KOMMENTARE/COMMENTS 10 Theses on the Future of Social Democracy in Europe POUL NYRUP RASMUSSEN I f you want to keep ideas afloat in an ocean of media cynicism you must first build a secure platform. Without somewhere stable that gives theory time to mature into practice, good ideas, ideas that challenge the conventional wisdom, are likely to sink to the bottom, or worse, become part of a press feeding-frenzy. This is particularly true of progressive ideas. It is no exaggeration to say that, these days, messages of solidarity, hope, or a collective solution to individual problems, have a hard time keeping their heads above water. Media outlets, particularly in their conglomerated,»synergized« form, have little time for such notions of togetherness. What sells is the idea of the individual. The lodestones are choice, freedom, and unfettered competition, or shock-horror stories, which are freakish statistically as well as in factual detail, and then become magnified as a general threat. Building the platform first is therefore essential. This also applies to the future of Social Democracy in Europe. Before we can begin to convince the millions of disillusioned or disenfranchised voters – and yes, they are in the millions – we need to create a viable platform that affords us the opportunity to put across the details of our message. Therefore, in this outline of 10 theses on the future of Social Democracy in Europe, I wish to concentrate first of all(points 1–4) on how we can best build the platform, and secondly(points 6–10), on how we can then showcase the social democratic policies that we believe point the way to a positive future. 1. Engagement In terms of its potential to represent and connect with people throughout Europe, no other political movement is as well positioned as the Party of European Socialists. The very history of social democracy and socialism is based on the concept of mass participation, increased transparency, and a fundamental belief in the principles of democracy. ipg 4/2010 Rasmussen, 10 Theses 13

And yet this position is not something that should ever be taken for granted. Currently, we are facing two major challenges to our status as the most representative political family. First, there is a deep-seated malaise among the people of Europe with regard to representative politics in general. This sense of disillusionment is something that affects the left more than the right. The more people become disinclined to vote or participate in politics, the less representative politics becomes. Socialists and social democrats cannot hope to make electoral inroads with a model which yields only 50 percent or less of the electorate vote. Recent elections that illustrated a major shift towards progressive politics showed a marked increase in the number of first-time and returning voters. Turnout is usually significantly higher than in preceding elections. Major examples include the 2008 us presidential election and the 1997 uk general election. Conversely, major right-wing shifts have occurred when voter turnout has drastically decreased. Recently, this was the case in Hungary(2010), the 2009 European elections in the uk and, most famously, the 2002 French presidential election. Secondly, the manner by which we reach our natural political constituency, never mind the wider electorate in European member states, is in a state of flux. Traditional methods of mobilization and, indeed, dissemination of information for political campaigns are undergoing a radical transformation. The most significant element in this change is the combination of new tools of communication, social networking in particular, and an increasingly segmented audience. While traditional »geographical« mobilization of communities remains paramount, new »identity-« based communities are now central in any political campaign. Such communities, based on an identity of cause or profile, open up the possibility for a multi-layered approach by political parties. However, the transfer to identity politics has also led to a shift in how political messages are communicated. It is no longer one-way. Rather, newly»information-rich« voters must feel that they are truly being engaged. This obviously means being heard at the beginning of the process; namely, when the policy is being drafted. This is why the pes is committed to making our 20,000 party activists an integral part of our European-wide movement. We have recognized that, in order to re-engage voters and introduce a sense of urgency to our European ideals, we need to have representatives in each local community. In the build-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections we 14 Rasmussen, 10 Theses ipg 4/2010

will make sure that our activists become a highly motivated, highly informed force to bring the campaign into people’s lives. Party members are vital for building a genuine European Party. We will provide more tools to enable them to get involved. As a consequence, we have decided to recognize their role in the pes statutes and create a » pes activists initiative« in order to build a true European activism, and be heard by pes bodies. In addition, the pes , as part of its Progressive Society consultation, will establish an online community to allow policy debates, campaign ideas, and general political concerns to be shared across the continent. 2. Leadership»Living Our Values« When looking at the disconnect between people and politics some blame so-called»professionalization.« They point to a new cadre of self-serving political operatives who are interested only in their career. Happily, this seems to be little more than a lazy stereotype. People are perfectly happy to note the professionalization of the legal sector, or indeed the medical sector: no one complains that doctors are»careerists« because they have dedicated themselves to their profession. People are happy that they have the required skills. The same should be true for professional politicians. The problem is not that politics has become more professional but rather that it is framed in largely negative terms. Media demands for pithy sound-bites and easy answers are endless. However, just because these demands are endless does not mean that they should be met. Political leaders should instill enthusiasm. Most importantly, this inspiration should come from the practical rather than the rhetorical. Social democratic leaders have a responsibility with regard to how they conduct their lives. Privacy should of course be protected, but when espousing values, one should be prepared to live them. Voters are expert at separating genuine commitment from empty words. What kind of message does it give if, having served as head of party, or even government, the departing leader swaps representative politics for a life of consultancies and company directorships. Is it illegal? No. But is it inspiring? Certainly not. This is why the pes has committed itself to a course of action that will produce a clear democratically elected candidate to front the European elections. Giving a face to a political platform is imperative in today’s ipg 4/2010 Rasmussen, 10 Theses 15

politics, especially in such difficult elections as the European ones. To make this election relevant, citizens must know that their vote can shape the executive and change policies. We have therefore made a commitment to choose a pes candidate for the European Commission presidency for the next European elections. This candidate will be expected to inspire party activists but also, most importantly, potential voters. 3. Defining the Political Center of Gravity In its most positive moments, Social Democracy has not only set the agenda, but also redefined public norms – public healthcare, state pensions, and reasonable working hours are just some examples. What start out as groundbreaking initiatives soon become accepted as the status quo. This is the result of political courage and the willingness to identify and define the standard. In recent years, however, there has been an overpreoccupation with the so-called»center ground.« Rather than positively define what is politically accepted, progressive parties have fallen prey to the temptation to second-guess what the mythical»floating or swing voters« want. Such reactive politics never ends well. It signals only that one lacks the courage of one’s convictions. It is this sense of conviction that the pes wishes to introduce to European politics. The political»center« is a constantly shifting concept and continually open to redefinition. Social Democrats must seize any available opportunity to conduct that definition. If we try to chase preconceived notions of»the center ground,« we will simply find ourselves on a conveyor belt moving ever rightwards. Europe’s right-wing has changed in a number of ways in the past decade. It has fragmented between traditional pro-European parties and eurosceptic and nationalist parties. They use Europe as a scapegoat and ignore the consequences of isolationist rhetoric. Many of these parties dress such negative polices up in social democratic language. Praise for women’s rights, the welfare state, and calls for financial market reform are made hollow by the absence of long-term policies to back up the rhetoric. At the same time, many right-wing parties use anti-immigration, antiminority, or xenophobic rhetoric to extend their electoral appeal further. This plays on people’s uncertainties and fears with inflammatory identity politics. 16 Rasmussen, 10 Theses ipg 4/2010

In our work with other democratic political parties we must be guided by our principles of equality, fairness, and respect for cultural, linguistic, ethnic or national minorities and apply the same standards at home and abroad. It is through this kind of conviction-based approach that we will establish a platform of credibility among voters. We must be prepared to speak out against injustice and intolerance where it exists and refuse to legitimize prejudice by remaining silent. We cannot let the political right define what is acceptable, particularly when they resort to tactics that play on vulnerable people’s fears. It is not enough for us to say that these fears are irrational. We must build a solid base of policies that illustrate how a diverse culture and identity can enrich the lives of all citizens. 4. Europe Could Be So Much Better – Coordination, Not Isolation One of the biggest»post-crisis« debates in the European Union centers on the level of economic governance. In simple terms, there seems to be a divide between those who see such governance in terms of supranational coordination and those who merely want to allow strong member states to be able to punish the weak. This debate on economic governance neatly encapsulates a wider European discussion – namely, whether we should have genuine coordination by the European Union as a single entity, or merely a managed series of steps by separate and disparate nation states. The Party of European Socialists wishes to see increased coordination between its member parties on European issues. We have to deepen the collective work undertaken with and between our member parties in government and in opposition, as well as within and between our member organizations and with all relevant stakeholders. The pes should not only be a platform for member parties and organizations to discuss European policies, but also the place where member parties come together to formulate the political vision, strategies, and policies for socialists, social democrats, and progressives across Europe. We will strengthen even further the cooperation between pes members with decision-making responsibilities in all eu institutions, notably with our governments, particularly when they hold the eu Presidency, with our Commissioners, and with our Members of the European Parliament and of the Committee of the Regions. ipg 4/2010 Rasmussen, 10 Theses 17

This kind of coordination will allow the pes not only to be seen as a genuinely European party, but will also help us to develop a detailed network of voices from the local level upwards. This will allow us to engage with and learn from activists as we prepare for the 2014 elections. It will also be crucial to reinvigorate our cooperation with stakeholders, such as our partners in the trade union movement and all spheres of civil society on a regular and coordinated basis. 5. Let’s Get Europe Working Again One of the most shocking aspects of the current crisis is how quickly blame for the financial crisis was transferred from the reality of bad banks and investment houses, to the myth of public sector overspends. The simple fact is that without public sector bail-outs the situation would have been immeasurably worse. How quickly those»market-first« advocates, who are now clamoring for drastic cuts in public spending, seem to have forgotten this. Instead, the public purse has been left holding not just the bill, but also the blame. The pressures now being brought to bear on public budgets and, by extension, on the European Social Model, are unprecedented. Unfortunately, those who have most to lose from these cuts are those whose voices are weakest. The disadvantaged and the socially excluded are left counting the cost of being unwilling creditors for the so-called titans of finance. This situation is unacceptable. It is for this reason that the Party of European Socialists is calling for a policy foundation that will reinforce the European Social Model. We need to ensure that ordinary people are not the long-term victims of financial sector profligacy and incompetence. In short, what Europe needs is a Social and Employment Progress Pact. As a first priority, new jobs must be identified as quickly as possible. Despite the crisis, millions of new jobs can be created in new sectors, such as green technologies or health care, if the European economy is restructured with the support of active economic, labor, and social policies. This requires that both public and private investment be redirected to labor-intensive sectors using European and national programs for job creation. At the same time, we have to re-skill our workers for the jobs of the future. Europe should never attempt to compete with emerging economies on the basis of low labor costs. It should, on the contrary, 18 Rasmussen, 10 Theses ipg 4/2010

base its competitiveness on high skills, effectiveness, productivity, and innovation in a knowledge-driven economy. To avoid mass unemployment, it is vital that governments implement fast and effective measures to maintain viable jobs. Employers should be discouraged from resorting to lay-offs. Active labor market policies must also be stepped up to swiftly reintegrate recently laid-off workers and the long-term unemployed into the labor market. 6. Gender Equality It should be clear that inequalities in the ways in which men and women are treated in society continue to have deeply negative consequences for the economy, social justice, and democracy. Women still earn, on average, 17.4 percent less than men for doing the same work. They are much more likely to be unemployed, discouraged from entering the labor market by the lack of decent jobs, or in lower-paid, low-quality, or part-time jobs. The financial and economic crisis and particularly the ill-thought out austerity measures are having a severe impact on women in the public sector, who account for 68 percent of employment there. The pes and member parties have shown that those European countries which have done most to increase women’s rights and opportunities are among the leading sustainable societies in Europe with the highest proportion of women in the workforce and the highest birth rates. Therefore, we believe that gender issues should be mainstreamed throughout all eu policies and instruments, including national and European economic recovery plans. It is urgent for the eu to adopt a European Women’s Rights Charter to improve women’s rights and opportunities and promote mechanisms to achieve gender equality in all aspects of social, economic, and political life. The pes recognizes, unlike our political opponents, that genuine advances in gender equality can be achieved only through a sensible combination of public policies. For example, improving paid and shared parental leave rights and pre-school child care and education would benefit labor market participation and economic performance, reduce poverty – thereby alleviating welfare burdens – as well as improve the life chances of children. ipg 4/2010 Rasmussen, 10 Theses 19

7. Green Growth We, as Europe’s socialists, social democrats and progressives, will continue to take the lead in the fight against global warming. We will act to further position our political family as the leading force for a progressive and ambitious climate policy on the European, as well as the international level. The pes believes that the minimum target should be a 30-percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and 80–95 percent by 2050, in addition to binding mid-term targets. Global, binding emissions reduction targets are needed for aviation, maritime traffic, and agriculture. Vulnerable developing countries should be supported to adapt to the consequences of climate change through capacity-building, transfer of knowledge and financing. The mechanisms and financing means must be established, including a global carbon trading system and an adequately resourced global climate fund for mitigation and adaptation across developing countries. Funding for climate change adaptation should be additional to development aid. Innovative financing instruments must be elaborated to meet the scale of investment needs. The fight against climate change – such as by radically stepping up energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy sources – will also serve Europe’s energy security by lowering our dependence on external energy sources. Investments in public infrastructure and the expansion of cross-border networks is a precondition for a successful new European energy and climate policy. We believe the eu and its Member States should consider the introduction of a specific Green Bond initiative at national level and possibly also at the European level. The pes supports the principle of environmental taxation that is socially just, bringing about necessary and profound changes in our living and transportation patterns. 8. European Social Democracy in a Globalized World Europe’s welfare states have been fundamental in protecting people from the harshest effects of the financial and economic crisis. But there are now far higher pressures – resulting from mass unemployment and an ageing population – in a context of tighter financial resources. The risk of permanent social divisions and inequalities has grown due to the 20 Rasmussen, 10 Theses ipg 4/2010

crisis. The conservative»austerity-only« response seems set to further exacerbate these divisions. Rather than accept this attempt to undermine the welfare state, the pes demands needs-based social welfare benefits for all those who are retired, unemployed, or unable to work in all European countries, to guarantee a life of dignity. We propose to include a social progress clause in every piece of European legislation, and to take into account social and environmental impact assessments when developing European legislation. We propose a European pact on wages, guaranteeing equal pay for equal work and setting out the need for decent minimum wages in all eu member states, agreed either by law or through collective bargaining and applying both to citizens and migrant workers. Employee participation at European and global level is a key issue for the future – a vital element of a more social Europe and a precondition for decent work. The eu should guarantee the primacy of labor law – including collective agreements and workers’ rights, such as equal pay for equal work – over against Single Market rules. The Europe-wide program»New Skills for New Jobs« should ensure a massive re-skilling for new jobs. Schemes should be implemented to enable employers to avoid job cuts, such as through the intelligent combination of working time with training programs. It is also essential that European business and competition rules must not conflict with our ability to deliver public services. Therefore, we believe a European legal framework for strong public services is essential, guaranteeing universal and equal access for citizens, quality, local autonomy and transparency in public services, irrespective of users’ language competences, maintaining their integrity as defined at national level, so that European competition and business rules do not run counter to citizens’ rights. 9. Fixing Finance As we are all painfully aware, one of the harshest economic crises in history hit the eu in September 2008. There can be no lasting recovery or new growth model without fundamental reform of the financial markets. The principal objectives of such reform should be to prevent future financial crises. Robust regulation and supervision must have two goals: to make financial markets serve the real economy and to ensure ipg 4/2010 Rasmussen, 10 Theses 21

financial stability. Banks have to get back to basics, serving people and businesses. The shadow banking system must operate according to the same principles and system of regulation. In response, the Party of European Socialists says it is not up to the citizens to pay for the reckless behavior of financial actors. We cannot accept that seven million citizens lose their jobs because of financial speculators. The ones that caused this crisis must be made responsible. It is for this reason that we are calling for a Financial Transaction Tax. 1 A tax of 0.05 percent applied to every speculative financial transaction in Europe would generate up to 200 billion euros each year, which could help to minimize the effects of the economic crisis and prevent future crises. Conservatives and Liberals have only just begun to speak the language of financial regulation in the past year. Their proposals are piecemeal; their commitment to fundamental reform is unconvincing. We must act decisively to overcome resistance to regulation. 10. Establish the Platform and Grow the Ideas The Social Democratic idea is alive and well in Europe. In many cases, it has become a victim of its own success, with the main elements – such as fairness, quality public services, equality and progressive taxation – all universally accepted. However, it is a constant battle to adapt these constant values within the framework of a constantly shifting society. The Social Democratic»ideas platform« will be built on: ̈ the engagement of our activists and, by extension, the electorate; ̈ leaders who are prepared to assert their values by living them; ̈ a renewed sense of political courage to define the political ground; and ̈ coordination of efforts across the continent to establish the pes as a truly European party. Social Democratic values and ideas are based, and will continue to be based, on quality job creation, adapting to environmental needs, genuine gender equality, respect for the welfare state, and a commitment to fundamental reform of the financial sector so that it benefits the real economy. 1. For more information, see http://www.pes.org/en/financial-transaction-tax/peseuropean-day-of-action. 22 Rasmussen, 10 Theses ipg 4/2010

Dawning of a New Era. On the Need to Construct Social Democracy in Europe ERHARD EPPLER The End of the Neoliberal Age When it came to pass that trust between the major banks was so low that they were unwilling to lend to one another – unless the state guaranteed that they would get their money back – the belief that markets are best left to regulate themselves was not simply refuted, it was rendered ridiculous. When the financial crisis caused the social product of many states to shrink more dramatically than in several previous years they had grown, the promise that one had only to give markets free rein in order that, eventually, inexorably rising prosperity would trickle down to the less well-off died with it. And when it became clear that the pressure exerted by free-marketeers for tax reductions on states which had had to rescue their banks and their economies by laying out almost inconceivable sums simply could not be taken seriously, it seemed that the era which, in the uk , had been ushered in by Margaret Thatcher and in Germany had begun with Otto Graf Lambsdorff’s letter to Helmut Schmidt, had truly ended. 1 An era came to an end in which the state – and thereby also politics – was deemed less and less capable, but the market more and more. Obviously the state was not entirely obsolete. Among other things, it was there to establish a framework for markets: a legal framework so that it was clear what is and is not permitted for competing firms; a social framework so that labor did not remain solely a cost factor, but the activity of people who have needs and – as guaranteed by the Constitution – dignity; and finally an environmental framework to ensure that one generation does not destroy the natural environment for the next generation and the one after that. 1. The letter of September 9, 1982, to German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in which economics minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff( fdp ) presented a plan for overcoming poor growth and to fight unemployment is generally regarded as the turning point which led to the break-up of the social-liberal coalition. ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 23

But who is to bring about the dawning of a new era? In Germany, since October 2009 we have been experiencing what happens – and indeed must happen – when the people running(or co-running) the country are precisely those whose dogmas led us into the crisis and who now believe that they can impose on highly indebted states as the result of force of circumstances what has clearly had its day as a promise: the weakening of the state without subduing the markets, especially the financial markets. Since the current government also includes a number of Christian Democrats whose understanding of the situation is more realistic than that of their colleagues no agreement can be reached on either»business as usual« or a new beginning, so that even those who voted for this coalition have no idea what this government really wants to do. If opinion polls are to be believed, the Social Democrats and the Greens together could now expect to win a majority of seats in the Bundestag, even without Die Linke. Not because the voters are turning towards social democracy in droves, but because the Greens are approaching the 20 percent mark. In any case, the crisis of European social democracy is not over just because Sarkozy, Merkel and Berlusconi no longer have a clue. When pollsters ask voters whether they are in favor of minimum wages or higher top rate taxes, in most European countries there is a clear majority in favor of the answers to be found in the social democratic program. But that is still not considered a good enough reason to vote for them, even though few people expect much from Conservatives and Liberals. Neoliberal Hegemony over Social Democracy In the meantime, most social democrats in Europe are in agreement on why this is so. Throughout Europe, although not to the same extent everywhere, the neoliberal wave which inundated the entire globe also took hold of social democratic parties, in particular when they were in power. Not as much as it did conservatives, and still less than many(economic) liberals, but it has left its mark. It is easy to reproach them for this today. But when in a media democracy virtually every economic editorial office and 90 percent of political editors are committed to a certain doctrine it is scarcely possible to govern consistently in the teeth of this – unless one is resigned to losing the next election and hopes to win the next but one. 24 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

By the first decade of the new century at the latest the free-marketeers had even managed to reshape the concept of reform in their own likeness. All of a sudden,»reform« no longer meant a step, however small, towards social equality. Now reform was whatever removed market impediments, unburdened»the economy,« and reduced government expenditure, especially on social security. Whereas at one time protection against dismissal for employees was an important reform, now so was its repeal, because hiring and firing is supposed to boost economic dynamism and growth. What is a government supposed to do which reads in virtually every newspaper that their country is bringing up the rear in Europe, that growth there is almost one percent lower than anywhere else and therefore unemployment is higher, and only because the government refuses to implement reforms which have been so beneficial elsewhere. This is how it was in economically the most capable country before Gerhard Schröder decided on Agenda 2010. No one has thought more deeply about the effects of the neoliberal hegemony over social democracy than former leader of the Dutch Labor Party Wouter Bos. In a talk given in Amsterdam on January 25, 2010, shortly before his retirement, he looked back at the Third Way, which he claimed had been invented in the Netherlands, before Tony Blair gave it a name:»We put it into practice without[putting a] label on it, the Third Way.« Bos said that it was not only fitting in which motivated the Dutch social democrats:»Instead of the welfare state making people dependent, the idea was developed of the activating welfare state«(Bos 2010). The activating welfare state which sought to prevent the children of welfare recipients – and their children – from having to continue to live on welfare was an idea which came from social democracy, as well as from earlier left-wing politicians, such as Jan Pronk. But they had not reckoned on having to tackle a different, unbridled form of capitalism:»The Third Way progressives went to bed while there was a reasonably controlled free market, but woke up with an unchained monster.« Bos is self-critical enough to add:»But was that really the case? Because who had unchained the monster?« None were able to hold their ground against this unchained monster:»Employees lost power vis-à-vis corporate governance. Governments lost power vis-à-vis multinational companies«(Bos 2010). Anyone unwilling to go along with this was told that it was all because of globalization, an inexorable process which nothing and nobody could slow down, let alone halt. According to Bos:»For too long the neoliberals ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 25

tried to make us believe that globalization is an anonymous and inevitable movement which happened to us and which you cannot escape«(Bos 2010). The outcome was what the free-marketeers had planned all along: »an ever increasing Anglo-Saxon economic system, an ever decreasing collective sector and increasingly[free] markets«(Bos 2010). What makes Bos’s speech so valuable for all social democrats is that it allows us to participate in his own learning process. This includes his conclusion:»I have been gradually convinced that it is sometimes easier and better to shield the public interest from the market than to attempt to tame the market in order to not damage the public interest«(Bos 2010). Bos does not forget that the success and failure of the neoliberals also has a moral side:»Human dignity is undermined by[the] incessant pressure of commercialization on the public atmosphere, the systematic appealing to our primary needs to want more, more and more and now, now and now and the ever-present strengthening of individual interests and emotions as the only thing bringing happiness. In the end, that disrupts society because it makes people indifferent vis-à-vis each other«(Bos 2010). Egoism is a natural inclination and should not be demonized. But what happens when it is systematically encouraged, celebrated, and held up as a model? Wouter Bos has been cited about this in detail because, as an active politician who has known government responsibility, he is able to explain how it happened that the neoliberal hegemony not only disheartened Europe’s social democrats and provoked them to opposition, but also fascinated them and led them to make concessions, the outcome of which today is that there is little demand for social democratic alternatives to free-market radicalism. Perhaps one might add – at least in the form of a question – as a pendant to the Dutch analysis how disastrous it was that the free-marketeers gave themselves out to be thoroughly progressive. Also that they adopted the notion of reform and turned it around, and that, by doing so, they touched a raw nerve in many social democrats who still wished to be progressive. And does not the question also arise of whether social democrats in the twenty-first century should, occasionally, energetically seek to preserve some things, even when their assailants profess to be progressives? One might mention solidarity-based health care systems or progressive income tax, which have proved their worth for more than a century. This gives rise to another question: is the concept of innovation of any use in the development of social democratic programs? In industry, technical innovation is essential: it will go on whether politics demands it 26 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

or not. But in politics itself? Is the new always superior to what is already in place? After all, this is the argument made – as an assertion, not a question – by the free-marketeers. Shouldn’t we instead once more establish clear criteria for what we mean by progress? Sigmar Gabriel, at the Dresden party conference, set out for what not only German social democrats call the»New Middle« what was urgently necessary:»The political center in Germany was never a fixed place, never a determinate group in society(…). The political center in a given country has always been won by those ready with the right questions and the right answers in the eyes of the majority of the population«(Gabriel 2009: 6). Fitting in with the prevailing trend does not lead to the center, but to the political scrapheap and obsolescence. Older social democrats know that there have been times in which social democratic demands spoke only to a minority. The majority wanted something else, and therefore cast their vote otherwise. It was annoying, but understandable. In Europe today, a majority are in favor of social democratic ideas and aims in many European countries – for two-thirds of Germans, democracy and social democracy are the same thing; a lack of social justice calls democracy into question – but a large proportion of this majority do not believe that the social democrats are capable of achieving their aims. Some even doubt whether they really want to; while others concede that much, but feel that they lack the necessary resolve. This seems to be part of the growing skepticism with regard to politics overall. In Germany, three out of four voters believe that things are unfair in their country. But half of this three-quarters no longer considers any party capable of changing anything. But where people no longer believe that politics can change anything, the parties of the left suffer more than most. What Is to Be Done? Conservatives have little inclination to change anything, being concerned rather that order is maintained and the economy keeps running. As a rule, they can just about manage that. But social justice? A fairer society? That would be nice, but it is too good to be true. When, on top of that, some social democrats announce, under the influence of freemarket hegemony, that distributive justice has passed its sell-by date, no wonder electoral ignominy ensues. ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 27

What is to be done? Cynics can simply rely on people’s forgetfulness: in three years’ time, the voters will have other memories and other concerns. Conscientious intellectuals can argue that what is needed is a new program. But the German social democrats had adopted the new»Hamburg Program« long before their election defeat on September 27, 2009, which contained not a trace of market-fundamental thinking – quite apart from the fact that it was nowhere to be found in the Berlin Program, which preceded it. Opinion-makers do not read party programs. What remains, therefore, is a path which anyone who prides himself on his political realism would dismiss as naïve. We could reappraise the past, face up to it, and admit our mistakes, but also explain how things turned out that way. We could try to restore our credibility in the eyes of those who no longer believe in us. Not by attempting merely to make excuses for what happened, but by showing what happens when an ideology, passing itself off as a science, attains total dominance in a mediadriven society. Such a reappraisal could take place at national level or at European level – or perhaps the one followed by the other. Foundations could provide a forum – in Germany, for example, the Friedrich-EbertStiftung or one of the church academies. The purpose of this should not be for a party to cleanse itself – that would only make things worse. But if it emerged from all this that there were achievements as well as mistakes, and that in any case those mistakes were not the work of sinister traitors but of fallible men and women with the best of intentions. If the outcome of a European reappraisal was a dozen joint theses on the past and the future, it could at the very least awaken, in particular among more thoughtful observers, new interest in an old, but still responsive, self-critical, and open-minded party. The Shield of Achilles At the peak of the neoliberal epoch a 900-page book was to be found in best-seller lists in both the usa and the uk with the unusual title»The Shield of Achilles«(Bobbitt 2002). The author was a smart historian, who was also an adviser to the us president: Philipp Bobbitt. The book contains – which is not immediately apparent from the title – a history of the state, especially over the past 500 years, looking at the relationship between weapons technology, military organization, and type of state. In other words, seemingly a purely academic work. 28 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

It became a political issue because Bobbitt also concluded from his investigations what the state would be like – indeed, what it would necessarily be like – in the twenty-first century: a market state. The three different forms of this market state distinguished by the author are not important here, especially because Bobbitt gives precedence to one of them, namely the entrepreneurial market state. The market state stands out from all previously known forms of the state because it is no longer responsible for people, but only for the functioning of markets. The citizens of this market state would have to rely on markets. The latter, in turn, must offer them opportunities, as many and as attractive as possible. Those who know how to make use of these opportunities need no more help, while for those who are not so competent or resourceful: tough. The state is not responsible for them. That may be feasible for goods markets and for many services, but Bobbitt extends the idea to encompass the labor market, the education market, and even the security market. The labor market must function in terms of»hire and fire,« and the state is responsible for the functioning of this market. What it is not responsible for, however, is those who lose out in it. On the education market, a poor education is available for a small amount of money, a more respectable one for more money, and an excellent education for a lot of money. Anyone without money is a nonperson, as far as the market is concerned. Astonishingly, Bobbitt puts in the hands of the market not only social security, but also security against crime. For anyone wanting to insure themselves for their old age, they know the telephone numbers of the insurance companies, and for anyone who doesn’t feel secure in their own home, they know what agencies are selling security. Bobbitt’s market state even relinquishes what has been the core of the state for centuries: the monopoly on force. Everything is for sale: some can afford it, but many cannot. Probably, Bobbitt’s market state would not have materialized anywhere on earth even if market fundamentalism had not turned out to be wrong. But Bobbitt has thought through to the end, what others have merely formulated as rules of thumb:»The less state, the freer the citizen« or»the market is always smarter than politics.« In the market state, the citizen becomes a customer. In the market the customer is king(or queen). As a citizen, however, they no longer have a say. Politics is not forbidden, but it no longer has an object. How is a parliament supposed to debate education policy when everyone can – and ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 29

must – decide what they wish to spend on education? No parliament or government any longer needs to worry about the police or domestic security: anything that has to be taken care of is dealt with between the customer and security agencies. To be sure, things haven’t gone that far yet anywhere, not even in the usa . But we are heading towards that end. When in our communities the department of works, local transport, and the water supply are privatized town councils are responsible for less and less decision-making. And citizens have been transformed into customers, willy nilly, no longer having the option of approaching their friendly neighborhood councilor. They are unable to change anything anymore, either. Even in Europe, police stations have been closed, while the security industry has boomed. But Bobbitt’s market state can help us to outline what kind of state is needed as an answer to market fundamentalism: the citizens’ state. Citizens establish the state, accept responsibility for it, support it, and it is there for them. The state has the duty – and naturally also the right – to ensure that nothing becomes a commodity, whose commodification is prohibited. Education is not a commodity which can be bought by one, but not by another, but a human right which the state has an obligation to provide. Security against crime is not a commodity, which some can afford, but many cannot, but an obligation of the state – the service it provides in return for its monopoly on force. The citizens’ state is responsible for the maintenance of humane and dignified living standards. In the citizens’ state, politics has primacy, namely the primacy of the will of its citizens. It is also a primacy vis-à-vis the laws of the market. That also means that, in case of doubt, the articles of the constitution take precedence over market outcomes. If, for example, in the German Basic Law the state is obliged to respect and protect human dignity, then wages which are insufficient to live on shall not be permissible as a violation of human dignity, regardless of whether the market offers only a pittance for many jobs. In a state in which citizens are the ultimate authority naturally they also have the right to pursue activities wherever they see fit: in the economy as entrepreneurs or employees, as customers, or as savers and investors, but also in all parts of civil society – in trade unions and associations, in clubs and parties, in churches, synagogues, and mosques. In the citizens’ state a vigorous civil society is not a rival to the state. It cannot replace it, but it can certainly encourage it, correct it, undertake social or pedagogical experiments, and even fill gaps which state action 30 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

must inevitably overlook. A democratic state and civil society need one another – in the best case, they strengthen one another. Where civil society wishes to assume its share of the responsibility calls for referendums become louder. Referendums bring civil society closer to those who are increasingly referred to disparagingly as the »political class.« The risks attendant on petitions and referendums can be mitigated by smart legislation. No one wishing to revive democracy in the twenty-first century can neglect referendums. Sustainable Growth Professor Meinhard Miegel has always been one of those political scientists who take care not to lose touch with practical politics. This was also ensured by his consistent relations over several decades with one of the best and most original minds of German Christian Democracy, Kurt Biedenkopf. Miegel now has his own institute and, at an age at which others are enjoying a well-deserved rest, he is causing a stir with his heretical ideas. They relate to a subject previously characterized by both consensus and taboo in almost equal measure: economic growth. Miegel expects, as others do, that the economies of emerging countries, such as China or Brazil, will continue to grow rapidly for some time, and hopefully those of some developing countries, too. As far as the industrialized countries of Western and Central Europe are concerned, a – historically anomalous – period of rapid growth is coming to an end. It will not happen overnight, of course, but the growth rates which have been leveling off for decades will continue to do so, at least on average. The instruments previously deployed – with varying degrees of success – to boost growth(tax cuts or credit-financed economic stimulus packages) are no longer an option in the face of record sovereign debt levels. What growth there is will have to be utilized to reduce debt, repair damage to the environment, and cope with catastrophes. It will no longer have much of a role in improving quality of life. Miegel is certainly not against growth. In some parts of the world it is necessary and inevitable. It is just that he considers European industrialized countries’ reliance on it as unrealistic. What he means is that anyone who makes growth a political goal, especially those who consider it the highest or, like Angela Merkel, the only aim, will fail. Naturally, this does not mean that governments should aim for zero growth. That ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 31

would be even more unreasonable than a growth target of three or four percent. If at year end the statisticians register growth of one or even two percent obviously that is better than a similar level of negative growth. Notwithstanding the beguiling slogans dreamed up by the various parties, growth or an»upswing« cannot be brought about by an election. They always depend more on the state of the global economy than on national governments. That will become increasingly clear, to the point at which no one believes such slogans any more. But what is the outcome of all this? Will we be reduced to pointless debates concerning whether growth is good or weak? Hopefully not. We are unlikely to be spared a debate on how growth can be stimulated, in defiance of the facts, but it will all be in vain. Social democrats may remember that – for example, in the spd ’s Berlin Program – before the market fundamentalist wave even fully started they had already claimed that it is less important how much growth there is than what is growing. In practice, we have made more progress than in theory. We do not want the use of fossil fuels to grow, but rather shrink. That means that anything which brings about such shrinkage should grow. When people talk about»green growth« in Europe today, it means: whatever puts the brakes on climate change should be allowed to grow, while whatever accelerates it should shrink. In short, what we need is not a quarrel between economists – or philosophers – about the blessings and the curses of economic growth, but rather a political debate about what should grow and what should not. To be sure, it will turn out that there is a wide range of goods and services which can simply be left to the market, and with regard to which governments need urge neither growth nor otherwise. What will be politically important is those areas in which public welfare requires either more rapid growth or more rapid contraction. Here too practice has already outstripped theory. When Frank-Walter Steinmeier, before the German general election in 2009, presented a detailed paper outlining what needed to be done over the coming four years he did not call for more economic growth, but rather described the areas in which growth had to be fostered. They included human services in addition to renewable energies and other investments, making Germany sustainable. Overall, it was an impressive list of items for selective growth. Whether the economy grows overall is decided by the markets. The market fundamentalists may therefore be said to have prevailed with their thesis that the freer and more deregulated markets are, the higher 32 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

the rate of growth. Tax reductions for companies accelerate growth: it is difficult to refute this argument. In a nutshell, if your aim is to achieve the highest possible plus in the gdp statistics, you have to put your trust in the markets and satisfy the demands of business leaders. The political consequences of this, generally speaking, do not favor social democratic ideas. The desire for wholesale growth was one of the levers used by market fundamentalists to undermine their opponents and this will continue. However, a society in which it is disputed what should grow and what not has to dare to engage more in politics. The question is, what is better for the»polis.« Anyone wishing to restore the primacy of politics needs to carry on the discussion on growth differently than hitherto. It can no longer be a matter of miniscule percentage gains or losses but of whether growth is urgently necessary, innocuous, or harmful. There is no lack of criteria: what accelerates or slows down climate change; what growth is sustainable and lasting? What kind of growth improves quality of life and what kind of growth jeopardizes it? Basic Values When European social democrats discuss their future they cannot avoid the fundamental values that have shaped social democratic politics for one and a half centuries. One might mention the paper by Jon Cruddas and Andrea Nahles(2009). The fact that European social democrats are bound together by basic values is important. The triad – often modified – of the French Revolution is what underlies it all. First and foremost, the same for everyone, comes freedom, with solidarity(»fraternité«) in third position. Some parties have retained equality(»egalité«), while others have replaced it with»justice«, making sure to explain in what instances justice requires equality and where it does not. The French Revolutionary triad of values is not only the basis of social democracy, however; it could also be argued that it forms the basis of European democracy as such. It is probably not only in Germany that these basic values also feature in the programs of Christian Democrats. And this is how it should be. They constitute the common foundation. Nevertheless, conservatives interpret these basic values differently from social democrats. They are poles apart particularly in respect of how these basic values are related to one another. For conservatives – and also for liberals – the relationship between freedom and justice(equality) ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 33

especially is one of unresolvable tension. Too much freedom endangers equality. In practice, the following is much more important: after a certain point, equality(social justice) inevitably involves a loss of freedom. Some sort of balance must therefore be achieved, and it is a constant object of contention in such parties whether such a balance has been achieved or not. Conservatives put the basic values on a seesaw: when one is up, the other must be down. Some sort of weight is therefore sought to get both sides of the seesaw to the same level. This balance is always unstable, however; in particular, because different wings of the party seek a balance in different places. Social democrats have always looked at this differently. In their experience, only equality in law and social equity – in other words, more »justice« or»fairness« – gave them the chance to make something of the freedom guaranteed in the Constitution. Social justice for social democrats means not less, but more freedom, in the sense of practicable, tangible freedom. Indeed, social democrats could even define justice as »equal freedom.« Not a seesaw, in other words, but two locomotives for one train. The same goes for solidarity. Where there is solidarity, people are freer, opening up new realms for free activity. Psychologists tell us that children brought up in a parental home characterized by unconditional solidarity are more comfortable and freer when they come into contact with other people or institutions. Solidarity fortifies freedom. The solidaristic society advocated by social democrats is a free society. In other words, solidarity is founded on the free decisions of free people. A majority of Europeans say they want a solidaristic society. For social democrats, therefore, the three basic values support and complement one another. Here, too, we are more in tune with the challenges of our age: given that the gap between rich and poor is widening and societies are becoming increasingly divided, even split, worries about too much social justice seem trivial. What applies to justice also goes for another value related to the triad: security. It is not true that security – whether in the sense of social security or security against crime – necessarily restricts freedom. One hundred years ago, left liberal Friedrich Naumann knew otherwise, asking his fellow party members what civil rights and liberties amounted to if one had no idea what one was going to live on in the coming month. Social security frees people – from fear and moral cowardice, but also to participate in society and in politics. 34 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

Not all social democrats would endorse the view that this also applies to domestic security. You don’t need to have experienced the dangers of a night-time stroll in a Latin American city to appreciate the invaluable freedom which the ability to walk in a public place at any time of the day or night represents. The unfairest and most unfree society is one in which security can only be purchased at a price which is beyond the resources of the majority. The state’s monopoly on force creates freedom and supports justice. It is therefore an accomplishment of civilization which social democrats, too, have to protect. Preaching about basic values is not the task of politicians. But even those with little interest in politics want to know what motives and moral values underlie everyday politics. Social democrats do best when they are able to base their practical action on their fundamental values, evaluating and presenting it as a small, even tiny step towards more freedom, more justice or more solidarity. Credibility emerges when politics is discernibly value-related. Social Cohesion In the twenty-first century, wars between states are rarer, but outbreaks of violence within them have become more frequent. Such outbreaks arise mainly when states disintegrate: many states are no longer capable of keeping their streets open for traffic, sending teachers into villages, or ensuring that legal proceedings are free of corruption. In most African states, policemen’s pay is so miserably low that, without corruption, they simply would not be able to feed their families. That often means that they have little enthusiasm for fighting crime. Traders whose markets are looted under the very noses of the police enlist their own militias which, in turn, hunt down anything they consider to be criminal. Consequently, the state’s monopoly on force disintegrates and violence is privatized and commercialized. The Fund for Peace publishes an annual Failed States Index. 2 However, it makes no distinction, as is usually done, between failing states (in other words, those in the process of disintegrating) and failed states (states which have already disintegrated and basically no longer exist). Instead, it distinguishes between»in danger« and»critical« states: for 2010, it 2. See http://www.fundforpeace.org. ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 35

classified 37 states – mostly in Africa and South Asia – as»critical.« Almost every Latin American state is classified as»in danger.« The split of society usually precedes the privatization and commercialization of violence. When millions eke out a living in slums,»barridas,« and»favelas,« while the well-to-do live hidden away in gated communities behind electrified fences, guarded by mercenaries, violence is privatized and both forms of violence rapidly converge in terms of their brutality. The victim count grows. More people have died in the drug war in Mexico than in the turmoil in Afghanistan, not including the 8,000 who disappear without trace every year in a country which neighbors the usa . What does this have to do with the future of social democracy? It shows that anyone permitting or even instigating social division is not just on the wrong track but on an extremely dangerous one. Those who find themselves in agreement with Margaret Thatcher’s throwaway remark»There is no such thing[as society]«(Thatcher 1987), 3 have no need to bother about social cohesion – until finally society splits in such a way that the privatization of violence is inevitable. If market fundamentalism had not failed economically, it would have destroyed itself in this manner within a couple of decades. Free markets simply cannot function without the order imposed by the state, including law which is prescribed and properly enforced. On the other hand, the foundering of market fundamentalism would also have brought down democracy and the rule of law. Now is the time, especially in Europe, to change course. The crises of recent years have made people all the more willing. A large majority now share the view that societies must be held together by means of social justice. This includes trade unions and churches, but also substantial segments of conservative parties and their supporters. If social democrats manage to convince the majority of voters that theirs are the best and most experienced hands with which to achieve social cohesion they will be confronted by an enormous challenge, but also a great opportunity. The solidaristic society, as it turns out, is not only right and proper, but also sorely needed. 3. Editor’s note: in fact, as the original context makes clear, she meant that there is no such thing as society in the sense of an entity distinct from the individuals, families and so on which constitute it. If anything, she was trying to make the point that people cannot simply opt out of their social responsibilities by positing a separate body which can do that for them. 36 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

Social Democracy and Europe In Europe, social democrats have celebrated their formative successes in individual nation-states. In these nation-states they have used the instruments of these nation-states for the benefit of these nation-states: as the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Baumann put it,»a state powerful enough to force economic interests to respect the political will of the nation and the ethical principles of the national community«(Baumann 2009). The fact that, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century social democrats are having a torrid time of it can partly be explained by another of Baumann’s insights:»But nation-states are no longer sovereign in any aspects of common life on their own territory« (ibid). Real power, according to Baumann, has left the nation-state for »global space.« Baumann concludes, resignedly:»It is no longer possible to construct a ›social state‹ that guarantees existential security to all its members within the framework of the nation-state.« Even those who find Baumann’s formulations too extreme have to admit that the nation-state has been downgraded by large multinationals and banks to the status of a mere»location,« which must compete with other locations for the investments of global capital. When, for example, a country’s tax policy is cited as the reason why a particular investment will not be made there, or even why existing investments may be withdrawn the nation-state comes under pressure. In the worst case, it becomes open to blackmail. In these circumstances, European voters have often demanded more of their social democratic politicians than they have been able to manage, try as they might. When a social democratic finance minister increased vat , while at the same time reducing corporate taxes, most voters found this unjust and even outrageous. If the finance minister had said to them, »I think it’s unfair, too, but my hands are tied since the last thing I want is for investment to stay away or even to be withdrawn, which would lead to a rise in unemployment,« the voters would be likely to reply:»Why did we vote for you, then?« Every politician fears such a question. All parties therefore have an aversion to admitting their powerlessness. But that only makes things worse, giving rise to legends of betrayal:»The finance minister has betrayed us.« The legend is then plastered all over banners and placards paraded through the streets by parties of the far left. The loss of sovereignty under debate here is not so much the result of eu impositions as of the globalization of markets, including the financial ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 37

markets. The obvious answer would appear to be a globalization of politics, including a globalization of social democracy. But at present that can be only a distant goal or an inspirational utopia. It is not a task for the foreseeable future. Europe – the European Union – remains. It is more than large and powerful enough to resist blackmail. Threats of relinquishing a market of 500 million people are simply not credible. The difficulty lies in Europe itself. The eu was designed not as a common state, but as a common market. The European Commission can deal with any obstacles which might arise to this common market and prohibit distortions of competition. And it does exactly that, sometimes overzealously. In the matter of its resumption of the tools which have slipped out of the hands of nation-states, the eu has so far proved ineffectual. The Council of 27 national governments is responsible for taxation. Only if all 27 want it does a submission get onto the agenda. In other words, nothing happens, even though the imposition of common upper and lower limits on corporate taxes alone would be enough to end the ruinous race to the bottom for the lowest corporate taxes, which has done more to push up sovereign debt than arguable social expenditures. No wonder that there are social democrats in Europe who are at odds with the European Union and put their faith in the remnants of national competences. To be sure, we should make full use of such remnants. But there is no future in it. One advantage of the fact that the nation-state is no longer what it was is that a war between Europeans is unimaginable. On the other hand, national interests are being pursued ever more eagerly within the European Union. That only weakens the eu , in particular when the strongest economy is one of the worst offenders. However, most people recoil with horror at the prospect of the break up of the eu . All that would be left would be more or less helpless nation-states in a world of giants. Anyone who is serious about politics, social democratic politics, must put their faith in Europe, although it is a European Union whose Commission has been more infected with market fundamentalism than most national governments. It is likely to be the work of a whole generation to establish in the eu the political levers which nation-states have lost and to make the Union a global actor, capable of pushing through global regulation. Hitherto, however, most social democrats in Europe have 38 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era ipg 4/2010

not considered this to be their task. Social democratic supporters are least likely to turn out to vote in European elections, the consequences of which are evident in the European Parliament. If Social Democracy in Europe wishes to secure a healthy future it must become more European and present itself as a European party. That should be easier in the wake of the collapse of market fundamentalism. We can begin again to establish common ground. Social Democrats will readily agree that we need a»social Europe.« But this requires first a political Europe – a Europe with the tools and competences need to build a social Europe. Jan Niklas Engels and Gero Maass have expressed this as follows:»Social democracy needs more Europe, but Europe, in turn, needs more social democracy«(Engels/ Maass 2009). In order to ensure that Europe gets more social democracy, let us build a viable European Social Democracy. Bibliography Bauman, Zygmunt(2009):»Reconnecting Power and Politics,« available at: http:// www.social-europe.eu/2009/11/reconnecting-power-and-politics(accessed on 11.8.2010). Bobbitt, Philip(2002): The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History . New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Bos, Wouter(2010):»Beyond the Third Way,« available at: http://www.pvda.nl/ binaries/content/assets/europanetwerk/engelse+site/Wouter+Bos+Beyond+the+ Third+Way.pdf/Wouter+Bos+Beyond+the+Third+Way.pdf(accessed on 11.8.2010). Cruddas, Jon, and Andrea Nahles(2009): Building the Good Society. The Project of the Democratic Left. London: Compass. Available at: http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ journals/soundings/social_europe/building%20good%20society.pdf. Engels, Jan Niklas, and Gero Maass(2009):»The Good Society Needs Good Social Democrats,« in Good Society Debate. Available at: http://www.social-europe.eu/ author/jan-niklas-engels-and-gero-maass/(accessed on 12.8.2010). Gabriel, Sigmar(2009): Speech of the Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party Sigmar Gabriel at the spd party conference in Dresden on November 14, 2009. Available at: http://www.spd.de/de/pdf/091113_rede_gabriel_bpt09.pdf (accessed on 11. 8.2010). Thatcher, Margaret(1987): Interview for Woman’s Own (»no such thing as society«). Available at: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689(accessed on 11.8.2010). ipg 4/2010 Eppler, Dawning of a New Era 39

ARTIKEL /ARTICLES The New Promise of Happiness Current State of the Discussion on the Future of European Social Democracy JAN NIKLAS ENGELS/ GERO MAASS A t the beginning of the new millennium, social democrats were in power in three-quarters of the 15 eu member states. Under the aegis of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty many fondly imagined that the eu was living through a social democratic age. But things have changed: in the meantime, Europe’s social democratic and socialist parties have come under intense pressure and are now mainly in opposition. 1 Given the failure of financial capitalism and the ensuing crisis of confidence many had hoped for a shift of Europe’s political coordinates towards the left. This has not happened. Instead, the transformation of the European party landscape may be characterized much more by – in some instances dramatic – losses of confidence in parties of the center, together with a boost for populist parties on the far right and left of the political spectrum. Large segments of the public feel that their socio-economic, cultural, and political life-worlds are in jeopardy. At the same time, social democratic parties are often no longer perceived as guarantors of social justice and protectors of the vulnerable, but, quite the contrary, as co-responsible for, or at least ineffectual in their efforts to combat, the global financial and economic crisis. Furthermore, other actors are looking to move in on social democratic policies which traditionally were the province of social democratic parties. European social democracy is faced by a number of challenges. It must carefully analyze its policies of recent years; clearly identify its successes and failures; open itself up in terms of both party programs and organization; and develop a future-oriented political alternative to neoliberalism,»soft« conservatism, and backward-looking populism. After falls from power in traditional strongholds, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and the uk , and the associated end of the 1. On this see the graphs on government participation 2000 and 2010, as well as the current figures on the fes ’s Social Democracy Monitor webpage; available at: http://www.fes.de/ipa/inhalt/monitor.php. 40 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Third Way, social democratic parties at present have neither universally accepted leaderships nor a new paradigm, and so they lack a clear policy orientation. Academics, foundations with close political ties, think tanks and, naturally, the parties themselves are in anxious pursuit of these things. The present contribution must therefore be understood as an attempt at an interim report on the debate. Step One:»Position Statement« – Search for Explanations and Self-Criticism The first step – the analysis of the current crisis of social democracy – is already under way among a whole host of social democratic actors. The general downward trend makes it clear that, besides individual country-specific reasons, transnational social and political changes play an important role. The various explanations can be expressed in terms of seven theses, which are to some extent related: 1. Dahrendorf thesis: With the end of the industrial age, social democracy has fulfilled its mission and so has become superfluous. The electoral base of the(oppressed) industrial working class no longer exists. The political promise of social advancement has either been realized or is no longer considered realistic(Dahrendorf 1983). 2. Narrowing thesis: The room for political positioning in the party spectrum has become narrower for social democratic parties, whether because conservative parties have become»soft« and now occupy the political center, or because populist parties attract the votes of dissatisfied population segments. In countries in which both tendencies manifest themselves, social democratic parties are»sandwiched.« 3. Discursive hegemony thesis: Social democratic parties have lost discursive hegemony concerning the most important social topics. The dominant influence at present is a kind of conservative-liberal mainstream. Progressive left-wing approaches, however, in most cases no longer enjoy majority support. 4. Lack of credibility/ performance record thesis: Social democratic parties are no longer perceived as guarantors of social justice. Other parties are now competing with them for this role. Reforms implemented by social democratic parties in recent years are regarded as socially unjust and no longer in line with social democratic core values. The performance record of social democratic governments is evaluated ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 41

negatively by the voters. As a result, although there continues to be considerable support for social democratic ideals social democratic parties are losing votes or being voted out of power. 5. Alienation thesis: Social democratic parties have become alienated from their original base in the working class. Exclusive ties to the trade unions or social movements no longer exist or have been severed in recent years. What social democratic parties are offering no longer corresponds to the ideas and problems of the working class, which is increasingly pessimistic about opportunities for advancement. 6. Splitting of the electoral base thesis: The former electoral base of social democrats has split into advocates and opponents of globalization. Voters who are among the losers in a globalized world, not to mention a European knowledge society, or who feel their social status under threat due to globalization no longer feel themselves sufficiently represented or protected by social democracy. But even globalization supporters consider themselves to be better represented by other parties, such as those which represent the interests of well-educated elites. The core electorate of social democratic parties is increasingly shrinking. The incessant individualization of European societies favors the formation or consolidation of small niche parties. 7. Value transformation thesis: In recent years socio-cultural issues have increased in importance in the public perception. This reflects both societal transformation processes in the wake of the»hedonistic revolution« of the post-68 era and the consequences of immigration, which is bringing about increasing cultural, social, and religious heterogeneity in(western) European societies. The»cosmopolitan« and multicultural ideas espoused by the left-wing nomenklatura have come into conflict with»communitarian« yearnings among part of the core social democratic electorate(Hillebrand 2009). For the latter, these changes are turning their world upside down, which finds expression in deracination and a loss of identity. As a consequence, former social democratic voters, in particular from among ordinary members of the working class, are deserting the party, either for populist movements or by simple abstention. In order to examine these theses and also as a contribution to the analysis of the crisis situation the International Policy Analysis unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung( fes ) commissioned a series of studies on social democratic or progressive parties in Europe, but also other countries, 42 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

such as the usa and Canada. 2 Some of these analyses are presented in this issue of»International Politics and Society.« On the one hand, these analyses briefly offer a good overview of the current situation of social democratic parties, and on the other hand, they identify the reasons given at national level for election defeats – or in some cases election victories – and lay out future prospects. Step Two: In Search of a New Social Democratic Narrative The very variety of the answers put forward concerning the decline – or rather, temporary downward turn – of Social Democracy(Weßels 2010) increases the difficulty of finding a new social democratic narrative. Notwithstanding this variety, social democratic policies and ideological party debates over the past decade have been strongly influenced by the predominantly British Third Way discourse of so-called»New Labour.« Around the turn of the millennium a progressive dialogue emerged, in whose direction, organization, and agenda-setting the London-based Policy Network played a decisive role. 3 These modernization efforts met with a positive response in particular from the Dutch PvdA, Italian Center-Left party movements, the Hungarian mszp under Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, and Germany’s spd under Chancellor Schröder. Resistance was not entirely lacking: many felt that things had gone too far with regard to non-ideological pragmatism in government and the constant mantra of»force of circumstances« – real or alleged – when social democratic parties were in power. Membership figures declined continuously and lost elections testified to the electorate’s alienation. With the 2005 German parliamentary elections 2. The background to the structure of the studies, the selection of authors, and the results are discussed in the editorial in this issue of ipg (4/2010). 3. The debates of recent years can be followed on its website – www.policy-network. net – especially the efforts to establish an annual Progressive Governance Conference, which initially, under President Clinton, also included the us Democrats. (Policy Network 2010). Although he has often complained of being misunderstood Anthony Giddens, with his book The Third Way. Renewal of Social Democracy, has done a good deal more than give the movement its name(Giddens 1998). Roger Liddle and Peter Mandelson, in their The Blair Revolution (1996), cast its basic ideas into a political program for New Labour(Liddle/ Mandelson 1996). ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 43

the Red-Green reform project had to be abandoned; 4 and after the uk general election in May 2010 the Labour Party went into opposition (Krönig 2010). 5 »We were too infatuated with the market,« according to Lord Liddle, one of the senior figures in the Policy Network. The repercussions of the global financial and economic crisis, after a series of lost elections, have finally buried the Third Way. The quest for a new paradigm goes on. The search teams are primarily from academia, party affiliated foundations, and think tanks, as well as from the parties themselves. For example, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies, after the disastrous – for European social democracy – European elections of June 2009, launched, together with the Karl Renner Institute, the panEuropean project»Next Left.« In a series of working papers and workshops the future of social democracy is debated in the areas of: values (solidarity, democracy, equality, and freedom), socio-economic models and the role of the state, and organizational challenges(partnerships, communication, education and training, and so on). Taking as point of departure the position paper»Building the Good Society« by Jon Cruddas( uk ) and Andrea Nahles(Germany)(2010), the journals»Social Europe« and»Soundings,«»Compass,« and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s London bureau organized an online debate 6 on the future of social democracy in Europe. The various contributions can be classified under the following headings:»European and Global Vision,«»Inequality,«»Sustainability,«»Reform of Capitalism,«»Role of the State,« and»Democracy and Party Organization.« 7 Ernst Hillebrand of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, in his paper»Eine Gesellschaft selbstbestimmter Bürger: Konturen eines sozialdemokratischen Projekts für das 21. Jahrhundert«[A Society of Sovereign Citizens: 4. A retrospective view of the Red-Green coalition in the perspective of the Third Way is provided by the conference report of the Progressive Zentrum:»Beyond the Third Way – Was heißt heute Progressive Politik?«(Progressives Zentrum 2010). 5. On this, see the results of the Bruno Kreisky Forum, Vienna, of June 7, 2010 (Kreisky Forum 2010). 6. SeeSocialEurope’sGoodSocietyDebateat:http://www.social-europe.eu/category/ good-society-debate. 7. A summary of the 90 or so contributions can be found in Henning Meyer/KarlHeinz Spiegel(2010): What Next for European Social Democracy? The Good Society Debate and Beyond . 44 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Contours of a Social Democratic Project for the Twenty-first Century] (2009), takes a critical look at the renewal of the objectives of European social democracy. He refers to gaps and anachronisms with regard to such issues as(i) the distribution of society’s wealth and the aims of welfare state intervention,(ii) the societal bases for a politics based on solidarity, (iii) the future role of the state,(iv) the social democratic conception of humanity and society, and(v) the future of democratic participation. He calls, as an alternative to neoliberalism’s economistic view of humanity and consumerism’s promise of happiness, for a specifically social democratic vision of a good society of sovereign citizens. The so-called Amsterdam Process, initiated by Policy Network and the Wiardi Beckmann Stichting, is focused on five thematic areas:(i) the idea of social democracy in the twenty-first century;(ii) demographic change;(iii) electorates and coalitions;(iv) political economy and reform of the welfare state; and(v) European integration. Besides these, there is a plethora of other approaches and projects, for example, the newly established Observatoire de la Démocratie der Fondation Jean Jaurès 8 in Paris and the various activities of the Fundacíon ideas 9 in Spain. The fes focuses its multifarious activities in its International Social Democracy Monitor, 10 within the framework of which it provides election analyses, research on European political parties, best practice comparisons of Social Democratic policies, and contributions to the debate on the future of Social Democracy. Countering Threefold Uncertainty The various debates in academia and politics, and among social democrats can be concentrated in three basic areas, in terms of what needs to be done in response to the voters’ uncertainty in their socio-economic, cultural, and political life-worlds. This is grounded in the social changes experienced by the European population in recent years. Broad population groups feel under threat in their social, cultural, and political milieus. The origins of this threefold uncertainty lie in the fundamental new challenges and development 8. On this, see: http://www.jean-jaures.org/Manifestations/Les-rencontres/Lesnouvelles-promesses-de-la-social-democratie-europeenne. 9. See: http://www.fundacionideas.es/en/home. 10. See: http://www.fes.de/ipa/inhalt/monitor.php. ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 45

tendencies which, for example, the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisers( bepa ), in its consultation paper»Social Reality in Europe« 11 has identified as follows: ̈ globalization; ̈ the ascent of China and India in the global economy; ̈ demographic change; ̈ the ongoing transition to a knowledge and service society; ̈ the looming costs of climate change; ̈ the individualization of values; ̈ the increasing ethnic and cultural variety of European societies. Social uncertainty: wide sectors of the population are anxious about losing social status(»fear of falling«). The financial and economic crisis also has repercussions for the concerns of Europeans. Across Europe, worries about increasing unemployment(54 percent of those asked) rank higher than fears about the loss of economic stability. 12 Europe is one of the richest regions in the world, but 17 percent of Europeans(79 million) live below the poverty line. In many eu countries, poverty has even increased in the past decade. 13 The societal chasm separating globalization’s winners from its losers is growing. Opportunities and hazards in European societies are becoming less and less evenly distributed: some social groups are able to maximize their potential opportunities and minimize their risk factors, while others are generally deprived of opportunity and also have to bear more and more risk. Cultural uncertainty: alongside people’s worries about their jobs and the economic situation, crime and immigration are also among the 10 problems Europeans find most important. In Denmark,»crime« takes first place, while in Malta worries about immigration take top spot (European Commission 2010a). Increasing ethnic diversity is regarded by broad segments of the population as a threat to social homogeneity. Convincing social democratic solutions which demonstrate how social integration and identification can be achieved in migration-magnet 11. The paper in question served as the basis for a European Commission consultation process with the aim of providing information on social reality and tendencies in European society(European Commission 2010c). 12. On this, see the study»Challenges of Europe,« 2009, conducted annually by GfK Nürnberg e. V.(GfK 2009). 13. See Euronet(2010): http://www.euranet.eu/ger/Archiv/Actualites/German/2010/ January/Der-endlose-Kampf-gegen-Armut; as well as Hans-Böckler Stiftung (2010): http://www.boeckler-boxen.de/2361.htm. 46 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Europe have so far not made much impact on the electorate. On the issues of crime and domestic security, too, many people feel that law and order is in safer hands with conservative parties. Political uncertainty: there has also been a major loss of confidence with regard to democratic institutions, although this is often rather an expression of frustration with the prevailing style of politics(European Commission 2010b). Around one-quarter of people in Germany consider themselves unfairly treated and as having somehow lost out. More than half tend to be skeptical about political reform. Around 40 percent believe that our democracy does not work as it should and, above all, are dissatisfied with how politics is currently conducted(Friedrich-EbertStiftung 2009). The election results in 2009 reflect these tendencies, since throughout Europe turnouts fell sharply, including in Germany. As the reasons for their failure to vote, non-voters cite democratic deficits, a general distrust of political institutions, and insufficient information (Hegewald/ Schmitt 2009, Infratest dimap 2009): 56 percent of Germans and 61 percent of Europeans feel that the state treats them like children(European Commission 2010a). If social democracy is to have any hope of re-establishing itself as a leading and transformative force in Europe it must come up with new and convincing solutions to the social, cultural, and political uncertainty by which European citizens feel so threatened. The following issues and topics play a key role in this. 1. How can we come up with a new socio-economic paradigm which stands for new, social, and also sustainable growth? How can this be properly gauged and specified? In September 2009, a prominent international commission under the leadership of two Nobel prize winners in economics – Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, who can definitely be described as»social democratic« economists – presented a report on the measurement of economic performance and social progress. Its verdict on the classical view of growth as an indicator of affluence is devastating. Affluence involves more than a society’s gdp . Much of what a society accomplishes and what is important to it is simply not reflected in gdp or the classic growth perspective. British academics Wilkinson and Pickett are to be praised for bringing the value of equality and issues of distribution back onto the political agenda with their book»The Spirit Level.« 14 Related to this is the question of reorganizing the relationship 14. See the review by Liana Fix and Gero Maass, as well as L. Fix(2010). ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 47

between market and state, in particular against the background of the need for regulation in the financial and banking sector. What possibilities are open to nation-states’ domestic economic policy in seeking to exert some sort of control, when economic relations and dependencies stretch far beyond the nation-state? The aim of economic policy should be to deploy resources where they are most beneficial for society. The credo of Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair, according to which there is no such thing as left-wing or right-wing economic policies, but only right or wrong ones, does not hold: every economic policy decision has consequences for society and must be subject to political discussion. What benefits society most includes investments in future-oriented factors, such as education and innovation. Also important are investments in social cohesion and the foundations of society: Tony Judt(2010), with his demand for a renaissance of the welfare state as a core social democratic concern, has recast the social democratic debate on the future of the welfare state under the aegis of a twenty-first century fraught with uncertainty. What at first glance appears to be a retrogressive plea turns out to be a clever historically well-founded argument to the effect that reforms do not always have to take the form of a search for new and radical ideas, but can also involve a return to – mainly hard-won – achievements. 15 Just like democracy, social cohesion and its institutional safeguarding via welfare state structures is not a one-way street, but has to be justified and defended ever anew. This brings us to the question of cultural uncertainty. 2. The safeguarding of social cohesion remains social democracy’s core political identity, brought to bear by a policy of social justice in tandem with economic innovation. Now, however, a»gradual erosion of solidarity« which»over the long term[undermines] the acceptance of left-wing policies«(Hillebrand 2009: 5) can be discerned. The question is, therefore, how the solidarity of society as a whole can be restored and revivified. Does social democracy need a new understanding of solidarity in the context of increasing heterogeneity? Many have come to doubt that political notions of solidarity can still command majority support and regard the European version of the welfare state as in serious jeopardy. But the examples of, say, Sweden and Norway show that people are willing to accept higher taxes and social contributions for social security systems if they thereby»benefit from high quality welfare services and, 15. On this, see the review by Tobias Dürr in ipg 4/2010. 48 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

at the same time, discernible limits are imposed on abuse«(Hillebrand 2009: 6). An increasing number of political analysts refer to the key significance of policy on migration and integration. 16 Rising immigration, 17 coupled with a lack of social integration has resulted in social tensions, as well as fears of swamping on the part of the established population. Social democratic parties have been either clueless or unwilling to come up with answers to this challenge. In some European countries, this issue has served as the gateway to success for populist parties. The task, therefore, is to»develop a policy response that is both politically responsible and faithful to the humanist values of Social Democracy and also focuses on both integration and control«(Pfaller 2009). Embracing this challenge will become increasingly important since immigration will play a key role in the future, and even – as the next paragraph shows – must do so. Less of a focus in the debate, but of key significance for the future development of the labor market, social security systems, and the economy is demographic change and the related question of generational justice . European societies are aging societies. The European Commission, in its last Demography Report, 18 postulates a birth rate of 1.5 children per woman(total period fertility indicator). For reproduction of the European population at its current level, a rate of 2.1 children per woman is necessary. At the same time, life expectancy – happily – continues to rise. 19 The Berlin Institute for Population and Development 20 points out that, given the current demographic structure, population aging in Europe will continue for another 30 to 40 years. Without migration, further growth in the European population is improbable. The approaching 16. For example, see Frans Becker and René Cuperus in this issue of ipg . But see also Hillebrand(2009) and Pfaller(2009). 17. In the European Union, according to the European Commission, over the past 20 years a net annual increase of around 500,000 immigrants has been recorded. These figures have tripled to between 1.6 and 2 million a year since 2002. Threequarters of net immigration in the eu is concentrated in Spain, Italy, and the uk (European Commission 2008). 18. Ibid. 19. According to the Demography Report, women in the eu 27 can count on a life expectancy of 81.5 years, men on only 75.2 years. Furthermore, there is a considerable East–West difference with regard to men: in Central and Eastern Europe, the average for men is between 65 and 70 years, while in the eu 15 countries the average is over 76 years(Commission of European Communities 2008). 20. Berlin Institute for Population and Development: http://www.berlin-institut.org. ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 49

contraction will exert enormous effects on every area of the economy and people’s lives. In this context, the issue of generational justice will come increasingly to the fore. Already, opinion polls indicate distribution conflicts between demographic groups. According to a study by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Development the older one is, the stronger one’s wish that the pension system place more of the burden on the younger generation and that there should be a shift of emphasis away from family-friendly policies. But even those without children, in contrast to parents, would like to see less support for families(Wilkoszewski 2009). Here too the question arises for social democracy, what a socially just response to the challenge of demographic change might look like. How can the welfare state be adapted to demography without giving a further impulse to the abovementioned erosion of solidarity? 3. The erosion of democracy 21 has become a commonplace of political debate. Prompted by the research undertaken by the Polis/ Sinus Institute for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, according to which one in three Germans no longer believe that democracy can solve society’s problems (Embacher 2009), more and more investigations and surveys are pointing to a crisis for democracy. In 1979, the turnout for the European elections was 61.99 percent. Since then, however, there has been a continuous decline. In 1999, for the first time fewer than half of all eligible voters participated in the elections. In the European elections in 2009 the previous low of 43 percent was attained once again(European Parliament 2010). In the democratic region of the world, 22 trust in democracy as a mode of opinion-forming and decision-making, as well as a general belief in the ability of politics to assert the public good continues to dwindle. Colin Crouch(2008) has coined the term»post-democracy« to describe this situation of»boredom, frustration and disillusion.« While he sees the cause of the decline of democracy in»the major imbalance now developing between the role of corporate interests and those of virtually all other groups,« others point to globalization or the failure of the state to provide the resources required to redeem the promise of the welfare state. 21. This is the title of Vorgänge, No. 190(June 2010). 22. There are nine European countries in the top ten of the Democracy Ranking 2009 compiled by the Austrian Democracy Ranking Association(Campbell et al. 2010). Further remarks on measuring the quality of democracy can be found in, among others, Marc Bühlmann et al.(Bühlmann et al. 2008). 50 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

