favor of each of the withdrawals. Furthermore, implementation of the plan will no longer be completely unilateral, as Egypt is to assume a supporting role. 9 Indeed, the first steps have been taken to prepare for the plan’s implementation. However, this does not guarantee that actual withdrawals will take place, partially or fully. In the months to come, we should rather expect controversies in the cabinet over each withdrawal, as well as further resignations by ministers and a series of no-confidence votes. Following the resignation of right-wing ministers from the government, Prime Minister Sharon has had to rule with a minority government. Negotiations with, amongst others, the Labor Party for a unity government are likely to begin seriously after the summer recess – but even early elections are a realistic scenario. Reviving the Peace Process? Sharon’s plan does not constitute a step towards reviving the Middle East peace process and solving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Unilateral measures such as those envisaged by the plan, along with Sharon’s statements that its implementation would definitely stifle Palestinian aspirations to statehood, do little to build confidence. Even basic coordination with the Palestinians is not provided for. Unilateralism also runs counter to the road map’s approach, which requires both parties to carry out their obligations in parallel and simultaneously. Furthermore, Israeli withdrawal of its settler population and military personnel does not amount to an end of the occupation of the evacuated territories, since Israel still retains all essential prerogatives. Of particular concern is the issue of territorial contiguity. The construction of the separation barrier(although declared temporary), with its deep incursions into the West Bank, carves up the Palestinian territories in a dramatic fashion. Large sections of farmland and water resources are already, or will become, inaccessible to the local Palestinian population. After completion of the separation barrier’s western part, Israel will 9. For the revised disengagement plan see Aluf Benn,»What’s been approved, what’s changed«, in Haaretz Internet Edition (June 7, 2004). ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 131

de facto have annexed around 20 percent of West Bank territory. If the Jordan valley also remains under Israeli control, as foreseen, around 45 percent of the West Bank will de facto be annexed. In addition, once construction of the separation barrier is completed, East Jerusalem as an important social, cultural–religious, economic, and service center, as well as the traffic junction between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, will be completely isolated from its surroundings. The Sharon plan is thus diametrically opposed to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and therefore to the realization of a durable two-state solution. Sharon’s plan does not constitute a step towards reviving the Middle East peace process and solving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Another major problem with the disengagement plan is its likely failure to substantially improve living conditions for the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip. Naturally, it will come as a relief for Palestinians living in the Strip no longer to have to face checkpoints and roadblocks and to enjoy free movement within the Strip’s 365 square kilometers. Of much greater importance to the 1.3 million inhabitants, however, is an improvement in their socio-economic situation. Presently, around 30 percent of the population is unemployed, around two-thirds live below the poverty line, and a large proportion is dependent on international aid shipments. This is largely a consequence of Israeli closure policy as Gaza inhabitants depend on employment in Israel and on foreign trade in commodities. Open access to world markets is essential, especially for perishable agricultural exports, and open borders to neighboring countries and – at least as long as no peace agreement has been signed – a proper seaport and airport are needed. The disengagement plan, however, does not provide for any of this. On the contrary, the Israeli minister of industry and trade, Ehud Olmert, has decided to close the Erez Industrial Zone until it can be handed over to an international body – eliminating another 4,000 jobs for Gaza residents. The Palestinian Authority, the Opposition, and Egypt’s Role The Palestinian Authority( pa ) has denounced the unilateral nature of the Israeli plan, as well as the construction of the separation barrier on Palestinian territory. At the same time, it has commenced preparations for an 132 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

eventual Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and for the taking over of responsibilities there. In particular, Palestinian protagonists are aware of the dangers of violent power struggles in the wake of an Israeli withdrawal. Armed confrontations with Israel have weakened the pa , strengthened militants, and caused a groundswell of support for Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Consequently, the pa has set up a national dialogue aimed at preventing civil strife and at finding a power-sharing arrangement which would involve its militant rivals in governmental responsibilities. Egypt already serves as a mediator in the national dialogue and ceasefire talks between Palestinian factions. An enlarged Egyptian role in withdrawal preparations, as envisaged by the Israeli government, would also include involvement in Palestinian security sector reform, training and oversight of Palestinian security personnel, and controlling the Egyptian side of the border with Gaza. Egypt has conditioned its involvement on several factors essential for success: both sides are to refrain from violence against each other; Israel is to withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip, including from the Philadelphi Route, to guarantee abstention from all military operations in the evacuated territories, and finally to establish safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Egypt expects the Palestinian Authority( pa ) to restructure its complex security apparatus into three branches under the interior minister’s authority and to substantially empower the Palestinian prime minister. However, these conditions are unlikely to be met. The Israeli government insists on control of all land and maritime borders of the Strip, as well as the airspace, and it has asserted its right to carry out military operations in all evacuated areas. And while in mid-July 2004 the Palestinian president finally announced the consolidation of the security forces into three branches and reshuffled senior security positions, these overdue moves triggered massive violent protests by members of the Popular Resistance Committees first in Gaza and then in the West Bank, as well as a series of resignations, ranging from the prime minister(whose resignation was later withdrawn) to several heads of security services. The protests not only indicate the pa ’s loss of control and its inability to effectively provide for law and order, but also illustrate the demand for much more comprehensive reform, clean leadership, and more inclusive policies, if legitimacy is to be regained. The involvement of Egypt in Gaza security carries considerable risks: first, the danger of Palestinian–Egyptian tensions, Israeli–Egyptian tensions, and, last but not least, the conflict spilling over into Egypt. Palesipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 133

tinian factions have clearly voiced their opposition for fear that Egyptian and(in the West Bank) Jordanian involvement in the security sector will effectively limit the pa ’s competencies and endanger the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state. Second, it is very doubtful whether the Egyptian security forces are in a position to train their Palestinian counterparts in anti-terrorism measures that are not only effective but also compatible with international human rights standards. Peacemaking in the Middle East – Challenges for European Policy The European Union( eu ) should definitely support Sharon’s efforts to evacuate settlements and troops from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Despite any reservations, the evacuation of settlements is a positive step. It might also be an opportunity to demonstrate to the Israeli public that settlements in»Judea and Samaria« can be evacuated without causing a civil war within Israel. And it might lead to growing pressure from the Israeli public to withdraw from other areas. These developments will make it easier for any future Israeli government to evacuate settlements on a larger scale, and ultimately to put an end to the occupation. The eu should also seize this opportunity to bring new momentum to the deadlocked road map process, instead of merely continuing to insist on the relevance of the quartet’s plan as the sole means for solving the conflict. This will require, however, that Europeans not only demand that the parties to the conflict deliver on their commitments, but also assess how they can meaningfully contribute, beyond declaratory politics, to transforming the Sharon plan’s unilateral approach into a success story. Egypt surely can help(as it is already doing) by mediating in the national dialogue and ceasefire talks between the Palestinian factions, and it can act as a go-between in the withdrawal preparations of Israelis and Palestinians. But we should not succumb to the illusion that the Egyptian government has the capacity and power to create the complex conditions necessary for a successful withdrawal and a resumption of the peace process. Supporting the Withdrawal from Gaza Initially, this entails insisting on immediate preparation and execution of the withdrawal, to be carried out as speedily as possible. The cabinet 134 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

