DEBATTE/ DEBATE Ten Years of the WTO: A Success Story of Global Governance MIKE MOORE T his year the World Trade Organization celebrates its 10th year of existence. That celebration is also an opportunity to review and evaluate its place, progress and evolution. The wto is unique among the international institutions and plays a vital role in the international architecture. The wto is at the center of the debate about democracy because of its successes, not its failures. More and more countries want to participate. More and more people recognize that the wto matters. More actors – businesses, trade unions, church groups, environmentalists, development ngo s – want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and their concerns. The wto is not a»global government«; but it is a key forum in which governments cooperate globally. It is not a»world democracy« – in the sense of being a government of the world’s people – but it is the most democratic international body in existence today. It provides an answer to perhaps the central political question of our time, concerning how to manage a globalizing world when democracy remains rooted in the nation-state. In a way, the wto – together with an expanding web of other global treaties and agreements – is more interesting than a new layer of government. From trade to the environment, human rights to war crimes, the world is moving towards rules, not power, towards persuasion, not coercion – a world of mutual respect, rights, and freedoms. Institutions for a»Free World« This looks like a brave new world, but its roots can be traced back over half a century. The generation that emerged from the devastation of the Second World War pledged»never again.« They dreamed of creating a new kind of global order based on common and universal values – of law, cooperation, shared prosperity, and individual rights. They launched the Marshall Plan, in which for the first time in modern history the victors rebuilt their former enemies – the opposite of what had happened under 12 Moore, WTO: A Success Story ipg 2/2005

the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles. They created a constellation of international institutions that, half a century later, are the bedrock of our global order today: the un , the International Monetary Fund( imf ), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade( gatt ), now the wto . This system was the embodiment of a revolutionary idea: that freedom – free democracies, free markets, the free co-existence of nations and peoples – was the surest guarantee of peace, and that a free world could, in turn, only be built on the foundations of the international rule of law. It is sometimes easy to forget – when even the Cold War is a fading memory – how spectacularly successful that idea has been. The United Nations Development Programme( undp ) reminds us that poverty has been reduced more in the past 50 years than in the previous 500. Life expectancy in the developing world has risen by over 20 years, and living standards by 190 percent. Literacy is up 34 percent in China, 33 percent in India, 39 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 41 percent in North Africa. In the first half of the 20th century, there were but a handful of democracies, and the future seemed a contest between the twin totalitarianisms of fascism and communism. By the century’s end, 120 of the 192 governments in the world were electoral democracies. Never before in human history have so many people enjoyed the freedom of the market-place and the ballot box. The existing system of international rules is not alone responsible for this world-wide march of freedom. But the promise of a»free world« would be inconceivable without it. The debate about democracy and the international system is to be welcomed and encouraged. This is particularly true at a time when a national government cannot ensure clean air and a clean environment, run an airline, organize a tax system, attack organized crime, solve the plagues of our age – aids , poverty, genocide – without the cooperation of other governments and international institutions. The threat to democracy is not debate, but silence and complacency, the indifference and ennui that come with familiarity. The value of the protests in Seattle, Prague, Washington, and Genoa is that they have awakened us from our complacency and ignited a much needed debate. They have forced the world to look anew at 50-year-old institutions, not only to examine what might be wrong, but to remind us of what is right – and what is enduring. ipg 2/2005 Moore, WTO: A Success Story 13

The Myth of the Democratic Deficit There is no meaningful»democratic deficit« in the wto unless one takes the position that governments do not legitimately represent their citizens and their interests. Some argue just that. Many ngo s claim a right of direct participation in the decisions of the wto and other international bodies. They have the right to a voice but not a vote. Some even propose a new»democratic« international order in which ngo s would offer an alternative form of representation in competition with governments. Others go further still. They would have us treat the world as if it were a nation state writ large. There would be world elections to a world parliament and even a world government – exercising the kind of sovereign powers now reserved for nation states. Every citizen – not just every nation – could have a vote. This is not a new idea. Generations of idealists have dreamed of Alfred Lord Tennyson’s»Parliament of Man.« The claim that the World Trade Organization is»undemocratic« starts from a basic fallacy. The WTO is not imposed on countries. Countries choose to belong to the WTO. Dream on. The international community is manifestly not ready for world government. Hopefully it never will be. Anyway, it is not going to happen. Who are»we the people« in a world where pride in culture and nation is so strong, and where shared global identity is so weak? Who represents a world electorate? Does anyone really believe that a body politic exists at the global level with a strong enough sense of community that it could legitimize decisions and the exercise of power based on world majority opinion? It does not exist. The philosopher Leo Strauss predicted that the»universal and homogenous state« would be a tyranny. Too many countries, cultures, and peoples would see world government as just that – a thinly veiled disguise for imperialism, neo-colonialism, more a tyranny than a democracy. The claim that the World Trade Organization is »undemocratic« starts from a basic fallacy. The wto is not imposed on countries. Countries choose to belong to the wto . No one is told to join. No one is forced to sign our agreements. Each and every one of the wto ’s rules is negotiated by member governments, agreed by consensus, and ratified by parliaments. Countries choose to participate in an open, rulesbased multilateral trading system for the simple reason that it is over14 Moore, WTO: A Success Story ipg 2/2005

whelmingly in their interest to do so. The wto has also introduced mechanisms to involve parliamentarians, and to bring to Geneva for briefings officials from the many poor and small countries that cannot afford representation in Geneva. Something no other international agency had tried. The alternative is a less open, less prosperous, more uncertain world economy – an option few countries would willingly choose. Principles of Equality The expansion of the multilateral trading system is remarkable. It began with just 23 members in 1947. The wto now has nearly 150 members – including, recently, China and Chinese Taipei – and this number could easily reach 170 or more within a decade. This also explains why members have repeatedly agreed to widen and deepen the system’s body of rules. The multilateral trading system was initially concerned mainly with trade in goods, and it was based not on a permanent organization but on a provisional treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade( gatt ). By the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the system contained sweeping new rules for services, intellectual property, subsidies, textiles, and agriculture. It was also established on a firm institutional foundation: the new wto , with a strengthened mechanism for settling disputes. And there is no sign that the system has stopped moving forward. The most recent Round, launched in Doha in November 2001, has development issues at its center. No other international body oversees rules that extend so widely around the world, or so deeply into the fabric of economies. At the same time, no other body is as directly run by member governments, or as firmly rooted in consensus decision-making and collective rule. The multilateral trading system works precisely because it is based on persuasion, not coercion – rules, not force. Two principles underpin the equal rights of wto members. One is the principle of non-discrimination . The wto treats all members alike, be they rich or poor, big or small, strong or weak. The same rules apply to everyone, even the world’s largest and most powerful economies. Central among these rules is(i) the»most-favored nation« obligation which prevents wto members from discriminating between foreign goods, or treating products from one wto member as better than those from another one, and(ii) the»national treatment« rule which obliges governments to treat foreign and domestically-produced products equally. ipg 2/2005 Moore, WTO: A Success Story 15

The most-favored-nation( mfn ) obligation is embodied in Article I of the gatt , Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in Services( gats ), and Article 4 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights( trips ). Some exceptions are allowed to mfn . For example, under gatt Article XXII countries within a region can set up a free trade agreement that does not apply to goods from outside the group. Or a country can raise barriers against products from specific countries that are considered to be traded unfairly. And in services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to discriminate. But the agreement only permits these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, mfn means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners – whether rich or poor, strong or weak. Non-discrimination has been key to the multilateral trading system’s success. Preferential trade blocs and alliances, by definition, exclude and marginalize non-member countries. This not only hurts the countries themselves, but can be harmful for the system as a whole. It is widely accepted that competition and conflict amongst trade blocs in the interwar years was a major cause of global instability – paving the way for a descending spiral of tit-for-tat protectionism, economic depression, and ultimately world war. The multilateral trading system – based on a uniform set of international rules under which all countries are treated equally – was designed precisely to avoid a world of inward-looking trade blocs and self-destructive factionalism. From a national perspective, the principle of non-discrimination has also allowed countries to liberalize their economies and integrate into the world trading system at their own pace. mfn and National Treatment do not demand»harmonization« towards universal norms or rules. On the contrary, these rules were designed precisely to allow countries to maintain their own policy »space,« to set their own standards and priorities, as long as all economic actors – foreign and domestic – are treated equally. Non-discrimination has provided the essential underpinning for the huge expansion of global trade over the past half century, and for the broad political consensus to move the system forward into new sectors and wider responsibilities. Non-discrimination has also enshrined universality as a central objective of the trading system. It is certainly one major reason why the gatt / wto system has emerged, especially after the Cold War, as a major force for integrating developing and transition countries into the world economy. 16 Moore, WTO: A Success Story ipg 2/2005

Equally central to the multilateral trading system is the principle of consensus decision-making . Unlike other international agencies, the wto has no executive body with delegated authority to take decisions on behalf of member governments. The small wto Secretariat has only limited independent authority and initiative-taking rights, but no grants or loans to hand out, no licenses to issue, and no influence over individual countries’ policies(although technical advice is offered, and some analytical comments are provided in regular trade policy reviews). In short, the wto does not tell governments what to do. Governments tell the wto . Each wto member has equal rights and an equal vote under the agreements. Because no decision is taken unless all member governments agree, effectively every country – from the largest to the smallest – has the power of veto. Even the enforcement of rules is undertaken by the members themselves under agreed procedures that they negotiated. Sometimes enforcement includes the threat of sanctions. But those sanctions are imposed by members, not by the organization. Challenges to the WTO System This is not to say that the workings of the wto are perfect. Far from it. One problem is that the system continues to rely on major new negotiating rounds – and»package« deals – to create new rules or to clarify existing ones. This means that reforms to the system occur episodically and infrequently. Seven years elapsed between the end of the Tokyo Round and the beginning of the Uruguay Round; eight years between the Uruguay Round’s completion and the launch of the Doha Development Agenda in November 2001. And the Uruguay Round itself spanned eight years from beginning to end. One reason for the successful launch of the Doha Round was a series of important reforms to wto decision-making processes since the failed launch of negotiations at the Seattle Ministerial in 1999. In Geneva, thousands of hours were spent in plenary discussions and in meetings of heads of delegations. Every issue and every national position had been fully aired and explored before Doha. At the Conference itself, every effort was made to keep ministers and delegations fully involved in the negotiations. When more limited – or»green room« – meetings were held they typically involved more and a wider representation of countries than the whole of the original gatt . At all times developing countries were in the majority. The transparency and inclusiveness ipg 2/2005 Moore, WTO: A Success Story 17

– which is to say, the»legitimacy« – of the process help to explain why member governments were more prepared and more willing to reach agreement. The Advisory Center for WTO Law marks the first time that a true legal aid center has been established within the international legal system, with a view to combating the unequal possibilities of access to international justice between states. Another challenge is that not all governments are equipped to participate in wto processes as effectively as they would like – certain least-developed and small countries cannot even afford to maintain offices in Geneva. The scope, complexity, and value of the wto ’s legal system continues to expand. Much of the controversy about implementation of Uruguay Round commitments stemmed from the human and resource constraints faced by developing countries in adapting legislation to new obligations and building the infrastructure needed to implement them. That is why an increasingly important function of the wto is technical assistance and capacity building – helping transitional, developing and least-developed countries to integrate into the multilateral trading system and to participate fully in negotiations. One key objective is to empower officials to better identify their negotiating objectives and to analyse the many proposals that will be forthcoming from other partners. Many of these activities are organized jointly with other international organizations, as a way of achieving a more»coherent« approach to global economy policy-making and development. A sign of confidence in my time as Director General was a 300 percent increase in capacity-building programs; and this at a time when other agencies had their budgets cut. Another goal is to help member governments make better use of dispute settlement. The wto has expanded the rules of international trade manifold compared to the gatt , and has created a new dispute settlement system – a»world trade court« – with a possibility of appeal. Legal advice in trade matters is expensive, thus creating potential problems of access to justice for developing countries. To help redress this imbalance the Advisory Center for wto Law was opened in October 2001. It marks the start of a true legal aid center on an international scale. Individuals appearing as defendants before War Crimes Tribunals have always been able to call upon pro bono legal aid. The International Court of Justice has a 18 Moore, WTO: A Success Story ipg 2/2005

small fund out of which costs of legal assistance can be paid for countries who need such help. But the Advisory Center for wto Law marks the first time that a true legal aid center has been established within the international legal system, with a view to combating the unequal possibilities of access to international justice between states. Cooperation and Consensus: Achievements Not to Be Forgone The fact remains that the multilateral trading system – for all its imperfections – gives even the smallest and poorest countries far greater leverage and security than they would ever have outside the system. Multilateral negotiations allow weaker countries to pool their collective influence and interests – as opposed to bilateral or even regional negotiations in which they have virtually no negotiating clout. In the same way, a system which replaces the role of»power« in international trade relations with the»rule of law« is invariably to the advantage of the smallest and weakest countries. The alternative is no rules and no impartial dispute settlement – a world where commercial relations are based on economic and political power alone, where small countries are at the mercy of the largest. It is an article of faith among opponents of the wto that the system is »undemocratic.« The irony is that many of the things they do not like about the wto stem from too much democracy, not too little. They want the wto to force open markets, strengthen labor standards, protect animal rights, preserve the environment, watch over indigenous peoples, save the developing world from capitalism, and a lengthening list of other goals – even when these goals are resisted by sovereign countries. They grasp that the dispute settlement system, and its threat of trade sanctions, gives the wto unique power to impose policies on recalcitrant governments – if only the wto could be made to exercise those powers. Some argue that consensus rule-making should be reconsidered because reaching agreement among nearly 150 governments is simply too slow, cumbersome,»bureaucratic.« Since every member effectively has a veto, it is claimed that the wto can only move at the speed of its slowest or most obstinate member – which is too slow for a fast-globalizing world. Still others suggest that the issues now facing the wto are too complex to be effectively debated and decided upon by all of its member governments acting as a»committee of the whole.« As one trade expert puts it,»mass membership simply does not lend itself to operational efipg 2/2005 Moore, WTO: A Success Story 19

ficiency or serious policy discussion.« This is why proposals for the creation of a smaller executive body – like the World Bank’s Development Committee or even the un ’s Security Council – are heard from time to time. But the more fundamental argument is political. The fact is that on certain issues international consensus simply does not exist. The rationale for circumventing consensus – through executive powers, weighted voting, trade sanctions – is basically that objectives which cannot be reached through persuasion should be reached through coercion. Of course, the consensus principle can sometimes be taken to unproductive extremes. When a national interest is involved that is fine. However, it does not always work so well in micro or practical»housekeeping issues« which are not of national interest, such as who is to speak at a seminar, but which are used as leverage by some representatives to get attention elsewhere. Nonetheless, the notion that consensus can – and should – be overruled on basic policy questions is easily the most dangerous idea confronting the wto . The most fundamental objection is that imposing policies on unwilling members is»undemocratic.« Who determines»correct« standards? What gives the wto the right to act as judge, jury, and police over sovereign governments? Only governments can decide that. And what makes us think that coercion and threats can produce lasting solutions? Not only are we asking the multilateral trading system to perform a role which runs contrary to its basic principles, but worse, coercion is the surest way of poisoning the spirit of international cooperation that is so desperately needed to begin building a consensus around broader global solutions. Unilateralism will not convince any country of the rationale or validity of the objectives which another asserts. A measure of a civilized society is how it manages its differences. Is it by the rule of law or by force? By that measure the wto has a lot to be proud of. With all its imperfections, the world would be a more dangerous, less democratic place without the wto . It is worth defending despite its imperfections. And its imperfections are those where governments cannot agree. Agriculture is a good example. If the deal was done this would be worth up to five times more than all the overseas aid that goes to Africa. However, this is a reason to support and conclude the Doha Development Round. Some people attack the wto and want to stop ministerial meetings when the best hope we have to fix these injustices is to conclude the round and strengthen the wto ’s ability to increase capacity for poor countries. 20 Moore, WTO: A Success Story ipg 2/2005

Ten Years of the WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade NICOLA BULLARD/ CHANIDA CHANYAPATE T he Uruguay Round of trade negotiations gave birth to a powerful institution in 1995, the World Trade Organization which, in concert with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund( imf ), would serve to strangle the domestic policy autonomy of the South. The wto was a significant departure from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( gatt ). Its agenda was much more ambitious than the gatt , going far beyond simply reducing tariffs on industrial products to 1. lowering the tariffs in agricultural goods, through the Agreement on Agriculture, 2. further limiting the scope for countries to determine their domestic legislation, through the Trade Related Investment Measures( trims ) and the General Agreement on Services( gats ), 3. permanently consigning the technologically less advanced to economic backwaters by dramatically restricting access to technology, through the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement ( trips ) and 4. subordinating development concerns to free trade principles favorable to corporations. The wto has been hailed as an achievement for multilateralism. Yet its impact on the world’s poor has been overwhelmingly negative. On the eve of the revolt by the developing countries at the wto ministerial in Seattle, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development( unctad ) issued a damning evaluation of the then nearly five-year-old world trade regime:»The predicted gains to developing countries from the Uruguay Round have proved to be exaggerated … Poverty and unemployment are again on the rise in developing countries which had struggled for many years to combat them. Income and welfare gaps between and within countries have widened further … As the twentieth century comes to an end, the world economy is deeply divided and unstable. The failure to achieve faster growth that could narrow the gap between the rich and the poor must be regarded as a defeat for the entire international community. ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 21

It also raises important questions about the present approach to development issues. Asymmetries and biases in the global system against the poor and underprivileged persist unchecked.« 1 Brushing aside unctad ’s warning, the so-called»Doha Development Round« was launched in November 2001. The Doha Round puts an extremely ambitious liberalization agenda in goods, agriculture and services squarely on the table. This, however, was only possible after developing countries had their arms thoroughly twisted in the shadows of September 11. 2 During the Doha Ministerial, just two months after the attacks in the us , it was suggested in the western press, as well as by certain key ministers, that developing countries’ refusal to launch a new round would somehow be tantamount to assisting the cause of terrorists. 3 Although the Doha Round suffered a setback in Cancun 2003, it was given a boost at the Geneva General Council meeting in July 2004. Multilateralism or»Disguised Unilateralism«? Despite its anti-development agenda, the wto as an institution continues to garner a certain(though grudging) amount of buy-in from the developing country governments. This seems to stem from the belief that some rules, no matter how skewed, are better than the»law of the jungle«. Furthermore, most governments want to avoid blame for derailing what is portrayed as an important multilateral institution. However, this unquestioning faith in»multilateralism« is counter-productive. According to S.P. Shukla, formerly India’s ambassador to the gatt ,»[t]here seems to be an intuitive belief, particularly among the relatively weaker members of the trading system, that the multilateral process by itself would ensure not only the legality but also the fairness or equity of decision-making. Once such belief triumphs over experience, it is only a short further step that leads to the proposition that a multilateral system is always desirable per se . … The more basic question of the ›power-relations‹ 1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development( unctad ), Trade and Development Report, New York and Geneva 1999. 2. For details, see Kwa, A., Power Politics in the WTO, published by Focus on the Global South 2003, and Jawara, F. and Kwa, A., Behind the Scenes at the WTO, Zed 2004. 3. See Zoellick, R.,»Countering Terror with Trade«, Washington Post, 20 September 2001. 22 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

defining the system tends to get obfuscated. Such an environment is conducive to manipulation of multilateralism by the powerful few. The form retains the multilateral character but the power-equation determines the substance. Some perceptive observers describe the phenomenon as the emergence of ›disguised unilateralism‹ or ›new regionalism‹.« 4 Shukla also argues that the application of the non-discrimination principle without substantive provisions to deal with the major trade problems of the »weaker members« leads to further discrimination. 5 »Treating the unequal equally« is, in his words, a»travesty of the equality principle«. 6 Despite their occasional ability to come together and challenge the industrialized nations, more often developing countries have succumbed to political pressures and divide and rule tactics by the major powers, or to their own internal contradictions. On paper each country has an equal voice. In reality, power is exercised through several means: 1. Chairpersons are handpicked by a small minority. Since the Doha 2001 Ministerial, Chairs have taken on the habit of drafting one-sided texts often excluding the views of the majority and presenting these as papers put forward on the Chair’s»own responsibility«. At a stroke of a pen, the views of the majority are rendered invisible. 7 4. Shukla, S.P., Developed Countries’ Trade Policies: Disguised Unilateralism? A Chronicle of Manipulated Mulilateralism, Paper presented at the First Annual International Forum for Development, New York, October 18–19, 2004. 5. Special and Differential Treatment provisions have proved to be ineffective, hence the promise in Doha to make them»effective« and»operational«. Unfortunately, these promises have remained unfulfilled despite deadlines that have long passed. 6. Shukla, S.P. 2004, p. 8. 7. See, for example, Antigua and Barbuda’s statement to the Heads of Delegations meeting at the Cancun 2003 Ministerial in response to the Chair’s 13 September text:»We do not recognize in this text the consensus we heard articulated in those groups on the development issues, small economy issues and Singapore issues. … And on cotton we believe the response … to the arguments put forward by Africa is insulting and unworthy of this organization.« India on the same occasion said,»It would appear that the views expressed by a large number of developing countries on the need for further clarification have been completely ignored. This is yet another instance of the deliberate neglect of views of a large number of developing countries. It represents an attempt to thrust the views of a few countries on many developing countries.« ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 23

2. The process of decision-making takes place behind closed doors 8 and only between a select few. Typically, the»quad«( us , eu , Canada and Japan) agree on an agenda and the decision-making circle is then widened to include other key developed and developing countries. The majority is kept in the dark until there is agreement amongst about 30 members and trade offs between them have been made. This exclusive process is known as the»green room« after the color of the room of the gatt director general where such meetings took place during the Uruguay Round. The outcome is then presented to the wider membership as a»take it or leave it« package. In the past two years, an even more alarming practice has taken root – super»green rooms« have mushroomed. For example, the trips negotiations on public health in August 2003 took place under a shroud of secrecy between four delegations – us , Brazil, India and Kenya. Unless a country is a big power, there are few that would have the political stamina to go against a package that is presented to them as having been agreed by some other significant countries. Similarly, the most critical negotiations in agriculture before the July 2004 General Council framework agreement took place between a handful of countries, the so-called Five Interested Parties( fips ) – the us , eu , India, Brazil and Australia. 3. Considerable amounts of arm-twisting and political pressures are brought to bear on countries that attempt to break a»consensus«. 4. Powerful countries undermine developing countries negotiating capacity by resorting to maneuvers at the highest political levels to remove their ambassadors. The former Dominican Republic ambassador Federico Cuello was removed from his position after the Doha Ministerial because he was an outspoken advocate of development. Due to these procedural irregularities, developing countries have repeatedly sought more transparent and accountable negotiating practices. 9 8. We are distinguishing here between the process of decision-making, and decisiontaking. A select few are involved in the former. The Membership is than brought on board to adopt a decision which they had no part in formulating. 9. See wto , Preparatory Process in Geneva and Negotiating Procedure at the Ministerial Conferences: Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, wt / gc / w /471, 24 April 2002. Other attempts to have proper rules of procedure also took place in January/February 2002 when the Trade Negotiations Committee Chair was being selected. See also Jawara and Kwa 2004, chapter»After Doha«. 24 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

However, these efforts have been systematically subverted by the powerful minority, insisting on»flexibility« 10 and fearful that formal, transparent and democratic processes would subject the wto ’s decisions to the »tyranny of the majority«. It is this fear by the powerful industrialized countries that they could loose grip over the decision-making process – as happened momentarily in Seattle 1999 and in Cancun 2003 – which has spurred the European Commission on various occasions to make suggestions for a»security council« type wto negotiating format where the green room would be formalized. This is the essence of the recent report by former gatt chair, Peter Sutherland,»The Future of the wto «, which most developing country members have distanced themselves from. Despite their occasional ability to challenge the industrialized nations, more often developing countries have succumbed to political pressures and divide and rule tactics by the major powers, or to their own internal contradictions. Thus, they have difficulties carrying through their development agenda. By the end of the negotiations, most end up severely compromising on their initial objectives. As a result, the outcome of negotiations is heavily weighted against the developing world. WTO’s Litany of Failures Getting the Fundamentals Wrong: The Myths of Integration and Exports The fundamentals of the institution are wrong. Openness, integration and market access have become the mantra. Yet the actual experience of the countries that expound this dogma does not tally with what they preach. 11 Africa has opened up its economy. Its share of global trade at the beginning of the Uruguay Round was six percent. Today, it has shrunk to about two percent. An open investment regime has not brought in the 10. See wto , Preparatory Process in Geneva and Negotiating Process at Ministerial Conferences: Communication from Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, China, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, wt / gc / w /447, 28 June 2002. Whilst the us and eu are not signatories to this paper, they nevertheless share similar views. 11. The experiences of developed countries have been amply illustrated by Ha Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: How the Economic and Intellectual Histories of Capitalism Have Been Re-written to Justify Neo-Liberal Capitalism , Cambridge University, uk 2000. ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 25

promised windfall. In contrast, the Asian countries that had tightly regulated their level of openness to the world market – Korea, Taiwan and Singapore – were more successful. In the words of Harvard economist Dani Rodrik,»the globalisers have it exactly backwards. Integration is the result, not the cause of economic and social development.« 12 Related to this, the trade regime’s fixation on exports as the route to development has not produced the promised outcome. There are many developing countries that have seen exports rising, even rapidly, but overall employment levels have not increased, nor have incomes risen. unctad comments,»making sense of a system in which many developing countries are vigorously expanding their foreign trade but are not rewarded by a comparable rise in income requires some hard thinking«. 13 In 2004, unctad ’s report on least developed counties( ldc s) called into question the market access doctrine on which the wto pins its existence, and which the various multilateral institutions have used as a substitute for development policy. It concludes that,»[t]he positive role of trade in poverty reduction is actually being realized in very few ldc s«. Whilst there had been a significant number of export take-offs in a large number of ldc s since the late 1980s,»on balance, future poverty reduction prospects seem to have worsened.« Export expansion has led to positive changes in private consumption per capita(that is, poverty alleviation) in only three ldc s – Bangladesh, Guinea and Uganda. According to the Report,»[t]here is no guarantee that export expansion will lead to a form of economic growth that is inclusive. Indeed, there is a strong likelihood that export-led growth(in ldc s with mass poverty) will actually turn out to be ›enclave-led growth.‹ This is a form of economic growth that is concentrated in a small part of the economy, both geographically and sectorally.« In fact, in over half the number of cases studied, 29 out of 51, export expansion has led to either ambiguous or immiserizing effects. The quality, not only the quantity, of trade has to be carefully examined. 12. Rodrik, D.,»Trading in Illusions«, Foreign Policy , March/April 2001, pp. 55–62. 13. unctad , Trade and Development Report , Geneva 2002. 26 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

Dismantling Developing Countries’ Agricultural Sector The agricultural sector continues to employ 70 percent of the workforce in the South(as compared to between two to five percent in oecd countries) and local production remains closely linked with people’s access to food and livelihoods. The trade regime, in combination with World Bank and imf structural adjustment policies, has systematically destroyed developing countries’ agriculture sector. Whilst setting the developing world firmly on the liberalization route, the wto ’s Agreement on Agriculture provided the cover for the us and eu to continue their high tariff and non-tariff border protection as well as their enormous subsidies to producers. Some examples of farmers affected by the subsidies include the dairy farmers in Thailand, India and Jamaica who had been hit by the eu ’s subsidies of about 1.7 billion euros(in 1999) a year on dairy products. eu exports in dairy make up about 50 percent of what is traded on the world market. European dairy products therefore set world prices. eu subsidies to their producers are up to 87 percent of the world price of milk powder. Similarly the us is depressing world prices of major food crops. The us 2002 Farm Bill, which promised farmers at least us $190 billion over 10 years, concentrated on eight areas, all of which are important food crops for developing countries and are closely linked to food security and rural employment: cotton, wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, barley, oats and sorghum. As a result of us subsidies, exports are sold at below their cost of production and Third World farmers are displaced. 14 The other stark failure of the Agreement on Agriculture has been its total silence on the manipulation of world prices by agri-businesses through their market power and control over the global production chain. In addition to subsidies, this is the second prong to the debilitating phenomenon of ever-declining commodity and food prices. From 1997 to 2001, the combined price index of all commodities had fallen by 53 percent in real terms, leading unctad to conclude that the»commodity trap« had become the»poverty trap«. 15 14. See the data in Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy( iatp ), United States Dumping on World Agricultural Markets, February 2004 Update, Cancun Series Paper No. 1. 15. Greenfield, G.,»The Agricultural Commodity Price Crisis: Back on the Agenda?«, Focus-on-Trade No. 100, June 2004. ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 27

Destroying the Industrial Base of the Developing World The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures( trim s) was brought into the wto in the Uruguay Round at the behest of the industrialized countries. It prohibits countries from imposing investment measures on foreign companies such as local content requirements, exportimport balancing in terms of foreign exchange, and technology transfer. These investment measures have been used by the developed countries themselves in the past, as well as by several East Asian countries. Regulating foreign investors is critical if countries want to capture the benefits of foreign direct investment, such as increasing the tax base, job creation and backward linkages between the export and domestic sectors. Many developing countries regard the TRIMs agreement as hostile to their development interests and designed to maintain the industrialization and technology gap between industrial and developing countries. Take the automobile industry as a case in point. Between 1995 and February 2002, 11 wto complaints in the automotive sector(involving not just local content requirements but also subsidies, incentives and foreign exchange balancing) were brought by Japan, the eu and the us against four developing countries with potentially large automotive markets – Brazil, India, Indonesia and the Philippines. Developing a domestic auto industry is a benchmark of industrial development, and developing countries with large internal markets have attempted to build their own car manufacturing sector. The number of cases brought against these countries is clearly an attempt by the industrialized countries to maintain their hold on the global market. In the case of Japan( us and eu as third parties) vs. Indonesia(in 1997) on the Indonesian national car program, the wto panel ruled that Indonesia’s local content requirements as well as tax exemptions violated the trim s agreement. This case, as with others, has led many developing countries to regard the trim s agreement as hostile to their development interests and designed to maintain the industrialization and technology gap between industrial and developing countries. Lowering tariffs on industrial products has been the objective of the gatt since its inception. Until now, industrial tariff reductions through the wto have been less stringent than those required through World Bank and imf structural adjustment lending. Now all this is changing in 28 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

the current negotiations of the Doha Round as the us and eu put pressure on developing countries to reduce their industrial tariffs. However, developing countries are resisting. According to Buffie, 16 rapid tariff cuts in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s resulted in deindustrialization: In Senegal, one third of manufacturing jobs disappeared, in Cote-d’Ivoire, the chemical, textiles, footwear and automobile sectors were crushed. In Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia, imports displaced local production of consumer goods, causing large-scale unemployment. The industries of Kenya have not been spared either – beverages, tobacco, textiles, sugar, leather, cement and glass have been negatively affected. According to unctad (2002),»most developing countries are still exporting resourceand labor-intensive products, effectively relying on their supplies of cheap, low-skilled labor to compete.« For most, competitiveness has been achieved through cheap labor. Exports which are labor-intensive have not »been accompanied by concomitant increases in value added and income earned in developing countries«. 17 To add to these woes, the price of simple manufactures is increasingly volatile and there is now a danger of oversupply in the markets for labor-intensive manufactured exports from developing countries, following much the same pattern of declining terms of trade that is typical of the agricultural sector. 18 Due to their experiences in the past 15 years, developing countries, especially the Africans, have been extremely reluctant to enter an ambitious round of tariff reductions. They rejected the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial text on non-agricultural market access( nama ) stating that this would cause deindustrialization. 19 Yet the pressure heaped on developing countries post-Cancun was too much to bear. The African delegates finally gave in to the text in July 2004, with the weak caveat that various contentious issues required»additional negotiations«. 20 16. Buffie, E., Trade Policy in Developing Countries , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 17. unctad , Trade and Development Report, Geneva 2002, p. 53. 18. Statistics showing expansion of technology and skill-intensive exports from developing countries, according to unctad , are misleading. Much of the skills in these exports come from components that are still produced in the developed world. 19. See the acp (African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries) Ministerial Declaration of 12 July 2004. 20.These contentious issues include: the non-linear tariff cutting formula(i.e. very aggressive tariff cuts); the treatment of tariff bindings; and the sectoral approach. ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 29

Erosion of Basic Services for the Poor Even though the gats has a»positive list« architecture(that is, governments liberalize only the sectors they have scheduled), there is strong pressure for members to submit their»offers«. 21 This is eroding the fundamental character of the gats of»progressive liberalization« which allows countries to open their services only when they are prepared for it. The 2004 July framework agreed by the General Council calls for revised offers to be tabled by May 2005. The eu , propelled by complaints lodged by the European Services Forum – an entity made up of European services corporations – regarding what they perceive as»low quality« offers from key countries such as Brazil, Thailand, China, and Indonesia, will be presenting new requests to its gats partners which it deems have not responded adequately. Yet developing country governments have not been deliberately unresponsive. The capacity difficulty that developing country governments have in assessing their services sectors and ascertaining their interests should not be underestimated, hence their relative reticence in the past two years of gats negotiations. Indeed, neither the wto nor any other multilateral institution have prepared a framework for assessing the economic, much less the social, impact of opening up services under the gats . wto analyst Chakravarthi Raghavan likens the lack of data and assessment to»a blindfolded person in a dark room chasing a black cat« and argues that assessment efforts have been systematically disrupted. 22 Second, the majority of developing countries are in a very weak position to compete with the multinational services giants of the developed world. Developed countries have dominated world trade in services, making up 70 percent of the world’s exports: the top ten exporters (mainly developed countries) control 65 percent of world trade in services. This share in some sectors reaches over 90 percent, for example in financial services, computer and information services, royalties and li21. Built into the gats agreement was a clause that said new market access negotiations would commence in 2000(after an assessment). gats market access negotiations take place first bilaterally. Requests to liberalize services markets are made to trade partners who can then decide whether or not to make offers of liberalization. Offers are negotiated bilaterally. The offers are subsequently provided to all wto members. 22. See Raghavan, C., in Drafts Notes for Commonwealth Consultation Meeting, South-North Development Monitor, 2000. 30 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

cense fees, and construction services. 23 Apart from the»movement of natural persons«(known as Mode IV), tourism and outsourcing, most developing countries have little or no competitive market access interests in these negotiations compared to the corporations of the us and eu . Liberalization of services usually means that access to services is based on a market model rather than a universal model and this disproportionately affects the poorest sectors of society who are unable to pay for services. How does gats affect the poor? Access to water, health, education, housing, and other essential services are fundamental human rights. Liberalization of services usually means that access to services is based on a market model rather than a universal model and this disproportionately affects the poorest sectors of society who are unable to pay for services. The argument for gats proponents is that liberalization and the entry of private providers of services can bring about more efficient services provision, including in basic services. The empirical evidence is less clear. There are some positive experiences, but also many failures especially in the provision of services to low income groups. undp ’s 2003 Human Development Report concludes:»The supposed benefits of privatizing social services are elusive, with inconclusive evidence on efficiency and quality standards in the private relative to the public sector. Meanwhile, examples of market failures in private provisioning abound.« 24 Privatization mostly leads to the»unbundling« or dismantling of public services and an end to cross-subsidization. In the area of utilities, Kessler and Alexander conclude:»Corporations have little incentive to invest in ›unprofitable people‹. … They are less likely to go into periurban, slum or rural areas, where topography is more difficult, per capita consumption is less, and most importantly, incomes are lower.« 25 23. Mashayekhi, M., gats 2000 Negotiations: Options for Developing Countries, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity Working Paper No. 9, South Centre, Geneva 2000. 24. United Nations Development Programme( undp ), Human Development Report 2003 , p. 113. 25. Kessler, T. and Alexander, N., Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services, unctad G24 discussion paper, 2004, p. 11. ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 31

gats does not mandate privatization, but its liberalization agenda provides the conditions for privatization. In addition, no sector is a priori excluded in gats . Public opinion and pressure from trade unions have forced the eu to withhold essential services such as water, health care and education from its gats commitments and current offer, yet the eu continues to be aggressive in asking other wto members to open these sectors. Complementary to their market access requests, the industrialized countries are also interested in limiting domestic regulation. As of July 2002, the us submitted requests to 141 wto members and the eu to 109. Many of these requests have specifically targeted the regulatory limits agreed in the Uruguay Round gats negotiations to allow developing countries to promote domestic development and to limit the activity of foreign investors. The eu and us requests have included removal of regulations subjecting foreign corporate takeovers to government approval, laws requiring foreign investors to form joint ventures when they enter the market, and regulation of land ownership. Many developing countries do not have good regulatory frameworks to begin with. Current gats negotiations could easily lock in these weak systems and pre-empt any future regulatory measures to limit the powers of monopolies and protect public and essential services. 26 Intellectual Property: Ensuring the Technological Dominance of Northern Corporations The trips Agreement(trade related aspects of intellectual property rights) has little to do with trade. In fact, it stymies trade by allowing the patent holder to maintain their monopoly over potential competitors. The trips agreement was brought into the wto by strong lobbying from the information technology and pharmaceutical companies in the industrialized countries. It widens the divide between those that have the technology and those that do not. Whilst the rationale for trips is that there should be a proper balance between the right of the inventor and public 26. Whilst not undermining the importance of foreign exchange remittances for many developing countries, there are also huge social and personal costs involved with Mode IV, and these costs are greatest for women and children. A more holistic strategy to development in the long term is to invigorate the domestic economy so that people can remain employed in their home country if they choose to, instead of being forced by poverty to leave. 32 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

interests, the 20-year patents stipulated by trips give all the power to the patent holders. The effects on the poor are manifold. Firstly, it stifles technology transfer or catch-up by the developing world, hence consigning the majority of developing countries to being locked in simple manufacturers rather than progressing towards high-end products with increasing value added and economic benefits. Even though multinational companies have been moving their production to the developing world, there has been no technology transfer. The know-how and technology are kept within the corporations. 27 This has contributed to exports in manufacturers being »enclaves« with little or no linkages to the domestic economy. Secondly, trips has allowed multinational companies to engage in bio-piracy. Biotechnology companies such as Monsanto may alter very slightly seeds that have been bred by farmers for hundreds of years and patent them for 20 years. Through the slight genetic modification of seeds bred by farmers, biotechnology companies can privatize the resulting organisms and enjoy patent rights on them for 20 years. These patented seeds are then sold to farmers world-wide, who are not allowed to follow the tried and true practice of using seeds for the following harvest on pain of being sued. The other highly controversial area is public health and access to medicines and medical equipment. The patent protection in trips has blocked the imports of low cost generic medicines and increased drug prices considerably, pushing them beyond the means of the majority. Since the adoption of the trips and Public Health Declaration in Doha, as well as the 30 August 2003 decision – the»solution« allowing countries without generic industries to import generic drugs – trips is no longer supposed to be a hindrance to poor people’s access to drugs. However, according to trips expert Carlos Correa, the legal red-tape that generic drug producers and the exporting and importing countries have to deal with makes the solution of 30 August»largely symbolic in view of the multiple conditions required for its application.« 28 The argument by the pharmaceutical industries is that intellectual property rights are needed in order to pay for the research and develop27. unctad , Trade and Development Report, Geneva 2002, p. 63. 28. Correa, C.,»Access to Drugs under trips : A Not So Expeditious Solution«, Bridges, No. 1, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, January 2004. ipg 2/2005 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade 33

ment costs for new drugs. The reality, however, is that tropical diseases are the main killers of the poor today, yet only 12 of 1233 new drugs that reached the market between 1975 and 1997 were approved specifically for tropical diseases. Even free-trade advocate Jagdish Bhagwati has described the wto ’s intellectual property protection as a»tax« that most poor countries pay on their use of knowledge, constituting a one-way transfer to the rich producing countries. 29 Conclusion The failures of trade liberalization and the obsession with export-lead growth have been clearly documented, yet the wto , the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund remain slow to catch on. Whilst a large portion of the wto ’s members remain crippled by massive poverty – especially those countries that have already opened their markets to the limit – the wto offers them nothing except more blind faith in trade liberalization, the very same»faith« that contributed to the stagnation and disintegration of their industries, agriculture and economies. The wto institutionalizes the subordination of development to corporate free trade. A viable trade regime cannot prescribe a»one-size-fits-all« solution, but must be loose enough to allow for a wide diversity in its members’ economic arrangements. Is this possible? Perhaps the most striking feature of the wto in the last 10 years is its inability to reform, despite the hopes poor countries pin on this agenda every day in their Geneva negotiations. The political and economic interests behind its agenda remain too deeply entrenched. 29. See Sexton, S.,»Trading Health Care Away? gats , Public Services and Privatisation«, South Bulletin , No. 15, South Centre, July 2001. 34 Bullard/Chanyapate, WTO: Subordinating Development to Free Trade ipg 2/2005