It is the task of a social democratic politics to resist this trend and to fight for the inclusion of all social groups in political decision-making. This must begin in social democracy’s own party structures and extend beyond expandable contacts with civil society groups and new social movements to encompass strengthening elements of direct democracy, within the framework of which even unconventional approaches, such as participatory budgeting by citizens or additional votes for families with children, as proposed, for example, in the green paper on the future of democracy in Europe(Schmitter/ Trechsel 2005), should be tried. Ultimately, politics must once more be made conceivable and tangible as a means for the positive transformation of social life. Werner A. Perger, with reference to the last presidential election in the usa , talks of a» populism of enlightenment .« This involves a»permanent populist dual strategy consisting of enlightenment and implementation[of a political program]«(Perger 2008). It is an open question whether President Obama has achieved this since his election. Perhaps it is worth casting a glance further south, towards Latin America, where various left-wing and progressive movements appear to have brought about the repoliticization of societal discourse. 23 Social Democratic Policies Make You Happy Ideally, the answers expected of social democracy to the perceived threat of social, cultural, and political uncertainty should be key elements of a new social democratic narrative. Social and economic security, societal recognition and cohesion, as well as democratic participation are not ends in themselves. It is rather the task of politics, society, and the economy to contribute to people’s wellbeing, self-realization, and happiness. But instead of attending only to individual advancement, the»we-feeling« should also be taken into account. Tony Judt 24 rightly called for the rediscovery of the»ethical view of what constitutes a good society and what are legitimate means of pursuing this and what not.« The Deutsche Bank’s think tank dbresearch, in a 2007 study, identified a high degree of trust in one’s fellows, a low level of corruption, 23. On this, see the contribution by Agustín Canzani in this issue of ipg . 24. Conversation with Tony Judt:»Eine neu zum Leben erweckte Sozialdemokratie,« in: Neue Gesellschaft / Frankfurter Hefte, No. 6/2010: 60. ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 51

low unemployment, a high educational level, and high income as the key indicators characterizing»the happy variety of capitalism.« 25 Not entirely without ideological bias, they also defined a few auxiliary categories, such as a high level of employment among older workers, a small shadow economy, high economic freedom, weak restrictions on hiring and firing, and a high birth rate. The international comparative study by Wilkinson and Pickett(2009) sought to verify statistically that states with more equality also have healthier, more contented, and happier societies. The aim of social democratic politics could therefore be described as the maximization of happiness. 26 With reference to other studies, 27 the following social happiness factors can be identified: 1. Basic political and social order, in terms of stability, the rule of law, sustainability, and social justice. 2. Rising incomes(above a certain level, however, this effect tails off significantly). 3. A higher level of equality. 4. Health. 5. Employment(in other words, work rather than social benefits). 6. The quality of democracy. Step Three:»Ability to Act Effectively and to Secure Majority Support« – Successful Management of the Variety of Tasks The last and certainly the most difficult step is the translation of the lessons learned into a concrete political platform with the aim of regaining majority support in society for social democratic policies. Decisive for political success in this respect is a party’s overall positioning. Besides 25. Among the happy countries in this respect are: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the usa , Australia, Switzerland, the uk , Canada, the Netherlands and, to a lesser degree, Finland and New Zealand(Deutsche Bank Research 2007). 26. For measuring the success of social democratic policies quality of life research approaches which include categories on the individual, the economy, society, politics, and the environment are useful. See, for example, the Wellbeing Index of the Australian Centre on Quality of Life: http://www.deakin.edu.au/research/acqol/ index.php. 27. Besides dbresearch and Wilkinson/ Pickett this would include the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentimihalyi (flow-experience), and Richard Layard, an economist close to the uk Labour Party(for example, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science [2005] or»Happiness and Public Policy,« in Economic Journal, 116: C24–C33). 52 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

the much needed program renewal, mentioned above, in the form of a clear social democratic narrative which reflects the party’s medium-term political goals, societal basis, political core competences, and substantive strengths, other important factors include: ̈ A credible and convincing political leadership based on a thriving and democratic party, which is also able to learn from previous periods in government and to renew itself while in office. ̈ Room to maneuver provided by the political culture and the electoral system in relation to the other political parties. ̈ A performance record which is substantive, professional, and properly publicized(or, during periods in opposition, proof that the government party has not managed this). ̈ The ability to mobilize strategic partners(especially the trade unions) on one’s behalf. ̈ In the context of globalization, the need to embed national considerations in the formation of European and international strategy. It is not enough here to try to make progress on some of these fronts or to be well positioned in some areas. Narrative, leadership, room to maneuver, performance record, partnerships, and European/ globalization strategy must form a coherent overall picture. At present, only a few social democratic parties in Europe have achieved this. What is needed, therefore, is management of the full range of tasks which can once more establish the social democratic movement as a leading force in Europe. Viable Narratives in a General Context of Strict Government Austerity Policies Central to the future success of Social Democracy is a viable social democratic narrative which goes beyond the core value of social justice and is at the leading edge with innovative ideas in other policy areas. This is easier said than done. In the context of a cycle of crises – first the financial crisis, then an economic and now a budgetary crisis – the austerity regime which is the result of now chronic deficits and dramatic increases in sovereign debt is likely to be the dominant framework of welfare state policies in the coming years. A number of dilemmas have to be resolved: ̈ Social democratic policies depend on the state’s – especially financialpolicy – room to maneuver: higher deficits may therefore be the short- to medium-term result of an active state, but later on restrict ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 53

a government’s creative options. State indebtedness is thus, from a long-term perspective, not necessarily an endorsement of a good social democratic economic and financial policy. ̈ Conservative governments, by contrast, are much better able to live with deficits and high sovereign debt over the long term(Wagschal 1996). In fact, deficits supply good arguments against escalating welfare state policies – tax increases are, naturally, taboo because of course they would be detrimental to such parties’ own clienteles. Interest on government debt, in contrast, delivers a secure return for wealthier social strata. ̈ High state liabilities arising from bailing out banks that are»too big to fail« and inevitable economic stimulation measures over the past two years have contributed to the intensification of what were already manifestly chronic fiscal deficits. The fear is, therefore, that fiscal austerity rhetoric will dominate the economic and social policy reform debate for years to come. 28 The political consequences of all this are predictable. During periods of austerity, policy tends to thrust aside efforts to transform society in favor of the defense of vested interests, and tries to respond with an effective management of expectations – in other words, poorly organized interests are in danger of being overlooked and necessary expenditure on promising innovation of being cut. If space for progressive measures is to be kept open, social democratic fiscal policy has no option but to try to increase public revenues. In this connection, increased charges for state services seem to be gaining ground just about everywhere – citizens are becoming clients of the state. Social democrats, however, must not confine themselves to this circumscribed understanding of society. There is no alternative to tax increases for those on higher incomes and especially for capital owners(in the Scandinavian sense). 28. An interesting development of the case of Germany, where the fiscal austerity regime has almost constitutional status and is on the way towards de facto annulling the Basic Law’s welfare state provision is provided by Wolfgang Streeck and Daniel Mertens(2010):»Politik im Defizit. Austerität als fiskalpolitisches Regime,« MPIfG Discussion Paper(May). 54 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Successfully Traversing the Credibility Obstacle Course: Political Leadership with Charisma, Exhibiting an Ability to Learn Both in Office and in Opposition, and Creating Open and Adaptive Party Organizations The longer a party stays in power, alone or in coalition, the more important it is for it to be able to renew itself in office and to be able to reappraise its previous actions credibly. This becomes difficult when a new policy agenda conflicts with former positions, in particular when the balancing act between adapting to – alleged – force of circumstances and maintaining party identity becomes too much to manage.»Changing lanes« is difficult to accomplish without losing credibility. Often only a change of leadership suffices – sometimes, however, even a series of new appointments are unable to usher in a new beginning, as the various changes in the spd leadership over the past few years shows. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt regards present-day Europe as largely leaderless. 29 Unfortunately, the social democrats do not represent much of an exception in this respect. Not only is there no pivotal policy issue, but also the requisite leading personalities are lacking whose charisma could enable them to function as opinion leaders in Europe. 30 Successful and charismatic politicians of the left have become rare. For example, the star of Spain’s Prime Minister Zapatero now seems to be on the wane against the background of the financial crisis. But outside Europe things do not seem much better. President Obama is increasingly becoming aware of how difficult it is to turn expectations aroused in election campaigns into concrete political projects. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was able to restore the social democrats to power in December 2007, although the decisive factor in the election was voter dissatisfaction with the environmental and foreign policy of conservative John Howard, who had ruled Australia for a decade with a coalition of liberals and nationalists(Scott 2009). Former social democratic golden boy Rudd was ousted in a cloak-and-dagger operation and replaced by Julia Gillard, who in turn has had to contend with falling opinion poll results and was unable to win an outright majority in the hastily arranged parliamentary elections. 29. See interview with ndr , August 4, 2010, preliminary report, Euractiv, August 2, 2010, under»Wahlen und Macht.« 30. Why and how this will change can be inferred from Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s 10 Theses in this issue of ipg . ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 55

A»personnel policy« driven to such a degree by the media and opinion polls is difficult for the voters to understand. The electorate yearns for representatives who exhibit constancy, political intelligence, decisiveness, credibility, and political will. The acclaim with which German presidential candidate Joachim Gauck was received by the German public, moreover, testifies to the public’s desire for»bona fide« candidates whose lives have not been entirely given over to a political career. Political parties must step up their efforts to come up with interesting and many-sided candidates for political office. Recruitment and development of party members, opportunities in the party for those from other walks of life, and membership ballots on top candidates are possible options whose significance is likely to increase in future. 31 Creating Some Room to Maneuver in Competition between Parties In countries with proportional representation the party landscape has opened up considerably. A five-plus party spectrum with one or two conservative parties, a liberal and environmental movement, and a party to the left of the social democrats seems to be the European norm. As a result, the composition of governments is becoming increasingly difficult to predict and tactical voting – for example, in countries with first and second ballots, as in Germany – is also reaching its limits. In Central and Eastern European countries in particular right-wing populist parties have managed to enter parliament(Bauer 2010). Absolute majorities are becoming a rarity. Even in the uk , the ancestral homeland of first-past-the-post elections in Europe, there has been a coalition since May 2010. In future, government formation under the leadership or with the participation of a social democratic party will mainly involve coalitions – unless the particular political culture also tolerates minority cabinets. It is not only in Germany that the future of traditional large national parties is being hotly debated. In future, »national parties« will be political groupings which manage – mostly from the same part of the political spectrum – to establish ties with other parties, for example, in the form of a coalition, at least for a time, thereby forming a government majority. 32 The Red-Red-Green government in 31. See the study on the organizational identity of social democratic parties in Europe by Matthias Micus et al., Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(forthcoming). 32. On the German debate after the parliamentary elections in 2009, cf. the special issue »Das Ende der Volksparteien?« of the research journal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 56 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Norway under social democrat Jens Stoltenberg 33 is a successful current example of this, from which the Swedish social democrats are also taking their bearings in their election campaign. Even though the electoral system has a major influence on the organization of the party system, nevertheless every party, by way of cooperation and policy demarcation has the opportunity to defend or even expand its room to maneuver within the framework of political contestation. In recent years, however, social democratic parties have been reactive rather than active when it comes to setting the political agenda. Communication and Performance Record But policy is not only made, it must also be explained. This applies especially in the case of social democratic solutions, which are supposed to be socially just as well as economically rational. In the past, social democratic governments have not always been able to manage this. Complaining that rational political decisions simply were not put across effectively does not really get us anywhere. Political craft, besides implementation, also involves promoting and explaining policy programs. An important element in this is laying down one’s own terms in order to separate oneself from the political competition. The voters want to be appealed to not only in their heads but also, by finding the right words, in their hearts.»We vote with our hearts, not our minds« – the much-studied psychologist and political consultant Drew Westen created a furor in us Democrat circles in the last presidential campaign with his book»The Political Brain«(Westen 2007). 34 While ideas point the way, only an appeal to voters’ value-laden emotions galvanizes them into action. But good slogans are not enough:»Engaging in political communication which is cognitively transparent involves a party becoming conscious of its fundamental values and internalized thought patterns, in order to be able to fit individual projects into this value system and communicate them accordingly«(Wehling 2009). But even the best communications will not get you anywhere if your performance record is not presentable. From the standpoint of social (No. 1/2010) and in particular the contribution by Joachim Raschke/ Ralf Tils. 33. See the analysis of Norway by Biermann/ Kallset in this issue of ipg . 34. George Lakoff and Elisabeth Wehling argue along similar lines(cf. Lakoff 2010, Wehling 2009). ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 57

democracy, the results of a performance comparison with regard to social justice are patchy: the Nordic countries clearly have the edge in this respect over the past two decades, while the continental European models are in need of reform. 35 In the crisis of the past two years Rhineland capitalism has regained something of its reputation, its automatic welfare state stabilizers proving somewhat more crisis-proof than many other supposedly modern systems(Abelshauser 2008). Strategic Partners For social democratic parties, the trade unions are, as a rule, difficult, but strategically the most important partners. However, they too are now experiencing turbulence and are steadily hemorrhaging members. In the context of crises related to opponents, collective bargaining, organization, and membership they are under pressure to raise their profile, which supposedly narrows their common ground with social democratic parties and makes compromises more difficult. Furthermore, the milieus which foster common organizational connections are in danger of disappearing: less dual membership, fewer high-ranking trade union representatives in parliament, fewer social democratic mp s with trade union affiliations. Perhaps only in the Nordic countries is it still possible to observe how close such organizational ties can be. samak , 36 for example, brings together the Nordic social democratic parties and trade unions in a close-knit discussion forum. However, the last elections in Sweden clearly showed that this strategic alliance, although a necessary element in electoral success is far from sufficient. 35. See in particular the results of Wolfgang Merkel et al.(2007) and of Thomas Meyer (2006) who, building on country studies of Sweden, the uk , the Netherlands, Germany, the usa , and Japan comes up with distinguishing features marking off »libertarians« from social democracy and develops indicators for the measurement of social justice. 36. The secretariat is located in Copenhagen. The current president is the Norwegian Prime Minister and chair of the Norwegian Labor Party Jens Stoltenberg(see: http://socialdemokraterne.dk/default.aspx?site=samak). An insight into the still close working relationship between the Swedish sap and the los is provided by Hakan A. Bengtsson(Bengtsson 2008). 58 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Governing Globalization A key challenge for social democracy is to come up with proposals for governing globalization. Most Germans(69 percent) and Europeans (61 percent) are convinced that globalization represents an opportunity for economic growth, but at the same time take the view that it will intensify social imbalances. The experiences of the past few years have reaffirmed the conviction of Germans(85 percent) and Europeans(74 percent) that the globalization process may no longer be left to its own devices but needs international regulation(»worldwide governance«)(European Commission 2010a). Globalization and the developments with regard to international risks have become a fixed component of our economic life, but not a fixed component of social and economic policy. 37 The economic and financial market crisis has shown that financial globalization, which to be sure has by and large delivered the world more prosperity and growth, has, at least for the time being, become the victim of its own success. The industrialized countries now find themselves confronted by the problem of whether their common capacities with regard to government, regulation, and cooperation will suffice to master, at least to some degree, the excesses of the phenomenon of free movement of capital, which they created. These questions are particularly pressing in the European context. Europe’s economic policy unification remains unfinished. It was a fundamental misconception that some sort of end point had been reached with the introduction of the euro. What is needed is a European governance substantially coordinating social and economic policies(in other words, which is more than an informal coordination method). It is not just many social democratic parties that are having a hard time taking account of the European horizon. Jürgen Habermas recently observed that the taming of casino-capitalism is going to fail because of the timidity of national governments, the overhasty abandonment of an international cooperation which sets itself the goal of building up inadequate capacities – worldwide, in the eu and, in the first instance, in the Eurozone(Habermas 2010). We need more»European courage« to come up with answers to the challenges of globalization in general, 37. From the many risk and trend analyses which are available we might mention the World Economic Forum’s annual»Europe& Risk. A Global Risk Network Briefing.« ipg 4/2010 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness 59

and to the current financial crisis in particular. Social democracy must therefore present itself as pro-European not only in speeches and party programs, but also in its concrete willingness to shape policy at the European level. Conclusion Even the longest journey begins with the first step. The resurgence of social democracy in Europe is as yet only in its infancy. The ongoing reappraisal of the Third Way shows clearly that, in some respects, not even the self-critical analysis of social democratic periods of office has yet been concluded. On the other hand, work has already begun on repositioning social democracy. The approaches and headings for a new narrative may still differ significantly in the various processes, but the topics chosen for development, such as solidarity, democracy, and a new socio-economic paradigm are often the same. In the coming months, therefore, the different national and bilateral reflections on the future of social democracy will have to be brought together. It is precisely the challenges at the global level, as well as the need for a unified Europeanpolicy approach for social democracy which demand a common understanding of the crisis and its lessons. Bibliography Abelshauser, Werner(2008): Zurück zum»Rheinischen Kapitalismus«? Interview with Tagesschau, October 8, 2008. Available at: http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/bankenkrise118.html(accessed on August 19, 2010). In more detail in:»Aus Wirtschaftskrisen lernen – aber wie? Krisenszenarien im Vergleich,« in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57(2009), Issue 4: 467–83. Australian Centre on Quality of Life(2010): Wellbeing Index of the Australian Centre on Quality of Life. Available at: http://www.deakin.edu.au/research/acqol/index. php(accessed on August 19, 2010). Bauer, Werner T.(2010): Rechtspopulismus in Europa. Vergängliches Phänomen oder auf dem Weg zum politischen Mainstream? Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07293. pdf(accessed on August 18, 2010). Bengtsson, Hakan A.(2008): Nordische Erfahrungen . Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis(November). Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/id/ipa/05862.pdf(accessed on August 18, 2010). 60 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

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Westen, Drew(2007): The Political Brain. The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation. New York: Public Affairs. Weßels, Bernhard(2010): Was ist dran an der These vom Ende der Sozialdemokratie? Eine empirische Analyse der Wahlergebnisse und Wählerprofile sozialdemokratischer Parteien in Europa in den letzten zwanzig Jahren . Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Policy Analysis. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07221. pdf. Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett(2010): The Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for Everyone . London: Penguin. Wilkoszewski, Harald(2009): Age Trajectories of Social Policy Preferences. Support for Intergenerational Transfers from a Demographic Perspective; mpidr Working Paper wp -2009-034. Available at: http://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/ wp-2009-034.pdf. World Economic Forum(2010):»Europe& Risk. A Global Risk Network Briefing,« Geneva. Available at: http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/globalrisk/index. htm(accessed on August 19, 2010). 64 Engels/Maass, New Promise of Happiness ipg 4/2010

Progressive Politics in the Age of Polarization and Economic Crisis Current Situation and Prospects of the Spanish PSOE CARMEN DE PAZ NIEVES/ GUILLERMO MORENO RODRIGUEZ SPANISH SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL, PSOE) Official website: www.psoe.es Secretary General: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Founded: May 2, 1879 by Pablo Iglesias SI and PES Membership: SI: since 1951; PES: since 1974 Party membership: 2008: 592,405(224,883 activists/ fee-payers and 367,572 sympathizers) Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2008: 43.87% of the votes(48.29% of seats), in government 2004: 43.3% of the votes(46.85% of seats), in government 2000: 34.1% of the votes(35.7% of seats), in opposition Electoral resonance European elections: 2009: PSOE 21 seats(38.51%), PP 23 seats(43.23%) 2004: PSOE 25 seats(43.46%), PP 24 seats(41.21%) 1999: PSOE 24 seats(35.33%), PP 27 seats(39.74%) Government participation: Since 2008: in government; head of government: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 2004–2008: in government; head of government: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 2000–2004: in opposition ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 65

Historical Overview Founded in 1879 by Pablo Iglesias, the historic leader of the workers’ movement in Spain, it was not until 1910 that the party first managed to achieve representation in the Spanish Parliament. During the second Republic, the party was part of the government between 1931 and 1933, and also as part of the Popular Front in 1936 and until defeat in the Civil War. During the Civil War, the psoe split into three streams: the revolutionary Marxist section, led by Francisco Largo Caballero, the more moderate and social democratic faction, headed by Indalecio Prieto, and the reformist group, led by Julián Besteiro. Immediately after the war was over, Franco declared the psoe illegal, and its members were forced into exile or went underground, until 1977, when the party was again legalized. During the 40 dictatorship years a large number of party activists were persecuted, imprisoned, and even executed. Felipe González was elected Secretary General of the Party at the xxvi Congress, which took place in Suresnes in 1974 and represented a turning point in the Party’s evolution from its initial Marxist ideology to a more social democratic position. In fact, González gave up his position in 1979 due to the internal resistance to the shift away from more radical positions, but was re-elected by an extraordinary Congress. González headed the shift in the Partido Socialista Obrero Español( psoe ) to a»catch-all party.« The previous strategy of mass mobilization and radical rhetoric was abandoned, and the party turned into the social democratic multi-class organization it is today(Encarnación 2008). This successful shift, together with the particular Spanish circumstances, allowed the psoe to become the hegemonic political force in Spain for 14 years, from 1982 to 1996. Since the beginning of the transition period in 1977 there have been 10 general elections in Spain, and three different governments(see Annex, Tables 2 and 3). In the first two elections and until 1982 the party in power was the centrist ucd , led by Adolfo Suárez. The party’s initial success in 1977 and 1979 was as rapid as its fall in 1982, when a large share of its vote transferred to the»reformed« psoe . The 1982 elections were the first and last in which a Spanish political party received such a large percentage of the vote and broad parliamentary representation. In 1986, the psoe restored its absolute majority, despite the emergence of iu (Izquierda Unida) as a viable political force to the left of the psoe . Although the psoe won again in the 1989 and 1993 elections, it lost its absolute majority, being forced to negotiate with the nationalist 66 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

parties c i u and pnv , and progressively losing popular support. In the 1996 general elections, the conservative Partido Popular( pp ), led by José María Aznar, won the elections for the first time in the democratic history of Spain. From that time until the 2004 elections, the psoe went through a transformation process, marked by the 2000 defeat under the leadership of Joaquín Almunia. In that election, the pp gained an absolute majority. In the same year, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was elected new Secretary General and a process of renovation, led by the so-called»New Way,« was initiated, which accounted for the successes of 2004. In the 2008 elections the psoe recovered its mandate. Regarding the eu parliamentary elections(see Annex, Table 4), the psoe comfortably won the first two, in 1987 and 1989, losing for the first time against the pp in 1994, in the elections leading to the pp ’s first national mandate. The pp won again in 1999, with three more seats, while in 2004 the psoe won by a narrow majority. In the last European elections, the pp obtained, again, a slightly better result than the psoe . Current Situation of the Party Voter Approval After the psoe ’s victory in the 2008 general elections, the polls started to show the impact of the serious economic crisis on the Party’s popular support. The pp has been ahead in the polls since June 2009, registering a 10 point lead very recently, according to various unofficial surveys, due to the introduction of measures to cut the public deficit that the government announced last May. However, this difference does not seem credible and is likely to be due to the exceptional circumstances. Concerning the gender segmentation of the socialist vote, the last Centre for Sociological Research( cis ) polls(E 2834, April 2010) show that, according to direct voting intentions, the psoe would gain the largest number of women’s votes. On the other hand, according to this poll the psoe has its biggest lead over the pp in the 45–54 year old age group(5.1 percent gap) and in the 55–64 year old age group(6.7 percent). ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 67

Public Perception Looking at José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s personal qualities, during the 2004 election campaign the attribute most frequently highlighted was his»talante,« his capacity for dialogue. During the six years in which he has headed the government, this quality has been highly valued by the public in opinion polls. In recent months, and taking advantage of the crisis, the pp has attacked the President constantly, portraying him as an inefficient manager. The cis polls show how the economic situation and the relentless attacks by the pp are undermining public perceptions of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as a safe pair of hands. Between January 2009 and January 2010 the share of citizens who considered that he was more competent than Mariano Rajoy, the pp leader, decreased from 43 percent to 33 percent. However, in January only 29 percent of the sample considered that Rajoy was more competent. More generally, and despite this change, Zapatero continues to inspire more confidence and is regularly valued more highly than Rajoy as a political leader. On the other hand, the Spanish population continues to associate the left with ideas such as equality, individual freedom, and progress, although efficiency is more generally associated with the right. Party Platform During Zapatero’s first term of office(2004–2008), the socialist policy agenda focused on:(i) widening and consolidating civil rights, through the promotion of gender equality, the law that allowed homosexual marriage, and the Law of Historical Memory, which recognized certain rights of victims of the War and dictatorship;(ii) consensus building in his political actions, which generated the expression»el talante de Zapatero,« and which translated into a continued dialogue among and with all social and regional actors;(iii) the realignment of Spain’s foreign policy with eu positions;(iv) the development of the fourth pillar of the welfare state, through the Law on Dependency, which provides support for dependent people; and(v) the reinforcement of a»plural« Spain, mostly through the negotiation and reform of most»autonomy statutes,« the special laws that establish specific regional competencies. During the second term of office, the agenda has focused mainly on combating the economic crisis and the development of a new long-term 68 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

economic paradigm. In a first phase, the government concentrated on mitigating the most immediate and negative effects of the crisis through an ambitious fiscal stimulus package and the strengthening of social protection for the most vulnerable. The government is also focusing on the introduction of the necessary measures to lay the foundations of a new economic model. Among the initiatives undertaken in this regard, the most important has been the Law and Strategy for a Sustainable Economy. At the same time, the government and the Party continue to promote the expansion of citizens’ rights, with initiatives such as the new Law on Equality of Treatment, the Law that widens the guarantees related to abortion and the Law on Religious Freedom. In addition, and through the Presidency of the eu that Spain held between January and June 2010, the Socialist government has promoted a policy agenda at the eu level that focuses on equality and innovation; has started the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty successfully; and has supported measures leading to a strengthening of the economic governance of the Union, which is finally close to becoming a reality after a period of stagnation in the integration process. Finally, the psoe recently established a new think tank, ideas , which encompasses other socialist foundations, with the objective of generating and stimulating new progressive political thinking and ideas for policy-making in the long term, to feed into the political debate and discourse, and establishing new international and national alliances with other progressive actors. Active Party Life and State of the Party The history and importance of the Party in the current political system makes of the psoe one of the main, if not the main, political party in Spain. Currently, the psoe has 592,405 members, divided into»militantes«(224,833), who pay a monthly fee, and»simpatizantes«(367,572), who do not pay anything but identify with the party. There has been a clear trend in recent years of a fall in the number of»militantes« and a rise in the number of»simpatizantes.« As for the youth branch of the Party, currently there are around 14,600»militantes« and 10,000»simpatizantes.« ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 69

Performance Record as Government or Opposition Party As already mentioned, the government’s approval ratings have deteriorated since the crisis started. Since April 2008 a decrease in approval ratings has been registered, falling from around 50 percent in the first semester of 2008 to 33.3 percent in April 2010. However, the pp has not directly benefited from this decrease, since Spanish voters continued to rate the government’s performance above the pp ’s in opposition( cis e 2834, April 2010). Today, the main issue on the agenda is the economic crisis. People’s concerns are clear from the official polls: 63.3 percent of the sample consider unemployment the key problem in Spain, followed by 19.1 percent who mentioned economic issues as their main concern. Corruption is also high on the list, due to the serious cases affecting the pp in recent months(particularly the so-called»Gürtel« case, which relates to the Party’s financing). Development Possibilities Despite the unprecedented crisis situation in Spain, the main opposition party has not managed to gather significant popular support. The main reasons behind this include the pp corruption scandals, its lack of credibility and alternatives and, especially, the party’s leadership problems, since Mariano Rajoy is among the lowest rated leaders, even among the conservative electorate. The third national party, iu , a coalition of parties to the left of the psoe , remains far below the pp and the psoe , and today has only two seats in Parliament. Although the party’s electoral expectations have improved with the current situation, its growth possibilities are constrained by the Spanish electoral system, which does not favor small national parties. 1 Finally, it is necessary to highlight the recent emergence of a new political party, up y d , founded around the ex-socialist leader Rosa Díez, which aims to occupy the center of the political spectrum. As a consequence of stark political polarization and the discrediting of the 1. Spain’s electoral system is one of proportional representation. However, the system overrepresents the smaller constituencies(since all provinces and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla receive at least two seats) and, in practice, favors the two large parties and parties with regional roots. For further reading, see Hopkin(2005) and Márquez and Ramírez(1998). 70 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

majority parties, analysts consider it highly probable that this party will consolidate to become a fourth political force in the next elections. Opening Up to Society and Strategic Partnerships The strengthening of relations with various civil society groups has been one of the major successes of the psoe . Even in the current situation, the government has managed to maintain social peace and stability. Relations with the trade unions have generally been very positive, especially with ugt (which was originally linked to the Party). Regarding business associations, and despite their traditional proximity to conservative parties and differences concerning topics such as labor market reform, relations have not tended to be confrontational. On the other hand, the concern and initiatives adopted by the psoe to fight against climate change and poverty, and for gender equality and civil rights, has led to good relations between the psoe and most civil society organizations and activist groups. European Policy and Global Challenges Promotion of the continuing construction of the eu edifice is a core objective of the psoe ’s international agenda. This is due partly to historical reasons, since the eu played a key role in Spain’s democratization and modernization after the dictatorship. Today, the psoe maintains its unconditional support for the Lisbon Strategy and Treaty and for the process of enlargement, as well as a commitment to continue to strengthen the European Union in its development towards a real economically and politically unified space. In this sense, the Socialist Party considers that the eu should play a key role in the fight against the current economic crisis and in advancing a new, more productive and sustainable European economic and social model. At the same time, and in global terms, the psoe promotes the establishment of new financial market rules that guarantee greater transparency and control over market activities, and an international convergence with regard to norms to ensure the stability of the financial system and thus of the real economy. Globalization is regarded by the psoe as a positive process with considerable potential to improve prosperity, although it will only be fair and politically desirable if it incorporates criteria of equity and social justice. ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 71

From»Quiet Opposition« to Progressive Governance After 14 years in government, the psoe was defeated in the general election of 1996, when the first right-wing government in Spain’s democratic history came into office. This defeat, together with the one in 2000 which gave the pp an absolute majority, led the Party into a period of internal renovation and the redefinition of its ideological positions. After the 2000 Congress the»New Way,« led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, took control of the Party. While in opposition, until 2004, Rodríguez Zapatero unfolded a non-confrontational strategy that has been dubbed»quiet opposition«, within the framework of which, in areas such as the fight against terrorism, economic policy, and judicial reform, the psoe found it necessary to reach a consensus with the pp . At the same time, Zapatero made it clear that there were other areas, such as education and foreign affairs, in which the two parties’ stances are very different. Zapatero’s consensual style thus became more aggressive when the government sought to reform the education system, and especially when Aznar decided to support the Iraq war. In addition, Zapatero was particularly critical of Aznar’s authoritarian governing style(Méndez Lago 2006). In order to win the election in 2004 the psoe tried to attract a new constituency, voters on the left, and to mobilize the significant share of the electorate that had positioned themselves to the left of center on the ideological spectrum, but had abstained or voted for the pp in 2000 (Campmany 2005: 215). In fact, various analyses of the 2004 elections show that the three million new socialist votes in 2004 actually came from previous non-voters and new voters, as well as transfers from the pp and iu (Michavila 2005). Although the exact role played by the 11-M terrorist attacks in Madrid remains unclear, there seems to be a certain agreement among specialists that the management of this crisis by the pp added to the growing discomfort of the majority of the population who did not support the Iraq war(around eight million people demonstrated in different Spanish cities to ask the pp government to withdraw from Iraq). Evidence suggests that both aspects played a determining role in the significant mobilization of left-wing voters and in the demobilization of the right-wing vote in 2004, although previous observable trends among the electorate, as reflected in public opinion polls, already showed a significant increase in the support for the psoe (Bosco/ SánchezCuenca 2009). 72 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

Mariano Rajoy’s pp , however, found in these events an argument for considering the election results illegitimate, and developed an opposition style which has been termed»crispación«(»tension« or »hostility«) which it has pursued during the whole period the psoe has been in office. This style basically consists not only of refusing to reach any kind of agreement with the government, but also of seeking direct confrontation and creating radical divisions by»negative campaigning,« based on giving offence and hurling insults, in relation to topics that divert attention from ideological issues(Bosco/ Sánchez Cuenca 2009). This strategy is not new. Since Aznar became the party leader, the pp has made continuous efforts to focus the political debate on three issues that are not ideological: terrorism and the fight against eta ; nationalism and devolution; and corruption. This, according to some scholars, corresponds to the pp ’s objective of undermining the advantage that the socialists have traditionally enjoyed as a consequence of their ideological proximity to the majority of the electorate, which tends to be to the left of the ideological spectrum(Ontiveros et al. 2008, Bosco/ SánchezCuenca 2009). This strategy, which the Secretary of Communication of the pp made explicit in an interview published by the Financial Times shortly before the 2008 elections, 2 generated, according to a recent study the significant retrenchment registered in the centrist socialist vote in the 2004 elections(Estefanía et al. 2008). Despite the pp ’s successful efforts to divert the public debate towards non-ideological issues, the clear focus and remarkable achievements of the psoe ’s ideologically left-wing policies, particularly those related to the equality and civil rights agenda, and the reinforcement of its links with its traditional partners, the unions, within the framework of Zapatero’s»consensual« style, as well as with its core voters, the workers, were decisive in the 2008 victory. Moreover, the deliberate attacks and»crispación« tactics of the pp seemed to rebound, mobilizing a significant share of left-wing voters against the pp in 2008(rather than in favor of the psoe ). Recent evidence suggests, in other words, that a large percentage of Spanish voters behaved strategically in the 2008 election. In fact, the loss of votes by the third main political party in Spain, iu – from 2,640,000 votes, or around 10 percent of the total in 1996 to 970,000 votes and only 2.»Our whole strategy is directed towards the floating socialist voter. We know that they will never vote for us, but if we can sow sufficient seeds of doubt in their minds about the economy, immigration, and the nationalist question then maybe they will stay at home.« ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 73

two seats in Parliament in the 2008 elections – is partly associated with the strategic behavior of regular iu voters who did not want to see the pp elected(Viñuela and Artes 2009, Bosco/Sánchez-Cuenca 2009). Around 20.4 percent of iu voters in 2004 changed their vote to the psoe in 2008. Even more striking due to its unprecedented nature was the transfer of the nationalist vote to the psoe , probably in response to similar considerations. Around 13 percent of c i u and 11 percent of erc voters in 2004 voted for the psoe in 2008(Bosco/Sánchez-Cuenca 2009). Two quantitative studies confirm these shifts statistically, alongside the centrist vote transfer to the pp (Urquizu 2008, Torcal/ Lago 2008). In view of the previous analysis, a number of factors seem to explain the prevalence of social democracy in Spain, in comparison to other European countries, where these political forces are clearly in decline. First – and in line with the»narrowing« and»dominance of the public discourse« theses 3 – the psoe is perceived in Spain as the only center-left political force in the ideological spectrum, in the context of an increasingly polarized public debate. This growing polarization is in turn explained by a conscious strategy on the part of the psoe and the pp , and has been a key driver of the vote in the past two electoral processes. This polarization is evident in the strong ideological association of certain values with»being or voting right-wing« and»left-wing,« which is represented in the following table. Equality, solidarity, human rights, freedom, progress, idealism, and tolerance are widely linked with the left by poll respondents in one of the latest cis exercises, whereas tradition and order are qualities or values associated with»being right-wing.« 3.»Narrowing« thesis: In the party spectrum, social democratic parties’ room to maneuver has narrowed with regard to policy, whether because conservative parties have become»soft« and now occupy the center ground or because populist parties are attracting the votes of disaffected population groups. In countries in which both trends arise, social democratic parties are»sandwiched.«»Dominance of public discourse« thesis: Social democratic parties have ceased to dominate the public discourse with regard to the key social topics. Public opinion represents a kind of center-liberal mainstream. Progressive left-wing policy approaches, in contrast, cannot in most cases command a majority in society. In recent years, the level of competence attributed to social democratic parties has experienced a clear downward trend. Any notion that they are more competent in comparison to other parties has all but disappeared. 74 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

Table 1: Values Associated with Right- or Left-wing Parties(%) Equality Honesty/ propriety Human rights Tradition Freedom Progress Order Solidarity Idealism Tolerance Efficiency Right-wing 9.2 14.7 10.2 53.7 14.9 20.3 43.5 10.7 17.4 11.00 25.6 Source: January 2010, CIS survey. Left-wing 45.0 25.1 38.1 10.7 39.6 33.7 13.8 43.9 36.1 44.9 20.7 Both 18.0 21.8 26.8 13.1 19.3 20.8 18.2 22.0 18.9 18.9 16.9 None 10.3 23.2 8.4 4.5 6.5 8.7 8.4 8.2 7.5 8.5 18.9 During the transition and almost until the change of government in 1996, the priority in Spain was the consolidation of democracy, social peace, and national modernization, over any political consideration that could lead the country into confrontation or division. Three informal institutions were put in place to ensure and facilitate this process: the Pact of Silence, which entailed avoiding any public debate on reparations for the victims of the Dictatorship; the search for»super-majorities« or qualified majorities on issues of state; and the primacy of centripetal rather than centrifugal alliances. The three institutions have progressively unraveled, however, giving rise – among other factors – to the high degree of political polarization that Spain exhibits today, in both historical and comparative terms(Dalton 2008, Field 2005, Field 2008). A similar polarization occurred in a majority of European countries between the 1970s and the 1980s, while in the 1990s the consolidation of the welfare state and the prevalence of the Third Way narrowed the gap between conservative and progressive political forces in these countries. Developments in Spain have been completely different. Second, it is necessary to consider that a majority of the electorate in Spain leans towards the left, where iu and the psoe are the only realistic ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 75

options(Ontiveros et al. 2008). The Spanish median voter position, according to most analyses, has traditionally been located towards the center-left of the left-right ideological spectrum(Ontiveros et al. 2008). Figure 1, based on the annual polls conducted by the Centre for Sociological Research( cis ), represents the evolution of the self-positioning of voters between 1978 and 2006. As the figure shows, the median voter position has progressively turned more centrist: while in the early 1980s it was located towards the center-left(3–5), in 1986 and 2000 it moved towards the center(4–6). In this sense, the proportional electoral system functions in practice as a majoritarian one and thus favors the prevalence of the two main parties, pp and psoe . The emergence of another leftist political force with potentially national appeal could threaten the psoe ’s pre-eminence, but this does not seem feasible at the present time. This is not the case in other European countries, however, where social democratic forces have experienced the emergence of other leftist parties that have taken the lead in matters such as environmental policy, which in Spain is part of the psoe agenda. Third, from the perspective of the»Dahrendorf« and»alienation« theses, 4 the psoe has managed, through its recent policy and Zapatero’s consensual style, to keep alive the alliances and ties with social groups that have traditionally supported the party. At the same time, the party has worked intensively to build new alliances with sectors and social movements whose aspirations are only likely to find accommodation in the socialist agenda, such as women, homosexuals, bisexuals and transsexuals, or immigrants, as well as many ngo s. This has not been the case in many other European countries, where the social democratic discourse and policies on civil rights have not, in recent years, been as strong and consistent as formerly. 4.»Dahrendorf« thesis: With the end of the industrial age social democracy has fulfilled its purpose and therefore has become superfluous. The electoral base of the(oppressed) industrial workforce no longer exists. The political promise of social advancement has either been fulfilled or is no longer regarded as realistic (»life should be better for our children«).»Alienation« thesis: The social democratic parties have become alienated from their original base among the workers. Exclusive links with trade unions or social movements no longer exist or have been broken in recent years. What social democratic parties have to offer no longer corresponds to the needs and aspirations of the workers, who increasingly see no prospect of personal advancement. 76 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

Figure 1: The Evolution of the Median Voter in Spain 30 25 1978 1986 2000 20 2006 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Source: Centre for Sociological Research(CIS) annual survey. Future Prospects The situation today is not favorable to the psoe , due to a combination of the following factors, among others: 1. The long and damaging economic crisis and the public perception that it is ultimately the middle class and the most vulnerable who are paying the price in Europe, given that it is conservative-driven measures that have prevailed in the second phase of the response. 2. The tireless and immoderate pr campaign conducted by the main opposition party, the conservative pp , within the framework of its »crispación« strategy, aimed at discouraging the socialist vote rather than appealing to its own electorate with an alternative and constructive agenda and debate. 3. The lack of support for the government from other political forces in Parliament and from most of the media, for various reasons, including the establishment of a coalition government in the Basque country with the pp which left out the nationalist party pnv , as well as the measures introduced by the government to inrease competition in the media and communications sector. However, despite the difficult situation, the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has remained cohesive and committed to the original ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 77

socialist agenda. On the one hand, the government is determined to continue to develop the expansion of civil rights that is turning Spain into one of the most progressive countries in Europe. In the first semester of 2010 a law improving guarantees related to abortion, a law on religious freedom, and a law on equality of treatment are being discussed and processed. In addition, the most vulnerable – including the unemployed and the dependent – continue to be at the top of the government’s priorities, despite the current financial constraints. On the other hand, and as part of the second main pillar of its agenda, the government will introduce some structural reforms aimed at laying the foundations of a new sustainable economy, including reform of the labor market, restructuring of the banking sector and pension system reform. The ideas Foundation has prepared a report on the new sustainable economy, which analyzes the current situation and trends in Spain, and the necessary reforms in the medium and long term, with a view to transforming the Spanish model of production by 2025, taking into account a threefold objective: economic, social, and environmental sustainability. This report highlights the fact that, if the right economic sectors are promoted through the reforms proposed over the next 15 years, employment in Spain could grow by 20 percent and Spanish income per capita by 40 percent, while income inequality could decrease by 30 percent and contaminating emissions by 20 percent, relative to a scenario in which no reforms are implemented( ideas 2009). The current political atmosphere seems to be generating a generalized public disaffection with politics, which might lead to an increase in abstention rates in coming elections. Analyses based on current data also suggest that minority parties, such as the new centrist up y d and the leftist iu , might particularly benefit from the current situation. However, the circumstances and high degree of uncertainty require caution in the evaluation and forecasting of political developments over the next two years, when local and regional elections will take place. It is clear that the events of these two years will, in any case, be crucial to the outcome of the general election in 2012, which today, considering the rapid pace of change in the political arena, remains unpredictable. 78 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

European Perspective The most recent election results in some countries seem to confirm the relative decline of social democratic parties in Europe. Only four European countries are ruled by social democrats today, and in the last European elections social democratic parties gained wider representation than right-wing ones in only six out of the eu 27. In line with these results, the last national elections in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the uk yielded the worst results – in historical terms – in recent decades for the Dutch and British Labour parties, the German spd , and the French Socialist party. In this context, the debate about the current situation of social democracy in Europe has become central. Are we witnessing the end or the renewal of one of the major ideologies of twentieth-century Europe? It is evident that circumstances today are different from those of the 1970s and 1980s. Growing globalization, the institutionalization of the welfare state, the consolidation of free markets as the main pillar of our economic model, the general rise in average income levels, increasing social heterogeneity»in no particular direction,« and the progressive political fragmentation are only some of the trends that might explain the lack of adjustment of some social democratic platforms, agendas, and alliances to the new concerns and aspirations of European publics. Some of the responses to these challenges emerging within the different forums aimed at the»renewal of social democratic thinking and policies« include: ̈ Defining an economic model that could become a real alternative to the conservative/ liberal paradigm, and which could also be applied in times of crisis. This model should be based on equity, efficiency, and sustainability, and would involve the redefinition of the roles of the financial sector vis-à-vis technology and industry, and of the public sector in general with regard to increased quality and efficiency of services. The energy model must also be recast. ̈ Defining a program and a clear roadmap to instill confidence in the electorate in hard times. Progressive movements are associated with change and thus, in some cases, with instability and insecurity. Mobility and positive change will continue to be the identifying signatures of social democracy, but in tandem with economic, legal, and social security. ̈ Actively contributing to the organization of civil society, the representation of new social groups and the generation of new social habits. ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 79

̈ Identifying a clear, coherent, and innovative international agenda that provides an adequate answer to delicate issues such as security – both military and economic – and the growing need to make different layers of government compatible with one another. ̈ Developing a new narrative and communication tools that will make it possible to reconnect with groups who speak the language of change and innovation, such as young people and intellectuals, while remaining in touch with traditional groups, such as technocrats, who employ a more»realistic« language. ̈ Renovation of social democratic parties’ culture and structures, which are currently too conservative and prone to endogamy. ̈ Strengthening of the role of the state at all levels, especially the local, together with those of civil society and individual responsibility, in three contexts: as citizens, as members of communities and as family members. Closing Remarks The psoe is one of the major political forces in Spain. A crucial agent during the transition process, its discourse and agenda have become drivers of important social and civil changes since the party returned to power in 2004, under the leadership of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Spain is today one of the most progressive countries in Europe in terms of civil rights, and has developed the fourth pillar of the welfare state, which deals partly with one of the major challenges facing the European Union: rapid demographic ageing. At the same time, the psoe has started to develop a new conceptual and policy framework for a new economic and productive model, focused on social, environmental, and economic sustainability. The global economic crisis has had a significant impact on the country and public perceptions of the psoe and its credibility. The deterioration of public support has been due partly to the limited room to maneuver of the Spanish government in recent months, since the European Unioncoordinated response to the crisis in this second phase of the recovery is being defined by the preponderance of conservative governments. However, the situation is likely to improve in the coming months, when the reforms the government is negotiating with the social and economic partners start to be implemented, and measures to regulate and tax 80 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

financial markets are adopted in international forums, as promoted by the Spanish Socialist Party. Over the next two years, leading up to the general election, the psoe will continue to work on renewing and developing its long-term ideological framework and policy agenda, strengthening its alliances within civil society and internationally, and developing immediate measures that deal adequately with the crisis, with a view to improving living standards across the board, protecting the most vulnerable, and ensuring that the progressive values of social justice and cohesion, freedom, opportunity, and sustainability remain at the center of the government’s actions. Table 2: Spanish Governments since the Transition 1977–1982 1982–1986 1986–1989 1989–1993 1993–1996 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–Today Party ucd psoe psoe psoe psoe pp pp psoe psoe President Adolfo Suárez Felipe González Felipe González Felipe González Felipe González José María Aznar José María Aznar José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Majority Yes Yes Yes 50% No No Yes No No Partners All parties pnv, c i u pnv, c i u pnv, c i u c i u PCE/IU PSOE UCD AP/PP CiU PNV Table 3: Electoral Results in Spain, 1977–2008 1977 % Votes% Seats 9.3 5.7 29.4 33.7 34.6 47.4 8.8 4.6 2.8 3.1 1.7 2.3 1979 % Votes% Seats 10.8 6.6 30.5 34.6 35.9 48.0 6.1 2.6 2.7 0.3 1.5 2.0 1982 % Votes% Seats 4.0 1.1 48.4 57.7 6.5 3.4 26.5 30.3 3.7 3.4 1.9 2.3 ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 81

IU PSOE AP/PP CiU PNV 1986 % Votes% Seats 4.5 2.0 44.6 52.6 26.3 3.0 5.1 5.1 1.6 1.7 1989 % Votes% Seats 9.1 4.9 39.9 50.0 25.9 30.6 5.1 5.1 1.2 1.4 1993 % Votes% Seats 9.6 5.1 38.3 45.4 34.8 40.3 4.9 4.9 1.2 1.4 IU PSOE PP CiU PNV ERC 1996 % Votes% Seats 10.6 6.0 37.5 40.3 38.8 44.6 4.6 4.6 1.3 1.4 0.7 0.3 2000 % Votes% Seats 5.5 2.3 34.1 35.7 44.5 52.3 4.2 4.3 1.5 2.0 0.8 0.3 2004 % Votes% Seats 5.3 1.42 43.3 46.85 38.3 42.28 3.3 2.85 1.6 2.0 2.5 2.28 2008 % Votes% Seats IU PSOE PP CiU UPyD PNV ERC 3.77 43.87 39.94 3.03 1.19 1.19 1.16 0.57 48.29 44.00 2.86 0.29 1.71 0.86 Source: Encarnacion(2008) and Centre for Sociological Research(CIS) survey. 82 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

Table 4: European Election Results, 1987–2009, PSOE and PP PSOE PP PSOE PP 1987 % Seats 39.06% 28 24.65% 17 1999 % Seats 35.33% 24 39.74% 27 1989 % Seats 39.57% 27 21.41% 15 2004 % Seats 43.46% 25 41.21 24 1994 % Seats 30.79% 22 40.12% 28 2009 % Seats 38.51% 21 43.23% 23 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Abbreviations ap : Alianza Popular(until 1988, thereafter Partido Popular) c i u : Convergència i Unió erc : Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya iu : Izquierda Unida pce : Partido Comunista de España pnv : Partido Nacionalista Vasco pp : Partido Popular psoe : Partido Socialista Obrero Español ucd : Unión de Centro Democrático up y d : Unión Progreso y Democracia Bibliography Astudillo, J., and E. García-Guereta(2006):»If It Isn’t Broken, Don’t Fix It: The Spanish Popular Party in Power,« in South European Society and Politics 11(3 and 4): 399–417. Barreiro, B.(2002):»La progresiva desmovilización de la izquierda en España: un análisis de la abstención en las elecciones generales de 1986 a 2000,« in Revista Española de Ciencia Política 5: 183–205. Bosco, A., and I. Sánchez-Cuenca(2009): La España de Zapatero. Años de Cambios 2004–2008. Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias. Campmany, J.(2005): El Efecto ZP. 1000 Días de Campaña para llegar a la Moncloa; Planeta. ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 83

Castro, C.(2008): Relato Electoral de España 1977–2007; Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona. Castromil, A.(2007):»Treinta años de elecciones democráticas(1977–2004): ¿cómo votan los españoles?,« Escola galega de Administración Pública. Chhibber, P., and M. Torcal(1997):»Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in a New Democracy: Spain,« in Comparative Political Studies 30(1): 27–54. Cox, G.(1990):»Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems,« in American Journal of Political Science 34: 903–35. Dalton, R. J.(2006):»Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of Ideological Polarization,« in Japanese Journal of Political Science 7(1): 1–22. Dalton, R. J.(2008):»The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences,« in Comparative Political Studies 41(7): 899–920. Encarnacion, Omar G.(2008): Spanish Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Estefanía, J. et al.(2008): Down But Not Out. Report on Democracy in Spain 2008; Fundación Alternativas. Field, Bonnie N.(2005):»De-thawing Democracy: The Decline of Political Party Collaboration in Spain(1977 to 2004),« in Comparative Political Studies 38.9 (November): 1079–1103. Field, Bonnie N., and K. Hamann(2008): Democracy and Institutional Development. Spain in Comparative Theoretical Perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. García Viñuela, E., and J. Artés(2009): Una Estimación del Voto Estratégico en las Elecciones Generales Españolas, 2000–2008; Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. González, J. J.(2004):»Voto y control democrático: las elecciones del 14-M,« Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia. Hamann, K.(2000):»Linking Policies and Economic Voting: Explaining Reelection in the Case of the Spanish Socialist Party,« in Comparative Political Studies 33(8): 1018–48. Hopkin, Jonathan(2005):»Spain: Proportional Representation with Majoritarian Outcomes,« in Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell(eds.): The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press: 375–394. ideas (2010): Ideas for a New Economy, Towards a More Sustainable Spain in 2025, Report, January 2010, ideas for Progress Foundation. Knutsen, O.(1998):»Expert Judgments of the Left–Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal Study,« in West European Politics 21(2): 63–94. Lago Peñas, I., and J. R. Montero(2005): Del 11-M al 14-M: Los mecanismos del cambio electoral, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Laver, M., and W. B. Hunt(1992): Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge. Macridis, R. C., and B. E. Brown(1990): Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings. Pacific Grove, ca : Brooks-Cole Publishing. Maravall, J. M.(1995): Los resultados de la democracia. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Márquez, M. L. and V. Ramírez(1998):»The Spanish Electoral System: Proportionality and Governability,« in Annals of Operations Research, vol. 84: 45–59. Martin Nájera, A.(2009): Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Fundación Pablo Iglesias. 84 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain ipg 4/2010