plan’s fall 2005 deadline leaves a period of more than one year in which both Palestinian militant groups and the Israeli government will try to claim victory with the withdrawal and thus continue escalating the violence. Also, the more radical settlers will use that time to mobilize massively against a withdrawal. The deadly confrontations and house demolitions in the Gaza Strip witnessed in May 2004, as well as the clashes between Palestinian militants and the pa in July/August 2004, have served as a warning of escalations to come. The challenge will then be to spell out in detail the arrangements for the withdrawal and the handover of security and infrastructure control to the pa . To this end, Israel and the pa will have to work out a plan that sets a timetable for withdrawal and transfer of power, clarifying what capacities can reasonably be assumed by the pa itself after a handover, and what kind of support must be provided by the international community. Coordination with the pa is paramount in this regard in order to prevent chaos and to keep self-declared victors from rising to power. The quartet should oversee the drawing up of this plan and monitor its implementation. There is a need for an international presence on the ground. A key task for such a military presence would be to disarm the population in tandem with the PA and to act against groups that continue to engage in attacks against Israel. Moreover, the eu can contribute to making the withdrawal a tangible success for the local population by generously supporting reconstruction of the evacuated areas and kick-starting economic development by way of substantial investment. This, however, can succeed only if the Gaza Strip is no longer economically isolated. Therefore the Israeli government will need to assume responsibility for creating the necessary conditions: above all, access to international markets by land, sea, and air must be assured, and permits for Gaza residents to work in Israel – at least in the short to medium term – need to be significantly increased. In the medium to long term, jobs could also be created by setting up joint ventures in the Gaza Strip or on the Egyptian border. On top of the economic aspects, three main issues will make or break the Palestinian population’s support for withdrawal: internal security, legitimacy of the political leadership, and the prospect of a solution to the conflict and the end of occupation. Security cannot be interpreted solely ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 135

as Israel’s security, to be realized through counterterrorism measures. Security also entails implementing law and order and ending the reign of gangs and militias in parts of the Palestinian territories. That, however, requires the restoration of a monopoly of power, as well as the transparency and accountability of the security services. It will also mean involving the young guard of Fateh, moderate Islamists, and other opposition groups in the political process and in sharing responsibilities – thus giving the pa the legitimacy it needs to enforce law and order. The international community should therefore support the national dialogue and urge the pa to hold elections, particularly at the local level, in the near future. The participation of the Palestinian population in the political decision-making process should no longer be subordinated to progress in the peace process, or made dependent on a favorable outcome. At the same time, international support for the Palestinian security apparatus is crucial for breaking the cycle of violence. The training of security forces already under way is not sufficient. There is also a need for an international presence on the ground. A key task for such a military presence would be to disarm the population in tandem with the pa and to act against groups that continue to engage in attacks against Israel. Only if this is done successfully will Israel cease to carry out preventive or retaliatory military operations. Such a presence would be welcomed by a majority of the Palestinians – provided it is perceived as a means to ending the occupation and not as a tool for its continuation. This, however, will not be the case as long as nothing more than a long-term interim situation is on the horizon. Reviving the Road-map Process Primarily, the eu will therefore have to work towards getting us policy to make good in a responsible manner on its support for the disengagement plan pledged by George W. Bush in April this year. This involves integrating the Gaza withdrawal into the road map process, that is, making it a first step to be followed by further steps towards a viable and mutually acceptable two-state solution. These steps need to be part of a realistic and binding timetable. It also involves spelling out the road map’s third phase in order to give clear direction to this process. Europe should urge the quartet to lay down the principles for a solution to the conflict, which would then serve as the basis for negotiations between Israel and the pa on the details of a two-state arrangement. 136 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East ipg 4/2004

In this respect, Europeans should also continue financially and technically to support track-two activities – such as the Geneva Initiative – in which different options and positions are worked out by experts and academics of both sides to prepare for final status negotiations. On top of this, the eu should offer concrete and generous support for solving complex issues such as the refugee question. For example, the eu and its member states should offer to make a substantial financial contribution to a fund for taking over compensation and rehabilitation costs for refugees. They should also offer substantial quotas for immigration of refugees, for example, from Lebanon, to eu member states. Current developments on the ground work against the realization of a viable two-state solution. The destructive erection of the separation barrier deep inside the West Bank, in combination with a newly enhanced settlement effort, is leading to an ever stronger»bantustanization« of the future Palestinian State’s territory and is cutting it off from access to resources, workplaces, and markets. The violent conflict, at the same time, undermines the pa ’s capacity to govern and to provide law and order, while Palestinian society’s militarization is increasing. Only if the international community is willing to engage much more intensively than at present and to insist that the commitments made by both parties to the conflict under the road map process are fulfilled, will we see the reinvigoration of a meaningful peace process. Without such an active international involvement, the implementation of Sharon’s disengagement plan – if it takes place at all – will not lead closer to peace, but rather contribute to the prevention of a durable and mutually acceptable two-state solution. More on Israel and Palestine in international politics and society ̈ Reiner Bernstein: Die»Road Map« und die blockierten Wege zu einem Nahostfrieden(4/2003) ̈ Winfried Veit: Eine europäische Perspektive für Israel: Schlüssel zur Lösung des Nahostkonflikts(2/2003) ̈ Natan Sznaider: Israel: ethnischer Staat und pluralistische Gesellschaft(1/2003) ipg 4/2004 Asseburg, Peacemaking in the Middle East 137