ARTIKEL /ARTICLES Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers: Changing Parameters for Global Economic Governance GARTH LE PERE T he current juncture of international relations is characterized by a noisy pluralism, underpinned by the progressive integration of economies and societies. New technologies, a multiplicity of economic and financial interactions and the policy impulses of a wide range of actors – governments, international organizations, business, labor and civil society – all come together to create an order that is at once integrative yet also profoundly sectarian and exclusive. On the one hand, trade, investment, technology, cross-border production systems, and flows of information and communication bring economies and societies closer together. One significant consequence of this is that many former developing countries have managed to achieve economic growth and aspire to play a more prominent role in international negotiations. On the other hand, the new transnational dynamics marginalize and exclude a great proportion of the world’s countries and people. These exclusionary effects intersect with another important dimension of globalization, namely the homogenization of policies and institutions, particularly with regard to trade and capital market liberalization, international standards for labor and the environment, regulatory agreements on international trade, and other standardization measures that de facto establish international rules, norms and practices. Homogenization has caused multilateral negotiations on these intersecting aspects to assume greater importance. Indeed, international bargaining processes have become»management tools in international politics,« 1 generating outcomes and expectations that contribute to a»diffuse reciprocity« 2 or the potential for redistributing benefits equally over time. The use of management tools to impose order on a complex and 1. Fen Osler Hampson, Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade and the Environment. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995, 6. 2. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 36 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

multidimensional process constitutes the essence of global governance, reflecting as it does»struggles over wealth, power and knowledge.« 3 However, it is in this struggle that many of the pernicious, so to speak »Darwinian« effects of globalization are manifested. Globalization of the world economy and related markets creates new instabilities, insecurities and inequalities. As has been demonstrated in countries and regions as diverse as Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997, and Russia and Brazil in 1998, global capital forces can turn with a vengeance against emerging markets that were once lavished with foreign loans and investments, unleashing the »horsemen of the apocalypse« with devastating effects on peoples’ lives. As a consequence, what has emerged is a search for long-term systemic economic stability that would guarantee cooperation on the basis of collective interests and shared expectations. In a constructivist sense, such cooperation would be grounded in institutions as the quintessential embodiment of international norms and practices. The interesting issue that springs from this reshaping of the contours of global governance is its plural and democratic character. While the developed countries of Europe, Japan and the United States bring different domestic institutions, political orientations and social values to the management of the world economy, they are committed to maintaining the shibboleth of expanded economic openness which has underpinned global capitalism since the 1940s. However, in the process of embracing this shibboleth, emerging markets are increasingly inserting their voices into the institutional reform agenda for governing the global economy after the recent spate of financial crises and are making strident demands that the custodians of economic governance – the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund( imf ) – be subjected to serious institutional and constitutional review. The debates about a New International Economic Order in the 1970s were a harbinger of developing countries adopting a more aggressive stance in seeking changes in international trade, greater authority over natural resources and foreign investment, better modes of technology transfer, improved terms and conditions for foreign aid, deeper debt relief and restructuring of international financial institutions. While the norms of economic liberalism have been in the ascendant, globalization has concentrated minds on some of the more glaring and 3. Craig Murphy,»Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood.« International Affairs, 75:4, 2000, 798. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 37

egregious inequities of our time, especially increasing levels of global poverty. The economic security of the state is now inextricably bound up with the economic security and well-being of individuals. Globalization, as the modernization, expansion and integration of the world economy, has thus become the catalyst for re-ordering international economic relations away from the hegemony of developed countries and in favor of a more consensual style of management. Markets cannot carry out this task:»the shaping of globalization is a task for the political sphere« 4 and hence the growth successes of emerging markets 5 have transferred power into the hands of their governments to engage in new international norm setting for economic governance, often in the face of resistance by the developed-country guardians of the status quo. Axes of Emerging Market Power How a country exercises its economic influence in the international political economy will define its economic wealth and power and this is determined by the interaction between states and international markets. Developments in international economic relations have increased the operational scope of modern financial markets and associated systemic risk. 6 There is, therefore, an increasingly interdependent relationship between the roles and functions of states and markets. It must be remembered that economic globalization is very much power-centered as regards who runs and manages world markets. Here politics, control and power matter as much as technical questions of currency regimes, capital movements, prudential standards and the financial underpinnings of systemic stability. The orthodoxy that the benefits of global, market-based integration can offset the costs for developing countries comes up against a core truth: that the global economic and financial system has not served the interests 4. Heribert Dieter, Reshaping Globalisation: A New Order for International Financial Markets. igd Occasional Paper 38, June 2003, 40. 5. Typical examples of emerging market countries include Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. Emerging markets are characterized as transitional in that they are in the process of moving from a closed to an open market economy while building accountability within the international system. 6. See, for example, Dani Rodrik,»Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate.« Foreign Policy , 107, 1997, 19–37. 38 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

of the poor in developing countries particularly well and hence the call to move beyond the current reform agenda for the international financial architecture to a broader and deeper structural reform of the system of global economic governance. What are the main axes around which emerging market power has evolved? International Trade World trade(in terms of nominal world exports of goods and services) has more than tripled, from us $2.3 trillion in 1985 to over us $7.8 trillion in 2002. Much of this increase is a consequence of liberalization and deregulation among developing countries. Until the early 1990s, emerging markets and developing countries for that matter generally adhered to neo-mercantilist trade policies as a means of engendering faster industrial development and avoiding balance of payments crises. In the 1980s, for example, developing country tariffs were on average about four times higher than those of developed countries and non-tariff barriers of developing countries covered more than twice the share of the import categories of developed countries. The last decade, however, has seen a progressive liberalization of their tariff regimes though the simplification of tariff structures, rate reductions and often the elimination of non-tariff barriers. Import growth among emerging markets increased in the early 1990s to more than five times the growth rate of the early 1980s. What is also noteworthy is that in strict dollar terms there have been considerable changes in terms of trade, with emerging markets experiencing dramatic increases at the expense of low-income developing countries. The implications of greater trade integration is that the costs of protection rise, thus constraining the range of options open to governments in managing domestic economic dislocation. As has been argued elsewhere:»Trade has progressively become more important for economic activity … If any reversal of global trade growth were to occur, it is believed that it would be more serious for economic performance than in previous decades because trade would fall on a higher base and involve more countries.« 7 Trade liberalization has created an imperative for stability and improved management of the multilateral trading system. 7. John Whalley and Colleen Hamilton, The Trading System after the Uruguay Round. Washington dc : Institute for International Economics, 1996, 13. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 39

Foreign Direct Investment and Capital Markets From 1985 to 2002, foreign direct investment inflows increased more than tenfold, from us $58 billion to us $633 billion. Emerging markets increased their share overall but the main beneficiaries were China and India, whose share rose from 2.9 percent in 1985 to 9.8 percent in 2002. The increasingly footloose character of investment and capital mobility has come to epitomize the logic of globalization. The exponential increase in daily foreign exchange transactions reflects the rapidity of cross-border investment and trade, which is more and more driven by speculative and arbitrage currency trading. There is a premium on retaining the confidence of investors and hence a structural incentive to pursue Friedmanesque macroeconomic policies which concentrate more on low inflation than growth and employment. Many observers of financial globalization view it as undermining the autonomy of the modern state and in very subtle ways, transforming inter-state relations and the system of norms and regimes that guide them. Foreign capital and investment do not easily bend to national regulation or control; if anything, they trample borders in their quest for profit. 8 Indeed, capital markets and foreign direct investment( fdi ) constrain the ability of states to adhere to the dictates of sound macroeconomic management, and fiscal and monetary discipline. As with the»Asian contagion«, investors and capital managers can quickly abandon an economy because of currency volatility. There is a premium on retaining the confidence of investors and hence a structural incentive to pursue Friedmanesque macroeconomic policies which concentrate more on low inflation than growth and employment. Any inclination to pursue Keynesian growth policies, promote more state activism in the economy or use stabilization instruments are bound to be met with capital flight and/or currency depreciation. 8. Gerald K. Helleinder,»Markets, Politics, and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?« Global Governance, 7:3, 2001, 243–263. 40 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

International Production The integration of trade and finance has been coupled with international production or what has been called the fragmentation of production and intra-product specialization which has split the production process into discrete parts across countries and national borders. A consequence of this is that production processes for intermediate products have increasingly been set up in emerging markets that are deemed to be most profitable. In other cases, the opening of markets has led to collusive behavior between firms and the forming of strategic cross-border alliances such as joint ventures and product-sharing schemes. 9 Such alliances, for example, insure that high-tech research and development costs will not result in a product that will wilt under competitive pressure or fail in the market. Alliances also have the salutary effect of guaranteeing global markets as a means of recouping product development costs. Besides concentrating trade in intermediate products in emerging markets, multinationals have also led a wave of mergers and acquisitions. Today they account for over two-thirds of world trade and their share is even higher in the trade of high-tech products. All this activity severely impedes the ability of governments and the local private sector to put in place their own industrial policies and national planning initiatives. The meshing of foreign with domestic investment, for example, makes national identity less apparent and increasing foreign penetration is bound to eclipse any form of economic nationalism. Moreover, the complex international division of labor that global firms rely on introduces functional differentiation that is costly and difficult to disrupt. This»structural« quality of openness has major implications for vast numbers of people whose livelihoods depend on it and is hostile to any form of protectionism. 10 The 1990s saw an intensification of competitive pressure to reduce labor costs and taxes in emerging markets. As more manufacturing moved from developed countries to emerging markets, it caused large-scale structural unemployment in the former and concurrent pressure to increase social protection. Among emerging markets, it led to competition 9. Barbara Emadi-Coffin, Rethinking International Organisation: Deregulation and Global Governance. London: Routledge, 2002, 165. 10. Martin Rama, Globalization and Workers in Developing Countries. World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper No. 2958, January 2003. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 41

in attracting production plants. For example, they resorted to setting up export-processing zones and making concessions to multinationals in the form of tax exemptions and public provision of infrastructure. This similarly led to large-scale structural changes in emerging market countries, without preventing structural unemployment. Even changes in trade policies have had a modest impact on the labor markets of emerging countries. Other aspects of globalization such as immigration, capital flows, privatization, production right- and down-sizing and technology transfer have been shown to have negative impacts on standards of living, job creation and labor productivity. Volatile capital flows have put the welfare of workers at risk, often resulting in massive retrenchments and job losses. 11 Emerging Markets – Persistent Poverty It is now widely accepted as an axiom that the benefits of growth crucially depend on the distribution of income that flows from economic advances and development. Nobel prize winning economist Simon Kuznets famously advanced the hypothesis that income inequality initially deteriorates as per capita gnp rises, peaking at intermediate income levels and declining for industrialized countries. While compelling, little empirical evidence was found that confirmed this inverse relationship. If anything, there is an emerging consensus that growth and equity need not be contradictory goals. And when the link between economic growth and human development is pursued with deliberate policies and political determination, it can be mutually reinforcing such that economic growth has the potential to reduce poverty and enhance human development. However, with regard to the impact of globalization on income inequality, much of the extant literature suggests an increase in income inequality both within and across emerging markets. 12 This has been exacerbated by the series of financial crises that have derailed economic growth, resulting in default, currency collapses and severe banking sector implosions. Domestic political coherence has been the key determining 11. Ajit K. Ghose, Jobs and Income in a Globalizing World. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2003. 12. See, for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World’s Most Prosperous Decade. New York: W.W. Norton& Co., 2003. 42 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

factor in assessing the severity and persistence of economic collapse associated with each crisis. Where the domestic polity has suffered from extreme weakness, in some cases leading even to the dissolution of the current government, the crisis has tended to spiral into deeper recession and default on external debt, with significant repercussions for depressing levels of income and employment. Consequently, in a sample of eight emerging markets it has been shown that financial crises have increased the incidence of poverty by some 40 to 60 million people(and possibly as many as 100 million) in a total population of 800 million. The poverty impact was much worse(21 percent) in cases where the crises were not successfully resolved than in cases where they were(7 percent). 13 The poor and disadvantaged have been the first-line casualties of the increase in insecurity in emerging markets, largely due to market failures that prevent them from having access to adequate income and consumption. Inequality is intertwined with insecurity, causing job losses, lack of social protection and existential angst. While heightened international volatility of trade, capital flows, and production has contributed to the negative impact of globalization in emerging markets, it is also clear that lack of concerted political action to offset the risk and uncertainty has contributed an equal share – if not more – to increased global insecurity. The poor and disadvantaged have been the first-line casualties of the increase in insecurity in emerging markets, largely due to market failures that prevent them from having access to adequate income and consumption. 14 Bringing the State Back In While there is widespread agreement that globalization has reduced the autonomy of the state in the economy, a growing chorus is calling for increased state intervention in social matters. While openness calls for the 13. William Cline, Financial Crises and Poverty in Emerging Market Economies. Center for Global Development , Working Paper No. 8, June 2002, 10. 14. Raphael Kaplinsky, Globalisation and Economic Insecurity . Institute of Development Studies Bulletin(Sussex), 32:2, April 2001, 13–24. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 43

state’s role in the economy to be restricted to regulatory, taxation and subsidy arrangements, it can play a leading role in providing social welfare. While globalization requires some homogenization of policies and standards, there are many areas in which differences in national standards have to be taken into account. In deciding who should act, the principle of subsidiarity should apply where many different actors could play a role: individuals, families, businesses, trade unions, civic organizations, governments and their agencies, regional and international development bodies, and so on. In many cases there will be complementarity between various actors that could reinforce global, regional and national institution-building and development. However, besides complementarities between actors, there is also the need for complementarities of policy action at the different levels. 15 Epistemic and policy communities have forged paradigm shifts whose postulates are instructive: achieving growth and reducing poverty implies actions that will make globalization a more equitable and sustainable process. National policy responses and state stewardship in emerging markets and developing countries generally are called for in areas that have dynamic welfare gains and include investment in education and training, the adoption of core labor standards, the provision and improvement of social protection, and tackling rising national inequality. 16 The Need for Global Economic Governance The challenge for emerging markets and indeed for the 21st century is to declare the moral equivalent of war against poverty that will require the same political commitment as say, the war against global terrorism. The Millennium Development Goals set the agenda for a global social contract to reduce income poverty by half by 2015. As should be evident by now, global economic governance and, by extension, improving the international financial architecture are necessary for checking market failures which have been shown to have devastating effects on the lives of developing-country populations. Two sets of proposals turn on initiating a 15. See, for example, Ha-Joon Chang, Globalisation, Economic Development and the Role of the State. London: Zed Books, 2003. 16. Nicola Yeates,»Globalization and Social Policy: From Global Neoliberal Hegemony to Global Political Pluralism.« Global Social Policy, 2:1, April 2002, 69–91. 44 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

development round of trade negotiations and forging a new financial architecture to ensure the provision of global public goods and to forestall the asymmetric effects of market failure. These proposals are emblematic of the increasing influence of emerging powers in shaping global agendas in a manner that was perhaps not possible, say, 20 years ago. Their influence resonates throughout the fabric of global governance as it relates to the reform of international rules and regulations, norms, structures and regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, this is in part a consequence of the renewed prominence of the North–South divide in international relations. Through a decade or more of un summits, the South has promoted a new development discourse steeped in the advocacy of global redistributive justice. Emerging markets, often classified as middle powers, have become critical players in refashioning a post-Westphalian order that diffuses power in the international system. 17 The United States, as the sole superpower, cannot manage the global commons on its own. Bogged down as it is with the war against terrorism and the loss of its multilateral credentials under George W. Bush, emerging-market countries have shown a strong commitment to maintaining global norms and institutions which have formed the basis of multilateral cooperation since 1945. However – and more importantly – countries as diverse as China, South Africa, India and Brazil have emerged as evangelists for a more just and equitable global order which is less subject to the whims of developed countries and based more on international compromise and democratic decision-making, with the un system and international organizations providing the raison d’etre for a reformed system. A Development Round of Trade Negotiations The end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1994 heralded a greater focus on the unfair rules of international trade and led to widespread calls by the developing-country membership of the World Trade Organization ( wto ) for a development round of trade negotiations. The main bones of contention were developed countries’ protectionist trade restrictions and lack of market access for developing countries’ agricultural goods, a more permissive intellectual property rights regime for making medicines 17. Jessica T. Mathews,»Power Shift.« Foreign Affairs, 76:1, 1997, 50–66. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 45

more affordable(especially with regard to urgently needed medication to fight hiv /Aids), and allowing developing countries longer transition periods to meet their wto commitments through its special and differential treatment mechanism. Irrevocable changes have taken place in trade diplomacy such that developed countries can no longer set the terms and conditions of negotiations. In particular, developing countries, with several emerging-market countries taking the lead, wanted to see an unambiguous normative shift from promoting liberalization to fostering development in trade negotiations. This was the signal success of the Doha development round in 2001: for the first time in the history of trade negotiations, the round explicitly enshrined a code that emphasized the centrality of developingcountry concerns, although the letter and spirit of this understanding was severely undermined at the subsequent desultory ministerial meeting in Cancun two years later. Again at Cancun, the advent of an emerging market-developing country coalition in the form of the G-20+ showed that irrevocable changes have taken place in trade diplomacy such that developed countries can no longer set the terms and conditions of negotiations. Developing countries have managed to curtail the promiscuous extensions of wto authority by developed countries into issues and areas that go far beyond traditional trade and have forced a review of the wto ’s sacrosanct single-undertaking mandate and consensus-building process. It is significant that – in part through the G20+’s consistent efforts – the July 2004 meeting of the wto ’s General Council managed to restore the integrity of the Doha consensus with regard to issues of critical concern to developing countries. This so-called»July package« contains a set of measures that are crucial for stimulating progress toward the 6th wto ministerial meeting to be held in Hong Kong in December 2005. The package includes advances in improving market access in key areas such as agriculture, textiles and cotton; reform of developed countries’ protectionist domestic support and export subsidy regimes; predictable and well-financed technical assistance to improve developing-country participation in wto negotiations; and important issues relating to transparency and democratic participation. This has been made possible precisely because coalitions and alliances of developing and emerging market 46 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

countries have used the negotiating space provided by the Doha consensus to insist on fairness and equity in global trade. A New Financial Architecture Developing-country participation and representation has long been a source of tension, if not acrimony, in the imf and World Bank. Both institutions are based on the liberal notion that economic stability and development are best achieved when trade and financial flows take place with as few restrictions as possible. While the World Bank’s original mandate was to facilitate reconstruction in post-war Europe, it has come to concentrate on making loan funds available for development and hence since the 1950s has become deeply embroiled in the lives of developing countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, it emphasized large infrastructure projects and then moved to funding basic needs in health, education and housing in the 1970s. In the 1980s, its mantra was private sector development and in the 1990s it sought to promote sustainable development, good governance and poverty alleviation. As has been said, the World Bank’s history has been one of»institutional stretching, incremental change, goal proliferation and wider consultation.« 18 As regards the imf , its original purpose was to assist countries in meeting short-term fluctuations in currency exchange rates, thus enabling members to establish free convertibility among their currencies and maintain stable exchange rates. Although not designed as an aid agency, its role in development has grown, insofar as stable currency values and currency convertibility are necessary for trade and development. And it has become increasingly involved in helping countries with chronic balance of payments difficulties and heavy debt, as well as with those requiring bailouts and structural adjustment lending. Critics of the Bank and Fund have inveighed against their style of governance, decision- and policy-making. By convention, the imf managing director is always a European and the World Bank president an American. In both institutions, a limited-member executive board decides everyday policies. The executive boards operate under weighted voting systems that guarantee the voting power of the major developed countries com18. Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey A. Winters,»Reinventing the World Bank.« In: Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey A. Winters(eds.), Reinventing the World Bank. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, 1. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 47

mensurate with their contributions. In the imf , for example, the us , Germany, France, Japan and the uk command more than 40 percent of the votes. Because of this weighted voting system, these institutions have been viewed as tools of the developed countries. Given this dominance, there is a legitimate concern that the imf may be»too responsive to its principal shareholders, which are high income, international creditor countries and whose interests do not necessarily coincide with those of global society as a whole.« 19 Reform of the international financial institutions is seen as key in building a new architecture for global markets and reform proposals stress the importance of improving their accountability and governance. Since the 1980s, the most trenchant criticisms have focused on structural adjustment programs, where the two institutions reinforce each other through informal cross-conditionality. The Bank and Fund thus exercise inordinate power in determining the trajectory of a country’s adjustment regime through, for example, currency devaluation, fiscal reform, removal of tariff and import quotas, price control liberalization, and civil service retrenchment. Critics charge that this has resulted in disproportionate suffering on the part of the marginalized and already deprived sectors of the population. Draconian adjustment programs have now been replaced with more benign and participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs. The imf has also come under the spotlight for its conduct in emerging markets, promoting a culture of bailouts in countries that have made imprudent economic decisions and through the »Washington Consensus« pushing countries into injudicious opening of their economies, making them more vulnerable to the risks of volatile international financial flows. 20 The recent financial crises underscored the notion that domestic financial institutions should be supervised and adequately regulated, since structural deficiencies such as laxity in risk management, poor governance, inadequate loan classification and loose loanprovisioning could invite crises and serious contagion. A growing num19. Jose De Gregorio et al., An Independent and Accountable imf . Geneva: Center for Economic Policy Research, 1999, 78. 20.See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton& Co., 2002. 48 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

ber of proponents of a new financial architecture suggest establishing a set of international standards and encouraging countries to adopt them. Harmonization of standards is also expected to achieve domestic financial stability and the adoption of common standards is likely to reduce transaction costs in the process of financial integration and so to foster international trade and investment, increase transparency and reduce moral hazard. However, because of their different levels of development, not all countries can be expected to meet the same standards. If enforcement of common standards does not permit a degree of variation and flexibility at country level, then standardization efforts could result in enormous adjustment costs for emerging market economies and developing countries. 21 Reform of the international financial institutions is therefore seen as key in building a new architecture for global markets and reform proposals stress, among other things, the importance of improving their accountability and governance. This would entail better representation of developing countries on the executive boards of the Bank and Fund; enhancing their capacity to contribute; bailing in the private sector; improving approaches to sovereign debt restructuring; putting in place appropriate exchange rate regimes and capital controls; giving the advisory group of developing countries, the G-24, a more prominent role; and harnessing the capacities of ngo s. At the broader systemic level, these measures are emblematic of a counter-offensive by emerging markets that mark some important paradigmatic shifts in the global economic governance discourse and debate. These are primarily anchored and framed by the following issues: ̈ institutional reforms that would make possible greater openness, public accountability and improved participation by developing countries in the decision-making of the imf and the World Bank; ̈ changes in economic policy reform instruments that will support more equitable, sustainable and participatory development and which address the root causes of poverty; ̈ scaling back the financing, operations, role and power of the imf and the World Bank and rechanneling financial resources into a variety of 21. Dani Rodrik, Governing the Global Economy: Does One Architectural Style Fit All? Brookings Institute Trade Policy Forum, April 1999. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 49

development assistance initiatives that will ameliorate debt and increase finance for low-income countries; and ̈ a stricter division of labor among global institutions in managing the economic governance architecture as well as their operating procedures and modes of governance. Conclusion It is trite but true to say that economic and financial globalization holds out the prospect of enormous benefits, but also poses great challenges and entails serious risks. One of the major benefits of globalization is that emerging markets have become increasingly involved in the exchange of goods and capital and stand to benefit handsomely from the transfer of knowledge, information and technologies. Emerging markets especially have become major global trading partners as well as primary recipients of financial flows. Some, such as those in Asia, have now approached thresholds of industrialized countries with sustained growth rates above those of high-income countries. They themselves have now become sources of international capital flows. Over the last five years, roughly 20 emerging markets have accounted for 30 percent of world exports and have received about 20 percent of gross global investment, a figure which is close to fdi inflows into the United States. However, greater integration also means greater economic and financial spillover effects from one country or region to the rest of the world. Some of these effects are positive, while others are less so. The most important positive spillover is the benefits to the global economy from the strong growth in many emerging market economies. However, globalization and capital mobility also make the international system more vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment and confidence. On several occasions contagion effects have spread from one country or market to others. Some of the crises originated in the public sector, such as the debt crisis during the 1980s, which started with Poland and Mexico and spread to Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and the Soviet Union. Thereafter crises followed in Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997/98, Russia in 1998 and more recently in Brazil, Argentina and Turkey. Others stemmed from events in the private sector, such as the stock market collapse in 1987, the bond market crash in 1994, the near failure of the large hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and the bursting of the technology 50 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers ipg 2/2005

bubble in 2000. All these events conspired to destabilize the international financial system, underscoring the need for deep systemic changes to the policy framework of the international economic and financial system. Two imperatives have arisen from the reform agenda. First, there is general consensus that the private sector and markets should enjoy a central role while sound public policies and institutions are needed to provide market participants with a secure operating environment. Second, increased international cooperation has been considered key in addressing the lack of congruence between globalized markets and national policy requirements. It is from this interface that debates about reconstituting global economic governance have taken place, particularly as they affect recasting the roles and functions of the Bretton Woods institutions. The thrust of reform measures includes greater transparency, broadened representation of emerging market economies, sharpening the Bank and the Fund’s focus and reinforcing their policy advice and financial support instruments. Emerging powers can use their multiple comparative advantages to make a difference in the living standards of the poorest citizens of the world. Finally, while the social impact of globalization on poverty, labor markets, the environment and migration remains a contentious subject, it is acknowledged to have exacerbated inequalities within as well as across emerging market countries and has increased economic and political insecurity. Thus globalization transcends the economic realm and is increasingly influenced by global health and environmental challenges such as hiv /Aids and climate change. Even if the causal linkage between income inequality and poverty as a consequence of globalization is dubious, it is a contributing phenomenon to poor performance in reducing poverty. 22 Too many of the world’s people live in conditions that are unacceptable for the 21st century. It is here that emerging market economies and their rapid development as emerging powers can use their multiple comparative advantages to make a difference to the living standards of the poorest citizens of the world. 22. Richard Kohl(ed.), Globalisation, Poverty and Inequality. Paris: Development Centre of the oecd , 2003. ipg 2/2005 Le Pere, Emerging Markets – Emerging Powers 51

MERCOSUR: Southern Integration under Construction MARCEL VAILLANT E conomic integration means liberalizing the rules which govern the movement of goods and production factors by distinguishing between two groups of countries: those which are party to the agreement and those which are not. This discrimination might generate an ambiguous final outcome, in the sense that trade may be more or less open than previously. Integrating entails becoming exposed to more competition from the output of another»club member,« while possibly creating more protectionism against the output of a third party which has not signed the treaty. This phenomenon makes it particularly rewarding to study trade liberalization in the context of an economic integration process. Countries which decide to integrate and grant each other preferential treatment usually belong to a particular geographical and/or cultural region, which is why agreements of this kind tend to be classified as regionalist. During the 1990s, regionalism spread as a strategy by means of which economic globalization could unfold. Regional Trade Agreements ( rta s) proliferated rapidly during that decade, growing from around 50 in the early 1990s to 215 in 2003. By 2007 the number is expected to reach 300( omc , 2003). There are various explanations for this phenomenon: for example, multilateralism as a mechanism for advancing the reciprocal, non-discriminatory liberalization of trade was showing signs of wear(Krugman, 1991), and regionalism is a strategic response to discrimination imposed by others(Baldwin, 1996). This paper does not set out to explore the broader motives behind this new wave of regionalism. Rather, it seeks to draw on the ideas reflected in the abundant literature on the topic to describe the genesis and evolution of a specific trade bloc: the Mercado Común del Sur( mercosur ). 1 This bloc stands out as an ambitious agreement by four countries of the South(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) to achieve economic 1. See, inter alia, Frankel(1997); De Melo and Panagariya(1993); World Bank(2000); bid (2002). 52 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

integration. Drawing on this case, the article will offer some general reflections on integration paths for economies of the South and propose a number of general arguments to explain the perceived incentives which encourage nations to opt for integration. Birth of an Ambitious Project 2 2 In the international economy, most trade takes place between neighbors or within regions. There are patterns of specialization and models of behavior that have been verified empirically and explain why neighboring economies manifest the closest trading links. Shorter distances, contiguity, a common language, cultural patterns, and relatively similar stages of development account for much of the relative intensity of commerce between neighbors. All these factors apply within mercosur . The members are geographically close with shared borders, remote from the rest of the world, with not dissimilar levels of development. These economies constitute what is known as a natural trade bloc. If these countries were to liberalize their trade, they would trade more with each other whether or not they applied a discriminatory trade policy towards the rest of the world(integration policies). There is evidence in the region to corroborate these statements. However, if this is the case – if the same thing would happen»naturally« simply by opening up trade – why do they need integration agreements? The advantage of an agreement is that it ensures access to each other’s markets on a reciprocal basis. Besides, economic integration permits the development of a framework for cooperation which can become an essential ingredient in the economic development of member countries. Regional integration in the Southern Cone of America has taken place against a backdrop of two processes which are worth recalling here. The first is the revival of regionalism or economic integration(reciprocal and discriminatory trade liberalization) in the early 1990s as an alternative to the multilateral format of trade liberalization(reciprocal and non-discriminatory). The second process is a shift in how all Southern Cone economies have pursued growth, from a model founded on import sub2. For a detailed description and evaluation of the trade agreement, its content, legal framework and institutional structure, see Secretaría del mercosur (2004). ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 53

stitution to one based on opening up their trade. The regional agreement was created as an instrument to facilitate, jointly determine and drive the integration of these economies as the international economy entered a new stage of globalization. The biggest change was witnessed by the Brazilian economy, which opened unilaterally and more fundamentally from the late 1980s and especially in the early 1990s. The integration agreement analyzed here should be seen within the context of this shift in paradigm, for it was intended to support and consolidate the unilateral strategy of liberalization which all economies in the region were embarking upon, albeit at different speeds. The integration agreement was intended to support and consolidate the unilateral strategy of liberalization which all economies in the region were embarking upon, albeit at different speeds. Over a decade after the Treaty of Asunción of March 1991, the founding moment of mercosur , both processes – regionalism and liberalization – are again acutely topical. Regionalism has been established in the international economy as one approach to liberalization. The paradigm is illustrated most clearly by the eu , where momentum is being maintained with regard to both deepening and widening. Two examples suffice: the common currency and Eastern enlargement. At the same time, the multilateral strategy is once again provoking a degree of skepticism due to its slow pace and meager results. The World Trade Organization ( wto ) has created a global framework of rules and a dispute settlement system, but the commitment is nevertheless weak. Member states are looking to regional agreements to create firmer foundations for their economies to participate in global exchange. The Southern Cone countries have committed themselves to opening up their trade, their economies have been restructured and they must expand their markets to ensure sustainability for their export strategy. The Treaty of Asunción constituted a reciprocal free trade agreement which was conceived in addition as an instrument for building a common market incorporating the economies of Southern countries at a relatively similar stage of development. It differed from earlier attempts at integration in its universal approach(in contrast to lists of products). The aim is to integrate in order to achieve growth and promote economic and social development for the peoples of the member states. 54 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

The integration agreement was formulated around two major time lines: the Trade Liberalization Program( tlp ) and the Regime of Adaptation to mercosur ( ram ). These two instruments govern the process of commercial integration, still the linchpin of the agreement. The tlp dates back to the initial Treaty of 1991 and was the basis for creating the Free Trade Area( fta ). Intra-regional tariffs were gradually eliminated by using a linear and automatic reduction scheme. This liberalization scheme was announced in advance by the member countries’ governments and then carried out twice a year on a regular basis, as envisaged at the outset. Its rigorous implementation makes it a model specimen of public policy adopted by the member countries. The second instrument, the ram , emerged from the Ouro Preto summit of December 1994. It was set up to finalize the Free Trade Area as the Trade Liberalization Program was reaching completion. However, this new instrument broadened the terms of liberalization, slowing down the construction process of the Free Trade Zone. A new list of products excluded from the intra-regional free trade was defined. Now that the schedule laid down for these ram lists has been fulfilled, the integration agreement can be described as a universal, non-tariff, free trade zone with a degree of harmonization in terms of trading policies adopted towards third parties. It was also at the Ouro Preto summit of 1994 that the members of the trade agreement adopted a Customs Union( cu ) format. To begin with, agreement was reached on a basic structure for the Common External Tariff( cet ), along with a convergence schedule for sectors in which political preferences were still not congruent. However, 10 years after this new direction was adopted, the cet has not yet established a common structure. There are still exceptions for certain member countries and sectors, unharmonized special trade regimes, there are no common trade defense mechanisms and so many national differences remain. This highly perforated cet system explains why rules of origin are still required for goods traded within the region. Member countries are still applying different national policies to a major chunk of the tariff universe. Economic Relevance in the Global Economy Since mercosur was founded it has increasingly caught the attention of the big players in the global economy(blocs, countries, international oripg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 55

ganizations, private sector) that have different interests in this initiative for a regional bloc of economies of the South. The strategy chosen by the mercosur members for economic integration makes this an ambitious venture. Its model is similar to the European format, developing through a sequence of stages with increasingly close economic relations. Moreover, this region is primarily a magnet for the world economy due to its relative abundance of natural resources. And finally, it constitutes a potential market which could attract global interest if it manages to steer a course of stable growth. If we assess the significance of the Southern Cone bloc by looking at how it has performed in respect of three parameters(production, trade, and foreign direct investment), however, we obtain a more differentiated picture, enabling us to place the above in a broader perspective(Baraibar and Vaillant, 2004). First, we can study mercosur ’s performance between the end of the 1980s(1990) and 2003(thus using the most recently available annual statistics). Moreover, mercosur ’s performance can be compared with that of other trade blocs: the Andean Community, the North American Free Trade Area( nafta ), the European Union of 15 member states( eu -15), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations( asean ). These blocs were chosen because they combine two criteria: their importance to the world economy and their importance to mercosur . With regard to production, momentum was lower than for the world economy as a whole and this is reflected by a decline in mercosur ’s share of global production. In the period under review the economic weight of the bloc decreased, from 2.6 percent in the early 1990s to 2.0 percent in the last three years considered(2001–2003)(see figure 1). Looking at global trade patterns, the five trade blocs account for twothirds of international trade. Half this trade is intra-regional, with a mostly upward trend in the period under review. With regard to mercosur , trade within the bloc increased in line with the integration process (reaching about 20 percent), but it remains low compared with other blocs(less than half the average for the five blocs as a whole). These statistics illustrate how the integration process is advancing. If we consider imports, the region’s share of world trade fell, from 1.4 percent in 1995 to less than 1.0 percent in 2003. As regards exports, on the other hand, the growth rate was slightly higher than for world trade as a whole between 1995 and 2003, when the share of world exports rose from 0.9 percent to 1.0 percent. In both cases trade share was noticeably 56 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

Figure 1: Trade Bloc Shares of Global Production(%) 40,0 35,0 30,0 25,0 20,0 15,0 10,0 5,0 0,0 SUR AC AN FTA EU OW CO ASE NA R ER M 1990–1992 2001–2003 Source: based on data from Baraibar and Vaillant(2004). ac = Andean Community. row = rest of the world. lower than share of production, reflecting the fact that the region is relatively closed compared with the world economy as a whole. In 2003 global trade was 22 percent of global production, while for mercosur the figure was 10.5 percent for imports and 17 percent for exports of regional production(see figure 2). The 1990s brought rocketing international capital movements. In 1990 global foreign direct investment( fdi ) flows were about four times as high as those registered in 1980. The eu and nafta countries were the principal destinations. Investment in blocs in the South focused initially on asean , where the fdi inflow in 1990 was six times higher than in 1980, and on the Andean Community, where it trebled over the same period. mercosur showed similar values, but the increasing flow into the region did not begin until later. The formal launch of the agreement in 1991 coincided with a substantial inward flow of fdi . In 1995 inward fdi was three times as high as in 1990, and in 2000 it was four times the total for 1995. One factor which boosted the bloc’s ability to attract this investment and explains what has been called the» fdi boom«(Chudnovsky, 2001) were the privatizations initiated by governments in the region. Towards ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 57

% Figure 2: International Trade as Percentage of Production(GDP) in 2003 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 MERCOSUR AC NAFTA EU IMP/GDP EXP/GDP World Source: based on data from Baraibar and Vaillant(2004). the end of the period for which statistics are available(2003) a decline set in, although the volume never dropped to the levels seen prior to the integration agreement(see table 1). In 2003 the region accounted for a somewhat higher share of global fdi (1.9 percent) than of global production(1.7 percent), whereas in 1990 share of global production was larger(2.6 percent) and the capacity to attract fdi considerably lower(0.5 percent). This is one of the few areas in which the bloc’s role in the world economy is substantiated by real economic data. A degree of caution is required, however, because fdi is increasingly focusing on Brazil. Table 1 demonstrates this eloquently. This gain in share by the largest country in the bloc is not merely a new phenomenon associated with the recent crisis(notably in Argentina), but the result of a more far-reaching process which has been going on since the outset, a trend which should sound an alarm with regard to the outcome of the integration process. We shall examine these matters in the following section. 58 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