Méndez Lago, M.(2006):»Turning the Page: Crisis and Transformation of the Spanish Socialist Party,« in South European Society and Politics 14(2): 227–31. Michavilla, N.(2005): Guerra, Terrorismo y elecciones: incidencia electoral de los atentados islamistas en Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, DT N13/2005. Ramiro, L., and L. Morales(2004):»Latecomers but Early Adapters: The Adaptation and Response of Spanish Parties to Social Changes,« in K. Lawson and T. Poguntke(eds.): How Political Parties Respond to Voters. Interest Aggregation Revisited. London: Routledge: 198–226. Sáez Lozano, J. L.(2001):»Las elecciones del 12-M en perspective: una interpretación estratégica,« in Revista de Estudios Políticos. Torcal and Lago(2008):»The 2008 General Election in Spain,« in South European Society& Politics 13: 363–375. Torcal, M., and L. Medina(2002):»Ideología y voto en España 1979–2000: los procesos de reconstrucción racional de la identificación ideológica,« in Revista Española de Ciencia Política 6: 57–96. Urquizu, I.(2008):»9-M: Elecciones tras la crispación,« in Claves de la Razón Práctica 181: 48–55. Van Biezen, I.(2003): Political Parties in New Democracies, Party Organization in Eastern and Southern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Viñuela, E., and J. Artes(2009):»Una estimación del voto estratégico de Izquierda Unida al Partido Socialista en las elecciones generales del período 2000–2008,« in Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas 128: 35–56. Acknowledgements: Carlos Mulas, Director of ideas supervised the preparation of this document. Special contributions have been made by Irene Ramos, head of the Politics, Equality and Citizenship area; David Giménez, head of the Institutional Relations area; and Ludolfo Paramio, member of the Board of the ideas Foundation and of the Spanish High Council of Scientific Research. In addition, David del Campo, Head of Cabinet of the psoe ’s Secretariat of Organization and José Antonio Espejo, Head of Cabinet of the psoe ’s Secretariat for International Policy and Cooperation as well as Jesús Caldera Sánchez-Capitán, member of the Spanish Parliament( psoe ), and vice-president of the ideas foundation have reviewed the paper. All these contributions are greatly appreciated. ipg 4/2010 de Paz Nieves/Moreno Rodriguez, Spain 85

The British Labour Party: New Labour Out of Power PATRICK DIAMOND BRITISH LABOUR PARTY(LP) Official website: www.labour.org.uk Party leader: Rt. Hon. Harriet Harman(acting) History at a glance: Founded by Keir Hardie in 1900. It was first elected as a minority government in 1924, with Ramsey MacDonald as Prime Minister, ruling until 1929. The first majority Labour Government in Britain was elected under Clement Attlee in 1945. SI and PES membership: SI and PES member Party membership: 2010: 190,000 members 1997: 405,000 members Since the 2010 General Election in May, however, over 15,000 people have applied to join the party. Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2010: 29.1% of the votes(258 MPs), in opposition 2005: 35.6% of the votes(356 MPs), in government 2001: 41.2% of the votes(415 MPs), in government 1997: 44.0% of the votes(418 MPs), in government Electoral resonance European elections: 2009: 15.6% of the votes 2004: 22.6% of the votes 1999: 26.8% of the votes 1994: 44% of the votes Government participation: Since 2010: in opposition 1997–2010: in government; head of government: Tony Blair(1997–June 2007), Gordon Brown(June 2007–2010) 86 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

D espite the electoral dominance enjoyed by the Labour Party since the mid-1990s, major questions have since emerged about its overall strategic direction as a party of power. These concern, first, the formation of the first coalition government in British politics for over 80 years and second, where the party now stands in relation to the twin poles of Europe and the United States. Since the mid-1990s, the Labour Party has enjoyed the most sustained period of electoral success in its history. Until 1997, Labour governed for relatively short intervals, as the Conservative Party achieved electoral hegemony in twentieth-century British politics. Only in 1945–51 and 1964–70 was Labour able to make a substantial impression on the country as a party of government. After 1997, however, so-called»New« Labour triumphed in three successive general elections. Despite the electoral success of the»new« Labour party, a wide-ranging debate is now under way among progressives in British politics concerning whether Labour has bequeathed an institutional legacy to the country akin to the 1945 post-war settlement. Critics allege that the party’s achievements were compromised by acquiescence to neoliberalism and that too little was done to change the terms of political debate during the New Labour years. On the other hand, New Labour’s supporters argue that it is the center-right in Britain that has been forced to accommodate a social democratic agenda. The Thatcherite inheritance has been ditched under David Cameron to enable the Conservative Party to become a potential party of government. No party can win an election in Britain any longer on an avowedly right-wing policy agenda. This is the ultimate triumph of New Labour, redefining the center-ground of British politics. The landscape of British politics was transformed, however, by the 2010 general election, and the formation of a center-right alliance between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democratic Party. Britain now has a multi-party system, and the combined Conservative-Labour vote share has fallen to its lowest ever level. This will make it even harder for either party to gain an absolute parliamentary majority, even under a»first-pastthe-post« electoral system. It is likely that British politics in the future will be far more pluralistic, with governments formed through coalitions and power-sharing agreements. The traditional mould of British politics has been decisively broken, with significant strategic implications for the uk Labour Party. The formation of New Labour was achieved by fusing together ideas and ideologies associated with the American progressive tradition, and ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 87

reconciling them with European social democracy. The idea was that Britain would bridge an Anglo-American orientation towards economic efficiency and market deregulation, with strong social protection and an approach to social justice associated with the welfare states of Western Europe. The great debate for the future is whether Labour will move closer to the European social model, bringing markets under firmer regulatory control and adopting an essentially European posture on defense and global security. There is some evidence that such an approach would be popular with voters, closer to what the British electorate is seeking after the Iraq crisis of 2003, and the global economic crisis of autumn 2008. But it would amount to a decisive rejection of the Third Way approach adopted by New Labour under the leadership of Blair and Brown. Current Situation The 2010 Election The Labour Party won 29.1 percent of the vote in the 2010 General Election. This is the second lowest share of the vote in a national parliamentary election for Labour since the First World War, reducing its representation to 258 mp s. Labour lost almost one million votes in comparison to 2005. Opinion polling evidence suggests that the most important issue in the election campaign was the economy(32 percent), followed by health (26 percent), education(23 percent), asylum and immigration(14 percent), taxation(12 percent), and unemployment(11 percent)( ipsos mori Political Monitor 2010). In fact, the dominant issue was how quickly each of the parties would seek to eliminate the uk ’s structural deficit, which now stands at 12.9 percent of gdp . The Conservative Party said that it would implement immediate cuts, irrespective of the overall health of the economy, after the most severe global recession for over 80 years. Meanwhile, Labour and the Liberal Democrats argued that it would be damaging to proceed too quickly with public spending cuts, and that it was necessary to sustain the stimulus, not cut too early. Even Labour promised to halve the deficit within four years, however, to be achieved by a stronger emphasis on income tax rises for the better-off. 88 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

Perceptions of economic competence were clearly central to the electoral outcome. The situation was very challenging for the Labour government, since it was in office when the financial crisis struck in autumn 2008. The British economy then experienced six consecutive quarters of contraction, while the rate of unemployment and bankruptcies rose sharply. Labour did succeed in narrowing the Conservatives’ advantage on economic competence over the course of 2009, however, arguing that fiscal activism had saved jobs and protected living standards. By May 2010, the two parties were level-pegging on the economy, although in the three previous elections Labour had enjoyed substantial leads. Labour also suffered the perils of incumbency after 13 years in office: by May 2010, 76 percent of voters agreed that Britain needed»a fresh team of leaders«( ipsos mori 2010). In 1997, New Labour successfully built a broad electoral coalition, enabling it to secure 44 percent of the popular vote; by 2010, this had crumbled. The loss of support for Labour was greatest among middle and lower income voters. In 2005, 43 percent of C2»blue collar« voters had supported Labour. By 2010, this support had declined to 23 percent. The party also lost substantial support in the south and south-east of England, winning only 10 out of 210 parliamentary seats and 16 percent of the popular vote. Initial analysis has attributed Labour’s poor electoral performance in 2010 to a loss of support among aspirational,»middle Britain« voters. Powerful forces in the global economy have squeezed pay and the cost of living over the past five years, increasing the sense of frustration and unease about issues such as immigration and welfare reform. While Labour had succeeded in building a powerful coalition of aspirational voters and traditional supporters in 1997 by claiming it would unify economic efficiency and social justice, this coalition had substantially broken down by 2010. Labour’s Performance in Government Where Labour goes next will be significantly determined by perceptions of its performance in office since 1997. For those who want Labour to pursue a radical program in the future that is more in tune with traditional social democracy, we have just witnessed 13 wasted years. The Labour government under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown had a unique ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 89

opportunity to reverse the social and economic inequalities that had arisen since Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, to rebuild the welfare state and public services, and to forge a fairer, more equal society. This opportunity was squandered by an administration which, according to these commentators, was determined to accept the fundamental tenets of market liberalism, to govern within the parameters of the Thatcher settlement rather than to break with it decisively, and to join the United States in a war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan that has dangerously divided the Western world. Those more sympathetic to New Labour contest this account vigorously, arguing that, whatever direction the Labour Party takes in the future, it will need to build on the achievements of Blair and Brown, not discard or disown them. These commentators point out that past Labour Governments, such as the 1945 Attlee administration, were disparaged for a long period after defeat. The Attlee era, however, was later celebrated as the party’s finest hour in which the National Health Service( nhs ) and the post-war welfare state were built. So it will be, its advocates say, with New Labour a decade from now. Objectively, Labour’s commitment to public services since 1997 is without parallel in modern British history. Investment in the nhs has more than doubled since the mid-1990s and is now higher than the European average: education, policing, criminal justice and transport have all received a substantial spending boost. There have also been significant performance improvements across the public services. For example, schools in England were performing better than ever in the international pisa study of numeracy and literacy among seven and 14 year olds by the early 2000s. The public realm in Britain is now stronger, safer, and more sustainable than in the previous decade. Steady growth in the British economy meant not only rising real incomes for the majority and a fall in unemployment to the lowest ever level, but a dividend to invest in Britain’s public services. Critics on the center-right, of course, argue that too much money was wasted on bureaucracy and placating the public sector workforce. Market-led reforms in health and education were insufficiently radical in expanding competition and choice, they contend. While local perceptions of public services improved, it is certainly the case that nationally many voters were skeptical about whether Labour had really brought about a fundamental transformation in public service performance. 90 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

On inequality, Labour’s record was rather more contentious. The aim of policy was to narrow the gap in real incomes between the middle and the bottom of the distribution. This objective was largely fulfilled through income transfers and tax credits. There were half a million fewer children in poverty by 2008–2009, with far fewer pensioners struggling on very low incomes. Overall, however, the gap between rich and poor widened during this period. In particular, there were concerns that the very wealthy were allowed to get even richer under New Labour, as demonstrated by the Gini coefficient. This was exacerbated by the financial crisis in autumn 2008, when the inequality of rewards enjoyed by bankers and financiers was blamed as a source of instability in the financial markets. Most controversial of all, of course, was Tony Blair’s decision to commit Britain to war in Iraq alongside the United States in 2003, as part of the unfolding war on terror. The decision to take Britain to war has to be set alongside three other significant themes in New Labour’s foreign policy. The first relates to Tony Blair’s commitment to liberal interventionism as set out in his Chicago lecture of April 1999. This was based on the argument that it was legitimate to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states – if necessary, by military force – in order to uphold international law and to protect fundamental human rights. The second theme is that, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the uk government decided to give unconditional and unilateral support to America in its pursuit of the war on terror. This stance reflected Britain’s post-war commitment to the so-called»special relationship« with the United States and was shared by all governments, whether left or right. Finally, despite the initial enthusiasm for the European project and Blair’s insistence that Britain must be»at the heart of Europe,« there was increasing skepticism about whether the eu could operate as an effective global player in security and defense matters. The Labour government’s European policy might best be described as one of conditional pro-Europeanism. The British case for Europe has rested since the 1970s largely on economics and the national interest. Few British politicians have ever been prepared to present a broader political argument in favor of Europe as a matter of principle. In the British debate, Europe is cast as the most effective solution to relative economic decline, where there is little or no alternative to full participation in the expanding European market. ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 91

This line of argument continued largely unaltered under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, both of whom preferred to make the case for Britain to Europe, rather than the case for Europe in Britain. They were arguably too prone to lecturing Europeans about flaws in the eu and the inefficient European economy, when the British model clearly had its own systemic weaknesses, most graphically revealed by the global financial crisis. The Gradual Death of British Social Democracy? There appear to be three factors that explain New Labour’s success in British politics since the early 1990s(Beech 2009). The first is that, electorally, New Labour has worked successfully as a moderate party firmly located in the center-ground. It succeeded in attracting a large number of voters who had previously supported the Conservatives, as well as the urban middle class, while retaining its traditional supporters in the North-East, North-West, Scotland, and Wales. Labour had at last emerged as the natural party of government. The second factor was that Labour in office was highly focused on achieving a discrete range of feasible objectives: establishing economic competence, implementing specific social policies, such as the national minimum wage and tax credits, and signing the European Social Chapter; expanding investment in the public services, alongside major structural and institutional reforms; and renewing Britain’s constitutional settlement through House of Lords reform and devolution for Scotland and Wales. In the past, Labour governments had often floundered on achieving high office, blown from one economic crisis to the next and unable to achieve any of their grand ambitions for social justice. New Labour, in contrast, put a strong emphasis on credible reform and the implementation of policy, never taking risks with economic stability. Finally, New Labour was able to effectively outmaneuver its opponents, forcing the Conservatives under William Hague, Iain DuncanSmith, and Michael Howard out to the right. For over a decade, the Conservative Party refused to change, shedding the image and policies that had caused it to lose so badly in 1997. This allowed New Labour and Tony Blair to dominate the British political landscape uninterruptedly until after the 2005 general election. Why, then, did New Labour lose its pre-eminence and cease to be a credible election-winning force; what occurred to cause it to lose the 92 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

mantle of being a serious contender for power by 2010? It is self-evident that the global economic crisis of 2008 badly damaged Labour’s reputation for economic competence. Having presided over a decade of stability and growth, Gordon Brown’s record as Chancellor is now a matter of serious conjecture and debate. The prosperity that the uk had enjoyed since the mid-1990s appeared increasingly illusory, built on a speculative housing bubble that collapsed with spectacular effect after the banking crisis in 2008. New Labour was increasingly implicated in the financial crisis because it was perceived to have liberalized the arrangements for uk financial regulation after 1997. This flawed economic model meant that Labour’s plans for public services came to rest on equally fragile foundations. According to this conception of social democracy, a buoyant financial services sector would provide the funds for long-term investment in the public realm through consistent economic growth. But after the seismic financial shock of autumn 2008, that growth model collapsed, leaving public services increasingly vulnerable to severe cuts, as all political parties openly pursued fiscal consolidation and austerity policies. This meant that, as New Labour entered the 2010 election, serious questions remained unanswered about the future of the party and British social democracy. What was the model of political economy that would replace the discredited commitment to global financial markets? How could Labour continue to improve public services at a time of fiscal constraint? How should the burden of fiscal consolidation be shared fairly to protect the most vulnerable in society? And given the impact of the recession and the scandal over parliamentary expenses on the morale of party activists and supporters, how should the base of the Labour Party itself be revived? There was little discussion about these ideological and political questions within the Labour Party itself in the period immediately prior to the government’s defeat. This made the prospects for British social democracy appear bleak indeed. New Labour: Life after Death? There is wide-ranging discussion in progressive circles about where »New« Labour goes from here. The Labour Party needs to have a far clearer conception of what it stands for and the kind of change it wants to bring about in British society. In the 1950s and 1960s, Labour developed ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 93

a model of egalitarian social democracy based on the writings of Anthony Crosland, who himself drew on earlier European revisionists, such as Bernstein and Kautsky. Crosland argued that Labour’s purpose was to bring about a more equal society in which resources, rewards, and opportunities would be more fairly distributed. Simply refurbishing traditional egalitarian ideology is hardly sufficient given the profound changes that have occurred in Western Europe over the past thirty years. But there needs to be sustained reflection in Labour circles about how to draw together its ideational commitments in a way that appeals to a broad coalition of the British electorate. Labour also needs to confront and address the major structural dilemmas and issues that made it increasingly unpopular in government. These included the decision to join the United States in the war in Iraq and the attendant consequences of the war on terror; the dislike of excessive»spin« and overzealous communications hastened by the rise of the»24/7« news cycle; and increasing disillusionment with politics itself, as evidenced by the catastrophic collapse of political trust since the mid-1990s, despite a wave of constitutional reforms under New Labour. Finally, Labour needs to formulate a set of credible policy goals that will address the social and economic challenges that Britain is likely to face in the decade ahead. Many outstanding Labour aspirations have been achieved since 1997, such as the national minimum wage and reform of the House of Lords. Labour needs to develop a coherent program for the future, rather than resting on past achievements. In the meantime, new issues have emerged, such as the revolutionary changes in the role of women in society and the emergence of new concerns about quality of life and the environment. The durability of the world economy is likely to remain of serious concern, and Labour will need to develop an approach to economic growth that fits with the need for sustained and coordinated action in Europe and across the world. Many of the guiding assumptions of neoliberalism have been discredited in recent years, but they are reappearing by default in the absence of a clear progressive or social democratic alternative. This relates to whether Labour’s conception of Britain’s future involves enabling the uk to become more like a mainstream European country, with European-style commitments to social welfare and public services, a pluralist and devolved polity, and a security and defense axis strongly oriented to the eu itself rather than the United States. New Labour was founded on a desire to avoid these painful strategic choices, 94 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

and to carve out a Third Way in British politics that would transcend false polarities. Whether this approach is really credible for the future remains very doubtful. There are major choices ahead that will need to be confronted honestly and clearly, and for which Labour’s enduring values can provide a compelling guide. But there is an even more fundamental challenge that Labour must face in the period ahead: a profound transformation in the political and electoral landscape of Britain. The 2010 general election saw the rise of the first coalition government in Britain for over 80 years. This is a reflection of the end of twoparty politics and the emergence of liberal, green, and nationalist parties that absorb an increasing share of the popular vote. The effect will not only be to end majoritarian,»winner takes all« governments, but to usher in a more pluralistic political system, promising a profound change in Britain’s political culture. Historically, Labour has tended to see its role as securing a clear parliamentary majority through which it could enact a socialist program. It had little appetite for cooperation with other parties, movements, and political forces in society, beyond the trade unions. It may well now be time to discard that mind-set, as it is highly unlikely that Labour will be in a position to govern alone for the foreseeable future. But the coalition poses an even more striking challenge to Labour’s status. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are attempting to dominate the centerground by stealing the mantle of progressive reform. The new coalition has promised to enact far-reaching financial and political reforms, and to protect the most vulnerable from the impact of public spending cuts and fiscal retrenchment. It will attempt to introduce historic constitutional changes, such as a wholly elected second chamber and a referendum on the Alternative Vote system for the House of Commons. Whether or not this is actually achieved is beside the point; the rhetoric and scope of ambition signaled by the Conservative-Liberal Democratic alliance should not be underestimated. Historically, Labour has tended to see itself as the progressive party in British politics, but that claim is being contested as never before. After a decade in which the Conservative Party effectively vacated the center-ground of British politics, it is now back with a vengeance under the leadership of David Cameron. Labour underestimates this development at its peril. Electoral politics aside, the challenge for Labour and British social democracy is similar to that for the European center-left as a whole: ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 95

how to achieve its core commitment to protecting the living standards and aspirations of middle and lower income workers, given the realities of globalization and the knowledge-driven economy. Since 1945, social democratic politics have been predicated on redistribution based on a model of Keynesian political economy. This used regulatory and fiscal measures to protect the real wages and incomes of workers, and to insure individuals against lifetime risks through a universal welfare state. But it presupposed a unitary national economy and the idea that social democracy could be achieved in one country. This is hardly tenable any longer, given that globalization is a self-evident fact, and increasingly the distinction between domestic and international politics is becoming obsolete. This will require social democrats to revive the internationalist mindset that came to define their mission at the turn of the twentieth century. The left has failed to benefit electorally from the economic crisis because it lacks a credible account of the politics of globalization. In reality, voters confront two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, they want strong governments to shield them from the economic and physical insecurities that globalization brings. On the other hand, they value choice and autonomy, and are increasingly skeptical of the capacity of centralizing states to protect jobs and living standards in a global economy. There are undoubtedly widespread fears of globalization across much of Europe. This relates to the occupational shift away from traditional semi-skilled occupations in mass manufacturing towards high-skilled service-oriented jobs. Employment polarization and rising wage inequalities are pervasive across the eu 27. However, social democrats will overreach themselves if they believe that the crisis legitimates the expansion of big government at the expense of the market. At the same time, voters are prepared to accept that national governments cannot shield them indefinitely from globalizing forces. There may be a demand for radical measures to deal with the impact of the financial crisis and to reform the financial institutions whose practices fostered excessive risk-taking and irresponsibility. But voters are most likely to support the party that is able to establish a framework of stability and order, within which they can lead their lives. They yearn for a safe pair of hands that will protect them from excessive turmoil and risk. The left in Europe has to work through this conundrum, instead of appearing to deny it. To begin with, there are three credible views of the role of the state, not just two. One is the»laissez-faire,« minimalist view: one that is still 96 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

dear to parts of the neoliberal right. Another is to argue unequivocally for the idea of the»centralizing state« as a guarantor of equity. But the third view is of a state with a strong strategic capacity that doesn’t try to run everything itself. New Labour might describe this as an»enabling state.« This may, however, come across as more minimalist than the situation requires. In fact, strategic capacity demands market-ordering, not just market-accepting. Social democrats need to argue for the construction of a reformed»developmental« state with far stronger, more focused strategic capabilities. That implies a very different approach to governing. In addition, there should be no retreat from the market economy à la Jospin. Open markets are the best available means of stimulating innovation and efficiency, and these benefits are strengthened by globalization. However, new technology and new consumer demands constantly create new patterns of»winners« and»losers.« Those with the right skills stand to succeed, while there is a continual loss of»good« working class jobs as companies invest in new markets, outsource, and de-localize. Well before the crisis, the confidence that economic growth automatically leads to broad-based prosperity had been eroded. While most social democrats claim they always recognized that markets are a good servant but a bad master, they didn’t say that clearly and explicitly and follow through the implications for policy. In the benign period created by the wave of globalization that has gathered force since the mid-1990s, such beliefs seemed out of sync with the times. Revisionists did foresee that the fatal weakness of globalization was not the economic dynamism it unleashed, but the fact that increased economic interdependence was not matched by new forms of global governance. Given neoliberalism’s intellectual hegemony, there was no decisive impulse to act before it proved too late. And we cannot be sure even now that the crisis has generated sufficient political impetus to secure comprehensive reform of global economic governance. But the global financial crisis has dramatically resurrected the social democratic case for an»active state.« There is, of course, little point in dusting down the interventionist industrial policies of the past. Nor is this the time to return to a protectionist, anti-European, anti-global,»socialism in one country« model. Social democracy must not turn its back on the dynamic strengths of economic openness, but recognize explicitly that the market’s limits, potential for failure, and resulting inequalities need to be better managed in the public interest. ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 97

The new paradigm should be one of multi-level governance within the framework of which, through political action at national, European, and international level, as well as regional and local, government has the necessary strategic capacity to act in order to shape the forces of globalization. Public policy towards industry has to change. Social democrats have to put the emphasis on supporting the right framework conditions for growth such as skills, competition, infrastructure, and research. In the uk , at least, even this is no longer sufficient, given the huge problems of lack of economic opportunity that we still face: the long tail of under-performance in our education system and continued neglect of skills; stubbornly high levels of worklessness and poor labor market integration of some ethnic minority groups; and regional problems of economic decline in old industrial areas with an overdependence on a low-wage service economy. This means a new impetus for the development of sectoral policies, regional specialization, lead technologies, and recognition of the need for long-term government planning in transport and energy to tackle climate change. Of course, a new era of industrial activism must avoid the»lame duck« bailouts of the 1970s. Essentially, the effect of these was to freeze the old industrial structures of the time, in the vain hope that restructuring could be agreed that would raise performance. Instead, we need to move from supply side policies that enable, to industrial policies that are developmental, recognizing the vital role that only government can play. Social democracy also needs to find an appetite for remedies that promote responsible business behavior. This involves, for example, sensible European regulation and the abandonment of»race to the bottom« regulatory competition. As for business as a whole, there must be greater transparency on top pay; open-minded thinking about workplace empowerment to improve lagging productivity; competition rules that discourage merger and takeover fever; and the inclusion of stakeholder obligations in company law reforms. Social democrats need to liberate their approach from a neoliberal »competition state« model. But they should also embrace Albert Hirschman’s view that the best way for progressives to secure support for collective action in the public interest is to acknowledge that state intervention can have unintended consequences. There are limits to state power, as Keynes argued in the 1920s. Social democracy does not exist to promote and protect the state, but to ensure that the state advances the collective interest rather than 98 Diamond, United Kingdom ipg 4/2010

the vested interests of an elite. What social democrats need to fashion is not larger government, but a more capable strategic state that can steer and intervene in the increasingly complex networks and institutions of a globalized economy and society. This is the major intellectual challenge that the crisis poses for European social democracy. At European level, the Party of European Socialists, together with party-affiliated research and policy institutes in each of the member states, ought to establish a high-level taskforce to prepare a strategy document on social democracy and the state in the global era. The British Labour Party must also be an enthusiastic participant. This will make a vital contribution to the revival of social democracy across Europe, alongside the necessary renewal of our organizational and campaigning base. Social democrats, of course, need the people of Europe; but the people of Europe also need social democracy at a time of unprecedented challenge and uncertainty. There is not a moment to lose. References Beech, M.(2009):»No New Vision? The Gradual Death of British Social Democracy,« in Political Quarterly 80(4): 526–32. ipsos mori (2010):»Political Monitor«. Available at: www.ipsosmori.co.uk. ipg 4/2010 Diamond, United Kingdom 99

Innovating Social Democracy – Houdini-style A Perspective from the Dutch Labor Party(PvdA) * FRANS BECKER/ RENÉ CUPERUS DUTCH LABOR PARTY(PARTIJ VAN DE ARBEID, PVDA) Official website: www.pvda.nl Party leader: Job Cohen History at a glance: Founded in 1946, it was the successor of the pre-war Social Democratic Labour Party(SDAP), originally formed in 1894. SI and PES membership: SI member; PES: since 1992 Party membership: 2000: 58,426 2005: 61,111 2010: 54,504 Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2010: 19.6% of the votes(30/150 seats) 2006: 21.2% of the votes(33/150 seats) 2003: 28.0% of the votes(42/150 seats) Electoral resonance European elections: 2009: 12.5% of the votes(3/25 seats) 2004: 23.6% of the votes(7/25 seats) Government participation: 2006–2010: in government 1994–2002: in government; head of government: Wim Kok * Parts of this article were written as input for the so-called Amsterdam Process, a joint initiative of the London-based Policy Network and the Wiardi Beckman Stichting to renew and refresh social democracy and progressive politics. See www. policynetwork.com and www.wbs.nl. 100 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

Paradigm Shift Third Way renewal has reached its limits. This is, among other things, the result of a broader paradigm shift in society at large. In the first place, we are confronted with a crisis of financial capitalism, paying the price for the deregulated, unfettered economy of the past two decades. We have now reached the stage of collateral damage and aftershocks, in the form of the euro crisis and public finance crises. In programmatic terms, there is an urgent need to develop a new political economy for social democracy, a new concept of economic growth and governance, and a new public spirit of responsibility in the private and public sectors. Furthermore, the historical compromise or alliance between the labor movement and the cultural elites, as well as between the working class and the professional middle classes around the project of the welfare state has been put under strain because of changes in lifestyle, value orientations, labor market patterns, social mobility, and ill-understood austerity policies which many believe constitute a»betrayal.« This is partly one of the unintended consequences of the success of social democratic meritocracy. In programmatic terms, however, there is a fresh need to rethink the concept of solidarity . Society is also being challenged by a host of cultural trends and changes. Individualization(»bowling alone«), cultural diversification and pluralism(»multiculturalism« and the proliferation of lifestyles and identities), and growing fragmentation(»broken society«) demand a new social democratic approach to bridging and bonding in order to develop contemporary forms of social cohesion and community. Society has also lost its» sense de la politique «(Rosanvallon). One might say that the essential progressive idea of»positive freedom«(to borrow Isaiah Berlin’s term) is in crisis: the belief in a better society or a better personal life to be attained through politics, the state or collective action has eroded in many segments in society, including parts of the younger generation. The participatory republic of citizens has turned into a»spectator’s democracy.« This»audience democracy«(Bernard Manin and Jos de Beus) consists of consumers with weak party affiliation and a deep distrust of politics and political representatives. The »logic« of the media and of political campaigning is marginalizing the politics of deliberation, open discourse, and compromise. The national parties of the political center are under pressure; on the political flanks, right- and left-wing populism is on the rise. To re-establish trust in(social ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 101

democratic) politics we need quality investment in citizenship and democracy . Also needed are an unprejudiced discussion about new progressive alliances(the Greens, churches, trade unions), better recruitment and R&D(Research and Development), and restoration of dialogue and other links with social democratic constituencies. Needless to say, many of the changes we have mentioned are part of long-term trends. Nevertheless, the current financial and economic crisis can act as a catalyst. Just as the Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s gave rise to the New Deal and the construction of the European welfare state; and just as the crisis of the welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to Reaganite and Thatcherite neoliberalism; the contemporary systemic crisis is calling out for a new design and formula for our political economy and democracy. What is at stake? Is a new period of growing social unrest, dangerous new inequalities, multicultural conflict, economic decline, demographic stress, and the implosion of democracy looming? Or is this picture far too gloomy and are we, instead, entering an era characterized by a prosperous, sustainable knowledge-based economy for all, and witnessing the rise of truly cosmopolitan citizenship in a global age? A Neo-Idealist Project Come what may, social democracy and our democratic system will be tested in unprecedented circumstances: can they come up with answers and solutions to the new challenges? After the era of collectivization and state intervention(New Deal) and that of markets and individuals(neoliberalism), a new paradigm is required. The politics of nostalgia is not an option. What we need instead is a strategy of»innovating social democracy,« profiting from the rich tradition of the socialist movement and applying basic social democratic values, with nonconformist bravery, to our changing society. This innovation, in our opinion, should amount to much more than a new and unreflective round of adaptation to a simplified notion of the Globalized World, or an ill-defined project of change and reform. Instead, it should be a»neo-idealist« project, including the restoration of checks and balances to counter the mainstream economic and political thinking of policy elites. In any event, we must not allow ourselves once more to fall victim to a» pensée unique «(cited by Judt 2010) which crowds out 102 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

all others. This is the hard lesson we must learn from the capitulation to neoliberal hegemony, in recent decades, by far too many academics (chiefly economists), politicians, and commentators. All traditional center or»governing« parties have been hit by the changes mentioned above, but social democracy has been at the forefront. One indication of this is its unprecedented electoral vulnerability: diminishing party loyalty, smaller ups and bigger downs. In particular, the sociological and cultural cleavages between the higher and lower educated, and the pressure on national welfare states due to internationalization, Europeanization, and immigration call for innovation, which will necessarily entail a number of strategic dilemmas and choices. That’s the state we’re in. Innovation: We’ve Done It Before The history of Social Democracy is also a history of innovation – of ideas, organization, and practices. Revisionism is in Social Democracy’s dna . The origin of the concept of revisionism may be found in the struggle between the reformist and evolutionary wings of the German socialist movement, the reformers versus the dogmatists. Revisionism at the present time, however, is a project in a completely different context. Now, what is called for is the redefinition of the basics of social democracy after a period of hyper-pragmatism and ultra-realism, which some have even described as a period of collaboration with neoliberalism or of ideological»treason.« Revisionism nowadays should once again entail the(re-)introduction of analysis and critique of our societies(»Gesellschaftskritik« in German), a craft that was once characteristic of the progressive movement. Social democracy has always been about more than economic functionalism (»education is indispensable for our knowledge economy«) or a moral appeal(»education is good for the individual«). It has also focused on the analysis of structural barriers to social improvement and positive freedom(»education is the backbone of social equality«) and the institutional arrangements needed to overcome these barriers. It has analyzed the structures and relations of power, aiming at democratic control and accountability and opening up power structures for democratic participation(Crosland). How urgently the need for innovation manifests itself depends on both internal and external(to political parties) factors, but will usually ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 103

involve both. An internal drive for innovation may originate in bad electoral results, loss of government power, differences of opinion about the ideological course of the party, or groups feeling left out. An external drive for innovation may come from a systemic change in the party’s social or political support base; an inability to deal with new social and political questions; shifts in social structures and cultural patterns in society; or generational pressures. When both internal and external drives converge, a major paradigm shift may be in the offing. This might affect the general ideological outlook, party leadership and party elites, the organizational structure, electoral and political coalitions, alliances with organized groups in society, and the themes and issues to be put on the agenda. In contemporary politics political campaigns have become the ultimate focal point. Here all these elements come together and are put to the most severe reality test. The history of Social Democracy can be described as a long learning process, involving a succession of paradigms and the development of new insights, ranging from the notion of a radical rupture with capitalism, via models of socialist planning of the economy and society, to the institutionalization of a mixed economy. While basic principles such as social justice, equality, and emancipation are the hardware of the social democratic movement, these ideas, institutional frames, and notions about embedding capitalism can be considered the software . In the history of the Dutch Labor Party, such profound innovation processes took place in the 1930s, the late 1960s, and the early 1990s. In the late 1930s, the social democratic movement underwent a paradigm shift from the classical Marxist ideas of class struggle as the engine of history and a revolutionary perspective to a perspective of ethical socialism, involving the organization of capitalism within a democratic framework and according to criteria of social justice. This included a program for social security, economic recovery out of the crisis, and a claim to be treated as a serious partner in Dutch society and politics. A new electoral alliance between the working and middle classes was to replace the exclusive focus on the working class. The conceptual, political, and electoral changes were set in motion by a new generation, a group of idealistic »engineers« and intellectuals who were able to create a breakthrough for the isolated socialist movement in a pillarized society. In the early 1960s, after more than a decade of social democratic participation in government, the Dutch Labor Party went through a period of deep stagnation, in terms of ideas, organization, and electoral 104 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

support. The later party leader Joop den Uyl took the lead in a process of renewal, with the Galbraith-inspired concept of»quality of life« and an ambitious public sector program. But the real shift came when a new generation, united in the so-called New Left movement, stood up against the sclerosis in political culture with radical ideas to democratize society, to polarize Dutch politics, and to modernize the style and culture of the party, with radical proposals for both domestic and foreign policy. They opened up the Labor Party to new social movements, including feminists, environmentalists, and gays. The radicalization of the program and basic principles was matched by new political and electoral strategies. The post-war corporatist, consensual class compromise was replaced by a politics of polarization, with the new social movements as partners and a coalition of the parties on the left, bringing together the working class, the post-materialistic middle classes, and representatives of the creative class in an electoral alliance. A new revisionism emerged around 1990, when the Dutch Labor Party waved goodbye to its recent radical past and embraced a more pragmatic approach to welfare state reform, giving center stage to policies of labor market activation, retrenchment in social security, and participation. In effect, the Dutch Labor Party became the social-liberal forerunner of the Third Way, but without the label(Bill Clinton:»You were first, Wim«). Electorally, the party hoped to gain ground among young professionals and the middle classes, taking over the Christian Democratic position in the political center. In terms of government coalitions, Dutch Labor formed the»purple coalition« with the conservative and progressive liberals, without losing touch with the neo-corporatist network(the »Polder model«). Since the 2002 wave of populism in the Netherlands, new attempts have been made to get back in touch with the(presumably) lost electorate. Former party leader Wouter Bos, in his Den Uyl lecture, critically evaluated the Third Way accommodation-type politics of the PvdA (2010). Earlier, the PvdA had published a new party document on immigration and integration, proposing a much stricter approach. This document, however, proved to be divisive within the constituency of the Dutch Labor party. The party has been left in limbo: neither the social-liberal Third Way adaptation to the economy, nor the integrationist adaptation to antiimmigrant populism have united and inspired the party with a new selfconfidence or a new common sense of direction. ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 105

Strategic Choices Today Are we trying to re-animate a comatose political movement, or does social democracy still contain hidden potential capable of reuniting fragmenting and polarizing societies? Although trends may be compelling, we think that there is enough room to maneuver to allow innovation and the redefinition of the social democratic project under new circumstances. Basically, three options are open for social democracy. The first would be to make a clear-cut choice in favor of the»enlightened« professional middle classes as our most important constituency. They represent the future of the knowledge economy and are a growing segment of society, concentrated in the metropolitan areas. They are the carriers of optimistic, liberal, and cosmopolitan views on internationalization, multicultural integration, and European unification. Such a choice would facilitate a coalition or even close cooperation with the other two liberal left parties, D66 and GreenLeft, around a common project of further flexibilization of the labor market, European political integration, green innovation, individual autonomy, and stimulating talents. It would represent a cultural follow-up to the – primarily social and economic – Third Way, Dutch-style. As a side-effect this option might attract specific support from the new career and»power« feminists and migrant groups. The second option would be to choose what, against all the laws of marketing and pr , has been labeled a»social democracy of fear«(Tony Judt 2010). This would be aimed at regaining the support of the traditional as well as the new, flexible working classes and the lower middle class, and those dependent on public services, social security and welfare. It would defend the protection and security which the classical welfare state used to offer. It would be extremely critical of market forces, especially in the public sector, and of the European Union – at least of the market fundamentalist way in which it currently functions. It would be more activist, with strong local roots. This choice would entail closer cooperation with the Socialist Party(in the Dutch case) or Die Linke(in the German case). It would also restore a close coalition with the trade unions. Then there is a third option – but not a new Third Way! This option would involve freeing ourselves – Houdini-like – from the limiting conditions in which we currently find ourselves and restoring the broad coalition of working class and middle class, flexible workers in the personal 106 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

services sector and professionals in the new knowledge sectors, enlightened entrepreneurs and unionized industrial workers. This option would unite the aims of protection and emancipation with the aspirations and commitments of those who are succeeding in contemporary society. It would address the responsibility, commitment, participation, and citizenship of both, those who have a lot to gain and those who have already gained a lot. It would entail a broad coalition of the left, bridging the gap between the conservative and liberal left, and new alliances with the third sector and civic initiatives. Since we are true Houdini enthusiasts, 1 we definitely prefer this third option, which we will present briefly. As the 2010 Dutch national elections have shown once again, 2 social democracy is losing electoral support to the conservative left( sp ) and the progressive-liberal left(Greens and social-liberal D66). It is even losing votes to the Wilders party, not directly at these elections, but certainly – in the long term – indirectly, being bypassed by abstentions or a vote shift to the sp , illustrating the farewell of the leftist working class. The Dutch Labor Party is still the main force on the left(with 30 seats, compared to 10 for gl and D66 and 15 for the sp ), but it is having trouble defining an authentic position vis-à-vis its progressive competitors. It can survive, whether as an independent force of the left or as part of a larger progressive alliance, only if it comes up with a project of its own. In order to restore a coalition of the different constituencies of social democracy, a program is needed that connects the materialist perspective of fair pay, decent work, opportunities to move forward, and social and physical security with a post-materialistic or cultural perspective involving a sustainable environment, an open outlook on the world around us and, up to a point, an acceptance of cultural diversity. Such a program would counterbalance the strong centrifugal forces in the economic, cultural, and political realms: growing inequality, ossifying cultural cleavages, and division lines of distrust and abstention in our democracies. Moreover, it would halt the commercialization of public goods, instead, strengthening »res publica« by introducing a public ethic and orientation, also in the private and third sectors. It would also produce an agenda characterized 1. Harry Houdini(1874–1926) was a Hungarian-American magician and escapologist who became famous for his daring stunts. He was also a famous debunker of selfproclaimed psychics and mystics. 2. See also Frans Becker/ René Cuperus(2010): Politics in a fragmented society. The 2010 elections in the Netherlands . Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07318. pdf. ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 107

by modesty, self-restraint, and moderation, built around notions of ecological, social, and cultural»sustainability,« counteracting the hyperconsumerist rat race. This could be seen as a restoration of the concept of quality of life, but in an unprecedented fashion. Houdini-style Innovation in Social Democracy: A Conceptual Framework Our Houdini-option needs new ideas, concepts, and orientations. We would propose a conceptual framework along the following lines. A People-based Economy If financial forces and freedoms are not corrected and regulated, nothing will change. Social democracy should be one of the forces of correction, picking up the tradition of the»Fabian Essays in Socialism,« with their criticism of the non-productive rich. What we need is a political economy in which innovation and entrepreneurship are key, not markets, still less greed. A political economy that pays tribute to the central role of human capital in both the private and public sectors. A social democratic agenda should represent more than a critique of capitalism and should focus, among other things, on: ̈ quality of work(the return of craftsmanship, à la Sennett, in the private and public sectors, rebalancing the position of professionals visà-vis management, and including new possibilities of social mobility, offering ample opportunities for on-the-job training and education; ̈ a better balance between work, family, and care in the course of life; ̈ stimulating innovation, sustainability, and entrepreneurship, also regionally, in industry as well as in the public services, including a fresh view of employment conditions in the public sector; ̈ rebalancing the power relations within corporations, limiting the short-term shareholder perspective and strengthening the position of the other stakeholders; ̈ strengthening the position of young starter-entrepreneurs who go it alone, the entrepreneurs without employees who simply do not fit in to our old-fashioned welfare state schemes. 108 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

A Fair Deal in Income, Wealth, and Security The idea of fairness in the welfare state has been undermined, on the one hand, by easy access to and abuse of its provisions and, on the other, by the disproportionate increase in the wealth and income of investment bankers, corporate ceo s, and managers in the semi-public sector. Being»intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich«(British New Labour’s Peter Mandelson) is no longer merely an option, but almost a moral default. The idea of fairness is also being undermined by the shadow side of meritocracy. Meritocracy – a social democratic ideal since the 1950s – has two faces: the just idea that not family background should determine social success, but talent, skills and effort, but also the unjust effect that those with less talent are increasingly considered as a burden on our knowledge society. They do not feel treated with respect and dignity, and have a real fear of social degradation(see Franz Walter 2010, who has carefully analyzed the erosion of the sociology underpinning traditional German social democracy: the total alienation of»die Neue Mitte« with regard to»das neue Unten«). Education is clearly one of the roads to improving one’s chances in society, although education can also have negative meritocratic effects. For that reason, not only the education of engineers should be»excellent,« but also that of mechanics and plumbers. A social democratic agenda should restore fairness as a central concept in our societies, addressing not only the responsibility of the unemployed to try to get back into the labor market, but also the responsibility of the better off and the rich for the common good. It must rebalance and diminish the inequalities in income and wealth, life chances and prospects for personal development. The activating welfare society of the Third Way was a step forward compared to the income transfer welfare state we were used to, but activation has its limits(Vandenbroucke). The old risks of unemployment, sickness, and loss of income have not vanished. Belonging in a Pluralist Society One of the most divisive issues in the political laboratory that is the Netherlands in recent decades is immigration and integration. It is a big-city problem that has spread fear, anger, and dissent far beyond the cities’ boundaries. It is a complex problem caused, among other things, ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 109

by badly managed immigration and integration processes, the speed and concentration of change, and the shock mutual encounter of conservative and liberal cultures under conditions of globalization, European integration, and individualization, which has already had a corrosive effect on the lives and prospects of lower class citizens in particular. It has led to disruptive extremism and populism. A social democratic agenda should start from the socio-economic basics – education, work, participation, social mobility – but should extend to a much wider agenda, including: ̈ security and freedom from fear in the streets:»smart« law and order (disproportionate levels of crime are eroding trust between different ethnic and social groups and threatening to turn high-trust societies into low-trust ones); ̈ the rule of law; ̈ active support for»family education« to combat the parental education crisis; ̈ turning bad schools into good schools by urgently creating the conditions they need to perform better; ̈ deliberative processes of bonding and bridging in the cities. A sense of belonging – around the concept of responsible citizenship – must be restored in the face of powerful countervailing forces of division and distrust. Local politics in particular is where this should be put into practice. It is the metropolitan areas where the contrasts between rich and poor, old working class and new immigrant workers arise and clash (Sassen), but also where new identities might be forged. The Return of Positive Freedom Contemporary European societies are still characterized by certain patterns of collective behavior, but a strong sense of individuality has been emerging. We are living in an unleashed society in which – in the wake of the cultural revolution of the 1970s and the commercial revolution of the 1990s – negative freedom in some ways seems to have become generalized. A social democratic agenda should focus on rebalancing individual freedom and community – on the concepts of positive freedom and social cohesion(Job Cohen’s»keeping society together«). Part of this agenda is directed towards moderation as a virtue – the development of checks and balances to curb the strong influence of commercial and economic forces in our societies(including crucial cultural institutions, such as broadcasting and the universities). It aims at 110 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

creating a new balance between the public and private sectors, redefining the role of the public sphere(Anthony Giddens), instilling the private sector with public ethics and the public sector with high quality standards and a new professionalism. What We Want to Cherish The social democracy of the Third Way embraced and propagated change. In the Netherlands, we have gone through 30 years of change and reform of the welfare state, and still more change is desired. Unfortunately, this program of change has been sloppy and lacking in arguments; has generated inequality; and has been disruptive in a number of sectors, undermining professional ethics and standards. Social democracy has followed fashion and the mainstream economic consensus, which failed dramatically to warn of the oncoming financial crisis. It has botched its role as countervailing power, so much needed to provide checks and balances at the time when capitalism was being unleashed. This was disastrous timing, to say the least. A society cannot live by change alone. It also needs continuity. Social democracy must therefore ask itself what it wants to cherish: what is worth keeping? Lampedusa’s dictum that if we don’t want anything to change, everything has to change (»Bisogna cambiare tutto per non cambiare niente«) no longer applies in a world in flux, in which the uncertainty of the elites in a global age is transferred to the»pornography of change«(René Cuperus) with the aim of reducing insecurity. Continuity and stability, however, require a change of mentality and of the agenda of social democracy itself. Risks and Pitfalls: Are We Still in Touch? Reinventing social democracy is necessary if it is to stage a comeback and win the war of ideas, not to mention campaigns and elections. But there are a number of risks and pitfalls. The first is that, at present, we face a period of 10 years of severe austerity policies, involving cutbacks in public spending to balance the public finances. Is there no substantially different, progressive way of tackling the crisis, beginning with a European Keynesian push to restore growth? Why not continue with a program of moderate cutbacks, combined with innovation and public commitment ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 111

to an improved public sector? Is there a way of engaging and appealing to citizens and public sector professionals, instead of letting them become mere passive victims of cuts and negative policy measures? The second pitfall is our fatal addiction to governing, the sadomasochistic relationship of social democrats to government. We might recall the familiar advice of an old Dutch socialist who was extremely adept in coalition politics: social democrats should only participate in government»if there is something for us to govern.« Unlike their predecessors, contemporary social democrats too often think in terms of technocratic ministerial dossiers instead of alliances and coalitions with social institutions or groups in civil society. Social democrats consider themselves to be managers of public policy systems, bringing about top-down change. In contrast to more populist political groups, they have become disconnected from the aspirations and anxieties of their voters. This brings us to the third pitfall, which we will put in the form of a question: Are we still in touch? Are we able to innovate in a climate of lack of trust in politics, in our parties, and in the carriers of our ideas, our politicians? Are we in touch with our constituencies, able to bridge the gap between lower and higher educated voters? Are we as parties living according to our professed ideals? Are we in touch with labor: or do we believe that the conservative left – embodied, according to many reformers, in the anachronistic trade unions – is the enemy within? Are we in touch with the»Zeitgeist,« within the framework of which, like a judoka, we will prevail by turning the strength of adverse forces against themselves? Are our parties in touch with standards of professionalism when they are needed: recruitment of the best and most representative politicians, effective campaigns, and timely changes of leadership? Are social democratic parties still in touch in terms of élan, energy, curiosity, openness, and countervailing ideas? Or have we become too isolated and can we only survive with a new effort to break open our own institutions? What we need are new progressive party formations and alliances, new contacts with the social organizations of the younger generation, and mobilization around new issues(climate change, the quality of higher education and the media, precarious jobs). 112 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

By Way of a Conclusion The problems of Europe’s center parties reflect what is happening in society. Potential splits within catch-all parties(»Volksparteien«) may foreshadow splits in society as a whole. We urgently need a»social New Deal«, a new pact between the privileged and the less privileged, forging a new idea of progress. Such a pact would be characterized by socio-economic security(based on a stable welfare state) and cultural openness (a tolerant, international outlook, while retaining national democracy). Social democrats need to develop a program that addresses the socioeconomic insecurities and options of the broader social democratic constituency, as well as their cultural anxieties. Such a program must appeal to both traditional working class voters and the middle classes. It should also dare to promote continuity and tradition(Tony Judt), instead of obsessing about modernity and innovation. It would present a new narrative that can encompass the daily experiences and stories of our voters. Re-establishing social democratic parties as what Johannes Rau called»the caring party«(»Kümmererpartei«), not merely secondguessing the voters in a populist manner, but reconnecting with them to restore trust and promote democratic deliberation, both learning from and educating, while showing moral leadership in a responsible and authoritative way, is also vital. The catch-all party(»Volkspartei«) must be rescued and renewed as a bridge between the winners and losers of new global trends. This new catch-all party will emerge from progressive coalition-building, encompassing other left-wing political parties, as well as progressive individuals, regardless of party affiliation, and»progressive« organizations, such as trade unions, churches, and ngo s. European welfare societies – under conditions of mass migration and globalization – must be renewed, but also maintained in the face of American and Asian competition. Europe must compete on the basis of human well-being and welfare, beyond the narrow neoliberal concept of economic growth. Let European social democracy remain the pillar of a modernized European social market model, but also develop a keen sense of cultural and identity politics. The large-scale discontent and unhappiness characteristic of affluent welfare democracies are to a considerable extent the products of concerns about community, social cohesion, and security: post-materialist problems of social psychology. European societies and parties are at a crossroads. We have to make up our minds: what kind of society do we want to live in? Will we choose ipg 4/2010 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands 113

a society in which inequality is growing, immigrants are considered as permanent intruders, markets dominate the public interest, financial interests are considered more important than entrepreneurship, and people regard one another as strangers? Or will we choose the European model that we constructed with so much care and effort after the War: an inclusive society with more moderate differences of income and wealth; a public sector that acts as countervailing power to the market, with responsible citizenship at the top and the bottom; an education system that cherishes mechanics as well as engineers; and with a green and innovative economy, the rule of law, and relaxed diversity? The divide between left and right in politics must be re-established, not least to combat the dangerous populist cleavage between»the establishment« and what populists falsely identify as»the people.« We must be tough on populism and tough on the causes of populism. The European social democratic movement today is far too fixated on the blues. Instead, it should revitalize itself by regaining its soul. It simply has to change the record. References Andeweg, R. B., and G. A. Irwin(2005): Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. New York: Palgrave. Andeweg, R. B., G. A. Irwin, and J. M. den Ridder(2008):»The Netherlands,« in D. Nohlen(ed.): Elections in Europe. A Data Handbook . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Judt, T.(2010): Ill Fares the Land . London: Penguin. Pellikaan, H., S. L. de Lange, and T. van der Meer(2007):»Fortuyn’s Legacy: Party System Change in the Netherlands,« in Comparative European Politics 5: 282–302. Thomassen, J.(ed.)(2005): The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van der Brug, W.(2007): Een crisis van de partijendemocratie? Inaugurele rede. Amsterdam: Uva. Walter, F.(2010): Vorwärts oder abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie . Berlin: Edition Suhrkamp. 114 Becker/Cuperus, Netherlands ipg 4/2010

Who Loves the PS? The Electoral Paradox of the French Socialist Party LAURENT BOUVET SOCIALIST PARTY(PARTI SOCIALISTE, PS) Official website: www.parti-socialiste.fr Party leader: Martine Aubry Founded: In 1905 as the French Section of the Workers’ International; in 1969 replaced by the Parti Socialiste. SI and PES membership: SI: since 1951; PES since 1992 Party membership: 2009: 203,000(The figure has been relatively stable, varying between 150,000 and 200,000 members for the past 10 years.) Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2007: general election: 42.25% of the votes; 186 seats out of 577, in opposition; presidential elections: 46.94% of the votes; defeat of Ségolène Royal in the second round 2002: general elections: 35.26% of the votes; 140 seats out of 577; in opposition; presidential election: 16.18% of the votes; defeat of Lionel Jospin in the first round 1997: general election: 44.2% of the votes; 255 seats out of 577; in government Electoral resonance European elections: 2009: 16.48%; 14 out of 72 French seats; PS list 2004: 28.9%; 31 out of 78 French seats; PS list 1999: 21.95%; 22 out of 87 French seats; PS/PRG/ MDC list Government participation: Since 2002: in opposition 1997–2002: in government led by the Socialist Party; head of government: Lionel Jospin as prime minister, with a coalition of left-wing parties (»Plural Left«) ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 115

T he Socialist Party now stands, in common with its European social democratic counterparts, at a historic crossroads. While the fundamental doctrines of democratic socialism – regulation of the market economy, a strongly redistributive social state, and the promise of the emancipation of the individual – are vindicated every day by the ongoing crisis of legitimacy afflicting deregulated capitalism and liberal orthodoxy, the political forces which claim to represent these doctrines are failing to get elected practically everywhere. The parties of the right, conservative and liberal, which have fought against social democratic ideas for decades, are winning election after election throughout Europe. The historical»model« of social democracy no longer appears capable of providing, as was the case 60 years ago, the best economic and social solution – the famous»compromise« – for liberal democracies. The French Socialist Party seems to be particularly hard hit by all this, and indeed for the past 10 years or so. National power – president of the Republic and parliamentary majority – has eluded it since 2002, even though it has managed to become the number one party in France in terms of number of representatives and the»collectivités territoriales« that it runs(regions,»departments,«»communes«). The presidential election and the general elections that will take place in 2012 already appear to represent a major challenge for the Socialist Party: a return to power and the opportunity to offer the country a new direction to get out of the crisis and build a new model of development and growth. The next two years will be devoted to this objective of 2012, but this short period of time cannot be devoted exclusively to planning an election victory which French socialists have awaited for so long. These two years must also be a period of profound reform of the party, both of its aims and of its workings, in order to ensure, once victory has been attained, the durability of its power and the long-term embedding of Socialist Party politics, and of the French left along with it. In order to bring this about, the Socialist Party should deal with a number of key questions concerning the narrowness of its»sociological« base, its relations to the institution of the Fifth Republic(especially the presidentialization of French politics), the contents of its policy plans for the country, and perhaps the alliance strategy that it plans to adopt. It should also conduct a profound reflection on the reasons for the malaise which is affecting it and which has left it languishing in opposition at the national level for such a long time. In particular, the Socialist Party should rethink its relationship to the construction of Europe, which to 116 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

date has largely rested on a confusion between the requirements of a certain deconstruction of national sovereignty needed for the realization of the European project and an attachment to principles – such as solidarity – which refer to a national dimension which is often neglected at present. After a brief historical recap of the century-old Socialist Party, we shall draw up an inventory of how the Party stands today, and then try to explain why it lost power and has been unable to regain it for 10 years, before outlining the Party’s prospects in 2012 and addressing the question of Europe. Brief History of the French Socialist Party(1905–2002) The French Socialist Party(»Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière« or sfio ) was created in 1905 through the coming together of various organizations and personalities in the socialist movement under the leadership of Jean Jaurès. However, the latter was unable to establish the party on a reformist basis because the presence of orthodox Marxists – behind Jules Guesde in particular – was indispensible for party unity. The split between the socialists(the minority) and the communists (the majority) took place in 1920 with the establishment of the French Communist Party( pcf ). It was only when the Popular Front(»Front populaire«) was formed, uniting the whole of the left – and in particular with the general election victory in 1936 with Léon Blum as prime minister – that the socialists and communists formed an alliance to counter the fascist threat. After World War ii , the pcf became the leading party on the left and overshadowed the sfio in elections, but it was the socialists who participated in a number of governments during the Fourth Republic, in particular the one led by the leader of the Socialist Party during this period, Guy Mollet, in 1956 and which would be caught up in the turmoil of the Algerian War. Opposed to the establishment of the Fifth Republic(1958), the sfio , then the Parti Socialiste( ps – refounded under this name in 1969) was to remain out of government at national level until François Mitterrand’s victory in 1981. Mitterand became party leader when he joined it in 1971(Epinay congress) and reorganized it with a view to winning the presidency on a radical left-wing platform(the»Joint Program« –»programme commun« – based on»planning, nationalization and worker ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 117

management«) and allied with the pcf , with which from then on he was on an equal footing, before coming to dominate it at the ballot box from 1978. In 1983–84, the so-called»tournant de la rigueur«(»liberal turn«) and the departure of the Communist Party ministers signaled a kind of normalization of French socialism in relation to the major social democratic parties(for this reason, some talk of a»creeping« Bad Godesberg with regard to the policies of successive socialist governments in the 1980s and 1990s). At the start of the 1990s, the end of Mitterand’s seven-year term of office was marked by various scandals and economic reversal, which led to the return to power of the right in 1993(general election) and 1995(presidential election). In 1997, Lionel Jospin, who had become the new leader of the ps in 1995 after years of struggle to succeed François Mitterrand, won the general election and became prime minister(under the presidency of Jacques Chirac). He implemented policies that were both distinctly left-wing(including the 35-hour week,»emplois-jeunes«[jobs for young unemployed people], and pacs [contract of civil union]) but also, leading directly from the policies of previous socialist governments of the Mitterand years, incorporated the market economy(privatization, deregulation, tax reductions). In 2002, Lionel Jospin fell at the first round in his bid to become president, both because of his lack of profile among the electorate and because of the fragmentation of the left, notwithstanding its participation in his majority government, leaving a Jacques Chirac whose credibility was in tatters and leader of the extreme right Jean-Marie Le Pen to confront one another. State of Play: The Socialist Party Caught in Midstream An Electoral Paradox The Socialist Party’s electoral position has been paradoxical for the past 10 years or so(2002–2010). While it has done well at the local level – the ps has won all the local elections since 2004(municipal, cantonal, regional) and has become the leading party in France in terms of number of representatives and the authorities it is running – in contrast, it has been regularly defeated at the national level(general and, especially, presidential elections). This paradox is particularly apparent in the period after each election. When it comes to a national election(and therefore 118 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

Table 1: PS Election Results since 2002 Presidential 2002(L. Jospin) General election 2002 Cantonal 2004 Regional 2004( ps + allied left) European 2004 European referendum 2005 Presidential 2007(S. Royal) General election 2007 Municipal 2008( ps + allied left) Cantonal 2008 European 2009 Regional 2010( ps + allied left) Result/ Recorded Votes(%) 16.18 35.26 38.56 49.92 28.9 Yes 54.67/ No 45.33 46.94 42.25 33.35 35.11 16.48 49.51 Political Outcome Defeat/ eliminated at the first round Defeat/ main opposition party Victory(+8 pts/ 2001) Victory(+13 pts/ gain on the right) Victory(+7 pts/ 1999) Defeat/ ps split Defeat at the 2nd round Defeat(+ 46 seats/ 2002) Victory(takeover of the towns) Victory(+172 seats) Defeat(– 17 seats) Victory(+18pts/ gain on the right) a defeat), the commentators declare that the death of the party is nigh, while when it comes to local elections(and therefore victory) those very same commentators declare that the ps has become a force to be reckoned with! In fact, the ps is neither dying – it has a solid network of representatives and local authorities which today constitute its real vitality – nor at the top of its game: any party which fails to win national elections or to gain the presidency despite numerous attempts really ought to ask itself some serious questions about its organization, how well it works, and what it is offering. It is precisely caught between this local potency and national uncertainty that the French Socialist Party finds itself today. The PS’s Threefold Sociological Problem The electoral paradox which has just been described can be traced back to what one might call the ps ’s»sociological problem,« which is threefold. The first problem is that the ps has become a party of representatives in the true sense of the word: almost half of its real members(party ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 119

membership of approximately 150,000) – that is, 60,000 people – are representatives at various levels(municipal, district, cantonal, regional, national, European) and the other half»aspire to become so,« to adopt the formula often used by the ps . 1 This has important consequences for both the decisions taken by the party leadership(political positioning, reform, ways of opening up procedures for the nomination of election candidates) and the»sociological« composition of the party itself, since the representatives are less inclined than other party members to tolerate any challenge to their position and favor the recruitment of cronies rather than of persons who might threaten them electorally, for example within the local party. The second major problem for the ps is that the sociological composition of its members is extremely lobsided. The last substantial inquiry into the matter dates from 1998, 2 but there is no reason to suppose that, as a result of recent developments – the joining of those known as»20euro activists« in 2006 at the nomination of the presidential candidates, for example – there has been a radical sociological change within the party. 3 The main features of socialist sociology remain those brought to light in 1998: male predominance, despite the undoubted readjustment due to the introduction of the law of parity(72 percent of members were men at this time); high average age(67 percent above 50 years of age); significant imbalance in favor of middle and higher social and occupational groups(16 percent workers and low-ranking employees as against 35 percent higher management and professionals), as well as members working in the public sector(58 percent). 4 The third»sociological« problem is the composition of the socialist electorate, as manifested at various elections on the basis of exit polls, supplemented by the results of various opinion polls among socialist supporters. Besides the weakness of the overall results registered by the 1. On this key point, see in particular, Chapter 2,»Les élites socialistes, une société ›d’élus‹,« in R. Lefebvre and F. Sawicki(2006): La Société des socialistes. Le PS aujourd’hui . Bellecombe-en-Bauge: Editions du Croquant: 67 ff. 2. Rey, H.; F. Subileau; and C. Ysmal(1999): Les Adhérents socialistes en 1998 . Paris: Cahiers du cevipof (Sciences Po). This inquiry followed on from one conducted by the authors about a decade earlier; H. Rey and F. Subileau(1991): Les Militants socialistes à l’épreuve du pouvoir . Paris: Presses de la fnsp . 3. See, in particular, T. Barboni(2009):»Le Parti socialiste, parti de militants, des militants… ou de supporters?,« in Recherche Socialiste 46–47(June): 12–27. 4. Figures taken from Rey; Subileau; and Ysmal(1998): op. cit. 120 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

ps (if one takes into account in particular increasingly low turnouts, with the exception of presidential elections), which individually gains between 20 and 30 percent of the recorded votes in the first round, it may be noted that this electoral»base« is sociologically rather narrow. It comprises mainly voters from the middle and upper strata and few from the working classes(especially from the social and occupational groups »employees« and»workers,« who represent more than 50 percent of the active population in France). Furthermore, the proportion of voters from the public sector is particularly significant in relation to their weight in the active population. The geographical distribution of the socialist vote also suggests the strong representation of densely-populated urban areas (especially downtown areas) and peri-urban areas in contrast to other residential areas. 5 This threefold sociological question-mark against the ps is a triple handicap to the extent that the party is no longer in step with French society, as it was in the 1970s, for example, because of its network of intermediaries and ties throughout the country and among social strata – even though the ps has never been, strictly speaking, a working-class party, due to the existence of the Communist Party to its left and the split from the trade union movement. The triple problem of over-representation of representatives within the party, an activist sociological profile out of step with the general population, and a narrow and skewed electoral base makes difficult, not so much the prospect of an election victory – which depends on numerous other factors – but, at a deeper level, the party’s ability to remain in power, its consistency over the long term, and the spreading of its values within society. It is in this respect that sociology plays an essential role in politics, as both Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci have shown. Partial Restoration of Its Image with Regard to Public Opinion The difficulties – both economic and political – of Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency have, in recent years, gifted the Socialist Party with leadership of the opposition. The French public considers the ps to be the left-wing party most likely to provide the candidate from this camp in the second round of the presidential election. However, the opposition to Nicolas 5. See, in particular, G. Brustier and J.-P. Huelin(2009): Recherche le Peuple désespérément . Paris: Bourin Editeur. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 121