The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States? KEITH GOTTSCHALK/ SIEGMAR SCHMIDT I n future, May 25(officially celebrated on the continent as»Africa Day«), 2004, may be considered a historic date, since it was on that day that the African Union( au ) launched its Peace and Security Council( psc ). The current Chairman of the au , Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, declared at the inauguration of the psc in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that the au »has made unprecedented progress in setting up our organization’s structure« 1 in the three years since the au was founded. According to its main promoter, South African President Thabo Mbeki, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development( nepad ) has also made considerable progress. While African leaders congratulate themselves on what has been achieved in recent years, a look into the past reveals a much more checkered history, made up of numerous attempts to solve the continent’s problems through regional cooperation and integration(Mistry, 2000). Few nowadays recall that President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana advocated a United States of Africa as early as 1963. However, as the history of the Organization of African Unity( oau ) – which would have celebrated its 41st birthday on the very day the psc came into existence – shows, the institutional frameworks of African integration attempted over the last four decades or so were chronically underresourced and politically marginalized. Therefore, we need to ask whether the foundation of nepad and the au improves the chances of a new era dawning for the continent, or whether the well-known gap in Africa between great expectations and high-flown rhetoric on the one hand, and low capabilities and inertia on the other, can be narrowed. The main purpose of this article is to assess the progress nepad and the au have made since their foundation(in 2001 and 2002, respectively). Since a complete assessment of the many facets of both the au and nepad will not be possible, we shall focus on the process of institution- and 1. Quoted in Cape Times (May 26, 2004). 138 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

capacity-building within both organizations, which we regard as crucial for achieving their ambitious goals. Although there are many similarities between nepad and the au – both founding documents identify respect for human rights, democratic principles, good governance, and peace as essential preconditions for development – the institutional connections remained unclear at first. The au ’s decision in 2002 to adopt nepad as a development program subordinated nepad to the au . The competences and responsibilities of their various institutional branches are not yet clearly defined. Our general hypothesis is that both nepad and the au can be regarded as unprecedented developments in Africa, whether Sub-Saharan or North. They are continent-wide, indigenous initiatives providing the continent with a vision for Africa in the twenty-first century. However, realization of these ambitious projects is hampered by a general lack of resources, leading to weak institutions and insufficient capacities. From Nkrumah to Gaddafi: Short Overview of the History of Pan-Africanism As already mentioned, the Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah famously advocated a United States of Africa in 1963, only five years after the Treaty of Rome which gave birth to the European Economic Community had been signed. Nkrumah committed his country to becoming a state within a continental federation. Prominent in his vision was African and continental prestige, and unified armed forces that could liberate the settler and colonial regimes in Southern Africa. Not one other head of state got behind this initiative; they agreed to found only the Organization of African Unity( oau ). This, in both name and substance, was similar to the older Organization of American States. Its constitution emphasized sovereignty, meaning non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, with the sole exception of those under white rule. It was effectively a multilateral conference for heads of government, meeting only a few times a year. The organizing principle was clearly intergovernmental, and consensus was required to make decisions. A secretariat, which lacked powers of its own, serviced this executive-focused institution. From the 1970s, member governments one after another fell into financial distress and became unable to continue paying their contribution. The absence of resources in general and the lack of political will on the ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 139

part of many members weakened also the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which was established in 1993. Although the Mechanism led to a more active role for the oau in respect of election monitoring and(mostly) diplomatic conflict interventions, the organization failed to deal with the growing number of violent conflicts on the continent throughout the 1990s. In retrospect, the oau can be regarded as a child of its time, the era of decolonization: it made the principle of national sovereignty sacrosanct, guaranteed the borders of the newly independent states, and fought against the remaining colonies and apartheid South Africa. It soon became evident that the oau was unable to transform itself into an efficient organization capable of promoting peace and security in Africa. From a historical perspective the record of the oau was disappointing(El Ayouty, 1994). Its failure to address the core problems or to serve the interests of the African peoples led to it acquiring the widespread negative image of a»club of dictators« – as the Kenyan James Karioki called it in a recent article in the South African»Sunday Times« (May 25, 2004) – both among African intellectuals and in the Western hemisphere. This explains why many Africans perceive regional organizations more or less as paper tigers and mistrust the grandiose rhetoric of current African leaders. In 1999»Brother Leader« Gaddafi of Libya revived the essence of Nkrumah’s proposal for a United States of Africa with a continental federal constitution and unified armed forces. This met with the same immediate rejection by other presidents. This time, however, influential African leaders – including South African President Mbeki – seized the opportunity to lobby energetically to salvage as much as was practical. They proposed a synthesis of eu - and uno -type institutions and procedures, and won support from a majority of governments and at least acquiescence from the rest. 2 A New Beginning: The Birth of the African Union On July 8, 2002 the oau ceased to exist and the au was born at a summit in Durban. The basic principles and objectives of the au are laid down in 2. The only holdout was the Moroccan king: the Moroccan government boycotted the founding of the au in 2002 because the latter supported the right of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic to independence. 140 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

the Constitutive Act. 3 The scope of the oau ’s successor organization is broad: the au is devoted to the promotion of peace, security and stability, democracy, popular participation and good governance(Art. 3). Although the principle of non-interference in matters of state sovereignty is reaffirmed, in cases of genocide and war crimes it is henceforth possible for the au to intervene with all necessary means, including force. The Constitutive Act also states in Art. 30 that governments which seized power unconstitutionally, for instance as the result of a coup, cannot participate in au structures and will not be recognized. Most important of all, the au incorporates the Treaty of Abuja of 1991, which commits member states to work towards an African Economic Community( aec ). 4 Sovereignty, the core principle of the OAU, is not curtailed by supranational institutions but by the mode of decision-making. The institutions mirror ec / eu structures: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ, and the Executive Council consists of the foreign ministers or other ministers. The Committee of Permanent Representatives, the African Court of Justice, the Pan-African Parliament, the Commission and various advisory and technical bodies for social, economic and cultural matters complete the institutional framework. Compared with eu institutions, two main differences are important. First, the au Commission has only the function of a secretariat and so far has no powers of its own: it is not a supranational institution. Second, decisions by both the Executive Council and the Assembly can be made by a two-thirds majority. In contrast, the right of veto is a core element of the European Council, and in the Council of Ministers states still have a veto on many issues. On the one hand, the au regulations could increase its effectiveness by making possible quicker decisions than in the eu , where the search for consensus, often according to the lowest common denominator, is the daily reality. On the other hand, there is a danger that states will not sup3. See www.africa-union.org. 4. The au and aec advocate rationalizing the Regional Economic Communities ( rec s) into five, each of which should be strengthened to become free trade areas by 2011. These five main rec s are nominally scheduled to merge to form a continental single market by 2021. ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 141