Table 1: FDI into MERCOSUR Countries: Annual Average for the Period(US$ Million) Period/ Country 1990–1993 1994–1997 1998–2001 2002–2003 Argentina 2 763 6 229 10 966 632 Brazil 1 361 9 429 28 168 13 367 Paraguay Uruguay 93 68 155 144 157 248 47 219 MERCOSUR 4 285 15 957 39 538 14 264 Source: from unctad database as cited in Baraibar and Vaillant(2004). Benefits of Regional Integration and Obstacles to Full Economic Integration The first and fairly obvious benefit which the mercosur countries have derived from integration is preferential access to a larger market. A simple quantification of the differentiated impact of this for member countries is comparison of the size of the region – excluding the country concerned – with the size of the country itself. Among other things this shows the great asymmetry between members: in the case of Brazil, the populations of the other countries, and hence the market they represent, amount to only about one-third of its own. For Uruguay, on the other hand, with its low density of population, the other countries constitute a market 64.6 times the size of its own. If production is our measure, Paraguay finds itself in a region almost 124 times as big as its own economy. Argentina is in an intermediate position by comparison with its fellow members: while the bloc gives it access to an economy several times larger than its own(almost three times for production and nearly five times for population), it is not as small as Paraguay or Uruguay, in respect of which the size of the regional market is overwhelming. One necessity facing the three smaller members(Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) is the opportunity to sell their products to the rest of the world. Small economies have specialized structures, producing large quantities of only a few products and consuming small quantities of many products. This specialization can be related to a certain external vulnerability, given that the country will be bound by the access requireipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 59

ments of the markets they are specializing in. The products in respect of which the minor mercosur countries enjoy conventional competitive advantages face international markets which can be difficult to enter. External vulnerability can be reduced if the size of the market that can be accessed under free trade conditions is bigger, broadening the range of products and services in which a country can specialize. The three smaller MERCOSUR countries have not yet profited from joining a larger market. For small economies, therefore, economic integration is another instrument for surmounting the constraints of their restricted domestic market. Modern manufacturing technology means that economies of scale play a dominant role in competitiveness. When the scale is bigger (or when more is produced), production costs per unit fall. International trade makes it possible to exploit these efficiency gains. Comparison indicates that regional integration plays a central role in this process. However, the three smaller mercosur countries have not yet profited from joining a larger market. For Argentina and Uruguay, integration brought with it a loss of their share in mercosur ’s industrial production during the first phase. A number of recent papers have documented this phenomenon for Argentina(Sanguinetti, Triastaru and Volpe, 2003) and Uruguay(Labraga and Lalanne, 2004). Table 2 shows how the countries with which we are concerned have evolved as a manufacturing base over a longer period, confirming this effect. 3 Economic integration has displayed two essential characteristics which explain the poor industrial performance of the bloc’s three smaller economies: i. The abolition of import tariffs on intra-regional trade by and large followed a previously announced schedule. Non-tariff barriers( ntb ), however, were not eliminated with the same efficiency, and these continued to influence intra-regional trade. The existence of non-tariff 3. The phenomenon must also be examined at subregional level within the countries concerned, especially in the case of the two geographically larger members. This permits more accurate comparisons in assessing the development of agglomerated industrial centers within the bloc and how their evolution relates to the progress of integration(Terra and Vaillant, 2000). 60 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

Table 2: Manufacturing GDP in MERCOSUR(US$ Million at 1995 Values and%) 1980–1982 1990–1992 2000–2002 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay mercosur US $ million 36 350 117 415 991 3 798 158 554 % 22.9 74.1 0.6 2.4 100.0 US $ million 36 507 121 986 1 218 3 772 163 483 % 22.3 74.6 0.7 2.3 100.0 US $ million 39 440 148 008 1 300 3 207 191 955 % 20.5 77.1 0.7 1.7 100.0 Source: author’s calculations based on eclac data(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean). barriers acts as an incentive to locate investment and production in the big market. This is due in part to the direct effect they have on prices and in part to the uncertainty they create about future results. The damage caused by barriers is not only direct, due to the way they hamper trade flows, but also indirect, because of the likelihood that future barriers might be imposed on current location decisions. ii. Although the bloc opted for a customs union format, 10 years after the Ouro Preto Protocol it continues to operate like a free trade area when it comes to the rules governing circulation of goods within the integrated zone. The only goods to which preferential customs treatment is applied in intra-regional trade are those considered native under the current Rules of Origin( ro ). The consequences are considerable in terms of the ability to attract industrial processes to small market economies, which have a low level of vertical integration in their industrial structure. It has been demonstrated that the Rules of Origin stimulate demand for and translate into higher prices for regional inputs. Small economies, which could offer advantages in shorter production chains, are unable to develop this specialization in the current scenario . Indeed, they are prevented from doing so because if goods are not native, even if they comply with common trade policy(Common External Tariff and common preferential regime for third parties), the tariff must be paid again as soon as the goods cross another border within the region. ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 61

In other words, the existence of ntb and the continued application of the ro to the full customs universe have left the elimination of hurdles and restrictions to intra-regional trade stranded halfway in terms of exploiting the integration potential. During the 1990s, the trade bloc made progress towards abolishing tariffs. Today, however, tariffs offer an incomplete yardstick and tell us little about the difficulties still being posed by market access. Zignago and Mayer(2004) have therefore estimated the explanatory power of borders by studying the extent to which domestic production is favored as against production from the rest of the world. The results for the 1990s show that on average in the world economy, a country buys 273 times more from itself than it would buy from any other country when the control variables(market size, distance, tariffs, and so on) are similar. There are differences, however, between North–North trade, with a ratio of 130, and South–South trade, with a ratio of 327! If countries have a preferential trade agreement, this border effect coefficient is reduced to 42. The result is clear: preferential trade agreements diminish border effects substantially for the regions examined in this analysis. This also applies to the four countries of mercosur , although the border effect coefficient within the bloc(120) is still considerable(by comparison: the ratio for the eu is 47, for Canadian– us trade 52, and for asean 81. Only the Andean Community has even stronger border effects, with a ratio of 330). Zignago and Mayer(2004) also conducted a longitudinal analysis of changes in border effects in the world economy as a whole and region by region. They demonstrate a declining tendency, especially within the framework of regional trading agreements. The two blocs that have proved most successful in reducing border-related fragmentation are the European Union and nafta . In the regional structure composed by our four Southern economies, the border effect fell noticeably in the 1990s, but it remains high. Geographical trade models which specify the complex interaction between economies of scale, transport costs and market size show that the level of industrialization of peripheral economies(those which are not within industrial heartlands) forms an irregular U-curve when set against the depth of integration achieved(Krugman and Venables, 1990). When levels of integration are very low, industry is spatially dispersed; as integration proceeds, strong incentives emerge to concentrate manufacturing where market size is greater. If integration progresses effectively, economies that were once peripheral come closer to the industrial core, thereby 62 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

increasing their capacity to retain manufacturing activity on their territory. 4 Consequently, if economic integration has led to deindustrialization in the smaller, more peripheral economies of mercosur , this is not due to high but to low integration. To the extent that regional integration has only managed to advance a few first steps, it has exacerbated the negative bias against manufacturing locations in smaller economies, as the theoretical literature predicts(the U-shaped pattern). Negotiating with Third Parties: Projects and Problems As already mentioned, mercosur is an agreement with ambitious goals for economic integration. The trading strategy it adopted was a Customs Union format. The cu is not often used in the global economy when setting up preferential trading agreements because it is associated with a greater degree of commitment among member countries to developing common policies and institutions. 5 There are a number of explicit reasons why this format was selected. One has already been described and relates to the fact that this model of preferential agreement permits more intensive regional integration, ultimately eliminating Rules of Origin and thereby permitting a more universal circulation of intra-regional trade. The other motive frequently cited is that a cu strengthens the region’s hand when negotiating with third parties because this integration model calls for a common trade policy. The comparative advantages of the four mercosur countries are heavily weighted towards goods with an intensive input of natural resources. These are the productive factors which the Southern Cone boasts in abundance. Many of the sectors concerned have problems accessing the international market, especially the big industrialized markets. There is a close correlation between the comparative advantages the bloc can offer and the protectionist core of trade policies adopted by the wealthy nations. This is especially evident in the case of agricultural food 4. Terra and Vaillant 2000 calibrated the center-periphery model for the economic geography of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay and in simulations with low and average levels of integration they obtained results of this type for the smaller countries in the bloc. 5. Of the 215 current regional trade agreements, only 14 have been notified to the wto as customs unions( omc , 2003). ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 63

Table 3: Manufacturing Production in Latin America (US$ Million at 1995 Values and%) 1980–1982 1990–1992 2000–2002 mercosur Chile ac mcca Mexico total US $ million 158 554 6 746 30 773 6 063 55 134 257 270 % 61.6 2.6 12.0 2.4 21.4 100.0 US $ million 163 483 9 908 33 382 6 883 67 835 281 490 % 58.1 3.5 11.9 2.4 24.1 100.0 US $ million 191 955 14 520 36 134 10 298 98 209 351 117 % 54.7 4.1 10.3 2.9 28.0 100.0 Notes: ac – Andean Community; mcca – Central American Common Market. Source: author’s calculations based on data from eclac . products, but not confined to them. The regional integration initiative could be regarded as an instrument for correcting this unequal access to the global economy. As the previous chapter showed, the member countries display a low dynamism compared to other regions, reflected in the aggregated figures for production and trade. The situation is equally worrying when we undertake a more specific comparison. If we consider the relative performance of manufacturing output compared with the other countries of Latin America, we will note that the Treaty countries come up with negative values. Table 3 illustrates this decline by comparing the share of industrial production for the three-year period at the beginning of three successive decades. The fastest growing countries were Chile and Mexico, where industrial output rose fastest, and their record is particularly striking when set against Argentina and Brazil(see table 2). This may partly be explained by their success in negotiations with third parties, especially the dynamic industrialized economies of the North. Obtaining better terms of access to the markets of industrialized countries is a priority, and indeed a strategic necessity in sustaining the model of trade liberalization and export-driven growth adopted by the merco64 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

sur countries from the 1990s onward. Opening up trade implies replacing inefficient domestic production with production from the rest of the world offered at a better quality and price. It is vital, therefore, to ensure that the productive resources no longer required as a consequence of this are channeled into domestic activities that promise greater relative efficiency. If these favorable sectors then encounter problems of global market access, the liberalization model will be constrained in its progress and limited in its sustainability. There is a link between the beneficial effects of negotiating trade conditions with third parties and the ability to establish a unified market. If there is a common trade policy, 6 it will be easier to express a negotiating position. If there is merely an intention to adopt a common trade policy but it has not yet been fully implemented, or even made to function partially, this will mitigate the potential for deriving national or collective advantages from joint negotiations with third parties. Joint negotiations of mercosur members with third parties have developed vigorously over the last 10 years, but the results have frankly been meager. Joint preferential agreements were struck very quickly with Chile and Bolivia, but a joint agreement with the Andean Community was only concluded in 2004. It is evident that this latter agreement will face serious implementation problems. Further negotiation scenarios have proliferated, but any significant talks have foundered or been suspended. Many factors have contributed to this outcome, but one which cannot be ignored is the region’s own inability to progress towards a common trade policy, which would include as one of its constituent elements a clear negotiating position for each of the areas described above. It is particularly worth noting what happened in trade negotiations with the European Union. Negotiations between the eu and mercosur , which were initiated in 1999 after ratification of the Interregional Framework Agreement geared towards the creation of an Interregional Association, led to the formation of several committees with the aim of reaching agreement on political, commercial, and cooperation issues(Arcuri and Vaillant, 2004). However, the strategy developed by both parties is based 6. There are various components in a common trade policy. The salient ones are: a classification system for common goods; similar customs valuation systems, which normally requires a common customs code; a common external tariff; shared trade defense rules(anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, protective clauses); a similar preferential trade scheme for third markets; harmonized or shared special trade regimes. ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 65

on different and contrasting views. mercosur is attempting to improve access – particularly for agricultural products – to the European market, which underlines a systemic approach and leads to conditions being imposed on the continuation of the negotiations, currently based on a liberalization offer perceived by mercosur as asymmetric. The eu wants to be sure that it can count on definite trade norms, including customs issues as well as trade in services, investment, government procurement, intellectual property, and sustainable development. The eu also regards it as necessary to establish clear rules with respect to free circulation within the mercosur countries, harmonization of customs norms, and a trustworthy system of conflict resolution. In order to achieve this, a negotiation process in two phases was proposed, which should begin with the question of norms, and continuing with negotiations on market access, including a better mercosur offer regarding custom duties. We can observe a shift in direction on the part of Brazil towards an option which privileges South–South negotiations, especially within South America, as a substitute for trade negotiations with the economies of the North. More than any other talks, these offered mercosur an opportunity to enhance its own agreement by joining a process of integration with a third party. This is not a trade agreement which waters down existing preferences(as might be the case with the Free Trade Area of the Americas, ftaa , in an American context), but it does require mercosur to function as a Customs Union. It is actually one of the few global precursors of bloc-to-bloc associations of this kind. Given the integrated nature of this association, which goes beyond the trade link to include political and cooperation aspects, the agreement with the European Union stands out as an ideal proposal to enable the bloc to profit from the technology of economic integration which the eu can be claimed without any exaggeration to have invented. Unfortunately, on this count again the balance is negative. Broadly speaking, since mercosur was launched in the early 1990s, not a single trade negotiation of any significance has been concluded with third markets. Some thought should be given to why the record on external negotiation has been so poor. One factor already mentioned is the slow progress of the Customs Union. However, deeper causes must be sought 66 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

which might relate to the true policy preferences of member states, in particular Brazil, rather than those currently being expressed openly. Generally, we can observe a shift in direction on the part of Brazil towards an option which privileges South–South negotiations, especially within South America, as a substitute for trade negotiations with the economies of the North. This attitude does not hold out particularly good prospects for future consolidation of the Customs Union: first, given the concrete economic relevance such agreements can have, besides the objectives they may be pursuing in terms of international relations, and secondly given that many of them highlight the erratic or incomplete functioning of the Customs Union and do not qualify as joint preferential agreements. The format they need in order to be politically acceptable makes them the worst possible agreements from an economic perspective. Hopes have been expressed more recently in relation to the agreements with India and China. It would be wrong to talk of irrelevance, but it can be argued that they do not appear to be the kind of trade agreements likely to further the bloc’s joint functioning. Moreover, there are no well-founded reasons for believing that mercosur ’s bargaining position will be any better when dealing with these highly populous, distant Asian nations than with an integrated Europe, with which the Southern Cone has long, continuous historical ties, political, economic, and cultural. Brazil is the country with the most reservations about signing agreements with the industrialized nations, but it is also the country which stands to gain the biggest markets and to benefit from increased bargaining power provided by joint negotiations. It is clear that the difficulties encountered by the bloc in negotiating with the industrialized world are not all of their own making. While mercosur may be a small fish in the global pond, it remains the biggest regional economic player in Latin America. The industrialized nations, both American and European, have come to the negotiating table with a broad, all-embracing agenda, but with trade offers which any sober observer is bound to describe as unacceptable. In those sectors in which the industrialized nations have a clear interest, the objective is total liberalization based on general rules, but when they want to defend particular sectors there is no limit to their particularism. It is logical that the domestic political elites within the Southern bloc, especially within its largest member, do not favor trade negotiations in this vein. In a recent book, Lorenzo and Vaillant(2004) argued with regard to the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas( ftaa ) that strengthipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 67

ening the case for liberalization depends on the groups who will benefit from increased exports and investments in outside markets. Their ability to put pressure on their home government depends critically on the scope for improving access to their trading partners’ markets. The industrialized countries have the option of pursuing an active policy to push for liberalization in an emerging market where a particular sector or focus attracts their interest, and making significant concessions in their own market in sectors where the Southern bloc can clearly benefit. This will strengthen the alliance of pro-agreement exporters in the South, encouraging liberalization and causing their markets to open up. In the case analyzed by Lorenzo and Vaillant(2004), it will be difficult for the United States to improve its access to markets for electronics, high tech and capital goods if it is not prepared to make significant concessions at the core of its protectionist structure for agriculture and traditional manufacturing. What goes for the bigger partner certainly goes for the Southern bloc and emphasizes the relevance of the domestic factor in international negotiations. Conclusions The 1991 Treaty of Asunción constituted a reciprocal initiative towards trade liberalization, additionally conceived as an instrument for building a Common Market, undertaken by economies of the South at similar levels of development. Since it was founded it has increasingly caught the attention of the major players in the global economy. However, the only conspicuous impact that the bloc has made on the global economy derives from its capacity to attract fdi , although there has been a continuous trend towards geographical concentration within the bloc, favoring Brazil as its largest member. In a context of asymmetric market size, gradual integration generates strong disparities in the industrial location of manufacturing activities. The present situation therefore poses a choice between moving ahead and turning back. Moving ahead means greater integration. This option inevitably entails a deeper commitment and the creation of common institutions capable of managing, among other things, the two issues described earlier: non-tariff barriers and rules of origin in intra-regional trade. These have both acted as a brake on the intensification of economic integration. Turning back would require the smaller economies to adopt 68 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

defensive measures to stem the tide of concentration in the largest country, reducing the level of integration. At the same time, a process of broadening mercosur is under way. The majority of the countries in South America are either integrated into the bloc or else associate members or candidates. 7 Negotiations about free trade agreements between the bloc and several other states or regions are also on track. One cannot be sure whether a joint preferential trade agreement with another country or bloc will be a substitute for pressing ahead towards a fully fledged mercosur trade agreement. One might expect, to take the reverse approach, that a joint trade policy ought to be a basic requirement for any joint trade agreement. In that sense one might expect there to be a positive complementary relationship between broadening the base and setting up new agreements on the one hand and deepening the structure of the present regional agreement on the other. To bring that about, however, real joint agreements have to be concluded with third parties, and one critical factor here is doubtless the kind of partner one should choose. It is not clear whether the current approach to broadening the bloc and extending relations with third markets will strengthen relations between the four members in a manner which will enable them to resolve the various problems preventing proper functioning of the trade agreement. Furthermore, the characteristics of these essentially South–South agreements encourage a certain pessimism about their ability to promote a functioning Customs Union, although they could certainly help the region to exert greater political influence in the global arena. Even so, one cannot tell how this greater political influence might translate into more favorable conditions regarding issues of concern to the region in particular and the South in general. The history of these new relations is too brief to allow an informed judgment. mercosur trade agreements with industrialized economies signify improved market access for products of interest, thus realizing the benefits of joint negotiation. In addition, however, they pave the way to intensifying the commitment of the four member countries in that they are obliged to apply stricter rules to implementing their regional trade agreement. Negotiations with both the United States(via the ftaa or bilater7. Chile, Bolivia, and Peru are associate members and Venezuela has asked to become one. To be an associate member, the country must enter into a universal trade agreement with the bloc(Free Trade Area). ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 69

ally) and the European Union are fundamental. In particular, a possible agreement with Europe could, more than any other, encourage the bloc to function more effectively as a Customs Union. But negotiating with the North is not easy, for the wide-ranging gains facilitated by these agreements are associated with a complex and adverse political economy which can be overcome only with a great deal of political will and leadership on both sides. Bibliography Arcuri, Reginaldo, and Vaillant, Marcel. 2004.»Acuerdo de Asociación ue / mercosur : ¿más de lo mismo o un nuevo marco de relaciones?«, in: Aportes a la III Cumbre UE-ALC , Guadalajara, 2004, celare , Santiago de Chile. Baldwin, Richard. 1996.»A domino theory of regionalism«, in: Richard Baldwin, Pentti Haaparanta, and Jaakko Kiander(eds.), Expanding Membership of the European Union. New York: Cambridge University Press for the Centre of Economic Research. Baraibar, Mercedes, and Vaillant, Marcel. 2004. El mercosur y la Economía Internacional: producción, comercio e inversion. fesur Working Paper. Montevideo, Uruguay. bid . 2002. Más allá de las fronteras, el nuevo regionalismo en América Latina. Progreso Económico y Social en América Latina. Informe 2002, Washington. Chudnovsky, Daniel et al. 2001. El boom de la inversión extranjera directa en el MERCOSUR. Siglo XXI. Madrid. De Melo, Jaime, and Panagariya, Arvind. 1993. New dimension in regional integration. World Bank/Cambridge University Press. Frankel, Jeffrey. 1997. Regional Trading Blocs in the world economic system. Institute for International Economics, Washington. Krishna, Pravin, and Mitra, Devashish. 2000. Reciprocated unilateralism: a political economy approach. Working Paper. Krugman, Paul, and Venables, Anthony. 1990.»Integration and the competitiveness of peripheral industry«, in: C. Bliss and J. Braga de Macedo(eds.), Policy and dynamics in international trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krugman, Paul. 1991. The move towards the free trade zones, in: Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones. Proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Labraga, Juan, and Lalanne, Andrés. 2004. Una visión desde la Nueva Geografía Económica al desempeño industrial de Uruguay en los’90. Graduation thesis, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administración, unpublished. Lorenzo, Fernando, and Vaillant, Marcel. 2004. MERCOSUR and the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Woodrow Wilson Center of Scholars, Latin American Program, Red mercosur , Washington. 70 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction ipg 2/2005

omc . 2003. Acuerdos Comerciales Regionales: un panorama cambiante. Sección de Acuerdos comerciales regionales, División de Examen de las Políticas Comerciales, Secretaría de la omc . Sanguinetti, Pablo, Triastaru, Iulia, and Volpe Martincus, Christian. 2003. Economic integration and location of production activities: the case of Mercosur. Preliminary draft. Secretaría del Mercosur. 2004. Primer Informe Semestral de la Secretaría del mercosur . Un foco para el proceso de integración regional. Montevideo. Terra, María I., and Vaillant, Marcel. 2000.»Comercio, fronteras políticas y geografía: un enfoque regional de la integración económica«, in: Gerónimo de Sierra(ed.), Los rostros del MERCOSUR, el difícil camino de lo comercial a lo societal . Buenos Aires: clacso . Vaillant, Marcel. 2001.»Profundización del proceso de integración económica en bienes«, in: Daniel Chudnosvky and José María Fanelli(coordinators), El desafío de integrarse para crecer, balances y perspectivas del MERCOSUR en su primera década, with a Foreword by Enrique Iglesias. red mercosur , Siglo XXI, bid , Madrid. World Bank. 2000. Trade Blocks . Oxford, Oxford University Press. Zignago, Soledad, and Mayer, Thierry. 2004. Market access in global and regional trade. Working Paper, cepii , Paris, France. ipg 2/2005 Vaillant, Southern Integration under Construction 71

Beyond the»Washington Consensus«: Macroeconomic Policies for Development HANSJÖRG HERR/ JAN PRIEWE I n this paper, we argue that a high rate of capital accumulation is vital for economic development 1 and poverty reduction and that improving the efficiency of markets on the micro level(improved allocation of resources) does not necessarily trigger growth. Instead, a stable monetary system with a high»quality« local currency and, in particular, a sustainable balance of payments constellation are key factors. This stands in contrast to the so-called»Washington Consensus«. Along these lines, in the first part of this article we analyse a scenario of underdevelopment and development. We show that the rapid economic growth in China over the last 25 years fits very well in this positive scenario of development. Generally speaking, most East and South Asian developing economies have in recent decades exhibited strong growth, whereas Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have stagnated in terms of growth per capita. 2 The expression»Washington Consensus« was coined to capture the vision of the Washington-based institutions – especially the International Monetary Fund( imf ), the World Bank and the us Treasury – designed to bring about development in Latin America, but later applied to all developing and transition countries. In part two we discuss the Washington Consensus and its later modification. Here, we identify some macroeconomic shortcomings and a lack of clarity. We conclude that macroeconomic policies must play an important and comprehensive role, especially in developing the domestic financial sector, whereas the Washing1. Here the term»development« is used in the sense of sustained growth, high enough to contribute to reducing poverty. We are well aware, of course, that development is more than just a matter of growth. 2. From 1980 to 2002 average annual per capita gdp growth(in 1995 us -Dollar) was –0.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.2 percent in Latin America, 3.2 percent in South Asia(India contributes about 75 percent to the region’s gdp ), and 5.9 percent in East Asia and the Pacific(China being the biggest contributor with 61 percent) (own calculations with World Bank 2004; the figures include only developing countries). 72 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

ton Consensus focuses too much on structural measures aimed at improving efficiency at a microeconomic level and on the belief that liberalized markets spontaneously create prosperity and reduce poverty. Regimes of Underdevelopment and Development Underdevelopment Regime The most important single macroeconomic factor that is a necessary precondition for development is a stable domestic currency which is widely accepted by domestic households, banks and firms. Stability of the currency involves low domestic inflation as well as a stable exchange rate. This is also a necessary precondition for a workable financial sector able to offer sufficient credit at low interest rates without a high degree of dollarization, 3 depreciation and inflation risk. It is evident that particularly currencies issued in developing countries have problems competing with the world’s leading currencies, as they are depreciation-prone. The typical underdeveloped country has a high current account deficit and thus an increasing stock of debt in foreign currency. 4 Such a constellation can be stable for a long time – theoretically it can even be sustainable under certain conditions and be connected with high growth. Generally speaking, however, the fragility of the economy increases with increasing gross foreign debt. Even if governments in developing countries follow sound economic policies they will be forced to accept the denomination of external debt in foreign currency. This»original sin«(Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999; Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 2002) – starting to incur external debt in hard currency – which cannot be overcome by developing countries, leads to great vulnerability. The higher the (gross) external indebtedness the greater the danger that indebtedness will lead to a debt crisis. There are two patterns: a) A country with high foreign debt is confronted with an abrupt refusal on the part of creditors to roll over credits and/or with a sudden out3. Dollarization is the unofficial or official use of a hard currency, mainly the us dollar, in parallel with or instead of the local currency. 4. The arithmetical average current account deficit in the 1990s of 100 low- and lowerincome countries(less than 2,955 us -Dollar per capita) was 5.9 percent, with maximum deficits of more than 30 percent in some countries. Average growth per capita in low income countries(less than 755 us -Dollar per capita) was –0.5 percent, in lower middle income countries 1.4 percent(cp. Priewe and Herr 2005). ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 73

flow of capital. Then the resulting depreciation leads to a serious domestic liquidity and solvency crisis as a sharp depreciation increases the real debt burden of those indebted in foreign currency. This is due to a currency mismatch(debtors realize revenues in domestic currency but have their liabilities in hard currency, see Jeanne and Zettelmeyer 2002). Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999) found that especially in developing countries an exchange rate crisis typically leads to a banking crisis as firms and banks in countries with high foreign debt break down as a result of a strong depreciation. 5 It should be emphasized that current account deficits(even high ones), combined with high growth, may prevail sometimes for long periods, especially if the deficits are used to import investment goods. However, the appearance of a link between growth and current account deficits is deceptive; the longer the imbalance is sustained the greater the risk that strong and often sudden depreciations will ultimately be triggered. 6 b) Most low income countries – especially the heavily indebted poor countries( hipc ) – have little access to commercial external finance and hence depend on credits from international institutions and foreign governments. These capital flows are relatively stable as donors normally do not cease to give credits. The problem facing these countries is that their current account deficit is not sustainable and that they grow slowly in a situation of permanent over-indebtedness. Debt relief improves the situation until after some time over-indebtedness returns (Easterly 2002). As rational economic agents know the disastrous consequences of overindebtedness and devaluations, high current account deficits and high gross foreign debt weaken the reputation of the domestic currency. This leads to a risk premium with substantially higher real(i.e. inflation-adjusted) interest rates in developing countries and leads to an even less equal income distribution. Countries with high foreign debt in foreign currency are afraid of devaluing and thus tend to delay devaluation even if they have huge current account deficits. Such a policy is detrimental to exports and the reputa5. The Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998 are good examples of these effects. In both cases the central bank could not help and the financial system collapsed. For an overview of such twin crises see Kaminsky and Reinhart(1999). 6. Potentially, the depreciation risk can be attenuated under a global currency system with fixed exchange rates like the Bretton Woods system 1944–73. 74 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

• weak quality of local currency • weak position in the international currency competition • permanent risk of depreciation and inflation Figure 1: Underdevelopment Regime • high current account deficit • high gross debt in foreign currency • high degree of currency mismatch risk of capital flight, currency crisis and depreciation expectations low acceptance of domestic money high dollarization weak domestic banking and financial system high real interest rates and low availability of credit low investment low growth and underdevelopment tion of the local currency. Capital flight has to be reduced or necessary capital imports have to be stimulated with high interest rates. Countries in such a situation are caught in a dilemma. Depreciation could destroy the domestic financial system because of too high foreign debt, and avoiding devaluation requires additional foreign debt and higher debt servicing. Since the current account deficits in such countries are partially paid for by policy loans or donations, these»soft budget constraints« can delay necessary adjustments. The currency crises in Russia in 1998 – despite a current account surplus – and Argentina in 2002 are two telling examples of the scenario described. Both countries accumulated unsustainable foreign debt, and in both cases extreme depreciations occurred ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 75

with disastrous effects on the domestic financial system(Stiglitz 2002; Mussa 2003; Teunissen and Akkerman 2003). Any external shock, sometimes even minor ones, from the world economy or from inside the country – and shocks are more likely in developing countries, with their often fragile economic, social and political systems – can trigger a financial crisis. In such a situation, economic agents prefer to retain a large share of their financial wealth in dollars or euros: if it is kept abroad, it is capital flight; if it is kept inside the country, it is dollarization. The results are high interest rates and an unstable domestic banking system. To put it differently, the country is not able to issue a domestic currency which is sufficiently accepted by wealth owners, resulting in high interest rates, high dollarization and a lack of credit. The overall effect is low investment and low growth. The bad economic performance of the country provides no scope for improving acceptance of the domestic currency. Even a stable price level and a stable exchange rate may not be able to improve the quality of the domestic currency, reduce dollarization and give the Central Bank the opportunity to cut interest rates and stimulate credit supply, as long as negative expectations prevail. The »wait-and-see« attitude stressed by Dornbusch(1990) prevents re-acceptance of domestic money, so the country gets stuck on an underdevelopment path. Figure 1 presents a typical underdevelopment regime. Development Regime Figure 2 depicts a macroeconomic scenario which is beneficial for sustained growth. Policies are actively geared towards the most vital point for development: the creation of an accepted national currency and the stimulation of investment. A high quality domestic currency can only be attained if price-level stability, exchange-rate stability(not necessarily fixed exchange rates) and sufficient growth can be realized over a longer period. Price-level stability and the accumulation of trust in the domestic currency in developing countries is directly related to exchange-rate stability as the exchange rate is the best indicator of whether a currency is keeping up with the international currency competition. Nominal exchange-rate stability and high international competitiveness – the latter is also a precondition for development – can only be achieved simultaneously if domestic costs are stable. The most important single domestic cost factor is wages, depending on the prevalence of wage-labor in the country. Hence nominal wage increases should follow average productivity growth(plus target 76 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

• high quality local currency • high acceptance of domestic currency Figure 2: Development Regime • current account surplus or equilibrium • low gross debt in foreign currency • low degree of currency mismatch • capital controls • sterilization policy in case of current account surplus low degree of dollarization stable and workable banking system high growth and development low interest rates and high availability of credit high investment FDI to support development • nominal exchange rate anchor • one-time devaluation in case of current account deficit • high international competitiveness low inflation rate • stable unit labour costs • nominal wage anchor inflation rate) – this is a»nominal wage anchor« which underpins exchange-rate stability(»nominal exchange rate anchor«). Active macroeconomic policy includes striving for a current account surplus or a balanced current account. The lower the stock of foreign debt the easier it is for a country to achieve such a constellation. Current account surpluses and low debt in foreign currency seem to be the most efficient lever in convincing economic agents that depreciations are unlikely and the domestic banking system is stable. Increasing exports in combination with a surplus in the current account lead to export-led growth. In fact, export and investment demand can be considered superior demand engines for growth, especially in developing countries. The ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 77

higher the acceptance of the domestic currency the lower the domestic interest rate as the reputation of the domestic currency is built up and fears of devaluation and systemic domestic failures in the banking system vanish. The world economy would create less destabilizing shocks for developing countries if there were more exchange rate stability between the US-dollar, the euro and the yen, and if at the same time there was a mechanism which could stabilize the current account balances of developing and developed countries. When growth starts, it is very likely that capital imports will increase. If capital imports become too high they push a country into a constellation of current account deficits. 7 To prevent the destruction of the positive development scenario, appropriate capital import controls can be used(Eichengreen 1999), as well as other measures such as increases in foreign reserves or stimulation of selected capital exports. In such a situation all types of capital inflow, except foreign direct investment( fdi ) and some long-term credits from international institutions like the World Bank, should be discouraged or even suppressed. fdi has the advantage that the exchange rate risk is on the side of the investor and that it increases the likelihood of transfers of technology and management skills and helps establish the creation of export channels. A central bank can combine fdi inflows with current account surpluses by building up foreign reserves. 8 The macroeconomic constellation described here is likely to reduce capital flight and dollarization. 9 High-growth economies like Germany during the 1950s, Taiwan for decades after the Second World War, China 7. By definition, with constant international reserves net capital imports are reflected in a current account deficit and vice versa. 8. In this case a sterilization policy on the part of the central bank is necessary to neutralize the growth of local money after hard currency inflows have been exchanged into local currency. Sterilization is only possible to a certain extent. 9. In the first phase of such a development, de-dollarization should be supported by discriminating in favor of domestic foreign currency deposits. Several options, such as higher reserve requirements for foreign currency deposits, are feasible in reaching this aim(Baliño, Bennett and Borensztein 1999). 78 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

in the 1980s and 1990s and Ireland in the 1990s combined export growth, current account surpluses, stable exchange rates, high domestic investment, fdi inflows and high gdp growth. Obviously not all countries can have a current account surplus and follow the ideal development strategy of a country considered in isolation. If every country in the world strives for a current account surplus the world economy will acquire a restrictive and destabilizing bias. The world economy would create less destabilizing shocks for developing countries if there were more exchange rate stability between the us -dollar, the euro and the yen, and if at the same time there was a mechanism which could stabilize the current account balances of developing and developed countries. A global regime with an equilibrium mechanism is possible only if there is a supranational institution which organizes cooperation between countries and is able to stimulate adjustment mechanisms in case current account deficits occur. Such a supranational institution could follow the ideas of the international»Clearing Union« proposed by Keynes after the Second World War(Keynes 1969; Davidson 1999). This would require a new world currency system. The Chinese Example It is well known that mainland China experienced constant high gdp growth of about 9 percent p.a. between 1978 and 2004, unprecedented in economic history(China Statistical Yearbook 2004). Although the data may be flawed, there is no doubt that the growth performance was and remains outstanding, especially in comparison to Latin American countries which have, to a large extent, followed the Washington Consensus. In many respects, China has taken an alternative policy track, especially in matters of(i) trade liberalization(export promotion as well as continued import substitution, high degree of protectionism with respect to imports and exports, even strong provincial barriers for domestic trade), (ii) privatization(dominance of enterprise reforms in state-owned enterprises and banks, little privatization before the end of the 1990s),(iii) financial liberalization(government controlled interest rates, strict capital import and export controls), and(iv) exchange rate regime(fixed exchange rate since the mid 1990s). The Chinese performance certainly has many causes. Some are more country-specific, others are of general importance(see oecd 2002). Here, we shall consider the following preconditions of this growth regime(Herr and Priewe 1999; Herr 2002b). ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 79

(1) The requirements of macroeconomic stability dominate over optimal allocation of resources. However, under conditions of high growth, structural adjustments were implemented in a country-specific way(Rodrik 2003). Compared to the textbook model of a competitive market economy based on private ownership, undistorted prices(as well as wages, interest rates, and exchange rates), and market-friendly institutions, China was – and still is, albeit to a diminishing extent – a highly regulated, distorted market economy with a high rate of politically managed allocation, especially in the banking system. In other words, adjustment issues are clearly subordinated to growth and price-stability requirements. (2) Macroeconomic policies are aimed chiefly at stimulating investment to achieve the high growth rates necessary for social stability under the present political system. Inflation ran out of control twice, in the late 1980s(18 percent in 1988) and in the early 1990s(24 percent in 1994). In both cases there was a soft landing. Besides these lapses, the degree of price stability was quite strong. After 1998, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, a slight deflation emerged but it was overcome in 2003. The exchange rate tied to the us dollar serves as a nominal anchor. The exchange rate has been de facto fixed since the one-off 50 percent devaluation in 1993/94, managed by strong central bank interventions and control of the capital account(Xie and Zhang 2003; Sommer 2002). Since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization( wto ) in 2002, the current account is by now almost fully liberalized after a reform period of more than twenty years. However, capital account transactions are strongly controlled or prohibited(though they are gradually being liberalized). Capital export is still highly regulated; more or less only fdi is allowed as a type of capital import. Therefore, the capital account controls function as a firewall for an autonomous and highly independent monetary policy. Recently the strict capital controls have been relaxed to some extent. One of the key elements of the Chinese macroeconomic concept is keeping the current account in balance or, better, in slight surplus and accumulating foreign exchange reserves(with reserves greater than gross foreign debt, the latter being very low in international comparison). We do not know whether this concept is based on a clear and rational strategy or whether it is the unintentional result of economic or political»instincts«. Apparently, there is a strong historical fear of becoming dependent on overseas creditors. The Chinese currency is expected to take over the function of a regional anchor currency in the future, and a constellation of current account surplus combined with increasing reserves is 80 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

thought likely to induce appreciation expectations, thus hardening the local money. The reputation of the Renminbi is high. Dollarization is not a problem(in 2003 less than 6 percent of all deposits in China were in foreign currency – see Table 2 in the next section) in spite of the fact that foreign currency deposits in domestic banks are allowed. (3) The financial system is still far from being domestically liberalized (see Herr 2002). It is dominated by the four big state-owned commercial banks which mainly provide state-owned enterprises with finance, thereby following a gradualist approach to hard budget constraints. The nexus of state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises is the demandside backbone of high investment dynamics as the engine of high growth (32 percent gross investment/ gdp ratio in the 1990s). In addition to the – comparatively – dynamic state-owned enterprise sector, China – since 1978 – has supported the growth of collectively owned enterprises, mostly small and medium-sized firms. Since the 1970s, fdi in the form of joint ventures as well as privately owned companies has gained importance (since the mid 1990s fdi has contributed 10–15 percent to gross domestic capital formation). Despite its under-developed, non-competitive, and distorted characteristics – with non-performing loans amounting to an estimated 30 percent – the financial sector does not jeopardize price stability, but contributes to growth. According to the gradualist transition approach, soft policy loans are slowly being phased out but are still tolerated to a certain extent, especially in the agricultural sector. One of the most amazing facts about the Chinese financial system is the ratio of domestic bank loans as a percentage of gdp : at 166.2 percent(2002) it ranks among the values of high-income countries, and is more than three times greater on average than those of low-income countries(see Table 3 in the next section). The bank-centred financial system with a certain amount of policy loans, low interest rates, low foreign debt and little dollarization has contributed to high Chinese growth. All in all, in China the domestic financial sector has been well able to fulfill its macroeconomic function of financing investment; as long as the financial distortions do not endanger financial stability, such a system is well suited to promote growth and macro-stability during a long development and transition period. 10 10. Aziz and Duenwald(2002) argue that in China the correlation between finance and growth is misleading as most of the credit has gone to state-owned enterprises and not to the faster growing non-state sector. This is true and also problematic for future development. However, the authors do not take into account the fact that the ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 81