Sarkozy constitutes neither a political program nor a platform. And it is on its plans for the country that the ps will now be judged. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the Republic in May 2007 and his defeat of the candidate of the ps and the left, Ségolène Royal, led to a period of despondency and disarray in the ps . Royal’s presidential campaign had, indeed, been conducted without the party and even against it. In parallel with that, the ps failed to back, as it should have done, a candidate whose legitimacy, notwithstanding her nomination at the party primaries in November 2006, was never entirely recognized by the whole party, from top to bottom. 6 The rifts within the party lasted until the convulsive events of the Reims congress in November 2008: Martine Aubry was narrowly elected leader over Ségolène Royal in the face of accusations of foul play. The numerous centripetal forces in the ps – influential figures at local level,»young« leaders known as»quadras«(40-somethings) – publically voiced their misgivings and disagreements for months, even though the new President of the Republic was pursuing a policy of»opening up,« poaching socialist figures by appointing them to his government or giving them assignments of various kinds. 7 The calamitous outcome of the European elections in June 2009 – even if many social democratic parties in Europe suffered the same fate – had convinced observers that the ps , if not deceased, was in no state to deny Nicolas Sarkozy a second term of office. Nevertheless, since 2009 the ps has not only gradually resumed its position as main opposition party, but its leader Martine Aubry is increasingly looking like a natural candidate for the presidential election and well before the primaries which must decide the issue. Such a turnaround in public perception is due above all to the mistakes made by the president, who has been hit by a number of scandals concerning his ministers or himself, for example, when he sought to have his son appointed head of epad , a quasi-governmental organization overseeing real estate and the administration of La Defense, near Paris. The turnaround is also due to the economic crisis, which has distinctly curbed the president’s reforming zeal by obliging him to implement increasingly harsh austerity 6. There is a well-informed account of the socialist campaign and of Ségolène Royal’s complex relationship with the party during 2006–2007 in R. Bacqué and A. Chemin(2007): La Femme fatale . Paris: Albin Michel. 7. See our analysis»La triple ingouvernabilité du parti socialiste,« available at: http:// laurentbouvet.wordpress.com/2008/12/01/la-triple-ingouvernabilite-du-partisocialiste. 122 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

measures, even though he refuses to retract the measures he introduced benefiting the wealthy as soon as he came to power in 2007. Finally, the abilities of Martine Aubry should be noted who, although she had a tough time getting elected party leader, has been able to get it back on track, put a stop to the rifts, and impose herself as its natural leader. The »victory« in the regional elections in 2010 has therefore been credited to her, even though she was not directly a candidate for the leadership of a region, in contrast, for example, to Ségolène Royal. The adverse public perception of Martine Aubry – especially as»La dame des 35 heures« 8 – has finally been overcome. And although she may still appear less a potential presidential candidate than, in particular, Dominique Strauss-Kahn – but more so now than Ségolène Royal – on the other hand, she best embodies the left and its values in the minds of the French public. 9 In contrast to Sarkozy’s razzmatazz, she cuts a rather austere and modest figure, not dissimilar to Angela Merkel. At a time of economic and social crisis in France, this personal aspect undoubtedly plays a key role. That is not yet enough to gain the presidency, but some ground has certainly already been made up, although no one rated the ps ’s chances very highly in 2008–2009. What still remains to be done – the plan, the presidential candidacy, electoral alliances and so on – is no less important for all that and the ps must not be found wanting if it is to have any hope of defeating Nicolas Sarkozy, who will probably be a candidate on his succession in 2012. Plans Remain Uncertain In order to win the presidential election in 2012 and to return to power for the long term, the ps must be in a position, in the next two years, to put before the people of France a political project which they can really get on board with. This means more than just proposing to put an end to »Sarkozyism.« Work on the ps ’s new political platform has certainly been rebooted since Martine Aubry became leader in November 2008, having 8. The title of an extremely critical book on Martine Aubry which appeared a few years ago. P. Alexandre and B. de L’Aulnoit(2002): La Dame des 35 heures . Paris: Robert Laffont. 9. See, in particular, bva -Orange-L’Express-France Inter index(which calculates the president’s popularity and future outlook for 20 top-tier political personalities) for July 2010, available at: http://www.bva.fr/fr/sondages/barometre_politique/ observatoire_de_la_politique_nationale_-_juillet_2010.html. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 123

been almost abandoned under the leadership of François Hollande (1997–2008). It remains at an embryonic stage, however, confronted by three major structural problems which threaten to limit its impact considerably. The first problem is related to the connection between the party’s platform and that of a presidential candidate. In the French presidential system, a person’s candidacy puts them directly before the French people, engaging in a kind of dialogue, notwithstanding the fact that a party’s infrastructure, resources, and networks are essential. Candidates have to present the country with a political agenda which is their own and with which they can be fully identified. In other words, the three essential dimensions of a presidential election – representation, personification, and presenting a narrative – must fit together perfectly. If the discrepancy between these dimensions is too great, candidates have little chance of winning over their fellow citizens. Hence the importance of the political platform and its extreme personalization. But how is this personalization to be coordinated with the collective development within the party of the latter’s political platform – all the more so as the general elections, which follow the presidential elections, basically involve the presentation of this platform. Considering the importance of the presidential election in determining political balances of power, including within the party, it is clear that the candidate’s agenda has priority. The role of the party in this context is to prepare, as best it can, the rolling out of this agenda once the candidate has been nominated. This is exactly what happened at the end of the 1970s, when the ps developed its»socialist project« which candidate Mitterand drew on for his»110 propositions for France« in 1981. The key element in this period was that François Mitterrand was both First Secretary of the Socialist Party and the presidential candidate, which meant that he was able to ensure that the party as a group was singing from the same hymn-sheet and that its activities remained coherent within the framework of his presidential candidacy. The second pitfall lying in wait for the party when it comes to develop its»projet« is that of reducing it to a simple program. There is a crucial difference between the two. Indeed, since the 1980s, when the general election comes around the ps and its candidates do nothing more than put forward programs of economic and social measures, sometimes with a few provisions labeled»societal« thrown in. These are not genuinely comprehensive»projets« – or political projects – which make it possible to impose a general direction on analyses of the current situation and of 124 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

society, which is subsequently reflected in the set of measures presented to the French people, endowing it with coherence. The reasons for this drift are manifold and not confined to the Socialist Party. One might mention here the domination of the agenda-setting process, for the past 20 years or so, by experts and, especially with regard to the ps , by socalled»technocrats« – in other words, economic and legal experts from the public administration whose number and influence grew as the ps became a party of government in the 1980s and 1990s. It is therefore the state which has invaded the party, rather than the other way around. The prospects for 2012, unfortunately, resemble what has usually resulted from this in the past: the selection of those in charge of the party »project« remains profoundly vitiated by the technocratic evolution of the past 25 years(practically all of them are grey technocrats from the personal staff of socialist ministers). As things stand, with barely two years to go before the presidential election, the ps has still not given much thought to the state of French society, apart from noticing that it is in crisis! Thus, the first elements made available since the»convention sur le modèle de développement« 10 – the first of the major meetings on the party project which took place in spring 2010 – are essentially related to fiscal reform which is supposed to make possible a readjustment of taxation in favor of the middle and working classes. Martine Aubry has also floated – in a personal capacity – a number of ideas to be explored in relation to social issues, most notably perhaps in her efforts to introduce the notion of»care« into the French political debate – although without much success so far – deriving from Anglo-Saxon social science and rarely used in France. 11 The third structural problem afflicting the working out of the ps ’s political project is due to the fact that the socialists have not always been clear about the position they intend to adopt on the left. For a start, this is because it is ultimately the person of the presidential candidate which orients the party in one direction or another at election time and during the following years. This was the case with François Mitterrand and Lionel Jospin, and will be so again for 2012 if we consider the two possible candidates Martine Aubry and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the 10.»Convention on the development model.« The text of this convention is available on the ps website: http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/articles/en-direct-le-conseilnational-de-la-convention-nouveau-modele-de-developpement. 11. See the presentation of this idea taken up by the ps , available at: http://www.partisocialiste.fr/articles/le-care-acte-i. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 125

former embodying a more classic and more social conception of the left, while the latter has for a number of years embodied the right wing of the ps and the refocusing of the party along Third Way lines. Secondly, in order to regain power within the party and undoubtedly also the presidential candidacy it is better to be able to unite the different strands of the party and therefore to bring together the left and right, be it in respect of members or sympathizers. The tradition according to which the party »wins when it campaigns on a left-wing platform« seems still to prevail, if the rhetoric displayed at recent congresses, conventions and other meetings is anything to go by; even if no one within the party is under any illusion about putting itself forward as a party of government that, once in power, will be in no position to effect any significant shift to the left. The most recent example of this socialist tradition of»talking left, but acting right« is retirement reform. The ps has declared officially that a left-wing government will restore the official retirement age of 60 – which the current reform proposed by the right-wing majority will change – while within the party everyone readily recognizes, in private, that nothing will come of it. This gap between rhetoric in opposition and policies actually implemented once in government is one of the main criticisms directed towards the ps in each of its terms in office. 12 This kind of vacillation may be found, moreover, in all the official documents of the ps , whether it be the last declaration of principles, adopted in June 2008, 13 or the text of the abovementioned»convention on the model of development« in which realist passages – especially on fiscal reform – alternate with, to a greater or lesser extent, lyrical flights of fancy about instigating»a change of civilization.« To that extent, it indicates both a lack of persistent political reflection with an eye to the long term and a party deeply divided ideologically, even to the point of conflict, with regard to key choices about society – the rift in the socialist camp concerning the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 is the most prominent example of this in recent years. 12. See, on this recurring issue for the ps , the now classic analysis by A. Bergounioux and G. Grunberg(2005): L’Ambition et le remords. Les socialistes français et le pouvoir (1905–2005) . Paris: Fayard. 13. The text of this declaration is available on the ps website: http://www. parti-socialiste.fr/le-ps/la-declaration-de-principes. 126 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

A Party in the Process of Modernization Reform of how the party works is currently a key issue. The fact is that the ps , despite a number of significant reforms of its internal workings in the past – in particular the election of the First Secretary by direct vote of the party membership – is a party fraught with difficulties in this respect. Its internal imbalance in favor of elected representatives is considerable; its low membership deprives it of a critical mass of representation and intermediaries in society; its leadership remains weak to the extent that the First Secretary is not also recognized as the»natural« or designated candidate for the presidential election; its finances are mainly dependent on state funding(in accordance with the general election results) and the contributions of its representatives which, of course, makes the ps even more dependent on the latter. In view of all this, the leadership has embarked on a process of what it calls»renovation« – in parallel with development of the»project« to which we have already referred – aimed at solving a number of outstanding problems: the ban on holding several offices concurrently(even if implementation of this reform will have to wait a few years) or more effective implementation of parity and an opening up to diversity(for example, ethnic minorities). However, the major issue of»renovation« is the primaries, the selection of the candidate for the presidential election in a procedure open to all supporters of the left, and therefore by no means confined to party members. This important reform is viewed by many socialists as a necessity for the resolution of many of the party’s structural problems: the leadership crisis(the designated person will be»legitimate«); the relationship of the leadership to the»project«; and party alliances. It may be doubted, however, that these primaries, as so far envisaged, 14 are capable of solving the organizational problems that have just been described. With this end in view, they would have to take place much earlier, before the presidential elections, in order to allow the candidate – who would also be the party leader – to establish him/herself and to prepare»his/her« project while setting the party to rights and getting it behind him/her – and, in the same way, establishing alliances around the candidacy and project over a period of years with other political forces. 14. The ps document on»renovation« is available at: http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/ renovation. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 127

The weakness of the current renovation process is reflected in the vagueness of the proposals and the party’s lethargy with regard to the fundamental issues. The approach involving numerous»conventions and topical meetings« in order to outline the party’s vision before the nomination of a candidate(in autumn 2011) testifies to the party’s incomplete conversion to the presidentialization of the Fifth Republic – it was evident at the last election that the presidential candidate alone was able to truly direct how the party’s program(»projet«) is put together because it is he/she alone who can make use of it at election time. However, at the moment, everyone at the ps is acting as if the candidate who will be nominated in the primaries will be content to take up the party’s agenda and simply make it their own, personalizing it and putting their own stamp on it. But a presidential campaign involves clear-cut and firm choices which have little to do with the consensual approach which governs the working out of the party’s program. Every tendency, group, or standpoint must recognize in it at least some part of its political dna in order to get behind this project and not risk exposing the divisions in the party in the public arena. The result is rather nondescript and unlikely to engage and inspire the voters or even ps supporters. Finally, it seems clear that the elephant in the room with regard to »rénovation« in its current form is the future of political parties as such, as a form of political organization serving as a reference point of contemporary democracy. 15 The debate on the primaries and the opening up of the party as regards the key moment of the nomination of the presidential candidate is only the beginning of a far greater deliberation on what might be called»the party form.« What does it comprise? What are the links between the party’s interior and its exterior? Must the distinction between member and non-member remain absolute? Should we move towards a federal form made up of various movements and groups whose goals would no longer be directed strictly towards electoral victory or even to continue to maintain specific organizations with this aim? The ps is clearly not the only party concerned with such questions. It may be noted in particular that the creation of Europe Ecologie directly calls into question the party format. The ps still has a long way to go 15. In the sense defined canonically by Robert Michels(1959[1911]): Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy; Dover Press, or Moisei Ostrogorski(1903): La Démocratie et les partis politiques. Paris: CalmannLévy, in particular. 128 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

before it reaches this»postmodern democracy,« 16 however, given both its essential role on the left and its current make-up, which is rather that of an exclusive club of local representatives than of a large organization on the same wavelength as society overall. From Opposition Party to Constructive Party 17 The ps ’s greatest challenge in the coming years will be to go beyond the opposition party stage to become a party which offers the country new ideas and is able to form a government. As has been seen, the ps has been able to re-emerge as a force to be reckoned with as principal opposition party against the right-wing majority – relegating to second place both the centrists and the environmentalists which for a while believed they might be able to oust the socialists as the main alternative to Sarkozyism. Politics as usual has therefore been restored in France, with the ps providing a candidate in the second round of the presidential election. Nevertheless, despite all its efforts and internal reforms, the ps is far from being a party which the electorate will vote for on its own merits rather than simply to block the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire ( ump ) or solely as a tactical vote for the left in order to fend off the right. Whether a decision to vote is taken for positive or negative reasons is a crucial factor in determining the legitimacy of the government which comes to power after winning the election. If its legitimacy is weak a government’s political room to maneuver will be much narrower than if elected to implement a set of policies explicitly endorsed by the majority of voters. The participation rate and the distribution of votes are clearly the two other factors to be taken into account in this respect. The ps has certainly re-emerged as the main institutional vehicle of the very strong opposition to Sarkozyism in France, but confidence remains low. This is because, on the one hand, what proposals it has come up with so far remain very vague or are the object of internal divisions – for example, the party is divided on whether to keep the powerfully symbolic retirement at 60 – and, on the other hand, there is no unifying principle – or, indeed, candidate – which could establish the ps as a coherent proactive force the people of France could get on board with. 16. On this issue, see in particular Colin Crouch(2004): Post-Democracy . Cambridge: Polity Press; and P. Rosanvallon(2006): La Contre-démocratie. La politique à l’âge de la défiance . Paris: Le Seuil. 17.»Du parti d’opposition au parti de proposition.« ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 129

Besides the risk of a lack of legitimacy in the event of victory in 2012, the main problem would be the new government’s precarious position in the face of rival political forces wishing to encroach upon the vast terrain of anti-Sarkozyism which often appears to be the sole unifying factor within the ps . The same applies on the left with regard to Europe Ecologie and in the center with regard to François Bayrou’s Modem, which have made the fight against Sarkozyism and its lack of public morality their main argument. This is also the case on the right, where the president of the ump group in the National Assembly, Jean-François Copé, or even former prime minister Dominique de Villepin oppose Nicolas Sarkozy in very different ways but both effectively in terms of public opinion. Alliance on the Left: Necessary But Not Sufficient Whoever its candidate might be, along with its policies and its ability to convince the voters that it is the only party able to govern the country apart from the right, the ps , if it is to win the elections in 2012 – both presidential and general – will have to form alliances with other political forces. In fact, the ps cannot win a national election on its own, obtaining sufficient votes in a general election, for example, to constitute an absolute majority in the National Assembly – which has only happened once, in 1981. In recent years, its average score has been around 30 to 35 percent of the votes. It therefore has to get an additional 15 to 20 percent of the votes in order to attain a majority – both in the second round of the presidential election(therefore in the name of its candidate) and in the general elections which follow. The ps , therefore, needs to enter into alliances – a call to vote for the socialist candidate in the second round of the presidential election and an electoral pact to give socialists a free run in the general election – with other parties in order to cobble together a majority. Traditionally, the ps allies itself with forces on the left, in particular with the pcf and the Greens. But since the center established itself as a distinct political force in relation to the right – in the form of François Bayrou’s Modem – in the 2007 presidential election, the question arises of whether priority should be given to a traditional alliance on the left or to an opening up to the center. In 2007, the socialist candidate proposed this alliance between the two rounds of the presidential election to the centrist candidate, who had won 17 percent of the votes, but the latter rejected it. Subsequently, Modem’s failure in various elections and the 130 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

return of a large part of centrist representatives to the traditional bosom of the right more or less resolved the issue by default and therefore, once again, an alliance on the left was favored by the ps . The fact is that in this framework it is now the Greens which play the role of principal ally and not the pcf , which in recent years have allied within the»Front de gauche« with the Left Party(Parti de gauche – pg ), founded by Jean-Luc Mélenchon on the model of Die Linke. 18 An alliance on the left – with the communists, the pg and the Greens – has many advantages but just as many drawbacks for the ps . The first benefit of such an alliance is its salience for the voters, since it fits squarely within the traditional right-left framework. The second is that it mobilizes voters on the left who refuse out of hand to vote for the ps , either because they consider it too liberal or right-wing or because they regard it as too dogmatic or not sufficiently concerned with environmental issues, for example. This pink( ps )-red( pcf )-green alliance allowed the left to attain the majority in the last local elections. Nevertheless, this kind of alliance also entails a number of drawbacks. First of all, if the ps is to have any hope whatsoever of obtaining the alliances which are essential for victory it must modify its position and policies, making them more left-wing or giving them a greener tinge in order to demonstrate its goodwill to its potential allies. The ps must therefore proceed in this way – and therefore make commitments not all of which it will be able to honor once in power – in order not to appear too hegemonic and so has to adjust its weight in the balance of power which it dominates. The second drawback is that the voters that the ps covets in this left-wing alliance are often the same as its own from a sociological standpoint. As a result, the likelihood of capturing the 15 to 20 percent additional votes which are essential for winning the second round is very low since the constituency of Europe Ecologie so much resembles that of the ps . In other words, the voters that the ps must attract in the second round – presidential and general elections – are not just supporters of other left-wing parties, but also those who abstained(particularly from the working class) and centrist voters. Such voters are not easy to persuade on the basis of electoral pacts between parties. If they vote, they do so for a party and a candidate who offers them a set of policies they 18. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a former member of the ps , sees himself as the Oskar Lafontaine of the French left – he often refers to his German counterpart and to Die Linke – and intends to change the ideological direction of the ps from the outside, having failed, according to him, to do so from the inside. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 131

can believe in. These voters are not the same sociologically and, to some extent, politically as classic socialist or left-wing voters, but they are indispensible for winning national elections. This is the main difference from local elections, in which decent mobilization of the socialist constituency is generally enough, given the low participation rates. To reach these other voters quite clearly something other has to be offered than formal party alliances. Beyond party-political alliances, the ps and the French left are also adversely affected by the institutional disconnection between the parties and the trade unions since the Charter of Amiens in 1906. Furthermore, the links between the parties and what one might call»civil society« – associations, social movements, the intelligentsia, business circles – are strained, both because of the way in which parties(which do not need it for their activities) are organized in France(their funding by the state; the dominance of representatives; their hierarchical structure; the strict distinction between the status of member and that of non-member; the primacy of the presidential election; and so on) and, in parallel with that, due to civil society’s indifference or even suspicion vis-à-vis political parties, which are considered to be purely institutional in nature and in which power is monopolized by exclusive groups solely concerned with obtaining it and the benefits it brings. The»European Question« Left Hanging in the Air At the ps everyone now pretends that the deep division in the party concerning the European question, which appeared at the time of the referendum on ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty( ect ) in 2005, has been overcome. As if the French Socialists, after having been split, were finally united on Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even if supporters and opponents of the ect are now to be found side by side in the ps leadership, the rift remains deep. The current situation which is so inauspicious for the construction of Europe – economic and financial crisis, institutional weakening as a result of the Lisbon Treaty – has clearly led to a downgrading of the European question among Socialist concerns. Not only that, but their credibility on the issue has suffered among the French public, if the ps ’s poor showing at the European elections in 2009 is anything to go by, having done very well in 2004, with a large number of European representatives. 132 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

The European split is even more serious, however, because it reveals the major ideological divide prevailing within the ps between two camps which cohabit but cannot reach agreement on fundamentals. This constitutes a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the building of a coherent and attractive set of policies, as we have seen. This divide opposes, on the one hand, those who support building up the European institutions, as practiced in particular since the Maastricht Treaty, as well as globalization and the compromise with capitalism and the market economy(especially the opening up of public services to market forces) and, on the other hand, those who advocate an anti-liberal – economically – vision and are hostile to capitalism, who favor an increased role for the state and public services, and perhaps protectionism – at the European level – or even the end of the euro. In short, there is a rift between social-liberal reformists and old-school socialists – to adopt the names which the two sides hurl at one another in a spirit of anathematization. 19 This split on Europe and, beyond that, on the party’s global vision could re-emerge at any time, especially in the event of yet another defeat in 2012. It could also prove crucial in terms of the primaries for nominating the presidential candidate if one considers, for example, the real differences between Dominique Strauss-Kahn(social-liberal), Martine Aubry(traditional left), and Ségolène Royal(who tends towards a kind of left-wing populism). Reasons for the Malaise: The PS Confronted by the Crisis of Social Democracy The French Socialist Party, like all European socialist, social democratic, and workers’ parties, has been hit hard by the crisis of Social Democracy. 20 However, as in every country, more specific national factors will 19. For a clearer idea – and a proposed typology – of the ideological divisions within the French left(and the ps ) which have been alluded to here, see in particular F. Miquet-Marty(2010): La Guerre des gauches n’aura pas lieu . Paris: Fondation Jean-Jaurès: 23 ff. 20. We shall refer, in this connection, to two of our own texts. L. Bouvet(2010): »Tackling Populism to Regain the People«(presented at an feps seminar in Brussels on March 16, 2010); available at: http://laurentbouvet.wordpress. com/2010/03/19/tackling-populism-to-regain-the-people; and»Les contradictions de l’antilibéralisme,« in Le Débat, No. 159(March–April 2010): 155–158. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 133

help us to refine the reasons why the ps has found it so difficult to translate election victories at local level into national election victories for the past 10 years. First of all, as in most other European countries, the advent of the post-industrial society since the 1970s has led, over the long term, to a marked reduction in the traditional electorate of the left and the ps – in France most evident in the collapse of the pcf and abstention or voting for the extreme right by part of the working class. The ps , which has not won back the communist electorate since 1981–83, has compensated for this in part by winning over middle class or higher categories of voter, especially in the urban centers. But the promise of a»social democratic government«(which may be translated as meaning, for example, an assurance given to the middle classes that their standard of living will rise and that their children will enjoy a status and living standards better than those of their parents), of which the ps was the main representative in France, has evaporated. 21 Confronted by this structural evolution of the left-wing electorate, the French right long remained clueless as to how to exploit it, handicapped as it was on the right by a Front National which was both strong and capable of attracting an electorate which was both working class and nationalist(especially small tradesmen and shopkeepers), and uncertain about its security, whether economic or personal. This difficulty recovering part of the working class vote which had abandoned the left was overcome by Nicolas Sarkozy in the presidential election in 2007. He was able, in fact, to»triangulate« some of the left’s cherished values – such as the value of»work« especially and by praising those French men and women»who have to get up early[to go to work],« while stressing, more traditionally, security – notwithstanding the presence on the left of a candidate, Ségolène Royal, who was also attempting to adapt to the same double logic. In recent years, the right has even begun to be converted on certain issues of cultural liberalism(the acceptance of gay rights, for example) which makes the frontier between right and left less marked than it was 10 years ago. Since 2007, the policies implemented by President Sarkozy have generally contradicted the campaign promises of candidate Sarkozy. It is almost exclusively the most well-off French men and women who have benefited from the reforms undertaken by 21. See on the particular form taken by the end of the social democratic»promise« in France, L. Chauvel(2006): Les Classes moyennes à la dérive . Paris: Le Seuil. 134 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

the right-wing majority. But the turning point of the 2007 campaign remains inscribed in people’s memories and right-wing candidates in the next elections, including Sarkozy, know that if they want to win once again they will have to continue in the same direction, namely the triangulation of a number of left-wing values. Besides these recent developments, it is also important to recall that the ps has never had a monopoly on discourse on the social –»left-wing« in the traditional sense – in France. The presence of a strong communist party which was also the guardian of a veritable»political culture« which, indeed, became a»passion«; 22 the special character of Gaullism one of whose characteristics was a concern for social issues(a significant portion of the electorate has voted Gaullist since the Liberation); and the presence on the moderate right(centrist) of a social element(of the Christian democratic variety) have made it difficult for the ps to establish its hegemony over social reform discourse. All the more so because there has been a broad national consensus on the welfare state – known as»social security« in France – since World War II. 23 The coming to power of the left in 1981 raised hopes of a social»new wave,« as in 1936, 1945, and 1968. This wave was all the stronger because, for the first time since 1936, the left – including the communists – was in sole charge of the government and of social advances(39-hour week, retirement at 60, a fifth week of paid vacation). But the»liberal turn« in 1983 – deregulation, deindustrialization, followed by privatization – put an end to these hopes and led to a clear break between the working classes and the government parties of the left(basically the ps on the(classic) grounds of betrayal. This led to an even greater alienation from the ps whose electoral strategy has never been to regain this lost constituency, but rather to replace it with another base centered on the middle class in the public sector in particular. A major part of the ps ’s loss of credibility derives, therefore, not only from the fundamental ideological turnaround in the mid-1980s, but also the distance between what the leadership says and the policies 22. See, in particular, M. Lazar(2002): Le Communisme, une passion française. Paris: Perrin; and»Forte et fragile, immuable et changeante… La culture politique communiste,« in S. Bernstein(ed.)(1999): Les Cultures politiques en France. Paris: Le Seuil, Chapter 6: 215–242. 23. The basis of the contemporary French social state was outlined by the Conseil national de la Résistance( cnr ), which brought together all the French political groupings opposed to the Vichy regime and to the Nazis: from communists to Gaullists, as well as socialists, radical republicans and Christian democrats. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 135

actually implemented by the party once in power. The ps has often been censured for»talking left« and»acting right« and the party has not been able to restore confidence among the French public. This lack of credibility is due in large part to the paucity of intermediaries for the ps in civil society – in accordance with the constraints and peculiarities of the situation in France already discussed. In the 1970s, the ps was, however, the party par excellence of the»new classes« that had emerged in French society, the party of the new activist middle class, and that of young»baby boomer« workers who established themselves in professional and family life, in particular by becoming home-owners. The ps was therefore the party whose policy program best represented the identity-based social movements – feminists, environmentalists, immigrants, gays and so on – which first came into their own during those years. It was the party which called for new rights, while continuing to embody the hopes of the»world of work« and the workers’ movement within the institutional framework of its alliance with the pcf . Since the 1980s and 1990s, for the various reasons discussed above, the ps is no longer part of this social dynamic. It has cut itself off from these opinionmakers who are indispensible for the effective promulgation of ideas, particularly in accordance with Gramscian notions of hegemony. When it comes to putting over its message or presenting its policies, the ps feels the adverse effects of this severance from civil society. It is no longer in a position to influence opinion or to put a particular topic on the agenda, as it once was. However, this capacity is absolutely essential if one wishes to govern for the long term and successfully implement the kinds of reform that are necessary, in particular in times of crisis when the state’s room to maneuver is constricted. In parallel with this, with regard to public opinion, French voters do not seem to expect anything in particular from the ps or have any specific political demands to make of it. It seems, moreover, that the increasing importance attributed by the ps to issues deemed»societal« – or relating to the»values« of post-industrial societies – to the extent that it has brought about the party’s liberal transformation has not been sufficient to guarantee it a new electoral base large and robust enough to ensure regular victory in national elections. The ps leadership therefore continues, while»talking left,« to try to get people to believe – and they often believe it themselves – that what matters most is their social and economic program: jobs, purchasing power, public services, and so on. However, their actual behavior, whether in government or in opposition, is utterly at odds with this 136 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

kind of talk, insofar as they direct their attention towards what they can really exercise some control over, namely so-called societal change, concerning, for example, the extension of individual rights, in particular to minorities, in the name of combating discrimination. This serves only to heighten the impression that the Socialists have converted to liberalism since not only do they seem to have surrendered to the laws of the market and of capitalism in the realm of economics, but they steadfastly promote a forthright cultural and moral liberalism – in other words, they favor wholesale individual emancipation: hedonism, frank consumerism(although it increasingly has a green or bio tinge), moral individualism, multiculturalism, and so on. However, this twofold conversion ultimately persuades only a narrow constituency – already described above and of whom the term»bobo«(»bourgeois bohemian«) represents a fairly accurate caricature – which is not likely to enable a national election victory and, above all, a democratic base large enough to legitimize a socialist-led government that will last. All the more so because the quasimonopoly which the ps long held on what could be called modernity as far as values and morals are concerned has ruptured in recent years since the conservative right, in turn, became more liberal. Working class voters are distinctly less susceptible to this change in values even if they often tacitly validate its effects in the form of mass consumption, especially as regards leisure activities. Target 2012 The next two years will be crucial for the ps . The 2012 elections – both presidential and general – are very important indeed. Facing a weak incumbent president, everyone at the ps is well aware that this election is winnable. It will be 24 years since the ps won a presidential election (1988) and 15 years since it won a general election. Yet another defeat would undoubtedly result in the demise of the ps as we know it. Victory would once more give the Socialists – and the French left in general – the chance to show that they are able to conduct a kind of politics different from the right: one that is both more effective economically and more just socially. The historic responsibility in this time of crisis is considerable, proportionate to the disaster of another defeat. That is why the ps must undergo a profound change over the next couple of years, above all taking the necessary steps to win back part of the working class. This ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 137

will involve tackling all the dimensions mentioned here – party program, candidate, alliances, party organization and so on – simultaneously, and all within a coherent framework. Regaining a»sens du peuple« 24 (translator’s note: literally»a sense of the people«: what in Michelet, for example, can be understood to mean direct access to the collective mind and spirit of the common people) is therefore absolutely essential for the ps , in common with a number of other social democratic parties currently suffering from the same problems, in particular having to confront the populist challenge. 25 In France, electoral victory, but also its»depth« – the participation rate and level of support for ps policies rather than merely beating Sarkozyism – will undoubtedly depend on winning over working class voters, even more than in 2007. If it is to take up this challenge the ps will have to meet at least three requirements. The first is the quality of its program. A lot more is needed, as we have seen, than what was offered at the last election and which already seems to be emerging: namely, a straightforward technical program, topped off by a declaration of commonplace general principles. What is needed is an ambitious social program which, besides an original and exhaustive analysis of contemporary French society – in particular the disconnection between the elites and the public, to use populism’s own terminology – will have to offer new, but common-sense solutions to the main economic and social problems, but also in relation to society and identity. The second exigency is the twofold achievement, always difficult to pull off, of left-wing unity – including the Greens – and expansion towards the center. The prevailing conditions of a rejection of Sarkozyism should certainly help to bring this about, but the ps must still devise both the right approach and the kind of organization required by this new strategy. However, what we are hearing from the Rue de Solferino (headquarters of the French Socialist Party) is quite different, since the old reflexes and the old left-wing alliances are in evidence, envisaging the simple adding together of the various groups which make it up – extreme left, communists and Left Front, socialists, radicals, republicans, Greens and so on – against a right-wing which is itself an amalgamation. The political dynamics of a two-round presidential election, even if it brings two candidates face to face only in the second round, is clearly more complex, 24.»Sens« being understood here in its three senses in French: meaning, direction, and sense(or reason). 25. See L. Bouvet:»Tackling populism to regain the people,« footnote 19. 138 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

especially because of the vote for the extreme right in the first round which is not transferred automatically and en masse to the right in the second round, particularly if the candidate is Marine Le Pen, daughter of the historical leader of the French extreme right, who is likely to succeed him because she appeals to social populism much more than her father. All of which underlines the importance, as if there was any need, of the third requirement which the ps will have to satisfy in order to win in 2012: the choice of a person able both to take up the populist challenge and to represent the broadest possible political constituency, which people can really get on board with. This is a real test, considering the current hardening of positions on all sides aimed at appearing, within the ps , as»more left than thou« in relation to everyone else. However, as the presidential elections approach the need for the candidates to»presidentialize« themselves – in other words, to show that they are capable of making it into the second round – and the position of president itself is likely to progressively narrow the ideological gap. The sole remaining question in this connection is what effect the primaries will have on this traditional process of realignment, since there is no precedent on this scale – these primaries are open to external participation and therefore not entirely bound by the internal logic of winning power inside the party, which is governed by a strictly pre-defined rhetoric concerning what is»genuinely« left-wing, what are the indications that one really belongs to it, and so on. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that these primaries will, as in American elections, prompt a radicalization of the candidates in accordance with the tactical exigencies of the campaign or the need to accentuate their differences. And Europe? What one might call the new»European crisis of consciousness« 26 today affects all European countries and all political forces on the continent, to 26. An allusion to a famous work by P. Hazard(1961): La Crise de la conscience européenne (1680–1715) . Paris: Fayard(published in English as The European Mind 1680–1715 ); by analogy with the(re)founding moment of our era. For an analysis of this crisis, see the chapter»La nouvelle crise de la conscience européenne: l’Europe politique entre nation et fédération. Regards français,« in J. Delors and K. Lamers(eds.) (1998): France-Allemagne: le bond en avant. Paris: Odile Jacob-Notre Europe: 113–180. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 139

be sure with the exception of the few genuinely anti-European parties scattered about here and there. However, the social democratic parties are more profoundly affected by this European crisis than any others. The concomitance of European disarray and the setbacks of the European social democratic parties is striking, as amply demonstrated by the results of the European elections in June 2009: as if the construction of Europe as it has taken place over the past 50 years and the historical project of social democracy in Europe had gone hand in hand and that they were both now undergoing a profound crisis. This critical situation reveals the constitutive paradox of contemporary European social democracy: while social democracy has been built within a national framework and has derived all the benefits of its»model« there, social democratic parties have always been among the strongest advocates of the federal construction of Europe – in other words, a Europe which calls into question national sovereignty. Indeed, while the social democratic regime and model was constructed at national level(the»social question,« the establishment of democracy, and nation-building are largely concomitant processes, even though they are often antagonistic in modern day politics), social democrats, since the very day after World War II ended, have been among the foremost advocates of the construction of Europe, in the name of the internationalist values deeply embedded in the history of the workers’ movement and of a more complex and more subtle vision of the East-West confrontation between communism and liberal capitalism. However, this preference for Europe has led to the dismantling of the protective and legitimate – because democratic – framework of the nation in which solidarity was forged, the fundamental principle of the social democratic model. The social democrats have allied themselves, at the European level, with Christian democrats both in the center and on the right in order to realize their European ambitions. They were seized by a kind of schizophrenia which gave way to a vision of the construction of Europe which was certainly pragmatic, but fundamentally(economically) liberal. This accepted the construction of a borderless market, in response to the impossibility for the foreseeable future of realizing a political Europe at the European level. By allying themselves – sometimes for good reasons, sometimes against their better judgment – with this liberalism the social democrats helped to destroy their own social base and their doctrinal legitimacy without, for all that, winning the battle to construct a truly political and social Europe. 140 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

This first paradox of European social democracy is coupled with a second: the European level is now the only one at which it is still conceivable to construct something closely resembling a social democratic model for the future, whether in the face of the challenges of globalization or the impotence of nation-states. Effective market regulation, more equitable distribution of wealth, greater democracy, and the renewed promise of emancipation for all must now be achieved by the construction of a political, economic, and social space which is effective and cohesive and in which social democratic values are able to assert themselves: manifestly, this space is Europe. The current state of the European Union, the»sick man« of globalization, cries out for some sort of reinvention of Europe; in other words, a new political process which goes well beyond a Europe of treaties and »small steps,« as well as the functionalist approach which has been applied so far. This»forward leap« 27 can only be towards a federal Europe and very much in the political sense – which will necessarily be closer and more integrated than the current eu 27, not to mention what looks likely on the basis of future enlargements(Serbia, Turkey, and so on). In simple terms, towards a Europe which will make it possible to reconstitute at another level – post-national – the conditions needed for realizing key elements of the social democratic form of government and social democratic models: the extension of practical democracy, while at the same time improving the level of education and living standards, social justice for all based on a legitimate and acknowledged solidarity between those actively involved in the body politic(yesterday the nation, tomorrow Europe), 28 with a political power which is democratic, legitimate, and effective at the head of it, able to ensure regulation of the market, active redistribution of wealth, and effective protection of its citizens. The political forces of social democracy are now confronted by this challenge all over Europe. The efforts made in recent years within the 27. Ibid. 28. This point is developed in detail in our article(2008):»L’avenir du principe de solidarité au sein de l’ ue : solidarité nationale ou européenne?,« in M. Koopmann and S. Martens(eds.): L’Europe prochaine. Regards franco-allemands sur l’avenir de l’Union européenne . Paris: L’Harmattan: 167–76. It is also available in German translation:»Die Zukunft des Solidaritätsprinzips in der eu : Nationale oder europäische Solidarität?,« in M. Koopmann and S. Martens(eds.)(2008): Das kommende Europa, deutsche und französische Betrachtungen zur Zukunft der Europäische Union . Nomos, dgap -Schriften zur Internationalen Politik: 165–74. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 141

pes in terms of the publication of joint electoral programs, especially at European elections, constitute a first step. But they are far from sufficient. The ps , because of the deep divisions on Europe mentioned above, does not seem ready to go further in these reflections; first, it has to decide between the two visions currently co-existing in the party. The selection of a candidate for the presidential election, by virtue of the authority and legitimacy it confers on the eventual winner, might serve as an opportunity to close the chapter which opened with the trauma of the debate on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 within the party, and cause it to choose the policy it will pursue on Europe in the coming years – in the same way that, for example, François Mitterrand and Jacques Delors were able to impose their clear and determined vision of Europe on the Socialists in the 1980s. Conclusion The 2012 election is not a foregone conclusion but the way is now clear for the ps to an extent not experienced for a considerable time: there is no serious rival on the left and the right has been profoundly weakened by Sarkozy’s presidency and its frustrated hopes. But if they are to win, the Socialists – and the rest of the left with them – will have to offer the French public a program for the country and not just a change of government. This program, which they must now come up with, will have to be conveyed by a person – whose program it will be every bit as much as the party’s – who will have been able to assert him or herself between now and autumn 2011, the date of the primaries at which the ps candidate will be nominated, and therefore, by default, the candidate of the left in the second round of the election. A good program and a good candidate: these are the two tasks of the ps between now and the election. Then it will have to run a good campaign. This program, this candidate, and this campaign will have to show the French public that the Socialists – far beyond the leftist rhetoric which they tend to adopt in opposition(and often forget once in government) – have learned from their past mistakes and that they are ready to take up the reins of national power once again in the clarity of their convictions and their policies. In that way, they will be able to retain power and deal with the serious difficulties facing both France and Europe today. In order to do this, two avenues will have to be given priority: taking into consideration the demands of the working class 142 Bouvet, France ipg 4/2010

in every domain – the Socialists have to regain a»sens du people« – and taking up a position in the European dimension. A narrow political path will have to be trod if these two requirements are to be reconciled, which have often appeared antagonistic, but it is now the only practicable one for social democracy in both France and Europe as a whole. Bibliography Baumel, L., and L. Bouvet(2003): L’Année zéro de la gauche . Paris: Michalon. Becker, J.-J., and G. Candar(eds.)(2004): Histoire des gauches en France . Paris: La Découverte, 2 volumes. Bergounioux, A., and G. Grunberg(2005): L’Ambition et le remords. Les socialistes français et le pouvoir(1905–2005) . Paris: Fayard. Bréchon, P.(ed.)(2005): Les Partis politiques français . Paris: La Documentation française,»Etudes.« Brustier, G., and J.-P. Huelin(2009): Recherche le Peuple désespérément . Paris: Bourin Editeur. Conan, E.(2004): La Gauche sans le peuple . Paris: Fayard. Hatzfeld, H., J. Mischi, and H. Rey(eds.)(2007): Dictionnaire de la gauche . Paris: Larousse. Lefebvre, R., and F. Sawicki(2006): La Société des socialistes. Le PS aujourd’hui . Bellecombe-en-Bauge: Editions du Croquant. Miquet-Marty, F.(2010): La Guerre des gauches n’aura pas lieu ; Fondation Jean-Jaurès. Rey, H., F. Subileau, and C. Ysmal(1999): Les Adhérents socialistes en 1998 . Paris: Cahiers du cevipof (Sciences Po). Rey, H.(2004): La Gauche est les classes populaires. Histoire et actualité d’une mésentente . Paris: La Découverte. ipg 4/2010 Bouvet, France 143

The American Democratic Party at a Crossroads MATT BROWNE/ JOHN HALPIN/ RUY TEIXEIRA AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY* * It is neither a parliamentary party nor a membership organization, but rather coordinated by a series of committees. Official website: The Democratic National Committee(DNC): www.democrats.org; The Democratic Governors’ Association(DGA): www.democraticgovernors.org; The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC): www.dscc.org; The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee(DCCC): www.dccc.org; The Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee (DLCC): www.dlcc.org; The Association of State Democratic Chairs(ASDC): www.democrats.org/asdc Party leader: Governor Tim Kaine is the Chairman of the DNC. Founded: 1828 Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2008: Senate: 57; House: 257 2006: Senate: 49; House: 233 2004: Senate: 44; House: 202 Government participation: President Barack Obama was elected 44th President of the United States on November 4, 2008, beating his Republican rival by 365 electoral votes to 173. He assumed office on January 20, 2009, returning the Democrats to the executive branch for the first time in eight years. 144 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

Foundations of the Democratic Party The Democratic Party of the United States was founded in 1828 and traces its philosophy back to Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, both of whom styled themselves as advocates of the»common man.« Despite these origins, the Democratic Party has not always been the most progressive party in the us . For example, the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln, not the Democrats, took the lead in ending slavery in the country. And in the Progressive Era(roughly 1890–1920), the Republicans, with figures such as Teddy Roosevelt and Bob La Follette, again took the lead in fighting corruption, reforming the electoral process, curbing the power of big capital, and developing social welfare programs. But since the New Deal era of Franklin Roosevelt, it has been the Democratic Party that has taken the lead in taming the excesses of capitalism, promoting the economic interests of the middle and working classes, and pushing for social justice. The Republican Party, on the other hand, has adopted an emphatic pro-business and socially conservative stance, thereby positioning itself consistently to the right of the Democrats on both economic and social issues. Current State of the Democratic Party The Democratic Party is not a membership organization, although in 30 of 50 states citizens can register by party when they register to vote. Around 70 million Americans are registered Democrats. More consequential for gauging the party’s strength is the partisanship or party identification of citizens, since this trait is so closely related to voting behavior and is easily measured. For 2009, Democratic Party identification was at 34 percent, compared to 24 percent for the Republican Party. 1 But these figures underestimate Democratic strength, since large numbers of Americans say they are»independent,« but in reality lean towards and consistently vote for one particular party. These »independent leaners« should be considered partisans 2 and, once they 1. Pew annual average, as reported in Pew Research Center:»Voting Intentions Even, Turnout Indicators Favor gop ;« July 1, 2010. Pew data closely approximate the average of all public polls. 2. See John Petrocik(2009):»Measuring Party Support: Leaners Are Not Independents,« in Electoral Studies, 28:4(December): 562–72. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 145

are taken into account, Democratic strength in 2009 was at 50 percent and Republicans at 37 percent. Moreover, state-level party identification results in 2009 showed the Democrats with a greater than five point advantage over Republicans in 33 states, compared to only five states in which Republicans had such an advantage. 3 Although precise spending and organizing figures are difficult to pin down, it is clear that increased funding and commitment to the controversial»50-state strategy« – devised and implemented by the chairman of the Democratic National Committee( dnc ) and former presidential candidate, Howard Dean – laid the groundwork for significant gains in Democratic support from 2005 through 2008. By allocating party resources to local and state organizing in difficult environments such as Nevada, Indiana, Colorado, and Virginia, the 50-state strategy offered a radical break from past approaches of using party money almost exclusively in targeted races and states blanketed with expensive advertising. 4 The basic goal of the 50-state strategy was to rebuild the party from the ground up through online and on-the-ground organizing rather than relying solely on a small class of donors and party elites to win elections in a handful of places. Democrats attempted to find their voters wherever they resided, especially in key conservative strongholds, and forced the Grand Old Party( gop ) into combat in districts and states where the party had faced little opposition in the past. The 50-state strategy proved successful, with the Democratic takeover of the House in 2006 and, more importantly, with the election of Barack Obama with 53 percent of the popular vote and 28 states in 2008. Underlying these favorable data is an electoral and ideological conundrum for the modern Democratic Party. The party’s long-term prospects could not be stronger. The shifting demographic composition of the electorate – with rising percentages of working women, minorities, younger and more secular voters, and educated whites living in more urbanized states – clearly favors»the party of the common man« and has increased the relative strength of the Democratic Party(see next section, »The Demographic Transformation of America«). In contrast, the Republican Party’s coalition of older, whiter, more rural and evangelical voters is shrinking and becoming more geographically concentrated and 3. Jones, Jeffrey M.(2010):»Party id : Despite gop Gains, Most States Remain Blue,« Gallup Organization(February 1). 4. Bai, Matt(2006):»The Inside Agitator,« in New York Times (October 1). 146 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

less important in terms of the overall political landscape of the country. Ideologically, Americans over the past few years have clearly favored a substantial role for government as a guardian against the vagaries of the market economy, as a check on reckless business behavior, and as an important source of public investment in national needs, from renewable energy and updated infrastructure to education and health care. Following the financial crisis of 2008, and the lingering employment crisis that has left nearly 18 percent of Americans either unemployed or underemployed, Americans’ faith in free market solutions and deregulation has waned significantly from its heyday in the Reagan and Bush presidencies. Building on these trends, Democrats put together impressive backto-back victories in the past two election cycles, flipping control of Congress from the Republicans in 2006 and electing America’s first African American president in 2008. Within the first few months of the Obama presidency in 2009, a slew of legislation was passed to address the banking crisis and implement key economic stimulus spending to invest in new energy projects, infrastructure needs, education, and support for working class families. In 2010, the Democrats passed major health care legislation, securing a 100-year progressive battle for universal health coverage, and passed the most significant regulatory changes to American finance since the days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Despite the advantageous context that has developed over the past few years, the Democratic Party faces significant short-term challenges that could easily alter or dislodge favorable prospects for the future. Almost immediately after Obama’s inauguration and early legislative victories, the conservative right mounted a fierce, well coordinated counterattack against the progressive momentum of the Obama presidency. The Republican leadership in the us House and Senate embarked on a cynical, if effective, strategy of obstruction through unified opposition to the president’s agenda and through procedural hurdles like the endless threats of filibusters in the Senate and holds on the president’s nominees for key governmental posts. The reactionary conservative movement, fueled by the demagoguery of Fox News, talk radio, and leaders like Sarah Palin, Glenn Beck, Rush Limbaugh, and Newt Gingrich, savaged the president’s every move as»socialism,«»communism,« and»fascism.« The nascent Tea Party, ostensibly a grassroots resistance movement built on libertarian ideals but in practice another arm of the conservative Republican base, built on this sentiment in opposing the president’s push for health care and additional stimulus to help cash-strapped states and the ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 147

unemployed. Even the organized business community, which had been somewhat cooperative with Obama’s administration on his major legislative priorities, is currently in full revolt against his presidency over a perceived lack of concern for business needs, new regulations, and the prospect of future tax increases. In the midst of the ongoing economic crisis that has seen the wealthy and Wall Street recover nicely while working- and middle-class Americans continue to suffer from job losses and wage erosion, the conservative and gop assault on the Obama presidency has clearly taken its toll. President Obama’s job approval numbers have declined steadily from around 70 percent when he was inaugurated in early 2009 to 45–47 percent by the middle of 2010. And where the Democrats had been running a solid lead on the generic congressional ballot, they are now no better than tied with the Republicans. As for the Democrats’ party identification advantage, that too has narrowed to seven points(49–42) from 13 points at the end of 2009. 5 Moreover, public dissatisfaction with government continues to rise, fed by doubts about its performance on the economy, on the bp oil spill, and on spending and deficits. The president’s legislative proposal on energy and climate change faces grim prospects along with congressional action to reverse the Bush tax cuts or create another round of stimulus spending. Progressive activists and the emerging Obama coalition are far less energized for the mid-term elections than their Tea Party counterparts. What happened? How did the Democratic Party find itself in such a precarious state after enjoying some of the most favorable trends in American politics? First, despite the general tendency of Americans to support progressive goals and policies, as documented in an extensive survey by the Progressive Studies Program at the Center for American Progress in 2009, 6 the early steps by the Administration to protect the country from financial collapse produced understandable confusion and anger among many Americans. Ongoing bank and auto bailouts and a massive stimulus package aimed at reviving aggregate economic demand and helping distressed homeowners and the unemployed unfolded at a rapid 5. Pew Research Center: op. cit. 6. John Halpin/ Karl Agne(2009): State of American Political Ideology, 2009: A National Study of Political Values and Beliefs, Center for American Progress(March). 148 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

clip without adequate explanation as to why these steps were necessary and how they would fit into the overall vision of change promised by progressives and Obama. The nearly year-long health care debate did little to alleviate people’s confusions about what exactly the government plans to do over the next decade in this critical area. Given the apparent lack of economic coherence, long-standing American skepticism of government intervention in the economy on both the left and the right reared its head in force. Second, and more importantly, the objective and subjective measures of the economy continue to drag. Growth is steadily rising in the us , but unemployment and underemployment remain stubbornly high. Steps to address the financial crisis have not significantly improved lending to small businesses and the housing market continues to suffer. Americans and their government are massively indebted and looking to pay down their obligations at a time of reduced overall demand. America faces uncertain economic times ahead and the American people remain justifiably angry and fearful of the future. Third, the Obama administration and the Democratic Party failed to recognize the rising damage to their leaders and agenda and, consequently, did not mobilize against the conservative forces seeking to undermine their position. The president’s continued insistence upon trying to find common ground with a party that sees his failure as their gain allowed the right-wing propaganda machine to completely dominate the terms of public debate for far too long. Rather than seeing and learning about the real progress Obama has made in fixing the problems of the Bush years and setting the nation on a new economic footing – what he calls a»house upon a rock« 7 – Americans have been subjected to nonstop vitriol and lies about his motives and policies. The Democratic Party successfully challenged the Bush-Rove electoral machine in the 2008 campaign, but has not been prepared to counteract the agenda-setting capabilities of conservative media in the United States once in office. Thus, the short-term problems facing the Democrats are real and cannot be ignored. The Democrats face the probability of large losses in the November 2010 elections – losses that could be large enough to lose control of one arm of Congress, the House of Representatives. Moreover, without noticeable improvement in the economy through 7. Obama, Barack(2009): Remarks on the Economy, Georgetown University (April 14). ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 149

2011, President Obama will face a serious challenge from any credible Republican candidate. Despite this grim prognosis for the near term, our analysis of electoral, demographic, and public opinion data suggests that these short-term trends may represent the last gasp of a slowing eroding conservative and Republican majority in America in favor of a steadily rising progressive and Democratic majority over the next two decades. In the next two sections, we will explore these emerging trends and then offer some thoughts on how the Democrats might take advantage of these conditions, both strategically and ideologically. The Demographic Transformation of America To understand how a progressive and Democratic majority was possible in 2006–2008 and how it may continue in the future despite the conservative counterattack, it is necessary above all to understand the demographic transformation of America. This transformation is driven by a number of large-scale trends that have turned Reagan-era(1980–1988) conservative America into a very different and more progressive place. Minorities The minority vote – blacks, Hispanics, Asians – in the United States has been steadily rising. Overall, the minority share of voters in the national exit poll rose to 26 percent in 2008 from 23 percent in 2004. Back in 1988, that share was just 15 percent. That’s a rise of 11 percentage points over 20 years, or about half a percentage point a year. 8 The advantage Democrats have derived from minority voters should continue to grow, since there is no sign this growth is slowing down. In 10 battleground states studied by Teixeira and demographer William Frey(Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Virginia), 9 the percentage of minority 8. The Current Population Survey( cps ) November Voter Supplement and the exit polls agree that minorities represented 15 percent of the vote in 1988 but disagree slightly on how much the minority vote has gone up since then. According to the cps , the minority vote rose nine points between 1988 and 2008, reaching 24 percent in the last election. 9. The Political Geography of Pennsylvania: Not Another Rustbelt State; The Political Geography of the Intermountain West: The New Swing Region; The Political 150 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

voters grew in every one between 2000 and 2006, including spectacular growth of a percentage point a year in Nevada. Nationwide, minorities grew by around 20 percent between 2000 and 2008, accounting for more than four-fifths of us population growth. 10 This was mostly driven by Hispanic population growth. Hispanics grew by 31 percent in this period, and they accounted for over half of us population growth. 11 Of course, it’s true that Hispanics’ population strength is not currently matched by their voting strength due to the large proportion of Hispanics who are not citizens and therefore cannot vote or are simply too young to vote. As a result of these factors, only 42 percent of Hispanics overall are eligible to vote, compared to 77 percent of non-Hispanic whites and 66 percent of African Americans. 12 Nevertheless, the Hispanic proportion among the voting electorate has grown steadily and will continue to grow. They represented only two percent of voters in early 1990s, but they stood at nine percent in 2008 and will likely surpass the level of black voters sometime in this decade. 13 Asians are the other significant contributor to minority growth. In the 1990s their growth rate was actually slightly higher than Hispanics. And in the 2000–2008 period they were not far behind(26 percent versus 31 percent for Hispanics). 14 Right now, they make up about five percent of the population and two percent of voters. 15 Both figures will increase in the next 10 years due to this group’s fast rate of growth, but because they start from a much smaller base than Hispanics their impact on the population and voting pool will be far more limited. In a longer-term perspective, the us is rapidly approaching a majorityminority nation. People tend to think of 2050 as the year America will become majority-minority. But it could be closer than that – the 2008 us census projections put the tipping point dates at 2042 for the entire Geography of Ohio, Michigan and Missouri: Battlegrounds in the Heartland; The Political Geography of Virginia and Florida: Bookends of the New South. 10. Frey, William(2010): Analysis of 2000–2008 Census Population Estimates Data for State of Metropolitan America, Brookings Institution. 11. Frey: op. cit. 12. Frey, William(2009):»How Did Race Affect the 2008 Presidential Election?«, Population Studies Center Research Report, University of Michigan, September. 13. Authors’ analysis of cps and exit poll data. 14. Frey, State of Metropolitan America. 15. Authors’ analysis of cps and exit poll data and Frey, op. cit. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 151

population and at 2023 for the population under 18. 16 By 2050 the United States will actually be 54 percent minority. Hispanics will drive minority growth above all. Their numbers will triple to 133 million by 2050 from 47 million today, while the numbers of non-Hispanic whites will remain essentially flat. Hispanics will double as a percentage of the population from 15 percent to 30 percent. Asians will also come close to doubling, going from five percent to nine percent. Blacks, however, will grow only from 14 percent to 15 percent of the population, making them only half the size of the Hispanic population by 2050. The foreign-born percentage in the population will also grow, reflecting the growth of non-black minorities. By 2050 about one in five Americans will be foreign born, up from one in eight today. These trends indicate that the voting electorate’s race-ethnic composition will continue to evolve rapidly. Political scientist and author Alan Abramowitz has projected that minorities will represent 34 percent of voters by the 2020 election. 17 If minorities retain their current political leanings this shift in the distribution of voters should substantially advantage the Democrats. 16. In 2009, the Census Bureau issued a set of projections that are»supplemental« to the 2008 projections. What this means is that, even though the 2008 projections remain the recommended data series for general use, the 2009 supplemental projections can be used to assess the effects of different immigration scenarios on future population levels and distribution. Of the scenarios provided, the»low net international migration« or low nim , which projects the number of immigrants per year to increase slowly to 2050, is fairly close to the original 2008 projections and quite similar to the projections produced by demographers Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohen for the Pew Research Center(» us Population Projections: 2005–2050«, February 11, 2008), based on a constant rate of immigration relative to population size. The low nim scenario puts the majority minority crossover point at 2045. Some argue(see William Frey[2010]:»Immigration and the Coming ›Majority Minority‹,« Brookings[March 19]) that the constant nim scenario(where the number of immigrants per year remains constant to the year 2050) should be preferred, since it corresponds well to recent us experience with immigrant flows. The constant nim scenario has a majority–minority crossover date of 2050, corresponding to the date frequently cited in popular accounts of rising diversity. 17. Abramowitz’s projection is based on an exit poll data series that begins in 1992, when the proportion of minority voters(13 percent) appears to have been anomalously low, leading to a possible overestimate of the minority share growth rate. Starting in 1988 instead of 1992 would produce a slower growth rate and therefore a lower estimated minority share in 2020 – perhaps 32 percent instead of 34 percent. 152 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