port an au action when they are outvoted. This could lead to the paralysis of the organization in cases where bigger and more powerful states will not respect a decision against their interests and therefore abstain. Sovereignty, the core principle of the oau , is not curtailed by supranational institutions but by the mode of decision-making. The au Commission remains in Addis Ababa, the seat of the former oau . The agreement is that no more than one organ should be situated in any of the five African regions. This means that a distance vastly greater than the commuting time between Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg will separate the au ’s Parliament, Civil Service, and Court of Justice. In contrast to nepad the au has adopted the statutes of an Economic, Social and Cultural Council( ecosocc ) which is designed to be a forum for civil society. Its 150 members will consist of two from each of the 53 au member countries, 24 representatives from transnational organizations, and 20 representatives of the African diaspora. The selection procedure is not yet clear, except that 50 percent of the members should be women. One of the key problems facing the au is lack of financial resources. At the Summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004 the au calculated that it would need 1.7 billion us dollars to transform itself into an effective institution, but the organization is already in the red: only 12 million us dollars came in out of a budget of 43 million us dollars for 2003. Currently, South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, and Libya pay 40 percent of the au ’s annual budget. 5 Since many countries cannot or are not willing to pay for their membership the economically stronger states will have to contribute larger shares of their national budgets. They now propose a»solidarity fund« of approximately 0.5 percent of the national budget. The Constitutive Act also mentions briefly that a Pan-African Parliament( pap ) should be established, ensuring the participation of Africa’s peoples. Initially, it will meet twice a year. Currently, there is equal representation, with five mp s for each country – whether Nigeria or the Seychelles – resulting in a democratic inequality in terms of the value of each vote of more than 1000:1. The requirement of a two-thirds majority to 5. South Africa currently plays a crucial role in all regional institutions. The acceptance of South Africa’s leading role in African institutions by other African states cannot be taken for granted. There is also the danger of overstretching the capacities of South Africa and other leading African powers. This could hamper their ability and willingness to encourage the more reluctant African states with extra or side payments. 142 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

pass any bill or recommendation is an alternative way of protecting the interests of smaller countries. The pap ’s first task will be to lobby for national governments to derogate powers to it. After a transitional period of five years with only advisory and consultative powers the pap should evolve into an institution with full legislative powers. Article 11(1) and(4) indicate that oversight and strengthening of the regional and African Economic Community and possibly nepad could be early pap priorities. At the inauguration of the parliament in Addis Ababa in March 2004, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and former President of Mali Alpha Oumar Konoré stated that»human rights protection, consolidation of democratic institutions, popularization and promotion of good governance« 6 should be another focus of attention of the pap . However, when the pap starts its first working session in September 2004, and comes to deal with human rights or democracy issues, it will face the problem that many of its mp s are not democratically elected. It is therefore questionable whether the pap will be able to work properly as an advocate of the peoples of Africa. Even if the two initially envisaged functions of the pap – oversight over regional institutions, including nepad , and promoter of human rights, democracy, and good governance – turn out to be overambitious, the pap can function as a forum for discussion and the exchange of views for African leaders from over 40 countries, together with media and civil society groups which will lobby around the pap . Since, besides un institutions, there are few opportunities for African leaders to meet, this is also important, even if more modest than proponents of the pap would like. The Parliament will be situated at Midrand, close to Pretoria, the South African capital. It is characteristic of the political climate – not only in South Africa – that the public debate in South Africa immediately concentrated on the cost of the building. Since the au declared that the organization could not find the 18 million us dollars requested by the President of the pap , Gertrude Mongella of Tanzania, for operating costs, and funds pledged by the eu recently will not be sufficient, it is very likely that South Africa will have to finance the lion’s share of those costs. 6. pap opening speech, in New Agenda (14)(2004, 2nd quarter): 11–13. ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 143

The Peace and Security Dimension By ratifying the protocol 7 of the Constitutive Act of the au , the Peace and Security Council( psc ) of the African Union was established on May 25, 2004. The African leaders recognize that peace and security are, as Joaquim Chissano, outgoing chairman of the au , believes, indispensable conditions for Africa’s socio-economic development(Cape Times, May 26, 2004). According to Article 4 of the Protocol establishing the psc this institution has wide-ranging responsibilities for prevention, management, resolution of conflicts, and post-conflict peace building. The promotion of democracy, rule of law etc. are regarded as part of conflict prevention. Article 4 also states that the Assembly can – with a two-thirds majority, as already mentioned – decide to intervene»in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity«(Art. 4J). Furthermore, member states have the right to request intervention by the au , and sanctions against unconstitutional changes of government are made possible. In a longer perspective the au aims at a common defense policy. Decisionmaking should ideally be by consensus, but if consensus cannot be reached a decision can be made by a two-thirds majority of psc members (Art. 8). The birth of the psc means a reversal of one of the key principles of the oau , sovereignty: in the words of au Peace and Security Commissioner, Said Djinni,»we are replacing the principle of non-interference with the principle of no indifference«(Business Day, May 25, 2004). The psc is a permanent organ and will have 15 members, ten of which will serve for two years and five for three years to strengthen continuity. A chairperson, appointed on a monthly basis, will head the closed meetings. In March 2004 the au appointed South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, and Gabon – representing all five regions of Africa – to serve for three years. In contrast to the un Security Council there is no right of veto. The protocol states that the psc will be assisted by a»Panel of the Wise«, an advisory body of highly respected persons representing the different African regions who will be appointed by the Chairperson of the psc . In addition – and more important – a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and a Special Fund for Peace-Keeping Operations are to be created. The standby force should by 2010 consist of 15,000 soldiers deployed at five regional bases. 7. See http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm(July 10, 2004). 144 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