The Washington Consensus and the Augmented Washington Consensus The model for development presented above and the Chinese case differ essentially from the approach to development proposed by the so-called »Washington Consensus.« The term»Washington Consensus« was introduced by John Williamson in the early 1990s to express what he thought would be the lowest common denominator of policy advice of Washington-based institutions at that time. Williamson(1990) captured the Washington Consensus in ten points(see Table 1). 11 Subsequently, Williamson’s original ideas were interpreted in a more»neoliberal« fashion which became dominant. Important divergences concern the idea of corner solutions in exchange rate policies(either fully flexible or fully fixed exchange rates), the neglect of the notion of»competitive« exchange rates and the de facto pressure to liberalize cross-border capital flows. Williamson holds that»his« consensus broke down in the mid 1990s when the us Treasury pushed policies in the direction we have referred to. The Augmented Washington Consensus did add some important points – especially the social dimension of development and the important role of institutions – and thus was clearly an improvement. However, it did not stress or revise the macroeconomics of development policy. Countries following the Washington Consensus closely are scarcely to be found in the list of the best growth performers. Policies in China(or India), for example, differed fundamentally from the Washington blueprint, and in spite of this were a tremendous success(Herr and Priewe 1999). On the other hand, Russia – following a shock strategy incorpostate sector was a growth engine which has served to boost the non-state sector too. In addition there is a huge gray and informal credit market in China, which also expanded very quickly(Naughton 1988). 11. See also Williamson(2000) and Kuczynski and Williamson(2003). It should be mentioned that, in fact, the Washington Consensus takes into account the local context only to a limited extent and is applied uniformly to all developing countries (Rodrik 2003). The remedy suggested for overcoming the Asian crisis in 1997, for example, was much the same as the one proposed for solving crises in Latin America a decade earlier(Stiglitz 2002). Moreover, the Consensus was applied to transition countries although Williamson had addressed only Latin America. 82 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

rating liberalization, stabilization and privatization which was more in line with the Consensus – failed utterly(Stiglitz 2002). Furthermore, the Mexican crisis in 1994 and even more the Asian Crisis in 1997 – which was a major surprise for the Washington institutions – followed by the Russian crisis in 1998 did not fit into the framework of the Washington Consensus. Argentina, to take another example, which followed the ideas of the Washington Consensus(at least to a large extent), can hardly be considered a success either. 12 In the 1990s, the role of institutions was re-invented, especially as they were neglected in the original Consensus. Rodrik(2003) proposed an »Augmented Washington Consensus« which added ten further»commandments« underscoring the role of institutions and good governance (see Table 1). Most of the twenty points concern improvements in resource allocation with the aim of increasing productivity and competition. Therefore, privatization, abolishing national monopolies, improving property rights, reducing corruption, enhancing competition, cutting subsidies »to get prices right,« abandoning barriers to domestic and international flows of goods and finance are in focus. The aim is to implement what is conceived as a truly free market economy. Free trade and financial liberalization, which after an adjustment process include more or less all capital account transactions, are important ingredients of such structural adjustments. The vision of the old and the new consensus is that macroeconomic policies have to provide a stable framework which allows markets to unfold. Thus macro-policies have to secure the preconditions for economic growth, which themselves will be triggered endogenously after structural adjustment policies are implemented. The Augmented Washington Consensus did add some important points – especially the social dimension of development and the important role of institutions – and thus was clearly an improvement. However, it did not stress or revise the macroeconomics of development policy. 12. Mussa(2003) argues that Argentina failed as the result of a misguided fiscal policy. Fiscal policy in Argentina certainly was not optimal, but it cannot explain the deep crisis. Without dollarization and high foreign debt the collapse of the currency board would not have had such disastrous effects. Strangely enough, Mussa does not even address the key point in relation to fiscal policy, namely the fact that the budget deficit was mainly denominated in hard currency, thus causing currency mismatch. ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 83

Table 1: The Washington Consensus and the Augmented Washington Consensus Washington Consensus (Williamson 1989) 1. Reduction of budget deficit to a non-inflationary level 2. Redirection of public expenditure to areas such as education, infrastructure, etc. 3. Tax reforms to lower marginal rates, broadening the tax base 4. Transition to market-determined interest rates(financial liberalization) 5. Sufficiently competitive exchange rates which induce a rapid growth in non-traditional exports 6. External trade: removal of quantitative trade restrictions; tariff reductions 7. Abolition of barriers to foreign direct investment 8. Privatization of state-owned enterprises 9. Deregulation for»start-ups,« general abolition of restraints on competition 10. Better protection of property rights, particularly in the informal sector Augmented Washington Consensus (Rodrik 2003) ( additions to the original 10-point-list) 1. Corporate governance 2. Anti-corruption 3. Flexible labor markets 4. Adherence to wto discipline 5. Adherence to international financial codes and standards 6.»Prudent« capital account opening 7. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes(completely fixed or completely flexible exchange rates, corner solutions) 8. Independent central bank/inflation targeting 9. Social safety nets 10. Targeting poverty reduction(for example the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) The macro-policies addressed in the Washington and Augmented Washington Consensuses can be summarized as follows:(i) absence of too high inflation – sometimes it refers to single-digit inflation rates as 84 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

tolerable(World Bank 2003),(ii) balanced or close to balanced public budgets,(iii) not excessive current account deficits, and(iv) either flexible or completely fixed exchange rate regimes. The main instruments for achieving these goals are tight monetary policies favoring control of the broad money supply or reaching an inflation target and tight fiscal policies focusing on the retrenchment of government expenditures. Furthermore, if both stabilization and adjustment policies are agreed and implemented, preferential loans can be made by the Washington institutions and other donors. This type of finance is regarded as preceding private capital flows, comprising all kinds of finance, such as bank credits, portfolio investment or fdi which are intended to make up for the shortcomings of the domestic financial sector and the lack of domestic savings. Hence, developing countries are seen as emerging financial markets which offer a higher rate of return for capital(due to higher risks) and have to be included in the global financial system. This will probably lead to a high capital inflow in developing countries, which are considered essential for rapid development. It is argued that foreign savings should be added to domestic savings, resulting in higher domestic investment(in line with the old savings gap theory of Chenery and Strout 1966). This approach requires a long period of current account deficits and an accumulation of foreign debt in developing countries until»take-off« is achieved. Apart from the aforementioned causal link between microeconomic reforms and overall economic growth, we see a lack of clarity in five areas of macro policy: Neglect of Dollarization Dollarization is the use of hard currency in a developing country for holding wealth, giving credit or expressing the price of wages and goods. It is a sign that agents do not trust the national currency as they expect high inflation and/or high depreciation. During the second half of the 1990s in developing and transition countries dollarization increased and became a widespread phenomenon(see Table 2). Dollarization is a double-edged sword as it makes the domestic banking system inherently fragile: a) Dollarization produces a dangerous currency mismatch, as banks, firms, households and the government may have debts in dollars and revenues in domestic currency. ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 85

Table 2: Dollarization – Foreign Currency Deposits to Total Deposits(%) Regions South America Transition Economies Middle East Africa Asia Central America and Mexico Caribbean Developed Countries Number of countries 8 26 7 14 13 7 10 14 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 45.8 46.1 49.4 53.2 54.0 55.9 37.3 38.9 43.5 44.3 46.9 47.7 36.5 37.2 37.7 37.5 38.2 41.9 27.9 27.3 27.8 28.9 32.7 33.2 24.9 28.0 26.8 28.8 28.7 28.2 20.6 20.8 22.0 22.1 22.5 24.7 6.3 7.6 6.8 6.7 6.1 6.2 7.4 7.5 7.5 6.7 7.0 6.6 Source: De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize(2003, p. 6). b) For countries with high dollarization a»lender of last resort«(i.e. the central bank always providing sufficient liquidity for the banking system) exists only for the part of the financial system working with domestic currency. c) Because of currency mismatch, there is a strong incentive for banks to invest abroad. Altogether, dollarization reduces the availability of credit in domestic currency and increases interest rates for credits in foreign and domestic currency, as compared with a situation in which the same amount of deposits is held only in local currency(Honohan and Shi 2003). 13 13. High market determined interest rates in liberalized credit markets can lead to distorted credit allocation as good debtors drop out and risk-prone debtors are selected (Stiglitz 1992). This effect is usually not discussed when the liberalization of financial systems is recommended. 86 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

d) The greater the extent of dollarization the smaller the room to manoeuver for monetary policy. In a state of high dollarization financial wealth in domestic currency can only increase in line with the increase in wealth in foreign currency. Otherwise domestic wealth will be immediately exchanged into foreign currency. 14 The volume of credit expansion in the domestic economy, which is necessary to prevent depreciation and inflation(through increased prices for imports), may become so small that credits for investment are almost unavailable. If they are available, they are extremely costly or their volume may even be too small to prevent a permanent lack of liquidity. Increasing dollarization is identical with portfolio shifts from domestic to foreign currency. If there are insufficient capital imports, leading to the negative effect of higher indebtedness in foreign currency, an increasing degree of dollarization leads to inflation, and finally to higher domestic interest rates. Obviously, the issue of dollarization has been neglected in development macroeconomics and regarded as an issue of minor impact. There are plenty of publications stressing the disadvantages of dollarization(for example, World Bank 2002, imf 2003), but there seems to be no clear commitment under the Washington Consensus to seriously combat dollarization as a precondition for a stable financial system and sustainable development. A country that cannot provide the domestic currency with sufficient trust will hardly be able to establish coherent economic mechanisms. Instead, the economy will be divided into a domestic currency segment, an unstable foreign currency segment, and – due to a lack of liquidity – undynamic barter and subsistence segments. If the domestic currency segment is inflationary, the erosion of the monetary system continues and dollarization even increases. If the domestic currency sector is stable with respect to inflation, credit expansion in this sector is likely to be so restricted that growth is repressed and in extreme cases the shortage of liquidity will stimulate the barter and subsistence segments of the economy. 14. Assume the banking system in a developing country creates 100 units of domestic currency by extending credit to the public. If the population prefers to keep 80 percent of its monetary wealth in dollars, 80 units of domestic currency will immediately be exchanged into dollars. This will lead to a depreciation of the local currency in the case of flexible exchange rates. If the central bank is not willing to accept this, monetary policy has to become more restrictive to reduce credit creation and to stabilize the exchange rate. Investment will drop sharply. ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 87

Neglect of the Domestic Financial System The domestic financial sector using domestic currency is one of the strategic sectors in developing countries in relation to stimulating investment. In conventional theories, finance automatically follows the real economy or a lack of domestic finance can be compensated by foreign finance. Much of the discussion about structural adjustment in the financial sector focuses on the debates on»repressed«(i.e. regulated, mainly with respect to interest rates) versus liberalized finance. The bi-polar view is not very conducive as both alternatives involve severe shortcomings. We call for more attention to be paid to the macroeconomic framework of the financial sector and appropriate institution-building, including adequate regulations. Prior to facilitating cross-border opening of financial flows, a stable domestic financial system must be shaped. As dollarization makes a financial system inherently vulnerable, the degree of dollarization has to be reduced to a low level as a precondition for a sound financial system. Investment in fixed assets is the key factor in growth and development. In line with investment, human capital formation and technical progress must and can take place. However, we do not agree that investment should be financed from foreign sources. Basically, a domestic financial system always has the potential to finance investment with domestic credit. Among others, Schumpeter(1934) argued that development is possible only if innovative entrepreneurs obtain bank credits to invest. What is necessary is new credit created first of all by the banking system with the help of the central bank. Savings under such an approach will be created subsequently out of the new income stimulated by investment. 15 It is frequently argued that financial systems in developing countries are shallow and too small to be efficient, therefore making it necessary to access the huge and sophisticated global financial markets(for example, World Bank 2001). However, even among poor countries there are sometimes huge differences as regards financial depth(see Table 3). Indeed, there is a clear link between domestic bank credits(relative to gdp ) and the development of countries. In general, low-income countries have a low percentage of domestic bank credits to gdp , whereas de15. Keynes(1937) developed similar arguments and the modern circuit models drawing on Schumpeter and Keynes see banks as necessary»circuit starters« for investment and production(Bossone and Abdourahmane 2002). 88 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

Table 3: Domestic Credit Provided by the Banking Sector and the Trade Balance in 2002(% of GDP) High Income Countries Middle Income Countries Low Income Countries Domestic credit * as percentage of GDP 168.5 82.9 48.6 Trade balance as percentage of GDP 0.0 3.4 0.4 China South Africa Brazil Indonesia India Vietnam Russian Federation Nigeria Belarus Uganda Mozambique 166.4 150.9 64.8 59.9 58.5 44.8 26.6 25.3 17.5 15.4 13.2 3.0 3.4 2.1 6.9 –0.4 –4.0 10.8 –5.9 –4.4 –15.4 –14.7 Note:* Domestic credit includes domestic credit in foreign currency. Source: World Bank(2004). veloped countries have a percentage about three times higher. The financial system in Uganda or Belarus, to choose two examples, is even more poorly developed in spite of their trade and current account deficits. When Uganda liberalized the financial sector, financial depth did not improve. China is an outstanding example, as already mentioned. Starting from a very low level, Vietnam too could improve its financial depth considerably. There is no compelling argument that low-income countries ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 89

are condemned to have a shallow financial sector and hence must depend on foreign finance. Instead, it is the shape of financial institutions and the concomitant monetary policy that matter. Inflation Target and Sources of Inflation How much price stability do developing countries need? The World Bank claims that less than 10 percent is considered to be sufficient(World Bank 2003a). Bruno and Easterly(1995) are even more indulgent. However, under conditions of global currency competition with free capital mobility and the pending risk of capital flight, developing countries need a higher degree of price stability. The benchmarks are set by the dominant strong currencies and their inflation rates. Deviations from these benchmarks result in permanent depreciation, a lower reputation for the domestic currency, capital outflows, and weakening of the domestic financial sector, including higher interest rates – to mention some of the economic costs of too high inflation. In other words, low inflation, hard as it may be to achieve and sustain, needs much more consideration. Higher inflation might be tolerable if strong capital controls reduce the intensity of international currency competition. Fighting inflation by reducing aggregate demand via a restrictive monetary policy may become extremely costly in developing countries. This, however, is the standard recipe of the Washington Consensus. Concerning the sources of inflation, analysis should focus on the causes of cost-push inflation accommodated by the monetary authorities. 16 Contrary to the traditional viewpoint, depreciations and wageprice spirals are the most prevalent source of inflation in developing countries. Typically an inflationary process is triggered and/or intensified by depreciation. The latter will create an inflationary push as import prices go up. As in this case real incomes fall it becomes likely that nominal wages will increase and an escalating inflationary process get under way. Non-accommodation of such cost-push inflation leads to an ex16. The idea of cost inflation draws on Keynes(1930). Keynes distinguished between cost and demand inflation. For him cost inflation is at the heart of inflationary processes(see also Herr and Priewe 2003 and Herr 2002a). 90 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

tremely tight monetary policy, which prevents development and threatens the functioning of the domestic financial system. In empirical surveys it was found that in strong inflationary processes in most cases depreciation came first and as a result the money supply went up(Fischer, Sahay and Végh 2002). In many developing countries with low growth rates, a devaluation-wage-price spiral in combination with a restrictive monetary policy to fight inflation leads to low domestic demand and production. The more strongly integrated international goods markets are, the stronger the pass-through from depreciation to inflation(Rojas-Suarez 2003, pp. 146 ff). And the higher the dollarization – for example, in case of indexation of domestic prices and wages in foreign currencies – the more direct the pass-through(Ize and Parrado 2002; imf 2003). Muddlingthrough between the fight against inflation and the need not to reduce aggregate demand too much, typically leads to a situation of low growth and continuing inflationary problems(stagflation). The conclusion is that an inflationary process has to be stopped by stable nominal exchange rates as a nominal anchor and a complimentary nominal wage anchor backing the exchange rate anchor. If these two anchors hold, monetary policy is relieved from fighting inflationary processes and can better support growth. Fighting inflation by reducing aggregate demand via a restrictive monetary policy may become extremely costly in developing countries. This, however, is the standard recipe of the Washington Consensus. Fixed or Flexible Exchange Rates? Orthodox monetarist theory favors flexible exchange rates, whereas the Washington and the Augmented Washington Consensus accepted that absolutely tight exchange rates(like currency boards) might also be feasible. By recommending extremely contrasting exchange rate regimes, the macroeconomic guidelines are not very clear, especially as it remains unresolved how to maintain absolutely fixed exchange rates if this regime is chosen(Baliño, Bennett and Borensztein 1999). Foreign reserves for exchange rate interventions will suffice only in the short run, and even very high interest rates can hardly defend exchange rates if confidence in the domestic currency breaks down, as experienced in many countries. The traditional bi-polar view on either fixed or flexible regimes seems somewhat beyond reality and practice, since almost all countries avoid(and must avoid) too high fluctuations of exchange rates(see Calvo and Reinipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 91

hart 2002) and too many countries opting for absolutely fixed exchange rates had to give up the peg. On the other hand, there is much evidence that free floating will lead to strong fluctuations that are in no way connected to»fundamentals«, to more inflation and to external debt shocks, as mentioned above. It is vital for developing countries to stabilize the nominal exchange rate against a hard currency or a basket of hard currencies and at the same time have the possibility of realigning the exchange rate. This can be done by different exchange rate regimes, for example fixed but adjustable exchange rates or flexible exchange rates with extensive central bank interventions(managed floating). Current Account Deficits and Net Capital Imports? John Williamson called for»competitive« exchange rates, but neglected to produce a clear definition. The exchange rate is competitive, according to our understanding, if a current account equilibrium can be achieved. However, in spite of the weak empirical and theoretical background of the savings-gap model, it is still widely used in international institutions and ministries(Easterly 1999). A balance of payments regime with longlasting current account deficits as a result of an»import-led strategy« of development has fundamental disadvantages. As long as developing countries cannot finance the current account deficit and capital exports with fdi and portfolio investment in the form of shares, they build up foreign debt. Portfolio investment as short-time finance can destabilize domestic stock markets and exchange rates in developing countries and is potentially unstable. If current account deficits are financed with fdi , risks can be kept low. The avoidance of a current account deficit and of a substantial gross foreign debt is the best basis of development in a world with volatile international capital movements and an unstable global economy. Discussions about balance of payments deficits and foreign debt have focused repeatedly on»good« and»bad« foreign debts; private foreign debt is conceived as tenable compared to financing budget deficits in foreign currency. It has been overlooked that high external debt – particularly when accompanied by currency mismatch – makes a country vulnerable to shocks which in developing countries cannot be avoided, regard92 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

less of the individual debtor. Prudence in financial liberalization is mentioned in the Augmented Washington Consensus, but the actual policy of international institutions and Western governments too often presses developing countries to open their doors to capital flows much too early. The avoidance of a current account deficit and of a substantial gross foreign debt is the best basis of development in a world with volatile international capital movements and an unstable global economy. It must also be recognized that countries with high foreign debt in foreign currency tend to loosen the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument. Especially if the exchange rate cannot be kept stable, foreign debt must be low. Keeping vulnerability in check and maintaining a certain degree of economic-policy autonomy are strong arguments against substantial foreign debt. The most favorable constellation for development seems to be a current account surplus and a stable nominal exchange rate, without sacrificing growth by cutting imports necessary for capital accumulation. If this is not feasible, a balanced current account should be accomplished; a realignment of the exchange rate may be necessary to implement this objective. If low-income countries are facing a high current account deficit, financed mainly by concessional loans(as is the case in most poor subSaharan countries), priority should be given to gradually reducing the current account deficit, in particular by improving the domestic financial sector and by export promotion policies. Also, grants are better than preferential loans as they do not aggravate external indebtedness. Moreover, debt relief can alleviate the current account if fresh new debt can be avoided. Conclusions In our positive scenario presented in Figure 2 we did not stress improvements in the allocation of productive factors which are so much at the heart of the policy recommendations of international institutions. This does not mean that we do not want to increase allocation efficiency or improve institutions. However, we believe that only stable macroeconomic development and integration into the world economy, which makes the country independent of unstable international capital movements, are capable of paving the way to deepening allocation improvements. Allocation reforms – or structural adjustments – without a stable macroecoipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 93

nomic constellation are doomed to fail and can even worsen economic performance. In brief, favorable conditions for the accumulation of fixed capital matter more for growth than focusing on more market-determined allocation. Theoretically, even the best allocation(or perfect performance in structural adjustment) does not automatically guarantee growth and capital accumulation. Improved efficiency can even go together with low growth or recession; long-run positive effects may never be realized if short-run problems cannot be overcome and a»bad« development path is followed. For instance, privatizing loss-making state-owned enterprises may improve microeconomic efficiency, but may be accompanied by strong output losses and increased unemployment. Alternatively, perfecting domestic capital markets by lifting capital controls can trigger a wave of capital outflows. There is no automatic market mechanism that offsets such setbacks. The notorious hopes for»the long run« may be in vain. Vice versa, there can be high growth due to favorable macroeconomic conditions despite sub-optimal allocation. China is an example. Therefore, more attention has to be paid to the macroeconomic forces of growth separately from adjustment issues on a micro level. Of course, improvements on the micro level should take place continuously. In the field of development it is often not possible to realize the best solution. Typically, there are trade-offs. For example, in case of a conflict between stabilization and growth on the one hand and optimal structural adjustment on the other, there is no doubt that growth is more important, even more as it can improve the economic, social and political conditions for structural reforms which require a long period of time. Capital controls are a good example. They are commonly regarded as an awkward and old-fashioned instrument from the age preceding the globalization of finance. If stable exchange rates, a current account balance or even surplus, and low foreign debt are regarded as necessary – although not sufficient – preconditions for growth and development, there is a conflict of goals. Capital import controls can help to keep the balance of payments in equilibrium. Premature liberalization of crossborder capital flows can smash or suffocate the domestic financial sector, which, however, is crucial for development. Taken altogether, every measure contributing to reduce dollarization and strengthen the local currency and trust in the domestic financial system is a step in the right direction. More attention needs to be paid to the quality of the local currency. When domestic money can fulfill all of its 94 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

basic functions(including its function as a store of value), the financial system can potentially provide the finance needed for a credit-, investment-, and income-creating process. Current account equilibrium or surplus(or at least gradually reduced deficits) are among the best means of building up the reputation of the domestic currency and at the same time stimulating aggregate demand. Literature Aziz, Jahangir, and Duenwald, Christoph. 2002. Growth-Financial Intermediation Nexus in China. imf Working Paper, 02/194, Washington dc . Baliño, Thomás J.T., Bennett, Adam and Borensztein, Eduardo. 1999. Monetary Policy in Dollarized Economies. imf Occasional Paper 171, Washington dc . Bossone, Biagio, and Abdourahmane, Sarr. 2002. A New Financial System for Poverty Reduction and Growth. imf Working Paper wp /02/178, imf , Washington, dc . Bruno, Michael, and Easterly, William. 1995. Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth. Cambridge, ma , National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5209. Calvo, Guillermo A., and Reinhart, Carmen M. 2002.»Fear of Floating.« Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(2): 379–408. Chenery, H.B., and Strout, A.M. 1966.»Foreign Assistance and Economic Development.« American Economic Review 56(4), Part I(September). China Statistical Yearbook . 2004, cd-rom , Beijing. Davidson, Paul 1999.»Global Macro Policies for Reducing Persistent High Unemployment Rates in oecd Countries,« in: Wolfgang Filc and Claus Köhler(eds.) (1999), Macroeconomic Causes of Unemployment: Diagnosis and Policy Recommendations , Berlin, pp. 97–116. De Nicoló, Gianni, Honohan, Patrick and Ize, Alian. 2003. Dollarization of the Banking System: Good or Bad? International Monetary Fund Working Paper 03/146. Dornbusch, Ruediger. 1990. From Stabilisation to Growth. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 3302, Cambridge, ma . Easterly, William. 1999.»The Ghost of Financing Gap. Testing the Growth Model Used in the International Financial Institutions.« Journal of Development Economics 60(2): 423–438. Easterly, William. 2002.»How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief.« World Development 30(10): 1677–1696. Eichengreen, Barry, and Hausmann, Ricardo. 1999. Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility. nber Working Paper No. 7418, Cambridge, ma . Eichengreen, Barry, Hausmann, Ricardo, and Panizza, Ugo. 2002. Original Sin: The Pain, the Mystery, and the Road to Redemption. Paper prepared for the conference »Currency and Maturity Matchmaking: Redeeming Debt from Original Sin,« Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, dc , November 21–22, 2002. ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 95

Eichengreen, Barry. 1999. Towards a New International Financial Architecture. A Practical Post-Asia Agenda. Institute for International Economics, Washington dc . Fischer, Stanley, Sahay, Ratna, and Végh, Carlos A. 2002.»Modern Hyper Inflations.« Journal of Economic Literature , 15: 836–880. Heine, Michael, and Herr, Hansjörg. 2003.»Der Neu-Keynesianismus als neues makroökonomisches Konsensmodell: Eine kritische Würdigung,« in: E. Hein, A. Heise and A. Truger(eds.), Neu-Keynesianismus. Der neue wirtschaftspolitische Mainstream? Marburg, pp. 21–54. Herr, Hansjörg, and Priewe, Jan. 1999.»High Growth in China – Transition without a Transition Crisis?« Intereconomics 34(6): 303–316. Herr, Hansjörg, and Priewe, Jan. 2003. The Macroeconomic Framework of Poverty Reduction. An Assessment of the imf /World Bank Strategy. Working Paper No. 17, Business Institute Berlin at the Berlin School of Economics, Berlin (http://www.fhwberlin.de/fhw2000/lehre_und_forschung/working_paper_17.pdf) . Herr, Hansjörg. 2002.»Das Finanzsystem in der vr China – Funktionsweise und Reformdruck,« in Hansjörg Herr et al.(eds.), Nachholende Entwicklung in China. Geldpolitik und Restrukturierung . Berlin: Sigma, pp. 21–52. Herr, Hansjörg. 2002a. Wages, Employment and Prices. An Analysis of the Relationship between Wage Level, Wage Structure, Minimum Wages and Employment and Prices. Working Paper No. 15, Business Institute Berlin at the Berlin School of Economics, Berlin( http://www.fhw-berlin.de/fhw2000/lehre_und_forschung/working_paper _15.pdf ). Herr, Hansjörg. 2002b.»Tastendes Suchen. Chinas erfolgreicher Reformprozess.« Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft , 3: 26–48. Honohan, Patrick, and Shi, Anqing. 2003.»Deposit Dollarization and the Financial Sector in Emerging Economies,« in: James A. Hanson, Patrick Honohan and Giovanni Majnoni(eds.), Globalization and National Financial Systems , Oxford: Oxford University Press. imf 2003.»Financial Stability in Dollarized Economies.« International Monetary Fund Document, sm /03/112, Washington dc . Ize, Alain, and Parrado, Eric. 2002. Dollarization, Monetary Policy, and the PassThrough. imf Working Papers, 02/188, Washington dc . Jeanne, Oliver, and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. 2002. Original Sin, Balance Sheet Crises and the Roles of International Lending. imf Working Paper, 02/234, Washington. Kaminsky, G.L., and Reinhart, Carmen. 1999.»The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems.« The American Economic Review 89(3): 473– 499. Keynes, John M. 1930. A Treatise on Money. Volume I, The Pure Theory of Money . London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. Keynes, John M. 1937.»The ›Ex-Ante‹ Theory of the Rate of Interest.« Economic Journal 47. Keynes, John M. 1969.»Proposals for an International Clearing Union.« in: J.K. Horsfield(ed.), The International Monetary Fund 1946–1965 , Vol. III, Documents , Washington dc . 96 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development ipg 2/2005

Kuczynski, Pedro-Pablo, and Williamson, John(eds.). 2003, After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America. Washington dc : Institute for International Economics. Mussa, Michael. 2003. Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy. Washington dc : Institute for International Economics. Naughton, Barry. 1998. China’s Financial Reform: Achievements and Challenges. brie Working Paper No. 112. oecd . 2002. China in the World Economy. The Domestic Policy Challenges . Paris. Priewe, Jan, and Herr, Hansjörg. 2005. Macroeconomic Strategies for Poverty Reduction and Development – Beyond the Washington Consensus . Baden-Baden. Rojas-Suarez, Liliana. 2003.»Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates: Guiding Principles for a Sustainable Regime.« in: Kuczynski and Williamson(2003), pp. 123–156. Rodrik, Dani. 2003.»Growth Strategies.« Harvard University. The paper will be published in the Handbook of Economic Growth . Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and Business Cycle . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sommer, Albrecht. 2002.»Vor- und Nachteile einer Wechselkursanbindung des Renminbi an den us -Dollar.« in: Hansjörg Herr et al.(eds.). Nachholende Entwicklung in China. Geldpolitik und Restrukturierung . Berlin: Sigma, pp. 115–152. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1992.»Capital Markets and Economic Fluctuations in Capitalist Economies.« European Economic Review 36: 269–306. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1999.»Reforming the Global Economic Architecture: Lessons from Recent Crises.« The Journal of Finance 54(4): 1508–1521. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalisation and its Discontents . New York and London: W.W. Norton& Company. Teunissen, Jan Joost, and Age Akkerman.(2003). The Crisis That Was Not Prevented: Lessons for Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation . The Hague. Williamson, John. 1990.»What Washington Means by Policy Reform.« in: John Williamson(ed.). Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Washington dc : Institute for International Economics. Williamson, John. 2000.»What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?« The World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 251–264. World Bank. 2001. Finance for Growth. Policy Choices in a Volatile World . World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington dc . World Bank. 2002. World Development Report 2002 , Washington dc . World Bank. 2003.»Financial Stability in Dollarized Economies.« International Monetary Fund Document , sm /03/112, Washington dc . World Bank. 2003a. Macroeconomic Issues , prsp Sourcebook, Chapter 6, Washington dc . World Bank. 2004. World Development Indicators ( cd rom ). Washington, dc . Xie Ping, and Zhang Xiaopu. 2003. The Coordination Between Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Policy in an Open Economy in Transition. A Case Study on China from 1994 to 2000. Manuscript, Beijing(People’s Bank of China). ipg 2/2005 Herr/Priewe, Macroeconomic Policies for Development 97

Bringing the State Back In: Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience* ROBERT H. WADE S ince the end of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, policy makers and policy analysts in these»transition« states have resolutely turned away from learning about East Asia’s development experience. They have been very keen, on the other hand, to learn about Western European and North American experience – for this is the world they wish to join, or rather, re-join after the communist hiatus. With few exceptions, they understand the causes of the prosperity of Western Europe and North America through the lens of»liberal« economics – as due, in large part, to the combination of(a) liberal markets for goods and financial assets only lightly restrained by public policies,(b) well-defined and well-enforced property rights allowing secure profit-taking by owners, and(c) the rule of law, which makes government, and all other economic agents, subject to a common set of rules. This is the combination they wish to copy, in the expectation that it will yield»catch-up« growth. To the extent that they pay attention to East Asia’s catch-up experience, they understand it to validate the same model. To the extent that they acknowledge the existence of pro-active industrial and technology policy in either Western Europe or East Asia, they treat it as an aberration or decoration on the central thrust for largely free markets. The last thing Eastern European policy makers and policy analysts want is a state that intervenes to alter the composition of economic activity within their borders; for this is what the communist state did, to disastrous effect. Therefore, a society organized around the free market is the only choice, they think. Hence the Eastern European consensus about catch-up development strategy involves: a) market liberalization and accompanying institutional reforms, with a special accent on»getting the state back out« of the economy; * This article is published simultaneously in the book Towards a prosperous wider Europe. Macroeconomic policies for a growing neighborhood, edited by Michael Dauderstädt, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Bonn 2005. 98 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

b) privatizing state-owned enterprises, and privatizing the provision of public services to the extent possible; c) becoming members of the European Union, or for those currently not eligible, entering a preferential trade arrangement with the eu ; d) attracting lots of foreign direct investment( fdi ), in anticipation that it will produce for export and help upgrade the low quality of the existing capital stock; e) attracting lots of aid(regional funds for the new eu members). What is wrong with this consensus? Several things. First, liberalization exposes their producers to direct competition with China and other East Asian producers in sectors with diminishing returns. Second, foreign direct investment( fdi ) is not likely to be an important means of catchup. Not much fdi has entered the region since 1998: between 1998 and 2003 Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States( cis ), and ex-Yugoslavia received only three percent of world fdi . And most of that was motivated by domestic market sales, not by the use of low-wage, low-tax platforms for producing exports to high-income markets, because Eastern European wages are far above those in much of East Asia while labor productivity is no higher. 1 Third, in these conditions radical liberalization may yield immiserizing growth, a»race to the bottom«. On the other hand, some sort of delinking strategy based on integration among groups of near-by countries outside the eu is not a promising alternative. Sooner or later these bad choices may induce Eastern European policy makers and policy analysts to reconsider the thrust towards free markets as the route to catch-up development, and then to engage in a more openminded way with the East Asian experience of the developmental state. The start of wisdom is to recognize that central planning is not the same as central allocation. Communism used and discredited central allocation. But central planning in the broad sense – public authorities intervening to alter the composition of economic activity within their borders, in line with an economy-wide exercise in foresight about the economy’s future growth, in the context of a capitalist economy – has been alive and well in East Asia. And it should – this is my subtext – be seen as an opportunity in Eastern Europe. Though it must never be called»central planning«, because the term is automatically illegitimate in the eyes of the powers that be.»Governing the market« sounds more acceptable. 1. Stefan Collignon, Investing in the new member states, PowerPoint presentation, European Investment Bank Forum, Warsaw, 14–15 October, 2004. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 99

This paper summarizes my understanding of some of the roles of the state in economic development in capitalist East Asia(South Korea, Taiwan, Japan), first in the post-Second World War decades, then in the last decade or so. 2 It should be emphasized that(a) a lot of the sectoral industrial policies and programs used in East Asia were of a rather modest kind, yet in aggregate probably very effective in accelerating the transformation of the economy into higher value-added activities;(b) they did not require sophisticated calculations and a highly skilled bureaucracy; and(c) other developing countries can and should adopt the same norms of industrial policy, even if with still more modest, blunter instruments. This is to reject the view of an economist as sophisticated as Howard Pack, who concludes from his study of Japanese and Korean industrial policy from the 1960s onwards that the benefits to Japan and Korea were modest, even in the 1960s when the benefits were highest, and that, »countries attempting to extract the benefits from an industrial policy that Japan and Korea obtained[NB: this implies that they did obtain some benefits] have to possess not only an exceptionally capable bureaucracy but also the political ability to withdraw benefits from non-performing firms …[Thus, developing] countries should be exceptionally cautious before embarking on such policies«. 3 If Pack is right, industrial policy should not be on the agenda of Eastern European governments. But he misses a whole swathe of East Asian industrial policy of a different kind to the big-scale, picking the winners kind that he concentrates on. Why the Liberal Explanation of East Asia’s Catch-Up is Wrong The conventional liberal explanation of East Asia’s catch-up growth is wrong – not entirely wrong but substantially wrong. Recall that the mainstream economics literature does present the catch-up as due in large part to steady liberalization of markets: first, liberalization of the trade regime, then, liberalization of capital movements in and out; both accompanied by a steady lightening of the hand of the state in the domestic economy, a steady deregulation and privatization of state-owned enter2. Fuller argument is given in the new edition of my book Governing the Market , Princeton University Press, 2004. 3. Howard Pack,»Industrial policy: elixir or poison?«, World Bank Research Observer , 15, p. 1, emphasis added. 100 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

prises. All the attention is focused on the retreat of the state from the»import-substitution industrialization« phase, when the state tried to change the composition of economic activity. In the conventional liberal explanation the liberalization of the trade regime receives central importance, as the key condition facilitating the rapid growth of exports. According to a major World Bank study, 4 countries with»outward oriented« trade regimes have shown very much better performance on a range of indicators than countries with»inward oriented« trade regimes. The Bank concludes that the causality is from trade regime to economic performance, and that the correlation between outward orientation and better performance holds not just across countries but for one country across time: the cross-sectional evidence strengthens our confidence that countries will experience improved economic performance as they liberalize their trade regimes. But the argument is full of holes. To give just a few illustrations: First, the World Bank study’s conclusion that outward oriented trade regimes have better performance than inward oriented ones obscures a contrary finding. The study took two time periods, 1963–73 and 1973–85, and for each period classified 41 developing countries in terms of four categories of trade orientation: strongly outward oriented and moderately outward oriented, and strongly inward oriented and moderately inward oriented. The moderately inward oriented countries had better performance, by most measures, than the moderately outward oriented cases. The result that the Bank celebrates – outward oriented trade regimes have better performance than inward – comes from aggregating the two subcategories. The»strongly outward oriented« cases have such good performance indicators, and the»strongly inward oriented« ones such bad performance indicators, as to reverse the results for the»moderately oriented« cases. Second, the sub-category of»strongly outward oriented« includes just three cases, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. They are all East Asian, which raises the possibility that their outstanding performance has more to do with»East Asia« than with»liberal trade«. Moreover, the performance of the sub-category is mostly Korea’s, which swamps the other two cases. Without the one case of Korea, the overall conclusion about outward oriented regimes having better economic performance than inward oriented ones would not hold. 4. World Bank, World Development Report 1987 , Washington dc , 1987. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 101

TABLE 1 Trade Regimes, Incentives to Sell on Domestic Market or Sell Abroad, Developing Countries Around 1969(%) Effective protection to manufactured goods Intersectoral dispersion Taiwan 14 23 Korea 13 47 Colombia 35 Argentina 112 56 35 Source: Robert H. Wade, Governing the Market, tab. 3.2, p. 56, based on Balassa 1982. Third, to describe Korea’s trade regime in 1963–73 and in 1973–85 as »strongly outward oriented« is in any case a gross mischaracterization, given that the sub-category is defined as one where»trade controls are either non-existent or very low … There is little or no use of direct controls and licensing arrangements«. The study adds another criterion when defining the»moderately outward oriented« regime, namely, low variation of effective protection rates to different sectors of the economy; and we may presume that this criterion should also apply to the strongly outward oriented cases. There is plenty of evidence that these criteria do not fit Korea’s trade regime in either period. 5 One piece of evidence comes, ironically, from the locus classicus of the belief that Korea got rich by having a liberal trade regime, and it is worth citing in order to see how the liberal conclusion has been reached by selective inattention to data that would upset the liberal way of seeing things. The long-term World Bank consultant, Bela Balassa, coordinated an intensive study of the trade regimes of six developing countries based on data from around 1969. The study defined a liberal trade regime as one with two basic characteristics:(1) low average protection;(2) low variation(or dispersal) around the low average – that is, uniform protection across all sectors. The study found that for Korea and Taiwan, the average level of protection of manufactures in 1969 was relatively low. This was the key finding that supported the picture of a liberal trade regime. Strangely, the study did not draw attention to another finding that can be drawn from the same data . Dispersion of protection around the rela5. See Wade, Governing the Market , chapter 1 and 11. 102 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

tively low average was quite high. Korea and Taiwan did not have a uniform level of protection. Within manufacturing, different sectors had quite different levels of protection(see table 1). It is likely that these differences were deliberate, the result of government intention reflecting the wider industrial development strategy. In contrast, where the level of average protection is high(Colombia, Argentina) it is more likely that a given degree of dispersion around the high average is not intentional but accidental. In short, even the study regarded as the locus classicus of the image of East Asian capitalist economies as having liberal trade regimes provides evidence that disconfirms its own conclusions. The observed sequences in East Asia better fit the hypothesis that »as countries grow richer they liberalize trade« than the hypothesis that»trade liberalization propels countries to become richer«. Furthermore, the conventional neoliberal explanation is wrong about timing, and therefore about the causality from trade liberalization to growth. Recall that it says that trade liberalization gave a strong propulsive boost to the growth of exports and thus to broader economic growth. Dani Rodrik has shown that this is not the observed sequence. One does not find a big improvement in incentives to export preceding the take-off in exports, but one does find a big improvement in investment incentives thanks in large part to government policy changes. First came a surge of investment(in the case of Taiwan, around 1958–60) while trade incentives remained largely unchanged, then rapid growth of exports, then faster growth, then accommodating liberalization of trade. »The lesson from East Asia is clear«, says Rodrik.»[T]he three East Asian ›dragons‹ with low investment rates in the early 1960s – South Korea, Taiwan and Singpore – would not have been nearly as successful had their governments not given capital accumulation a big push by subsidizing, cajoling and otherwise stimulating private investors. The evidence from East Asia and elsewhere shows that investment booms produce economic growth as well as greater export orientation[and higher imports]«. 6 6. Dani Rodrik, The Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work , Overseas Development Council, Washington dc , 1999, p. 63. The argument applies only to capitalist economies. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 103