White College Graduates Democrats fare much more poorly with white voters. But they are doing much better among some white voters than others. They have been gaining particular strength among white college graduates, for example. Obama only lost white college graduates by four points in 2008, compared to an 11-point deficit for Democrat John Kerry in 2004 and a 20-point deficit for Democrat Michael Dukakis in 1988. Moreover, white college graduates are a growing constituency, especially in the suburbs of America’s most dynamic metropolitan areas, where they are characterized by relative social liberalism and strong interest in effective public services. Their share of voters has gone up by four points since 1988, even as the share of white voters overall has declined. Recent trends suggest that white college graduates should continue to increase as a share of voters in the immediate future, which should benefit Democrats. In the ten 2008 battleground states Frey and Teixeira studied the percentage of white college graduate voters grew in every one of them between 2000 and 2006. But the durability of this trend – in contrast to the minority voter trend – is open to debate. The basic issue is how long the white adult population’s educational upgrading will continue to outweigh the decline of whites overall, producing a net increase in the white college graduate share of voters. The population’s educational upgrading depends on two factors. The first is whether and at what rate younger whites’ educational credentials – in this case, attaining a four-year degree or more – are increasing. The second is the rate at which younger, more educated whites replace older, less-educated ones. Inspection of Census Bureau data indicates that both factors continue to be relevant: the educational credentials of younger whites are still rising(albeit more slowly than in the 1990s), 18 and generational replacement is still exerting significant upward pressure on educational credentials. It therefore seems likely that the white college graduate share of the adult population will continue to increase for quite some time, 19 18. There are two reasons for this. First, higher percentages of recent cohorts of white 25–29 year olds have attained a college degree(37 percent in 2008 cps data, up from 34 percent in 2000). Secondly, some in these cohorts who have not attained a college degree by 25–29 complete the degree later in life. 19. This assessment is consistent with that of a Census Bureau study from the beginning of this decade;(Jennifer Cheeseman Day/ Kurt J. Bauman(2000):»Have ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 153

which, amplified by the group’s relatively high turnout, should result in significant ongoing increases in the white college graduate share of voters. Moreover, since college completion rates can potentially be boosted by public policy – and there is plenty of economic room to do so, as Massachusetts Institute of Technology labor economist Paul Osterman points out 20 – these projected increases in white college graduate voters could be even stronger than they appear today. White Working Class Democratic Party performance among white working-class voters(defined here as whites without a four-year college degree) has improved little in contrast to white college graduates. These voters tend to be more socially conservative and to blame government for their long-term economic difficulties. Obama lost the white working class by a very large – 18-point – margin in 2008, which is somewhat better than Kerry’s 23-point deficit in 2004 but actually a little worse than Democrat Al Gore’s 17-point deficit in 2000. Moreover, Democrats’ continuing difficulties with the white working class are thrown into stark relief if we look back to 1988. The Democratic deficit in that year among the white working class and white college graduates was identical: 20 points. The respective deficits in 2008 were 18 points and four points. Obama thus only improved over Dukakis by two points among white working-class voters but by 16 points among white college graduates. Quite a contrast. Democrats’ continuing difficulties with white working-class voters are, however, considerably mitigated by the fact that there are now far fewer of them in the voting pool. According to the exit polls, the proportion of white working-class voters is down 15 points since 1988, while, as discussed above, the proportion of white college graduate voters is up four points and the proportion of minority voters is up 11 points. This general pattern – a sharp decline in the share of white workingclass voters accompanied by increases in the shares of minority voters We Reached the Top?: Educational Attainment Projections of the us Population,« Census Bureau Population Division: Working Paper Series No. 43(May), which predicted continued educational upgrading through 2028. 20. Osterman, Paul(2008):»College for All? The Labor Market for College-Educated Workers,« Center for American Progress(August). 154 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

and white college graduate voters – has been replicated in state after state since 1988, including many critical states in the 2008 election. Since 1988, for example, the share of white working-class voters in Florida has declined 17 points, while the white college graduate share has risen four points and the minority share is up by 12 points. Even more spectacularly, in Pennsylvania white working-class voters are down 25 points over the time period, while white college graduate voters are up 16 points and minorities have increased by eight points. In the key swing state of Ohio the share of white working-class voters fell by 15 points between 1988 and 2008, while white college graduates rose by eight points and minorities by six points. And in Nevada, white working-class voters are down 24 points since the 1988 election, while white college graduate voters are up four points and minorities an amazing 19 points. Millennial Generation Other demographic trends accentuate the Democrats’ advantage. The Millennial generation(those born 1978–2000) gave Obama a stunning 66–32 margin in 2008. This generation also leans heavily Democratic on party identification. The difficult 2010 political environment for the Democrats has seen their overall party identification lead slip considerably, but they have retained a double digit lead(14 points) among Millennials. 21 Millennials also hold a raft of progressive positions in various issue areas that should continue to propel them toward the Democrats. 22 On social issues, Millennials support gay marriage, take race and gender equality as givens, are tolerant of religious and family diversity, have an open and positive attitude toward immigration, and generally display little interest in fighting over the divisive social issues of the past. They are also notably progressive on foreign policy issues, and favor a multilateral and cooperative foreign policy more than their elders. And Millennials, more so than other generations, want a stronger government to make the economy work better, help those in need, and provide more services. These views extend to a range of domestic policy issues including education, clean energy, and, especially, health care. 21. Pew Research Center(2010): Millennials: A Portrait of Generation Next, Washington dc (February). 22. For data and discussion, see David Madland/ Ruy Teixeira(2009): New Progressive America: The Millennial Generation, Washington, dc (May). See also Pew Research Center: op. cit. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 155

Millennials were around 20 percent of the vote in this election. This figure will steadily rise as more Millennials enter the voting pool. About 55 million Millennials were of voting age in 2008, and roughly 48 million were citizen-eligible voters. Millennials of voting age will increase by about 4.5 million a year between now and 2018. And in 2020 – the first presidential election in which all Millennials will have reached voting age – this generation will be 103 million strong, of which about 90 million will be eligible voters. Those 90 million Millennial eligible voters will represent just under 40 percent of America’s eligible voters. 23 These trends mean that every election up until 2020 will see a bigger share of Millennial voters – both because more of them will be eligible to vote and because the leading edge of the Millennials will be aging into higher turnout years. In 2012, there will thus be 74 million Millennials of voting age and 64 million Millennial eligible voters, 29 percent of all eligible voters. Assuming that Millennials’ relatively good turnout performance continues(but doesn’t get any better), that should translate into roughly 35 million Millennials who cast ballots in 2012 and an estimated 26 percent of all voters. There will be 93 million Millennials of voting age by 2016, and 81 million Millennial eligible voters, making them 36 percent of all eligible voters. This should produce an estimated 46 million voting Millennials, which represents 33 percent of all voters. And in 2020 those 90 million Millennial eligible voters should translate into 52 million Millennial votes, representing 36 percent of all votes cast in that election. Other Demographic Trends Professionals are now the most Democratic, as well as fastest-growing, occupational group in the us and that support increases with every election. In 2008, they gave Obama an estimated 68 percent of the vote. By the middle of this decade, professionals will account for around one in five American workers. Democrats generally do better among women than men in the us and they do particularly well among growing subgroups of women like the unmarried and the college-educated. In 2008, unmarried women 23. Estimations in this and subsequent paragraphs are based on the authors’ analysis of 2008 Census National Population Projections by single years of age, 2008 nep exit poll sample composition, and 2004 Census Voter Supplement data by single years of age. 156 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

voted 70 percent for Obama and 57 percent of college-educated women supported Obama. Unmarried women now account for almost half of adult women, up from 38 percent in 1970. College-educated women are an especially rapidly growing population group. They have more than tripled in recent decades, from just eight percent of the 25-and-older female population in 1970 to 28 percent today. The growth of religious diversity, especially rapid increases among the unaffiliated(who voted 75 percent for Obama), also favors Democrats. Unaffiliated or secular voters, together with non-white evangelical Protestants, are the fastest-growing»religious« group in the us . From 1944 to 2004, the percentage of adults reporting no religious affiliation almost tripled, rising from five to 14 percent. Projections indicate that, by 2024, 20–25 percent of us adults will be unaffiliated. This trend, combined with growth among non-Christian faiths and race-ethnic trends, will ensure that by the election of 2016, the us will have ceased to be a white Christian nation. Looking even farther down the road, by 2040 white Christians will be only around 35 percent of the population and conservative white Christians, who have been such a critical part of the Republican base, only about a third of that – a minority within a minority. Relationship between the American and the European Situation This demographic transformation is a clear and unambiguous boon to the Democratic Party. The reason for this is simple: these emerging constituencies lean progressive and in America there is only one progressive party, the Democrats, for which these constituencies can vote. Thus, as these constituencies grow, it is the Democrats and no other party that receives a potential boost in support. In Europe, however, the situation is quite different. The simple American two-party system exists nowhere. Instead, European party systems ensure that social democrats typically do have competition for the progressive vote. Indeed, in many countries they have competitors in three different parts of the political spectrum: greens, far leftists, and liberal centrists. And not only do they have competition, but these other parties, on aggregate, typically over-perform among progressive emerging demographics, while social democrats generally under-perform(with the exception of immigrants in most countries). 24 24. See Browne/ Halpin/ Teixeira(2009): The European Paradox, cap Progress. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 157

The ability of social democracy’s center-left competitors to attract emerging demographic groups has allowed these parties to capture a larger share of the vote in the past several decades, in contrast to social democracy, whose vote share has been declining. Across 13 traditional European social democratic parties, the average vote has been just 27 percent in this decade. This figure represents a four-point drop from the 1980s. But the rest of the center-left in these countries has increased their average vote share by five points over this time period, bringing them up to 32 percent. Collectively, they are now larger than social democracy, constituting about 55 percent of the center-left vote. That about reverses the situation back in the 1980s, when social democrats still represented 53 percent of the center-left vote. 25 Social democrats have therefore been caught in a kind of electoral pincer movement. On the one hand, the traditional working class is declining as a share of the electorate and is also giving less of its support to social democrats over time, with that lost support generally going to the right(occasionally to the far left). Since the 1960s, for example, working class support has declined by 20 percentage points for the Swedish social democratic party, by 17 points for the Danish social democratic party, and by 12 points for the British Labour party. 26 On the other hand, social democrats are not getting their fair share, as it were, of progressive emerging constituencies, with much of that going to their center-left competitors. This concatenation of trends, so central to social democracy’s current problems, is not clearly captured by any of the seven theses on social democratic decline advanced in the fes background document on the»Current State and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Europe.« But these trends are critical. Among other things, they suggest that the future of progressive politics in Europe cannot simply be equated with the fate of social democrats. As a rich tapestry of new political parties, be 25. Based on 13 European social democratic parties for which continuous data are available since World War ii : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Analysis by authors of data in Gerassimos Moschonas: »The Electoral Dynamics of European Social Democratic Parties(1950–2008),« in J. Cronin, G. Ross, and J. Shoch(eds.): Futures of the Left . Durham, nc : Duke University Press(forthcoming) and on the Parties and Elections in Europe website (http://www.parties-and-elections.de/countries.html). 26. Authors’ analysis of data in Gerassimos Maschonas(2008):»Lower Classes or Middle Classes? Socialism and its Changing Constituencies in Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark,« presentation to Council for European Studies(March 5). 158 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

they green, liberal, red or other, increase their share of the electorate, the future of progressive politics in multi-party systems will be determined by the total share of votes or seats won by a coalition of progressive forces with overlapping – if differentiable – values and programs, and thus the ability of these parties to forge a governing coalition. This coalitional challenge is absolutely central to reconceptualizing the role of European social democrats. The seven theses also generally fail to shed much light on the problems currently bedeviling American Democrats and progressives (though some, such as the»dominance of public discourse« thesis have at least some modest purchase). For example, the»Dahrendorf« thesis, which posits that progressive politics in the guise of social democracy has fulfilled its historical purpose and thus become superfluous, does not apply to the us . Consider President Obama’s pledge and action to deliver universal healthcare to all Americans, which could be regarded as a step toward the completion of the nation’s welfare state. Similarly, the current Administration’s proposals to promote green industrial jobs and growth blends the promise of social advancement with a post-modern industrial agenda for economic growth. Nor, for that matter, as the analyses above illustrate, has the political space for the Democratic Party»narrowed.« Unlike in Europe, where many Christian Democratic and center-right parties have adopted the core tenets of social democratic thinking, or have at least sought to colonize them, the Republican Party in the us has become increasingly more right-wing. While the birth of the Tea Party may suggest that an increasing number of disillusioned voters are being attracted to this new populist movement, this is far more likely to split the Republican vote than the Democratic one – 80 percent or more of Tea Party supporters are Republicans or lean Republican. Future Prospects of the Democrats A more fruitful way to conceptualize American Democrats’ problems and future prospects, we would argue, is to look at two big challenges they currently face. These are the organizational challenge and the definitional challenge . We would also argue that these two challenges, along with the aforementioned coalitional challenge, provide a useful way of conceptualizing the similarities and differences between American Democrats and European social democratic parties. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 159

Organizing for America Consider first the Democrats’ organizational challenge. All great political movements swell the numbers of those engaged in the political process, encouraging either a new generation to participate or inspiring anew those previously disengaged. This was most certainly the case during the 2008 Presidential campaign. In the time since, much has been written about the innovations in Internet campaigning, the use of social networking tools, and the fundraising and organizing capacity they generate. While it is true that technology played a more decisive role than in any previous election cycle – Obama raised almost three-quarters of his 687 million us -dollars online from four million people; 13 million people signed up to receive regular e-mails; and countless neighborhood events and campaign operations were organized through the social networking tool, MyBarackObama.com – one should not forget that Obama’s tactics were essentially of an old-fashioned variety. The primary focus was on grassroots mobilization, canvassing, and saturation advertising. The success of the Obama campaign resided in the fact that his team could build a»sui generis« structure informed by the latest organizational and information management tools, and married to a classical community organizing model to achieve this. Prior to taking office, there was much speculation about how these new campaigning and organizing techniques – and Obama’s infamous e-mail list – would be applied to, and hopefully transform, the political process in Washington dc . Many expected that the newly inspired movement would be harnessed to pressure Congress – particularly those Representatives and Senators unsupportive of the President’s reform program – to toe the line. With the establishment of a new unit within the Democratic National Committee – Organizing for America – there was also hope that the insurgency and momentum of the campaign could be institutionalized within the Democratic Party. Why, then, has the transition from campaign to governance proved more difficult than some had hoped for? Why has the new President found it so hard to maintain and mobilize the sense of insurgency within the wider progressive movement that carried him to office? For one thing, rallying against the incompetence of the previous Administration did not require that all those disappointed and frustrated by their failures agree on what should be done to rectify the problems they caused – it was a simple matter of»kicking the bums out.« Once 160 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

governing began, and thus the policy-making process too, small details could sow the seeds of division amongst previously allied and aligned forces – for example, with regard to the public option in the healthcare debate – regardless of whether or not they shared the same values or long-term policy goals. The same techniques utilized in the campaign to mobilize turnout seem to be less attuned to building consensus within – and then calling to arms – the progressive movement. While the extraparty progressive infrastructure continues to be far more developed in the United States than is currently the case in Europe, at times the White House has appeared quite isolated. Second, the need to seek consensus on the reform agenda with different strands of legislators within the Democratic Party proved more difficult than could have been imagined, particularly given – or perhaps because of – the large majorities the Party held in both House and Senate. When combined with a desire to build, at least in the early days of the Administration, cross-party support for the stimulus package, health care reform and a broader legislative agenda, the net result was a more pragmatic approach to governance that also entailed a return to the more traditional style of Washingtonian politics – including bargaining and backroom deals – that many had not expected from President Obama. Ironically, then, while the legislative achievements of the first 18 months of the new Administration are very substantial – if not historic – enthusiasm among Democratic activists and voters is at an alltime low. The implication seems to be that for the broader progressive movement part of President Obama’s mandate was not just to change what government did, but also how it was done. There are, of course, multiple benefits from including such movements more closely in policy-making discussions. Not only do they commonly provide expertise on the specific policy challenges in question, but the inclusion of such groups also gives them a better understanding of the compromises that must be made while governing, part-ownership of these decisions, and thus an improved basis of knowledge on which these movements can rally their members to campaign for and support the Administration’s policies. For right or wrong, the feeling of exclusion – and consequent disappointment – some activists and opinion-formers within the progressive community are currently feeling is undoubtedly contributing to and feeding the currently low levels of enthusiasm among Democratic voters ahead of November’s mid-term elections. Given that these movements ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 161

often do not feel ownership of the legislative achievements of the Democrats, they are also less likely to be staunch advocates of them. Today’s activists are less deferential than their predecessors. This was a lesson the Obama campaign had learnt, as embodied in its organizing motto – Respect, Empower, Include. Those same activists now want to be part of the governing process. The Democratic Party and Administration need to remain open to just such a possibility, and indeed should actively invest the time and technology needed to facilitate this. Defining Progress The second key challenge that the Democrats need to address in order to harness and truly benefit from the demographic shifts identified above is the definitional one. As noted earlier, President Obama entered office at a time when the global economy was on the brink of collapse, the domestic and international financial markets were in turmoil, and the American automotive industry on the verge of bankruptcy; the list could go on. These national and global crises required urgent and immediate responses. As decisive action was taken in all of these areas, and health care too, there was little time either to define or set benchmarks for what would amount to progress, or indeed to lay out a broader progressive vision for American society in the twenty-first century. The consequences of this have been particularly acute when it comes to the nation’s understanding of the President’s vision of state–market–society relations and the management of the economy. We noted in the introduction the tensions that currently exist between recent trends in public opinion that tend to favor a stronger role for government, and the deeper historical skepticism about the role of government in American society. Thus, in the us , the issue of the credibility and performance of progressive politics is more nuanced than in Europe, where a decline in the social democratic vote can be linked to social democrats’ inability to use the state and government policy to effectively pursue socially just social democratic policies. Today, many of the legislative battles fought in the United States – be they over healthcare, energy or financial regulation – are effectively proxy battles about whether government can ever be used as a force for good in American society, regardless of the performance of any particular party. While each of these battles will need to be fought on a case by case basis, and won or lost on the respective merits of each argument, 162 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

embedding each of them in a grand narrative that clearly articulates the case for modernized government could, over time, shift the center ground of common sense and make each battle progressively easier to win. Moreover, the very absence of such a narrative has created a vacuum in which opponents of the President and the progressive movement have been able to define their vision for them. While the accusations of the reactionary conservative movement, and their attempts to label President Obama’s agenda as»socialist,«»communist,« or»fascist« are irresponsible and disappointing, they have also been effective, and cannot be left un-countered. In this regard, in the us , the credibility – although perhaps»legitimacy« is a more appropriate term – of government action is intimately tied to issues of the dominant public discourse. There is now an urgent need for progressives to articulate a coherent vision of state–market relations in the twenty-first century. This vision must clearly outline both what the new, vibrant American economy will look like in the years to come – that is, the end goal – and explain the role of government in assisting and enabling this transition. This vision must also be made in language and values that resonate with most Americans. It is not anti-American to promote opportunity, prosperity and fairness, nor is it anti-American to use the tools of government to do so. However, simply articulating why a new and improved role for modern government is necessary to ensure America’s future prosperity – be that through the transition towards a low carbon economy, investment in research and technology, keeping Wall Street and Corporate America in check, or enabling American workers to re-skill and train for the jobs of the future – will be insufficient to rehabilitate the role of the state in the eyes of most Americans. The re-assertion of the necessity of government action must be accompanied by an agenda that also seeks to reform and modernize government, to ensure that government delivers on its commitments and goals as effectively and efficiently as possible. The next phase of progressive politics in America must seek not only to reform the market, but also the state. As we head into the 2010 election season, progressives in the United States would do well to keep these challenges in mind. If they wish to harness the long-term demographic trends that seem to be working in their favor, they will also need to take a long-term perspective on the arguments they make during the day-to-day grind of campaigning. It is time to remake a coherent and long-term case for American government as a force for good. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 163

Conclusion: Prospects for a Transatlantic Progressive Dialogue Through the lenses of the organizational and definitional challenges progressives face, the prospects of a future transatlantic dialogue may be better than some had thought. Indeed, we would argue, progressives are as likely to benefit from discussing the differences in the challenges faced on either side of the Atlantic as they are from discussing the similarities. Organizing Insurgency When it comes to the organizational challenge, for example, at first glance one might assume that the fundamentally different natures of the Democratic Party – which is essentially a maze of electoral committees and bodies – and the European parliamentary parties would provide little basis for fruitful discussion. On reflection, however, there is much to learn from the relative strengths and weaknesses of each other’s organizations. As argued above, the Democratic Party needs to work to institutionalize – or at the very least more effectively collaborate with – the wider progressive movement. Here, then, there may well be lessons that us progressives can learn from the more disciplined and structured nature of social democratic parties in Europe. In the us system, it is has proved hard to transform the momentum and sense of insurgency of the progressive movement witnessed during the campaign into an aid to governance – and a greater degree of institutionalized or structured collaboration between the party and the movement could very well help with this. Conversely, in Europe, there is a growing debate about whether parliamentary parties need to become more flexible. The advantage of the European system is that both a shared memory and movement of common purpose is – or at least was – institutionalized within a structured body. It has, however, become increasingly apparent how difficult it is to open parties up so that they can appeal and reach out to new groups or respond to new issues. There is now a need to rethink how to accommodate new technologies and organizing techniques, both of which often require a fundamental rethink with regard to how to do and organize politics. The internet, interest groups, and social networking cannot be simply»bolted on« to existing structures, at least not if they are to be used effectively. 164 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

It would seem to us, then, that investigating how progressives might achieve a happy medium between the flexibility, innovation, and vibrancy of American campaign committees, and the discipline, structure, and hierarchy of European parliamentary parties is a worthy endeavor. A New Progressive Agenda Similarly, it is high time that deeper discussions began on the formation of a common progressive policy agenda. Nowhere is this more urgent than with regard to a vision for post-crisis economic renewal. Eighteen months ago, progressive parties across Europe were struggling to distinguish themselves from their Christian Democratic and center-right opponents, many of whom had sought to respond to the global financial crisis by adopting the Keynesian economic stimulus packages and unemployment and social protection policies commonly associated with the social democrats. As the center-right and Christian Democrats colonized the social democrats’ political terrain, progressives effectively found themselves squeezed out by their opponents on the left and right. At the G20 summit in London, leaders of all political persuasions embraced the call for concerted and coordinated global stimulus packages. Fast forward a year and the political and policy poles have reversed. Across Europe a series of harsh spending cuts are now on the agenda. These programs are being implemented by progressive governments in Spain and Greece with the same conviction as the newly elected conservative-liberal coalitions in the uk and Germany. Mimicking the politics of Herbert Hoover, it appears that all Europeans are now betting that raising taxes and cutting spending will expand their economies. In the us , however, President Obama has continued to pursue an ambitious, stimulus-led, pro-growth agenda. Both President Obama and Treasury Secretary Geithner have warned of the long-term economic dangers associated with diverting from this course and prematurely implementing fiscal austerity measures. In both Europe and the United States, long-term unemployment remains persistently high and the threat of a deflationary trap is ever present. The resurgence of this old economic orthodoxy in Europe puts long-term job growth and economic recovery at risk – both in Europe and the us . Worryingly for progressives, it also promotes a thoroughly unprogressive style of leadership, one that glorifies the ability to impose suffering on other people in tough times. ipg 4/2010 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA 165

On this issue, more than any other, the tectonic divide between Europe and the United States seems to be getting ever wider. Today, us progressives are the ones that find themselves being squeezed. Isolated internationally, the new Administration has been unable to build a new global consensus for the further stimuli necessary to ensure continued economic recovery. At home, they also face opposition to their state aid package from conservative Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Now, more than ever, it is essential for progressives in Europe and the us to work in partnership to define a progressive growth model as an alternative to conservative economic orthodoxy. It is not overstating the case to say that the future of progressive politics depends on our ability to craft such an alternative. 166 Browne/Halpin/Teixeira, USA ipg 4/2010

»Everyone on Board!« 1 The Nordic Model and the Red-Red-Green Coalition – A Transferable Model of Success? WOLFGANG BIERMANN/ KRISTINE KALLSET NORWEGIAN LABOR PARTY(DET NORSKE ARBEIDERPARTI, DNA; OR MORE COMMONLY: ARBEIDERPARTIET, AP) Official website: http://arbeiderparti.no Party leader: Jens Stoltenberg History at a glance: Founded in Arendal in 1887. Represented in the Storting(Norwegian parliament) since 1907. From March 1935 to April 1945 the AP governed together with the Farmers’ Party(Bondepartiet) under Johan Nygaardsvold and laid the initial foundations of a welfare state – abruptly suspended by the German occupation from April 1941 to May 1945 and the conduct of the resistance from exile in London. Between 1945 and 2010 the AP has governed for around 45 years with brief interruptions. SI and PES membership: SI: since 1932; PES: since 1999 Party membership: 2009: 50,269 1999: 61,327 Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2009: 35.4% of the votes, 64 seats 2005: 32.7% of the votes, 61 seats 2001: 24.3% of the votes, 43 seats 1997: 35.0% of the votes, 65 seats Government participation: 2005: in government; head of government: Jens Stoltenberg 2000–2001: in government; head of government: Jens Stoltenberg, in coalition with SV and SP 1.»Alle skal med« – literally»Everyone is to come with us« or»everyone on board«– has been the main slogan of the Norwegian Labor Party since 2005. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 167

From Electoral Disaster in 2001 to the Resurrection of Social Democracy in 2005 What’s going on in Norway? While in many European countries social democracy is struggling, in both 2005 and 2009 the left-wing coalition government and successful reform policies of the Norwegian social democrats were endorsed in the elections. Is it because of the oil which makes it possible to fund social democratic favors? From the Norwegian standpoint, the answer is a resounding »no.« This is because only a maximum of four percent of the petroleum fund 2 (one of two sovereign wealth funds comprising the Norwegian government’s pension fund) may flow into the state budget; the rest goes into an international fund. The center-right parties resorted to the »oil argument« again in calling for cuts in taxes and contributions – and lost the past two elections against the social democratic»state and tax party« with its left-wing/ red coalition partners. In 2001, the Norwegian Labor Party(DnA), under the»Norwegian Tony Blair« Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, suffered its worst election defeat for 77 years with a meager 24.4 percent of the votes. 3 Afterwards, the ap ’s poll ratings sank even further, to as low as 15 percent, 4 accompanied by a fierce internal debate between supporters of party leader and former prime minister Thorbjörn Jagland, and those of Jens Stoltenberg, ousted as prime minister but elected leader of the parliamentary group. However, from 2004, the ap was able to remold the party program and its organization, both by returning to traditional values and social democratic policies and by further developing the»Nordic welfare state« in close cooperation with the trade unions. For the first time ever, the ap opposition group worked out a joint program with the Sosialistisk Venstreparti(Socialist Left Party or sv ) 5 2. Withdrawal from the»Statens Pensionsfond Utland«(»State Pension Fund – Global,« the other sovereign wealth fund) is limited to the average tax revenues (the four percent cited). 3. At the Storting election in 1924 the ap received only 18.4 percent, but thereafter always comfortably topped 30 percent(with the exception of 2001). 4. According to DnA interviewees. 5. The sv was founded in 1961 as the Sosialistisk Folkeparti( sf /Socialist People’s Party Volkspartei) by former social democrats opposed to the eu and nato and in 1975, reinforced by former communists and other left-wing groups, was renamed the Socialist Left Party. 168 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

and the Senterparti(Center Party or sp ) 6 (»155 points on which we are in agreement«). The ap led a coalition election campaign with them and won enough votes – 32.7 percent – to oust the center-right coalition with a Red-Red-Green majority in the Storting in September 2005. This RedRed-Green coalition was endorsed by the electorate once again in the elections in September 2009. For outside observers, but also for the Norwegian Labor Party itself, the question arises of whether and how the Nordic model à la Norway can continue – but also whether and how it could be transferred to other countries and other social democratic parties in Europe. 7 The present study is intended to contribute to answering this question and thus to the dissemination of Norway’s»lessons learned.« Historical Background Since 1945 up to the present day the ap has governed for around 45 years, furnishing six prime ministers: Einar Gerhardsen, Trygve Bratteli, Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Thorbjørn Jagland, and now Jens Stoltenberg. With relatively short interruptions by center-right governments, social democratic governments worked out the foundations of the Nordic welfare state – in close cooperation with the trade unions and in discussion with samak , the Nordic cooperation committee bringing together social democrats and trade unions. Under the social democratic governments of Bratteli(1971/72 and 1973–1976), as well as Nordli the first basic reforms of the»Nordic model« were introduced. The Nordic welfare state was to be tax-financed and guarantee a basic provision permitting a decent living standard»for all« registered inhabitants, independent of family or social assistance. This was to be achieved, among other things, by the following means: 6. The sp is a traditional conservative-green party with its electoral constituency in rural areas. 7. Further testament to the transferability of Nordic experiences is provided by the invitation by the World Economic Forum to make the»Lessons Learned« from the Nordic model the main theme of the meeting in Davos in summer 2011. (»Ber verden se mot Skandinavia«/»Let the world look towards Scandinavia«), Aftenposten, June 20, 2010; see also:»Danmark bliver darling på Davos-møde«/ »Denmark becomes the darling of Davos summit«), Business.dk, June 16, 2010. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 169

̈ tax-financed»free« public health care; ̈ replacement of the»Bismarckian« school system and of schools for disabled and special needs children by a uniform, integrated education for all children up to the 10th grade; ̈ gradual introduction of all-day care – for example, with places in daycare centers for children whose parents are in full-time employment – up to early adolescence; ̈ support for academic education for all young people of majority age, entirely independent of their parents, through educational credits or grants; ̈ state minimum old-age pension dependent solely on residence (»Volkspension« or»national pension«), besides the income-related statutory old-age pension; ̈ funding of social benefits via consumption taxes in the form of (relatively high) vat and high»sin taxes,« as they are known in the vernacular(for example, on cars, alcohol, tobacco, sugar, and so on). On these foundations of the Nordic welfare state, established by the end of the 1970s, the Labor Party, under Gro Harlem Brundtland as Prime Minister of the ap minority governments between 1986 and 1996, drove the reform process further, the standards of which were still largely determined by the Labor Party even after her resignation in 1996. Gro’s resignation as Norwegian prime minister left a major political vacuum which was difficult to fill. Nevertheless, under Gro Harlem Brundtland the Nordic welfare state developed into the foundation of modern Norwegian society. The successor to Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who stepped down on October 25, 1996 was Thorbjörn Jagland, who had already replaced her as party leader at the ap party conference in 1992. 8 After the elections in September 1997, in which the ap received 35 percent of the votes, Jagland resigned as head of the government, having publicly made his continuation as prime minister conditional on at least matching the previous election result(under Brundtland) of 36.9 percent. This was why the leader of the Kristelig Folkeparti( k r f /Christliche Volkspartei), Kjell Magne Bondevik, formed his first coalition government(a minority government) on October 17, 1997 with the k r f , the Center Party( sp ) and Venstre(V/Liberal Party). On March 17, 2000 8. Gro Harlem Brundtland’s standing as party leader was very high; she stepped down in 1992 purely for personal and family reasons. 170 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

he submitted his resignation after his government received no support from the ap and the conservative party Høyre(H, literally»Right«) and thus was unable to attain a majority in the debate on the construction of a gas-fired power station. Leader of the ap parliamentary group Jens Stoltenberg then took up the reins as prime minister of an ap minority government, which was forced to govern with fluctuating parliamentary majorities. In September 2001, the ap then suffered – similar to the spd eight years later – the worst electoral defeat in its history, at around 24 percent of the votes. On the surface, this seemed to confirm the vacuum left by Gro Harlem Brundtland’s resignation. But in that case, what can explain the revival of Brundtland’s political legacy only four years later? Analysis of the Current State of the Norwegian Labor Party 2010 Indeed, Gro Harlem Brundtland had left behind her not just a political vacuum, but also a political legacy with which the majority of Norwegians identify. That explains both the temporary disappointment with her younger and less experienced successors and the solid foundations on which the Labor Party was able to rebuild after 2001. In order to understand the current state of the Norwegian Labor Party(2010) we shall examine the following: ̈ the Brundtland foundations: the substantial performance record of the legendary ap leader and head of government Gro Harlem Brundtland(certainly comparable to that of Willy Brandt); ̈ the election defeat in the crisis year 2001; ̈ the policy and practical weaknesses during the brief Stoltenberg government of 2000/2001; the ap ’s policy shift enabling the formation of the Red-Red-Green coalition while still in opposition; ̈ the party’s performance record in implementing the government program based on the so-called»Soria Moria declaration« of the RedRed-Green coalition since 2005; ̈ internal party changes, as well as the character and societal acceptance of the ap in 2005/2009. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 171

The Brundtland Foundations: Enormous Success and Enormous Burden Under Brundtland’s leadership the economic and political foundations were laid for Norwegian society’s sustainability, modernity, and capacity to integrate, of which Norwegian social democracy can be particularly proud. This includes the exemplary development of women’s roles in Norwegian society. Because the most important economic foundation – and effect! – of the Nordic welfare state in Norway is, notwithstanding a widespread misunderstanding, not the»oil money,« but the results of the reforms which were implemented largely under Brundtland: ̈ The most striking advances were pushed through by Gro Harlem Brundtland as prime minister of several minority governments in 1986–1989 and 1990–1996. Herself the mother of four children, she wanted to eliminate all obstacles to full employment by means of equality between men and women in working life and thereby fully reconcile family and working life. ̈ Her governments pursued these reforms under the overall banner of »work line« in continuous consultation with the trade unions. ̈ Measures for increasing employment included extension of the statefinanced continuation of the payment of the full wage on the birth of a child from 18 to 46 weeks(80 percent in the case of 52 weeks), all-day care in kindergartens and schools, and quota regulations for top management positions in parties, public companies, and administrations. ̈ Brundtland’s»work line« also encompassed more tax reforms, work incentives for both marriage partners, and lower corporate taxes coupled with abolition of write-offs not related to investments. ̈ Elimination of obstacles to employment flexibilization(e.g. incomedependent maximum pensions on the basis of the 20»best« out of 40 years of employment so that occasional unemployment, training, or part-time working does not entail a reduced pension). In 1992, the Brundtland government, with the agreement of the trade unions, introduced a law whereby all company and collective bargaining measures had to be tested with regard to whether they promoted or hindered employment, and in the latter case they had to be changed. 9 9. Cf. Wolfgang Biermann(2004):»Umbau des ›Nordischen Wohlfahrtsstaates,‹« (Rebuilding of the»Nordic welfare state«) background paper for the event organized by the Norwegian-German Willy-Brandt-Stiftung,»Aus der tiefen Krise 172 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

The consequences of these policies were discernible after about 10 years and continue to exert their effects today: as a result of the Brundtland reform policies there have been increases in, for example: ̈ the employment rate of women, from 40 percent in 1970 to 75.3 percent in 1997; ̈ the employment rate of older workers aged 60–64, from 37 percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 2002; ̈ the pass rate of the school leaving certificate thanks to the introduction of comprehensive schools to 70 percent in 2007, while in the case of Muslim girls in Oslo it was as high as 80 percent in 2009; ̈ the birth rate, to around 1.9 children per woman. Among Norwegian women in responsible management positions three or more children are more common than the population average. 10 When Gro Harlem Brundtland resigned in October 1996 for personal reasons she left behind her a historic legacy of which the ap – also in international comparison – could be proud, although for her successors she represents an almost impossible act to follow. This success is part of a possible explanation for both the crisis which the Norwegian Labor Party subsequently went through – but also for its re-emergence. Crisis Year 2001 – Policy Uncertainty and Practical Weaknesses as Causes of the Loss of Public Trust? The electoral catastrophe of 2001, in particular with regard to the trade unions and many core voters, had both current, policy, and»cultural« causes. While the success of social democratic policies even under the conservative predecessor and successor regimes under Kjell Mange Bondevik(1997–2000 and 2001–2005) were not called into question, the in den Höhenflug – Wie reformiert man in Skandinavien?,«(From deep crisis to euphoria – what is the approach to reform in Scandinavia?)(January 28, 2004). Available at: www.willy-brandt-stiftung.de/htmldocs/umbau.pdf. 10. Cf.:»Rike kvinner føder mest«, in Dagsavisen, May 27, 2003(»En ny undersøkelse (…) slår i hjel myten om at kvinner velger mellom karriere og barn. I stedet er det slik at kvinner med høy lønn oftere får barn nummer tre enn lavtlønte medsøstre.« (»New research[…] shattered the myth that women choose between a career and children. Instead, women on high wages more often go for a third child than their more poorly paid sisters.«) ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 173

triumphant election victory of New Labour under Tony Blair infiltrated traces of the Third Way even into Norway. The formulas presented in the Schröder/ Blair paper and adopted by the predominantly social democrat government heads at European summit meetings were also celebrated by the media in Norway. Even though the leadership of the Norwegian Labor Party did not formally embrace the Third Way and had no intention of rejecting the Nordic welfare state, Jens Stoltenberg, elected leader of the parliamentary group in spring 2000 and from March 2000 head of government, was described by the Oslo media as the»Norwegian Tony Blair.« This portrayal by the media aroused among the trade unions and parts of the Labor Party fears of a possible renunciation of social democratic values. The emphasis on personal responsibility rather than state benefits, the»allocative function of markets,« and discussion of the liberalization of global financial and economic movements necessarily implied keeping the trade unions at something of a distance, as well as center-right sympathies. During Stoltenberg’s short period in office the government covertly considered – although it was leaked to the media – cutting unpaid sick leave within the framework of sickness benefit. This led to massive conflicts with the trade union federation Landsorganisasjonen i Norge( lo ) and its then leader Yngve Hågensen. A proposal formulated by energy minister Akselsen on the part privatization of Statoil provoked strong resistance within the ap and the protests of Finn Lied, who as industry minister in the 1970s developed the Statoil concept in order to safeguard national oil resources from international oil groups. This and other debates led to uncertainty within the party and among voters and escalated during Stoltenberg’s brief term of office as prime minister to a violent altercation within the ap between the»traditionalists« (who looked to party chair Thorbjørn Jagland) and the»modernizers« (with whom Jens Stoltenberg was identified). This contributed to the dramatic exodus of ap voters at the Storting elections in September 2001. An analysis of the changes in voter approval makes the drama of the Labor Party’s standing among the electorate particularly clear. 11 11. On this cf. Bernt Aardal, Henry Valen, Rune Karlsen, Øyvin Kleven and Tor Morten Normann:»Valgundersøkelsen 2001,« Dokumentasjonsrapport, Rapporter, 2003/14, Statistisk sentralbyrå 2003: 19 ff. 174 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

For the ap , the 2001 elections were characterized mainly by the mass desertion of younger voters: only 11 percent of voters below the age of 29 voted ap , in comparison to 18 percent in 1996. On the other hand, the Socialist Left Party( sv ) polled 26 percent and the conservative Høyre (H) –»the Right Party« – as much as 28 percent of younger voters. 12 In its analysis of the vote shift in 2001 the Central Statistical Office ( ssb ) declares:»The proportion of those who either voted for another party or simply stayed at home grew to 44 percent. Discounting the abstainers 37 percent switched their vote to a different party«(Valgundersøkelsen 2001, Rapporter 2003/14, Statistisk sentralbyrå 2003: 19). Only 56 percent of those who had voted ap in 1997 did so again in 2001. Thirteen percent of ap voters switched to the Right Party, 10 percent to the sv , and 12 percent stayed at home. In contrast, 73 percent of sv voters and 69 percent of Høyre voters remained faithful to their party. ap losses were particularly significant among, traditionally, their most important core voters, members of lo trade unions: only 32.8 percent of trade union members voted ap , in comparison to 53.8 percent in 1997. Evidently, previous ap supporters among the trade unions felt»betrayed and sold out.« AP Policy Shift – From the Third Way»Back« to the Nordic Model and the Red-Red-Green Coalition After the election defeat there were further discussions within the party. For example, a section of the Labor Party in Sør-Trøndelag in northern Norway wrote an internal paper in which it appealed to the party’s will towards unity and renewal and criticized the lack of communication and the arrogance within the ap leadership, as well as plans to privatize public services reported in the press. Under the slogan»Mitt Arbeiderparti« (My Labor Party) 13 the paper – later adopted by Fylke-Arbeiderparti Sør-Trøndelag 14 – demanded the renewal and development of the ap towards an»inclusive party« which would, with a policy of tax-financed 12. On this, cf. Figure 5.2, Valgundersøkelsen 2001, Rapporter 2003/14, Statistisk sentralbyrå 2003: 21. 13. From 2005,»MittArbeiderparti« became a regular feature of the ap internet campaign to improve the inclusion and mobilization of ap members(http://www. mittarbeiderparti.no/). 14. Fylke-Arbeiderparti Sør-Trøndelag(»South Trøndelag«) is one of the ap ’s 19 regional organizations in Norway. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 175

»collective solutions« contribute to the development of society and»a dependable social and welfare policy.« 15 After the election of Jens Stoltenberg as ap leader in spring 2002 the party’s policy shift accelerated in close cooperation with ap secretary general Martin Kolberg. The change was comprehensive – a Norwegian »exception« in the true sense of the word, apart from anything else because it was able to build on the Brundtland foundations and rely on the strong support of the trade unions. While other social democratic parties in Europe struggle despairingly with the disappearance of their voter base and inability to dominate the public debate, abjure their left-wing policy stances and, faced with the problems of financing social security systems, follow the path of cuts, a smaller state and more self-responsibility, after Jens Stoltenberg had taken over the party leadership in 2002, the Norwegian Labor Party offered exactly the opposite line towards the further development of the social democratic»Nordic model.« In a nutshell this meant: ̈ close agreement and cooperation with the trade unions; ̈ rejection of the privatization of public services and instead their development, but with less bureaucracy and more efficiency; ̈ clear identification of the tasks of the state in the strengthening and strategic orientation of state-owned companies; ̈ no cuts in high consumption and»sin« taxes, but rather utilization of their revenues to expand and improve public services. The Labor Party pursued this policy shift in close cooperation with the lo trade unions and adopted ideas emanating from the lo leadership. One important lesson was that the minority governments of Gro Harlem Brundtland were successful because she as prime minister showed undisputed leadership quality, held the party together and, both personally and politically, radiated a charisma whose influence and ability to secure people’s commitment extended far beyond party boundaries. 15. Gjenreis Arbeiderpartiet, Arbeiderpartiene på Fosen(Region 1). The author of the Fosen paper, the chair of ap -Fosen and now mayor of Rissa, Per Skjærvik, told us in a research interview that the tax-financed»collective solutions« in terms of the Nordic welfare state had wide grassroots support even in 2001. That was why in many»fylke«(the 19 regions) there was cooperation with the sv , the sp and the k r f . Many were worried, however, that the ap leadership would be tempted by the media to opt for Third Way-style privatization. 176 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

The legacy and the vacuum which she left behind were too great for minority governments with fluctuating majorities in parliament to be able to continue and develop. Due to these ups and downs during a very short term of office the ap had lost its authority by the end of the 1990s. The severe punishment dealt out by the voters in September 2001 was therefore a logical consequence of these circumstances. Shift to the Formation of the Red-Red-Green Coalition »Minority governments« under the Labor Party for the implementation of social democratic policies had become unrealistic under the circumstances, and the dream of an absolute majority for the social democrats, as in the 1950s, was finally over. The ap therefore had to achieve a stable majority»which stands behind us« via coalitions. But without regular communication and contact with one another there was no prospect of working out stable majorities with former, to some extent hostile opponents, such as the sv . Stoltenberg tabled this new course for debate in his speech before the central committee(Landsstyret) of the ap on March 18, 2004, had it blessed by the party and Secretary General Martin Kolberg, and reported in the press:»Jens Stoltenberg first explained in plain terms that the ap would prefer to have cooperative parties in a coalition government. Previously, this was only one of several forms of cooperation aimed at establishing a majority.« He even made an offer to the Christian Democratic Party( k r f ):»He thought that the k r f would feel more at home in such a framework than in the kind of cooperation[with the conservatives] in which they now find themselves.« This aspect of offers made to parts of the center-right is likely to be reinforced in future in order to secure majorities for the policy of tax-financed»collective solutions.« 16 16. ntb (Norwegian News Service) announcement, March 18, 2004, ntb tekst. Stoltenberg’s opening up to the k r f had strategic aims: socio-political common ground between the ap and k r f (in terms of foreign policy also in development policy and at that time in disapproval of the Iraq war) also had the attraction of sowing discord in the center-right camp and of securing a narrow majority for the policies of the Red-Red-Green coalition. Longer term, cooperation with the k r f could be necessary with the advent of a new debate on Norway’s possible eu membership since a change of opinion on the part of the – regional farmers’ party – sp in favor of the eu appears out of the question. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 177

Stoltenberg also engaged in some self-criticism concerning the quarreling between the ap and the sv :»The ap leader explained that both his own party and the sv had learned from the quarreling which had raged between them a few weeks previously and had led to worse opinion poll results for both parties. ›We should avoid such discussions and instead rather debate with the[conservative] government parties,‹ he said«( ntb report, March 18, 2004, ntb tekst). At the same time, this course adopted by Jens Stoltenberg met with considerable support from the trade unions. The new lo leader elected in spring 2001, Gerd Liv Valla, was herself a strong supporter of Red-RedGreen cooperation. 17 This transformation via convergence on»Red-Red-Green« was not easy: the Socialist Left Party( sv ) came into being out of hostility to the ap ’s positive line towards nato , from the coming together of frustrated social democrats and communists. Later on, the sv profited from the conflict over eu membership. The environmental-agrarian Center Party( sp ) had already entered into pacts with the center-right parties from time to time. The social democrats had to avoid allowing their opponents to get ahead of them. During its time in opposition the ap now wanted to prepare joint election campaigns in the Red-Red-Green alliance for a joint government. The convergence between the ap , the sv , and later the sp took place first among mp s in the Storting. This new»cooperation« also made things easier with regard to seating arrangements in parliament. In the Storting, mp s do not sit according to parliamentary groups, but according to constituencies. By chance, sv leader Kirstin Halvorsen and ap parliamentary group leader Jens Stoltenberg sat on the same bench, since they represented neighboring constituencies, and both realized very quickly that they»understood one another.« The same applied to the relationship with sp leader Åslaug Haga. In informal issue-related dialogue groups of ap and sv mp s, first of all only the less controversial social-policy and women’s issues, as well as environmental topics, were to be discussed. After»informal discussions« developed into cross-party»talks« the ap also invited the sp to participate as a third party. 17. Liv Valla was deputy leader(1997–2001) and leader(2001–2007) of lo . 178 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

Only after careful preparation were the controversial issues – nato , Afghanistan, the eu – addressed, leading to a common position on maintaining foreign policy»continuity«(presence in Afghanistan and nato membership and in the European Economic Area) and the precedence to be given to the principle»unity before freedom« with regard to the self-presentation of the future coalition partners. When the press got wind of the»secret talks« the working groups had already made progress and come to the realization that they could »do business together.« In July 2005 – two months before the Storting elections – the three party leaders presented their»155 points on which we are agreed« at a press conference. Soria Moria Program 2005 At the parliamentary elections in September 2005, the social democrats won 32.7 percent of the votes and formed the first Red-Red-Green coalition government. In seclusion in a remote castle with the fairy-tale name»Soria Moria« the coalition reached agreement in October 2005, on the basis of the abovementioned 155 points, the so-called»Soria Moria« government program, incorporating a series of reforms intended to consolidate the Nordic model. Analysis of the 2005 election, similar to that of 2001, shows a major swing among the voters, but this time in the opposite direction, back to the Labor Party. The votes for the ap as leader of the Red-Red-Green coalition rose from 24.3 to 32.7 percent. Approval of the ap among first-time voters rose from 11 percent in 2001 to 28 percent in 2005.(See Figure 2.2[2005], Rapporter 2007/31, Statistisk sentralbyrå 2007: 11.) Support among the 860,000 or so members of the lo trade union federation rose from 32.8 percent in 2001 to 51.6 percent in 2005. The ap attracted significantly more support among women(37 percent) than among men(31 percent). While in 2001 the Labor Party exhibited the weakest voter loyalty, in 2005 its voter loyalty was the strongest, at 78 percent. In contrast, Høyre and the sv , having enjoyed the highest voter loyalty in 2001, this time did extremely poorly in that respect(Rapporter 2007/31, Statistisk sentralbyrå 2007: 10 f). The renewal of the ap towards fundamental social democratic positions, the revival of the alliance with the trade unions, and the leadership of a joint election campaign as a potential Red-Red-Green coalition paid ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 179

off. As leader of this election coalition for»collective solutions« the ap regained their status as agenda setters in the public debate. ap insiders explained the election victory in the following terms: ̈ The coalition’s joint election campaign based on the»155 points« went down well with the voters and reduced uncertainty about the prospects of political change as a result of a new majority in parliament, »even if I vote ap .« ̈ The ap ’s policy shift and the»traditional« line of close coordination with the trade unions through reintroduction of weekly informal meetings with the lo leadership boosted the ap among its 800,000 or so members. ̈ Closer cooperation with civil society groups also bore fruit. ̈ By means of the consistent strengthening and improvement of public services, privatization in this area was opposed. The ap was able to consolidate its position as dominant political force in Norway up to the September 2009 elections, despite the fact that opinion polls and the media had for months, and up until a few days before the elections, predicted losses for the Labor Party and a majority for the center-right bloc. Despite these predictions, the ap ’s vote increased to 35.4 percent and it was able to continue in power with the Red-RedGreen coalition and a three-vote majority in parliament(86:83), even though the Left Party, with 6.1 percent(–2.7 percent) and the Center Party with 6.2 percent(–0.2 percent) lost votes. An Active Party Based on Strong Communication In tandem with the clarity of its policies the ap adopted modern forms of internal party communication. Both telephone and internet conferences were among the new methods for including regional organizations in communication with the party leadership. 18 The members of the 25-strong consultant team of the Sentralstyre(party headquarters) travelled every month in the two years leading up to the 2009 elections for a week at a time for discussions, evaluation and training with the Norwegian provincial parties. 18. Per Skjærvik identified these new forms of communication and dialogue with the party leadership introduced after 2001 as a key contribution to the remotivation of the whole ap after the election catastrophe. 180 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

ap efforts to include members and supporters were very successful, in particular with regard to young people via modern internet communication. The ap ’s homepage received numerous awards in 2008 and 2009 for being an»excellent website« from»Webkvalitet«, meeting the criteria of»W3C validation,« as»victor in the digital election campaign,« and »Beste nettsted, samfunnsinformasjon 2009«(»Best social information site«), and so on. 19 The opening up of the ap website to creative, highly professional and youth-oriented communication with young people probably contributed to the strong increase in the number of first-time votes for the ap . 20 In addition, the ap consistently combined joint canvassing with leading figures and candidates from the coalition with its own modern internet and mobile telephone campaigns. The ap made a point of organizing and mobilizing party members via mobile telephone and internet»on the ground«(for example, the ap made 160,000 home visits in Oslo alone, handing out red roses and successfully attracting new members, as well as school visits and joint local activities by the coalition). Reasons for Electoral Victory in 2009 Soria Moria I was popular and, according to all opinion polls, received wide public support, far beyond what party preferences might indicate: Soria Moria I contains a series of social-policy commitments on modernizing public services, which the coalition subsequently implemented. 19. See: http://www.webkvalitet.no/kvalitetsmerket;»vinneren av den digitale valgkampen«; www.valgpanelet.no; www.farmandprisen.no; www.Gulltaggen.no. 20. At the beginning of 2009 the campaign entitled»What’s important for you« commenced on the website www.hvaerviktigfordeg.no. Visitors were supposed to register six words that were important to them for a»placard,« which was to be disseminated via e-mail, Twitter, Facebook or the Norwegian website»Origo.« Interaction with the ap ’s internet activities was very strong on the part of both interested young voters and ap members. Even before the internet election campaign the internal party campaign www.mittArbeiderparti.no commenced, which included such issue-related ap portals as the»climate change portal,« the»training portal,« the»international portal,« and the»integration portal.« Even after the 2009 election campaign the ap remains very active with its internet communication programs: www.arbeiderpartiet.no, www.mittArbeiderparti.no, www.youtube.com/arbeiderpartiet(video) and www.flickr.com/arbeiderpartiet(images). ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 181

To this end, for example, with regard to education, the coalition committed itself to expanding»comprehensive schools for all«, so that »everyone can achieve recognition and support and newcomers can be properly integrated.« Furthermore, they pushed ahead consistently with the modernization of predominantly state-owned companies(Telenor, Statoil, and so on): although strategic direction is determined by the relevant minister via the state majority at the general meeting, the state does not interfere in commercial matters, as long as the private shareholders exert a positive influence on modernization. The principle»modernization instead of privatization« was also applied to state-regional hospitals and communal nursing services. Soria Moria also contained statutory 40-percent gender quotas for the supervisory and administrative boards of large public and private companies, to be implemented if need be under threat of winding up the company. The election victory in 2009 was able to build on a whole series of individual successes on the part of the government coalition, including: ̈ Full kindergarten coverage for all children from two years of age onwards(promised in 2005 and fully implemented from January 2009). 21 ̈ Improvement of the integration of children from immigrant families. One result of this is that in 2009 79 percent of female Muslim school leavers graduated from high school. Many schools with a majority of immigrant children have managed – since the introduction of systematic responsibility on the part of teachers for supporting disadvantaged children – to perform even better than schools in middle class areas with few immigrants. ̈ The management of the financial crisis by finance minister Halvorsen ( sv ). Large sums of money were invested by local authorities in order to preserve jobs, especially in the construction industry. The survival of banks was ensured, for example, by exchanging»toxic« real estate bonds for a kind of government bond. ̈ Simplification and people-friendly efficiency of public services. To take an example, income tax regulations were simplified: since 2005 tax payers have received from the Tax Office on the basis of current and extrapolated data an outline of their income tax declaration. The 21. In order to fulfill its promises of full day-care coverage the coalition also supported the building and expansion of private daycare centers. 182 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

person concerned can either accept it or reject it simply by sending a text message to the Tax Office. ̈ Gender quotas in the management bodies of large companies. Particularly demonstrative with regard to the government’s record was the implementation of women’s quotas in management bodies under threat of winding up the company. The Special Role of Gender Equality Policy The 40-percent quota was originally introduced by the conservatives from January 1, 2004 as a legal»recommendation« on voluntary implementation, but its impact was merely marginal. Consequently, from January 1, 2008 the quota was made obligatory for all large companies, under threat of the withdrawal of company registration. 22 This brought about not only strict fulfillment of the quota but also a considerable improvement in corporate decision-making. 23 As a result of this and other measures taken by the coalition on implementing gender equality in the economy and in society Norway was ranked first in the international»Gender Report« 2008 by the World Economic Forum. 24 Norway has also repeatedly been ranked in first place in the un ’s Human Development Index(Germany comes in at number 20), 25 which specifically takes into account not only economic developments, but also qualitative societal developments. Such international»honors« contribute to people’s pride in the government responsible, even on election day. The positive international perception of the Red-Red-Green government’s performance record on gender and social policy has also 22. On this see also the fes publication, Das norwegische Experiment. Eine Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte [The Norwegian experiment. A women’s quota for supervisory boards](June 2010). Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf. 23.»Women increase board effectiveness,« press release, Norwegian School of Management, March 22, 2010. Available at: http://www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem. aspx?ItemId=71042&CultureCode=en; see also: Kilden:»A story of success,« Information Centre for Gender Research. Available at: http://eng.kilden.forskningsradet.no/c52778/nyhet/vis.html?tid=57242. 24. Cf. Global Gender Gap Report 2007 of the World Economic Forum. Available at: http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Gender%20Gap/index.htm(accessed on August 3, 2010). 25. See: http://www.nationmaster.com/red/graph/eco_hum_dev_ind-economy (accessed on August 7, 2010). ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 183

undoubtedly contributed to Norwegian pride in its exemplary successes in gender policy. These internationally acknowledged Norwegian successes with regard to gender equality also explain the disproportionately high increase in female voters for the two coalition parties, the ap and the sv . The »female voter rate« for the ap was 37 percent as against 31 percent among men in 2005, and 38.7 percent as against 32.1 percent in 2009, and for the sv it was 14 percent as against seven percent in 2005( sv data are not yet available for 2009). The striking and exclusive»women’s preference« for the Norwegian social democrats and the sv were decisive in the coalition’s election victory. The opinion poll results – not broken down by gender – constantly predicted defeats for the ap sv sp coalition. 26 Even if the disproportionate support among women for the ap on election day can be accounted for in terms of the pollsters’ five percent margin of error, the question remains how the ap can obtain a broader voter base for its policies over the long term, which can also garner more support among male voters and correspond to the broad support for the ap program. Joint Public Presentation and Unity of the Coalition – Modern and Citizen-friendly Mobilization The ap , the sv , and the sp appeared side-by-side in the 2005 and 2009 election campaigns as an»electoral coalition.« Contentious issues in the government were not hushed up, but publically discussed objectively and without controversy, even at joint election rallies. While the social democrats in this way showed their ability to correct themselves even in government, the sv and the sp presented themselves – by prior arrangement with the ap – as performing an important corrective function in the government(for example, with regard to environmental issues by delaying oil production in the Lofoten conservation area). At the same time, it was essential to emphasize the common ground in the coalition and any debate on alternative coalitions was taboo. 26.» ap faller kraftig på ny måling,« in VG, August 14, 2009. 184 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

The Labor Party’s Policy Line: Societal Integration –»Everyone on Board« In the election campaign, the ap deliberately put itself forward as committed to its policy platform based on the primordial social democratic aim of integrating the whole of society. The ap ’s main slogan since 2005, »Alle skal med«(»Everyone on Board«), also pervaded party policy in 2009. Two weeks before the election the mass daily»Dagbladet« published a two-page presentation on the ap ’s comprehensive social-policy vision portraying it as a party of»integration« and»inclusion,« as well as an interview with the party leader. According to him, the social democrats have already realized two great historic projects and are now tackling a third: The first historic project of the ap was that of helping the working class to achieve participation in power, influence, and prosperity; in Norway, this is bound up with the name Einard Gerhardsen(first prime minister after World War II). The second project is the equality and inclusion of women in Norway, linked to the name of Gro Harlem Brundtland. This includes abortion on demand(under certain conditions), as well as the abovementioned reforms(for example, full kindergarten coverage, no loss of pay for the first year after giving birth, high level of participation with equal rights for women in working and societal life). The third, future historic project of Norwegian social democracy is the integration and inclusion of»marginalized groups.« The task will be to support ethnic minorities and other population groups in this respect and to encourage them to participate to the fullest possible extent in working and societal life. In this way, the Labor Party stands out as the sole Norwegian national party which demonstrably has asserted the integration and equality of all groups in society and will continue to do so in future. This clear and comprehensible policy orientation has made it possible to mobilize the party and the voters to an extraordinary degree. Consequently, the ap as a national party has made it an issue for society as a whole to bring about the integration of society as a whole. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 185