The psc is one of the most ambitious projects on the war-hit African continent, but at the moment it is ill equipped for its Herculean tasks. There is an overall lack of resources. Whereas the un has approximately 2.3 billion us dollars for peacekeeping – and even that is insufficient – the au had only six million us dollars in its Peace Fund in 2003. It is therefore no surprise that the most important current missions – in the Democratic Republic of Congo( drc ), Burundi, and Sudan – are underfinanced. Since the au could raise only 23 million euros out of the annual 123 million euros needed for the Burundi peacekeeping mission, the un had to take over the mission on the very same day the psc was launched(This Day, May 26, 2004). Despite its chronic lack of resources the au has already started to intervene in the drc and, most recently, in the Darfur conflict in Sudan. Reluctantly accepted by the Sudanese government, the au has sent 270 troops from four African countries to protect the 120 members of the au Ceasefire Monitoring Unit. This small force will not be capable of guaranteeing the security of the African population in the Darfur region, which is being attacked and murdered by militias supported, pogromstyle, by the Sudanese government. The attacks, which have been categorized as ethnic cleansing or even genocide, have not only killed around 30,000–50,000 villagers but have also created a severe humanitarian crisis with around one million refugees in camps. The au has declared that in case of ongoing violence the number of troops could be increased to 2,000. Although the au force is much too small and the organization is dependent on external airlift capacities, the intervention in Sudan marks an important departure from the oau ’s handling of such conflicts, which was characterized by inertia. The au commitment to the Sudan crisis includes also mediation efforts between the Sudanese rebels and the government, which started in July 2004. Although the ongoing missions are relatively small there is a danger of overstretching the military capacities of the members, especially South Africa, the country with the most resources in this respect; the country currently has 3,000 troops on peacekeeping missions, mainly in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo( drc ). Due to the necessary sixmonthly rotation of troops, health problems with malaria, and hiv infection, the South African Defense Forces( sadf ) are generally lacking in experienced troops. Internal criticism is mounting concerning the cost of foreign peacekeeping, particularly in light of the inadequate policing of the ongoing domestic crime wave and other mammoth social challenges. ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 145

The Reaction of the Donor Community The reaction of the donor community towards the au and, especially, the psc was cautiously optimistic. Most of the multi- and bilateral donors officially welcomed the au but expressed concerns about realization of this ambitious project. Ratification of the psc protocol and its subsequent implementation was regarded as a major step forward. The donor community regards the spread of conflicts during the 1990s as a major reason for Africa’s severe problems. Conflict prevention and management has therefore become one of the key priorities of the West. At the last summit, at Sea Island, Georgia, usa , the G-8 also made it clear that, in contrast to African leaders, they are not committed to nepad infrastructure projects. 8 Both the eu and the usa emphasize the importance of African ownership:»African solutions for African conflicts« is the guiding principle. The only exception was the European mission to Eastern Congo. This intervention, named Operation Artemis, was on a small scale and of a temporary character and the mission has since been handed over to the un . The last G-8 meeting pledged in the context of its Action Plan to finance the training and equipping of 75,000 peacekeepers, including police forces, up to 2010. The participating African leaders were requested by the G-8 to give detailed information concerning their logistic needs. The eu offered 250 million euros in support of African Peacekeeping in reaction to the founding of the psc . This amount would be enough to finance only two years of the Burundi mission. In contrast to the eu the us favors a bilateral approach. Most recently the us offered to equip and train two battalions of the sadf . Stronger and more comprehensive support for the new African institutions is not very likely as long as the au remains quiet about the ongoing violations of democratic principles and human rights, alongside economic meltdown(inflation is over 500 percent), in Zimbabwe. African institutions with a strong human rights and democracy rhetoric in this way lose credibility in the West. In addition, the so-called»quiet diplomacy« of South African President Thabo Mbeki has been sharply criticized by civil society representatives, opposition parties, and the media in Zimbabwe: 9 since no tangible results have been forthcoming the West 8.»G8 to nepad : Brigades Not Bridges«, This Day (the new South African daily newspaper funded by a Nigerian business group)(June 16, 2004). 9. See for a critical discussion of Mbeki’s position Olivier(2003). 146 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

perceives it as a failure. The situation in Zimbabwe has not been on the agenda of the au so far. Indeed, the organization is trying to avoid any discussion 10 since this could lead to conflict within it; in any case, Zimbabwe could react by simply withdrawing from the au . At the last au summit in Addis Ababa the organization seemed to take the first steps to alter its position on Zimbabwe. At the summit the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights handed to the African Union Executive Council a report condemning human rights violations in Zimbabwe and criticizing the government for harassment of members of the opposition. The government of Zimbabwe will have to respond to the report soon, at the latest within six months. Although the Zimbabwean government was able to prevent the report from being published and discussed at the meeting, developments could make it possible for Thabo Mbeki to alter his policy without losing the support of other African leaders. 11 As long as the AU continues more or less to ignore the situation in Zimbabwe and to turn a blind eye to the human rights abuses of other member states, the West will be reluctant to increase support for the new institutions. It is characteristic of the diplomatic style at au summits that, despite the human rights and democracy rhetoric, it was left to un General Secretary Kofi Annan to speak out clearly against long-standing dictators. Annan said that the»days of indefinite one-man or one-party governments are behind us«, and continued that African leaders should know »when to pass the torch to a new generation«(This Day, July 7, 2004). His speech, which avoided naming names, can be interpreted as a critique of such long-standing dictators as Omar Bongo in Gabon or Togo’s President Eyadema, both of whom had been in power for 37 years by 2004. As long as the au continues more or less to ignore the situation in Zimbabwe and to turn a blind eye to the human rights abuses of other 10. The donor community’s common position is that a clear statement condemning the government of Zimbabwe from the au and nepad is necessary. However, the question of more sanctions remains very controversial among Western countries. 11. Robert Mugabe still enjoys much respect in Africa, particularly South Africa, partly because of his role in the struggle against apartheid. ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 147

member states, the West will be reluctant to increase support for the new institutions. The same goes for nepad , as a development program based explicitly on the principles of democracy and human rights. An African Development Strategy: The NEPAD Program The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, nepad , was born on October 23, 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria. Its progenitors had been different initiatives from Senegal, Algeria, South Africa, and Nigeria, which were now fused into one program. At the outset nepad had been an initiative of a few powerful African heads of state. The long and detailed founding document 12 gives the impression of an extensive shopping list since nearly all aspects of development are tackled: for instance, a list of sectoral priorities is given and the prevention and management of conflicts are prominent. nepad urges governments to plan to attract foreign investment of 64 billion us dollars per year, while also mobilizing local capital. Furthermore, it urges priority should be given to building a continental infrastructure of transport, ict , energy, and water. 13 Renewed investment in Africa would end the continent’s marginalization and reintegrate Africa into the globalized world(Schmidt, 2003). Objectives are a seven percent annual growth rate, a four percent share in world trade and – as foreseen in the un Millennium goals – a reduction of poverty by half by 2015. nepad can be interpreted as a comprehensive program addressing most of the impediments to Africa’s development. 14 The economic and developmental goals seem to be over-ambitious. Set against the current state of African economies they seem unrealistic or even utopian. Similar to the un Millennium goal of reducing poverty by half by 2015 the nepad aims must be understood as a political com12. The document can be downloaded from www.nepad.org. 13. nepad prioritized as its first economic project»Grand Inga«. This is a four-decadeold engineering project to build on the Congo River the world’s largest hydro-electric power station, delivering energy through a continental grid. Should nepad persuade the corporate sector to build and operate this, it would be the single largest business opportunity for the world’s energy industry. The same can be said of proposals to construct pan-African tarred highways from Dakar to Djibouti, and from the Cape to Cairo. 14. The document remains brief and vague on two of the most burning issues in Southern Africa: hiv / aids and the land question. 148 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