The observed sequences in East Asia better fit the hypothesis that»as countries grow richer they liberalize trade« than the hypothesis that »trade liberalization propels countries to become richer«. The priority to investment is not specific to East Asia: a step-up in investment seems to be a nearly-necessary condition of a step-up in growth rates. Rodrik concludes:»Countries that are able to engineer increases in their investment efforts experience faster economic growth«. 7 What about the World Bank’s»East Asian Miracle« study, published in 1993? 8 It examined eight high-performing East Asian economies(not including China), and applied a range of tests to examine the impacts of industrial policy. About the impacts of sectoral industrial policy(targeted at specific sectors, such as chemicals or semi-conductors) the study says, »industrial policies were largely ineffective« and:»We conclude that promotion of specific industries generally did not work and therefore holds little promise for other developing countries«(p. 312, 354). It also concluded that even had they been effective in East Asia, their administrative/political conditions are so demanding(for example, in terms of the sophistication of the calculations for identifying sectors for special promotion) that few other developing countries could achieve the same success.»[T]he prerequisites for success[such as it was] were so rigorous that policy makers seeking to follow similar paths in other developing countries have often[read, usually] met with failure«(p. 6). If this sounds like Howard Pack, quoted above, it is no accident; for he was the consultant who wrote the chapter in the»Miracle study« about the impact of industrial policies. But the»Miracle’s« evidence is not convincing. 9 To give just one reason: the problem of capturing»externalities«, or spillovers from one sector to another. It turns out to be very difficult to track the effects of spillovers across sectors. Yet they are real. Some critics of industrial policy have pointed to the lack of correlation between the amount of subsidies and protection given to sector X and the growth of productivity in sector X, or even to a negative correlation, as evidence of industrial policy failure 7. On the other hand, the cross-country correlation between decade-average investment rates and decade-average gdp growth rates(1950–1990) is not particularly strong. World Bank , World Development Report 1999/2000 , Entering the 21rst Century, World Bank, 2000, figure 9. 8. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle , Washington dc , 1993. 9. Albert Fishlow et al., Miracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian Experience , Overseas Development Council, Washington dc , 1994. 104 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

– or even of»picking losers«. But the test ignores the point that East Asian government gave various kinds of resource help to»infrastructural« sectors like steel and basic chemicals not mainly to promote productivity growth in those sectors but to have spillover benefits on the users of steel and basic chemicals. The World Bank has been a leading proponent of the idea that East Asia got rich because it liberalized markets and followed the policy mix later called the»Washington Consensus«.»The East Asian Miracle« was a Bank research report; and the Balassa et al. study was sponsored by the Bank, while Balassa worked as a de-facto Bank staff member(de facto, because formally he was a long-term consultant). In appraising the evidence of these and other Bank studies, it is important to bear in mind that the staff see themselves as – like it or not – speaking for the organization. 10 To its credit, though, the»Miracle study« does recognize that its evidence is hardly conclusive.»… we cannot offer a rigorous counterfactual scenario. Instead we have to be content with … analytical and empirical judgments«(1993:6). A Closer Look at East Asian Industrial Policies The Catch-Up Phase To think constructively about industrial policy, one has to distinguish at least three types. First, economy-wide»functional« policies, that include exchange rate policies, macroeconomic balance and competition policies (including average level of protection). Second, multi-sectoral»horizontal« policies, that include incentives for r&d , incentives for»small and medium enterprises«, investment in port infrastructure, and the like. Third, sectoral policies, to promote specific sectors or sub-sectors or firms(the Proton auto firm in Malaysia, for example). 11 Most of the de10. The External Affairs Department instructs staff(including research staff) as follows: »Crucially, staff contemplating a speech, article, opinion/editorial, or letter to the editor must realize that a disclaimer that the speaker or writer is expressing personal views is unconvincing and usually ineffective. It also does not exempt the staff member from following procedures, or from recognizing that they speak for the institution«. Quoted in David Ellerman , Helping People Help Themselves , University of Michigan Press, 2004, p. 151. 11. I am indebted to an important paper by Justin Barnes, Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris,»Industrial policy in developing economies: developing dynamic comparipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 105

bate concerns the latter – did it matter in East Asia and could it work elsewhere? Immediately one can intuit how difficult it is to separate out the effects of the latter from the effects of the first two, because of the mutually-supporting relationships among them. No industrial policy champion would claim that the third type, sectoral policies, can work with inhospitable policies of the first and second types. Part of the problem of getting evidence specifically on sectoral policies’ impacts is that the policies entered into the assessment tend to be of the kind»The Ten Year Plan to Develop the Petrochemical Industry«. What this misses is a great deal of activity»below the radar screen«, which may have rather small public expenditure costs but which in aggregate probably has had a powerful effect in raising the average level of technological and production capacity of East Asian firms. The nudging of firms into higher value-added products – and jolting of transnational firms and domestic firms to establish domestic supply relationships – has been going on across many sectors, case-by-case, for many decades in Taiwan. Taiwan, for example, had an Industrial Development Bureau( idb ) comprising, in the 1980s, some 200 engineers and allied professionals, and a sprinkling of economists. Much of the work was organized by inputoutput chains. The specialists in the chain that included, say, glass, monitored carefully the imports of glass, the buyers of imports, the production capacity of Taiwanese glass makers. As part of their job they were required to spend several days a month, at least, visiting firms in their sector. The aim of their monitoring and visits was to find opportunities to»nudge« the process of import replacement and export promotion, by using various kinds of administrative methods of»encouraging« the big buyers of imports to switch from importing to local sourcing once they judged that domestic suppliers could meet the quality and price of imports, provided they had a long-term supply contract and some technical help. In the case of a transnational company, Philips, importing specialized glass for its televisions, the idb officials informed Philips of the potential ative advantage in the South African auto sector«, Competition and Change 8, 2, 2004, pp. 153–72. 106 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

for switching, and indicated that they would look favourably on other Philips’ requests if it saw its way to switching. Philips said no. Then Philips began to experience longer and longer delays in its applications to import the specialized glass, which had previously been granted immediately. Philips protested to the minister, who apologized profusely, said he would look into it. The delays continued. Eventually Philips got the message and switched. The domestic suppliers undertook the needed investment in quality, and later were in a position to start exporting. 12 The point is that this sort of nudging of firms into higher value-added products – and jolting of transnational firms and domestic firms to establish domestic supply relationships – has been going on across many sectors, case-by-case, for many decades in Taiwan. It has required an honest, competent cadre of public officials with skills in engineering and finance – though not a particularly large one; and an array of instruments on which to draw, which may include some capacity to manage trade(as in the Philips example) but also a wide range of non-trade measures for encouraging and discouraging. It has not required the sort of subtle strategic trade calculations that seem to be required – according to conventional strategic trade theory – in the case of cutting-edge hightech industries in the advanced industrial economies. There is no question that it is difficult to pin down the quantitative effects of this sort of below-the-radar intervention by public officials – whether positive or negative. All we can be sure of is that a great deal of it was going on over decades, all the time, with a dedicated cadre of public officials to do it. Forging Ahead Today Taiwan has reached the technological level of middle-ranking oecd countries – which is an astonishing, almost unprecedented achievement given its starting point around 1950. But it remains well behind the world technology frontier in most sectors. For all its commitment to wto principles the state continues to exercise economy-wide foresight, continues to shape the composition of activity within its borders, does not let »the market« take its course. 12. Wade, Governing the Market , 2004, p. 285. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 107

Linda Weiss and Elizabeth Thurbon remark that»the practice of governing the market is not just about policy – gtm [governing the market] is also, and perhaps more importantly so, about the normative environment that sustains the will to govern the market, and the legitimacy of governing the market as perceived by actors in the polity. This is a point often overlooked in the mainstream literature …, which typically bases its claims on observed policy changes since the[financial] crisis[of 1997–98 – that is, claims that the Taiwan government has given up governing the market since the crisis]. The assumption is often that if a state has relinquished certain pre-crisis policies … it must also have abandoned a commitment to gtm and be acting in ways broadly consistent with the norms of competitive liberalism.« 13 They relate that the entrance to the Industrial Development Bureau is emblazoned with a quote from Goethe, that captures the difference at the level of norms between a government role based on strategic economics and one based on liberal economics:»the most important thing in life is to have a goal, and the determination to achieve it«. The Taiwan state continues with the organizational structure of the developmental state: 14 ̈ A pilot agency located in the very heartland of the state and chaired by the third ranking political leader in the state(the vice premier), called the Council for Economic Planning and Development; ̈ An operational agency that does the»nuts and bolts« of industrial policy, the Industrial Development Bureau described earlier, located within the Ministry of Economic Affairs; ̈ Industry associations by sector, membership of which is obligatory, whose secretary is semi-appointed by the government and is responsible for two-way interaction between the member firms and the government(and hence not likely to let the association become a center of political resistance to government); ̈ Public r&d laboratories, notably the umbrella agency, the Industrial Technology Research Institute( itri ), with a staff of some 10,000 sci13. Linda Weiss and Elizabeth Thurbon,»›Where there’s a will there’s a way‹: Governing the Market in Times of Uncertainty«, Issues and Studies , 40, 1, March 2004, pp. 61–72, at p. 63. 14. On the organizational structure of the developmental state(with specific reference to Korea) see Vivek Chibber, Locked in Place , Princeton University Press, 2003. 108 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

entists(by the mid 1980s) organized in more sector-specific labs; and an even bigger military-oriented counterpart. The essence of the political process of national development is intense dialogue between these organizational components of the developmental state. Earlier, the first two tended to call the tune and the others responded; since democratization in the late 1980s the balance of power has shifted towards the labs and the industry associations. In particular, much of the brainstorming takes place between itri labs and industry associations, which helps to build inter-firm networks with reliable collaboration between members. Commonly, an itri lab incubates a specific technology(e.g. Radio Frequency Information Devices, a type of chip), gets it to pre-commercial stage, takes out patents, and then spins off a sort-of private firm, to which it gives the patents in exchange for equity. Often the senior managers of the firm are exitri , or part-time itri . This technique has been used for many initiatives, including the import-replacement of bottleneck components whose recurrent delays in importing are impairing Taiwan’s entry into advanced sectors. In this and many other ways, the state helps to assume a large part of the risks of research and development of technologies to commercialization stage. Emphasis is given to promoting nationally-owned firms, with limits placed on the operation of foreign firms(e.g. foreign service firms). All the time, the apparatus of the developmental state is looking for ways to maximize technology spillover from foreign firms(abroad or in Taiwan) into the heads and hands of local firms. Equally, however, the apparatus is actively involved in building up a large stock of Taiwan-owned firms operating abroad – building up outward FDI – so that Taiwan is more of a reciprocal partner than if it were only playing the role of a periphery welcoming inwardfdi from the center. Taiwan’s outward fdi in China is well known; but it has also built up a large stock in other developing regions as well as in the core regions of the world economy(Japan aside). The underlying competitive strategy for the nation is based on recognition that its firms, being some way off the world technology frontier, must seek to capture second-mover advantages. Its firms are mostly unable, yet, to capture the brand-name advantages of first movers. They must be able to chase hot products developed by first movers, push up production of specified items quickly, and exploit scale economies before profit margins become paper-thin. For this strategy large firms, not networks of small and medium enterprises, are increasingly needed – large ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 109

firms which are able to produce in large volumes and which are big enough to be of interest to first-mover firms as subcontractors. 15 The government’s role is to push on with industrial policy of all three of the types distinguished earlier. In particular, to promote»industrial complexes« or»urban economic commons« or»growth poles«; and to promote moves in many industrial and service sectors – but often with sector-specific and even firm-specific instruments – into higher valueadded parts of global value chains(such as into manufacturing-related service industries, mrsi s, as part of which the Radio Frequency Information Device mentioned earlier was developed). 16 Besides Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and China also retain major features of the developmental state. South Korea, on the other hand, has gone some way to dismantling what used to be a model of the type. The dismantling began in the late 1980s, with democratization and the discrediting of military rule – and by the same token, discrediting of bureaucratic rule. Like a swing in fashion, many Korean economists and public officials converted to neoliberal economics of a fundamentalist kind, with us -trained Korean economists in the role of modern missionaries. Their ideas acquired power from their resonance with the interests of the large Korean conglomerates, like Samsung, which by the late 1980s had reached the point of organizational and technological sophistication where they saw the state as more of an obstacle than a help. And the G7 states particularly focused on Korea with demands that it open its markets, to avoid»another Japan«. By 1995 the Economic Planning Board – the pilot agency since the early 1960s – had in effect been abolished, and the capital market had been largely opened up for foreign borrowing and foreign financial service firms. Yet even in Korea things are not what they seem to be. Norms of»governing the market« continue. That is, the government continues to have a legitimate role in steering and coordinating the strategies of the private sector – it coordinates a governance arrangement spanning government and autonomous but interdependent firms, though not(as before) a commander of specific outcomes. Take telecommunications liberalization, for example. Before the early 1990s telecommunication services in Korea were provided by a public 15. Alice Amsden and Wan-wen Chu, Beyond Late Development: Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies , mit Press, 2003. 16. Weiss and Thurbon, above. 110 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

enterprise, backed by a history of heavy government regulation in equipment and telecom services. Then in the late 1980s and early 1990s a new technology, digital mobile telecommunications, appeared on the world frontier. This promised a much higher demand for mobile services and accompanying infrastructure. The conglomerates wanted to diversify into telecoms. The us government pressed Korea to open its telecom market to us firms; as did the prospect of gatt / wto membership. For all these reasons the Korean government had to privatize and liberalize the sector. The overall result illustrates the virtues of gradual liberalization orchestrated by the state in line with national development objectives, where those objectives give weight to national ownership in important sectors. But the government recognized that telecoms would be a»leading sector« on a world scale in the coming decades, and that Korea had to maintain a strong presence of Korean-owned firms. It began to liberalize by creating another public enterprise to compete with the first; then privatized them; then invited a small number of other Korean firms to apply for licenses; then invited some foreign telecom firms to enter in minority partnership with Korean firms(to get their technology); and only then did it allow some wholly-owned foreign firms to compete, under conditions restricting their suppliers of equipment and their technology standards to government-approved ones. The whole process was aimed at developing a strong indigenous telecom capacity before full liberalization, quite contrary to what the us government had in mind. 17 At the same time, a parallel project was under way to use a publicprivate partnership to do the r&d for cdma (Code Division Multiple Access) digital transmission technology, especially because the leading foreign telecoms firms would not sell advanced technology to the Koreans. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce formed a technology development network with the government-sponsored Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute( etri ) linked to the former public telecom company and a number of private Korean manufacturers, each 17. This account of Korea’s telecommunication strategy is based on information in »Liberalisation as a development strategy: new governance in the Korean mobile telecom market«, a paper under journal review whose author remains anonymous. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 111

with an assigned task. Much of the funding for this network came from the sale of shares in the privatized public enterprises. The proceeds were also used to subsidize the uptake of demand for telecommunications services, including internet access, making a virtuous circle between supply and demand. The overall results have been spectacular: Korea jumped from being a nobody in world telecommunications in the early 1990s to being a major player in the early 2000s. It has the highest broadband penetration in the world. It illustrates the virtues of gradual liberalization orchestrated by the state in line with national development objectives, where those objectives give weight to national ownership in important sectors. The Theory of Governing the Market It is one thing to say that governments in East Asia remain committed to governing the market; but is there any theory which might suggest why such actions might be effective at promoting rapid economy-wide development? Conventional economic analysis stresses that any attempt by public agents to change the composition of economic activity away from that which results from well-functioning markets is bound to be ineffective, bound to thwart the expansion of comparative advantage along whose path sustainable development lies. Measures such as protection, or domestic content or export performance requirements, withdraw resources from more productive uses and reduce consumption. Export requirements, for example, may worsen the trade account by reducing the export potential of other industries. But once the underlying assumption of perfect competition is replaced with an assumption of oligopoly – a small number of firms and barriers to the entry of competitors – the argument changes. In particular, the argument changes when there are increasing returns to scale such that only some of many potential production sites can be established, and when there are learning-by-doing economies which give advantages to firms which establish production early. In these conditions there is scope for states, not to»create« comparative advantage or»pick winners« out of thin air, but to shape and direct comparative advantage. These conditions occur frequently in the mid-tech industries of Eastern Europe and the mid-tech and high-tech industries of East Asia. 112 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

For example, states can intervene in order to accelerate the move of chunks of productive activity from existing high-cost sites abroad to host country sites, faster than»the market« would. Case studies of transnational corporations show clearly that corporations operating in conditions other than perfect competition – which is the normal case – are often slow to react to price signals at the margin, even when they are wellinformed about profitable opportunities to shift locations. This is especially so when rearranging intra-firm operations as in re-locating production out of the core regions to a cheaper-labor site, or switching suppliers from a high-cost one at home to a cheaper one in a developing region would incur substantial exit costs. The case of automobile production in Mexico provides an illustration. Ford and Volkswagen established assembly and engine plants in Mexico in the 1960s, with a large part of production intended for export. From this experience it became clear to them and to other auto firms that big cost advantages were to be reaped. Yet by the late 1970s their investments remained relatively small, far from world-scale capacity and far from being integrated into their global sourcing network; and other major auto makers had not followed them in establishing Mexican plants. So in 1978–79, Mexican industrial policy officials, aware that us car makers were under competitive pressure at home from Japanese imports, decided to enforce a 1977 decree that linked access to the domestic market to exports:»if you fail to meet an escalating export schedule your domestic sales will be cut«. The first to respond was General Motors, which in 1979 announced the biggest one-time investment in its history, to be placed in Mexico. Other auto makers soon followed GM’s lead in announcing plans for major expansion of exports from Mexican sites, in order not to lose share in the Mexican domestic market. But this was 16 years after Ford and Volkswagen first began to show the cost advantages of Mexican sites! They and the other auto firms had resisted international comparative advantage for a long time, and it took the»jolting« of Mexican officials to break their lock-in to exit costs and other intra-firm rigidities. 18 The more recent case of auto production in South Africa provides another illustration. Here the government after 1995 introduced an export18. Theodor Moran, Strategic trade theory and the use of performance requirements to negotiate with multinational corporations in the Third World, typescript, Georgetown University, October 1991. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 113

import link system(similar to that in Mexico), such that an auto firm’s access to the domestic market(with current sales of around 350,000 light vehicle units a year and expected to grow) was made conditional on export performance, either of finished vehicles or components in the value chain. In addition, several complementary programs – formulated and monitored by an auto industry development council, comprising representatives of assemblers, component makers, retailers, trade unions, government, plus a few academics who met every six weeks – helped to improve business organization and labor relations up and down the supply chain. The whole program was designed to harness the rivalry between the big three German auto makers, but also Toyota and Ford, to the benefit of the South African economy. Justin Barnes et al. show that the selective policies targeted at the auto industry were almost certainly effective by several measures of effectiveness, and that they did not require large public expenditures or a sophisticated bureaucracy making sophisticated calculations. 19 Conclusions The general point from all this is that there is a body of theory, or theoretical insights, at hand to support a strategy of governing the market in a developing country context(including Eastern Europe), based on ideas of economies of scale, learning-by-doing, second-mover advantages, stickiness in location decisions of transnational corporations, and the arbitrariness of much of»comparative advantage«. 20 And there is also some relevant empirical evidence, even if its conclusions about effectiveness are open to dispute – though no more so than the evidence which purports to show the fallacies of government efforts to change the composition of economic activity. The case studies show that the task for industrial policy strategists in identifying products or sub-sectors for targeting is not particularly difficult – it involves estimating costs of production, comparing with import prices and quality, estimating demand elasticity, and so on, the same sort of calculations as transnational corporations make every day; and it involves understanding the bargaining tactics of transnationals and how to 19. Barnes et al., 2004, above. 20.Philip Toner, Main Currents in Cumulative Causation , Palgrave, 1999. 114 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience ipg 2/2005

turn them to national advantage. In the Eastern European case it is important for industrial policy strategists not to think only of inwardfdi , but also of outwardfdi as a strategy – using banks awash with funds to make mergers and acquisitions and perhaps green-field investments in core economies; this helps to shift thinking out of the center-periphery mindset where the periphery thinks its salvation lies in obtaining resources from the center. Again, Taiwan and other East Asian cases show how the government can help to orchestrate these outward-investments in line with a national interest. The more difficult task is not the policies themselves, but designing an industrial policy bureaucracy – even if not the larger developmental state, as above – which is motivated to achieve its intended objectives. But relatively meritocratic agencies like Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau should not be beyond the wit of many Eastern European states. In the end, the main obstacle to success lies at the level of the norms: the legitimacy of efforts by public agencies to change the composition of economic activity. Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau has the Goethe quote referred to earlier. The prevailing norm in the»international development community« and in the transnational community of economists, on the other hand, is captured in the remark of Sir Terence Burns, chief economic advisor during the Thatcher years:»if we can’t make money by manufacturing things, we’d better think of something else to do«, or the remark of Herbert Stein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors during the Reagan years:»if the most efficient way for the u.s. to get steel is to produce tapes of ›Dallas‹ and sell them to the Japanese, then producing tapes of ›Dallas‹ is our basic industry«. 21 Burns and Stein reflect the assumption that the competitive model is a reasonable approximation to the real world; the Goethe quote, as operationalized in Taiwan, reflects the assumption that the real world is better understood in terms of oligopolistic markets, where governing the market has potentially big payoffs. Eastern European economists and policy makers believe Burns and Stein at peril to their economies’ catch-up with the West. 21. Cited in Robert Wade,»East Asia’s economic success: conflicting perspectives, partial insights, shaky evidence«, World Politics , 44, January 1992, p. 270–320. ipg 2/2005 Wade, Lessons from East Asia’s Development Experience 115

Transformation im Rückwärtsgang? Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie DIETMAR DIRMOSER I nterne Konflikte, politische Instabilität und zunehmender Autoritarismus kennzeichnen die Situation in vielen lateinamerikanischen Ländern. Gut zwei Jahrzehnte nach dem Beginn der großen Demokratisierungswelle im Südteil des amerikanischen Kontinents ist eine beachtliche Zahl der Demokratien der Region unter Druck geraten. Sie kommen mit ihren inneren Widersprüchen nicht mehr zurecht, weil die Bürger immer weniger bereit sind, sich mit Misswirtschaft, Korruption, der Verletzung demokratischer Normen, wachsender Verteilungsungerechtigkeit und den Zumutungen einer ökonomischen Dauerkrise abzufinden. Vielerorts ist der Ruf nach autokratischen Haurucklösungen zu vernehmen und einige Beobachter warnen vor einer»autoritären Regression«. Die bis vor kurzem hochgelobte»Belastbarkeit und Krisenresistenz« der lateinamerikanischen Demokratien hat jedenfalls nicht sehr lange vorgehalten: Die Demokratie in Lateinamerika ist angeschlagen, ihre zentralen Institutionen sind ausgehöhlt und taugen oft nur noch als Fassade. Demokratie ohne Demokraten Allenthalben erweitert die Exekutive ihre Macht, versucht den Einfluss der Parlamente zu verringern, unabhängige Kontrollen auszuhebeln und sich der Aufsicht der Justiz zu entziehen. Die traditionell starke Position des Präsidenten in den lateinamerikanischen Verfassungen ist für solche Projekte ausgesprochen förderlich. Im Extremfall werden personalistische Regime mit vertikaler Kommandostruktur etabliert, wo Seilschaften die Kontrolle des gesamten institutionellen Gefüges, insbesondere aber der machtstrategisch relevanten Institutionen wie Armee, Polizei und Wahlbehörde, usurpieren. Einige lateinamerikanische Machthaber finden es überdies nicht einmal mehr selbstverständlich, nach Ablauf ihrer Amtszeit abzutreten. In den letzten Jahren ließen mehrere amtierende Präsidenten konstitutionelle Wiederwahlverbote aufheben. Ein Abge116 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

ordneter aus dem Tross des venezolanischen Präsidenten Chávez forderte gar für seinen Chef die Präsidentschaft auf Lebenszeit und deren Absicherung in der Verfassung. Ein ähnliches Projekt hatte zuvor bereits der peruanische Präsident Fujimori betrieben. Die genannten Phänomene markieren eine unübersehbare Tendenz zur Schwächung der Demokratie und damit zur Verstärkung der autoritären Züge der politischen Systeme in Lateinamerika. Die Prototypen der bisweilen als»hybrid« bezeichneten neuen Regierungsformen stammen aus den 1990er Jahren und sind mit den Namen Fujimori und Menem verknüpft. Der Peruaner Alberto Fujimori, Präsident von 1990 bis 2000, steht für einen personalistischen Autoritarismus mit Legitimation durch Wahlen, der Argentinier Carlos Menem, Präsident von 1989 bis 1999, für die Kolonisierung der Institutionen durch die Exekutive. Beide Modelle finden mittlerweile zwischen Mexiko und Feuerland immer mehr diskrete und offene Nachahmer. Doch die demokratischen Institutionen werden durchaus nicht nur von den Regierenden ausgehöhlt. Autoritäre Neigungen und undemokratische Verfahrensweisen und Verhaltensmuster finden sich im gesamten Spektrum der sozialen und politischen Akteure. Großgrundbesitzercliquen, die Todesschwadrone unterhalten, Klientelnetze von Drogenkartellen und Militärlogen mit diskreter Vetomacht sind gewiss extreme (wenn auch durchaus nicht rare) Erscheinungsformen undemokratischer Enklaven. Selbiges gilt für mächtige Wirtschafts- und Finanzgruppen, die in reservierten Domänen tun und lassen, was ihnen gerade zum Vorteil gereicht. Am anderen Ende des sozialen Spektrums stößt man ebenfalls auf mit demokratischen Verkehrsformen nicht kompatible Phänomene. Vielerorts sind Anti-System-Kräfte auf dem Vormarsch; sie spielen in sozialen Bewegungen eine wichtige Rolle und beeinflussen die Dynamik politischer Konflikte. Ebenso wie Militärlogen und Drogenkartelle haben sie ein lediglich taktisches Verhältnis zur Demokratie und sind bereit, sich über Normen und Spielregeln hinwegzusetzen, wenn diese sich nicht zum eigenen Vorteil nutzen lassen. Prominente Beispiele sind in Bolivien der mas (Movimiento al Socialismo) und die von Felipe Quispe geführte Aymara-Bewegung, in Ecuador radikale Gruppen aus dem Umfeld der Indianerallianz conaie (Confederación Nacional de Indígenas del Ecuador), in Argentinien Sektoren der »piqueteros« genannten Arbeitslosenorganisationen und in Brasilien Teile der Landarbeiterbewegung mst (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra). ipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 117

Es ist gewiss kein Indikator für die Stärke der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie, dass sie die Probleme und Forderungen, für die solche Gruppen stehen, nicht integrieren und verarbeiten konnte. Und gerade weil sie dies nicht konnte, hat sich die politische Auseinandersetzung vielerorts in den außerparlamentarischen Raum verlagert. Dort sind aber zumeist weder das Politikverständnis der Akteure noch die von ihnen angewandten Methoden demokratisch. In Fällen, wo es Anti-SystemAkteuren gelang, die politische Führung von Protestbewegungen zu übernehmen, attackierten sie frontal die demokratischen Institutionen und schreckten nicht einmal davor zurück, Regierungen zu stürzen(wie im Fall der Regierung von Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador im Jahr 2000, Fernando de la Rua in Argentinien, 2001, und Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivien, 2003). Sie ließen Konflikte eskalieren ohne Rücksicht darauf, dass diese drohten, außer Kontrolle zu geraten. 1 Die Transformation vollzieht sich allmählich, üblicherweise ohne Brüche und Aufsehen erregende Ereignisse. Verfassungen werden nicht außer Kraft gesetzt, sondern reformiert; Gesetze werden nicht verletzt, sondern Interessenlagen angepasst. Eine weitere Dimension des Trends zur Aushöhlung der Demokratie besteht darin, dass die autoritären Neigungen der politischen Akteure mit empirisch nachweisbaren Einstellungen und Stimmungen in der Bevölkerung korrespondieren. Nach der neuesten Erhebung des Latinobarómetro glaubt in neun von 17 untersuchten Ländern in Lateinamerika inzwischen weniger als die Hälfte der Befragten, dass die Demokratie die beste Regierungsform sei. In acht Ländern ist die Anhängerschaft der Demokratie seit 1996 deutlich, in einigen Fällen dramatisch zurückgegangen. In elf Fällen erwarten lediglich 30–50 Prozent der Bevölkerung, dass Wahlen etwas bewirken. Hinzu kommt, dass zwischen 48 und 69 Prozent der Bevölkerung bereit wären, für ein Mehr an Ordnung und Sicherheit Einschränkungen von bürgerlichen Freiheiten in Kauf zu neh1. Einige Autoren werten dies dennoch als zukunftsweisende Entwicklung. So sieht Aníbal Quijano in den radikalen außerparlamentarischen Politikansätzen»neue soziale Subjekte« am Werk, die eine neue und bessere Form der Demokratie hervorbringen werden. Aníbal Quijano:»El laberinto de América Latina: Hay otras salidas?«, in: Tareas , Nr. 116, 2004, S. 45–74( cela , Panamá). 118 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

men. Wohin man schaut – auf das politische Führungspersonal, auf die sozialen und politischen Bewegungen oder auf das Wahlvolk: Überall nimmt die Bereitschaft zur Abkehr von zentralen demokratischen Prinzipien zu. Nach der Freedom-House-Klassifizierung des Jahres 2004 sind alle lateinamerikanischen Staaten(bis auf Kuba, Haiti sowie Antigua und Barbuda) als Demokratien(»electoral democracies«) einzustufen. Doch wenn der gegenwärtige Trend anhält, könnte es sich bald um Demokratien ohne Demokraten handeln. Die Aushöhlung der Demokratie ist in einigen Ländern weiter, in anderen weniger weit vorangeschritten. Die Transformation vollzieht sich allmählich, üblicherweise ohne Brüche und Aufsehen erregende Ereignisse. Verfassungen werden nicht außer Kraft gesetzt, sondern reformiert; Gesetze werden nicht verletzt, sondern Interessenlagen angepasst. Wenn Militärs beteiligt sind, dann diskret im Hintergrund, denn Militärcoups stoßen ebenso wie Militärregierungen auf einhellige Ablehnung: Außer in Paraguay ist eine zumeist große Mehrheit der Lateinamerikaner grundsätzlich gegen Militärregime. Ob und in welchen Ländern der Rückbau der Demokratie bereits so weit vorangeschritten ist, dass man von einem neuen Regimetyp sprechen kann, ist heftig umstritten, denn es handelt sich um eine Definitionsfrage – eine Definitionsfrage allerdings, die von erheblicher Bedeutung für die internationalen Beziehungen ist, denn es gibt in internationalen Abkommen und bilateralen Programmen eine Vielzahl von Demokratieklauseln und-konditionalitäten. Neue Einsichten der Demokratieforschung Demoskopen und Demokratieforscher sind bereits seit einigen Jahren durch die Negativtrends alarmiert. Selbst die Stiftung Freedom House, deren Demokratiedefinition in ihrer Anspruchslosigkeit nicht zu unterbieten ist 2 , versieht in ihrem Bericht des vergangenen Jahres immerhin zehn Länder in Lateinamerika und der Karibik mit einem Fragezeichen. Obwohl dort die politischen Freiheiten und Bürgerrechte eingeschränkt sind, wird ihnen der Demokratie-Status allerdings nicht aberkannt. Da2. Als»electoral democracy« werden alle Länder eingestuft, in denen das politische Führungspersonal durch im weitesten Sinne allgemeine, freie und periodisch stattfindende Wahlen ausgewählt wird. ipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 119

runter sind auf dem Kontinent Venezuela, Kolumbien, Ecuador, Bolivien und Paraguay, sowie auf dem zentralamerikanischen Isthmus Guatemala, Honduras und Nicaragua. Deutlich sensibler – und kritischer – gegenüber autoritären Trends sind neuerdings die Exponenten der Transitions- und Konsolidierungsforschung, insbesondere jene aus den tonangebenden Zirkeln um das Journal of Democracy. Sie haben eine Vielzahl von zusammengesetzten Bezeichnungen in Umlauf gesetzt, die allesamt auf den Qualitäts- oder Substanzverlust der Demokratie verweisen: etwa Semi-Demokratie, defekte Demokratie, virtuelle Demokratie, Pseudo-Demokratie, oligarchische Demokratie, nicht-liberale Demokratie, Semi-Autoritarismus, weicher Autoritarismus, hybride Regime, um nur einige zu nennen. Den Vogel bei neuartigen Wortprägungen hat gewiss Charles King mit der »Potemkin-Demokratie« abgeschossen. 3 Die unabweisbaren Zweifel am Transitionsparadigma zwingen Außenpolitiker und Nichtregierungsorganisationen(NROs) dazu, ihre Konzeptionen und Kooperationsprogramme zu revidieren, die insbesondere in den USA seit den 1980er Jahren mit explizitem Bezug auf die Demokratieeuphorie der Transitologie entwickelt worden waren. Ein weiterer Hinweis auf wachsendes Problembewusstsein unter den Analytikern ist der proliferierende Gebrauch der Bezeichnung»Neopopulismus« für Regime, die sich über Regeln und Normen hinwegsetzen, klientelistische Gefolgschaften organisieren oder von starken Führerpersönlichkeiten dirigiert werden. Die historische Kategorie»Populismus« verliert allerdings jeden Sinn, wenn sie auf ein oder zwei hervorstechende Merkmale reduziert und auf völlig andere Kontexte projiziert wird, was dann u.a. ermöglicht, Fujimoris radikales Strukturanpassungsprogramm 3. Vgl. u.a.: Carothers, Thomas:»The End of the Transition Paradigm«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002; Diamond, Larry:»Thinking about hybrid regimes«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002; Karl, Terry L.:»The Hybrid Regimes of Central America«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 6, No. 3, 1995; King, Charles:»Potemkin Democracy«, in: The National Interest , No. 64, 2001; Levitsky, Steven/Way, Lucan A.:»Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002; Merkel, Wolfgang et al.: Defekte Demokratie , Bd.1: Theorie, Opladen 2003. 120 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

der frühen 1990er Jahre mit der widersinnigen Bezeichnung»neoliberaler Populismus« zu belegen. 4 Die konzeptionellen Bemühungen, die Aushöhlung der Demokratie begrifflich zu fassen, stellen im Fall der Transitions- und Konsolidierungsforscher eine bemerkenswerte Revision früherer Positionen dar. Denn bis vor nicht allzu langer Zeit galt die Rückkehr der in den 1970er Jahren in Lateinamerika installierten Militärregime zur Demokratie noch als unaufhaltsamer und irreversibler Prozess. Er wurde verstanden als Teil einer globalen Entwicklung, in deren Verlauf der Autoritarismus schließlich im Weltmaßstab für immer überwunden werden würde. Samuel Huntington hat diese Idee in das Bild der»Demokratisierungswellen« gekleidet und damit einmal mehr sämtliche Zitierrekorde gebrochen. 5 Die»Welle« erreichte in den 1970er Jahren Südeuropa(Griechenland, Portugal, Spanien), erfasste Ende der 1970er Jahre Lateinamerika, und riss nach dem Zusammenbruch der kommunistischen Regime ganz Osteuropa mit. Einige Autoren gingen zeitweise so weit, von historischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten oder gar von Naturgesetzen zu sprechen, die die Transition antrieben. Und als schlagendes Argument galt, dass der Übergang zur Demokratie sich selbst durch tiefe Wirtschaftskrisen nicht aufhalten ließ. Mittlerweile zwingen die unabweisbaren Zweifel am Transitionsparadigma Außenpolitiker und Nichtregierungsorganisationen dazu, ihre Konzeptionen und Kooperationsprogramme zu revidieren, die insbesondere in den usa seit den 1980er Jahren mit explizitem Bezug auf die Demokratieeuphorie der Transitologie entwickelt worden waren (vgl. u.a. Ronald Reagans»demokratische Revolution« und Bill Clintons »liberale Marktdemokratien«). Während die»Transitologen« und die Anhänger der Neopopulismusthese den neuen Problemen oft nur durch terminologische Kreativi4. Demmers, Jolle/Fernández, Alex/Hogenboom, Barbara(Hrsg.): Miraculous Metamorphoses: The Neoliberalization of Latin American Populism , London/New York 2001; Crabtree, John:»Neopopulismo y el fenómeno Fujimori«, in: Crabtree, John/Thomas, Jim(Hrsg.): El Perú de Fujimori , Lima 2000; Roberts, Kenneth: »Polarización social y resurgimiento del populismo en Venezuela«, in: Ellner, Steve/Hellinger, Daniel(Hrsg.): La política venezolana en la época de Chávez: clases, polarización y conflicto , Caracas 2003; Vilas, Carlos:»¿Populismos reciclados o neoliberalismo a secas? El mito del neopopulismo latinoamericano«, in: Estudios Sociales , Vol. 14, No.26(Heft 1), 2004, Universidad del Litoral, Santa Fé, Argentinien, S. 27 –51. 5. Huntington, Samuel P.: The Third Wave. Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century , New York 1993. ipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 121

tät beizukommen versuchen, hat der argentinische Sozialwissenschaftler Guillermo O’Donnell unter dem Stichwort»delegative Demokratie« eine differenziertere Konzeption vorgelegt. 6 Deren zentrale Elemente: In der delegativen Demokratie regiert der Gewinner von – in der Regel kompetitiven – Wahlen nach Gutdünken, ohne sich um Wahlversprechen oder Regierungsprogramme zu kümmern, eingeschränkt lediglich durch die realen(nicht-institutionalisierten) Machtverhältnisse. Delegative Regime stützen sich auf Bewegungen und Gefolgschaften und präsentieren sich als überparteiliche Verkörperung der Interessen der Nation, mit der Mission, die Nation zu»heilen« und vor den chaotischen Folgen der Dispersion der Partikularinteressen zu»retten«. Sie tendieren dazu, direkt an »das Volk« appellierend, sich über organisierte Interessen sowie Institutionen hinwegzusetzen und gegenüber niemandem Rechenschaft abzulegen. Dies provoziert Konfrontationen und Konflikte, die gleichsam dazu zwingen, Regeln zu verletzen und die Gegengewichte und Kontrollinstanzen der Demokratie zu umgehen, zu ignorieren oder Institutionen zu korrumpieren. Kurzum: Delegative Regime zielen auf die Neutralisierung oder Zerstörung des Netzwerkes, das die»horizontale Verantwortlichkeit« der Exekutive gewährleistet. O’Donnell betont, dass delegative Regime zwar Demokratien seien, aber eher einen Beitrag zur Schwächung als zur Weiterentwicklung und Stärkung der demokratischen politischen Institutionen leisten. Zusammen mit anderen war O’Donnell maßgeblich an der bislang umfassendsten und profundesten Untersuchung des United Nations Development Programme( undp ) über den Zustand der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie beteiligt, deren Ergebnisse im vergangenen Jahr der Öffentlichkeit präsentiert wurden. 7 Über mehrere Jahre hatte ein undp Projekt-Team unter Leitung des ehemaligen argentinischen Außenministers Dante Caputo zusammen mit zahlreichen namhaften Wissenschaftlern ein theoretisches Gerüst konstruiert, dann mit fast 19 000 Befragungen Einstellungen und Meinungsprofile in 18 Ländern erhoben und 230 Tiefeninterviews mit hochkarätigen politischen Funktionsträgern(dar6. O’Donnell, Guillermo: Delegative Democracy? Kellog Institute Working Paper Nr. 172, Notre Dame 1992; ders.:»Delegative Democracy«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 5, No. 1, 1994; ders.:»Illusions about Consolidation«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996; ders.:»Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies«, in: Journal of Democracy , Vol. 9, No. 3, 1998. 7. undp : Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy ; New York 2004. 122 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

unter fast alle amtierenden und viele Ex-Präsidenten) durchgeführt. Der Abschlussbericht des Projekts und die ergänzenden Daten- und Materialbände stellen sowohl hinsichtlich der konzeptionellen Qualität als auch der Differenzierung und der Reichweite der Interpretationen für jeden, der mit Demokratieförderung und-verbreitung befasst ist, eine empirische und theoretische Fundgrube dar, die bislang aber viel zu wenig genutzt wurde. Auch das undp -Demokratie-Projekt teilt die allgemeine Besorgnis über den Zustand der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie, fürchtet um ihre Stabilität, sieht die Möglichkeiten der Wahrnehmung von politischen, bürgerlichen und sozialen Rechten eingeschränkt und verzeichnet einen Trend zu wachsender Toleranz gegenüber autoritären Verfahrensweisen. Eigenheiten und Transformationen der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie Das theoretische Fundament für die beschriebenen Befunde über den Zustand der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ist eine normative Demokratiekonzeption. Diese erlaubt, relativ präzise anzugeben, welche Funktionen ein politisches System erfüllen und welche Strukturen es herausbilden muss, um als Demokratie funktionsfähig zu sein. Was bei einem solchen Analyseansatz deshalb zuerst ins Auge fällt, sind die Unterschiede zwischen Realität und Modell und dies kann dabei helfen, Probleme zu erkennen und Ansätze zu ihrer Überwindung zu entwickeln. (Ohnehin kommt keine theoretische Konzeption der Demokratie ohne normative Elemente aus, denn die Entscheidung für oder gegen Demokratie basiert auf Werten, die nicht theoretisch ableitbar sind). Gleichwohl haben normative Konzeptionen Schwierigkeiten zu erklären, warum die real existierenden politischen Systeme funktionieren, wie sie funktionieren und was ihre Entwicklungslogik bestimmt. Solchen Erklärungen kommt man mit Ansätzen näher, die die politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in ihrer komplexen Wechselbeziehung aus historischer Perspektive analysieren, also auf das Verständnis von Prozessen abzielen. Im demokratischen Gemeinwesen ist das Allgemeinwohl das oberste Ziel. Die Institutionenordnung und der Willensbildungsprozess müssen so strukturiert sein, dass sie die Erreichung dieses Ziels fördern. In den politischen Systemen Lateinamerikas haben allerdings klientelistische ipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 123