Decisive for the Election Victory: Collective Solutions of the Nordic Welfare State – Building Bridges to Middle Class Voters In the course of strategy development for the election campaign the ap tested several statements regarding its public approval. One argument which explained in simple fashion the need for taxes to pay for the collective tasks of the Nordic welfare state was as follows, which met with broad support even among supporters of the Christian Democrat k r f , the liberal Venstre(V)and even parts of Høyre: taxes for better public services instead of tax cuts and privatization. Figure 1: Assent to More Taxes for Better Public Services »Society is a great common pot into which we jointly pay contributions for the sake of security and prosperity. For that reason, it’s more important to do something to make up for any shortfalls with regard to care for the elderly, hospitals and schools than that those who continue to have most pay less taxes. We need a government that focuses on collective solutions rather than on tax breaks, privatization and creating even more disparities in society.« 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Total SV Ap Sp KrF V H FrP Don’t know Very convincing Convincing Not very convincing Not at all convincing Don’t know Source:»Taxes for collective solutions« – internal materials of the Labor Party. This argument struck most voters as the most convincing. The answers to the argument showed particularly strong differences between progressive voter groups and voter groups of the opposition center-right parties 186 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

and also among the latter groups themselves. On top of everything, the argument was relatively attractive to k r f and Liberal voters, as well as undecideds. In the Norwegian elections of September 2009 the»left-wing government« taking the line of improving tax-financed public services won against the»privatization line.« The majority of the population accepted higher vat and»sin taxes«(high duties on alcohol, cigarettes, private cars and so on) rather than the line of the conservative party(with a vote share of only 15 percent) advocating the privatization of public services or the populist bid for the»oil funds« by the Progress Party(22 percent). Credibility by Means of Personal Example Over the past 10 years the ap has tried to maintain a basic principle: the leadership itself must be seen to keep to and implement political decisions. As an example, one mp mentioned gender-related decisions: when the ap adopted quotas it adhered to them scrupulously. In order to emphasize equality in the government not only were ministerial and other leading posts allocated on a parity basis, but it was also ensured that concrete examples of behavior illustrating equality were paraded before the media: For example, a state secretary publicly refused to have appointments before nine o’clock, the reason being that he takes his children to kindergarten every morning(his wife picks them up). This was also repeated by the Norwegian media. 27 The prime minister invited an Italian tv crew to his house for an interview and was found ironing his shirts. On being asked why his wife didn’t do it he replied that he always irons his own shirts. What was treated in the Italian media as an example of Nordic eccentricity was taken in Norway as cause for pride in the progress that had been made. Future Prospects – What Must Change Despite a good deal of common ground in the left-wing government alliance the smaller coalition partners lose votes due to the dominance of the social democrats. Over the longer term, the challenge facing the 27. Conversation between Elke Ferner, chair of the Working Party of Social Democratic Women, with mp Marit Nybakk. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 187

ap – without damaging the coalition with the sp and the sv – in the interest of future majorities is to gain part of the vote share of the opposition parties and, on the other hand, to weaken the still relatively positive response encountered by the – to some extent xenophobic –»Progress Party« in parts of the working class and the trade unions. Support for the policies of the ap is much greater than the election results show. It emerges from one voter study commissioned by the ap in autumn 2008 that: ̈ only 33 percent of the Norwegian public believe that things are going in the wrong direction; ̈ 46 percent of the population want society to develop in a social democratic direction, not a conservative one; ̈ two-thirds of the population – 66 percent – say that they are»more community oriented than towards the individual.« Under the previous Bondevik government 2001–2005 the majority said that social development was going in the wrong direction. The study comes to the conclusion that the political messages of the leftwing coalition are accepted far more widely than those of the right(which have already been tested): the political message of»collective solutions« (»fellesskapsløsninger«) is very popular. The Labor Party, according to opinion polls,(once again) enjoys the highest level of public trust with regard to health care/ hospitals, care of the elderly, and taxes and contributions. It also enjoys high trust with regard to the management of immigration/ integration, education and training, as well as working and economic life. Although the opinion poll results generally indicated some doubts with regard to the Red-Red-Green coalition’s prospects of victory, both the approval of the ap ’s policies, both in theory and practice, and the actual election results vindicated the ap -led government. On June 23, 2009 the tabloid»Verdens Gang« published opinion poll results according to which the ministers of the Stoltenberg government received considerably higher competence ratings than the ministers of the previous conservative Bondevik government. 28 But there is an Achilles heel. The ap benefits from the policies of the coalition, but it also benefits from the smaller coalition parties: if the ap 28.»Stoltenberg-regjeringen får bedre karakterer enn Bondevik-regjeringen«(»Stoltenberg government receives better marks than the Bondevik government«), in VG, June 23, 2009. 188 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

wins, the two smaller partners lose votes to the ap , especially the sv . As a result, the parties in question to some extent need to make their mark, which could threaten consensus in the coalition. The openness towards inclusion of the k r f , mentioned by Jens Stoltenberg as early as 2004 and already put into practice with regard to individual items of legislation and decentrally in some regions indicates the ap ’s interest – but also that of the coalition – in developing cooperation which goes beyond the coalition by means of»collective solutions.« With Soria Moria I and II the coalition has formulated a comprehensive and detailed program. 29 As the opinion polls show, there is broad agreement, extending far beyond the coalition, on this program, above all because of its employment policy and management of the financial crisis. However, there are also a number of challenges which have already contributed to somewhat disheartening opinion poll results and encouraging the aggression of the Right(H) and the Progress Party( f r p ). Health service waiting lists: health service capacities are still unsatisfactory despite considerable management improvements and personnel increases through the recruitment of foreign doctors and nursing staff. The coalition has enormously expanded care for the elderly but it remains inadequate, especially in Oslo and in larger towns. The coalition has therefore agreed on the creation of 12,000 new care jobs by 2015. 30 The expansion of the road and rail networks is proceeding too slowly: expansion of the transport system is very costly in Norway for geographical reasons and has been neglected for years. Here too Soria Moria II plans comprehensive expansion in the National Transport Plan 2010–2019. Unresolved environmental and climate change issues: although the electricity supply is sustainable(almost 100 percent water-powered) there have been internal government conflicts about oil exploration in the marine nature conservation area around the Lofoten islands and new routes for high-tension power lines. Environmental policy weaknesses also revealed themselves after the 2009 election, which had partly been disguised. For example, the delay of Carbon Capture and Storage( ccs ) for the Mongstad gas-fired 29.»Politisk plattform for flertallsregjeringen, utgått av Arbeiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Venstreparti og Senterpartiet, 2009–2013.« 30.»Political platform as basis for the Government’s work 2009–2013(Soria Moria II)«: N49. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 189

power station(the ccs for the power station was once endorsed by Jens Stoltenberg as the Norwegian»moon landing«). Such problems will continue to occupy the new government, provide constant targets for the right, and remain an Achilles heel for opinion polls which in summer 2010 once again predict a center-right majority, although the basic Red-Red-Green political orientation continues to enjoy broad support. This means that, while the ap has regained wide approval of its policies, an actual majority cannot be guaranteed forever by the small coalition partners alone. The ap has developed and implemented policies with the Red-Red-Green coalition, but over the long term cannot exclude some sort of expanded or even different coalition, if it wishes to make use of the creative power of social democracy and the broad public acceptance of its policies. Conclusions The example of the Red-Red-Green coalition under the leadership of the Norwegian Labor Party disproves a number of theses about the decline of social democracy: ̈ The»narrowing electoral base« or the loss of»discursive hegemony« are not the inevitable result of modern industrialized society, but dependent on policies which can attract broad support in society. ̈ »Reforms« do not have to be socially unjust and alienate social democrats from their social base, but they do need to focus more on maintaining core social democratic voters and winning back stay-at-home voters is more important in the Norwegian context than attempts to win over voters from the center. ̈ The exclusive relationship to the trade unions must not be allowed to collapse over the long term; rather, close relations with them are a condition of pushing through reforms capable of winning broad assent. ̈ The split in the social democratic electorate is not a natural consequence of globalization or value change – these things simply have to be overcome. ̈ The dramatic decline in the fortunes of Norwegian social democracy about 10 years ago – and the corresponding voter shifts – taken separately might have confirmed all of these theories. However, the 190 Biermann/Kallset, Norway ipg 4/2010

ap ’s determined about-turn to embrace social democratic values and alliance partners, coupled with a clear will to take action which encompasses the whole of society, within the framework of the Nordic welfare state, refutes the theories in question. If social democracy is capable of achieving clarity with regard to policy and political and organizational leadership of a left-wing coalition it can also inspire the majority of people to embrace comprehensive societal change instead of merely standing by while society sinks into individual resignation. Norwegian – and Scandinavian – society has a key advantage in this respect: It has already implemented fundamental reforms since the 1970s which make up the»Nordic model« which, in comparison to the rest of Europe, has given rise to much more equality, security, flexibility, integration, and equal educational opportunities for all, as well as the ability to deal with social and economic problems. The other European countries to some extent have a lot of catching up to do. But if that is the case, who apart from the social democrats is capable of conducting this process of social renewal? Authors’ note: Kristine Kallset contributed as co-author in particular to ap documentation, while Wolfgang Biermann is responsible for external research and the original version of the study. We would particularly like to thank Ola Mansåker, member of the»Friends of the spd « circle in Oslo, ap member, and research associate of the ap faction in the Storting for its extensive support of this research. Further thanks go to contacts such as Storting mp s Marit Nybakk and Sverre Myrli, Sverre Jervell, Bettina Thorvik and Kjetil Hestad, journalist Hallvard Bakke and Arne Strand, as well as the mayor of Fosen, Per Skjærvik. ipg 4/2010 Biermann/Kallset, Norway 191

Whither the Liberals? Current State and Prospects of the Liberal Party of Canada EUGENE LANG LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA(LPC) Official website: www.liberal.ca Party leader: Michael Ignatieff Founded: 1867 Party membership: 2010: 58,000 2006: 150,000(informed estimate) 2003: 230,000(informed estimate) 1990: 125,000(informed estimate) (A national membership registry existed for three years, but data on party membership are not publicly available.) Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: 2008: 26% of the votes(76 seats of 308-seat Parliament) – in opposition 2006: 30% of the votes(103 seats of 308-seat Parliament) – in opposition 2004: 37% of the votes(135 seats of 308-seat Parliament) – minority government Government participation: 2006–present: Official Opposition 2004–2006: minority government; head of government: Prime Minister Paul Martin (Sustained to some degree in the House of Commons by support from the New Democratic Party of Canada, including a jointly negotiated Budget in 2005.) 2003–2004: majority government; head of government: Prime Minister Paul Martin 2000–2003: majority government; head of government: Prime Minister Jean Chretien 192 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

Historical Overview The Liberal Party of Canada( lpc ) came into its own under Wilfred Laurier, Canada’s first French Canadian Prime Minister, who governed from 1896 to 1911. Subsequently, the Liberal Party held office for most of the twentieth century, garnering the moniker»Canada’s Natural Governing Party,« including 22 years under Prime Minister William Lyon McKenzie King from the 1920s to the 1940s, the longest serving Prime Minister in British Commonwealth history. Liberal governments have been notable for three principal achievements: longevity, strong, dynamic leadership, and policy innovation. Since the end of World War II, four Liberal leaders have won multiple elections and have governed for a total of 45 years: Louis St. Laurent in the late 1940s and 1950s, Lester B. Pearson in the 1960s, Pierre Elliott Trudeau from 1968 to 1984, and Jean Chretien from 1993 to 2003. Liberal governments established the post-war welfare state or»social safety net,« including unemployment insurance, old age pensions, Medicare, family allowances/ child tax benefits, government support for post-secondary education, equalization payments, 1 various national institutions, and»mega projects,« such as the Trans-Canada Highway, St. Lawrence Seaway, and the Trans-Canada Pipeline. The Liberals also negotiated the entry of Newfoundland into the Confederation in 1949. Liberal governments successfully defeated two referendums on Quebec’s independence in 1980 and 1995, respectively,»patriated« the Canadian Constitution from Britain and established a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. In the 1990s, a Liberal government returned the federal budget to balance after a quarter century of deficits, thereby resolving the fiscal crisis of the federal state. Liberal governments – St. Laurent, Pearson, Trudeau, and Chretien – have been innovative on the international stage, for example, playing a leading role in the establishment of nato in the late 1940s, 2 inventing the concept of United Nations peacekeeping in the mid-1950s – for which Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize – and playing an important leadership role in Afghanistan in the post-9/11 period. 1. Equalization is a scheme of fiscal transfers from the federal government to the socalled»have not« provinces in order to ensure that these governments can provide their citizens with levels of public services comparable to the richer provinces. 2. Lester Pearson, Canada’s Foreign Minister at the time, was offered the first Secretary Generalship of nato but turned the position down. ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 193

Situating Canada in the Social Democratic Tradition Canada has never had a social democratic national government in the European sense of the term. What Canada has had is progressive and activist government in the form of the Liberal Party of Canada. Since World War II, the lpc has dominated the governance of Canada, holding office for 45 out of 65 years. The lpc does not and never has identified itself as a social democratic party. It is not class-based, anti-business, or trade union dominated, although it has historically received a significant share of the union vote. The lpc has been defined, variously, as»progressive,«»centrist,«»liberal« (in the Canadian or American senses of the term), and sometimes even »center-left.« During the 1990s the lpc governed from the center-right on fiscal policy, redefining the center of Canadian politics in the process, at least with regard to fiscal policy. 3 Perhaps the best description of the lpc was offered many years ago by long-serving Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who famously remarked that the party is in»the radical center,« implying that, when in office, the lpc delivers significant social and economic reform, but is not wedded to an ideology or part of a movement, and is in the broad mainstream of Canadian opinion(which tends to be pragmatic, non-ideological, and centrist in orientation). During the post-war period, Liberal governments under various Prime Ministers(King, St. Laurent, Pearson, Trudeau) built the Canadian welfare state, engaged in neo-Keynesian fiscal policy and market interventions of various kinds(such as wage and price controls and various types of business regulation), and believed in the mixed economy, establishing numerous state-owned enterprises, or»crown corporations,« and regulatory bodies. Liberal governments are known for putting in place social reform legislation and adhering faithfully to a multilateral foreign policy. The lpc is perhaps best thought of, in comparative terms, as being slightly to the left of the Democratic Party in the United States, or similar to New Labour in Britain. In fact, it could be argued that the Third Way concept originated in Canada in the lpc , well before the emergence of New Labour. 3. All federal political parties today at least pay lip service to the goal of balanced budgets, in contrast to the pre-1995 period when only conservative political parties seriously advocated balanced budgets. 194 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

In short, the lpc has delivered the closest thing Canada has had at the federal level to social democratic government. Analysis of the Current Situation Voter Approval After winning an unprecedented three consecutive majority governments in 1993, 1997, and 2000, the Liberal Party has since been in relative decline. The Liberals were reduced to a minority government in the 2004 election, were defeated in the 2006 election, and were reduced to their lowest seat count and popular vote in a quarter century in the 2008 election(see Figures 1 and 2). Today, after over four years in opposition, the Liberal parliamentary party is a rump, with 77 out of 308 seats, the lowest seat total for the lpc since 1984–88. Geographically, it is confined to a few large cities and the Atlantic Canadian region, and is virtually shut out of large parts of Quebec and Western Canada, where economic and population growth have been strong in recent years. The lpc ’s electoral fortunes today are as bleak as they have ever been, even against a Conservative Party that has governed through an economic recession, albeit a mild one compared to other countries and the past two major Canadian recessions. Most polls today show the lpc commanding around 25–30 percent electoral support. 4 The significance of this is profound: no party has ever formed a national government in Canada with less than 36 percent support.»The Natural Governing Party,« which had been the Liberal moniker for decades, no longer applies. University of Toronto historian Michael Bliss has argued that the Conservatives are now Canada’s natural governing party. 5 The Liberals have been hemorrhaging support in previously core demographic groups for several years. There is also evidence that the Liberal’s core partisan support has been eroding over time(Gidengil et al. 2009). The latter is hard to substantiate, but the fact that estimates of Liberal members are under 60,000 today, from a high-water mark of 4. See Ekos Research weekly tracking poll; available at: http://www.ekos.com. 5. Bliss, Michael(2009):»Has Harper Found His Tipping Point?,« in Globe and Mail (October 1). ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 195

230,000 seven years ago, suggests a significantly weakened partisan base. Moreover, we know that between 1 and 1.1 million fewer citizens voted in the 2008 election, as compared to the 2006 election, 6 and we also know that the Liberals received 800,000 fewer votes in 2008 as compared to 2006. We can therefore deduce that the decline in eligible voter participation has been largely attributable to a decline in Liberal support(the decline in votes experienced in the two elections by the Conservative Party of Canada[ cpc ] and the New Democratic Party[ ndp ] is between 35,000 and 65,000 in total). The last time the lpc won a majority government, in 2000, the party won with the support of two demographic groups that have been key to Liberal election victories for decades: Catholics and visible minorities. Throughout the post-war period, Catholics – who account for over 40 percent of the Canadian population – have voted disproportionately for the Liberal Party. Ethnic minorities and immigrants have also tended to vote Liberal, due to the party’s association with a generous immigration and refugee policy, as well as the fact that Liberal governments established, and have vigorously defended for decades, the policy of official multiculturalism. By the 2004 election, however, support for the Liberals among minorities had dropped by 14 percent(Gidengil et al. 2009) and by the 2008 election the lpc had lost 19 percent of its minority supporters in comparison to the election results eight years previously. More significantly, Catholic support has dropped 24 percent since 2000. Since the 2004 election, the lpc has seen its share of the union vote cut in half(Ibid). The Liberals have also been losing ground among young people. Voters under 35 years of age were significantly less likely to vote Liberal in the 2008 election, despite an lpc platform anchored by a bold environmental agenda, a policy area which tends to be of greater priority to younger voters. Women have also historically voted disproportionately for the Liberals, relative to the various conservative parties that have existed at the federal level in Canada. However, recent polls suggest that the lpc ’s support among women is roughly the same as for the Conservative Party: 26 percent for the Liberals and 28 percent for the Conservatives. 7 These 6. See Elections Canada; available at: www.elections.ca/home.asp. 7. See Ekos Research weekly tracking poll; available at: http://www.ekospolitics. com/wp-content/uploads/full_report_june_17.pdf. 196 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

losses in support in core and historical demographic groups have many complex causes, not least of which are public perceptions of the party’s competence, integrity, and agenda. Public Perceptions Historically, the lpc has been regarded as a party of policy innovation. Throughout the post-war period most of Canada’s major domestic and foreign policy innovations – the building and, later, the reforming of the welfare state, the invention of and contributions to un peacekeeping, the »patriation« of the Constitution, the establishment of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the elimination of the fiscal deficit – occurred during periods of Liberal government. For most of this period, the lpc won far more elections than they lost, suggesting that the public regarded the lpc as the most competent party to govern the country, whose agenda was most in line with Canadian opinion and aspirations. However, during the four years in which the lpc has been in opposition, polls and election results suggest that the public’s attitude to the lpc has changed dramatically on matters of competence and policy. Most polls show that the public has much greater confidence in the Conservatives to manage both the economy and the nation’s finances. This is particularly counter-intuitive – and frustrating for Liberals – with regard to fiscal performance, since Conservative governments ran large deficits for most of their time in office in the 1980s and early 1990s and since 2008, while recent Liberal governments have balanced the books (from 1997 to 2006). This might be due to a general perception that conservatives are superior economic managers because they tend to emphasize the economy more in their rhetoric, and that, historically, Liberal governments have been more associated with activist government and social programs. But this fails to explain why polls and election results also show the Conservatives as equal or better stewards of Canada’s public health care system(a Liberal invention and historically a Liberal strength) and the environment, notwithstanding the Conservative government’s failure to do anything substantive in either policy area during their four years of government. 8 8. Climate change is particularly instructive in this regard. Early in its mandate the Conservative government questioned the science of climate change. At the ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 197

Party Platform Liberal election platforms in 2004, 2006, and 2008 were fairly progressive and activist. An ambitious national child care program – an effort to fill a major gap in Canada’s welfare state – anchored the 2004 platform of Prime Minister Martin. This platform represented a deliberate attempt to present a progressive agenda and narrative by a Prime Minister whose image had been defined by a nine-year period as Finance Minister, during which his major achievement was balancing the budget, cutting program spending, and significantly cutting income taxes. By contrast, the 2006 election platform was basically a summary of, and a commitment to continue to follow through on a litany of initiatives the Martin government had implemented during its two years in office, the centerpiece being national child care, which at that point had been negotiated with the provincial governments but had not yet been implemented. The 2008 election platform, under the new Liberal Leader Stephane Dion, was a watershed document. Highly progressive and activist, it was anchored by a carbon tax scheme, a litany of environmental initiatives, and a major anti-poverty program, among many other things. The platform presented a complex and highly detailed agenda that no government could realistically have implemented in a single term of office. Dion and his agenda were strongly rejected by the Canadian people in the 2008 election, reducing the Liberal seat count by about 30 and nearly resulting in a Conservative majority government. The carbon tax proposal, in particular, was effectively vilified by the Conservative government as»a tax on everything,« and was deeply unpopular. The anti-poverty agenda and the vast majority of the other initiatives in the platform were never able to rise above the albatross of the carbon tax, known as»the Green Shift.« Today, the party remains hamstrung by the experience of the Dion leadership and platform, and in particular the Green Shift. While the Copenhagen summit Canada routinely won the»fossil of the day award« from environmental ngo s for its negotiating position on climate change. Media reports suggested that other advanced industrial democracies at Copenhagen regarded Canada as obstructionist. In the spring of 2010, un Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visited Ottawa and admonished Canada for its recalcitrance and weak efforts on climate change. After four years in office the Conservative government has made no meaningful policy progress on climate change and has abandoned Canada’s Kyoto targets in favor of a harmonized target with the United States. 198 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

lpc remain open to new issues and ideas and are striving under Michael Ignatieff’s leadership to find a basic policy orientation, the party seems incapable of taking bold, clear, and differentiating stands on any major issue, especially with regard to the environment, fiscal policy, or further reforms to social programs. As an election looms, polls suggest that Canadians have little idea of what the lpc stands for today and what it plans to do if it comes to power. Active Party Life and State of the Party The party’s active membership is at a historic low point, probably around 60,000 members, in comparison to well over 200,000 members less than a decade ago. Its leadership over the past six years is generally characterized as, successively, competent and experienced but with too many priorities(Paul Martin); weak, ineffective, and in pursuit of an unpopular agenda(Stephane Dion); and unprincipled and lacking any direction whatsoever(Michael Ignatieff). Party finances have been a problem for the lpc for a decade. In the early 2000s, while in government, the lpc reformed the Canadian party financing system and strictly limited the contributions individuals could make to 1,000 Canadian dollars($) per year, while banning contributions from corporations and unions. A public subsidy system, based on the party’s support in the previous election – at a rate of$1.75 per vote – was put in place to compensate for this curtailment of funding. The new financing system puts a premium on garnering small contributions from individual Canadians between elections. Ironically, the lpc has had far more trouble adapting to the system they created than the other parties, largely because the lpc has in the past relied heavily on corporate contributions and large donations from well-off individuals. As a result, for several years the lpc has been lagging behind the Conservatives in fund raising. For example, in 2009 the lpc raised about$10 million, as compared to$18 million for the Conservatives. In the first quarter of 2010(the last period for which figures are available), the lpc raised$1.6 million, as compared to$4 million for the Conservatives and nearly$1 million for the New Democratic Party ( ndp ). 9 Today, the lpc is estimated to be several million dollars short 9. See Elections Canada; available at: www. www.elections.ca/home.asp. ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 199

of the$24 million maximum amount that can be spent in a Canadian federal election. 10 The lpc remains firmly anchored in some major urban centers of Canada(notably Toronto and its suburbs, Montreal, and Atlantic Canada), but has lost considerable support in rural Canada, Western Canada, and parts of Ontario, all areas in which the lpc dominated in the 1990s. As already discussed, this erosion of parliamentary seats can be attributed to a loss of support among core demographic groups – Catholics, minorities, women – that historically have been vital to Liberal election victories. Performance Record as Government or Opposition Party From 1993 to 2006 the lpc ’s governance record, particularly under Prime Minister Chretien(1993–2003), was generally judged by Canadians to have been sound. The best evidence of this is the fact that the Liberals were elected to an unprecedented three successive majority governments under Chretien’s leadership(although the fragmentation of the conservative vote between two nominally conservative parties played a major role in Liberal election victories during this period). The elimination of a quarter century of federal deficits is considered to be the lpc ’s most important achievement during this period in office. However, there were many other major – and generally popular – progressive initiatives during that time, notably the establishment of the National Child Benefit(the first new federal social program in two generations); the reform of the Canada Pension Plan, putting it on a financially sustainable footing; a major increase in federal fiscal transfers to the provinces for health care; the establishment of same-sex marriage legislation and the decriminalization of marijuana; major federal investments in research, science, and technology; the Clarity Act, stipulating the process by which any future Quebec referendum on independence must be conducted; Canada’s leadership in establishing the International Criminal Court and the global landmines treaty; and Canada’s refusal to participate in the Iraq war. However, the lpc ’s record as an opposition party over the past four years is generally considered to have been highly ineffective. The party 10. Interview with National Revenue Chair, lpc . 200 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

now has its fourth leader in that period. Throughout its time as the Official Opposition the party has appeared weak, vacillating, overly partisan, tactically-oriented, and lacking in clear priorities and strategic direction. It has had only a marginal influence over the minority Conservative government’s agenda(which is unusual in minority governments), and has been unwilling to challenge the government seriously on major issues with which it disagrees for fear of provoking another election which the party is ill-prepared for and would likely lose(having lost two elections in the past four years). For its part, the Conservative government has been quite effective, strategically, loading major policy initiatives into federal budget legislation in the knowledge that the Liberals are unlikely to vote against budget bills which are matters of»confidence,« in the sense that defeat of the legislation would lead to the dissolution of Parliament and a general election. For example, the 2009 federal budget implementation bill contained major and controversial reforms to the Investment Canada Act and the Competition Act, neither of which have anything to do with the budget. The 2010 Budget Implementation Bill(Bill C-10) controversially amended no fewer than 79 statutes, many of which have nothing to do with governmental ways and means. The lpc has been so weak in opposition that it has felt compelled to vote for – or at least not against – both of these controversial budgets, despite voicing criticisms of them in public. This inconsistency in rhetoric versus action has further contributed to a public sense that today’s lpc stands for very little. There is one major exception to this litany of failure, and where the lpc has had a significant influence on the government: Canada’s post-2011 policy in Afghanistan. In 2008, the Liberals authored a Parliamentary resolution requiring the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Kandahar – the region where the Canadian military has been stationed since 2006 – in 2011. This resolution was supported by the Conservative government and has effectively set Canada’s Afghanistan policy post-2011. Development Possibilities Development possibilities for the lpc do not look particularly good. The party seems incapable of articulating a twenty-first-century progressive narrative and policy agenda that would differentiate it sharply from the Conservatives, their main electoral rivals. This is due, in part, to the fact ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 201

that the leadership and the caucus are torn between three dominant constituencies. One constituency wants the party to emphasize its legacy of balancing the federal budget in the 1990s, given that the federal government today is running a deficit, and media commentary tends to regard this as the major issue facing Canada. Another constituency wants the party to tilt much more to the center-left, identifying itself with needed reforms to pensions, the environment, and health care, partly in an effort to differentiate it from the Conservatives and anchor it more firmly in what many regard as»traditional« Liberal values and policy terrain. A third constituency, however, which seems to be in the ascendancy, wants to say little about policy and take no bold stands or policy risks in any area, in the hope that the public will simply tire of the Conservatives by the next election and hand the government over to the Liberals as the only alternative. The fragmentation of progressive voters in Canada among four parties – the lpc , the National Democratic Party( ndp ), the Bloc Québécois( bq ), and the Greens – poses a particular problem for the lpc , especially since the Conservative vote is now consolidated in one party, in contrast to the 1990s, when conservative voters were divided between the Reform/ Canadian Alliance parties and the Progressive Conservatives. The Green Party and the ndp are polling at historic high-water marks and, along with the bq (which has won two-thirds of the seats in Quebec in every election since 1993), these three parties have collectively commanded nearly a third of the electorate in most recent polls. The result of a historically weak lpc , a resurgent ndp and Greens, and a solid bq , competing for many of the same votes, means that conservatives’ votes are much more effective than those of progressives in Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system. The obvious solution to this dilemma is proportional representation, but this is anathema to the Liberals, and even the ndp are no longer arguing for it as they once did. This fragmentation dilemma and the perpetually weak standing of the Liberals in recent elections and polls have led to calls for a coalition government of progressives. In fact, shortly after the 2008 election, during a Parliamentary crisis, the Liberals and the ndp attempted unsuccessfully to topple the Conservatives and to engineer a coalition government, which would have been the first such government, at federal level, since World War I. More recently, a number of influential voices – including former Prime Minister Jean Chretien – have suggested in public that the best 202 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

solution to the progressive fragmentation problem and the persistently weak Liberal standing might be to create a new political party of progressives through the merging of the lpc and the ndp . However, the party merger idea has been rejected by the current Liberal leader and most senior figures in the party. The lack of internal cohesion and the unresolved debate over the party’s basic orientation, narrative and policy agenda, coupled with progressive voter fragmentation and conservative voter consolidation, are likely to mean continued Conservative government for the foreseeable future. The Liberals could, however, enhance their chances of acceding to power if they countenanced a coalition government with the ndp . While some commentators have suggested that a coalition of the lpc and ndp is unworkable due to sharp electoral rivalries, fierce tribalism, and vast policy differences between the two parties, recent history suggests that cooperation is possible. In the mid-1980s a Liberalndp governing accord was established in the province of Ontario in a successful effort to replace the Conservative government of the day. More recently, at the federal level, Prime Minister Martin’s 2004–2006 minority government sustained itself in the House of Commons in part via a jointly negotiated budget with the ndp in 2005. The current Conservative/ Liberal Democrat government in the uk has served to restore coalition government in Canada as a topic of legitimate debate. Opening Up to Society and Strategic Partnerships There are opportunities for the lpc to appeal to unions and ngo s and their respective constituencies. The union leadership and ngo s are deeply hostile to the Conservative government and might be persuaded to argue for strategic voting in the next election to support the Liberals and replace the Conservative government. But that is unlikely to happen without some clear and bold progressive policy offerings that will appeal to the center-left(for example, public pension reform and a strong environmental agenda). None of this seems forthcoming from the Liberals. ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 203

Conclusion The lpc appears to be at a historic crossroads. All polls over the past year suggest that it will lose the next election to the Conservatives. That would mark the first time in post-war history that the lpc has lost three consecutive elections. Another election loss cannot be attributed entirely to leadership personalities, as the Liberals would have lost the past three elections under three different leaders. Something more fundamental is at work, which the party ignores at its peril. The gradual loss of support among previously core demographic groups is a serious and perhaps fatal ailment that the party has done nothing to attempt to diagnose, let alone remedy. The loss of representation in large parts of the country and the attendant isolation of Liberal mp s in a few large cities in central Canada and the Atlantic region, is a similarly serious affliction. The rise of the Green Party, now polling at over 10 percent in some surveys, and the historically high levels of public opinion support for the ndp at 17–20 percent is largely at the Liberals’ expense. The failure of the Liberals to supplant the bq in Quebec(a protest party that has no chance of ever governing Canada or any aspiration to do so) and re-establish their position as the dominant party in French Canada – a position they commanded from the nineteenth century until the early 1990s – represents a major structural change in the political landscape to which the party has no answer and has not adjusted. The lpc is resting on its progressive policy legacy and the identity it established in the past, particularly in the Trudeau and Pearson eras: but this is a distant and fading memory to an increasing number of Canadians. The party has failed, at the last two leadership conventions and in several policy conventions and meetings, to even attempt to crystallize a progressive, Liberal narrative and agenda for the twenty-first century, which it could then present to the public as fundamentally different from those of the Conservative government. If the Liberals aim to return to government soon, they must decide who they are, what they stand for, and why they want to govern Canada again, rather than following a strategy of waiting until the public becomes fed up with the Conservative government and turns again to the lpc . The party’s historically and persistently low popular support and persistently poor competence ratings on major issues, plus the unprecedented fragmentation of the progressive vote, guarantees the lpc 204 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

nothing in the future. The old two-party governing configurations – within the framework of which the Liberals governed most of the time with majorities and ceded power occasionally to the Conservatives – is a thing of the past. In short, the party must come to grips with the present and the future, and establish a political identity that is faithful to the values and achievements of the party’s past, while being tailored to the challenges and realities of today and tomorrow. Figure 1: Recent Electoral Results(% of Popular Vote) Percentage of Popular Vote 60 50 40 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 30 20 10 0 2008 Cons Libs BQ NDP Green Other Alliance PC Reform Figure 2: Recent Electoral Results –(% of Seats) Percentage of Seats 60 50 40 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 30 Cons Libs BQ 20 NDP Green Other 10 Alliance PC Reform 0 2008 ipg 4/2010 Lang, Canada 205

Bibliography Aster, Howard, and Thomas S. Axworthy(eds.)(2003): Searching for the New Liberalism: Perspectives, Policies, Prospects. Oakville: Mosaic Press. Bliss, Michael(1994): Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from MacDonald to Mulroney . New York: Harper Collins. ———(2009):»Has Harper Found his Tipping Point?,« in Globe and Mail (October 1). Browne, Matt, and Eugene Lang(2010):»Progressives Must Come Together to Return to Power,« in Ottawa Citizen, Arguments(June 17): A17. ———(2009):»In Search of a Progressive Centre,« in Globe and Mail, Comment Section(June 14): A17. Clarkson, Stephen, and Christina McCall(1990 and 1994): Trudeau in Our Times, Vol. 1& 2. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. DeMont, Philip, and J. Eugene Lang(1999): Turning Point: Moving Beyond Neoconservatism . Toronto: Stoddart Publishing. Giddens, Anthony(1998): The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Gidengil, Elisabeth et al.(2009):»The Anatomy of a Liberal Defeat,« paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association(May 2009), Carleton University, Ottawa/ Canada. Head, Ivan, and Pierre Trudeau(1995): The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy, 1968–84: Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Pammett, Jon H., and Christopher Dornan(eds.)(2004): The Canadian General Election of 2004 . Toronto: The Dundurn Group. 206 Lang, Canada ipg 4/2010

The Crisis of Social Democracy in Poland: A New Start for the Left? ANNA MATERSKA-SOSNOWSKA THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE(SOJUSZ LEWICY DEMOKRATYCZNEJ, SLD) Official website: www.sld.org.pl; www.kplewica.pl Party Leader: Grzegorz Napieralski Founded: 1999(in its present form) SI and PES membership: SI and PES member Party membership: 2010: 47,000(declared by the party) 1999: 60,000 THE UNION OF LABOR(UNIA PRACY, UP) Official website: www.uniapracy.org.pl Party leader: Waldemar Witkowski History at a glance: Founded in 1992; coalition with SLD and co-created the government in 2001; common lists to the European Parliament SI and PES membership: SI and PES member POLISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY(SOCJALDEMOKRACJA POLSKA, SDPL) Official website: www.sdpl.pl Party leader: Wojciech Filemonowicz Founded: 2004 SI and PES membership: no membership ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 207

SLD, UP, SDPL: Electoral resonance parliamentary elections: Electoral resonance European elections: Government participation: 2001: SLD-UP: 41.04% of the votes; 216 seats 2005: SLD-UP: 11.31% of the votes; 55 seats 2007: LiD(SLD, SDPL, PD, UP): 13.15%; 53 seats 2004: SLD-UP 9.35%; 5 seats 2009: SLD-UP 12.34%; 7 seats 2004: SDPL 5.33%; 3 seats 2009: SDPL Agreement for the Future – center-left (PD+SDPL+Zieloni 2004/ Greens 2004/) 2.44%; 0 seats SdRP/ SLD formed coalition cabinets and remained in power throughout the whole tenure in 1993– 1997 and in 2001–2007 as a»senior partner«. T he Democratic Left Alliance( sld ) has for a decade been one of the largest and most important parties in the political arena but it seems that its period of dominance is now over. For the past few years two right-wing parties have tended to dominate the Polish political landscape: the Civic Platform( po ) and Law and Justice( p i s ). These two conservative parties, both stemming from the Solidarity movement, enjoy the support of around 60–70 percent of the electorate, and in the last presidential election(2010) won over 80 percent of the vote. The political system in Poland, inevitably, has been decisively shaped by recent history. As a result of the political transformations in Poland after 1989 a multiparty system was created in the form of a parliamentary democracy. One of the first legislative moves was to eliminate the article in the Constitution on the leading role of the communist Polish United Workers’ Party( pzpr ). The first freely elected Parliament was composed of representatives of 27 electoral committees, representing all milieus and all political forces. Since the fall of the pzpr , new parties have been created on its ruins(1990). The process of party building on the left was much slower and restrained than the creation of rightist parties on the remains of Solidarity which, until 1989, was the only influential opposition party in the country. The division into right and left in Poland is the result, among other things, of historical divisions: post-communist groups have automatically been classified as left-wing, while those which have grown out of the oppositional Solidarity, as right-wing. Party roles were assigned at the outset, so they have not had to work much on shaping their ideo208 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

logical identities, as historical divisions have also divided the electorate. s d rp (Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland, whose establishment was publicly announced at the same convention at which the pzpr was dissolved) was the most influential force on the left. The party has strong post-communist roots and formed, from the very beginning, an electoral alliance( sld ). The up (Union of Labor) was created in 1992 as an oppositional party as a result of the fusion of several minor leftist organizations, independent of the post-communist s d rp . It united Solidarity representatives and members of the so-called reformist wing of pzpr . The left did not have to wait long for success and began to dominate the Polish political arena as early as 1993. The sld was the biggest parliamentary grouping and helped form the government, while the up formed the fourth biggest grouping. Although not at first institutionalized, the two parties initiated a cooperation which continues to this day. A split in the left occurred in 2004 when a new party, the sdpl , emerged from a faction of the sld . It did not prove popular, however, and further splits led to a further decline in the left’s fortunes. The attitude of such rightist parties as the po and the p i s has undoubtedly also contributed to the electorate’s shift to the right. The declared aim of these parties is not only cooperation but also the need for restoration or rather the moral reconstruction of the state which had been»depraved« by the rule of the left. The parliamentary and presidential elections which took place in the second half of 2005 were an unqualified success for the right and led to the marginalization of the left. For the first time since its establishment, the sld entered parliament as the third party(behind the populist Samoobrona or Self-Defense), winning only 11 percent of the votes. This rightist trend was repeated in the early elections in 2007 and in the presidential election in 2010. The left in Poland has always played and continues to play an important role in the formation of the political system. Many left-oriented groups are registered, but the vast majority of them remain in the political background, exerting no influence. The institutionalized left is the Democratic Left Alliance( sld ) which, under different names, has been present in the Polish party arena virtually from the beginning, in 1989. It is worth underlining that the sld long dominated the political scene in Poland. Attempts to create alternatives to the sld (for example, the sdpl ) have weakened the party but have never really threatened its existence. The party continued to strengthen its position for over a decade. After the 2001 parliamentary elections, won by the coalition of the sld and the ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 209

up ( sld up ), it seemed that the left would form a government for at least two terms. But less than four years later, before the next elections, it was not even certain whether any of the left-wing groups would pass the 5-percent election threshold. The sld constitutes the biggest and the most significant social democratic formation, so the crisis in which the party found itself well illustrates the condition of the Polish left overall. The aim of this analysis is to show the reasons for the crisis, both internal and external, and the present state of the party, and to set out a program to overcome the crisis. Historical Overview In East-Central Europe, the post-communist social democratic parties have arisen in a completely different way from their western counterparts. They were fairly small, created by former communist elites, especially at the parliamentary level. The post-communist left in Poland – s d rp – was created on the rubble of the dissolved Polish United Workers’ Party ( pzpr ). It inherited most of the pzpr ’s activists, but most importantly all its finances and its local organization, which made its start in the new democratic system considerably easier. Since the first presidential elections in 1990, together with 20 other parties, the s d rp has formed an effective electoral alliance under the name of the Democratic Left Alliance( sld ), finally transformed in 1999 into a unified party of the same name. The result of this loose alliance was a centrally managed party incorporating a number of features of a ruling party. An sld president ran for re-election in 2000. Aleksander Kwa´sniewski was re-elected – so far the only president to have achieved this – in a first-round victory, receiving over 53 percent of the votes(almost 9.5 million). He was also supported by the up which had not had any electoral success since 1993. This led to closer cooperation with the sld and resulted in the signing of a coalition agreement. The left also succeeded in the 2001 parliamentary elections which enabled the sld up coalition to form, with the psl (Polish People’s Party), a government with a stable parliamentary majority in which most ministerial offices fell to the left. Unfortunately, the opportunity was squandered. The government did not carry out any important and necessary reforms. There were conflicts regarding the leadership within the party and also corruption scandals. Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004 – an unquestioned success on the 210 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

part of the sld – was not enough to stop the erosion of the party and the decline in public trust. After a period of weak parliamentary rule, internal conflicts and many occurrences which tormented the party in 2001–2005, cracks appeared in the party monolith. However, the painful election defeat of 2005 resulted in an attempt to reinstate the left coalition. Before the 2006 local government elections a coalition group called l i d (Left and Democrats) was created, uniting social democratic parties( sld , sdpl , up ) and the center party(Democratic Party – pd ). Their goal was to improve guarantees of human and civil rights and the freedom of the individual, and to accelerate industrial progress and national modernization. But fundamental in Poland and particularly important for leftist parties are slogans related to the fight against poverty, social exclusion, and improving the position of Polish women. The parties participated in the last parliamentary elections in 2007 as a joint left-wing block, the Left and Democrats( l i d ). That project did not bring the expected growth in electoral support, however, and the newlyformed Joint Parliamentary Group of the Left has only 43 deputies in the parliament. Before the presidential election in 2010 the parties could not agree on a joint candidate. What is more, the sld itself could not decide who to nominate. Many names were mentioned by different leftwing factions and camps. Finally, seeking a compromise, the sld put up Jerzy Szmajdzin´ski, deputy marshal of the Sejm and former pzpr activist. After Szmajdzin´ski’s tragic death in a plane crash near Smolen´sk chairman of the party Grzegorz Napieralski was nominated. The decision seemed natural as the shortened electoral calendar made the quest for a new candidate or the attempt to promote someone new virtually impossible. In the face of early presidential elections most parties put up their chairs or party leaders. In fact, from the very beginning the electoral battle was fought out by the two largest and, at the time, most mutually antagonistic camps: the po and the p i s . To be precise, it was a personal clash between Jarosław Kaczyn´ski( p i s ) and Bronisław Komorowski( po , the incumbent president). Despite an extremely hard campaign(national mourning, flood, radicalization of the public mood) the leader of the sld managed to make his mark and became the sole alternative to the rightist candidates. As the youngest and most free of historical baggage he aimed his program not only at the traditional left-wing constituency but also at young people, claiming to want to surmount the old divisions. ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 211

Present Condition of the Party For a decade, the sld has been improving its results from election to election, taking advantage of its leadership status on the political left. Given this leadership position, it has not elaborated a proper ideology or program. We cannot charge the party with lack of slogans but in the socio-economic sphere its sloganizing has become disconnected from legislative activity. The institutionalized left has to some extent parted from its traditional electorate, the trade unions. It does not really have a comprehensive vision of development and the goals it wants to achieve. Ideological weakness and an excess of power in the hands of party activists have led to internal conflicts, erosion of support, and leadership disputes. By 2005, support had receded to 1990 levels. The sld , once the dominant party, ended up as a parliamentary grouping of minor significance. At that time, initiatives were launched to reunite the various left-wing factions and to put forward a joint election list. The l i d election coalition gained the support of over two million voters in the 2007 election, which means that the status quo of the 2005 election was maintained. But it was a very broad coalition, also incorporating the centrist party, the pd . The coalition therefore lost its left-wing character without gaining any more support. sld candidates obtained 70 percent of all votes, as they were the most recognizable candidates on the lists. In percentage terms, however, the l i d as a whole did not obtain as much support as all the members of this alliance had received in previous elections, when they were standing for election separately. The reasons for this included the specific plebiscitary character of the election, and a lack of preparation as far as the program and organization of the campaign were concerned. The early presidential election in 2010 had a similar character; the sole left-wing candidate, chairman Grzegorz Napieralski, received over two million electoral votes(2,299,870 or 13.68 percent). The result is not very satisfying, compared to previous results, especially if we consider the fact that the two main candidates were both from rightist parties. However, we must emphasize that the sld leader strengthened his position as chairman and at least showed that there is an alternative. This constitutes a starting point for the restoration of the left’s position on the party scene. Generally speaking, the campaign was not aggressive, but it did not touch on serious matters, either. There was no debate about the parties’ visions of Poland. All the slogans can in fact be reduced to one: we will build Poland’s future together. The 212 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

left-wing candidate mainly addressed young people, proposing a break from the past and familiar social slogans. The more important debate related to the role of the Church, although it really got going only after the campaign ended and only between the rightist parties. Nevertheless the left is trying to take advantage of it. We may also hypothesize that this dispute may develop into an attempt by the left to determine its ideological identity. The sld has relatively even support all over the country, with a marginal dominance in small and medium-sized towns, as well as among young people with a secondary education or a university degree. It’s worth mentioning that the party’s lowest support is among people over 60, with only elementary education, and living in the countryside(based on:»How Poles Voted: Presidential Election 2010,« in Gazeta Wyborcza, June 21, 2010). Until recently, it was believed that sld support comes mainly from older people nostalgic for the days of the prl , but this has changed. Slogans referring to the party’s global vision are becoming more important than economic ones. The sld can be seen as a national party and not only as representative of one group or social class. To begin with, the sld was perceived as a post-communist party, which carried a considerable stigma, at least in certain quarters, especially among rightist politicians. Over time, however, it has become the major representative of the left. Interestingly, people generally no longer recall the party’s post-communist origin and it has become a potential partner for any party. The sld ’s biggest problem is the loss of primacy of left-wing parties in the electorate’s eyes; many political and moral slogans connected with the left have been taken over by other parties. The sld is not an opinion-former; it does not offer a vision or shape public discourse. The terms of debate are imposed by rightist parties engaged in disputes on whether or not to create the Fourth Rzeczpospolita. The sld has lost its traditional left-wing constituency – workers from large industrial plants – and is unable to attract the young due to its lack of radical positions on the Church, abortion, gay relationships, and so on. The party participates in the public debate but never initiates it. Unfortunately, the party concentrates more on advertising and election campaigns than anything else. Absorbed in its own internal arguments and personnel reshuffles it seems to have forgotten about creating and maintaining its own image. The party scene in Poland is rather static and reorganization within the present framework almost impossible. This is due partly to the electoral system(proportional representation with electoral thresholds and ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 213

using the d’Hondt method), but chiefly to party financing by the state. New parties face enormous problems trying to establish themselves on the political stage. The disgrace in which the left still finds itself at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the fulfillment – ironically – of at least some promises of the left(for example, a higher standard of living), and the turn to the right(to the Church after the death of Pope John Paul II in 2005) have resulted in growing support for right-wing parties. The two major political forces – the Civic Platform( po ) and Law and Justice( p i s ) – are rightist parties with their origins in Solidarity and enjoy the bulk of electoral support. The sld – and the left in a broader sense – has generally allowed the two biggest right-wing parties to co-opt some of its basic issues: a number of social issues have been taken over by the p i s (at least the policy program, even some slogans) and the defense of democratic procedures by the po . The division between the»post-communist« and»postsolidarity« camps increases the sld ’s coalition possibilities in the future, however. Moreover, in the present distribution of power in the parliament, the left is beginning to hold the balance of power in some political endeavors of the ruling coalition. The lack of organized groupings which could function as an intellectual core for the party is a disadvantage for the sld . So far, the latter has been perceived mainly as a party seeking power in which ideology does not play an important role. There are many different reasons why there has not been closer cooperation with, for example, the circle of Krytyka Polityczna which can and should be regarded as furnishing the left’s most important intellectual support. Unfortunately, the party itself has no such backing. According to its program, the sld is concentrating on equality of opportunity and the fight against social exclusion and unemployment. The party espouses the protection of employees’ rights, free education, and public health care. However, so far slogans tend to predominate rather than policy content and concrete legislative proposals. The sld is a pragmatic party, not an ideological one. Electoral pragmatism was justified in the first years of the s d rp , when the party targeted a relatively narrow group with its election programs, but as early as 1993, the leaders of the sld consciously accepted the concept of developing broad electoral appeal to maximize election results. The culmination of that approach was the transformation of the s d rp into the sld and the party’s shift towards the center. Moreover, party programs have generally been approved unanimously, without any internal 214 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

debate. There has been little discussion of what the party’s vision is, or what its goals or expectations are. In contrast to western European social democracies, until recently in Poland economic issues have not been the most important matters for political parties. However, attitudes towards church and tradition are key, and seem to be the main factor in the eyes of the electorate. This is why the non-institutional left or parties which have tried to establish themselves to the left of the sld have not found their sociopolitical place. Poland is becoming more secular and liberal, which is why there is room for a third party on the political scene, dominated at present by conservatives and liberals. Support for Grzegorz Napieralski in the presidential elections was in large part due to work carried out by intellectual circles outside parliament. The party must impose its vision and give life to the ideas it is fighting for, otherwise all its actions will remain incomprehensible to the electorate. The party was created on the basis of a parliamentary group, but inherited a well-organized local structure, with offices and human resources. At its peak, the party numbered more than 60,000 members and although today it claims to have more than 40,000 members, the number of activists is lower. They include older members who have been in the party since the days of the previous regime, as well as an entire generation of managers who today are in their fifties. The party leader is trying to cement the party by keeping the so-called old guard while opening the party up to newer, younger members. Despite the fact that the party – which is social democratic, after all – officially supports parity, in practice this is not applied and women comprise a marked minority both on voting lists and in positions of power. The party is seeking to remain open to all groups and does not advocate any form of radicalism. This is how the general public tends to regard it, too. The sld ’s glory years are long gone. For many years it was the main or at least a dominant group on the political stage. From party ranks have risen such figures as Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, a two-term president in 1995–2000 and 2000–2005, as well as four prime ministers: Józef Oleksy, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Leszek Miller, and Marek Belka. Since 1989 it has twice won the elections and co-formed six governing cabinets as first partner(it handed the prime minister’s office to coalition members on two occasions). The party systematically improved its electoral results until the parliamentary elections of 2005 and received record support in 2001, which almost enabled it to form a government in its own right. Under the sld , Poland joined both nato and the European Union. ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 215

However, the party has not achieved any spectacular successes in social or ideological terms. On the contrary, it adopted a number of bills which went against key left-wing values, such as the annulment of the Alimony Fund and the announcement of restrictions regarding the revaluation of retirement pensions, as well as gestures and declarations of a religious nature. At present, the party is yet to take a stand on such issues as threats to the environment, biotechnology, or genetics. The present political situation does provide an opportunity for the sld to develop, however. As already mentioned, the electoral system and the fact that the party is granted money from the state budget virtually »freezes up« the political scene, but the recent elections indicate that there is still room and a need for a social democratic party, and not just one with an explicitly left-wing face. The sld , as befits a social democratic party, is open to everyone, while excluding none and striving for all groups of voters. Even as an electoral alliance, before it became a true party, it had many organizations centered around it, such as trade unions( opzz , znp ) and employers’ organizations(such as Lewiatan), as well as various smaller parties. During its time in power the party lost contact with social organizations, however, and failed to take care of the interests of trade unionists and members of cooperatives. The sld is now trying to restore contacts and rebuild its representation. It remains open to society and to strategic partnerships. The European Union is, from the sld ’s point of view, a priority issue with regard to Poland’s foreign policy. It is very critical of other foreign policy directions, such as expanding partnership with the usa . The sld is, for example, against the deployment of the anti-missile shield in Poland. According to them, it would do nothing to enhance the country’s security and could in fact lead to the start of a new arms race. Poland’s membership of nato remains a sufficient guarantor of security and it should enhance the quality of its involvement in nato missions. At the same time, the party leader has declared himself in favor of the withdrawal of Polish troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible, taking the view that the government betrayed leftist ideals by involving Poland in a war. Furthermore, the party, in a Congress Resolution, has appealed for a change in policy towards Ukraine and Russia:»Polish diplomacy should strive to base cooperation with Russia on the principles of partnership while remaining pragmatic and separating ideological and historical notions from economic issues.« It should be noted that, beyond campaign slogans, the sld has not sought to utilize any options for improving 216 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

things with the aid of the European Union. Although it is a member of pes , it neither initiates nor promotes common initiatives and therefore seems unable to provide an answer to current challenges and global problems. Reasons for the Crisis of the Social Democrats in Poland The crisis of the Democratic Left Alliance manifests itself on many levels, including program, personnel, and organization. Some symptoms of the crisis, as well as events leading to the decline of the sld , were already apparent during the time of the s d rp . The bipolar division of the political scene resulted in the post-communist camp basing its program on criticism of the post-solidarity government and thus having virtually no need to come up with an ideological position of its own. It was enough for them to construct election platforms based on opposition to the governing party. This lack of programmatic and ideological clarity made it possible for the left to form a coalition comprising several political groups under the aegis of the Democratic Left Alliance. The transformation of the coalition into a single party represented a victory of the pragmatic faction, which had been attempting to create a suitable vehicle for electoral contestation. A centralized and disciplined organization was built to ensure electoral victory. The efficiency of the apparatus was more important than pluralism of ideas and viewpoints within the party. Internal tendencies and growing divisions within the party itself were ignored, as were the voices calling for a reflection on the party’s identity. The party also underestimated the changes that were taking place in its political environment. It continued to treat the parties on the right as weak and defeated. Despite the sld ’s unquestioned victory in the parliamentary elections of 2001, no notice was taken of the fact that the electorate had begun to drift towards parties with a more defined ideological platform (for example, Law and Justice, the League of Polish Families, and SelfDefense[Samoobrona] all entered the Sejm at that time). Since 2001, the electorate has put more emphasis on axiology and values – and those have been sorely lacking. The sld ’s formula of political pragmatism exhausted itself in 2005. Leadership has been another area in which the sld clearly reveals its weaknesses. Leszek Miller, an efficient and effective leader of the opposition party, failed as head of government and party leader(2001–2004). ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 217

During that time the media uncovered a number of scandals involving members of the party, a pathology Miller was unable to do anything about. In addition, personal disagreements resulted in a split of the party into supporters of Leszek Miller and supporters of Aleksander Kwa´sniewski (then president). The symptoms of the growing crisis were ignored until 2004, when the ranking of the prime minister and the party in polls had dropped so low that any further ignoring of society’s disappointment with the government of the left might have led to the Alliance being eliminated from parliament altogether in the coming elections. In the end, the party was much weakened and a group of its members associated with Marek Borowski abandoned it to form an alternative to the sld called Polish Social Democracy( sdpl ). The removal of the»old guard« and the ascent to power of politicians of the younger generation was supposed to improve the situation. However, these young politicians did not have the necessary leadership abilities. After the plane crash near Smolensk the party’s current leader, Grzegorz Napieralski, was able to take the reins smoothly. The election confirmed him in this role. This does not mean that the problem of the party’s leadership has been solved, but at least it has been put on hold for the time being. Another problem the sld has to struggle with is the voters’ perception of it. Its manner of wielding power led to the development of an image of a corrupt party intent only on guaranteeing benefits for its members and devoid of any leftist orientation. Furthermore, attempts to»disguise« the political origins of the party through the lack of a unified attitude towards the People’s Republic, or the downplaying and lack of opposition to unfair assertions about the prl era, caused the sld to be regarded as lacking an ideological compass, betraying its traditional electorate, and simply conformist. Returning to the question of ideological identity, it is difficult not to agree with the theories of Roy Hattersley or Ralf Dahrendorf that leftwing ideology has run out of steam and that, according to the so-called »narrowing thesis,« room for a social democratic movement has become limited in the party spectrum and is increasingly being encroached upon by conservative parties. More precisely, in Poland its place has been taken by parties with rightist roots, such as Law and Justice( p i s ) and Civic Platform( po ). After the difficult years of 2001–2005 under a leftist government, the thesis that left-wing parties no longer dominate public discourse because their level of competence is declining and, indeed, that they are seen as positively incompetent seemed to be confirmed. 218 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

The party now suffers from a lack of identity, which makes any future programs it may come up with short-term strategies at best. As a result of its 2005 election defeat, the sld was confronted with the need to rebuild and reform the party. This it has begun to do and it appears to be bringing about gradual but measurable improvements at the ballot box. Most importantly, the image of the party itself has improved thanks to its newer, younger management and the introduction of leftwing elements into the party’s rhetoric. An electoral alliance, the Left and Democrats( l i d ), has also been formed, but it has not brought the expected results. This may be a result of the fact that the 2007 elections were held early and were rather in the nature of a plebiscite. The majority of steps taken by the party in 2004–2009 were fairly chaotic and of little consequence, dictated by a perception of electoral expediency, not as a result of any deep, wide-ranging reflection on the party’s program or ideology. Also, the party leaders themselves did not present a consistent vision regarding strategy and did not make independent decisions. The changes were mostly on the surface and did not come about as a result of any deep conviction in the party about the necessity of reform. Nonetheless, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century an awareness of the crisis within the party had become commonplace, but a coherent approach is still lacking to improve the party’s image. The European Perspective The Democratic Left Alliance and the Labor Union are members of the Party of European Socialists( pes ) with full rights, and their representatives regularly take part in the programmatic work of the party. Within the scope of thematic networks on the modernization of political parties, climate and energy, and Social Europe common positions are being developed. Individual positions can be found in the party’s documentation but there is no deeper debate. The most important values are the concern for unity, sensitivity, and solidarity. The left’s fundamental goals are to ensure fairness for citizens in a Social Europe, to prevent financial crisis, to ensure gender equality and tolerance, to impose an effective immigration policy, to fight against climate change and environmental pollution, and to strengthen Europe’s role as a partner for peace, security, and development. The sld ’s position is that the left has to concentrate on economic recession, the rise in unemployment, and the growing cost of ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 219

living. There is a need for cooperation, particularly within the framework of the European Union, which is a crucial link in the era of globalization. Thanks to the Community, the member states have more power to resolve the problems of the world, particularly those which affect us locally. According to the sld , the European social democratic parties argue that the social market economy will give everybody a chance to make use of the opportunities brought by globalization. Acting in support of environmental protection, the left wants to reshape the economy by developing environmental technologies and creating new jobs in that sector. Protection of the rights of immigrants in modern Europe should consist in preventing abuse and human trafficking, and should rest on the principles of equal rights and responsibilities for all. We should also enable immigrants to integrate with the societies in which they come to live. According to the party, European social democracy should take action to better protect the lives and health of its citizens with regard to threats to democracy and civil rights, terrorism, crime and extremism. The members of the European Union must act as one to promote peace and development. In fact, the Polish social democrats are taking a stand and incorporating these things into party programs, but they are not debating them. Suggestions for Future Development Among the various parties of the left in Poland, the sld has the most potential to transform itself into an authentic left-wing party as still commonly understood. There is a pragmatic current within the sld that has resigned itself to the current order of things, but there also exists a need to create a critical current to help formulate answers to new challenges; to articulate new ideas and define the interests of various groups. In order to become a modern left-wing party it should define its own ideological identity while remembering that the traditional divisions into left and right have become somewhat anachronistic. It should also come to terms once and for all with its own past, the era of the People’s Republic of Poland. Challenges confronting the parties as well as the party’s function should be redefined. With regard to values, the sld is trying to open itself up to different environments, social groups, and minorities. The party must also remain open to society in general. It should establish priorities that are 220 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

in accordance with the axiology of the»new left« and devise a program with a long-term vision in matters of social, economic, and international policy. It is not enough simply to select new leaders; the members must also be suitably qualified and prepared to take power. There is room in the Polish political arena for a party that will both advocate freedom of outlook and concern itself with the economy. The recent presidential election also confirms that the party has become a factor in the»balance of power« when it comes to forming a majority in parliament. Its relevance is increasing and it is becoming a potential coalition partner for both right-wing parties. What is really important here is that the sld has ceased being»undesirable« merely because it is a»post-communist« party, and has resumed its position as equal partner in the political arena. Nevertheless, before it enters any coalition, the sld should first properly define its own identity, otherwise it risks being marginalized and its slogans risk being adopted by larger parties. Clearly, for a party that was until recently the dominant force on the political scene, its position today as the»third« party cannot be seen as satisfactory. As an institutional party of the left the sld has parted from its traditional electorate, but has not yet acquired a new one. It has not answered the fundamental questions of whom it wants to represent and how, and has not identified an electorate it can count on. The sld has become a party seeking power and has distanced itself from both labor and particular segments of the intelligentsia. In addition, inevitably, other parties have co-opted some of the achievements(especially socio-economic) of the left, to which the sld has been unable to respond. The fundamental problem which the sld is facing today is programmatic in nature: answering the question of what it means to be a party of the left in the twenty-first century. The division between right and left has definitely become blurred: common program elements shared by the three parties are readily apparent. The question now is, how the sld can make itself stand out. Bibliography Grabowska M.(2004): Podział postkomunistyczny. Społeczne podstawy polityki w Polsce po 1989 roku . Warsaw: Scholar. Karwat, M.(2005):»O toz˙samo´sci partii,« in Forum Klubowe, No. 5. ipg 4/2010 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland 221

Kik. K.(ed.)(2003): Znacznie ideologii dla socjaldemokracji. Materiały z II Krajowej Konferencji Teoretycznej sld , Warsaw. Korna´s, J.(ed.)(2005): Partie polityczne: permanentne problemy. Studia z zakresu funkcjonowania systemu politycznego . Kielce: Wyz˙sza Szkoła Ekonomii i Prawa. Markowski, R.(2002): System partyjny i zachowania wyborcze. Dekada polskich do´swiadczen´; Warsaw. Materska-Sosnowska, A.(2006): Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – dostosowanie syndykatu władzy do zasad demokracji parlamentarnej . Warsaw: Elipsa. Miller, L.(2009): Tak to było. Warsaw: Zapol. Tomczak, Ł.(2007): Partie i system partyjny RP. Stan i perspektyw . Torun´: Marszałek. ———(2008): Polska lewica u progu XXI wieku. Wybrane aspekty; Wrocław. Walzer, M.(2005): Lewica ma warto´sci(May 21–22); available at: www.gazeta.pl, www.wyborcza.pl. 222 Materska-Sosnowska, Poland ipg 4/2010