mitment. The danger of both nepad and the un is that expectations will be high and disappointment with results could negatively affect support. A new feature of the document is that it advocates a new partnership with the more developed world, but also stresses Africa’s responsibility for development. Although colonialism, unfair trade practices, or, more recently, globalization are identified as reasons for Africa’s poor state of development nepad also recognizes that»failures of political and economic leadership in many African countries« have also impeded development( nepad , 2001: 13). The will to take the fate of Africa into its own hands and self-criticism make nepad an exceptional document. Another major achievement of the nepad document is that it identifies respect for human rights, democratic principles, good governance, and peace as essential preconditions for development. These principles, together with economic good governance, will be assessed by the African Peer Review Mechanism( aprm ). The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) The most innovative element 15 of nepad is the aprm . It is described by nepad as a voluntary self-monitoring system for au member states to ensure that policies and practices are in line with the principles agreed in the nepad document. 16 A team of five to seven eminent persons from African countries conducts the country review. The apr Forum, consisting of the heads of state and government of participating states, is the highest aprm institution. It is currently not identical with the nepad Heads of States and the Government Implementation Committee since not all states have signed the aprm document. Additional institutions are the Panel of Eminent Persons with oversight functions over the whole process and the secretariat providing technical support. 17 In August 2004 the following 24 states had ratified the aprm : Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo(Brazzaville), Egypt, 15. The concept of peer review has a long history and is practiced by other international organizations, for example, the oecd (see Pagani, 2002). 16. To be more precise: the aprm checks commitments made by participating countries which have ratified the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative. 17. See for more details Cilliers(2003). Currently, the Eminent Persons review panel is chaired by the Senegalese activist and former un official Angelique Savane and includes Chris Stals, former South African Reserve Bank Governor, and Graca Machel, former education minister of Mozambique and wife of Nelson Mandela. ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 149

Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The member countries are highly heterogeneous with respect to their social, economic, and political situations and performances. With the notable exception of Botswana, the vanguard of democracy in Africa – Benin, Ghana, Kenya(since 2002), Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa – are members. The other members are mostly authoritarian states(for example, Ethiopia) or semi-authoritarian states(for example, Egypt). Political instability still prevails in Algeria, Sierra Leone, Congo, and, to a certain extent, Rwanda. The review mechanism unfolds in five stages: 18 1. A report based on documentation prepared by the aprm secretariat and various regional and international organizations is drafted and circulated. In response to this report the government of the country under review produces an action plan. 2. The aprm team visits the country and conducts background interviews with government officials, representatives of civil society, and political parties. It checks whether the action plan addresses the main challenges. 3. A draft report is discussed with the government of the country under review and its responses integrated into the report. 4. The report is handed over to different aprm institutions and finally discussed by the Heads of State and Government. 5. Six months later the report is discussed in au forums, such as the PanAfrican Parliament. With respect to the findings of the aprm team, two scenarios are most likely: if the government under review is willing to reform, nepad promises assistance and will also urge donor agencies and countries for support. If a government refuses to change, a dialogue is begun, but it is left open whether more pressure will follow. The absence of explicit punitive mechanisms for governments violating the nepad principles gives the impression of a»velvet« mechanism. Mainly African proponents of nepad stress that the aim is a non-adversarial and collegial process, but 18. nepad distinguishes between four types of review; country review within 18 months of a country becoming member of the aprm ; periodic reviews every two to four years; review at the request of a country; crisis review. This article focuses only on the first type; the other types have not been elaborated further by nepad . 150 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

should stipulate learning. This approach, as is often argued, is more in line with the African tradition of dialogue. This understanding of the aprm differs vastly from that prevailing among donor countries, which perceive the mechanism as an instrument for enforcing good governance (see below). The aprm focuses on four areas: 1. democracy and political governance; 2. economic governance and management; 3. corporate governance; 4. socio-economic development. The review of democracy and political governance 19 (which includes human rights issues) will be oriented towards the various documents of the African institutions, treaties such as the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and various oau documents signed by countries under review. 20 The indicators developed by nepad therefore refer to different standards, which are codified in the various documents and formulated in the form of a set of questions or»indicative indicators«. This checklist approach is a method widely used to assess the state of democracy and good governance. Although the detailed list of indicators is impressive, no weightings or scales which would allow clear judgment are given. This is in marked contrast to most international comparative assessments and rankings which use qualitative(for example,»fully or nearly realized«, and so on) or quantitative(numerical), or a combination of both methods of judgment. 21 Indeed, it is questionable whether African politicians are really interested in receiving comprehensive and clear indicators and a final positive or negative judgment. If such criteria were available this could reduce the willingness to submit to review; it could also curtail the political leverage of the institutions. In the wake of several nepad and au meetings over the last two years the Heads of State and Government agreed at a high-level meeting that the aprm process on democracy and political governance would be guided and supervised by au institutions. In contrast, the review of economic and corporate governance and development practices will be re19. See nepad ,»Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the aprm ,«(March 9, 2004) download: http://www.nepad.org/documents/110.pdf,(downloaded July 13, 2004). 20.Some of the documents mentioned are problematic since their definitions are often very vague. 21. See the recently released Bertelsmann Transformation Index, for instance, which used both qualitative and quantitative indicators and measures of economic and political governance and performance(www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de). ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 151