Praktiken traditionell ein erhebliches Gewicht. Dies hat zur Folge, dass Gruppen- und Partikularinteressen häufig schwerer wiegen als das Allgemeinwohl. Während funktionierende Demokratien universalistisch sind, sind die den Verfassungen nach demokratischen Systeme Lateinamerikas seit der Unabhängigkeit stets partikularistisch gewesen. Klientelismus bedeutet im Kern, dass die Integration der Bürger in das politische System wesentlich über Netzwerke der Unterordnung unter Macht- und Interessengruppen erfolgt, die die Klienten im Gegenzug mit der Zuteilung von Ressourcen und Leistungen»belohnen«. Die Beziehung zwischen Patron und Klient ist eine Tauschbeziehung, auf die insbesondere die Klienten angesichts knapper und schwer zugänglicher überlebensnotwendiger Ressourcen angewiesen sind und die das Handeln beider Seiten prägt. Der Politiker trachtet danach, sich die Ressourcen anzueignen, die er in den Tauschakt einbringen muss(deshalb besteht ein enger Zusammenhang zwischen Klientelismus und Korruption), während die Klientel dafür mit(politischer) Unterstützung»bezahlt«. Auf beiden Seiten dominieren Partikularinteressen, die quer zum Allgemeinwohl liegen können. Die historische Erfahrung hat gerade die unteren Schichten gelehrt, dass der klientelistische Tauschakt ein sicherer und schnellerer Weg ist, um ein Problem zu lösen, als das Pochen auf Rechtsansprüche oder das Vertrauen auf die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz. Ein Freund oder Bekannter in einflussreicher Position ist in der Regel unerlässlich, nicht nur, um im Leben weiterzukommen, sondern oft bereits, um ein Krankenhausbett oder einen Job zu erhalten. Gerade die Gruppen mit den niedrigsten Einkommen sind auf die Nutzung solcher Mechanismen am stärksten angewiesen, da sie sonst bei der Verteilung öffentlicher Güter und Leistungen, die nur für einen Teil der Bevölkerung ausreichen, nicht berücksichtigt würden. Der klientelistische Partikularismus hat über weite Strecken des vergangenen Jahrhunderts den modus operandi der politischen Parteien geprägt und ist der Schlüssel zum Verständnis für ihre heutige Krise. Gerade die größeren und moderneren Organisationen übertrafen sich gegenseitig dabei, viele unterschiedliche Klientelgruppen unter ihrem Dach zu vereinigen. Je heterogener das Konglomerat der Gefolgschaftsgruppen, desto heterogener und inkonsistenter war dann zumeist auch die staatliche Politik. Solange Parteien die Beziehung zu ihren Anhängern nur nach dem Muster der Begünstigung von heterogenen Partikularinteressen strukturieren, können sie eine der zentralen Funktionen von Parteien, die Interessenaggregation, nur unzureichend erfüllen. Doch die 124 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

meisten lateinamerikanischen Parteien waren ohnehin nie mehr als Koalitionen von Gruppen- und Partialinteressen. Sie blieben oft ohne Ideologie und Programm und schafften es in der Regel nicht, die Herausforderungen für ihre Länder, nationale und internationale Entwicklungen sowie die Interessen ihrer Anhängerschaft in politischen Projekten zusammenzuführen. Es gab allerdings auch nichts, was sie dazu gezwungen hätte. In der Phase der nach innen gerichteten Entwicklung oder importsubstituierenden Industrialisierung( isi ), vom Ende des zweiten Weltkriegs bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre, verfügte der protektionistische Staat über ein großes Arsenal an Instrumenten und Ressourcen zur Bedienung von Partikularinteressen. Dazu gehörten die Ermessensspielräume bei Staatsinterventionen, die Vergabe von Staatsaufträgen sowie die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen im öffentlichen Sektor, die überall erheblich zunahmen. Das Modell der nach innen gerichteten Entwicklung, gesteuert von einem starken Entwicklungsstaat und abgesichert durch partikularistische Verteilungskoalitionen, geriet in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren in immer mehr Ländern wegen wachsender wirtschaftlicher Schwierigkeiten und zunehmender sozialer Konflikte mit den Ausgeschlossenen an seine Grenze. Die radikale Linke, die im Gegensatz zu den anderen Parteien nicht in partikularistischen Kategorien dachte und durchaus zur Entwicklung von politischen Projekten für ganze Nationen in der Lage war, wurde nach dem Sieg der kubanischen Revolution zu einer immer größeren Gefahr für die traditionellen Machtgruppen. Nahezu in allen südund mittelamerikanischen Ländern ergriffen rechte Militärs die Macht, suspendierten die demokratischen Institutionen und hoben die demokratischen Freiheiten auf. Der Rückzug der Militärs, die keines ihrer Entwicklungsziele erreichen konnten, leitete Anfang der 1980er Jahre auf dem gesamten Kontinent die Redemokratisierung ein. Die neuen Demokratien wurden jedoch mit Problemen unbekannter Größenordnung und nie gekannter Intensität konfrontiert. Schuldenkrise, Hyperinflation und drohender Staatsbankrott zwangen geschwächte Staaten mit orientierungslosen Regierungen zur Implementierung neoliberaler Sanierungspolitiken nach den Rezepten des sogenannten Washington Consensus. Die 1980er Jahre gingen als»verlorenes Jahrzehnt« in die Geschichtsbücher ein, die 1990er Jahre als»halbes verlorenes Jahrzehnt«(Comisión Económica para America Latina, cepal ). Denn die Neoliberalisierung des Kontinents, seine aggressive Integration in den Weltmarkt und seine konsequente Ankoppipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 125

lung an Globalisierungstrends hatten aus heutiger Sicht nicht nur für die Unter- und Mittelschichten katastrophale Wirkungen, sondern warfen auch die wirtschaftliche und technologische Entwicklung zurück. Die Neoliberalisierung des Kontinents, seine aggressive Integration in den Weltmarkt und seine konsequente Ankopplung an Globalisierungstrends hatten aus heutiger Sicht nicht nur für die Unter- und Mittelschichten katastrophale Wirkungen, sondern warfen auch die wirtschaftliche und technologische Entwicklung zurück. Was die Mechanismen der Interessenrepräsentation angeht, so wurde der partikularistische Klientelismus zunächst von den Militärs außer Kraft gesetzt. Nach der Redemokratisierung ließen die Hyperinflation und die Konditionalitäten der multilateralen Finanzinstitutionen, die die Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen überwachten, den Regierungen zunächst keinen Spielraum für die klientelistische Befriedigung von Partikularinteressen. Der Konsens, dass die Kosten der Sanierung unvermeidlich seien und nicht den jeweiligen Regierungen angelastet werden könnten, hielt erstaunlich lang. Erst nach dem Volksaufstand in Caracas (»caracazo«) im Jahre 1989 und ähnlichen Episoden in anderen Ländern begannen die Reformverlierer, die versprochenen Reformdividenden, mindestens aber die Wiederherstellung ihrer früheren Situation, einzufordern. Dabei orientierten sie sich am altbewährten Modell der partikularistischen Repräsentation und Durchsetzung von Interessen. Doch seit der militärischen Okkupation der Politik hat sich, nicht zuletzt als Konsequenz der liberalen Reformen, zweierlei grundlegend verändert: Zum einen haben die wirtschaftlichen Strukturveränderungen im Gefolge der»adjustment«-Pakete und der forcierten Internationalisierung der Binnenmärkte das gesamte Spektrum der sozialen und politischen Akteure radikal transformiert. In der isi -Phase existierten, am stärksten ausgeprägt in den klassisch populistischen Regimen, differenzierte Netze der Aushandlung und Konfliktbearbeitung zwischen Regierung und Bevölkerung, zu denen Organisationen wie Gewerkschaften, Bauernorganisationen sowie diverse andere Verbände gehörten. Von diesen Netzwerken ist heute nur noch wenig übrig. Vielen Gewerkschaften kamen durch die Prekarisierung und Informalisierung wesentlicher Teile der Ökonomie die Mitglieder abhanden. Unternehmerverbände verloren ihren Einfluss an transnationale Unternehmen, die im Zuge der Privatisie126 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

rungspolitik Schlüsselpositionen eroberten. Wegen der Schwächung und teilweisen Auflösung der organisatorischen Strukturen der Interessenwahrnehmung werden wichtige Mediationsfunktionen nicht mehr wahrgenommen und die Regierungen stehen gleichsam ungeschützt einer Bevölkerung gegenüber, die nach den liberalen Reformen noch stärker fragmentiert ist als vorher. Zum anderen ist auch der Staat, an den Interessen herangetragen sowie Forderungen und Erwartungen gerichtet werden, heute ein ganz anderer als der Staat der isi . Er hat interventionistischen Praktiken abgeschworen, hat seinen administrativen Apparat ebenso wie sein Leistungsangebot radikal verkleinert und die staatlichen Produktionssektoren weitgehend privatisiert. Dadurch hat er allerdings auch die Instrumente zur Bedienung partikularer Interessen weitgehend aus der Hand gegeben. Der Staat ist deshalb gezwungen, potenzielle Klienten mit ihren Forderungen auf den Markt zu verweisen, auf den er nur wenig Einfluss hat und wo die Interessenten sich nun selbst beschaffen müssen, was sie früher vom Staat gefordert und oft auch erhalten haben. Dies bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass die Menschen aufgehört hätten, die Lösung ihrer Probleme vom Staat zu erwarten, oder dass sie begonnen hätten, ihre Partikularinteressen einem wie auch immer gearteten Gemeinwohl unterzuordnen. Ebenso wenig verzichten die politischen Akteure neuerdings auf klientelistische Angebote. Notwendige Folge ist, dass Erwartungen und Versprechen nicht erfüllt werden, was wiederum dazu führt, dass die klientelistischen Beziehungsnetze von Misstrauen und Enttäuschung zersetzt werden. Die Konsequenzen haben insbesondere die traditionellen lateinamerikanischen Parteien, aber auch die Gewerkschaften und andere Verbände zu spüren bekommen. Langdauernde Parteienbindungen haben sich aufgelöst, die Identifikation mit politischen Parteien ist drastisch zurückgegangen, traditionelle politische Milieus sind verschwunden. Die mageren Resultate der Parteien in der Regierungsverantwortung und ihr Desinteresse an den spezifischen Interessen ihrer Klientel haben beim politischen Publikum eine erhebliche Aggressivität gegen Parteien und Politiker freigesetzt. Der Wähler neuen Typs ist antipolitisch. Er ist darauf bedacht, die politischen Akteure dafür abzustrafen, dass die politischen Resultate sich immer weiter von den Notwendigkeiten und Erwartungen insbesondere der armen Mehrheit entfernen. Gleichzeitig nimmt die Bereitschaft zu, postmodernen Medienphänomenen oder politischen Projekten des delegativen Typs an die Macht zu verhelfen. ipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 127

In den 1980er Jahren hatten die lateinamerikanischen Parteiensysteme einen bemerkenswerten Institutionalisierungsgrad erreicht. Doch der radikale Umbau des Wirtschaftsmodells hat das bis dahin allenthalben genutzte System der Mediation, das auf partikularistischer Interessenrepräsentation basierte, obsolet werden lassen und einen Prozess der Zersetzung der Parteiensysteme in Gang gesetzt. Parteien, die weitermachen, als ob nichts geschehen wäre, und eine Art Klientelismus ohne Gegenleistung(für die Klientel) zu installieren versuchten, waren bald von der politischen Bühne verschwunden. Selbst zwei Massenparteien mit langer Tradition wie die peruanische apra (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) und die venezolanische ad (Acción Democratica) wurden dezimiert und marginalisiert. Bis heute haben die traditionellen Parteien keinen Weg aus der Krise gefunden. Wer sich indessen mit den Defekten der lateinamerikanischen Demokratien nicht abfinden will, muss die Schaffung institutionalisierter und einigermaßen solider Instanzen der Repräsentation von Interessen ganz oben auf die Tagesordnung setzen. Und das Leitbild für solche institutionellen Innovationen darf gewiss nicht der klientelistische Partikularismus sein. Krise der Repräsentation und autoritäre Trends: Herausforderungen für linke Regierungen Die Bilanz nach knapp drei Jahrzehnten liberaler Reformen ist nicht ermutigend. Die lateinamerikanischen Ökonomien sind weiterhin abhängig und krisenanfällig. Sie finden weder den Anschluss an die entwickelte Welt noch sind sie in der Lage, die Voraussetzungen für den Abbau der Armut und der extremen Wohlstandsdisparitäten zu schaffen. Gleichzeitig sind viele Menschen von der Demokratie enttäuscht, die politische Instabilität und soziale Konflikte nehmen zu. Der Linken ist all dies aber am allerwenigsten anzulasten, denn sie trug in der gesamten Phase kaum Regierungsverantwortung und hatte über weite Strecken mehr mit sich selbst als mit den politisch zu bewältigenden Problemen zu tun. Das Projekt der lateinamerikanischen Linken, ein ganz anderes Entwicklungs- und Gesellschaftsmodell zu installieren, ist in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren überall gescheitert, doch nur zögerlich wurden hieraus Konsequenzen gezogen. Erst nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs (1989) und der Wahlniederlage der Sandinisten in Nicaragua(1990) be128 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie ipg 2/2005

schleunigte sich dieser notwendige Prozess. Nach einer langen und schmerzhaften Reorientierungs- und Regruppierungsphase hat die Linke schließlich ein neues politisches Angebot entwickelt, das innerhalb der Marktdemokratien mit anderen politischen Angeboten konkurriert und bessere politische Resultate als die der Mitte-Rechts-Regierungen verspricht. Die Unfähigkeit oder der Unwille vieler Regierungen, die soziale Frage anzugehen, hat der Linken Protestwähler zugetrieben. Ihre traditionell stärker ausgeprägte soziale Sensibilität sowie die Verankerung der linken Parteien in sozialen Bewegungen und Basisorganisationen hat ihr Glaubwürdigkeit verschafft. Da die Linke an der Durchsetzung von Anpassungs- und Liberalisierungspaketen nicht beteiligt war, vermag sie sich als neue und unverbrauchte politische Kraft, gleichsam als moralische Reserve, zu präsentieren. Sie ist von der Parteienfeindlichkeit nicht betroffen und ihr schadet weniger als anderen die antipolitische Einstellung vieler enttäuschter Wähler. Mittlerweile sind in Brasilien, Argentinien, Uruguay und Chile linke Regierungen am Werk, die sich durch makroökonomischen Pragmatismus und soziale Sensibilität auszeichnen. Wenn sie ihre historische Chance nicht verspielen wollen, müssen sie eine erfolgreiche Wachstumspolitik implementieren, mit der die Ausweitung von Sozialprogrammen finanziert werden kann. Nur beides zusammen,(stetiges) Wachstum und eine effiziente, fokussierte Sozialpolitik, können mittelfristig eine Reduzierung der extremen Verteilungsungerechtigkeit bewirken. Chile ist auf diesem Weg ein Stück vorangekommen. Weitere Erfolge könnten auch bei der politischen Konkurrenz der Einsicht zum Durchbruch verhelfen, dass ohne sozialstaatliche Leistungen und ohne Regulierungen, die die Arbeitskraft und die natürlichen Ressourcen schützen, kapitalistische Marktwirtschaften nicht dauerhaft funktionsfähig sind. Erfolge der linken Regierungen sind aber auch nötig, um der Verstärkung autoritärer Tendenzen und dem Vormarsch von Zynismus und Antipolitik entgegenzuwirken. Sie haben es in der Hand, durch die Ausweitung von Partizipationsansätzen der Politik- und Parteienverdrossenheit entgegenzuwirken. Dabei könnten neue Instanzen und Strukturen der Mediation zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft entstehen, die erstmals nicht nach klientelistischen Prinzipien funktionieren, sondern sich an einer realistischen Konzeption des Allgemeinwohls orientieren würden. ipg 2/2005 Dirmoser, Zur Krise der lateinamerikanischen Demokratie 129

Größer, weiter, schwächer: Warum die EU einen»harten Kern« braucht WINFRIED VEIT D er 9. November 1989 und der 1. Mai 2004 bezeichnen den Anfangsund den(vorläufigen) Endpunkt einer Entwicklung, die von den meisten Autoren als quasi unvermeidlich bezeichnet wird: die(Wieder-) Vereinigung von West- und Osteuropa nach über fünfzig Jahren der Trennung durch den Eisernen Vorhang. Für die einen ist es eine»historische Notwendigkeit«, die schon in den Visionen der europäischen Gründerväter Monnet und Schuman angelegt war; für andere ist es»das Ende eines geopolitischen Fluches«, der die Mittelosteuropäer seit Jahrhunderten dazu verdammte,»Zwischenzone« zu sein – zunächst zwischen Deutschland und Russland, seit 1945 zwischen Ost und West. 1 Dazwischen liegt der 11. September 2001 und dieser hat die geopolitischen Koordinaten auch für Europa vielleicht noch mehr verändert als die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union. Die mit dem Fall der Mauer eingeleitete Ausdehnung des»europäischen Modells« des Friedens, der Wohlfahrt und der sozialen Gerechtigkeit hat dazu geführt, dass sich Europa nach einem halben Jahrhundert des»Kalten Krieges« plötzlich mit»heißen Konflikten« an seinen Grenzen konfrontiert sieht. Zusammen mit der nach dem 11. September entstandenen neuen, explosiven Konstellation stellt dies eine außerordentliche Herausforderung an die Union dar, der die gegenwärtigen Strukturen und Entscheidungsmechanismen kaum gerecht werden. Unter diesen Umständen gewinnen geopolitische – und in ihrem Gefolge geostrategische – Überlegungen wieder stärker an Gewicht, auch wenn diese in Deutschland noch immer unter dem Generalverdacht einer allzu großen Nähe zu Imperialismus, Militarismus und Nationalsozialismus stehen. Im angelsächsischen Raum und in Frankreich existiert hingegen eine ungebrochene geopolitische Tradition, an die angesichts der 1. Vgl. Stephan Martens,»Das erweiterte Europa«, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte , B 17/2004, S. 3, und Christian Lequesne/Jacques Rupnik, L’Europe des Vingt-Cinq , Paris 2004, S. 71. 130 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

neuen Herausforderungen wieder angeknüpft werden kann. Denn »Raum, Macht, Religion, Geschichte, Kultur, Wirtschaft und Bevölkerungswachstum sind jene zeitlosen globalen Faktoren, die unverändert und immerwährend auch auf das beginnende 3. Jahrtausend einwirken«. 2 Das beste Beispiel dafür ist die aktuelle Debatte um Demographie und Migration, die so noch vor wenigen Jahren undenkbar gewesen wäre, oder auch die Renaissance religiöser Faktoren, kulminierend im islamistischen Terrorismus. Letzterer macht deutlich, dass die neue Geopolitik sich von der nationalstaatlichen Sichtweise lösen muss, um der zunehmenden Bedeutung nichtstaatlicher Akteure oder auch dem Phänomen der»failing states« gerecht werden zu können. Was also hat sich unter geopolitischen Gesichtspunkten für Europa(und das deutsch-französische Tandem als dessen Kern) zwischen 1989 und 2004 verändert? Die neuen geopolitischen Koordinaten Das große Europa: Mehr Risiken, weniger Handlungsfähigkeit Für den deutschen Außenminister Joschka Fischer ist Europa aufgrund des 9.11.(1989) und des 11.9.(2001) zum»strategischen Projekt« geworden. Daraus leitet er die Forderung nach einer»strategischen Dimension« Europas ab, die sich mit der Größe der usa , Russlands, Chinas und Indiens messen kann, vergisst aber dabei, dass jede Ausdehnung die innere Konsistenz gefährdet und Europa zugleich in größere Nähe zu Krisengebieten rückt. Und allein schon die europäische Strategie der Stabilisierung durch Mitgliedschaft hat einen hohen Preis, nach Ansicht von Stefan Collignon einen zu hohen:»Europa hat seine Grenzen erreicht. Mit 15 hat es nur mit großen Schwierigkeiten funktioniert. Mit 25 wird es paralysiert sein«. Das Bestreben der Europäer, Mittelosteuropa zu stabilisieren, führe im Ergebnis zu einer Destabilisierung im Westen mit zerrütteten Staatsfinanzen, hoher Arbeitslosigkeit und Demokratieverdruss. 3 2. Heinz Brill,»Geopolitik in der Diskussion«, in: Zeitschrift für Politik , Nr. 2/1998, S. 207; vgl. Ulrike Guérot/Andrea Witt,»Europas neue Geostrategie«, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte , B 17/2004, S. 6 ff. 3. Stefan Collignon, Viva la République Européenne! , Paris 2004, S. 121 ff; vgl. auch Wolfgang Quaisser/Manfred Wegner, Welche Zukunft hat die EU?, Europäische Politik, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Bonn, Mai 2004, S. 12:»Mit der Osterweiterung ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 131

Doch es ist absehbar, dass diese Strategie weiter verfolgt wird, wie der 2007 anstehende Beitritt Rumäniens und Bulgariens(vielleicht auch Kroatiens), die Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei und der Blick auf den westlichen Balkan zeigen. Letzterer ist die Europa am nächsten gelegene Krisenregion. Doch schon jetzt zieht sich ein Krisengürtel um die Europäische Union, der mit jeder Erweiterung näher rückt: Nahost, Kaukasus, Iran, Maghreb(und dahinter, sich mit Gewalt immer wieder ins Gedächtnis rufend, Schwarzafrika). Alle diese Länder und Regionen sind arm, wenig entwickelt und von drei Defiziten gekennzeichnet: »Unfreiheit, Ungleichheit, Unwissenheit«. 4 In unterschiedlicher Ausprägung verfügen sie dazu über ein Bedrohungspotenzial, das die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie( ess ) folgendermaßen zusammenfasst:»Bei einer Summierung dieser verschiedenen Elemente – extrem gewaltbereite Terroristen, Verfügbarkeit von Massenvernichtungswaffen, organisierte Kriminalität, Schwächung staatlicher Systeme und Privatisierung der Gewalt – ist es durchaus vorstellbar, dass Europa einer sehr ernsten Bedrohung ausgesetzt sein könnte.« 5 Hinzufügen könnte man noch die Probleme von Migration, Integration und Demographie in ihrer sicherheitsund stabilitätspolitischen Dimension. Ein erstes Fazit der geopolitischen Veränderungen ist also von einem Paradox gekennzeichnet: Das Europa der 25 ist zwar die größte Friedenszone der europäischen Geschichte, aber die Gefahren an seinen Rändern haben dramatisch zugenommen. Selbst in der unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft, in Bosnien und im Kosovo, ist man weit von einer definitiven Stabilisierung entfernt. Und mit dem Näherrücken an die Gefahrenzonen gerät man auch ins Gehege der großen Mächte und deren Interessen: die usa im Nahen Osten, in der Iran-Frage und im Irak, Russland im Kaukasus und in der Schwarzmeer-Region. Europas Interessen in seiner unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft unter wahrhaft schwierigen Bedingungen zu wahren, erfordert nicht nur diplomatisches Geschick, sondern auch robustere politische und militärische Instrumente. Doch das von Fischer wurde erstmals der Grundsatz durchbrochen, dass Erweiterungen mit einer Vertiefung des Integrationsprozesses einhergehen müssen«. 4. Andrä Gärber,»Für eine transatlantische Initiative gegenüber dem Nahen Osten«, in: Winfried Veit/Jean-Pierre Maulny(Hrsg.), Die transatlantischen Beziehungen und die Krise im Nahen Osten , Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Paris, September 2004, S. 16. 5. Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt , Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie, Institut für Sicherheitsstudien der Europäischen Union, Paris 2003, S. 11. 132 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

herbeigewünschte große Europa ist nur zahlenmäßig eine Macht: 450 Millionen Einwohner; ein Viertel des weltweiten Bruttosozialprodukts (was immer noch unter dem Anteil der usa liegt); Verteidigungsausgaben von 168 Milliarden Dollar(gegenüber 330 Milliarden der usa ). Vor allem die letztere Zahl(die dazu nur die Summe von 25 nationalstaatlichen Verteidigungshaushalten bei geringer Koordination ist) macht die europäische Schwäche deutlich. Dazu kommt eine»Weltpolitik mit 25 Meinungen« 6 und eine nur rudimentäre militärische Kapazität, die für alle genannten Krisenregionen unzureichend ist. Geopolitische Ambitionen in Richtung der Schaffung von Stabilitäts- und Wohlstandszonen rund um Europa(früher war es das Streben nach Einflusssphären) sind unter diesen Umständen nur schwer in die Tat umzusetzen. Veränderte Interessen, neue Allianzen Wo sind in dieser Konstellation Frankreich und Deutschland zu verorten? Geht man von der geopolitischen Prämisse aus, wonach Raum, Macht und Interessen in engem Zusammenhang stehen, dann hat sich für beide Länder einiges geändert. Frankreich ist aus seiner früheren komfortablen Mittellage im»alten(West-) Europa« in eine relative Randlage gerückt, was die französische Zurückhaltung in Sachen Osterweiterung erklärt. Psychologisch gesehen ist für die Franzosen der Mittelmeerraum näher gerückt, weil die Ostgrenze der eu sich von der Mitte Deutschlands an die russisch-polnische Grenze verlagert hat. Und wie wichtig psychologische Faktoren auch für das Verständnis von Völkern und Nationen sind, zeigt sich etwa am unterschiedlichen Verhalten von Amerikanern, Briten und(Kontinental-)Europäern nach dem 11.9.: Die usa sind durch die»frontier«, die fortschreitende Grenze und das Gefühl raumgeschützter Sicherheit geprägt, die Briten durch die Insellage –»splendid isolation« – und die Deutschen durch ihre Lage in der Mitte Europas ohne natürliche Grenzen, aber mit vielen Nachbarn, mit denen sie überwiegend im Konflikt lebten. Relative Sicherheit bot den Deutschen und ihren Nachbarn – paradoxerweise – erst der»Kalte Krieg«, der beide Teile Deutschlands in festgefügten Strukturen verankerte. Die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und dann Europas hat die Deutschen wieder in die alte Mittellage zurück versetzt – mit vielen Nachbarn, aber jetzt offenen Grenzen. Und natürlich profitieren sie davon: Deutsch 6. FAZ , 27.4.2004. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 133

ist die zweite Fremdsprache in Mittelosteuropa(nach Englisch), Deutschlands Anteil am Außenhandel dieser Länder beträgt 25 Prozent (Frankreich: 6 Prozent) und an den ausländischen Direktinvestitionen fast 20 Prozent(Frankreich: 12 Prozent, usa : 10 Prozent), Deutschland exportiert genauso viel nach Mittelosteuropa wie in die usa . Der von Deutschen und Franzosen gepriesene Multilateralismus als natürliche Grundlage internationaler Politik hat in der Irak-Krise des Jahres 2003 einem»bilateralen Unilateralismus« beider Länder Platz gemacht. Und wo bleibt da das spezifische deutsch-französische Verhältnis? Allenthalben ist die Rede davon, dass das deutsch-französische Tandem – bisher gemeinhin als Motor der europäischen Einigung apostrophiert – durch die Vereinigung Ost- und Westeuropas an Einfluss verloren hat. Im Kreis von 25 Mitgliedstaaten, mit jeweils nur noch einem Kommissar in Brüssel, wirtschaftlich kränkelnd, wird es für das deutsch-französische Paar mit Sicherheit schwieriger als bisher, seine Interessen durchzusetzen. Der von Deutschen und Franzosen gepriesene Multilateralismus als natürliche Grundlage internationaler Politik hat in der Irak-Krise des Jahres 2003 einem»bilateralen Unilateralismus« beider Länder Platz gemacht, für den sie prompt bestraft wurden. Durch den»Brief der acht«, dann der zehn anderen Mitgliedstaaten als Reaktion auf das deutsch-französische Vorgehen, wurden Ansätze neuer Allianzen sichtbar, die insbesondere eine starke Anlehnung der Ost- und Mitteleuropäer an die usa erkennen lassen. 7 Diese – ob in der eu oder außerhalb – sehen ihre Sicherheit und neu gewonnene Freiheit am besten an der Seite der Amerikaner in der nato aufgehoben, und angesichts ihrer historischen Erfahrungen ist ihre Bedrohungsanalyse in Sachen Russland eine andere als die der Westeuropäer. Bestätigt wurden sie in ihrem Misstrauen gegenüber dem deutschfranzösischen Tandem durch den sich entwickelnden engen»Trilateralismus« zwischen Paris, Berlin und Moskau und durch die teilweise arroganten Belehrungen aus den beiden westlichen Hauptstädten. Das»Weimarer Dreieck« aus Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen bietet hier nur wenig Gegengewicht, zumal es wiederum bei den kleineren Ländern das 7. Vgl. Thomas Schreiber,»Le rêve américain de la ›nouvelle Europe‹«, in: Le Monde Diplomatique , Mai 2004, S. 18, und Lequesne/Rupnik, op. cit., S. 74. 134 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

Misstrauen gegenüber einer polnischen Vormachtstellung in Mittelosteuropa weckt. Gerade Polen ist aber neben den baltischen Staaten(und den noch nicht zur eu gehörenden Bulgaren und Rumänen) am stärksten pro-amerikanisch, während Ungarn, die Tschechische Republik und Slowenien eine differenzierte Haltung einnehmen. Insgesamt kann man kaum davon reden, dass es sich bei den neuen Mitgliedsländern um einen geschlossenen»pro-amerikanischen Block« handelt. Andererseits unterstellen aber manche Autoren den amerikanischen Neokonservativen und der von ihnen dominierten Bush-Administration, die neuen Mitgliedstaaten zu benutzen, um Europa zu schwächen und zu teilen. Mit der Erweiterung solle verhindert werden, dass die eu ein Gegengewicht zu den usa wird – die Umkehrung des Argumentes von Fischer hinsichtlich der»strategischen Dimension« Europas durch schiere Größe. Diese Sichtweise sucht und findet teilweise ihre Bestätigung in der»Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie« der Vereinigten Staaten vom September 2002, in der auch präventive Alleingänge gegen Terroristen und Schurkenstaaten angedroht werden und in der Europa eine relativ geringe Rolle spielt. 8 Daraus wird vielfach die Gefahr eines amerikanischen Hegemoniestrebens abgeleitet, das Europa lediglich die Rolle als Hilfstruppen-Potenzial überlässt, und das die Vorstellung von einer multilateralen»konsensuellen und post-tragischen« Welt brutal zerstört. 9 So haben die mit dem Fall der Mauer eingeleiteten Umbrüche nicht nur Europas Antlitz verändert, sondern auch seine Rolle in der Welt einem tiefgreifenden Wandel unterzogen: Trotz Erweiterung und demographischer wie ökonomischer Stärkung hat seine relative Bedeutung abgenommen. Amerika zieht als einzig übrig gebliebene Supermacht souverän seine Kreise, und dieses unilaterale Vorgehen im Verein mit europäischer Uneinigkeit und Schwäche hat zu einer schweren Krise in den transatlantischen Beziehungen geführt. Die vor allem von Paris und Berlin gepflegte Vorstellung einer eurasischen Achse(mit Moskau, vielleicht bis nach Tokio) dürfte angesichts der Entwicklung in Russland und der völlig unterschiedlichen Interessen eine Utopie bleiben. Und als Mitspieler im »global game« der Zukunft lässt sich Europa in seinem jetzigen Zustand im Vergleich zu China oder Indien nur schwer vorstellen. 8. The National Security Strategy oft the United States of America, The White House, Washington, September 2002. 9. Henri Nallet/Hubert Védrine,»Multilatéralisme: une réforme possible«, in: Les Notes de la Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Nr. 43, September 2004, S. 11. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 135