Substance and Reputation Successes and Challenges for Progressive and Left Parties and Governments in South America AGUSTÍN CANZANI N ot so many years ago, a theoretician of continental repute(Harnecker 2000) published an account of the principal episodes in the story of the left in Latin America. It described the triumph of the Cuban revolution; the rise of the revolutionary left and rural guerrilla forces; Liberation Theology; the assumption of power by the Sandinistas and their subsequent electoral defeat; military dictatorships; and partial or supervised democracies; before moving on to the fall of the Socialist bloc; the Central American peace agreements; and the guerrilla campaigns in Chiapas. The only example from South America was the victory of Unidad Popular(Popular Unity) in Chile, followed by its overthrow. Today, any observer surveying the region as the twenty-first century enters its second decade will be confronted by a rather different panorama, and will not hesitate to conclude that left and progressive forces have established a firmer foothold across the continent than ever before. This reputation is clearly due, in part, to so many current or recent governments in Southern America branding themselves as progressive. That is the case, at least, in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 1 But it is also colored by the fact that many of the region’s most prominent leaders – such as Lula, Chávez or Evo Morales – are champions of progressive and left-wing ideas. Another credible argument is that these governments are seen to be confronting – some more openly and others at least in their rhetoric – those neoliberal models generally identified as products of the Washington Consensus, and that they claim to offer alternatives. Although the differentiation between them has been discussed(Lanzaro 2008), another factor is probably that a number of them have put items on the political agenda 1. Except for Chile, where Concertación(Concert of Parties for Democracy) was defeated in the second round of the presidential elections in January, most of these progressive governments have been in power for periods of one to four years, or face favorable election prospects(Brazil). ipg 4/2010 Canzani, South America 223

that were not common among previous governments, including questions ranging from ownership of natural resources to regulation of the mass media. Similarly, their reputation will have been reinforced by issues such as redefining the model of state intervention, the mobilization potential of segments of the population who have not traditionally played a role, and high levels of public support for these administrations, providing a significant power boost and enabling them to take decisions on public policies affecting diverse vested interests, even some which are embedded in distant geographical contexts. Last but not least, as models associated to some degree with this kind of scenario(such as social democracy in Europe) find themselves in crisis, one key attraction of these governments is that they evidently constitute one of the few new developments in progressive and left-wing politics on the global stage. It is by no means easy, however, to define the contours of the phenomenon, given the not inconsiderable variety of situations and views that have been clustered under this label. It suffices, for example, to consult the list of participants at the so-called Progressive Summit at Viña del Mar, Chile, in 2009. us Vice-President Joe Biden was invited, but not Hugo Chávez, who protested at his exclusion and that of others, such as Evo Morales and President Fernando Lugo. Bearing these difficulties in mind, this paper seeks to set out a few preliminary hypotheses about the nature, reach, and limits of the phenomenon and to analyze a number of notable aspects of the progress of these governments and the challenges they face. A Heterogeneous Set In this continent at least, we have a major problem when it comes to clarifying the scope of the notions»left« and»progressive.« Even the formal definitions provided by the Spanish Royal Academy are fairly generic and in some ways contradictory. If we look up the word»left,« the recent entries of political relevance read:»in parliamentary assemblies, the set of party representatives who are not conservative or centrist« and»the set of individuals advocating reformist or, in general, non-conservative ideas.« 2 These two entries have been modified or deleted in the latest edition of the Dictionary. Although the definition of»progressive« has made some 2. See Diccionario de la Real Academia Española: http://www.rae.es/rae.html. 224 Canzani, South America ipg 4/2010

headway, alluding now to»an individual or group with advanced ideas and the attitude that this implies,« it is not particularly helpful. Leaving aside strict linguistic definitions, we might consider whether identification proves easier by way of political parties, which seems to be common practice on other continents. Here the systemic reality of Latin American parties raises new challenges, due to a convergence of three different currents associated with left-wing and progressive forces. Two of these probably exhibit clear similarities to currents familiar on other continents, such as Europe, but the third is hardly comparable. The first current is made up of the historical parties of the traditional left, essentially aligned with the socialist and communist movements. Usually founded in the early years of the twentieth century, most of them are small parties, in the main with a merely token function and little, if any, parliamentary presence, having entered government on no more than a handful of occasions, and even then within alliances and for short periods, as in the case of Unidad Popular in Chile. The second, again with clear links beyond Latin America, is in the social democratic mould, although its role has been more modest. Weak and embryonic in Latin America until the late twentieth century, either because traditional left parties leaned more towards the classical left or due to a tendency to back insurrectionist strategies such as armed guerrilla warfare, it emerged more often than not through specific groups which took part in coalitions or alliances, more frequently over the past two decades. The third tradition is the one with roots in the»popular nationalist« camp, linked to certain forms of what is called Latin American»populism.« This type of political expression, closely associated with historical examples such as»Peronism« in Argentina and»Varguism« in Brazil, entails the construction of political subjects who bring together structures able to mobilize large sectors of the population, integrating them by means of social and/or political rights, and a powerful personal profile engaging in major confrontations with existing power structures, with effective links between the political structures set up as a platform for mobilization and the states where they are in government. In some cases, these have imposed restrictions on pluralism or displayed little concern for political tolerance. 3 Many forms of Latin American populism have enjoyed strong electoral support, and on several occasions they were ousted from government by military dictatorships. Their political structures do not 3. For a Latin American reading of this subject, see Laclau(2005). ipg 4/2010 Canzani, South America 225

always survive, but the tradition continues to be articulated through other partisan vehicles which champion the cause. This distinctive factor should explain why, applying the conventional criteria, parties help to some extent to identify the phenomenon, but are still far from sufficient. Although some scenarios grant a role to classical forces of the left(the Partido Socialista in Chile, or Partido Socialista and Partido Comunista in Uruguay) or more recent parties of similar orientation(the Partido dos Trabalhadores, Brazil), their involvement does not always allow us to classify governments of this kind as left-wing, and there are several reasons for that. They may be part of a broader pre-election coalition which includes major parties such as the Christian Democrats (Chile) or progressive wings of traditional parties(Uruguay), or they may govern by parliamentary accord within a spectrum of parties far more diverse in their ideological complexion, an alliance forged through political agreements(Brazil). In other cases, the political instrument itself may follow a classical populist or popular national tradition, whereas the government apparently takes its cue from a dominant progressive grouping within the party structure(Argentina). The Latin American experience has also included some new political structures, such as the Movimiento al Socialismo(Movement for Socialism, or mas , Bolivia), some established virtually on the eve of taking power or even afterwards, as with the Movimiento Quinta República(Movement for a Fifth Republic, Venezuela) and pais (Alliance for a Proud and Sovereign Fatherland, Ecuador), or directly as the result of a purely electoral pact, which enters government but then fails to function smoothly, like the Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio(Patriotic Alliance for Change, or apc , Paraguay). The difference between the two traditions seems to be important in combination with the nature of the party system and the structure of previously existing social movements, and when it is reflected in aspects of the political behavior adopted by the leaders of these structures. Some party instruments have fairly deep roots within, or alliances with, social movements, and in some instances this may even account for their formation, as with the Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil, the mas in Bolivia and the Partido Justicialista in Argentina. Or else they may view themselves, within a project for change, as strategic allies of the trade unions, such as the Frente Amplio(Broad Front) in Uruguay. But there are also constellations where the links are more heterogeneous, such as the Paraguayan apc , or which resort frequently to plebiscites as a regular expression of their legitimacy, as in Venezuela or Ecuador. 226 Canzani, South America ipg 4/2010

The parties best able to build an organized base seem to be those which have for some time accepted electoral contests as a fundamental part of their political existence, and have even gained significant previous experience of government at local level prior to taking national office, as in Brazil and Uruguay. In these cases, over the medium term they have not merely strengthened the party system but have become a factor in its transformation. Those parties that operate on the basis of a more personalized leadership often take shape or consolidate within an electoral context, grasped as an opportunity. This constellation is frequently associated with a party system that is weak or, indeed, collapsing, which was the situation in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. In countries with older party structures and more institutionalized party systems, leadership tends to evolve around relatively long, significant political careers(Lula, Kirchner, Vázquez, Mujica), whereas in countries where these political instruments are more recent and party systems have witnessed crisis, leadership is closely linked to the personal charisma of key figures(Chávez, Correa, Morales, Lugo), who tend to be relative newcomers to political life, either entering as outsiders or advancing suddenly from secondary roles. This diversity does not seem sufficient, however, to undermine the conclusion that all these scenarios can be placed within the context of the same political phenomenon, and there are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, in almost every case, these political organizations constitute the most significant left-wing formation in the ideological spectrum of the country concerned(Alcántara 2008), whether in terms of tradition, views expressed or electoral constituencies. Secondly, the majority of them have publicly articulated similarities in their orientation which extend beyond the limited or variable exchange afforded by regional interaction. Common Features There are also common, recurring aspects to these scenarios. Progressive governments in the region declare an intention to redress the situation they have inherited from previous governments, which in one way or another implies altering their neoliberal legacy. However, their plans will range from what might be regarded as tweaking the model to a desire for a different society, in the form of a new kind of socialism. The extent ipg 4/2010 Canzani, South America 227

to which these alterations actually progress also varies, and everything suggests that this depends not just on the intention itself, but also on the party landscape in each country, determined by institutional, economic, social and political structures and the level of restrictions or opportunities they encounter. Situations such as the rise to power of Kirchner in Argentina – following an unprecedented economic crisis – or of Correa in Ecuador(after a series of acting presidents) or of Chávez in Venezuela(in the wake of corruption scandals and a meltdown of the party system), seem quite dissimilar to those faced by Concertación in Chile – with economic growth along with major restrictions deriving from Pinochet’s authoritarian constitution – or by Lula in Brazil, faced with the problem of ousting a candidate put up by the political party of his predecessor in government. There are also contrasting institutional, political and electoral contexts, for example between the structured political system into which the Frente Amplio government was able to slip with its parliamentary majority after six electoral periods, and the unexpected victory of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, with a narrow majority and reduced parliamentary support. These variables are determining factors in the construction of each government agenda. Depending on the context, they may entail a rather more gradualist approach – of which there are the more reserved varieties, as seems to be the case in Chile, and others that are more profound, as with Uruguay and in some respects Argentina – or, indeed, other processes, such as efforts towards reconstitution, reflected in substantial amendments to the constitution endorsed by plebiscite, as would appear to be the case in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. However, there are at least four factors which apparently cut across all these scenarios and might be regarded as common features. The first is the ability of these governments to meet the basic requirements of public administration in general, and in particular to manage the so-called»macroeconomy.« Many of these scenarios were preceded by economic crisis, associated with drastic falls in output and financial crisis in a number of Latin American countries, and this seems to have initiated a learning curve in terms of managing economic policy. So far, in most cases, this has resulted in significant periods of growth, combined with an accumulation of reserves. While there is consensus that the global economic climate has been highly favorable to the development of Latin American countries, with rising global prices for raw materials and commodities, everything suggests that to date these governments have 228 Canzani, South America ipg 4/2010

passed the test when it comes to managing the economy, allowing them to lay one of the ghosts that have traditionally haunted progressive and left-wing forces in Latin America once they assume power. Today, their ability to generate economic growth and in particular to contain inflation does not appear to be in dispute. The second is the repositioning of the role played by the state, and this acquires different forms depending on conditions in each country and the thrust of public policies. In some instances, this repositioning is expressed in a return to state ownership of certain natural resources or else state responsibility for their exploitation, which we can witness, with variations, in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, although there are also manifestations of it in Brazil and Argentina. In other countries, it takes the form of the state’s return as provider of various social services – such as pension schemes in Argentina – or the restoration of key regulatory functions in a number of fields – such as health care in Uruguay. In all countries, it has substantially boosted the importance of social protection schemes, with public policies advancing in three different directions: ensuring decent conditions for the most deprived communities, essentially reflected in vigorous measures to combat poverty, often with direct income transfers; efforts to overcome inequalities by ensuring access to public services – extending eligibility, reducing inequalities in distribution, providing subsidies or public funding for certain schemes; and the enactment of new rights, fundamentally expressed in changes to labor legislation and in universal benefits. The third is a major enhancement of the role of political life in society as a whole. This enhancement has brought about changes in the way political rhetoric is used in public debate, and advocacy of the valuable contribution politics can make as a pivotal element of social life. This repositioning also entails the reinstatement of antagonistic positions in political discourse, but this time applying the same rules that apply to the democratic contest for power. In the same vein, many of these governments clearly state their identification with ideologically inspired doctrines, something which has not been particularly widespread across the continent in recent decades. The fourth aspect is the unfurling of processes to settle various historical debts, taking the form of reparations for inherited wrongs, the constitutional enshrinement of rights or the effective involvement of traditionally marginalized groups and communities in relevant public policies or, indeed, the political landscape. Although these processes have ipg 4/2010 Canzani, South America 229

been contradictory and their impact and nature may be open to debate, they are undoubtedly contributing fundamentally to building greater social cohesion. Human rights and the status of indigenous peoples or different races are clear examples. Progressive Latin American governments 4 have steered an exit from the crisis, and while they have doubtless benefited from the economic tailwind of rising prices for commodities and natural resources, it is also evident that they have the skills to achieve more. They have demonstrated their ability to run the macroeconomy – including controlling inflation and managing debt – and, which is by no means trivial in view of what the continent suffered a few decades ago, to build up monetary reserves by various means, restoring a degree of leeway for economic policies, and introducing or reintroducing a number of intervention mechanisms unlike those of neoliberal models. Ultimately, they have been able to begin realigning their relationship with the market. In every scenario, they have complemented such measures with a strong framework of social policies, ranging from more classical interventions – measures to compensate for inequalities, the provision of goods and services associated with welfare – to an incipient revamping, with various levels of complexity, of systems of social protection. These successes on the economic front cannot disguise the existence of major outstanding issues, such as investment rates that remain inadequate, significantly inhibiting the expansion of growth which does more than keep idle factors of production ticking over. Potentially, this could counteract the improvements in distribution, partly because these are evidently closely linked to the economic cycle and partly because levels of growth are key to continuing to fund compensatory policies. The problems of combating inequality seem to be associated with the challenge of establishing a new model of accumulation, given that most economies are still operating restrictive policies, geared towards tapping the yields of more dynamic sectors. The leap from creating better conditions for economic activity to more development-oriented 4. Many of the issues mentioned here are closely linked to the outcome of analyses and debates conducted in the course of various activities of the network Red de Fundaciones Progresistas del Cono Sur, which has been organizing seminars, workshops and publications since 2008 with the participation of cepes (Argentina), the Fundación Chile xxi (Chile), the Fundación Líber Seregni(Uruguay), and the Fundación Perseu Abramo(Brazil), as well as the support of the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung. 230 Canzani, South America ipg 4/2010

policies is still far from able to quell the latent volatility which underlies the economies of most of these countries in order to manage factors such as the evolution of prices for principal products and the dynamics of capital flows, or the structural unevenness that entails big differences in productivity between one sector and another. These countries have also inherited patterns of weak public finance, further debilitated by preceding governments, and structures of taxation that in most cases were regressive. In this respect they find themselves in situations essentially different from those in which European social democrats operate. There has been some success in capturing a larger proportion of national revenue by intervening directly to exploit natural resources or by designing direct taxes specifically linked to these activities. Evidently, however, a more radical reshaping of the taxation structure presents problems, as does building efficient and effective state administration in these areas. Besides, changing taxation has become trickier, given a basic lack of confidence in the purpose of government spending. Neoliberalism has defined a paltry, inefficient role for the state, which makes progress on these matters difficult, and many of the coalitions to which progressive political forces belong have imposed limitations on such reforms. However, it is vital to recover this territory as a key to progressive policies, for this is what makes it possible to generate substantial advances in distribution and to uphold policies with greater transformational potential in the medium and long term. Progressive governments similarly confront very significant challenges with regard to their ability to frame education and training for the knowledge-based society as a new model for development, without allowing the education system simply to churn out labor to meet a limited demand, creating segmented economies and helping to reinforce inequality. In a number of countries, the left has played a fundamental role in resisting neoliberal education reforms, but in the present climate it seems crucial to advance in a number of directions. The call for greater equality in the education system is clearly reflected in the need for thoroughgoing reform of education that seems to have been designed to suit the middle classes, but has serious problems adjusting to new requirements and catering for the entry of other social groups. This likewise implies recognizing the need for substantial progress towards changing the educational environment in schools, so that they are not merely centers of reproduction, but places for knowledge creation and ipg 4/2010 Canzani, South America 231

cultural expression, which would enable education to play a key role in changing the civilisatory role of societies. It is equally crucial to remember that the social distribution of knowledge is a key factor in combating inequalities. To be part of the knowledge-based society is to be part of global society, and not being part of it is a form of exclusion that restricts social participation, a key aspect of the progressive model. There is a need to move forward to models that ensure the universal availability of the information technologies, while overcoming crude digitalization and designing systems that will combine access to the new technologies with assistance in using them, inspired by a desire to enhance not only productivity, but also rights. Many of these challenges are also associated with a need to rethink the role and, ultimately, the structure of those nation-states through which progressive governments in the region operate. While there seem to have been substantial advances with regard to restoring the state in certain fields of the economy, providing public services and guaranteeing rights, there are still evident deficits in terms of both structure and the conception and management of state agencies. Beyond observing that it is difficult to engage in progressive politics with a state inherited from neoliberals, there needs to be a radical debate to avoid simple restoration and to create the right structures in order to achieve new political objectives at this moment in history. The challenges are not confined to governments. In this context, the political parties that represent or are associated with these governments currently in power likewise face major challenges with regard to how to develop leading personnel and how to adapt their organizational formats and their working methods to meet new conditions. It does seem clear that the logic of electoral contestation is increasingly being accepted as legitimating governments and to a large extent this has gradually changed left and progressive parties in the region. As a result, parties in many of these countries now have political structures which include strong capacity-building for running election campaigns and mobilizing support, along with the other elements that might be required to enter the electoral race in the classic sense. In many instances, however, their appeal remains in part attached to the charisma of certain historical leaders, with whom not only parties but also governments are identified. The decisive influence of these leaders is not confined to the composition of government and relations with the electorate, but also clearly sets its stamp on the patterns of political behavior. Developing 232 Canzani, South America ipg 4/2010

organizations with a vitality of their own that can outlive these leadership phenomena is a key issue. The importance of these governments in the countries concerned also incurs the risk that they may turn into chameleons or become alienated from their origins. The risk of becoming a chameleon occurs if there is excessive overlap with the government, so much so that the boundaries between the party structure and the government structure are ignored or, indeed, dissolved. The risk of alienation arises when a government cuts itself loose from political parties or movements. Parties, as the vehicles of historical projects, need to strike up a relationship with governments which allows them to drive those processes forward without forgetting that the experience of government is contingent and, consequently, temporary. South America is probably the most interesting region in the world from a left-wing or progressive perspective, and this merits close attention from other corners of the globe. The attention is quite likely to be founded on a generalization which often overlooks the tensions between different models of progressive development across the continent, whether more left, more social democratic, or more popular and national in inspiration. But these distinctions should not blur the significant indications of common identity which permit different experiences of national politics to be clustered under the same heading. Rigorous analysis of their characteristics and the story of their successes, failures, and challenges will contribute to repositioning a Latin American perspective within the international debate on progressive and left-wing thinking. Bibliography Alcántara, Manuel(2008):»La escala de izquierda. La ubicación ideológica de los presidentes y partidos de izquierda en América Latina,« in Nueva Sociedad, No. 217 (September–October). Alegre, Pablo(2009):»Los gobiernos de izquierda y las variantes del desarrollo en América Latina.« Available at: http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2009/files/AlegrePablo.pdf(accessed on July 27, 2010). Elissalde, Roberto(ed.)(2009): Gozos y sombras del gobierno progresista. Aportes al balance. Montevideo: Dedos. Ermida Uriarte, Oscar(2007): La política laboral de los gobiernos progresistas . Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/uruguay/05063.pdf(accessed on 23 July 2010). ipg 4/2010 Canzani, South America 233

Figueredo, Ademir et al.(2010): 2003–2010 O Brasil em transformacao, Volume 2: As Novas Bases da Cidadania: Políticas Sociais, Trabalho e Previdencia Social . Sao Paulo: Editora Fundacao Perseu Abramo. Harnecker, Marta(2000): La izquierda en el umbral del Siglo XXI. Haciendo posible lo imposible . Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores. Laclau, Ernesto(2005): La razón populista . Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Lanzaro, Jorge(2008):»La socialdemocracia criolla,« in Nueva Sociedad, No. 217 (September–October). Mercadante, Aloízio et al.(2010): 2003–2010 O Brasil em transformacao, Volume 1: A Nova Política Economica, a Sustentabilidade Ambiental . Sao Paulo: Editora Fundacao Perseu Abramo. Quiroga, Yesko et al.(eds.)(2009): Consenso Progresista. Las políticas sociales de los gobiernos progresistas del Cono Sur . Fundación Friedrich Ebert, Red de Centros y Fundaciones Progresistas del Cono Sur: Fundación Chile 21, Fundación Perseu Abramo, Fundación Líber Seregni, cepes . Quiroga, Yesko and Jaime Ensignia(eds.)(2009): Renovación partidaria. Los partidos políticos progresistas en los países del Cono Sur . Fundación Friedrich Ebert, Red de Fundaciones Progresistas del Cono Sur: Fundación Chile 21, Fundación Perseu Abramo, Fundación Líber Seregni, cepes . 234 Canzani, South America ipg 4/2010

REZENSIONEN/BOOK REVIEWS Progress in an Age of Fear? TONY JUDT: Ill Fares the Land: A Treatise on Our Present Discontents London 2010 Allen Lane, 237 pp. W ith the publication of his last book,»Ill Fares the Land,« shortly before his death in August 2010, the great British historian Tony Judt made an invaluable contribution to the debate on the future of social democracy and progressive politics. The book is required reading for anyone interested in the past, present, and future of social democracy – as is Richard Wilkinson’s and Kate Pickett’s»The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better,« to which Tony Judt makes copious reference. Naturally, one is not obliged to agree with every word even of required reading. But it does not matter whether one agrees with Judt’s arguments or not: in any case,»Ill Fares the Land« compels social democrats to rethink their customary arguments. In the twenty-first century, can and should social democracy continue to conceive of itself as a party of progress? What direction should this progress now take? Or could it be that today»progress« represents rather the problem than the solution? These are the provocative questions that Judt poses. It is clear that belief in the necessity of progress and its possibility in principle was always a constitutive factor in social democracy. In contrast, conservatives have tended to believe in the existence of a»natural order of things,« which could not be radically changed. Conservatism, properly speaking, was always a fundamentally pessimistic world view. That changed to some degree around 30 years ago with the emergence of the neoconservative and neoliberal hegemony. Judt rightly stresses the historical dimension of this turning of the tide:»It is the Right that has inherited the ambitious modernist urge to destroy and innovate in the name of a universal project.« This observation is uncontroversial among social democrats. However, the conclusion Judt draws from it with regard to the task of social democracy is likely to give rise to some debate:»If social democracy has a future, it will be as a social democracy of fear.(…) The first task of radical dissenters today is to remind ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 235

their audience of the achievements of the twentieth century, along with the likely consequences of our heedless rush to dismantle them. The left, to be quite blunt about it, has something to conserve.« Tony Judt’s truly arresting point, therefore, is that in the twenty-first century it is social democracy which must become the party of a genuine or»conservative conservatism«:»We take for granted the institutions, legislation, services and rights that we have inherited from the great age of 20th century reform. It is time to remind ourselves that all of these were utterly inconceivable as recently as 1929. We are the fortunate beneficiaries of a transformation whose scale and impact was unprecedented. There is much to defend.« That is why»social democrats, characteristically modest in style and ambition, need to speak more assertively of past gains.« They should indeed. Judt is quite right to emphasize that»[t]o abandon the labors of a century is to betray those who came before us as well as generations yet to come.« However, more questionable is the manner in which Judt seems to play off the task of defending»past gains« against the task of working towards the progressive goal of a better future for as many people as possible. In his New York lecture of October 19, 2009, on which the book is based Judt formulated the presumed alternative in particularly stark terms:»Rather than seeking to restore a language of optimistic progress, we should begin by reacquainting ourselves with the recent past.« But why should we have to choose between them? This alleged contrast is inexplicable – and counterproductive for the social democratic cause in the twenty-first century. Of course, it is right to fight for a social democracy which defends the civil and social standards achieved in an earlier era: equality, justice, integrity, belief in the possibility and worth of common efforts for the common good. In this specific sense, social democrats must really be»conservative.« But as every footballer knows, teams which, after scoring an early goal, timidly try to defend their one-nil lead for the remainder of the match are likely to be punished. In politics, no less than in football, it pays to take the game to the opposition, dictating the play and believing in one’s own ability to score more goals. In other words, if the goals social democrats represent are important and they have a cause worth fighting for – which is indeed the case – they must take their ideas to the people, instead of merely taking cover and hoping for the best, while secretly expecting the worst. It is true that in the era of radical free-market hegemony, which has now passed, the idea of social democracy went onto the defensive. Even social democrats themselves no longer believed in their cause, because they had lost their specifically social democratic»language of optimistic progress.« And this language continued to ebb away from them, because they no longer believed in their cause. One led to the other – and vice versa. This vicious circle has to be broken. As things stand, there is indeed every reason to fear. Free-market radicalism may be a thing of the past – at least as 236 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

a hegemonic narrative – but the destruction of everything achieved under the aegis of social democracy in the post-war years still threatens. As a result of climate change; endemic financial, economic, debt, and currency crises; population growth; energy scarcity; demographic imbalances; mass migration; scarcity of food; terrorism; weapons of mass destruction; nuclear proliferation; and a public which is either distracted or panic-stricken; the world has indeed become a very dangerous place. During such times, backward-looking»parties of fear,« held together by little more than a yearning somehow to halt the erosion of their earlier achievements will never be able to mobilize anything more than ultimately helpless blocking minorities. Fear paralyzes people and stifles creativity. Instead of giving in to it, however, we should revive the conviction that the idea of a progressive, future-oriented social democracy, which also includes green and liberal goals, has every hope of winning electoral majorities in the twenty-first century. If social democrats themselves do not believe that they have something valuable to offer, why should anyone put their faith in them? Martin Luther King did not say:»I have a nightmare.« And Barack Obama did not become president of the United States and introduce health insurance for millions of previously uninsured Americans by wringing his hands about neoliberal hegemony. Instead, he prevailed by persuading enough people that positive change, progress, and a better future are still possible. Perhaps – even probably – there will not be a better future for all. The dilemma of progress in the twenty-first century is evident. In his latest book,»The Politics of Climate Change,« Anthony Giddens puts his finger on the problem: »Our civilization could self-destruct – no doubt about it – and with awesome consequences. Doomsday is no longer a religious concept, a day of spiritual reckoning, but a possibility imminent in our society and economy.(…) No wonder many take fright. Let’s go back! Let’s return to a simpler world! They are entirely understandable sentiments and have practical application in some contexts. Yet there can be no overall ›going back‹ – the very expansion of human power that has created such deep problems is the only means of resolving them, with science and technology at the forefront. There will probably be nine billion people in the world by 2050 – after which the world population hopefully will stabilize, especially if the least developed countries make significant economic and social progress. Ways will have to be found of providing those nine billion people with a decent way of life.« The world of the twenty-first century therefore is in urgent need of progress and of alert social democracies so that at least some of the problems can be solved for which, it must be said, past progress is also responsible. To be sure, we cannot be certain that we will succeed in this. What we can be certain of, however, is that conservatism, whether social democratic or otherwise, will not save us. It may be that we are doomed to failure even if we opt for more and – hopefully – better progress. In any case, we are definitely doomed to failure if we reject the guiding ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 237

notion of progress out of hand. As even Tony Judt admits:»The past really is another country: we cannot go back.« Not that social democrats and other progressives have nothing more to learn from history. Far from it. Our success in coping with this century will depend not least on whether enough people in western countries come to acknowledge how precious, improbable, and fragile the social and liberal-democratic post-war settlement is. Judt is right to warn us not to take anything for granted:»If we are going to build a better future, we must begin with a deeper appreciation of the ease with which even solidly-grounded liberal democracies can founder.« The fact that Tony Judt relentlessly and assiduously promulgated this message right up until his death merits the highest praise.»Social democracy does not represent an ideal future,« he writes,»it does not even represent the ideal past. But among the options available to us today, it is better than anything else to hand.« Social democracy will therefore remain indispensible in the twenty-first century – not as the defensive ersatz-conservatism which Tony Judt had in mind, however, but as the optimistic, progressive, but also sober political belief that our dangerous times so urgently need. But will social democracy take on this task and is it even capable of doing so? These are the questions which, inspired by Tony Judt’s book, are now being debated all over Europe – for example, in»Berliner Republik,« in»Die Neue Gesellschaft,« and on the website of the Dutch Wiardi Beckman Stichting. In the Netherlands, Judt’s book was available in every bookstore – in Dutch translation – not long after the appearance of the original. The fact that Judt’s complacent German publisher – of many years’ standing – did not find itself able even to announce a German-language edition of»Ill Fares the Land« in the months before his death is as incomprehensible as it is unforgiveable. Tobias Dürr, Editor of the political journal»Berliner Republik«; Chairman and founder of the»Progressive Zentrum«, Berlin 238 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

REZENSIONEN/BOOK REVIEWS Fortschritt in einem Zeitalter der Angst? TONY JUDT: Ill Fares the Land: A Treatise on Our Present Discontents London 2010 Allen Lane, 237 S. M it seinem letzten Buch»Ill Fares the Land« hat der große britische Historiker Tony Judt noch kurz vor seinem Tod im August dieses Jahres einen unschätzbaren Beitrag zur Debatte um die Zukunft von Sozialdemokratie und progressiver Politik geleistet. Wer sich für Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft der sozialen Demokratie interessiert, für den ist»Ill Fares the Land« eine Pflichtlektüre – genauso übrigens wie Richard Wilkinsons und Kate Picketts ebenso wichtiges Buch»Gleichheit ist Glück: Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind«, auf welches sich Tony Judt ausgiebig bezieht. Auch einer»Pflichtlektüre« muss man natürlich nicht rundum beipflichten. Doch egal, ob man Judts Argumenten folgt oder nicht: Auf jeden Fall zwingt»Ill Fares the Land« Sozialdemokraten, ihre gängigen Argumente neu zu durchdenken: Kann und soll sich Sozialdemokratie im 21. Jahrhundert weiterhin als Partei des Fortschritts begreifen? Welche Richtung sollte dieser Fortschritt heute einschlagen? Oder könnte es sein, dass»Fortschritt« heute eher das Problem und nicht die Lösung darstellt? Das sind die provokativen Fragen, die Judt aufwirft. Klar ist, dass der Glaube an die Notwendigkeit und prinzipielle Möglichkeit von Fortschritt für die Sozialdemokratie stets konstitutiv war. Demgegenüber glaubten Konservative an die Existenz einer»natürlichen Ordnung der Dinge«, die nicht radikal verändert werden dürfe. Der Konservatismus, begriffsgetreu verstanden, war eine fundamental pessimistische Weltanschauung. Das änderte sich vor drei Jahrzehnten mit dem Heraufziehen der neokonservativen und neoliberalen Hegemonie. Zu Recht hebt Judt die historische Dimension dieses Gezeitenwechsels hervor:»Es ist die politische Rechte, die den ehrgeizigen modernen Drang geerbt hat, im Namen eines universellen Projekts zu zerstören und zu erneuern.« Diese Beobachtung mag unter Sozialdemokraten unstrittig sein. Diskussionen sollte hingegen der Schluss auslösen, den Judt hieraus mit Blick auf die ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 1

Aufgabe der Sozialdemokratie zieht:»Wenn die Sozialdemokratie eine Zukunft hat, dann als Sozialdemokratie der Angst.(…) Die erste Aufgabe radikaler Dissidenten besteht heute darin, ihr Publikum an die Errungenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts zu erinnern – und über die wahrscheinlichen Folgen des leichtfertigen Eifers zu reden, mit dem wir diese Errungenschaften zerstören. Die politische Linke hat, um es ganz deutlich zu sagen, etwas zu bewahren.« Tony Judts wirklich denkwürdige Pointe lautet also, dass es im 21. Jahrhundert die Sozialdemokratie sei, die zur Partei eines echten, also»konservativen Konservatismus« werden müsse:»Wir halten die Institutionen, die Gesetzgebung, die Dienstleistungen und die Rechte, die wir aus der großen Reformära des 20. Jahrhunderts geerbt haben, für selbstverständlich gegeben. Es ist an der Zeit, uns daran zu erinnern, dass all diese Dinge noch im gar nicht so lange zurückliegenden Jahr 1929 völlig undenkbar waren. Wir sind die glücklichen Nutznießer einer in ihrem Ausmaß und ihren Auswirkungen beispiellosen Transformation. Es gibt viel zu verteidigen.« Deshalb müssten»(…) Sozialdemokraten, typischerweise bescheiden in ihrem Stil und Ehrgeiz, nachdrücklicher über die Errungenschaften der Vergangenheit sprechen«. Ja, das sollten sie tatsächlich tun. Völlig zutreffend betont Judt:»Die Anstrengungen eines ganzen Jahrhunderts im Stich zu lassen, ist Verrat nicht nur an denen, die vor uns da waren, sondern auch an künftigen Generationen.« Skeptisch stimmt indessen, wie Judt die Verteidigung»vergangener Errungenschaften« gegen die Aufgabe auszuspielen scheint, heute offensiv auf das progressive Ziel einer besseren Zukunft für möglichst viele Menschen hinzuarbeiten. In seiner dem Buch zugrunde liegenden New Yorker Vorlesung vom 19. Oktober 2009 formulierte Judt die vermeintliche Alternative besonders drastisch:»Statt den Versuch zu unternehmen, eine Sprache des optimistischen Fortschritts zu erneuern, sollten wir anfangen, uns wieder mit unserer jüngeren Geschichte vertraut zu machen.« Nur: Warum eigentlich sollten wir zwischen beidem wählen müssen? Dieser angebliche Gegensatz ist unerklärlich – und kontraproduktiv für das Anliegen der sozialen Demokratie im 21. Jahrhundert. Natürlich ist es richtig, für eine Sozialdemokratie zu kämpfen, die in einer früheren Ära erreichte zivile und soziale Standards verteidigt: Gleichheit, Gerechtigkeit, zivilen Anstand, den Glauben an die Möglichkeit und den Wert gemeinsamer Anstrengung für das gemeine Wohl. In diesem spezifischen Sinn müssen Sozialdemokraten in der Tat »konservativ« sein. Aber wie jeder Fußballer weiß, werden jene Mannschaften regelmäßig für ihre furchtsame Taktik bestraft, die in den ersten zehn Minuten 1:0 in Führung gehen und danach nur noch versuchen, den mageren Vorsprung über die Zeit zu retten. Nicht weniger als im Fußball kommt es in der Politik darauf an, proaktiv zu handeln, das Spiel zu gestalten und an die eigene Fähigkeit zu glauben, weitere Treffer zu erzielen. Anders gesagt: Falls Sozialdemokraten wichtige Ziele vertreten, für die sich zu kämpfen lohnt(was ja der Fall ist), dann müssen sie ihre Ideen heute offensiv 2 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

unter die Menschen bringen, statt in Deckung zu gehen, auf das Beste zu hoffen, aber insgeheim mit dem Schlimmsten zu rechnen. Es ist wahr, in der inzwischen beendeten Ära marktradikaler Hegemonie war die Idee der sozialen Demokratie in die Defensive geraten. Sogar Sozialdemokraten selbst glaubten nicht mehr an ihre Sache, weil sie ihre ganz eigene»Sprache des optimistischen Fortschritts« verloren hatten. Und umgekehrt kam ihnen diese Sprache immer weiter abhanden, weil sie nicht mehr an ihre eigene Sache glaubten. Das eine bedingte das andere – und vice versa. Dieser Teufelskreis muss durchbrochen werden. Denn es besteht heute ja tatsächlich aller Anlass zur Furcht. Der Marktradikalismus zwar mag – jedenfalls als hegemoniales Narrativ – Geschichte sein. Aber die Zerstörung all dessen, was im Zeichen der sozialen Demokratie in den Nachkriegsjahrzehnten erreicht wurde, ist immer noch möglich. Der Klimawandel, endemische Finanz-, Wirtschafts-, Verschuldungs- und Währungskrisen, Bevölkerungswachstum, Energieknappheit, demografische Ungleichgewichte, Massenmigration, Nahrungsmittelknappheit, Terrorismus, Massenvernichtungswaffen, die Verbreitung von Atomwaffen, eine bald zerstreute, bald in Panik verfallende Öffentlichkeit – die Welt ist tatsächlich ein sehr gefährlicher Ort geworden. In solchen Zeiten werden gerade rückwärts gewandte»Parteien der Angst«, zusammengehalten von kaum mehr als der Sehnsucht, die Erosion ihrer früheren Errungenschaften irgendwie zu bremsen, niemals mehr auf die Beine bringen können als letztlich hilflose Sperrminoritäten. Angst lähmt und macht unkreativ. Statt ihr nachzugeben, sollten wir uns wieder selbst davon überzeugen, dass die Idee einer progressiven, zukunftsorientierten sozialen Demokratie, die auch grüne und liberale Ziele einbezieht, im 21. Jahrhundert jedes Potenzial besitzt, Mehrheiten zu überzeugen. Wenn Sozialdemokraten selbst nicht daran glauben, dass sie etwas Wertvolles anzubieten haben, warum sollte ihnen dann irgendjemand folgen? Martin Luther King rief nicht:»Ich habe einen Alptraum.« Und Barack Obama wurde nicht Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten, der es vermochte, einen Krankenversicherungsschutz für Millionen zuvor unversicherter Amerikaner durchzusetzen, indem er über die neoliberale Hegemonie lamentierte. Vielmehr gelang ihm dies, indem er hinreichend viele Menschen davon überzeugte, dass positiver Wandel, Fortschritt und eine bessere Zukunft immer noch möglich sind. Vielleicht, wahrscheinlich sogar, wird es eine bessere Zukunft für alle nicht geben. Das Dilemma des Fortschritts im 21. Jahrhundert liegt klar zutage. In seinem aktuellen Buch»The Politics of Climate Change« bringt Anthony Giddens das Problem auf den Punkt:»Unsere Zivilisation könnte sich selbst zerstören, kein Zweifel. Der Jüngste Tag ist nicht mehr bloß eine religiöse Vorstellung, nicht mehr nur ein Tag der spirituellen Abrechnung, sondern er steht unserer Gesellschaft und unserer Wirtschaft möglicherweise tatsächlich bevor.(…) Kein Wunder, dass viele Menschen Angst haben. ›Lasst uns umkehren‹, sagen sie, ›lasst uns in eine einfachere Welt zurückkehren!‹ Diese Gefühle sind vollständig veripg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 3

ständlich, und in manchen Kontexten besitzen sie auch ganz praktische Bewandtnis. Aber es kann keine ›Rückkehr‹ auf der ganzen Linie geben. Gerade die Ausweitung menschlicher Macht, die unsere großen Probleme verursacht hat, stellt das einzige Mittel dar, diese Probleme zu lösen – mit Wissenschaft und Technologie an der Spitze. Es wird im Jahr 2050 wahrscheinlich neun Milliarden Menschen auf der Erde geben. Danach wird sich die Weltbevölkerung hoffentlich stabilisieren, vor allem dann, wenn die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder bis dahin erheblichen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Fortschritt erleben. Deshalb müssen Mittel gefunden werden, diesen neun Milliarden Menschen ein annehmbares Leben zu ermöglichen.« Die Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts bedarf also ganz dringend des Fortschritts und hellwacher Sozialdemokratien, damit zumindest einige der Probleme gelöst werden können, die vergangener Fortschritt eben auch geschaffen hat. Wir können überhaupt nicht sicher sein, dass uns dies gelingen wird. Was wir aber mit der allergrößten Sicherheit wissen, ist, dass uns Konservatismus, ob in sozialdemokratischer oder sonstiger Spielart, auf gar keinen Fall retten wird. Möglicherweise sind wir selbst dann zum Scheitern verurteilt, wenn wir uns für mehr und – hoffentlich – besseren Fortschritt entscheiden. Auf jeden Fall aber sind wir zum Scheitern verurteilt, wenn wir prinzipiell gegen die regulative Idee des Fortschritts optieren. Wie sogar Tony Judt selbst einräumt:»Die Vergangenheit ist tatsächlich ein anderes Land: Wir können nicht in sie zurückkehren.« Das heißt nun keineswegs, dass Sozialdemokraten und andere Progressive nichts mehr aus der Geschichte zu lernen hätten. Ganz im Gegenteil! Unser Erfolg bei der Bewältigung dieses Jahrhunderts wird nicht zuletzt davon abhängen, ob hinreichend viele Menschen in den westlichen Gesellschaften die Kostbarkeit, die schiere Unwahrscheinlichkeit und die Zerbrechlichkeit der sozialen und freiheitlich-demokratischen Nachkriegsordnung begreifen. Zu Recht warnt uns Judt davor, nur ja nichts davon für selbstverständlich zu halten: »Wenn wir eine bessere Zukunft bauen wollen, dann müssen wir ein tieferes Verständnis dafür entwickeln, wie plötzlich selbst festgefügte freiheitliche Demokratien zugrunde gehen können.« Tony Judt verdient große Anerkennung dafür, dass er diese Botschaft bis zu seinem Tod glasklar und unerbittlich vertreten hat.»Die Sozialdemokratie steht nicht für eine ideale Zukunft«, schreibt er,»sie steht nicht einmal für eine ideale Vergangenheit. Aber unter den Optionen, die uns gegenwärtig offenstehen, ist die sozialdemokratische besser als jede andere.« Deshalb wird die soziale Demokratie im 21. Jahrhundert unentbehrlich bleiben – aber nicht als jener defensive Ersatz-Konservatismus, den Tony Judt selbst im Auge hatte, sondern als das optimistische, fortschrittliche und zugleich nüchterne politische Bekenntnis, das unser gefährliches Zeitalter so dringend braucht. Ob die Sozialdemokratie diese Aufgabe überhaupt schultern will und kann – das sind die Fragen, über die, inspiriert durch Tony Judts Buch, derzeit an vielen 4 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

Stellen in Europa intensiv diskutiert wird – etwa in der Berliner Republik, in der Neuen Gesellschaft oder auf der Website der niederländischen Wiardi Beckman Stichting . In Holland lag Judts Buch bereits kurz nach Erscheinen des Originals, ins Niederländische übersetzt, in allen Buchhandlungen. Dass sich Judts behäbiger deutscher Verlag in den Monaten bis zum Tod seines langjährigen Autors nicht im Stande sah, eine deutschsprachige Fassung von»Ill Fares the Land« auch nur anzukündigen, ist ebenso unverständlich wie unverzeihlich. Tobias Dürr; Chefredakteur der»Berliner Republik«; Vorsitzender und Initiator des Progressiven Zentrums, Berlin Stehen wir vor der Rückkehr der Tugend der Gleichheit in die Politik? RICHARD WILKINSON/ KATE PICKETT: Gleichheit ist Glück – Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind Berlin 2009 Haffmans& Tolkemitt(bei Zweitausendundeins), 320 S. T raue keiner Statistik, die du nicht selbst gefälscht hast«, fasste der britische Staatsmann und Schriftsteller Winston Churchill(1874–1965) einmal seine Erfahrungen mit aufbereiteten Zahlen zusammen. Sie lassen sich auf vielfältige Weise interpretieren: Jeder in Deutschland, der im Fernsehen nach Bundes- und wichtigen Landtagswahlen der Runde der Generalsekretäre gelauscht hat, weiß: Zumeist hat jede Partei gewonnen. Zahlen sind geduldig, sagt man: Oft kann man schlechte Statistiken verbergen und verschleiern oder Ergebnisse schönen, wie jüngste Beispiele aus dem Kreis der Mitgliedsländer der Eurozone mit erheblichen Folgewirkungen gezeigt haben. Andere Zahlen lassen einen dennoch aufschrecken: Im Juni dieses Jahres publizierte das Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung eine neue Studie zur Einkommensverteilung in Deutschland. Die Einkommensgegensätze zwischen ärmeren und reicheren Haushalten vergrößern sich, die Mittelschicht schrumpft. Die Gesellschaft driftet auseinander in eine kleine wohlhabende und eine breite arme Schicht. Der Trend zur Einkommenspolarisierung ist mitnichten nur ein deutsches Phänomen. Die britischen Sozialwissenschaftler Kate Pickett und Richard Wilkinson nehmen in ihrem Buch»Gleichheit ist Glück. Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind« die gesamtgesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen einer solchen Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich in den Blick. Wie kommt es, dass die Gesellschaften reicher Industrieländer so wohlhabend leben wie noch nie zuvor, aber dennoch so große soziale Probleme haben? Die usa zum Beispiel haben das höchste Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und gleichzeitig die ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 5

Is Equality Set to Return as a Political Good? RICHARD WILKINSON/ KATE PICKETT: The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better London 2009 Allen Lane, 352 pp. (Translated from the English by Edgar Peinelt and Klaus Binder as»Gleichheit ist Glück – Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind,« Berlin 2009) W inston Churchill(1874–1965) once summed up his experience with processed data as follows:»The only statistics you can trust are those you falsified yourself.« This can be interpreted in a number of ways: anyone listening to the party secretaries discussing the results on television after national and important regional elections in Germany would generally get the impression that every party had won. Numbers are patient, it is said. Bad statistics can often be hidden or disguised and results can be»sexed up,« as illustrated recently by Eurozone member states, with dire consequences. Other sets of figures can be startling, however: in June 2010 the German Institute for Economic Research published a new study on income distribution in Germany. Income differentials between poorer and richer households are increasing and the middle class is shrinking. Society is drifting apart into a small and prosperous stratum and a broad and poor one. But the trend of income polarization is by no means merely a German phenomenon. In their book»The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better,« British social scientists Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson examine the consequences for society as a whole of this development, also taking into consideration the international dimension. How is it that the societies of rich industrialized countries are more prosperous than ever before but suffer from such profound social problems? The usa , for example, has the highest per capita income but, at the same time, the highest homicide rate of the western industrialized countries. The authors think they have the answer: income and prosperity are not distributed equally. Once a certain level of social product has been reached, the more fairly income and prosperity are distributed, the healthier, happier, and more successful a society is. Bu the consequences of unequal distribution are not borne solely by the poorer strata of the population. The well-to-do also feel the effects of a socially unequal society to a greater extent than previously thought. To take one example: in the usa the top 20 percent of the population have seven and a half to eight times as much money at their disposal as the bottom 20 percent – in Norway, by contrast, it is only around four times as much, despite broadly similar living standards. By comparison, Norway comes off much better in every area than the usa . A child born in Norway is healthier, generally does better at school, has ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 239

a longer life expectancy, and has less risk of becoming a victim of crime. This applies to all strata of the population. In the course of research over several years the authors accumulated extensive statistical materials and compared income distribution mainly in the western industrialized countries. Germany is still in the upper third of generally more socially equal countries. The authors then linked this country index with data on social issues: trust, mental illness, addiction(which the authors link to mental illness), life expectancy and infant mortality, obesity, how well children do in school, teenage pregnancy, suicide, size of prison population, and social mobility. The data used in these researches come from the official surveys conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development( oecd ), the un , and the World Health Organization( who ), generating a comparable and robust database. The book’s Appendix is also very useful, added to the English paperback second edition(which also has a new subtitle:»Why Equality Is Better for Everyone«): it contains an explanation of where the data come from and the statistical approach taken. This makes the graphs easier to read and more comprehensible – one of the main criticisms leveled by conservative critics especially, who have attacked the imputed statistical evidence and claimed correlations in particular. The authors are particularly adept in the detailed analysis of social malfunctioning and the chapter on mental illness, life expectancy, and obesity is convincing. It seems perfectly logical that higher pressure of competition and»fear of falling« in more unequal societies should lead to more mental illness. Other derivations remain vague and ambiguous, however: in the chapter on suicide, for example, the authors assert – in contrast to their previous findings – that the suicide rate in less equal societies is lower than in societies in which income is more evenly distributed. Their explanation for this is that depressed people in egalitarian societies tend to direct their violence towards themselves. In more unequal societies, in contrast, depression tends to find external expression in the form of more violent crime and higher murder rates. This postulated connection between suicide rate and violent crime is not persuasive. Similarly, the connection between equality and global warming and resource scarcity also seems rather forced. It is wiser to stick more closely to the empirical findings. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the book has met with a strong response, depending on political standpoint. What, for example, Polly Toynbee of the leftliberal Guardian newspaper praises as pioneering research(Toynbee 2009) is regarded by those on the right as fraught with contradictions. Christopher Snowdon entitled his critique»The Spirit Level Delusion. FactChecking the Left’s New Theory of Everything«(Snowdon 2010) and found fault with the fact that some countries had not been included in the data comparison and that much of the book refers solely to the northern European model countries. Snowden considers himself an independent journalist, but has ties to the Democracy Institute(with headquarters in London and Washington), a think 240 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

tank which can be identified, through its leadership, funding, and advisory committee, as an appendage of the Cato Institute – the traditional neoliberal»talent foundry« in the usa . Otherwise, his main claim to fame is his ideological-critical reappraisal of the anti-smoking movement. Peter Saunders is from Policy Exchange, one of the most respected British think tanks, with close links to the Conservative Party. It is plain from the very cover of his study –»Beware False Prophets« – what he thinks of the line of argument he is criticizing: it depicts a shell game, the implication being that skillful manipulation makes it possible to achieve a desired(false) result(Saunders 2010). In almost as much detail as the original Saunders puts most of Wilkinson and Pickett’s tables and figures under the microscope and re-interprets them within the framework of his own paradigm: what counts is not fairness and distribution, but primarily social product per capita – in other words, growth, not equality. British sociologist Daniel Dorling, in his book»Injustice. Why Social Inequality Persists,« tries to uncover the deep-lying structures and thought patterns in our capitalist societies and political cultures which ensure that inequality is constantly reproduced and predominantly approved in public discourse as justified and beneficial for all(Dorling 2010). Under the aegis of a difference – and so also inequality – which is part of the nature of things an elite constantly seeks to legitimize itself as inevitable and convinces itself and mainstream public opinion that it has to take the reins of the economy and politics in its hands for the good of all, regretfully accepting that the exclusion of some segments of society is unavoidable. In parallel with the critique of neoliberal global financial capitalism in the wake of the bank crises of the past two years, appeal to the idea underlying the book»The Spirit Level« could now bring the long-spurned»good« of equality back into the political debate. In their passionate closing chapter Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson venture out of the world of statistics into the political realm to offer a number of proposals concerning what changes need to be made: their prescriptions range from redistributive taxation, through restrictions on excessive wages at the top, to the closing of tax loopholes. The authors have also set up a foundation, the Equality Trust, 1 whose goal is the public dissemination of the results of their work and their political implementation. To return to Churchill for a moment: at some points, in pursuit of the statistical evidence and the correlation between inequality and living standards they are looking for the authors get somewhat carried away, as a result of which the book here and there fails to convince. Inequality cannot be the reason for all ills and problems. But the book does show that it is with more equality and not with reference to the level of average income –»a rising tide lifts all boats« – that the 1. www.equalitytrust.org.uk – a response in particular to the critique by Policy Exchange may also be found on the website. ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 241

life circumstances of all parts of the population improve. This calls for a veritable paradigm change. Statistical juggling or not, in pursuit of the right policies to open up people’s life chances social democracy has also long overestimated the importance of markets, within the framework of which the issue of distribution is downgraded and the close connection between equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes ignored. Under the aegis of economization and consolidation programs in the wake of the financial and economic crisis(social democratic) governments have limited room to maneuver. Equality of opportunity under the aegis of fairer distribution, however, requires in particular intact welfare states and a decent level of public services, and both these things are in jeopardy. Liana Fix and Gero Maass; Liana Fix is Program Officer at the Körber-Foundation, Berlin; Gero Maass is head of the International Policy Analysis unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin Bibliography Dorling, Daniel(2010): Injustice. Why Social Inequality Persists . Bristol: Policy Press. Saunders, Peter, with Natalie Evans(2010): Beware False Prophets. Equality, the Good Society and»The Spirit Level .« London: Policy Exchange. Available at: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Beware_False_ Prophets_Jul_10.pdf. Snowdon, Christopher(2010): The Spirit Level Delusion. Fact-checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything; Little Dice. Toynbee, Polly(2009):»Revenge for Past Failings Is a Luxury the Poor Can’t Afford,« in The Guardian (December 4). FRANZ WALTER: Vorwärts oder Abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie Berlin 2010 Suhrkamp, 142 pp. I ndividual accounts of the problems of European social democracy and the various parties and organizations which make it up are available in abundance. High time, therefore, for a synopsis, an analytical overview, a positioning of current processes within the framework of longer-term political and ideological contexts and lines of development. With»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?,« Franz 242 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

Stellen in Europa intensiv diskutiert wird – etwa in der Berliner Republik, in der Neuen Gesellschaft oder auf der Website der niederländischen Wiardi Beckman Stichting . In Holland lag Judts Buch bereits kurz nach Erscheinen des Originals, ins Niederländische übersetzt, in allen Buchhandlungen. Dass sich Judts behäbiger deutscher Verlag in den Monaten bis zum Tod seines langjährigen Autors nicht im Stande sah, eine deutschsprachige Fassung von»Ill Fares the Land« auch nur anzukündigen, ist ebenso unverständlich wie unverzeihlich. Tobias Dürr; Chefredakteur der»Berliner Republik«; Vorsitzender und Initiator des Progressiven Zentrums, Berlin Stehen wir vor der Rückkehr der Tugend der Gleichheit in die Politik? RICHARD WILKINSON/ KATE PICKETT: Gleichheit ist Glück – Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind Berlin 2009 Haffmans& Tolkemitt(bei Zweitausendundeins), 320 S. T raue keiner Statistik, die du nicht selbst gefälscht hast«, fasste der britische Staatsmann und Schriftsteller Winston Churchill(1874–1965) einmal seine Erfahrungen mit aufbereiteten Zahlen zusammen. Sie lassen sich auf vielfältige Weise interpretieren: Jeder in Deutschland, der im Fernsehen nach Bundes- und wichtigen Landtagswahlen der Runde der Generalsekretäre gelauscht hat, weiß: Zumeist hat jede Partei gewonnen. Zahlen sind geduldig, sagt man: Oft kann man schlechte Statistiken verbergen und verschleiern oder Ergebnisse schönen, wie jüngste Beispiele aus dem Kreis der Mitgliedsländer der Eurozone mit erheblichen Folgewirkungen gezeigt haben. Andere Zahlen lassen einen dennoch aufschrecken: Im Juni dieses Jahres publizierte das Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung eine neue Studie zur Einkommensverteilung in Deutschland. Die Einkommensgegensätze zwischen ärmeren und reicheren Haushalten vergrößern sich, die Mittelschicht schrumpft. Die Gesellschaft driftet auseinander in eine kleine wohlhabende und eine breite arme Schicht. Der Trend zur Einkommenspolarisierung ist mitnichten nur ein deutsches Phänomen. Die britischen Sozialwissenschaftler Kate Pickett und Richard Wilkinson nehmen in ihrem Buch»Gleichheit ist Glück. Warum gerechte Gesellschaften für alle besser sind« die gesamtgesellschaftlichen Konsequenzen einer solchen Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich in den Blick. Wie kommt es, dass die Gesellschaften reicher Industrieländer so wohlhabend leben wie noch nie zuvor, aber dennoch so große soziale Probleme haben? Die usa zum Beispiel haben das höchste Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und gleichzeitig die ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 5

höchste Mordrate der westlichen Industrieländer. Die Antwort der Autoren: Weil Einkommen und Wohlstand nicht gleich verteilt sind. Ab einer gewissen Höhe des Sozialprodukts gelte: Je gerechter die Einkommens- und Wohlstandverteilung, desto gesünder, glücklicher und erfolgreicher sei eine Gesellschaft. Die Konsequenzen einer ungleichen Verteilung gingen zudem nicht nur zu Lasten der ärmeren Teile der Bevölkerung. Auch die Wohlhabenden bekommen die Folgewirkungen einer sozial ungleichen Gesellschaft deutlicher zu spüren, als bisher gedacht. Ein Beispiel: In den usa haben die oberen 20 Prozent der Bevölkerung siebeneinhalb bis achtmal so viel Geld zur Verfügung wie die unteren 20 Prozent – in Norwegen hingegen nur etwa viermal so viel, trotz durchschnittlich ähnlichen Wohlstandes beider Länder. Im Vergleich zeigt sich: Norwegen schneidet in allen Bereichen besser ab als die usa . Ein Kind, das in Norwegen geboren ist, lebt gesünder, hat einen tendenziell besseren Bildungsabschluss, eine höhere Lebenserwartung und ein geringeres Risiko, Opfer einer kriminellen Straftat zu werden. Dies gilt für alle Bevölkerungsschichten. In mehrjähriger Recherche haben die beiden Autoren umfassendes statistisches Material zusammengetragen und die Einkommensverteilung in den vorwiegend westlichen Industrieländern miteinander verglichen. Deutschland liegt dabei noch im oberen Drittel der tendenziell sozial gleicheren Länder. Dieser Länderindex wird nun verknüpft mit Datenmaterial zu gesellschaftlichen Fragestellungen: Vertrauen, psychische Erkrankungen und Sucht, Lebenserwartung und Säuglingssterblichkeit, Fettleibigkeit, schulische Leistungen der Kinder, Teenager-Schwangerschaften, Selbstmorde, Zahl der Gefängnisstrafen und soziale Mobilität. Die Zahlen zu diesen Untersuchungen stammen aus offiziellen Erhebungen der Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ( oecd /Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung), der uno und der World Health Organization( who /Weltgesundheitsorganisation), um eine vergleichbare und solide Datenbasis zu schaffen. Sehr nützlich ist auch der Anhang des Buches, der in der englischen Auflage erst im Nachhinein eingefügt wurde: Dort werden die Herkunft des Datenmaterials sowie die Funktionsweise der Statistiken erklärt. Dies macht die Diagramme für den Leser transparenter und nachvollziehbarer – ein Hauptkritikpunkt vor allem der konservativen Kritiker, die insbesondere die unterstellte statistische Evidenz und Korrelation aufs Korn nehmen. Bei der Einzelanalyse der gesellschaftlichen Fehlfunktionen sind den Autoren besonders gut und überzeugend die Kapitel zu psychischen Erkrankungen, Lebenserwartung und Fettleibigkeit gelungen. Es erscheint logisch, dass erhöhter Konkurrenzdruck und Abstiegsangst in ungleicheren Gesellschaften zu mehr psychischen Krankheiten führen. Andere Ableitungen bleiben eher vage und unklar: Im Kapitel zum Suizid zum Beispiel stellen die Autoren fest – im Gegensatz zu ihren bisherigen Erkenntnissen –, dass die Suizidrate in tendenziell ungleicheren Gesellschaften niedriger 6 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

ist als in Gesellschaften, in denen das Einkommen gleichmäßiger verteilt ist. Als Erklärung hierfür schlagen sie vor, dass depressive Menschen in egalitären Gesellschaften tendenziell eher Gewalt gegen sich selbst anwenden. In ungleicheren Gesellschaften hingegen träte eine Depression eher nach außen in Form von mehr Gewaltstraftaten und höheren Mordraten in Erscheinung. Dieser postulierte Zusammenhang zwischen Selbstmordrate und Gewaltstraftaten überzeugt nicht. Ebenso wirkt der Zusammenhang von Gleichheit und Erderwärmung sowie Ressourcenknappheit konstruiert. Besser wäre es hier, näher an den empirischen Ergebnissen zu bleiben. Im angelsächsischen Raum hat die Studie je nach politischem Standort für starke Resonanz gesorgt. Was Polly Toynbee vom links-liberalen Guardian als bahnbrechende Forschungen lobt(Toynbee 2009), sorgt auf der anderen politischen Seite für erheblichen Widerspruch. Christopher Snowdon betitelte seine Kritik mit»The Spirit Level Delusion. Fact-Checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything«(Snowdon 2010) und bemängelte, dass einige Länder im Datenvergleich keine Berücksichtigung gefunden hätten und sich vieles allein auf die nordeuropäischen Modellländer beziehen ließe. Snowdon sieht sich als unabhängiger Journalist mit Beziehungen zum Institute for Democracy(mit Sitz in London und Washington) – ein Think Tank, der sich über Leitung, Finanzierung und Beirat leicht als Anhängsel des Cato Institute ausmachen lässt, der traditionellen neoliberalen Kaderschmiede vor allem der usa . Publizistisch hervorgetan hat er sich ansonsten bislang mit einer ideologiekritischen Aufarbeitung der Nichtraucherbewegung. Peter Saunders und Natalie Evans kommen vom Policy Exchange, einer der angesehensten britischen Denkfabriken – mit sehr hoher Anschlussfähigkeit zur konservativen Partei der Insel. Schon das Titelblatt ihrer Studie ordnet die kritisierten Argumentationslinien provokativ ein: ein Hütchenspiel – mit geschicktem Drehen und Wenden der drei Hütchen lässt sich ein gewünschtes (falsches) Ergebnis schon erzielen(Saunders, Evans 2010). Fast ebenso ausführlich wie das Original nehmen die Autoren in ihrer Erwiderungsschrift die meisten der von Wilkinson und Pickett präsentierten Schaubilder und Tabellen unter die Lupe und interpretieren sie unter ihrem Paradigma neu: Was zählt, sei nicht Gerechtigkeit und Verteilung, sondern in erster Linie das Sozialprodukt pro Kopf, also Wachstum statt Gleichheit. Der britische Soziologe Daniel Dorling versucht in seinem Buch»Injustice. Why Social Inequality Persists« den tiefsitzenden Strukturen und Denkmustern in unseren kapitalistischen Gesellschaften und politischen Kulturen nachzuspüren, die dafür sorgen, dass sich Ungleichheit immer aufs neue reproduziert und im führenden öffentlichen Diskurs als richtig und vorteilhaft für alle gutgeheißen wird(Dorling 2010). Im Zeichen ewiger Unterschiedlichkeit(und damit auch Ungleichheit) legitimiere sich eine Elite ständig als unvermeidlich neu und überzeuge sich selbst und den formierten öffentlichen Meinungsmainstream ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 7

davon, dass sie die Fäden von Wirtschaft und Politik zum Wohle aller(unter Inkaufnahme der leider nicht vermeidbaren Exklusion einiger Gesellschaftsteile) in die Hände nehmen müsse. Parallel zur Kritik am neoliberalen globalen Finanzkapitalismus im Zuge der Bankenkrisen der letzten beiden Jahre könnte mit Spirit Level nun die lang verschmähte Tugend der Gleichheit wieder ihren Weg zurück in die politische Debatte finden. In ihrem mit Verve geschriebenen Schlusskapitel bleiben Kate Pickett und Richard Wilkinson nicht nur in der Welt der Zahlen, sondern wagen sich hinaus in die Politik, mit konkreten Vorschlägen, welche Änderungen nötig seien: Von Steuerumverteilung über die Einschränkung überzogener Spitzenlöhne bis zur Schließung von Schlupflöchern im Steuersystem reicht die Bandbreite ihrer Rezepte. Zudem haben die Autoren eine Stiftung gegründet, The Equality Trust, deren Ziel es ist, die Ergebnisse ihrer Arbeit in die Öffentlichkeit zu tragen und in die Politik zu implementieren. 1 Kurz zurück zu Churchill: An einigen Punkten mag die angestrebte statische Evidenz und Korrelation zwischen Ungleichheit und Lebensstandards mit den Autoren durchgehen, wodurch das Buch hier und da an Überzeugungskraft einbüßt. Ungleichheit kann nicht der Grund für alle Übel und Probleme sein. Aber das Buch zeigt, dass mit mehr Gleichheit und nicht durch Verweis auf die Höhe des Durchschnittseinkommens die statistische Wahrscheinlichkeit wächst, dass sich die Lebenslagen aller Bevölkerungsteile verbessern. Und dies bedeutet in der Tat einen Paradigmenwechsel, schließlich galt bisher eher der Spruch»a rising tide lifts all boats«. Zahlenakrobatik hin oder her – bei der Suche nach der richtigen Politik zur Eröffnung von Lebenschancen hat auch die Sozialdemokratie lange die Bedeutung der Märkte überschätzt, die der Verteilungsfrage unterschätzt und den engen Zusammenhang zwischen Chancengleichheit und Ergebnisgleichheit zu übersehen versucht. Im Zeichen von Spar- und Konsolidierungsprogrammen im Zuge von Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise stehen(sozialdemokratische) Regierungen indes vor limitierten Handlungsspielräumen. Chancengleichheit im Zeichen gerechterer Verteilung transportiert sich jedoch insbesondere über intakte Wohlfahrtsstaaten und ein adäquates Angebot öffentlicher Dienstleistungen – beide drohen auszubluten. Liana Fix und Gero Maaß; Liana Fix ist Mitarbeiterin der Körber-Stiftung, Berlin; Gero Maass ist Leiter des Referats Internationale Politikanalyse, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 1. www.equalitytrust.org.uk – dort findet sich auch eine Erwiderung vor allem auf die Kritik von Policy Exchange. 8 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