viewed by the nepad secretariat until appropriate au institutions have been created. For the review of the three non-political – or less political – aprm dimensions, nepad will borrow technical expertise from international organizations with oversight experience. In the longer term, it is envisaged by the au that the nepad secretariat should be absorbed into the Commission of the African Union(Cilliers, 2003: 12). The political dimension of the aprm therefore relies to a large extent on institutions that are not yet in place, or on existing but weak au institutions – such as the Pan-African Parliament – which are in the process of establishment and will need years before they are fully effective(Cilliers, 2003: 8). It is difficult to imagine how the complex aprm process can work smoothly under these unfavorable institutional conditions. Besides the unfinished institutional structure the lack of resources is another obstacle: for instance, the nepad secretariat, modestly staffed with only 47 persons, was made only possible because a nepad Business Group seconded corporate staff to it. Whereas reviews as such will not require substantial resources the reforms recommended by the review team will depend largely on external funding. In June 2004, after months of delay, the first review panel under the leadership of Chris Stals started in Ghana. Besides Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, and Rwanda are under review in 2004. After the reviews have been completed and the results published in December 2004 a second group of states, including South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Benin, will be reviewed in 2005. Reactions and Critique nepad has been criticized from different angles. From the political left it has been repeatedly argued that the project has»sold out« Africa to neoliberal market ideology. Others criticize nepad for its lack of a coherent strategy and central leadership. Another perspective views nepad as a top-down process, initiated by the Heads of State and Government without prior consultation of civil society(Keet, 2003). An innovation to broaden nepad beyond an inter-governmental organization are the two nepad business groups. 22 One is based around Nigerian corporations, the other around South African companies. These are now increasingly coordinating their activities. 22. See www.isupportafrica.com/nepad/index.htm. 152 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

However, the exclusion of civil society since nepad was launched in 2001 continues. Repeatedly, leaders of the South African trade unions and the South African National Civic Organization( sanco ) have demanded inclusion in nepad and aprm structures. On the side of the donor countries and international institutions, the initial reaction to nepad was very positive, sometimes enthusiastic. The German government even appointed a special nepad representative in the Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development( bmz ). The donor countries and the G-8 welcomed nepad as an indigenous African initiative with the potential to cure the continent’s chief ills. The aprm mechanism received most attention. In contrast to vague statements from African leaders about possible consequences of the aprm , the donor community has already announced it will link aprm outcomes to the further disbursement of aid. The aprm reviews will therefore become an element of donor conditionality(practiced since the early 1990s). This is also recognized by nepad itself. The Chairperson of nepad , economics professor Wiseman Nkhulu, stressed at the launch of the African Investment Initiative in November 2003 that investors and donors in general would penalize states with a poor human rights record and extensive corruption(This Day, November 20, 2003). This expected punitive reaction by the donor community is probably one reason why African leaders do not see the necessity of sanctions in case of a negative review outcome. Meanwhile, a more realistic view of NEPAD and sometimes even disappointment have characterized the views of donors. nepad ’s greatest success so far is to have put Africa high on the international agenda. G-8 meetings have always had a strong focus on Africa since the birth of nepad . The G-8 leaders regularly discuss the situation in Africa with African leaders and pledge support. Six African leaders, including Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, were invited to the last summit in Sea Island in June 2004. Although not all promises for increased aid have been kept, the financial support from developed countries increased between 2000 and 2002, from roughly 16 billion us dollars to 18.6 billion(Cape Times, February 18, 2004). In contrast to the reluctance of most bilateral donors, international agencies are willing to fund nepad projects. The World Bank alone has pledged over 500 million us dollars for each of nepad ’s agricultural and infrastructural programs. ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 153

Complaints from many African intellectuals about the reluctance of donors to support nepad more vigorously and nepad ’s failure to attract more support are misleading. Budget constraints in many European countries, such as Germany and France, and a general perception of Africa as a»lost continent« where aid fails to achieve results, lead to donor fatigue and reduce the ability and will to increase development aid. It is a major success of nepad to keep Africa on the international agenda and even attract additional funds. Meanwhile, a more realistic view of nepad and sometimes even disappointment have characterized the views of donors. There are at least two reasons for this change in perception. First, the unwillingness of nepad – like the au – to deal with the human rights violations and the disregard for democratic principles in Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe was not made the»litmus test« of nepad ’s stance towards democracy and human rights, nepad ’s inertia was widely perceived as wrong. The second and main reason for skepticism was the decision by the Heads of State and Government to give au institutions responsibility over the political dimension of the aprm , while nepad retained responsibility only over economic governance(Cilliers, 2003: 2). Due to the historical experience with the oau and the strong position of Gaddafi in the au , the decision was seen as watering down the aprm . The donor community was particularly afraid that the aprm would face a similar fate as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and become a »toothless tiger«. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, based in Banjul(The Gambia) remained ineffective due to the lack of political support from some heads of state and government. Many states did not even send reports to the Commission. Between the drafting of the nepad core document and 2003, nepad stagnated and the donor community’s attention shifted more to the au and security issues. It was not only the donor community which became more and more disappointed and impatient with nepad ; strong opposition came from within nepad , from the business community. Open criticism from the business side was articulated at the au Maputo summit in May 2004 towards the au ’s handling of the aprm . The nepad business group, chaired by the chairman of South Africa’s electricity giant eskom , Reuel Khoza, stated that business»would be much happier with the mechanism being a little more robust«(Business Day, May 31, 2004). In various statements members of the nepad business group have publicly criticized the aprm as toothless and pointed to the lack of clear indicators. 154 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

They even threatened the au that they would introduce their own rating system in parallel with the aprm . Against the mounting criticism both from donors and from the business sector the au summit»expressed concern at the slow pace of implementing nepad ’s aprm «(Cape Times, May 24, 2004). The support of the donor and business communities strongly depends on the results of reviews and possible consequences. In case of negative findings the willingness of the relevant government to change its policy will be decisive for external support. If a government refuses to introduce reforms most likely it will face a reduction of external aid and also(informal) market sanctions because private investors would shy away from it. In some cases, especially when countries do not have significant mineral or agricultural resources for export, the exclusion or isolation of these countries could result. In contrast, countries with a positive review would most likely be»rewarded« by increased aid and stronger political support. The reviews could also create a dilemma for nepad in general: on the one hand, it is possible that clear results and recommendations, especially in case of a negative review, would dampen the willingness of countries to be reviewed; on the other hand, soft, ineffective, or meaningless reviews will undermine the credibility of nepad and the au . In the long run, the aprm could contribute to enhancing the emerging dividing line between good performers/willing reformers and bad performers/reform-averse states. Prospects for Ambitious Projects Undertaken by Weak States The quest for African unity reached an unprecedented height with the founding of nepad , the aec , and the au . Measured by their own goals and timetables, nepad and the au are by far Africa’s most ambitious program to date. After two years of stagnation the continent-wide projects, by establishing a system of new institutions, reintroduced a dynamic element. Compared with the process of European integration this has taken place extremely quickly. The greatest progress has been made with respect to the pap and the psc , which should become the core element of Africa’s future security architecture. Most recently, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights was founded after 15 states signed the protocol in January 2004. In contrast to large phases of European integration, which followed the neo-functionalist path which can be simplified as ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 155