Jacques Attali sieht Europa gar zum Spielball der großen Mächte der Zukunft absinken. Er prophezeit für das 21. Jahrhundert»einen heftigen geopolitischen Kampf um die planetare Vormachtstellung« zwischen den sieben größten Mächten: usa , Europa, China, Japan, Indien, Russland und Brasilien. Dabei verfügen die usa über Militärmacht und Technologie, Europa über Markt und Kompetenz. Die fünf anderen haben Bevölkerung, Energie, Kreativität und Willen. Attali sieht eine Allianz der Fünf mit den usa zu Lasten Europas voraus, das quasi als Beute dient und insbesondere von China und den usa 20 Jahre lang ausgesogen wird, bevor sich beide um die Vorherrschaft streiten(»L’Express«, 20.9.2004). Man mag dieses Szenario als Ausfluss blühender Phantasie ansehen, das zudem noch zu sehr vom nationalstaatlichen Denken alten Stils ausgeht und tiefgreifende Unterschiede zwischen den genannten Mächten nicht berücksichtigt(z.B. ähneln Japans demographische Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Schwächen denen Europas). Aber eines hat Attali richtig diagnostiziert: Ohne gemeinsame Industriepolitik, die Koordinierung der öffentlichen Haushalte, ein gemeinsames Budget für Verteidigung und neue Technologien sowie eine Zoll- und Steuerharmonisierung wird Europa in der Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht bestehen können. Man könnte noch hinzufügen: ohne eine europäische Armee, einen gemeinsamen diplomatischen Dienst, eine einheitliche Politik der Migration und Integration sowie gemeinsame Maßnahmen der Kriminalitätsbekämpfung. In Ansätzen kann der von der Regierungskonferenz im Juni 2004 verabschiedete Verfassungsvertrag den Rahmen für die Entwicklung solcher Politiken bieten. Dieser Vertragsentwurf – verkürzt als »europäische Verfassung« bezeichnet – bildet somit die unverzichtbare Grundlage für die Selbstbehauptung Europas in der Weltpolitik, gerade auch im Verhältnis zu den usa . Zwei Wege der Identitätsstiftung Die Verfassung und die transatlantischen Beziehungen berühren auch das Selbstverständnis Europas, seine(fehlende) Identität. In fast allen neueren Beiträgen zur Frage einer europäischen Identität spielen diese beiden Themen in positiver(Konstruktion) oder negativer Weise(Abgrenzung) eine Rolle. Aber braucht Europa überhaupt eine Identität oder – metaphysisch ausgedrückt – eine Seele? Die Antwort muss positiv ausfallen, betrachtet man die Wahlergebnisse und Umfragen der letzten Jahre. Sie zei136 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

gen, dass die Identifizierung der Bürger mit Europa dramatisch abnimmt – im Westen wie im Osten, bei den alten wie bei den neuen Mitgliedern der Union. Identifizierung der Bürger, das heißt Identität, ist aber die Voraussetzung für tatkräftiges Handeln und geschlossenes Auftreten auf der Weltbühne. Denn alle anderen – von Attali benannten – konkurrierenden Mächte verfügen(bis auf die bedingte Ausnahme Indien) über eine Identität, in manchen Fällen sogar über eine weltpolitische Mission. Daran mangelt es zwar auch in Europa nicht(Frankreich:»zivilisatorische Mission«; Deutschland: der»deutsche Gedanke«), aber eben nur im(überholten) nationalstaatlichen und geschichtlichen Rahmen. Die Befunde hinsichtlich einer europäischen Identität sehen nicht gut aus: Europa hat keine Seele, postuliert der ehemalige französische Ministerpräsident Michel Rocard,»es ist im wesentlichen eine vom Recht dominierte Friedenszone«(Le Monde, 28.11.2003). Der frühere polnische Außenminister Bronislaw Geremek konstatiert:»Wir haben Europa. Nun brauchen wir Europäer«( faz , 10.9.2004). Wo sollen diese ihre Identität hernehmen? Der Nationalstaat hat zwar viele Kompetenzen an Brüssel abgeben müssen, er ist aber in der Regel immer noch der Referenzrahmen für den Bürger. Das ist kein Wunder, denn zum einen beruhte die»europäische Idee« auf dem bewusst»unpolitischen« Herangehen der Gründerväter, das sich im undurchsichtigen Entscheidungsprozess zwischen Europäischem Rat, Kommission, Europaparlament und nationalen Parlamenten bis heute fortsetzt. Zum anderen erscheint Europa als vorwiegend wirtschaftsliberales Projekt der Marktöffnung, das kaum politische Identität zu stiften vermag, weil alle die Bereiche, in denen eine solche Identitätsstiftung stattfinden könnte, wie Soziales, Außen- und Umweltpolitik, dem äußerst mühseligen und für den Bürger undurchschaubaren Prozess der Konsensbildung unterliegen. 10 Zwei Wege der Identitätsstiftung bieten sich an: Erinnerungsgemeinschaft und Willensgemeinschaft. Erinnerungsgemeinschaft ist das»traditionelle« Projekt der europäischen Einigung; es bezieht sich auf die Erkenntnis nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg, dass Europa nach all den Katastrophen und Verheerungen nur noch als friedliche Gemeinschaft ehemaliger Feinde überleben kann – europäische Einigung als Friedensprojekt. Erinnerungsgemeinschaft wurzelt aber auch tiefer, wie der holländische Ministerpräsident Jan Balkenende hervorhebt:»Wir sind zusammenge10. Vgl. Thomas Meyer, Die Identität Europas , Frankfurt 2004, S. 43 ff. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 137

schmiedet durch die Ideen der Griechen und Römer, des Christentums, des Judentums, des Humanismus und der Aufklärung«(Le Figaro, 9.9.2004). Das trifft zu, ist aber zugleich ein Mythos; doch ohne Mythen (und Symbole) ist noch keine Nation entstanden. 11 Und auch nicht ohne Abgrenzung:»Wir und die anderen« ist ein ewig wiederkehrendes Element der Identitätsstiftung von der Mikroebene(Sportverein, Stadtviertel) bis hin zur(manchmal blutig ausgrenzenden) Nationsbildung. Ohne Mythen und Symbole ist noch keine Nation entstanden. Und auch nicht ohne Abgrenzung. In fast allen Debatten um die europäische Identitätsfindung tauchen die Stichwörter Islam, Türkei und usa auf. Im Falle des Islam und der Türkei lassen sich die Spuren im kollektiven Gedächtnis der europäischen Völker aufgrund der jahrhundertealten Konfrontation zwischen Orient und Okzident leicht finden. Islamistischer Terrorismus und eu -Beitritt der Türkei sind dabei die aktuellen Töne, die auf dem Resonanzboden dieses kollektiven Gedächtnisses negative Reaktionen hervorrufen, wie zahlreiche Umfragen beweisen(wobei im Falle des türkischen eu -Beitritts eine durchaus verlogene Diskussion geführt wird, weil – bis auf die extreme Rechte – niemand wagt, den wahren Grund für die Ablehnung zu nennen). Da ist es schon einfacher, und heutzutage ungefährlicher, europäische Identitätsstiftung in der Abgrenzung zu den usa zu suchen, wiewohl dies einem Vatermord gleichkommt, hat doch Amerika den »alten Kontinent« zweimal vor dem völligen Ruin(Weltkrieg I) beziehungsweise der totalen Barbarei(Weltkrieg II) bewahrt. Und schließlich existiert noch immer eine»alle Differenzen überragende enge Wesensverwandtschaft beider Demokratien, der amerikanischen und der europäischen,(…) sobald sie mit den eigentlichen Alternativen konfrontiert sind, im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert Faschismus und Kommunismus, im angebrochenen einundzwanzigsten dem religiös-politischen Fundamentalismus«. 12 Allerdings spricht nichts gegen eine positive Abgrenzung: ein 11. Vgl. Die Beiträge von Herwig Wolfram, Michael Lützeler und Rainer Bauböck, in: Monika Mokre/Gilbert Weiss/Rainer Bauböck(Hrsg.), Europas Identitäten, Mythen - Konflikte- Konstruktionen , Frankfurt/New York 2003, und Armin von Bogdandy, »Wir Europäer«, in: faz , 27.4.2004. 12. Meyer, op. cit., S. 145. 138 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

soziales Europa, das sich deutlich vom neoliberalen angelsächsischen Modell abhebt, und ein zuvörderst ziviles Europa, das Konflikte zunächst mit friedlichen Mitteln zu lösen sucht, aber auch vor dem Einsatz militärischer Mittel nicht zurückscheut. Mythosbildung und Abgrenzung werden als identitätsstiftende Elemente für das Europa von heute von den Vertretern der Willensgemeinschafts-Schule abgelehnt. Was aber ist eine Willensgemeinschaft? Ernest Renan hat in seiner berühmten Rede»Was ist eine Nation?« im Jahre 1882 dies als den»Willen, miteinander zu leben« definiert. Und woher kommt dieser Wille? Im Falle Europas nach zwei Weltkriegen sicherlich aus der Einsicht, dass es so nicht weitergehen kann. Nachdem aber diese Phase des»Friedensprojektes« abgeschlossen ist, muss ein modernes politisches Projekt her, eine»Projektidentität«, die für Thomas Meyer auf drei Säulen ruht:»Europa als partizipative regionale Demokratie, in der sich informierte Bürger in der Zivilgesellschaft und in den Parteien aktiv an den Entscheidungsprozessen beteiligen; Europa als Sozialregion, in der überall die sozialen Grundrechte gesichert und die Märkte in einen umfassenden Sozialstaat eingebettet sind; Europa als zivile Weltmacht, für die Krisenprävention und zivile Formen der Konfliktlösung Vorrang vor dem Einsatz militärischer Gewalt haben«. 13 Noch einen Schritt weiter geht Stefan Collignon, wenn er die Schaffung einer wahren»europäischen Republik« fordert, in der die Bürger zunächst Europäer und dann erst Franzosen, Deutsche usw. sind, und in der durch die tatsächliche Beteiligung der Bürger am politischen Prozess auf europäischer Ebene im Laufe der Zeit automatisch ein Gefühl europäischer Identität entstehen würde, so wie ja auch erst die französische Republik eine kollektive französische Identität geschaffen hat. Zwischen dieser(noch) utopisch anmutenden Vorstellung und Meyers pragmatisch-bescheidenem Ansatz gibt es verschiedene Abstufungen, die insgesamt um die von Habermas und anderen verfochtene Idee eines»Verfassungspatriotismus« kreisen. Die Grundlage dafür ist vorhanden, denn der»Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa« ist zwar keine Verfassungsurkunde im strengen Sinn, aber doch eine Verfassung im materiellen Sinn mit einem Korpus an grundlegenden Rechten und Entscheidungsverfahren. Allerdings reicht sie gerade für das Europa der 25 aus; doch»will die 13. Meyer, op. cit., S. 188. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 139

eu langfristig eine weltpolitische Rolle spielen, so führt kein Weg an einer Reform des institutionellen Designs vorbei«. 14 Zivile Weltmacht Europa Eine der wichtigsten Reformen in diesem Zusammenhang betrifft die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Hier scheiden sich die Geister hinsichtlich einer weltpolitischen Rolle der eu . Für die einen muss Europa die »Nische als Zivilmacht« verlassen, um zum machtpolitisch bewussten Akteur zu werden. In ihren Augen bietet die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie»die Grundlage für eine europäische Geostrategie, in der militärische, ökonomische und institutionelle Fähigkeiten zusammengeführt werden«. 15 Für die anderen bleibt Europa trotz ess in erster Linie eine »Zivilmacht«, weil in der ess der Multilateralismus und der Primat nichtmilitärischer Instrumente festgeschrieben sind. 16 Doch so weit sind die Positionen auch wieder nicht auseinander: Im Prinzip besteht Einverständnis darüber, dass die eu zwar in allen Fällen versucht, bei Konflikten vermittelnd einzugreifen und durch»präventives Engagement«( ess ) den Ausbruch von gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen zu verhindern, aber dass, wenn nötig, eben auch mit robusten militärischen Mitteln eingegriffen wird. Vorbilder dafür gibt es schon: die Missionen»Artemis« im Kongo und »Concordia« in Mazedonien waren vergleichsweise»einfache« Operationen, die Übernahme der Verantwortung durch die Europäer in Bosnien-Herzegowina ist schon ein anderes Kaliber. Europa ist eben bisher mehr Zivilmacht als zivile Weltmacht. Für größere militärische Einsätze fehlen die Kapazitäten, vor allem adäquate Transportmittel, Präzisionswaffen und nachrichtendienstliche Instrumente. Dazu kommt, dass bis auf England und Frankreich keine europäische Armee in der Lage ist, eigenständig internationale Interventionen durchzuführen, wie dies Frankreich in Côte d’Ivoire und England in Sierra Leone getan haben – 14. Siegfried Schieder,»In guter Verfaßtheit?, Nutzen und Nachteil eines europäischen Verfassungsvertrages«, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte , B 17/2004, S. 17. 15. Guérot/Witt, op. cit., S. 10. 16. Stefanie Flechtner/Marika Lerch, Mit Sicherheit in eine bessere Welt? Europas Strategiedebatte, Reihe Frieden und Sicherheit, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Bonn, April 2004, S. 5. 140 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

von Einsätzen wie im Irak einmal ganz abgesehen. Sicherlich gibt es Fortschritte in der sicherheitspolitischen Kooperation der Europäer, vom englisch-französischen Gipfel in St. Malo(Dezember 1998) bis zur trilateralen(deutsch-englisch-französischen) Vereinbarung von Berlin(November 2003), die vier wesentliche Punkte des europäischen Verfassungsvertrags vorwegnahmen: eine Beistandsklausel, die Möglichkeit einer »strukturierten Zusammenarbeit« auf sicherheitspolitischem Gebiet, die Einrichtung einer europäischen Rüstungsagentur und die Etablierung einer militärischen»Planungszelle« als»Keim eines Hauptquartiers«. Die neue Weltkonstellation, die einerseits von einem zunehmenden Unilateralismus der Vereinigten Staaten und andererseits von einem wachsenden Multilateralismus der Konflikte gekennzeichnet ist, verlangt auch von Europa – gerade nach der jüngsten Erweiterung – neue Antworten. Insgesamt hat sich die Welt seit dem Fall der Mauer und dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion dramatisch verändert und mit ihr der Charakter bewaffneter Konflikte. Anstelle der bipolaren Konfrontation ist eine neue Unübersichtlichkeit zutage getreten mit einer Vielzahl von Krisenherden und Konfliktsituationen, die sich seit dem 11. September 2001 noch zugespitzt haben. Internationale Interventionen zur Konfliktverhütung, zur Friedensstabilisierung und-entwicklung, zur Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte und des Völkerrechts, aber auch zur Aufrechterhaltung oder Wiederherstellung staatlicher Strukturen und zur Abwehr drohender Gefahren für die internationale Gemeinschaft, sind zwar nicht selbstverständlich geworden, werden aber in der Regel akzeptiert. Vom zweiten Golfkrieg 1990 über Somalia, Bosnien, Kosovo, Mazedonien und Afghanistan bis hin zum Irak-Krieg 2003 zieht sich eine Kette internationaler(militärischer) Interventionen, die zumeist mehrere der oben genannten Elemente enthalten. Die neue Weltkonstellation, die einerseits von einem zunehmenden Unilateralismus der Vereinigten Staaten und andererseits von einem wachsenden Multilateralismus der Konflikte gekennzeichnet ist, verlangt auch von Europa – gerade nach der jüngsten Erweiterung – neue Antworten. Voraussetzung für die Konfliktfähigkeit Europas ist eine Angleichung der nationalen Doktrinen und der Planungskapazitäten der Streitkräfte, was zugleich auch eine positive Wirkung auf die neuen Mitglieder und ihre Haltung gegenüber ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 141

einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik hätte. 17 Die größte Herausforderung für die zivile Weltmacht Europa ist – neben der Ablösung der nato in Bosnien – die Lage im Nahen Osten und in Nordafrika. Diese riesige Region, mit zwischen 300 und 550 Millionen Einwohnern(je nachdem, ob man die Türkei, Pakistan und Afghanistan dazu zählt), überwiegend islamisch-arabisch geprägt, stellt im Augenblick den gefährlichsten Krisenherd in der Nachbarschaft Europas und die größte Bedrohung seiner Sicherheit dar. Der islamistische Terrorismus hat am 11. März 2004 in Madrid gezeigt, dass Europa jederzeit das Ziel von Anschlägen werden kann; die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen ist eine reale Gefahr(Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Syrien, bis vor kurzem auch Libyen und früher der Irak); der Migrationsdruck wird wegen der demographischen Entwicklung und der hohen Arbeitslosigkeit weiter zunehmen; der internationale Drogenhandel macht sich die wachsende Instabilität an den europäischen Rändern zunutze, um neue Routen nach Europa zu erschließen. Der Nahe Osten/Nordafrika ist nach dem letzten»Human Development Report« der Vereinten Nationen – trotz gigantischer Ressourcen – eine der rückständigsten, unterentwickeltsten und am wenigsten»globalisierten« Regionen der Welt. Die »Greater Middle East Initiative« der usa zielt darauf ab, diesen Zustand zu ändern und Stabilität, Wohlstand und Demokratie in der Region zu verankern. Die Amerikaner haben die Europäer aufgefordert, dabei zu helfen. Bei diesen – allen voran Deutschen und Franzosen – stößt dies angesichts der Erfahrungen in der Irak-Krise und der chaotischen Entwicklung im Irak auf berechtigtes Misstrauen. Dennoch war man sich bei einem Treffen deutscher und französischer Fachleute und Politiker einig darüber, die amerikanische Initiative nicht rundweg abzulehnen, sondern sie möglichst in eine gemeinsame transatlantische Initiative umzuwandeln und dabei vor allem auf die(allerdings wenig ermutigenden) Erfahrungen im Barcelona-Prozess zurückzugreifen. 18 Wie wenig das zivile Europa derzeit als Weltmacht bezeichnet werden kann, zeigt sich am Nahost-Konflikt zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern. Dort haben die Europäer fast jeglichen Einfluss als Vermittler oder gar als 17. Vgl. Winfried Veit/Jean-Pierre Maulny, Europäische Sicherheit und internationale Intervention, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Paris, 2003, S. 11. 18. Vgl. Winfried Veit/Jean-Pierre Maulny(Hrsg.), Die transatlantischen Beziehungen und die Krise im Nahen Osten, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Paris, September 2004, S. 7. 142 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

Garant einer Friedenslösung verloren, weil beide Konfliktparteien wissen, dass Europa im Ernstfall(sprich: Militäreinsatz) nichts bieten kann. Vor allem Israel, dessen Existenz im Zweifelsfall bedroht wäre, würde sich niemals auf europäische Sicherheitsgarantien verlassen, nicht nur, weil man den Europäern – allen voran den Franzosen – pro-arabisches Verhalten unterstellt, sondern weil Europa gar nicht dazu in der Lage wäre, solche Garantien einzulösen. Kerneuropa – Fokus der veränderten geopolitischen Lage Wie kann diese Schwäche überwunden werden und Europa wirklich zur zivilen Weltmacht aufsteigen? Mit ständigen Erweiterungen sicherlich nicht, wie wir gesehen haben. Im Dezember 2002 erklärte der Präsident der Europäischen Kommission, Romano Prodi, in einer Rede vor der 6. Weltkonferenz des Studienverbandes der Europäischen Gemeinschaft in Brüssel:»Wir können nicht unbeschränkt das Gebiet der Sicherheit, der Stabilität und des Wohlstandes allein mit dem Erweiterungsinstrument ständig ausweiten. Wir dürfen nicht das politische Projekt Europa verwässern und die Europäische Union in eine den Kontinent umfassende Freihandelszone verwandeln«. Dies sagte ein Kommissionspräsident, unter dessen Ägide die größte Erweiterung der Union stattgefunden hat und dessen beinahe letzte Amtshandlung darin bestand, den Boden für eine Ausdehnung noch über den Kontinent hinaus vorzubereiten (Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei). Was mit der letzten Erweiterungsrunde vom 1. Mai 2004 eingeleitet wurde, dürfte mit den bevorstehenden Erweiterungen(Rumänien, Bulgarien 2007, vielleicht auch Kroatien; Türkei 2015?) zur Gewissheit werden: Europa ist handlungsunfähig, vor allem was sein Handeln auf der weltpolitischen Bühne anbelangt. Das politische Projekt, von dem Prodi spricht, ist längst verwässert, der Zug in Richtung große Freihandelszone faktisch abgefahren – auch unter der Annahme, dass die europäische Verfassung in allen Referenden und Ratifizierungsverfahren der 25 Mitgliedstaaten akzeptiert wird. Gesiegt hätte damit die britische Linie,»die, was Europa anbelangt, das Prinzip verfolgt, nur dem zuzustimmen, was man nicht verhindern konnte«(»Nouvel Observateur«, 13.–19.5.2004). Dieser Obstruktionsstrategie liegen drei Prämissen zugrunde: die Souveränität des britischen Parlaments, die special relationship mit den usa und ein tief verwurzelter Wirtschaftsliberalismus. Dem kommt die Entwicklung der ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 143

eu zu einem großen Wirtschaftsraum und einer riesigen Friedenszone, aber ohne gemeinsame Haushalts- und Fiskalpolitik und mit nur geringer politischer Integration entgegen. Ein starkes, politisch integriertes Europa, ein»Europe puissance«, kann paradoxerweise nur aus der Verkleinerung heraus entstehen, ein Prozess, den man in der Wirtschaft»gesundschrumpfen« nennt. Ein starkes, politisch integriertes Europa, ein»Europe puissance« , »fähig, eine autonome politische Rolle auf der Weltbühne zu spielen«(so der französische Europa-Abgeordnete Henri Weber), kann paradoxerweise nur aus der Verkleinerung heraus entstehen, ein Prozess, den man in der Wirtschaft»gesundschrumpfen« nennt. Ohne den bisherigen Rahmen und den unzweifelhaft erreichten Fortschritt in Frage zu stellen, geht es um die Schaffung eines»Europa in Europa«, das die Integration derjenigen eu -Mitgliedstaaten vorantreibt, die dies möchten, ohne von den anderen behindert zu werden. Der Verfassungsentwurf, wie auch der Vertrag von Nizza, lassen solche Möglichkeiten zu, die im Übrigen auf zweierlei Weise entstehen können: ̈ die thematisch orientierte Integration, wie dies mit der Euro-Zone, dem Schengen-Abkommen und ansatzweise in der verteidigungspolitischen»Planungszelle« schon geschehen ist; ̈ eine»Neubegründung« einer Union mit einem festen Kern von Aspiranten, die klar auf einen europäischen Bundesstaat zusteuern. Kerneuropa im hier verstandenen Sinne kann nur über den zweiten Weg führen, weil der erste nur in Teilbereichen funktioniert, sich die Kerngruppen nur zum Teil überschneiden, und es angesichts der weltpolitischen Entwicklung verhängnisvoll wäre, so lange zu warten, bis sich irgendwann aus dem Zusammenfließen dieser Ansätze ein starkes und handlungsfähiges Europa entwickelt. Die Gründung eines Kerneuropa ist auch kein Widerspruch zu der von Joschka Fischer geforderten»strategischen Dimension«, denn Kerneuropa würde ja weiterhin in der geographischen und demographischen Masse der ständig erweiterten Union »ruhen« und durchaus auch mit diesem Pfund wuchern können(im Übrigen hat Fischer in seiner berühmten Rede an der Humboldt-Universität im Jahre 2000 noch vehement für Kerneuropa plädiert). Stefan Collignon hat dafür das hübsche Bild vom»Haus im Garten« geprägt, wobei der Garten die Union und das Haus Kerneuropa(in seiner Version 144 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

die europäische Republik) darstellen. Damit wäre auch(beinahe) der Streit um den Beitritt der Türkei und anderer potenzieller Kandidaten gelöst, denn in diesem Modell könnte auch die Türkei problemlos ihren Platz finden(und müsste selbst nicht befürchten, zuviel an nationaler Souveränität und kultureller Identität aufgeben zu müssen – in diesen Punkten den Briten ähnlich). Wer aber soll zu diesem Kerneuropa gehören? Fast jedermann ist sich einig darüber, dass Deutschland und Frankreich den»Kern des europäischen Kerns« bilden. Die beiden Europa-Kommissare Günter Verheugen und Pascal Lamy haben – um die Dinge in Gang zu bringen – zunächst für eine deutsch-französische Union plädiert, um die herum später ein Kerneuropa entstehen könnte(Libération und Süddeutsche Zeitung v. 21.1.2003). Ähnlich argumentieren Martin Koopmann und Hans Stark: Je nach Politikbereich könne es unterschiedliche Partnerschaften geben, aber in jedem Fall müssten Deutschland und Frankreich beteiligt sein. 19 Sie verweisen auch noch auf einen anderen Punkt, der in der(deutschen) Euphorie über die Zivilmacht Europa oft unterzugehen droht: Frankreich ist durchaus zu globalen(militärischen) Interventionen bereit und beklagt das zögerliche Verhalten(und die langwierigen Entscheidungsprozeduren) der Deutschen in solchen Fällen, erkennt aber an, dass es unter der Regierung Schröder mit dem deutschen Engagement in Bosnien, Kosovo und Afghanistan in dieser Hinsicht wesentliche Fortschritte gegeben hat. Wer würden die anderen Partner im Projekt Kerneuropa sein? Collignon plädiert in dieser Hinsicht für eine natürliche demokratische Auslese: Bei Volksabstimmungen über die Verfassung einer europäischen Republik würde sich die Spreu vom Weizen trennen. Doch dieses Instrument ist zwar demokratisch, aber, wie viele Politiker aus leidvoller Erfahrung wissen, durchaus zweischneidig, denn oftmals wird nicht über das Thema der Volksbefragung abgestimmt, sondern über die jeweiligen innenpolitischen Probleme(und das bei einer Wahlbeteiligung, bei der die demokratische Legitimität manchmal in Frage gestellt werden kann). So könnte es kommen, dass bei einer solchen Prozedur Griechenland zu Kerneuropa gehört, Polen aber nicht; Estland ja, Italien aber nicht, usw. Es könnte ein unter geopolitischen Gesichtspunkten»unmögliches« Gebilde, einem Kraken gleich, entstehen, dessen Fangarme aber nicht 19. Martin Koopmann/Hans Stark, Zukunftsfähig? Deutsch französische Beziehungen und esvp , dgap -Analysen Nr. 27, Januar 2004, S. 13. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 145

Stärke, sondern Verwundbarkeit demonstrieren(ganz abgesehen davon, dass dieser Weg derzeit noch – leider – in den Bereich der Utopie zu zählen ist). Das Projekt der Moderne einem noch nicht vorhandenen europäischen Demos anzuvertrauen, ist ein riskantes Unternehmen. Bleibt also der von Collignon und anderen so heftig kritisierte intergouvernementale Weg, der aber so schlecht auch wieder nicht ist. Immerhin hat die»Methode Monnet« mit ihrem technokratischen Ansatz Europa so weit geführt wie noch nie in seiner Geschichte. Das heißt nicht, dass man auf diesem Weg unbesehen fortfahren sollte. Aber die»Gründerväter« waren ja nicht nur schlichte Technokraten – sie folgten einem politischen Ideal, das in der seinerzeitigen Konstellation eben nur über den relativ unpolitischen Weg der ökonomischen Einigung zu erreichen war. Diese Methode ist heute an ihre Grenzen gelangt – das Ideal bedarf der psychologisch-emotionalen Unterfütterung, kurz: einer Identität. Die Suche nach den Wurzeln ist sowohl ein individuell- wie kollektivpsychologisches Phänomen. Es als archaische Spurensuche –»Archäologie der kulturellen Überlieferungen« nennt es Thomas Meyer – abzutun, könnte gefährlich sein, wie die Wahlerfolge rechtspopulistischer Parteien in alten wie neuen Mitgliedsländern zeigen. Das Projekt der Moderne einem noch nicht vorhandenen europäischen Demos anzuvertrauen, ist ein riskantes Unternehmen: Wer kennt schon das Kant’sche Ideal vom ewigen Frieden, das uns Europäer angeblich vom Hobbes’schen Bild des permanenten Kampfes unterscheidet, wie es Robert Kagan in seinem Bestseller darstellt? 20 Aus dem oben Gesagten ergibt sich, dass Kerneuropa nach dem derzeitigen Stand der Dinge nur aus einer Mischung von Methode Monnet, Bürgerbeteiligung und kulturellen Überlieferungen entstehen kann. So wie die Europa-Idee nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg von einer Handvoll entschlossener Männer mit Visionen, aber auch dem realistischen Blick für das Machbare vorangetrieben wurde(die dabei zunehmend von einem Teil der öffentlichen Meinung und der politischen Parteien unterstützt wurden), so sind heute – angesichts der offensichtlichen Krise der 20.Robert Kagan, Macht und Ohnmacht, Amerika und Europa in der neuen Weltordnung , München 2004. 146 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

Europa-Idee – zunächst einmal wieder kreative Visionen gefragt, für die man sich Mehrheiten erarbeiten muss. Beispiele dafür sind der schon erwähnte Vorschlag von Lamy/Verheugen zur deutsch-französischen Union, die älteren Vorstellungen von Karl Lamers und Wolfgang Schäuble zu Kerneuropa und jüngst die»50 Vorschläge für das Europa von morgen« des ehemaligen französischen Finanzministers Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 21 In letzerem Dokument wird von der Existenz einer europäischen Gesellschaft ausgegangen, die durchaus Zeiten der»imperialen« (erwähnt werden griechische Zivilisation, Römisches Reich, Karl der Große, Karl V., Napoleon) und kulturellen Einheit(Christentum, Aufklärung) gekannt habe. Strauss-Kahn ist im Übrigen ein Verfechter der These von den»konzentrischen Kreisen«, wobei der größte ein euro-mediterranes Gebilde, der kleinste(innerste) die»politische Union« sein würde. Hinzu kommen weitere Argumente und Vorstellungen, die das Bild von Kerneuropa abrunden: die unbestreitbare Tatsache, dass Großbritannien und die skandinavischen Länder vorwiegend aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen der eu beigetreten sind und wenig von einer politischen Union halten; 22 die sich abzeichnende subregionale Gruppenbildung innerhalb und an den Grenzen der eu (Mitteleuropa, Balkan, russische Einflusszone); die Tatsache, dass mit der Erweiterungsperspektive im Blick auf Rumänien, Bulgarien, die restlichen Balkanländer und die Türkei»die eu definitiv über die Kulturschranken der orthodoxen und der islamischen Tradition hinaus« greift; 23 und schließlich der von Prodi in seiner Brüsseler Rede vom Dezember 2002 erwähnte»Ring von Freunden«, der sich von Marokko bis Russland erstrecken soll. Daraus könnte sich folgendes Bild von Kerneuropa, den»Vereinigten Staaten von Europa«, und der diese umgebenden Europäischen Union herausschälen: Zu Kerneuropa müssten auf jeden Fall die deutsch-französische Allianz und die anderen Gründungsstaaten der eu (Italien, Benelux) gehören; dazu kämen – aus historisch-kulturellen Gründen, wie sie bei Strauss-Kahn erwähnt sind – die mitteleuropäischen Länder(Österreich, Polen, Tschechische Republik, Slowakei, Ungarn, Slowenien 21. Dominique Strauss-Kahn , Construire l’Europe politique, 50 propositions pour l’Europe de demain , Paris, April 2004. 22. Quaisser/Wegner, op. cit., S. 11. 23. Joscha Schmierer,»Suche nach Wegen im Dickicht: Nationale Interessen zwischen Staatenwelt und Weltgesellschaft«, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft , Nr. 1/ 2004, S. 71. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 147

und Kroatien), denen irgendwann einmal – schon aus geographischen Gründen – die Schweiz folgen wird. Ob Spanien und Portugal dazu gehören oder eher eine subregionale Gruppierung im Rahmen der eu bilden würden, wäre vom Ergebnis der Volksabstimmungen abhängig. Denn ein Bundesstaat Europa bräuchte eine wirkliche Verfassung, die eine – sich auf die erwähnten historischen und kulturellen Gemeinsamkeiten berufende – europäische Identität und einen europäischen Demos schaffen würde. Eine Mitgliedschaft wäre dann keine relativ unverbindliche, weil auf intergouvernementalen Absprachen beruhende Angelegenheit mehr, Obstruktionspolitik von innen nur noch in geringfügigem Ausmaß möglich(wie etwa die Instrumentalisierung des Bundesrates im deutschen politischen System). Um dieses Kerneuropa herum würden sich – einer Schale gleich – im Rahmen der auf dem Stand einer großen Friedens- und Freihandelszone verharrenden eu weitere subregionale Blöcke gruppieren: Großbritannien und Irland; Skandinavien und Baltikum; Balkan und Levante(unter Einschluss Griechenlands, der Türkei und Israels). Diese erweiterte Union hätte es an ihren Grenzen mit zwei Regionen bzw. Machtblöcken zu tun: der arabisch-islamischen Welt und der russischen Einflusszone, die den Kaukasus, die Ukraine und Weißrussland einschließt. Beide Regionen sind von erheblichen Turbulenzen gekennzeichnet, die den Begriff »Ring von Freunden« als Euphemismus erscheinen lassen. Eine realistische Nachbarschaftspolitik muss zunächst ganz bescheiden auf eine Stabilisierung dieser Räume abzielen, weil sie unmittelbare Auswirkungen auf Europas Sicherheit haben. In dieser Hinsicht könnte ein geschlossen handelndes Kerneuropa mehr bewirken als eine zwar größere, aber eben auch diffusere eu mit unterschiedlichen Interessen. Dies gilt auch für die Behandlung von sensiblen Bereichen, wie dem Konflikt in Tschetschenien, der Lage in Georgien und den Beziehungen zu Israel. Und dies gilt nicht zuletzt auch im Verhältnis zu Amerika, das angesichts der weltweiten Unsicherheit und dem Aufkommen neuer Mächte von der Maxime bestimmt sein sollte, dass Europa»als strategischer Partner der usa aufgebaut werden(muss) und nicht als ›multipolarer‹ Gegenspieler«. 24 Man kann gegen das Modell Kerneuropa einwenden, dass es utopisch und politisch nicht realisierbar ist. Aber es stellt die adäquate Antwort auf 24. Guérot/Witt, op. cit., S. 6; vgl. auch folgendes Zitat aus der ess (op. cit., S. 18): »Die transatlantischen Beziehungen sind unersetzlich«. 148 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht ipg 2/2005

Europas veränderte geopolitische Lage dar. Und im Übrigen hat die europäische Einigung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg genauso angefangen und zu unbestreitbaren Erfolgen geführt. Wie 1945 steht Europa jetzt wieder vor einer Zäsur. Dies hat viel mit dem Fall der Mauer und der nachfolgenden Osterweiterung der eu zu tun. Doch am eindrücklichsten hat der 11. September 2001 die Notwendigkeit eines entschlossenen und geschlossen handelnden Europas deutlich gemacht. ipg 2/2005 Veit, Warum die EU einen harten Kern braucht 149

Nach dem Frieden – mitten im Krieg: Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt MANFRED ÖHM D er 9. Januar 2005 brachte den Sudanesen den lang ersehnten Friedensschluss zwischen der Regierung und der südsudanesischen Rebellenbewegung Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army( splm / a ). Nach 22 Kriegsjahren ist es gelungen, den Krieg auf dem Verhandlungsweg zu beenden. Der in Kenia unterzeichnete Friedensvertrag bietet nun eine einzigartige Chance auf eine friedliche Entwicklung im Sudan und am Horn von Afrika. Und doch findet der Frieden wenig internationale Beachtung: Zu sehr ist die Wahrnehmung der internationalen Öffentlichkeit vom Krieg in Darfur bestimmt. Die dortige humanitäre Krise rief Erinnerungen an den Genozid in Ruanda 1994 wach und löste weltweit Entsetzen aus. Die positiven Entwicklungen im Friedensprozess zwischen Nord- und Südsudan sind der Intervention der Staatengemeinschaft, insbesondere der usa , Englands, Norwegens und Kenias, sowie der Regionalorganisation igad (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) zu verdanken. 1 In der westsudanesischen Region Darfur hat es die Staatengemeinschaft jedoch verpasst, eine humanitäre Krise zu verhindern. Genau diese Krise erschwert nun die Umsetzung des Friedensschlusses zwischen Nord- und Südsudan. Diese Konstellation stellt die Staatengemeinschaft vor schwierige Alternativen. Allgemein wird die Wiederaufnahme der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit vorbereitet, und man will es dem Sudan erlauben, aus der internationalen Isolierung herauszutreten. Doch die Darfurkrise macht dieses Vorgehen immer schwieriger, weil sie zeigt, dass sich der Charakter des Regimes in Khartum durch den Friedensprozess mit dem Südsudan keineswegs geändert hat. 1. Die Friedensverhandlungen werden organisiert vom igad -Friedenssekretariat in Nairobi. 150 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

Der Sudan leidet an der schwachen Staatlichkeit Der Sudan, der 1956 von Großbritannien in die Unabhängigkeit entlassen wurde, ist kulturell sehr heterogen. Es gibt mindestens 19 ethnische Gruppen und über 100 verschiedene Sprachen. Mit einer Fläche von 2,5 Millionen km 2 ist Sudan der größte Staat Afrikas. Man geht davon aus, dass 90 Prozent der etwa 33 Millionen Sudanesen unterhalb der Armutsgrenze leben. Im Sudan überlagern sich mehrere Konflikte: der dominierende Nord-Süd-Konflikt(1. Bürgerkrieg 1955–1972, 2. Bürgerkrieg 1983–2005), lokale, meist traditional geprägte Konflikte in den Regionen, und Zentrum-Peripheriekonflikte jeweils zwischen der Zentralregion und dem Westen(Darfur), Osten und Norden des Landes. Die Akteure sind stark zersplittert, allein in der Provinz Upper Nile gibt es über ein Dutzend Milizen, die in wechselnden Allianzen mit der Regierung oder der spla kämpfen. Es herrscht eine»chronische humanitäre Krise mit mulitdimensionaler Konfliktlage«. 2 Der zentrale Konflikt des Sudan dreht sich um die fehlende Legitimation des Staates und die sehr schwache Staatlichkeit des Sudan. Das postkoloniale Staatsgebilde ist in der sehr traditionellen sudanesischen Gesellschaft bis heute nicht verankert. Es gab unter General Numeiri(1969– 1985) den kurzen Versuch, den Staat sozialistisch zu begründen, der alsbald scheiterte. Der seit den 1970er Jahren aufstrebende und seit 1989 durch ein Putschregime regierende politische Islam versucht wiederum, diese Leerstelle zu füllen. 3 Mit anderen Worten: Auch das gegenwärtige islamisch-fundamentalistische Regime – von den usa auf die Liste der »Schurkenstaaten« gesetzt –, ist letztlich nicht als religionsorientiertes, sondern als machtorientiertes Regime zu verstehen. Der Versuch dieses Regimes, den Staat in einem kulturell und religiös so heterogenen Land mit einem zivilisatorischen Projekt der Arabisierung und Islamisierung zu begründen, muss notwendigerweise zum Scheitern verurteilt sein. Dieser Anspruch ließ sich nur mit Repressionen aufrechterhalten, die zwar das Regime stützten, aber den Staat an sich schwächten. 2. Marina Peter 2004: Studien zur länderbezogenen Konfliktanalyse, Sudan, hrsg. vom Deutschen Entwicklungsdienst und der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, S. 4. 3. Zur Diskussion des islamischen Fundamentalismus vgl. Christoph Marx 2001: »Fundamentalismus und Nationalstaat«, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für historische Sozialwissenschaft 27(19), S. 87–117. ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 151

Der sudanesische Staat ist in den Regionen so wenig präsent, dass er kaum ein Gewaltmonopol herstellen kann. In den Regionen gibt es gewaltoffene Räume, und die vorliegenden Konflikte drehen sich dort eben nicht um den Staat: Vielmehr geht es bei Konflikten traditioneller Ausprägung um Landnutzung(Darfur) oder um Vieh(Bahr-el-Ghazal), in moderner Ausprägung um die Kontrolle von Handelswegen und des lokalen Gewaltmonopols(Gewaltmärkte) durch lokale Kriegsherren. 4 Krieg und Frieden sind in diesen Gebieten unzureichende analytische Kategorien, die Eindämmung von Gewalt ist von außen schwer regelbar. Es gab nie den Versuch eines inklusiven Nation-Building, immer nur die Herrschaft einzelner Cliquen zum Preis der Ausgrenzung und Erniedrigung der großen Mehrheit der Sudanesen. Seit der Unabhängigkeit sind weder die definitorische Frage der sudanesischen Grenzen noch die Frage nach der Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung beantwortet. Es gab nie den Versuch eines inklusiven NationBuilding, immer nur die Herrschaft einzelner Cliquen zum Preis der Ausgrenzung und Erniedrigung der großen Mehrheit der Sudanesen. Trotz der Heterogenität des Landes lässt sich vereinfachend sagen, dass der Sudan im Grunde aus zwei Staaten besteht, die sich kulturell unterscheiden: dem afrikanischen Süden und dem arabischen Norden. Und es ist schwer vorstellbar, dass sich die Südsudanesen bei freier Wahl in dem Referendum, das in dem Friedensabkommen zwischen Nord und Süd vorgesehen ist, für einen geeinten Sudan aussprechen würden. Die Friedensprotokolle von Machakos und Naivasha: ein Frieden auf Raten Der seit 1983 dauernde zweite sudanesische Bürgerkrieg wurde am 20. Juli 2002 beendet: In der kenianischen Stadt Machakos wurde von der sudanesischen Regierung und der splm / a ein Protokoll über die Rah4. Zu den Begrifflichkeiten»gewaltoffene Räume« und»Gewaltmärkte« vgl. Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang u.a.(Hrsg.) 1999: Dynamics of Violence: Processes of Escalation and Deescalation in Violent Group Conflicts. (=Sociologicus, Beiheift 1), Berlin. 152 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

menbedingungen eines Friedensprozesses unterzeichnet. Im Protokoll einigten sich die Verhandlungsparteien auf ein Referendum über die Unabhängigkeit des Südsudan nach einer sechsjährigen Interimperiode. Das Machakosprotokoll war der Auftakt für einen»Frieden auf Raten«: Über einen Zeitraum von zweieinhalb Jahren wurden im Rahmen des igad Friedensprozesses mehrere – nachfolgend dargestellte – Teilprotokolle eines Friedensvertrages ausgehandelt, bis dieser am 9. Januar 2005 schließlich unterzeichnet werden konnte. 5 Bis kurz vor diesem endgültigen Friedensschluss glaubten viele Beobachter nicht an sein Zustandekommen. Zu schwierig waren die Verhandlungen, die nur von einem temporären Waffenstillstand begleitet wurden. Das Abkommen über Sicherheitsfragen, 25.9.2003: Im Herbst 2003 gelang mit dem Abkommen über Sicherheitsfragen ein weiterer Durchbruch. 6 Es soll künftig drei Armeen im Sudan geben. Das Protokoll sieht neben der Weiterexistenz der Regierungsarmee als auch der spla -Armee die Gründung einer dritten gemeinsamen Truppe vor. Die Regierungsarmee soll sich bis auf wenige Soldaten aus dem Südsudan, die spla aus dem Osten des Landes zurückziehen. Im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Truppe wäre zukünftig die spla auch in der Hauptstadt militärisch präsent. Die schrittweise Umsetzung des Abkommens während der Interimzeit wird entscheidend für den Erfolg des Friedens sein, allerdings außerordentlich schwierig. Die geplante Präsenz mehrerer bewaffneter Gruppierungen in der Hauptstadt neben dem Apparat der Staatssicherheit und der Staatsmiliz Popular Defense Force wirft die Frage nach der künftigen Stabilität der sudanesischen Hauptstadt auf. 5. Der folgende Abschnitt basiert auf Abdel Rahim Belal und Manfred Öhm 2004: Sudan: Die Darfurkrise bedroht die Hoffnungen auf Frieden zwischen Norden und Süden, Kurzberichte aus der Internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, hrsg. von der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin. 6. Vorausgegangen war ein Wechsel in der Verhandlungsführung der Regierungsdelegation vom Berater des Präsidenten für Friedensfragen, Ghasi Salah el Din, zum Vizepräsidenten Ali Osman Taha. Taha gilt als islamistischer Hardliner, der dennoch Kompromisse mit den Rebellen einzugehen bereit war. Dies war eine entscheidende Wende, die den Verhandlungen mehr Glaubwürdigkeit verlieh, allerdings die Islamisten in Khartum intern spaltete. ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 153

Das Abkommen über Ressourcenverteilung, 7.1.2004: Das Abkommen regelt insbesondere die Verteilung der südsudanesischen Ölressourcen, deren Erlös zu gleichen Anteilen an Süd- und Nordsudan gehen soll, jedoch nach Abzug von zwei Prozent für die Ölförderregion. Letzteres stellt einen Schritt zur Stärkung der Regionen dar. Dass das Abkommen nicht alle sudanesischen Ölvorkommen erfasst, ist ein unbedingter Anreiz für den Südsudan, sich abzuspalten, da ein unabhängiger Südsudan sein Öl selbst verwalten könnte. Aus dem gleichen Grund will die Regierung Bashir natürlich die sudanesische Einheit erhalten. Hier wie an anderer Stelle zeigt sich jedoch, dass die zwischen den Parteien formulierten Kompromisse auf einen unabhängigen Südsudan hindeuten. Andere Lösungen, beispielsweise eine bedarfsorientierte Verteilung der Öleinkünfte, war wegen des großen Misstrauens zwischen den Kriegsparteien nicht möglich. Nur durch die Zugeständnisse im Hinblick auf eine eigene südsudanesische Armee und die Struktur des Abkommens über die Ressourcenverteilung konnte ein Friedensvertrag erreicht werden. Der Südsudan erhält eine Filiale der Zentralbank des Sudan, die in ihren Kompetenzen einer unabhängigen Zentralbank entspricht. Der Südsudan kann nun übergangsweise offiziell eine eigene Währung einführen, bevor der gesamte Sudan eine neue einheitliche Währung erhalten soll (gegenwärtig gibt es allein im Südsudan fünf Währungen aus verschiedenen Ländern, aber kaum Handel!). Zudem kann die südsudanesische Bank unabhängig auf dem internationalen Finanzmarkt agieren. Insgesamt regelt das Abkommen die Ressourcenverteilung im Sudan, ohne auf das Hauptproblem der Sudanesen einzugehen: die Armut. Das Protokoll über die Machtverteilung, 26. Mai 2004: Das Protokoll regelt die Schlüsselfragen der Übergangsverfassung des Sudan, welche sechs Wochen nach Friedensschluss von einem Constitutional Review Committee vorgelegt werden muss. Für wichtige politische Fragen wie das Wahlrecht, die Steuerpolitik, Menschenrechte und das Referendum für den Südsudan werden Kommissionen eingesetzt werden, deren Mitglieder von den beiden Verhandlungsparteien bestimmt werden. Die Exekutive wird vom Präsidenten und zwei Vizepräsidenten geführt, erster Vizepräsident wird der Führer der splm / a . Letzterer wird zugleich der Präsident der weitgehend autonomen Regierung des Südsudan. Der Südsudan wird eine eigene Verfassung erhalten. Im Parlament, das aus zwei Kammern bestehen wird, wird die regierende Kongresspartei 52 Prozent der Sitze erhalten, die splm 28 Prozent, andere südsudanesi154 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

sche Gruppen erhalten 6 Prozent, 14 Prozent gehen an die nordsudanesische Opposition. Nach der Hälfte der Interimperiode sind freie Wahlen auf allen politischen Ebenen vorgesehen. Diese Wahlen könnten den Grundstein für einen echten politischen Wandel im Sudan legen. Die Parteien haben sich allerdings trotz großen internationalen Drucks in dieser Frage durch eine Terminklausel die Verschiebung des Termins aus wichtigen Gründen vorbehalten. Daher wären freie Wahlen auf nationaler Ebene nach drei Jahren eine Überraschung. Schließlich sieht das Protokoll die Beibehaltung des islamischen Strafrechts, der Sharia, im Sudan vor. Nur im Südsudan und für Nicht-Muslime im Norden wird die Sharia nicht angewendet. Die splm hat damit der Fortexistenz der Sharia im Sudan prinzipiell zugestimmt, obwohl dies seit der Machtergreifung der Islamisten das Haupthindernis für einen Friedenschluss war. Damit wird ein zentrales Hemmnis für eine weitere politische Öffnung in der Übergangsverfassung festgeschrieben. Die Protokolle über den Status der Provinzen Abyei, Nuba und Blue Nile, 26. Mai 2004: Eine Einigung über den Status der umstrittenen Provinzen war bis zuletzt problematisch. Der Hauptstreitpunkt war die Zugehörigkeit der Provinzen zum Süd- oder Nordsudan. Der Befreiungskampf der spla wurde von Teilen der Bevölkerung in diesen Provinzen unterstützt. Nuba und Blue Nile gehörten historisch jedoch nicht zum Südsudan, Abyei wurde noch vor der Unabhängigkeit dem Nordsudan angeschlossen. Für Nuba und Southern Blue Nile hat man sich nun auf eine begrenzte Autonomie und eine spätere endgültige Regelung des Status durch die politischen Institutionen in den Regionen geeinigt. Damit wird einer zentralen Forderung der Regierung nach der Anerkennung der Provinzgrenzen zum Zeitpunkt der Unabhängigkeit 1956 zunächst Genüge getan. In der Provinz Abyei soll allerdings gleichzeitig mit dem Referendum über den Status des Südsudan ein Referendum über die Zugehörigkeit der Provinz zu Süd- oder Nordsudan durchgeführt werden. Der Frieden ist eine Chance – doch sie zu nutzen wird schwierig sein Am 9. Januar 2005 wurden ein permanenter Waffenstillstand und der endgültige Friedensvertrag – zusammengesetzt aus den oben beschriebenen ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 155

Protokollen – zwischen der sudanesischen Regierung und der splm / a in Kenia unterschrieben. 7 Viele Beobachter hatten bereits begonnen, am erfolgreichen Abschluss der Friedensbemühungen zu zweifeln. Zu lange zogen sich die Verhandlungen hin und zu sehr wurde die politische Situation von dem Krieg in Darfur überschattet. Dementsprechend hielt sich die öffentliche Begeisterung über den Frieden in Khartum sehr in Grenzen. Doch wo steht der Sudan tatsächlich nach dem Friedensschluss? Verläuft alles nach dem für die geplante sechseinhalbjährige Interimperiode vereinbarten offiziellen Fahrplan, dann wird es im Laufe des Jahres 2005 eine neue Regierung geben, im Jahr 2008 freie Wahlen auf allen politischen Ebenen und im Jahr 2011 ein Referendum über die Unabhängigkeit des Südsudan. Im Südsudan soll der Frieden durch 10 000 Soldaten der Vereinten Nationen abgesichert werden. Am Ende wird entweder ein einheitlicher demokratischer Sudan stehen, oder aber die Trennung in zwei souveräne Staaten vollzogen werden. Der Frieden ist in einem doppelten Sinn nicht umfassend: Es sind nicht alle Konfliktursachen berücksichtigt und auch nicht alle relevanten Akteure. Im Kern führt der Friedensschluss zu einem Bund zwischen zwei autoritären Machthabern, die sich in ihren jeweiligen Landesteilen repressiv-autoritär gegenüber der Bevölkerung verhalten haben. Wie ihre Partnerschaft in der Regierung aussehen wird, ist offen. Alle anderen politischen Akteure(Parteien, Zivilgesellschaft) waren vom Friedensprozess ausgeschlossen und werden zunächst auch von der Regierung ausgeschlossen sein. Eine bereits wenige Tage nach dem Friedensschluss in Kairo mit der National Democratic Alliance (NDA) – einem Zusammenschluss einiger nordsudanesischer Oppositionsgruppen und der splm – getroffene Vereinbarung deutet darauf hin, dass man versucht, andere Parteien in die Regierung einzubinden. Letztlich scheint jedoch jede Gruppe vor allem darauf bedacht, in einem Wechselspiel der Allianzen die Oberhand zu behalten. 7. In der letzten Phase der Verhandlungen wurde die praktische Umsetzung des Friedens konkretisiert. Der Hauptstreitpunkt blieb bis zuletzt die künftige Finanzierung der spla -Armee, die nun nicht aus dem nationalen Budget erfolgen wird. 156 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

Trotzdem ist der Friedensschluss die derzeit bestmögliche Alternative, auch wenn die praktische Umsetzung sehr schwierig sein wird. Die Protokolle enthalten viel Positives, nicht zuletzt das Versprechen von Demokratie, Menschenrechten und Selbstbestimmung, und sie könnten damit den Sudan aus seiner internationalen Isolierung herausführen. Vor allem im Norden keimt Hoffnung auf einen einheitlichen und vor allem demokratischen Sudan. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es viele Südsudanesen, denen es vor allem auf ihr Selbstbestimmungsrecht und weniger auf eine Demokratisierung ankommt. Aus ihrer Sicht ist die Wartezeit bis zum Referendum über die erhoffte Unabhängigkeit viel zu lang. Die Zerbrechlichkeit des Friedens zeigt sich auch daran, dass beide Seiten ihre Armeen behalten. Die Kompromisse der Friedensverhandlungen ebnen – inhaltlich betrachtet – einer Unabhängigkeit des Südsudan den Weg, wie bei der Verteilung der Öleinkünfte gesehen werden kann(s.o.). Während man sich auf der Ebene politischer Eliten auf solche Kompromisse geeinigt hat, wurde eine entscheidende Konfliktursache vergessen, nämlich die Armut und die damit verbundenen sozialen Konflikte. Der Frieden ist folglich in einem doppelten Sinn nicht umfassend: Es sind nicht alle Konfliktursachen berücksichtigt und auch nicht alle relevanten Akteure. Der Frieden bedeutet im Südsudan eine große Verbesserung der Lebenssituation, insbesondere durch die Einstellung der Bombardierung ziviler Ziele durch die Regierung. In einigen Regionen wird der Frieden jedoch kein Ende der Gewalt bedeuten. In der Provinz Upper Nile ist die Gefahr der Fortführung durch Kämpfe verschiedener lokaler Milizen sehr groß, und es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass diese Milizen weiterhin von der Regierung unterstützt werden. In mehreren Regionen des Südsudan könnten Folgekonflikte aufbrechen, intra-ethnische Konflikte, zwischenethnische Konflikte ebenso wie Konflikte zwischen Regionen. Und ein Ende der Gewalt ist auch in anderen Landesteilen nicht sichtbar, insbesondere nicht in Darfur. Doch trotz all dieser Schwierigkeiten bietet sich den Sudanesen zum ersten Mal seit vielen Jahren die Chance auf ein friedliches Zusammenleben. Internationaler Druck als Friedensursache? Nach 22 Kriegsjahren drängt sich die Frage auf, warum es gerade jetzt zu einem Friedensschluss gekommen ist. Es war seit Jahren offensichtlich, ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 157

dass der Krieg zwischen Nord- und Südsudan militärisch nicht zu entscheiden war, aber Friedensbemühungen waren zuvor nie erfolgreich. Nach einem derart langen Krieg drängt sich die Vermutung auf, die eigentliche Friedensursache sei die schiere physische Erschöpfung des Landes. Tatsächlich gibt es kaum einen normalen Sudanesen, der für die Fortsetzung des Krieges plädieren würde. Auf südsudanesischer Seite ist die physische Erschöpfung von Land und Leuten eindeutig. Jegliche Infrastruktur ist vernichtet, die Hälfte der Bevölkerung hat den Südsudan verlassen. Auch in den nördlichen Teilen des Landes ist eine physische Auszehrung zu beobachten. Sie ist jedoch nur zum Teil durch den Krieg mit dem Südsudan verursacht. Die Verarmung eigentlich aller Regionen, die auch die urbane Mittelschicht erfasst hat, ist ebenso auf die Wirtschaftspolitik und Kleptokratie des Regimes zurückzuführen. 8 Und doch: Trotz dieser»Erschöpfung« geht es den politischen Entscheidungsträgern beider Kriegsparteien nach wie vor ökonomisch gut, und man darf eher an ihrem Friedenswillen zweifeln. Daher muss der internationale Druck als der wichtigste Erklärungsfaktor für den Frieden betrachtet und dabei insbesondere die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten hervorgehoben werden. Mit dem us -Sondergesandten John Danforth und einer Friedensinitiative begannen die usa im Jahr 2001 eine aktive Sudanpolitik. Die usa erlegten der Regierung Sudans ultimative Verhaltensregeln auf, wie beispielsweise ein Ende der Bombardierungen im Südsudan, um den Friedenswillen der sudanesischen Machthaber zu testen. Auf diesem Weg konnte schließlich ein räumlich begrenzter Waffenstillstand in den Nubabergen erreicht werden. Zudem hat die Verabschiedung des»Sudan Peace Act« im amerikanischen Kongress den Druck auf Sudan massiv verstärkt. Dieses Gesetz verpflichtet den us -Präsidenten zur regelmäßigen Berichterstattung über den Fortschritt der Friedensverhandlungen. Für den Fall unzureichender Fortschritte wird der sudanesischen Regierung nicht nur mit Sanktionen gedroht, sondern auch mit einer beträchtlichen finanziellen Unterstützung der splm . Später wurde eine Liste des cia von elf Mitgliedern des 8. Seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre hat das Regime eine kontinuierliche Politik der wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung und Privatisierung durchgeführt, die mit einem Rückzug aus dem staatlichen Gesundheits- und Bildungssystem einherging. Auch in den für den Sudan grundlegenden Agrarsektor wird kaum mehr investiert, und die Importe von Grundnahrungsmitteln nehmen jährlich zu. 158 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

engsten sudanesischen Führungszirkels lanciert, die wegen ihrer Verantwortung für schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen international strafrechtlich verfolgt werden sollten. Bei den igad -Friedensverhandlungen in Kenia wurde die Vermittlertätigkeit der usa sowie Großbritanniens und Norwegens intensiviert. Der Verhandlungsprozess wurde vom sogenannten igad -Partner-Forum ( ipf ) unterstützt. Mit dem kenianischen General Lazarus Sumbeywo wurde ein geschickter und bei den Verhandlungsparteien akzeptierter Hauptunterhändler gefunden. igad als Organisation wäre zu schwach und die Mitgliedsländer zu zerstritten gewesen, um allein die Friedensverhandlungen voranzubringen. Der igad -Friedensprozess bot aber das richtige Forum zur richtigen Zeit, um das durch die us -Friedensinitiative entstandene Moment zu nützen. Der internationale Druck sorgte dafür, dass die Verhandlungen, die auch nach dem Machakosprotokoll mehrfach vor dem ergebnislosen Abbruch standen, am Leben gehalten wurden. Er verhinderte aber nicht die Eskalation des Konflikts in Darfur. Eine angekündigte humanitäre Krise in Darfur Dass der Sudan im Jahr 2004 wieder in den Medien auftauchte, ist nicht dem Friedensprozess zu verdanken, sondern war eine Reaktion auf den »neuen« Krieg in Darfur, dem Westen des Landes. Das internationale Bild des Sudan war völlig von der Darfur-Krise bestimmt, zugleich war die mediale Darstellung der Ereignisse sehr verkürzt. Zynisch gesprochen war der Darfurkonflikt nötig, damit der Sudan überhaupt wahrgenommen wurde. Dadurch entstand ein beträchtlicher politischer Druck auf die Regierung des Landes. Das Kernproblem in Darfur ist eine zunehmende Ressourcenknappheit, insbesondere die Verknappung von Land, das sowohl von Ackerbauern als auch von den halbnomadisch lebenden Viehhirten und Kamelnomaden gebraucht wird. Traditionell auf Kooperation ausgerichtete Beziehungen der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen wurden durch die Bevölkerungszunahme und zunehmende Ressourcenknappheit weiter erschwert. Die Eskalation der schon lange existierenden Konflikte in Darfur ist im direkten Zusammenhang mit dem Friedensprozess zwischen der Regierung und der splm zu sehen. 9 Der igad -Ansatz, neben diesen beiden Akteuren keine weiteren Verhandlungsparteien zuzulassen, war verhandipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 159

lungstechnisch sinnvoll, ließ jedoch die politischen Realitäten außer Acht: Nicht nur der Süden, sondern im Grunde alle Regionen des Sudan wurden politisch und ökonomisch marginalisiert und schienen nun wiederum von der Teilhabe politischer Macht im Sudan ausgeschlossen. Die splm / a hatte jedoch genau diese Teilhabe durch den bewaffneten Kampf erreicht, zumindest schien die Regierung nur mit bewaffneten Gruppen zu verhandeln. Dies war ein eindeutiger Anreiz, auch in Darfur zu den Waffen zu greifen. Um die Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Regierung und SPLM/A in Kenia nicht zu gefährden, wurde die Regierung in Khartum über Monate hinweg nicht ausreichend unter Druck gesetzt. Dies hat die sudanesische Regierung darin bestärkt, auf eine militärische Lösung in Darfur zu setzen. Es gibt in der Region zwei Widerstandsbewegungen, die im Februar 2003 den bewaffneten Kampf aufnahmen: die Sudan Liberation Movement/Army( slm / a ) und das Justice and Equality Movement( jem ). Die Rebellen in Darfur waren zunächst sehr erfolgreich, eroberten vorübergehend selbst den Flughafen der Provinzhauptstadt El Fasher und fügten der Regierungsarmee schmerzliche Verluste zu. Die Regierung griff zu den im Südsudan jahrelang erprobten Mitteln. Man ließ Dörfer und Städte in Darfur aus der Luft bombardieren und bewaffnete arabische Reitermilizen, die so genannten Jenjaweed 10 , um gemeinsam mit der sudanesischen Armee gegen die Rebellen vorzugehen. Dabei wurde bewusst in Kauf genommen, dass die Zivilbevölkerung Hauptleidtragende des Krieges sein würde. Das Ergebnis sind mittlerweile bis zu 70 000 Tote und 1,2 Millionen Vertriebene. 11 In weiten Teilen Darfurs existieren 9. Einen guten Überblick über die Geschichte der Konflikte in Darfur gibt Adam Azzain Mohamed 2004: The New Civil War in Darfur Region of Western Sudan: Background and Situation Analysis, unveröffentlichtes Papier, Khartum. 10. Die Jenjaweed stammen allerdings nicht nur aus Sudan, sondern auch aus Tschad und weiteren westafrikanischen Ländern. 11. Zahlen der who , Oktober 2004. Einen Überblick über die Situation in Darfur gibt z.B. icg Africa Report no. 80, 23. May 2004: Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, www.crisisweb.org . Vgl. auch den Bericht von Amnesty International: Sudan: Darfur: Too many people killed for no reason, Februar 2004, www.web.amnesty.org/ library/index/engafr540082004. 160 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

keine Dörfer mehr. Die in Lagern untergebrachten Flüchtlinge sind oft selbst dort schutzlos den Jenjaweed ausgeliefert. Mindestens bis Ende September 2004 gab es Augenzeugenberichten zufolge systematische Vergewaltigungen und gezielte Hinrichtungen von Kindern. Seitens der usa und der Vereinten Nationen werden der sudanesischen Regierung»ethnische Säuberungen« und versuchter Genozid an den afrikanischen Stämmen Darfurs(Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit) vorgeworfen. In Europa wurde häufig eine Parallele zum Völkermord in Ruanda gezogen. Tatsächlich hat man trotz vieler Warnungen nicht rechtzeitig auf die zunehmende Gewalt in Darfur reagiert. Für die Staatengemeinschaft ergab sich ein Dilemma: Um die Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Regierung und splm / a in Kenia nicht zu gefährden, wurde die Regierung in Khartum über Monate hinweg nicht ausreichend unter Druck gesetzt. Dies hat die sudanesische Regierung darin bestärkt, auf eine militärische Lösung in Darfur zu setzen. Während des amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlkampfes nahm der Druck auf die sudanesische Regierung wegen Darfur dann zwar zu, allerdings machte man schon im Dezember 2004 wieder einen Rückzieher: Nach einer bezüglich Darfur sehr schwachen un -Sicherheitsratsresolution eskalierte der Krieg. Mittlerweile ist klar, dass die Regierung sich ohne ein Ende der willkürlichen Gewalt in Darfur nicht aus ihrer internationalen Isolierung lösen kann. Vom Regionalkonflikt zu einem Flächenbrand? In Darfur überlagern sich verschiedene Konfliktursachen: ̈ Ein Zentrum-Peripherie-Konflikt: Die Region wurde von der Zentralregierung über Jahre politisch und ökonomisch marginalisiert. ̈ Ein Ressourcenkonflikt über die Landnutzung zwischen nomadischen Viehhaltern und sesshaften Ackerbauern: Dieser Konflikt hat sich durch Dürren und durch zunehmende Immigration von arabischen Nomaden vor allem aus Tschad stark verschärft. Ebenso ziehen arabische Nomaden vermehrt von Nord- nach Süddarfur, wo überwiegend Ackerbauern leben. ̈ Ein ethnischer Konflikt zwischen arabischen und nicht-arabischen Bevölkerungsgruppen: Die friedliche Koexistenz der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen wurde nicht nur durch die zunehmende Ressourcenknappheit, sondern auch durch die einseitige Unterstützung der arabischen Bevölkerungsgruppen von Seiten der Zentralregierung erschwert. ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 161

̈ Ein Konflikt um arabische Milizen, die von der Regierung bewaffnet worden sind: Die so genannten Jenjaweed-Milizen haben von der Regierung freie Hand erhalten, um gegen die Zivilbevölkerung unter den Zaghawa, Fur und Masalit vorzugehen. Es handelt sich zum Teil schlicht um kriminelle Banden. Die Grenze zwischen Jenjaweed und Regierungsarmee ist fließend. Jenjaweed-Attacken gegen die Bevölkerung wurden von der Armee abgesichert. Schon immer gab es in Darfur Auseinandersetzungen um Land und vor allem Landnutzung. Die lokalen Konflikte in Darfur haben sich aber insofern verändert, als sie nun nicht mehr nur indirekt sondern direkt in ein größeres Konfliktsystem eingebunden sind. Die anfangs rein regionalen Konflikte wurden zunächst nationalisiert und schließlich internationalisiert. Die einseitigen Interventionen der Zentralregierung seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre und die zunehmende ökonomische und politische Marginalisierung Darfurs zugunsten der Zentralregion um Khartum haben die Herausbildung von Widerstandsbewegungen ermöglicht. Deren Ziele sind mehr Autonomie(nicht jedoch Unabhängigkeit!) für Darfur, und ein Umsturz der Zentralregierung. Die Ziele sind also auf den ganzen sudanesischen Staat bezogen und nicht mehr nur auf Darfur. Zudem kommt der politische Widerstand mittlerweile aus mehreren Regionen: Politische Führer aus dem Westen und dem Osten des Landes befinden sich in engem Austausch über gemeinsame politische Ziele gegenüber der Zentralregierung. 12 Es gibt darüber hinaus Hinweise, dass sich der Widerstand gegen die Zentralregierung sogar in einem Halbkreis um Khartum organisieren könnte(Darfur-Südkordofan-Beja), mit dem Ziel, sich des Regimes zu entledigen. Darüber hinaus werden scheinbar beide Widerstandsbewegungen von nationalen politischen Akteuren unterstützt, vermutlich vom Popular Congress des derzeit inhaftierten Religionsführers Hassan el Turabi und auch von der südsudanesischen splm . Auf lange Sicht ist die ideologische Begründung des politischen Widerstandes in Darfur besonders wichtig: Mittlerweile wird von einem Krieg zwischen afrikanischen Bevölkerungsgruppen und arabischen Milizen gesprochen. Die Vorstellung von afrikanischen Stämmen und arabischen Stämmen, die sich gegenseitig bekriegen, ist jedoch zu einfach. Tatsächlich gibt es in Darfur ebenso Auseinandersetzungen zwischen ver12. Im Osten des Sudan wird die Bevölkerungsgruppe der Beja vom Beja Congress vertreten. Dieser wird vermutlich von der eritreischen Regierung militärisch unterstützt. 162 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

schiedenen arabischen Gruppen und zwischen verschiedenen afrikanischen Gruppen. Überdies ist eine klare Abgrenzung zwischen»afrikanisch« und»arabisch« oft weder möglich noch sinnvoll. Klare Abgrenzungsmerkmale fehlen und die arabische Sprache ist ein verbindendes Element für die gesamte Bevölkerung Darfurs. Trotzdem stößt man in der Diskussion mit Menschen aus Darfur immer häufiger auf solch ein kulturelles Erklärungsmuster des Krieges. Ein stärker werdendes»afrikanisches Selbstverständnis« wird jedoch das Kräfteverhältnis zwischen den politischen Akteuren im Sudan zu Ungunsten der gegenwärtigen»arabischen« Machthaber verschieben. Erfolgreiche Internationalisierung Ein deutlicher Unterschied zwischen den Kriegen in Darfur und im Südsudan ist die große internationale Aufmerksamkeit, die Darfur zuteil wird. Während der Krieg im Südsudan über viele Jahre weitgehend unbemerkt von der internationalen Öffentlichkeit geführt wurde, war Darfur über Wochen ein Thema in der internationalen Presse und im Fernsehen. Die Regierung des Sudan hat offensichtlich nicht mit einer so starken Reaktion der Staatengemeinschaft gerechnet, denn ihre Vorgehensweise glich weitgehend der im Südsudan oder auch in den Nubabergen: Sie setzte zunächst auf eine militärische Lösung, bewaffnete regierungstreue Bevölkerungsgruppen und Milizen, und agierte dabei gegenüber der Zivilbevölkerung völlig rücksichtslos. Hingegen wollten sowohl slm / a als auch jem von Beginn an eine Internationalisierung des Darfurkonfliktes erreichen. Dass dies gelang, wurde durch mehrere Faktoren begünstigt: ̈ Einflussreiche Vertreter der Rebellen leben in Mitteleuropa, von wo sie die internationale Öffentlichkeit vergleichsweise leicht mobilisieren können. ̈ Durch den fortgeschrittenen Naivasha-Friedensprozess war bereits ein gewisses öffentliches Interesse am Sudan entstanden. ̈ Die amerikanische Regierung wollte einen außenpolitischen Erfolg durch einen Friedensschluss im Sudan. Dies erklärt das große Interesse am Sudan und die harsche – wenn auch späte – Reaktion auf die Entwicklungen in Darfur, als im Wahlkampfjahr 2004 der vermeintliche außenpolitische Erfolg in eine humanitäre Krise umzukippen drohte. ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 163

Die Internationalisierung hat die Darfurkrise zu einem existenziellen Problem für die sudanesische Regierung gemacht, weil ein immenser Druck durch die Staatengemeinschaft und die Vereinten Nationen ausgeübt wird. In den Resolutionen des vn -Sicherheitsrats wurde ultimativ mit Sanktionen gedroht, und Sudan musste der Präsenz von Truppen der Afrikanischen Union( au ) als Beobachter zustimmen. Die au hat eine Mission mit über 3000 internationalen Soldaten nach Darfur entsandt. Diese Mission, finanziert u.a. von eu und usa , wird international als Testfall betrachtet für die Fähigkeit der au , regionale Konflikte eigenständig zu lösen. Ansätze zur Konfliktregulierung? Im September 2003 wurde zwischen Regierung und slm ein Waffenstillstandsabkommen geschlossen, vermittelt vom Präsidenten des Tschad. Die slm zweifelte das Abkommen postwendend an, da die Verhandlungsteilnehmer unter Druck gesetzt worden seien. Am 8. April 2004 wurde ein erneuter Waffenstillstand vereinbart, dieser wird seither jedoch häufig gebrochen. Zuletzt wurden von der Afrikanischen Union getragene Friedensgespräche in Abuja, Nigeria, abgehalten, allerdings am 18. September 2004 ergebnislos abgebrochen. International scheint man weiterhin auf Druck zu setzen, auch mit der Androhung von Sanktionen und der Entsendung internationaler Truppen. Das ist insofern richtig, als dem Regime in Khartum der politische Wille fehlt, den Krieg zu beenden. Doch ob in Darfur durch eine internationale Intervention eine Lösung gefunden werden kann, ist fraglich. Unter Berücksichtigung traditioneller Konfliktlösungsmechanismen, d.h. vor allem durch Schlichtung der Chiefs, könnte eine Versöhnung in der Region erreicht werden. Um einen stabilen Frieden in Darfur zu erreichen, müssen vielmehr wohl koordinierte, von der Staatengemeinschaft gestützte Verhandlungen zwischen den Konfliktparteien stattfinden, die mit glaubhaftem internationalem Druck einhergehen. Die igad -Friedensverhandlungen zwischen Regierung und splm in Kenia bieten bereits ein gutes Beispiel. Gleichzeitig muss eine Lösung unter Einbeziehung der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen in Darfur selbst gefunden werden. 164 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

Da die kämpfenden Kriegsparteien alle aus der Region kommen, liegt es auf der Hand, dass sie sich letztlich wieder miteinander arrangieren müssen. Unter Berücksichtigung traditioneller Konfliktlösungsmechanismen, d.h. vor allem durch Schlichtung der Chiefs, könnte eine Versöhnung in der Region erreicht werden. Dies sollte prinzipiell möglich sein, da lokale Schlichtungsansätze in Darfur eine lange Tradition haben. Allerdings sind viele traditionelle Führer heute von der Zentralregierung eingesetzt und bezahlt, d.h. parteiisch. Eine umfassende Konfliktlösung müsste dreierlei Elemente enthalten: eine Autonomieregelung für Darfur, eine deutliche politische Dezentralisierung zugunsten der restlichen nordsudanesischen Provinzen sowie ein tragfähiges lokales Landregime, in dem die Frage von Landeigentum und-nutzung in Darfur geregelt wird. Schließlich werden konkrete und zielgerichtete Entwicklungsperspektiven für Darfur benötigt. Die traditionelle Subsistenzwirtschaft kann den gestiegenen Bevölkerungszahlen nicht gerecht werden. Deswegen ist eine Transformation bzw. Modernisierung der Landwirtschaft im Sudan nötig. 13 Die Zentralregierung unter Druck Die Ereignisse in Darfur haben Sudan entscheidend verändert. War vor der Eskalation des Krieges in Darfur ein Friedensschluss zwischen Nordund Südsudan zu erwarten, der zwei autoritäre Machthaber verbindet und dem Regime al Bashirs die Fortexistenz ermöglicht, so ist die Regierung in Khartum nun nachhaltig geschwächt: International steigt der politische Druck wegen der Darfurkrise, innenpolitisch gibt es Widerstand vom Popular National Congress( pnc ) des geschassten Religionsführers Hassan el Turabi und – noch wichtiger – von Mitgliedern des regierenden National Congress. Die islamische Bewegung ist zunehmend in sich zerstritten, weil Teile nicht mit dem Frieden von Naivasha und mit der Regierungspolitik in Darfur einverstanden sind. Im September 2004 haben diese internen Differenzen zu einer ersten politischen Eskalation geführt: Nach einem echten oder vermeintlichen Putschversuch am 25.9.2004 wurde die gesamte politische Führung des pnc verhaftet und ganz Khartum von Militär und 13. Den Hinweis auf diesen Aspekt verdanke ich Dr. Adam Azzain, Vortrag am 10.10.2004 in Khartum. ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 165

Polizei mit Razzien überzogen. Die sonst so rational agierende Regierung schlug um sich. Das Regime hinterlässt gegenwärtig den Eindruck, als wäre es ein Regime, das seinen politischen Herbst durchlebt. Doch was kommt danach? Trotz des Friedensschlusses steht der Sudan zunächst nicht vor einem Machtwechsel. Die splm wird lediglich an der Macht beteiligt und im Südsudan die dominante politische und militärische Kraft sein. In der Zentralregierung bleibt der National Congress mit einer großen parlamentarischen Mehrheit weiterhin tonangebend. Wie in der Analyse der Friedensprotokolle dargelegt, werden verschiedene Pakte zwischen Hauptakteuren geschlossen, die die Grundlage für die Partnerschaft splm /Regierung für die Interimperiode sind. Um mittelfristig ihre Macht abzusichern, sind jedoch beide Akteure auf neue Allianzen angewiesen, und es ist fraglich, ob der politische Pakt der Machtteilung lange halten wird. Mit einer komfortablen Parlamentsmehrheit im Rücken ist die Regierung nicht mehr wirklich auf die splm angewiesen und kann versuchen, in gewohnter Manier Oppositionsparteien und die splm gegeneinander auszuspielen. Deren Führung unter John Garang könnte versucht sein, sich als Juniorpartner an der Regierung für die anderen marginalisierten Regionen einzusetzen, um ihrerseits politisches Profil und Allianzpartner zu gewinnen. In der Konsequenz kann dies nur allzu leicht zu einer gegenseitigen Blockade zweier konkurrierender Regierungsparteien führen. Bringt der Frieden eine politische Öffnung mit sich? Der Sudan hat in den letzten Jahren eine vorsichtige politische Liberalisierung erlebt, die allerdings seit 2002 auf einem mäßigen Niveau stagniert. Pressezensur und willkürliche politisch motivierte Verhaftungen sind nach wie vor üblich. Der Staatssicherheitsapparat gilt als die eigentliche Macht im Staate. Im Vergleich zur Mitte der 1990er Jahre gibt es sehr viel mehr politische Freiheiten, aber eine weitergehende Demokratisierung bleibt unwahrscheinlich. Die beiden großen Oppositionsparteien, die umma und Democratic Unionist Party( dup ), sind schwach. Sie stellen keine überzeugende politische Alternative zur Regierung dar. Ihr Reservoir an fähigen Politikern ist sehr begrenzt und ihre Leistungen waren in der Vergangenheit enttäuschend. Ihre Machtbasis beruht in erster Linie auf der traditional-religiösen Legitimation ihrer Führer. Die Or166 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005

ganisationen politisch-progressiver Alternativen, ehemals die Gewerkschaften, Kooperativen und Berufsverbände, leiden an der Verarmung der Mittelklasse als Trägergruppe. Die Zivilgesellschaft kann die Schwäche des politischen Systems nicht ausgleichen. Zwar waren zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen die einzigen, die seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre demokratische Alternativen für den Sudan formuliert haben, doch agieren sie überwiegend in der Hauptstadt Khartum. Diese Nichtregierungsorganisationen sind ein Forum für die Entstehung demokratischer und säkularer Werte. Doch es fehlt ihnen an den notwendigen Fähigkeiten und an der notwendigen sozialen Verankerung, um kurzfristig die politische Entwicklung maßgeblich zu beeinflussen. Das herrschende Regime verhält sich gegenüber jeglicher gesellschaftlicher und politischer Mobilisierung argwöhnisch und hat das internationale Interesse an einer Stärkung der Zivilgesellschaft erkannt. Um die Zivilgesellschaft zu kontrollieren und zu beeinflussen, wurden sudanesische Nichtregierungsorganisationen strikten Regularien unterworfen. Darüber hinaus sind seit 2002 mehrere 100 regierungsnahe Nichtregierungsorganisationen gegründet worden. 14 Die Tendenz zu einer stärkeren zivilgesellschaftlichen Vernetzung wurde durch das Verbot oder die Nichtzulassung von ngo -Netzwerken gekontert. Seit 2004 gründet die Regierung zudem eigene ngo -Netzwerke, die mit den zivilgesellschaftlichen namensgleich sind. 15 Es handelt sich also nicht nur um Maßnahmen gegen eine freie Organisation der Zivilgesellschaft, sondern das Vorgehen muss im Rahmen einer Strategie der Staatssicherheit gesehen werden, die darauf abzielt, alle gesellschaftlichen Bereiche zu durchdringen. Die Elite der Staatssicherheit – als eigentliche Macht im Staate – hat nicht nur alle politischen und öffentlichen Institutionen durchsetzt, sondern seit geraumer Zeit Wirtschaftsunternehmen erworben. Die Verflechtung zwischen Regierung und Wirtschaft dehnt sich nunmehr auf die Zivilgesellschaft aus. 14. Sogenannte gongo s(Government orientated ngo s). 15. Beispielsweise das Civil Society Network for Peace oder das Female Genital Mutilation Network. ipg 2/2005 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt 167

Ein Friedensschluss als Anfang Der Sudan muss in den kommenden Jahren enorme Aufgaben bewältigen. Um den sudanesischen Staat zusammenzuhalten, braucht es künftig klare politische Visionen. Diese müssen nicht auf kulturellen oder nationalen Ideen beruhen, welche allzu leicht wieder Konflikte provozieren. Eine Alternative könnte eine partizipative und pluralistische – in einem weiten Sinn demokratische – politische Kultur sein, die es den vielen verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen erlaubt, sich gleichberechtigt im politischen System einzubringen. Die Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens von Naivasha wird politisch und technisch schwierig sein. Der vermutlich noch geraume Zeit anhaltende Darfurkrieg wird die Stabilität des Landes umso mehr bedrohen. Einerseits muss die politische Situation im Sudan also sehr nüchtern beurteilt werden. Aufgrund der großen kulturellen und politischen Differenzen wird der Friedensschluss in einem schwachen Staat bis auf weiteres kein Ende der Gewalt bedeuten. Andererseits muss dieser Friedensschluss als die einzige Chance auf eine friedliche Entwicklung begriffen werden, die der Sudan auf absehbare Zeit haben wird. Tatsächlich bietet das Friedensabkommen alle notwendigen Ansätze zu einer friedlichen und demokratischen Entwicklung des Landes. Die Staatengemeinschaft muss dieses Ziel jedoch nicht nur mit un und au -Truppen unterstützen. Sie muss auch mit kontinuierlichem, berechenbarem politischem Druck auf die friedliche und demokratische Entwicklung des Landes drängen. 168 Öhm, Der Sudan und der Darfur-Konflikt ipg 2/2005