»form follows function«, the recent efforts for African integration fit into the federal model of integration, or»function follows form«: the African Heads of State and Government have signed new and far-reaching treaties creating an impressive legal and institutional framework, and this framework must be filled with concrete projects, deepening integration. Compared to 1963, the situation is much more favorable for continental organizations. First, many African leaders show a real commitment to development, human rights, and democracy. Second, changes on the African continent, such as a stronger civil society in many countries, ict , professional organizations, and networks in the corporate world, such as the Association of African Stock Exchanges, have intensified the ties between African states. Third, South Africa, which was a pariah state in 1963, became, together with other important states and regional hegemons such as Nigeria, a driving force for regional integration from the end of the 1990s. It is too early to say how effective the au institutions will be since they are still being operationalized, but set against the checkered record of the oau , the divergent interests of the members, and an overall lack of resources, it remains at least doubtful whether the ambitious plans, programs, and schedules are realistic: 1. The basis for regional and continent-wide integration remains small. Protectionism, structural imbalances between states, and the minor importance of interregional trade – which made up less than 11 percent of the total – call into question the benefits of further economic integration. However, systematic lowering of both customs duties and non-tariff barriers to create broader markets, linked by improved roads, will indisputably increase cross-border trade. 2. There is a confusing proliferation of institutions, set up by mostly weak(in terms of economic performance and political stability) states. The new Pan-African executive, legislative, and judicial organs face immense challenges. They are chronically underfunded and understaffed, and their capacities are therefore low. Only where countries with both the political will and funds to substantially subsidize them host institutions – such as the Pan-African Parliament – can we be confident that they will deliver, and deliver largely on schedule. 3. Besides the problem of scarce resources the duties and responsibilities of the various institutions overlap or remain vague, as in the case of the aprm . The interlocking of these institutions is another challenge facing African unity(van Nieuwwkerk, 2004). 156 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004

4. Until recently, civil society was to a large extent excluded. This is hard to understand since the aims of most groups, particularly in respect of democracy and human rights, are very similar to nepad ’s and the au ’s. Civil society could popularize the projects, strengthen societal support, and provide legitimacy. This is necessary since, except in countries that can be regarded as the driving forces behind nepad and the au – especially South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal – the institutions are not well known, even in intellectual circles. 23 5. Most decisive for the fate of the ambitious nepad and au projects will be the political will and commitment of African states for further integration, which will reduce their sovereignty. The mechanisms installed by nepad and the au – especially the abandonment of a veto in the psc – mean that African leaders have»slaughtered a holy cow«, the principle of sovereignty. This is a marked departure from the past, a revolution in thinking. The major question is, how committed, how serious are African leaders with regard to their self-proclaimed goals? One should not be too optimistic about the common political will since there are vast differences and often even distrust between the governments. If nepad and au principles in the field of political and economic governance are taken seriously, major conflicts within the institutions – for example, between democratically governed and authoritarian states – can hardly be avoided. There is the danger of the au becoming a charade. 6. The international credibility of and domestic confidence in the newly established organizations could be damaged by the fact that many of the 28 countries which have ratified the psc protocol – for example, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Cameroon, and Libya – do not meet the basic principles of the au , such as democracy, human rights, and good governance. It is difficult to see how those countries will guarantee respect for au principles once elected as members of the psc (Cilliers and Sturman, 2004: 100). The donor community reacted positively and pledged support for both nepad and the au . However, the financial support is focused in one area, namely security. In general, a wait-and-see attitude, especially with re23. Compare the results of the only existing survey on»African Elite Perspectives« regarding au and nepad , covering seven countries. According to this survey even African elites are skeptical about the positive impact of the aprm on governance in Africa(Kotzé and Steyn, 2003: 112). ipg 4/2004 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? 157

spect to the handling of the Zimbabwe crisis and the outcomes and consequences of the aprm , prevails. Against the background of historical experiences with the oau donor pessimism is understandable in the face of such high-flown, ambitious, even utopian aims as a single market and a single currency by 2021. On the other hand, there is also the danger that the donor community could miss an unprecedented window of opportunity since the chances for African unity have never been as good as today. No other regional community of the developing world ever sought to strengthen and democratize itself by founding continental legislatures and courts of human rights. Even the North American Free Trade Area ( nafta ) would not consider that. If the au succeeds it will be second in the whole world after the eu and immensely accelerate democracy and development in Africa. Bibliography Cilliers, Jakkie. 2003. A Guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism . Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Cilliers, Jakkie, and Kathryn Sturman. 2004.»Challenges Facing the au ’s Peace and Security Council«, in African Security Review, 13(1): 97–104. El-Ayouty, Yassin(ed.). 1994. The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years. Westport: Praeger. Keet, Dot. 2003.» nepad and the African Union«, New Agenda, no. 9: 112–33. Kotzé, Hennie, and Carly Steyn. 2003. African Elite Perspectives: au and nepad , Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer Foundation Occasional Papers. Mistry, Perey S. 2000.»Africa’s Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration«, African Affairs, 91(397): 533–52. New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Basic Document(Oct. 2001), http://www. nepad.org. Olivier, Gerrit. 2003.»Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?«, International Affairs, 79(4): 815–28. Pagani, Fabricio. 2002.»Peer Review as a Tool for Co-operation and Change,« African Security Review, 11(4): 15–24. Schmidt, Siegmar. 2003.»Afrika – ein marginaler Kontinent? Die Globalisierung aus afrikanischer Perspektive,« in J. Betz and S. Brüne(eds.), Neues Jahrbuch Dritte Welt. Globalisierung und Entwicklungsländer, Opladen, pp. 87–100. Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. 2004.»The Role of the au and nepad in Africa’s New Security Regime«, in Shannon Field(ed.), Peace in Africa. Towards a Collaborative Security Regime, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, pp. 41–61. 158 Gottschalk/Schmidt, Strong Institutions for Weak States? ipg 4/2004