Literaturverzeichnis Dorling, Daniel(2010): Injustice. Why Social Inequality Persists. Bristol: Policy Press. Saunders, Peter und Natalie Evans(2010): Beware False Prophets. Equality, the Good Society and»The Spirit Level «. London: Policy Exchange. Online verfügbar: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Beware_ False_Prophets_Jul_10.pdf. Snowdon, Christopher(2010): The Spirit Level Delusion. Fact-checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything; Little Dice. Toynbee, Polly(2009):»Revenge for Past Failings Is a Luxury the Poor Can’t Afford«, in The Guardian (4. Dezember). FRANZ WALTER: Vorwärts oder Abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie Berlin 2010 Suhrkamp, 142 S. E inzeldarstellungen zu den Problemen der europäischen Sozialdemokratie und der verschiedenen Parteien und Organisationen, die sie ausmachen, gibt es mittlerweile genügend. Höchste Zeit also für eine Synopse, eine analytische Gesamtschau, eine Verortung der gegenwärtigen Prozesse in längeren politischen und ideologischen Zusammenhängen und Linien. Franz Walter hat mit»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« genau dies geleistet. Wenn die Darstellung auch ein gewisses Schwergewicht auf die spd und ihre Veränderungen in den letzten Jahren und Jahrzehnten legt, so gibt sie dennoch auch einen sehr viel breiteren Überblick, indem sie die Entwicklungen außerhalb Deutschlands, insbesondere die in Großbritannien, Frankreich, den Niederlanden und Skandinavien ebenfalls berücksichtigt. Dieser breite Ansatz erlaubt es, die Gefahr einer zu großen Personifikation der aktuellen Probleme der europäischen Sozialdemokratie zu vermeiden. Zwar räumt Walter den persönlichen Charakteristika gerade der deutschen Spitzensozialdemokratie einen relativ großen Raum ein. Aber er stellt diese Aspekte immer in den Kontext breiterer Entwicklungen. Der Niedergang der Sozialdemokratie, so Walter, habe im Grunde bereits Anfang der 1970er Jahre begonnen, als der Nachkriegskeynesianismus an seine Grenzen kam. Diese Einschätzung ist an sich nichts Neues. Wo sich andere Autoren mit dem Argument des»schieren Sachzwanges« zufrieden geben, schildert Walter die politischen und ideologischen Entwicklungen dieser Zeit und den Triumph des»neuliberalen« Denkens als eine Schlacht der Ideen, einen von Interessen getriebenen»Ideologiekampf«, den die traditionelle Linke schlicht verlor. Am Ende dieser Entwickipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 9

life circumstances of all parts of the population improve. This calls for a veritable paradigm change. Statistical juggling or not, in pursuit of the right policies to open up people’s life chances social democracy has also long overestimated the importance of markets, within the framework of which the issue of distribution is downgraded and the close connection between equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes ignored. Under the aegis of economization and consolidation programs in the wake of the financial and economic crisis(social democratic) governments have limited room to maneuver. Equality of opportunity under the aegis of fairer distribution, however, requires in particular intact welfare states and a decent level of public services, and both these things are in jeopardy. Liana Fix and Gero Maass; Liana Fix is Program Officer at the Körber-Foundation, Berlin; Gero Maass is head of the International Policy Analysis unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin Bibliography Dorling, Daniel(2010): Injustice. Why Social Inequality Persists . Bristol: Policy Press. Saunders, Peter, with Natalie Evans(2010): Beware False Prophets. Equality, the Good Society and»The Spirit Level .« London: Policy Exchange. Available at: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Beware_False_ Prophets_Jul_10.pdf. Snowdon, Christopher(2010): The Spirit Level Delusion. Fact-checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything; Little Dice. Toynbee, Polly(2009):»Revenge for Past Failings Is a Luxury the Poor Can’t Afford,« in The Guardian (December 4). FRANZ WALTER: Vorwärts oder Abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie Berlin 2010 Suhrkamp, 142 pp. I ndividual accounts of the problems of European social democracy and the various parties and organizations which make it up are available in abundance. High time, therefore, for a synopsis, an analytical overview, a positioning of current processes within the framework of longer-term political and ideological contexts and lines of development. With»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?,« Franz 242 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

Walter provides precisely this. While there is a certain emphasis on the spd and the changes it has undergone in recent years and decades the book’s perspective is at the same time much broader, taking in developments outside Germany, in particular in France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the uk . This broad-based approach makes it possible to avoid the danger of excessive personification of the current problems of European social democracy. Although Walter goes into a fair amount of personal detail especially concerning leading German social democrats, he puts this in the context of broader developments. The decline of social democracy, according to Walter, basically began in the early 1970s when post-war Keynesianism reached its limits. This assessment is not new as such. But where other authors have been content with arguing on the basis of»sheer force of circumstances« – in other words, bowing to necessity and adapting to the prevailing conditions – Walter depicts the political and ideological developments of this period and the triumph of»new liberal«(»neuliberal«) thought as a battle of ideas, an interest-driven»ideological struggle« which the traditional left simply lost. It was at the end of this course of development that social democrats adapted themselves to the»Zeitgeist« and the prolonged dominance of liberal thought, in its neoliberal, but also eco-liberal forms. The subsequent flirtation with the Third Way, which turned out to be a blind alley, ultimately did massive and lasting damage to social democracy’s basis of trust among its traditional constituencies – and finally led to the debacle of the Bundestag elections of 2009. An extensive chapter on the situation in Europe shows that the German experience in this regard was not unique. In his analyses of the crisis of social democracy Franz Walter has always strongly emphasized the inclusion of developments in terms of social background and organizational sociology. A chapter is also dedicated to this in»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?,« in which the author describes the dissolution of the traditional social democratic milieu, the disconnection of parties and organizations from the social context of the classic working classes and the capture of the party apparatus and positions by a generation of careerists who have little empathy with those losing out as a result of modernization. Anyone wishing to understand developments in Germany, but also in the uk in recent years must not underestimate this factor, as many authors have done. As a consequence of this slippage of the sociological anchor, social democratic parties can be characterized less and less as workers’ parties. Instead, according to Walter, these parties are increasingly becoming parties of the public sector, whose foothold in Europe’s problem and crisis locales is now fairly tenuous. In the description of the»defective party,« the spd , what stands out is how much Franz Walter focuses his analysis on the socio-economic and sociological aspects. Presumably – although the reviewer does not feel competent to judge – this is perfectly proper for an understanding of the problems of the spd . In this respect, however, Walter differs from some other authors who, in recent years, ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 243

have tried to explain the current problems facing European social democracy. Hanspeter Kriesi and his co-authors; René Cuperus, who is repeatedly cited by Walter; and also Patrick Diamond and Roger Liddle stress much more emphatically than Walter the significance of socio-cultural factors – adaptation to a »cosmopolitan« elite ideology, the effects of immigration processes and the fetishization of multiculturalism and universalism – for the problems of European social democracy and its separation from parts of its erstwhile proletarian electorate. It would have been fascinating to see how the shrewd and extremely knowledgeable Walter assesses these aspects. In the final chapter, Walter addresses the prospects for social democracy in Europe. His conclusion is not optimistic. Given the structural shortcomings of European social democracy, the enormous loss of trust over recent years, and the deep-lying alienation of strategic constituencies it is far from certain that social democracy will ever be able to re-establish its hegemony. Instead, the specter of an upsurge in right-wing populism looms – the»negative mobilization« of those disaffected with democracy. To sum up,»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« is a book which has no equivalent in either Germany or the rest of Europe: no other author has so far managed to summarize the variety of crisis symptoms from which European social democracy is suffering in similar depth. The variety of sources from different European countries is impressive. Precisely because it denies the reader a happy end the book is simply required reading for all those interested in the future of social democracy. Ernst Hillebrand, Head of the Department of Central and Eastern Europe of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin Left-wing Ways: Reconnoitering Political Topography FRANZISKA DROHSEL(ed.): Was ist heute Links? Thesen für eine Politik der Zukunft Frankfurt 2009 Campus, 250 pp. SIGMAR GABRIEL: Links neu denken. Politik für die Mehrheit Munich 2008 Piper, 379 pp. T he spd ’s election defeat on September 27, 2009 can be described with some justification as a watershed in the history of Germany’s oldest political party. 244 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

Literaturverzeichnis Dorling, Daniel(2010): Injustice. Why Social Inequality Persists. Bristol: Policy Press. Saunders, Peter und Natalie Evans(2010): Beware False Prophets. Equality, the Good Society and»The Spirit Level «. London: Policy Exchange. Online verfügbar: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Beware_ False_Prophets_Jul_10.pdf. Snowdon, Christopher(2010): The Spirit Level Delusion. Fact-checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything; Little Dice. Toynbee, Polly(2009):»Revenge for Past Failings Is a Luxury the Poor Can’t Afford«, in The Guardian (4. Dezember). FRANZ WALTER: Vorwärts oder Abwärts? Zur Transformation der Sozialdemokratie Berlin 2010 Suhrkamp, 142 S. E inzeldarstellungen zu den Problemen der europäischen Sozialdemokratie und der verschiedenen Parteien und Organisationen, die sie ausmachen, gibt es mittlerweile genügend. Höchste Zeit also für eine Synopse, eine analytische Gesamtschau, eine Verortung der gegenwärtigen Prozesse in längeren politischen und ideologischen Zusammenhängen und Linien. Franz Walter hat mit»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« genau dies geleistet. Wenn die Darstellung auch ein gewisses Schwergewicht auf die spd und ihre Veränderungen in den letzten Jahren und Jahrzehnten legt, so gibt sie dennoch auch einen sehr viel breiteren Überblick, indem sie die Entwicklungen außerhalb Deutschlands, insbesondere die in Großbritannien, Frankreich, den Niederlanden und Skandinavien ebenfalls berücksichtigt. Dieser breite Ansatz erlaubt es, die Gefahr einer zu großen Personifikation der aktuellen Probleme der europäischen Sozialdemokratie zu vermeiden. Zwar räumt Walter den persönlichen Charakteristika gerade der deutschen Spitzensozialdemokratie einen relativ großen Raum ein. Aber er stellt diese Aspekte immer in den Kontext breiterer Entwicklungen. Der Niedergang der Sozialdemokratie, so Walter, habe im Grunde bereits Anfang der 1970er Jahre begonnen, als der Nachkriegskeynesianismus an seine Grenzen kam. Diese Einschätzung ist an sich nichts Neues. Wo sich andere Autoren mit dem Argument des»schieren Sachzwanges« zufrieden geben, schildert Walter die politischen und ideologischen Entwicklungen dieser Zeit und den Triumph des»neuliberalen« Denkens als eine Schlacht der Ideen, einen von Interessen getriebenen»Ideologiekampf«, den die traditionelle Linke schlicht verlor. Am Ende dieser Entwickipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 9

lung stand eine Anpassung der Sozialdemokratie an den herrschenden Zeitgeist und die langanhaltende Dominanz liberalen Denkens – in seiner neo-, aber auch ökoliberalen Spielart. Die daraus folgende Flucht in die»Sackgasse des Dritten Weges« beschädigte in letzter Konsequenz die Vertrauensbasis in den traditionellen Wählermilieus der Sozialdemokratie massiv und anhaltend – und führte schlussendlich zu den bitteren Bundestagswahlergebnissen des Jahres 2009. Ein umfangreiches Kapitel zur Entwicklung in Europa zeigt, dass die Entwicklung außerhalb Deutschlands ähnlich verlief. Franz Walter hat bei seiner Analyse der Krise der Sozialdemokratie immer starkes Gewicht auf die Einbeziehung der milieu- und organisationssoziologischen Entwicklungen gelegt. Dieser Frage ist auch in»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« ein eigenes Kapitel gewidmet: Der Autor schildert dort die Auflösung des traditionellen sozialdemokratischen Milieus, die Entbettung der Parteien und Organisationen aus dem sozialen Kontext klassischer Arbeitermilieus und die Übernahme der Parteiapparate und-funktionen durch eine Generation von Aufsteigern, die mit den absteigenden Modernisierungsverlierern nichts mehr zu tun haben wollte. Will man die Entwicklung in Deutschland, aber auch in Großbritannien in den letzten Jahren verstehen, so darf dieser Aspekt nicht, wie es viele anderen Autoren tun, unterschätzt werden. Diese Milieuentbettung hat zur Konsequenz, dass die sozialdemokratischen Parteien heutzutage immer weniger Arbeiterparteien sind. Vielmehr, so Walter, entwickeln sich die Parteien immer stärker hin zu Parteien des öffentlichen Dienstes, deren Verankerung in den Problem- und Krisenvierteln dieses Kontinents nur noch marginal ist. Bei der Schilderung der»defekten Partei« spd fällt besonders auf, wie sehr Franz Walter seine Analyse auf sozioökonomische und soziologische Aspekte fokussiert. Vermutlich – der Rezensent fühlt sich hier nicht hinreichend sachkundig – ist dies für das Verständnis der Probleme der spd auch völlig richtig. Damit unterscheidet sich Walter aber von einigen anderen Autoren, die in den letzten Jahren versucht haben, die aktuellen Probleme der europäischen Sozialdemokratie zu erklären. Hanspeter Kriesi und seine Co-Autoren, der von Franz Walter immer wieder zitierte René Cuperus oder auch Patrick Diamond und Roger Liddle, betonen sehr viel stärker als Walter die Bedeutung soziokultureller Faktoren – die Anpassung an eine»kosmopolitische« Elitenideologie, die Auswirkungen von Immigrationsprozessen und die Fetischisierung von Multikulturalismus und Universalismus – für die Probleme der europäischen Sozialdemokratie und ihrer Trennung von Teilen ihrer einstmals proletarischen Wählerbasis. Nur zu gerne hätte man gelesen, wie ein kluger und extrem sachkundiger Mann wie Franz Walter diese Aspekte bewertet. Im Schlusskapitel widmet sich Walter den Perspektiven der Sozialdemokratie in Europa. Sein Fazit ist nicht optimistisch: Angesicht der strukturellen Defizite der europäischen Sozialdemokratie, des enormen Vertrauensverlustes der letzten Jahre und der tiefgehenden Entfremdung von strategischen Wählermilieus sei 10 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

nicht unbedingt mit einer Wiederherstellung sozialdemokratischer Hegemoniefähigkeit zu rechnen. Vielmehr drohe das Gespenst eines Erstarken des Rechtspopulismus, der»negativen Mobilisierung« der Demokratieverdrossenen. In der Summe handelt es sich bei»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« um ein Buch, für das es weder auf dem deutschen noch auf dem europäischen Markt ein Pendant gibt: Keinem anderen Autor ist es bisher gelungen, die Vielfalt der Krisensymptome der europäischen Sozialdemokratie in einer ähnlichen Form und Tiefe zusammenzufassen. Die Vielfalt der konsultierten Quellen aus den verschiedenen Ländern Europas ist beeindruckend. Gerade weil es dem Leser ein Happy End verweigert, ist das Buch für jeden, der sich für die Zukunft der Sozialdemokratie interessiert, schlicht eine Pflichtlektüre. Ernst Hillebrand; Leiter des Referats Mittel- und Osteuropa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin Auf linken Wegen: Erkundungen in politischer Topographie FRANZISKA DROHSEL(Hrsg.): Was ist heute links? Thesen für eine Politik der Zukunft Frankfurt 2009 Campus, 250 S. SIGMAR GABRIEL: Links neu denken. Politik für die Mehrheit München 2008 Piper, 379 S. D ie Wahlniederlage der spd am 27. September 2009 darf mit einigem Recht als Zäsur in der Geschichte der ältesten deutschen Partei gelten. Mit dem Bundesparteitag 2009 in Dresden wurde folgerichtig ein Prozess der Erneuerung der spd eingeläutet, der für die Partei weitreichende Folgen haben wird. Wo die Reise hingeht, ist dabei längst nicht gewiss. Denn gemäß ihrer Tradition als heterogene Volkspartei stehen in der spd sehr verschiedene Ansichten über Wirtschaft, Staat und Politik miteinander im Dialog und gelegentlich im Widerstreit. Sigmar Gabriel und Franziska Drohsel, die ihre Partei auf sehr unterschiedliche Weise vertreten, haben theoretisch-politische Analysen und Zukunftsentwürfe vorgelegt, die aus heutiger Sicht als Bauskizzen für die Nach-Agendaspd gelesen werden können. Dennoch zeichnet beide Bücher aus, dass sie im Jahr 2008, also weit vor dem Wahldebakel geschrieben wurden. Sie sind somit beide nicht als dezidierte Beiträge zur Erneuerungsdiskussion der spd verfasst worden, sondern sollen jeweils grundsätzliche Beiträge über Grundwerte und programmatische ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 11

have tried to explain the current problems facing European social democracy. Hanspeter Kriesi and his co-authors; René Cuperus, who is repeatedly cited by Walter; and also Patrick Diamond and Roger Liddle stress much more emphatically than Walter the significance of socio-cultural factors – adaptation to a »cosmopolitan« elite ideology, the effects of immigration processes and the fetishization of multiculturalism and universalism – for the problems of European social democracy and its separation from parts of its erstwhile proletarian electorate. It would have been fascinating to see how the shrewd and extremely knowledgeable Walter assesses these aspects. In the final chapter, Walter addresses the prospects for social democracy in Europe. His conclusion is not optimistic. Given the structural shortcomings of European social democracy, the enormous loss of trust over recent years, and the deep-lying alienation of strategic constituencies it is far from certain that social democracy will ever be able to re-establish its hegemony. Instead, the specter of an upsurge in right-wing populism looms – the»negative mobilization« of those disaffected with democracy. To sum up,»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« is a book which has no equivalent in either Germany or the rest of Europe: no other author has so far managed to summarize the variety of crisis symptoms from which European social democracy is suffering in similar depth. The variety of sources from different European countries is impressive. Precisely because it denies the reader a happy end the book is simply required reading for all those interested in the future of social democracy. Ernst Hillebrand, Head of the Department of Central and Eastern Europe of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin Left-wing Ways: Reconnoitering Political Topography FRANZISKA DROHSEL(ed.): Was ist heute Links? Thesen für eine Politik der Zukunft Frankfurt 2009 Campus, 250 pp. SIGMAR GABRIEL: Links neu denken. Politik für die Mehrheit Munich 2008 Piper, 379 pp. T he spd ’s election defeat on September 27, 2009 can be described with some justification as a watershed in the history of Germany’s oldest political party. 244 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

At the 2009 spd party conference in Dresden a process of renewal was heralded, which will have far-reaching consequences. Where the journey will take the spd is far from certain. Traditionally a broad church, the spd encompasses very different views on the economy, the state and politics, which are usually in dialogue with one another but sometimes come into conflict. Sigmar Gabriel and Franziska Drohsel, whose views on their party differ considerably, have laid out theoretico-political analyses and outlines for the future which, in a contemporary perspective, can be read as blueprints for a»post Agenda 2010 spd .« Having said that, it is striking that both books were written in 2008, well before the election debacle. Neither, therefore, was solely intended to be a contribution to the party’s renewal debate, but instead they represent fundamental pronouncements on the basic values and programmatic foundations of social democratic politics. The two books also share an interest in the normativeideological grounds of political action, in contrast to the apolitical»there-is-noalternative« discourse of the 2000s. The authors frame their reflections in terms of classic political topography: they raise the question of what»left-wing« means and what a contemporary»left-wing« politics ought to look like. The book edited by Franziska Drohsel –»Was ist heute Links?« – constitutes a debate-oriented contribution to the issues. The volume consists of 63 theses agreed on by the Young Socialists(»Jusos«) – of which Drohsel was national chair until mid-2010 – in autumn 2008. Also included are articles by leading figures in the spd ,»Juso« veterans, academics, and representatives of civil society, all of whom take up the question of a modern left and the 63 theses. The Young Socialists’ theses are in the tradition of neo-Marxist theory and take their point of departure from an analysis of the basic categories of the capitalist economic and social order. They then turn their attention to the actors and also strategies involved in current political conflicts, as well as examining the current forms of capitalism in detail. Finally, they take a closer look at individual policy areas, such as feminism, anti-fascism, internationalism, and environmentalism. Capitalism is the key concept, which the Young Socialists describe in the tradition of Critical Theory as a»totality« –»the dominant structural principle of society«(Drohsel 2009: 28), whose logic pervades every area of life. Despite its changing forms, capitalism is always inherently crisis-ridden, is driven by a compulsive logic of exploitation, and must therefore be surmounted in order to make possible a»free and equal life for all«(p. 20). The market principle automatically leads to inequality. Capitalism produces winners and losers»not for want of proper organization but as a consequence of its inherent laws«(p. 58). As the dominant trends of the historical forms capitalism has assumed the theses cite globalization and the disconnection of the financial markets from the real economy, as well as precarious employment and social divisions(cf. pp. 46–65). The Young Socialists regard the state as, on the one hand, a useful tool for progressive politics, by means of which changes can be secured(cf. p. 57), but on the other ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 245

hand as structural guarantor of the conditions of capitalist exploitation. What they are calling for, then, is not merely that the»good« state restrain the»bad« market, but rather changes of emphasis brought about by political means within a capitalist state and economic system. The Young Socialists’ theses judge spd governments harshly. Not only because of their the political(co-)responsibility for the developments mentioned above, but also because of the depletion of democratic culture in the party as a result of a certain authoritarianism and segregation. Nevertheless, the Young Socialists are clear that progressive politics is simply not possible without the spd and therefore that what is needed is to struggle»in and for the spd «(p. 36). In Drohsel’s book the success of spd policies is measured not in terms of the party’s approval ratings, but rather its ability to translate left-wing policies – whether alone or in partnership – and thereby to move closer towards the abovementioned free and just society. The spd is conceived of as an instrument for changing society, not as an end in itself. The Young Socialists’ theses oscillate between a rigorous anti-capitalism in principle and a reformist line in detail, even though the reform program remains fragmentary. The contradictions between radical rejection and incremental reform are as frankly admitted in Drohsel’s book, as they are harshly criticized in the part presenting the debate.»Being left-wing« also has an individual component for Drohsel and the Young Socialists, however, namely putting up with life’s contradictions while struggling for progress in the here and now(cf. pp. 90–92). The book devotes a fair amount of room to this aspect of self-assertion. In contrast, Sigmar Gabriel spells out his»being left-wing« not as a position of marginalization but, on the contrary, as a politics for the majority . Gabriel’s book which, in contrast to Drohsel’s volume is a monograph, has its origins well before his election as party leader and is very much a controversial work, not an attempt to reconcile every position in the party. In his 370-page book»Links neu denken« the former German Minister of the Environment develops a policy outline for a »social democratic creative left«(Gabriel 2008: 12) to distinguish himself and his party from his political rivals. Gabriel understands left-wing politics to mean»guaranteeing social inclusion and incentives to economic progress for the great majority«(p. 22). He derives his concept of the»left« from the principle of emancipation. In the opening passages of his book he uses this idea against a politically eviscerated fetish of the »center« in political communication, which he considers inherently conservative. Gabriel explains convincingly how talk of practical constraints and the lack of any alternative is a repudiation of democratic politics and an abrogation of responsibility. From this he derives his demand for a renewal of democracy in which the primacy of politics is restored. But he also discusses internal party reforms, such as opening up the spd to people who have already distinguished themselves in other spheres, in order to make democratic participation attractive again. 246 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

The greatest contemporary challenges to the putative capacities of democratic politics, according to Gabriel, are financial capitalism, environmental disruption and climate change, post-democratic tendencies, and social cleavages, as well as the dissolution of political boundaries and the disturbance of societal equilibria. The detailed explanations satisfy the author’s claim to»say how things are« (p. 66), but they neglect to say why. Gabriel largely leaves out of account the spd ’s contribution to many of the developments he describes and deplores. The book contains virtually none of the analyses of the party’s mistakes or the self-criticism of Gabriel’s later public statements. Based on his analysis of the situation Gabriel wishes»to continue with the leftwing project«(p. 139). Against a conservative environmentalism which is skeptical about technology he opposes the idea of sustainable progress, which marries Bloch’s principle of hope with Jonas’s principle of responsibility(cf. p. 143). From the idea of progress understood in this way he develops a political blueprint, the majority-oriented»politics of balance«(p. 109). An environmental industrial policy which promotes growth and employment has a key role in this, as does the promotion of innovation and the frequently invoked enabling welfare state. The education policy side of former teacher Gabriel is evident from his focus on a culture of learning and early childhood education, but the explosive debate on the school system is largely neglected. By and large, these passages illustrate Gabriel’s political strengths, containing a polished presentation of a logical and ethically well-grounded reform program, marred from time to time by a ministerial predilection for detail. In strategic terms, Gabriel puts his faith in social democracy finding its place as a»creative left« which pursues balanced policies for the majority of the population. He sets himself apart from the»bisected liberalism« of the fdp , the fickle Christian Democrats, and narrow-minded environmentalists among the Greens (pp. 336 f) and takes a strong stance against the»protest left«(pp. 354 f) and oldleft»to-ing and fro-ing«(pp. 124 f). In the process, he construes his political opponents, in particular to the left of the party spectrum, rather simplistically, as typical dogmatists in thrall to their respective ideologies. This reduces the political competition to cardboard-cutouts who can easily be knocked over. Any search for common ground is rarely to be found. »Left« does not always have to mean the same thing: this insight is confirmed by reading these two books. On a number of fundamental questions the authors are worlds apart. This is particularly evident in respect of the crucial question for the left: where do you stand on capitalism? Sigmar Gabriel evinces a generally optimistic conception of capitalism which rests on observations of the variety of capitalist phenomena. Gabriel conceives of capitalism as malleable and economically productive, and basically trusts it to be able to deliver balanced development within the right political framework. Furthermore, Gabriel considers markets to be fundamentally adequate instruments of allocation which, through the approipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 247

priate regulation and internalization of external effects, curb power and enable efficient resource distribution. Although he wishes to roll back the market in some areas, in others – for example, climate change – he wishes to expand market mechanisms. For the Young Socialists, in contrast, the capitalist system per se is crisis-prone and its fundamental workings are not readily susceptible to reform. They consider the market principle to be the actualization of capitalism’s competitive logic, which systematically produces social inequality and exclusion. The question of whether a left-wing politics can succeed with or against the market may therefore be answered in a number of different ways. Beyond the differences, the two books share a number of ideas about what it means to be»left-wing.« The analysis of the current situation is similar in the two books, as are some of the proposed instruments and detailed reforms. The differences in respect of the assessment of the spd are significant, however. While Gabriel barely mentions any of the spd ’s mistakes, and tends to attribute unfavorable developments to market fluctuations, the Young Socialists touch on a sore point by pointing out the fact that the intensification of precarity and social polarization coincided with social democratic participation in government. In terms of strategic issues»left-wing« means different things to different people. While the Young Socialists understand themselves to be part of a societal left, who work within the framework of a left-wing project both individually and in groups, for Sigmar Gabriel»left-wing« is exclusively reserved for social democracy. But a politics of the majority will also need partners. Anyone hoping to distill a magic potion or elixir of life to fill up the water bottles of those engaged in everyday political conflict will be disappointed – the prescriptions are too much at variance. Anyone seeking stimulus for a debate and incentives to think more deeply will have much to gain from these books. Because they confirm at least one thing: the left’s distinctive culture of reflection and debate. The open and rational discussion of what it means to be»left-wing« is part and parcel of»being left-wing.« Matthias Ecke, Scientific Assistant to a member of the German parliament 248 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

nicht unbedingt mit einer Wiederherstellung sozialdemokratischer Hegemoniefähigkeit zu rechnen. Vielmehr drohe das Gespenst eines Erstarken des Rechtspopulismus, der»negativen Mobilisierung« der Demokratieverdrossenen. In der Summe handelt es sich bei»Vorwärts oder Abwärts?« um ein Buch, für das es weder auf dem deutschen noch auf dem europäischen Markt ein Pendant gibt: Keinem anderen Autor ist es bisher gelungen, die Vielfalt der Krisensymptome der europäischen Sozialdemokratie in einer ähnlichen Form und Tiefe zusammenzufassen. Die Vielfalt der konsultierten Quellen aus den verschiedenen Ländern Europas ist beeindruckend. Gerade weil es dem Leser ein Happy End verweigert, ist das Buch für jeden, der sich für die Zukunft der Sozialdemokratie interessiert, schlicht eine Pflichtlektüre. Ernst Hillebrand; Leiter des Referats Mittel- und Osteuropa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin Auf linken Wegen: Erkundungen in politischer Topographie FRANZISKA DROHSEL(Hrsg.): Was ist heute links? Thesen für eine Politik der Zukunft Frankfurt 2009 Campus, 250 S. SIGMAR GABRIEL: Links neu denken. Politik für die Mehrheit München 2008 Piper, 379 S. D ie Wahlniederlage der spd am 27. September 2009 darf mit einigem Recht als Zäsur in der Geschichte der ältesten deutschen Partei gelten. Mit dem Bundesparteitag 2009 in Dresden wurde folgerichtig ein Prozess der Erneuerung der spd eingeläutet, der für die Partei weitreichende Folgen haben wird. Wo die Reise hingeht, ist dabei längst nicht gewiss. Denn gemäß ihrer Tradition als heterogene Volkspartei stehen in der spd sehr verschiedene Ansichten über Wirtschaft, Staat und Politik miteinander im Dialog und gelegentlich im Widerstreit. Sigmar Gabriel und Franziska Drohsel, die ihre Partei auf sehr unterschiedliche Weise vertreten, haben theoretisch-politische Analysen und Zukunftsentwürfe vorgelegt, die aus heutiger Sicht als Bauskizzen für die Nach-Agendaspd gelesen werden können. Dennoch zeichnet beide Bücher aus, dass sie im Jahr 2008, also weit vor dem Wahldebakel geschrieben wurden. Sie sind somit beide nicht als dezidierte Beiträge zur Erneuerungsdiskussion der spd verfasst worden, sondern sollen jeweils grundsätzliche Beiträge über Grundwerte und programmatische ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 11

Fundamente sozialdemokratischer Politik darstellen. Beide Bücher eint das Interesse an der normativ-ideologischen Begründung politischen Handelns, entgegen der apolitischen Alternativlosigkeitsdiskurse der 2000er Jahre. Ihre Kategorie wählen die Autorin und der Autor gemäß der klassischen politischen Topographie: Sie werfen die Frage danach auf, was überhaupt»links« sei, und wie eine»linke« Politik in der Gegenwart aussehen müsse. Einen debattenorientierten Beitrag dazu liefert das von Franziska Drohsel herausgegebene Buch»Was ist heute links?«. Der Band besteht aus 63 Thesen, die die Jusos, denen Drohsel bis Mitte 2010 als Bundesvorsitzende vorstand, im Herbst 2008 beschlossen. Daran knüpfen weitere Artikel von spd -Größen, JusoVeteraninnen und Veteranen, Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wirtschaftlern sowie Vertreterinnen und Vertretern der Zivilgesellschaft an, die sich mit der aufgeworfenen Fragestellung nach einer modernen Linken und den vorgestellten Thesen selbst kontrovers auseinandersetzen. Die Thesen der Jusos stehen in der Tradition neomarxistischer Theorieorientierung und nehmen ihren Ausgang in einer Analyse der Grundkategorien der kapitalistischen Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsordnung. Dann wenden sie sich Akteurinnen und Akteuren sowie Strategien in aktuellen politischen Konflikten zu und beleuchten weiterhin die gegenwärtigen Ausformungen des Kapitalismus im Einzelnen. Abschließend werden einzelne Politikfelder wie Feminismus, Antifaschismus, Internationalismus und Ökologie genauer untersucht. Zentral ist der Kapitalismus-Begriff, den die Jusos in der Tradition der Kritischen Theorie als»Totalität« beschreiben, als»das dominante Strukturprinzip der Gesellschaft«(Drohsel 2009: 28), dessen Logik alle Lebensbereiche durchziehe. Der Kapitalismus sei trotz wandelnder Gestalt stets immanent krisenhaft, treibe eine zwanghafte Verwertungslogik an und müsse daher überwunden werden, um ein»freies und gleiches Leben für alle« zu ermöglichen (S. 20). Das Marktprinzip führe automatisch zu Ungleichheit. Der Kapitalismus produziere Gewinner und Verlierer»nicht mangels besserer Organisation, sondern als Folge seiner ihm innewohnenden Gesetzmäßigkeit«(S. 58). Als dominante Trends der historisch-konkreten Gestalt des Kapitalismus benennen die Thesen die Globalisierung und die Abkopplung der Finanzmärkte von der Realwirtschaft sowie prekarisierte Beschäftigung und die Spaltung der Gesellschaft(vgl. S. 46–65). Den Staat sehen die Jusos dabei einerseits als Ansatzhebel für fortschrittliche Politik, mittels dessen Regulierungen erkämpft werden könnten(vgl. S. 57), andererseits aber auch als strukturellen Garanten kapitalistischer Verwertungsvoraussetzungen. Plädiert wird also nicht für eine bloße Zurückdrängung des»bösen« Marktes durch einen»guten« Staat, sondern für politisch erkämpfte Akzentverschiebungen innerhalb eines kapitalistischen Staats- und Wirtschaftssystems. Mit der Regierungsspd gehen die Juso-Thesen hart ins Gericht. Nicht nur der politischen(Mit-)Verantwortung für die beschriebenen Entwicklungen 12 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

wegen, sondern auch aufgrund der durch Autoritarismus und Abschottung ermatteten demokratischen Kultur in der Partei. Dennoch steht für die Jusos fest, dass es ohne die spd keine fortschrittliche Politik geben wird, und dass es deshalb »in der und um die spd «(S. 36) zu kämpfen gelte. In Drohsels Buch wird der Erfolg sozialdemokratischer Politik nicht in Zustimmungsraten zur spd gemessen, sondern an der Fähigkeit, linke Politik umzusetzen(ob allein oder mit Partnern) und somit der erwähnten freien und gerechten Gesellschaft näher zu kommen. Die spd wird als Instrument zur Gesellschaftsveränderung begriffen, nicht als Selbstzweck. Die Thesen der Jusos changieren insgesamt zwischen einem rigorosen Antikapitalismus im Grundsätzlichen und einer reformistischen Linie im Konkreten, auch wenn das Reformprogramm fragmentarisch bleibt. Die Widersprüche zwischen radikaler Ablehnung und inkrementeller Reformpolitik werden in Drohsels Buch ebenso freimütig eingestanden, wie im Debattenteil harsch kritisiert.»Links sein« hat aber für Drohsel und die Jusos eben auch eine individuelle Komponente, nämlich das Leben in Widersprüchen auszuhalten und trotzdem im Hier und Jetzt für Fortschritte zu streiten(vgl. S. 90–92). Diesem Aspekt der Selbstvergewisserung wird im Buch ein breiter Raum eingeräumt. Sigmar Gabriel hingegen buchstabiert sein»Links-Sein« nicht als marginalisierte Position, sondern im Gegenteil als Politik für die Mehrheit . Gabriels Buch, das im Gegensatz zu Drohsels Band als Monographie gestaltet ist, stammt aus der Zeit vor seiner Wahl zum Parteivorsitzenden und versteht sich als Streitschrift, nicht als Parteiflügel übergreifende Synthese. In seinem über 370 Seiten starken Buch»Links neu denken« entwickelt der damalige Bundesumweltminister einen Politikentwurf für eine»sozialdemokratische Gestaltungslinke«(Gabriel 2008: 12), den er gegen politische Mitbewerber abgrenzt. Gabriel versteht unter linker Politik»(…) die Gewährleistung sozialer Teilhabe und den Ansporn zu wirtschaftlichem Fortschritt für die große Mehrheit«(S. 22). Er leitet seinen Begriff von»links« aus dem Emanzipationsprinzip ab. In den Anfangspassagen seines Buches wendet er diesen Begriff gegen einen politisch entkernten Fetisch der»Mitte« in der politischen Kommunikation, den er für strukturkonservativ hält. Überzeugend legt Gabriel dar, wie die Rede von Sachzwang und Alternativlosigkeit demokratische Politik verleugnet und Verantwortung aufgibt. Daraus leitet er den Anspruch auf eine Erneuerung der Demokratie ab, in der das Primat der Politik wieder gilt. Aber auch parteiinterne Reformen wie die Öffnung gegenüber Quereinsteigern mahnt er mit Blick auf die spd an, um demokratische Beteiligung wieder attraktiver zu gestalten. Die gegenwärtig größten Herausforderungen für die proklamierten Lösungskapazitäten demokratischer Politik sind Gabriel zufolge der Finanzkapitalismus, die Umwelt- und Klimazerstörung, postdemokratische Tendenzen und soziale Spaltungen sowie die Entgrenzung der Politik und die gestörten Gleichgewichte in der Gesellschaft. Die umfassenden Ausführungen genügen dem Anspruch, zu ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 13

»Sagen, was ist«(S. 66), verfehlen jedoch zu sagen, warum das so ist. Gabriel klammert den Beitrag der spd für viele der von ihm geschilderten und skandalisierten Entwicklungen weitgehend aus. Von der Fehleranalyse und Selbstkritik seiner jüngeren öffentlichen Äußerungen findet sich im Buch kaum etwas. In Anbetracht seiner Situationsanalyse will Gabriel»das linke Projekt weiterführen«(S. 139). Gegen einen technikskeptischen Umweltschutz-Konservatismus setzt er die Idee eines nachhaltigen Fortschritts, der das Bloch’sche Prinzip Hoffnung mit dem Jonas’schen Prinzip Verantwortung vermählt(vgl. S. 143). Aus einem so verstandenen Fortschrittsbegriff entwickelt er seinen Politikentwurf, die mehrheitsorientierte»Politik der Balancen«(S. 109). Eine wachstumsund beschäftigungsfördernde ökologische Industriepolitik nimmt darin einen zentralen Platz ein, ebenso die Innovationsförderung und der viel beschworene vorsorgende Sozialstaat. Der bildungspolitische Teil des früheren Lehrers Gabriel sticht durch seinen Fokus auf Lernkultur und frühkindliche Bildung hervor, klammert die brisante Debatte um die Schulstruktur aber weitgehend aus. Insgesamt zeigen diese Passagen die politischen Stärken Gabriels, sie enthalten die eingängige Darstellung eines schlüssigen und ethisch fundierten Reformprogramms, bisweilen jedoch mit einer schon ministerialen Detailverliebtheit. Strategisch setzt Sigmar Gabriel auf eine Selbstverortung der Sozialdemokratie als»Gestaltungslinke«, die eine ausgewogene Politik für die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung betreibt. Er grenzt sich gegen den»halbierten Liberalismus« der fdp , die wankelmütige Union, die»Nur-Ökologen« bei den Grünen ab(S. 336 f) und richtet sich dezidiert gegen die»Protest-Linke«(S. 354 f) und gegen altlinke »Irrungen und Wirrungen«(S. 124 f). Dabei konstruiert er die politischen Gegner, insbesondere auf der linken Seite des Parteienspektrums, jedoch arg holzschnittartig als idealtypische Dogmatiker ihrer jeweiligen ideologischen Endgültigkeitsansprüche. So wird die politische Konkurrenz zum Pappkameraden, auf den es sich einfach einschlagen lässt. Die Suche nach Gemeinsamkeiten findet nur am Rande statt. »Links« muss nicht gleich»links« sein: Diese Einsicht bestätigt sich beim Lesen beider Bücher. In einigen fundamentalen Fragen klaffen Welten zwischen den Ansichten der Autorin und des Autors. Besonders deutlich wird dies in der linken Gretchenfrage: Wie hältst du’s mit dem Kapitalismus? Sigmar Gabriel zeigt ein allgemein optimistisches Kapitalismusverständnis, das auf der Beobachtung der Vielfalt kapitalistischer Phänomene beruht. Gabriel begreift den Kapitalismus als gestaltbar und ökonomisch produktiv, traut ihm bei richtiger politischer Rahmensetzung auch prinzipiell zu, eine gleichgewichtige Entwicklung zu gewährleisten. Zudem hält Gabriel Märkte für grundsätzlich geeignete Allokationsinstrumente, die bei angemessener Regulierung und Internalisierung externer Effekte Macht begrenzen und eine effiziente Ressourcenzuteilung ermöglichen. Zwar will er die Marktlogik in einigen Bereichen zurückdrängen, in anderen Feldern(wie etwa dem des Klimaschutzes) aber durchaus Marktmecha14 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

nismen ausbauen. Für die Jusos hingegen ist das kapitalistische System per se krisenhaft und seine fundamentale Wirkungsweise nicht beliebig reformierbar. Im Marktprinzip sehen sie die Konkurrenzlogik des Kapitalismus verwirklicht, die systematisch die vielfach beklagte soziale Ungleichheit und Exklusion produziert. Die Frage, ob eine linke Politik mit oder gegen den Markt erfolgen soll, wird folglich unterschiedlich beantwortet. Jenseits der Unterschiede finden sich aber auch viele gemeinsame Vorstellungen dessen, was»links« ist. Die Gegenwartsanalyse ist in beiden Büchern ähnlich, ebenso einige der Instrumente und konkreten Reformvorschläge. Unterschiede werden aber in der Bewertung der Rolle der spd deutlich. Während Gabriel kaum Fehlurteile der spd benennt, und unliebsame Entwicklungen eher den Marktdynamiken zuschreibt, legen die Jusos die Finger in die Wunde der Gleichzeitigkeit von verschärfter Prekarisierung und sozialer Polarisierung einerseits und sozialdemokratischer Regierungsbeteiligung andererseits. Auch in der Strategiefrage ist»links« nicht gleich»links«. Während die Jusos sich als Teil einer gesellschaftlichen Linken verstehen, die als Individuen oder in Gruppen gemeinsam an einem linken Projekt arbeiten, ist bei Sigmar Gabriels»links« exklusiv für die Sozialdemokratie reserviert. Eine Politik für die Mehrheit wird aber auch Partner brauchen. Wer aus den beiden Büchern eine Rettungsportion»links«, ein Elixier für das Feldfläschchen der alltäglichen politischen Auseinandersetzung zu destillieren erhoffte, wird wohl enttäuscht werden – zu unterschiedlich sind die Rezepte. Wer aber Debattenanstöße und Anreize zum Weiterdenken sucht, wird an der Lektüre Freude haben. Denn eines zumindest bestätigen die Bücher: die ausgeprägte Reflexions- und Debattenkultur der politischen Linken. Denn der offene und vernünftige Verständigungsprozess darüber, was»links« denn genau bedeutet, gehört zum»Links-Sein« dazu. Matthias Ecke, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Deutschen Bundestag ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO/ FLORIAN RÖDL/ CHRISTOPH U. SCHMID (Hrsg.): Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa Baden-Baden 2009 Nomos, 408 S. A us politisch-normativer Sicht wird seit Jahren die»soziale Schieflage« Europas kritisiert, die auch mit dem aktuellen Verfassungsprozess noch nicht behoben ist. Die europäische Sozialdemokratie hat zu diesem Vorwurf ein ambivalentes ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 15

A. FISCHER-LESCANO/ F. ROEDL/ C. U. SCHMID(eds.): Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa Baden-Baden 2009 Nomos, 408 p. F or years Europe’s»social imbalance« has been subject to criticism, which the current Constitutional process has done nothing to rectify. European social democracy has developed an ambivalent attitude to this reproach: on the one hand, it calls for the creation of a»Social Europe«; on the other hand, it frankly presents the existing order of the eu as, in principle, open to social composition and locates the»social imbalance« rather in the dominance of neoliberal parties and in the neoliberal orientation of the European Court of Justice. Against this background, the book produced by the Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik( zerp ) in Bremen,»Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung«(A European Societal Constitution), could represent an important contribution to further analysis and theoretical discussion. The guiding theme of the 20 contributions collected in the book is clearly discernible from the subtitle: no less than the possibility of a»constitutionalization of social democracy in Europe« is to be examined. In the foreword the editors refer to another important point: modern constitutions tend to be»societal constitutions,« their inherent goal being to permeate the entire social sphere. Around half of the contributions collected in the book are devoted to the areas of private, labor, and economic law. In this connection, the editors expressly invoke the social democratic debate on constitutional theory during the Weimar Republic and the early Federal Republic, a theoretical line to which several of the authors refer in another section under the heading»Prospects of a Social Democratization of Europe.« A concluding section is dedicated – setting out from the thesis that a»return to the nation-state« is impossible – to the possibilities of a»conceptualization of a transnational societal constitution.« The eu ’s imbalance with regard to a labor and social constitution has often been discussed. The contributions brought together in this volume attempt to understand this in individual thematic areas, but above all seek the reasons for this development. As far as general private law is concerned, it is a body of law which hitherto has rarely been the focus of critical consideration. The authors consciously distance themselves from»jurisprudence’s illusion of neutrality,« as Brigitta Lurger writes in her contribution. Considerable space is also given over to discussion of the European welfare state and the labor constitution. For example, Florian Rödl, in a very readable contribution, comes to the sobering conclusion that the discussion of a»Social Europe« has finally proved to be an»interminable blind-alley,« while the model of a European Social Union has been talked into being in defiance of the facts. ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 249

Christoph U. Schmid, in his contribution, addresses the»judicial expansionism« of the European Court of Justice( ecj ) in recent years. Schmidt examines in detail the ecj ’s argumentation which, according to his analysis, can by no means be characterized simply as the dogmatic prioritization of the basic freedoms over European basic rights. The calm dissection of juristic argumentation and its testing against its practical effects here is also an attraction of other contributions in the book. Under the rubric of»social democracy« a number of contributions explicitly take up the social democratic constitutional theory of the Weimar Republic – associated above all with Hermann Heller and Wolfgang Abendroth – and of the early Federal Republic. In these terms, according to Hans-Jürgen Bieling’s interpretation, forms of democratic intercourse remain fragile in two respects in a society characterized by antagonistic interests: on the one hand, sharp lines of conflict and division could impair political stability, and on the other hand, the processes of democratic representation are in many ways not utilized adequately and thereby come to nothing. Therefore, the formal rule of law should be supplemented by institutions of labor law, economic democracy, and the welfare state. »Social democracy« is therefore not to be understood in a party-political sense here, but the discussion is nevertheless fascinating. The»social imbalance« of European unification has often been addressed. Criticisms have mainly been formulated as political demands and do not tend to find their way into social science or jurisprudential theory. On the contrary, European jurisprudential debate has been characterized for many years by an almost total lack of consideration of the social conditions and consequences of juristic norms and decisions. Taking up the social conditions pertaining to juristic decisions could also prove to be a possible path for a self-conscious social democratic(in the partypolitical sense) European legal policy: in that case, legal policy would have to be understood as policy aimed at shaping society as a whole and ultimately as enabling and extending democracy – as does, for example, Oliver Eberl with his plea to regard democracy and the welfare state as inseparable for the development of social democracy. With its attempts at a»conceptualization of a transnational social constitution« the volume is expanded to take in another fundamental jurisprudential perspective. In their contribution, Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller start from the assumption that difference and not unity is the key characteristic of modern societies. Within the framework of a»constitutional pluralism« it comes to a decision between»technocratic« and»societal collision management.« Legal collisions, in the sense of»societal collision management,« should be left to societal negotiation processes and not be decided»technocratically« by judicial process through the construction of hierarchies of norms. In particular, the connection established with the line of debate after Abendroth and Heller is fascinating. It should be linked to the debates on 250 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

constitutional pluralism. The establishment of societal unity was a complex problem for Heller and Abendroth. As the contributions collected in the volume show, the level of complexity has increased with Europeanization and internationalization. The approaches put forward in the book offer intelligent food for thought concerning why the simple – hasty – conclusion»back to the nation-state« cannot be drawn, but also how the reality of a society legally integrated at various levels can be captured theoretically and above all how it can be opened up for measures which shape it in a social direction. All in all, therefore, this collective volume represents critical scholarship at its best. Thilo Scholle, Juridical Assessor(German:»Ass. iur.«), Lünen J. CALLAGHAN/ N. FISHMAN/ B. JACKSON/ M. MCIVOR(eds.): In Search of Social Democracy. Responses to Crisis and Modernisation Manchester and New York 2009 Manchester University Press, 304 pp. P. DIAMOND/ R. LIDDLE(eds.): Beyond New Labour. The Future of Social Democracy in Britain London 2009 Politico’s, 288 pp. M uch has been written recently about the dire state of social democracy, its intellectual emptiness, and the need for programmatic and organizational renewal. After all, in 2010, only five out of 27 member states of the European Union are ruled by social democrats. Britain, France, Germany, and many other states are governed by center-right and liberal parties, with the social democrats trying hard to re-build their credentials in opposition. It seems to be the perfect moment to re-define social democracy and adapt it to a fast-changing global context. Two edited volumes, both published in 2009, approach the topic from different, yet often complementary angles.»In Search of Social Democracy,« edited by John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson, and Martin McIvor, is a collection of academic essays. It presents a critical, yet optimistic and forward-looking alternative to the apocalyptic writings of the moment. The strength of this book lies in its comparative and multidisciplinary approach to social democracy. Divided into three parts, the book strikes the(difficult) balance between the past, present, and future of social democracy and manages to successfully link classic socialist and republican thought with the challenges of modern policy-making in various countries across Europe and abroad. ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 251

nismen ausbauen. Für die Jusos hingegen ist das kapitalistische System per se krisenhaft und seine fundamentale Wirkungsweise nicht beliebig reformierbar. Im Marktprinzip sehen sie die Konkurrenzlogik des Kapitalismus verwirklicht, die systematisch die vielfach beklagte soziale Ungleichheit und Exklusion produziert. Die Frage, ob eine linke Politik mit oder gegen den Markt erfolgen soll, wird folglich unterschiedlich beantwortet. Jenseits der Unterschiede finden sich aber auch viele gemeinsame Vorstellungen dessen, was»links« ist. Die Gegenwartsanalyse ist in beiden Büchern ähnlich, ebenso einige der Instrumente und konkreten Reformvorschläge. Unterschiede werden aber in der Bewertung der Rolle der spd deutlich. Während Gabriel kaum Fehlurteile der spd benennt, und unliebsame Entwicklungen eher den Marktdynamiken zuschreibt, legen die Jusos die Finger in die Wunde der Gleichzeitigkeit von verschärfter Prekarisierung und sozialer Polarisierung einerseits und sozialdemokratischer Regierungsbeteiligung andererseits. Auch in der Strategiefrage ist»links« nicht gleich»links«. Während die Jusos sich als Teil einer gesellschaftlichen Linken verstehen, die als Individuen oder in Gruppen gemeinsam an einem linken Projekt arbeiten, ist bei Sigmar Gabriels»links« exklusiv für die Sozialdemokratie reserviert. Eine Politik für die Mehrheit wird aber auch Partner brauchen. Wer aus den beiden Büchern eine Rettungsportion»links«, ein Elixier für das Feldfläschchen der alltäglichen politischen Auseinandersetzung zu destillieren erhoffte, wird wohl enttäuscht werden – zu unterschiedlich sind die Rezepte. Wer aber Debattenanstöße und Anreize zum Weiterdenken sucht, wird an der Lektüre Freude haben. Denn eines zumindest bestätigen die Bücher: die ausgeprägte Reflexions- und Debattenkultur der politischen Linken. Denn der offene und vernünftige Verständigungsprozess darüber, was»links« denn genau bedeutet, gehört zum»Links-Sein« dazu. Matthias Ecke, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Deutschen Bundestag ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO/ FLORIAN RÖDL/ CHRISTOPH U. SCHMID (Hrsg.): Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa Baden-Baden 2009 Nomos, 408 S. A us politisch-normativer Sicht wird seit Jahren die»soziale Schieflage« Europas kritisiert, die auch mit dem aktuellen Verfassungsprozess noch nicht behoben ist. Die europäische Sozialdemokratie hat zu diesem Vorwurf ein ambivalentes ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 15

Verhältnis entwickelt: Einerseits erhebt sie die Forderung nach der Schaffung eines»sozialen Europas«. Andererseits stellt sie aber auch die bestehende Ordnung der eu als grundsätzlich sozialer Gestaltung offen dar und verortet die »soziale Schieflage« eher in der Dominanz neoliberaler Parteien sowie in einer neoliberalen Ausrichtung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnte das am Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik( zerp ) in Bremen entstandene Buch»Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung« einen wichtigen Beitrag für die weitere analytische und theoretische Diskussion leisten. Schon mit dem Untertitel des Buches wird das Leitmotiv der im Band versammelten 20 Beiträge deutlich: Nichts weniger als die Möglichkeiten einer»Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa« sollen untersucht werden. In ihrem Vorwort weisen die Herausgeber auf einen weiteren für sie wichtigen Punkt hin: Moderne Verfassungen seien»gesellschaftliche Verfassungen«, ihr inhärentes Ziel eine Durchdringung der gesamten gesellschaftlichen Sphäre. Etwa die Hälfte der im Band versammelten Beiträge widmet sich daher den Bereichen des Privat-, Arbeits- und des Wirtschaftsrechts. Ausdrücklich schließen die Herausgeber dabei an die sozialdemokratische Staatstheoriediskussion der Weimarer Republik und der frühen Bundesrepublik an, ein Theoriestrang, auf den auch mehrere der Autoren in einem weiteren Abschnitt unter der Überschrift »Perspektiven einer sozialen Demokratisierung Europas« Bezug nehmen. Ein abschließender Abschnitt widmet sich – ausgehend von der These, dass ein»Zurück zum Nationalstaat« unmöglich ist – den Möglichkeiten einer»Konzeptualisierung transnationaler Gesellschaftsverfassung«. Die Schieflage der eu in Sachen Arbeits- und Sozialverfassung ist oft diskutiert worden. Die im Band versammelten Beiträge versuchen, diese auf den einzelnen Themenfeldern nachzuvollziehen, suchen vor allem aber nach Gründen für diese Entwicklung. Mit dem allgemeinen Privatrecht wird dabei auch eine Rechtsmaterie in den Blick genommen, die bislang wenig in den Fokus kritischer öffentlicher Betrachtung geraten ist. Bewusst distanzieren sich die Autorinnen und Autoren dabei von der»Neutralitätsillusion der Rechtswissenschaft«, wie Brigitta Lurger in ihrem Beitrag schreibt. Breiten Raum nehmen auch die Diskussionen über den europäischen Sozialstaat und die Arbeitsverfassung ein. So kommt Florian Rödl in einem sehr lesenswerten Beitrag zum ernüchternden Fazit, letztlich habe sich die Diskussion um ein»soziales Europa« als»endlose Sackgasse« erwiesen, während das Modell einer Europäischen Sozialunion eher kontrafaktisch herbeiredet worden sei. Christoph U. Schmid wendet sich in seinem Beitrag dem»judiziellen Expansionismus« des Europäischen Gerichtshofs(EuGH) in den letzten Jahren zu. Detailliert untersucht Schmid die Argumentationsketten des EuGH, die nach seiner Analyse keinesfalls auf die dogmatisch zwingende Schlussfolgerung hinauslaufen, dergemäß ein Vorrang der Grundfreiheiten vor den Europäischen Grund16 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

rechten bestehe. Gerade in der unaufgeregten Sezierung juristischer Argumentationen und deren Prüfung auf ihre praktischen Auswirkungen liegt ein Reiz auch weiterer Beiträge des Bandes. Mit dem Begriff»soziale Demokratie« wird in verschiedenen Beiträgen explizit an die vor allem von Hermann Heller und Wolfgang Abendroth geprägte sozialdemokratische Staatstheorie der Weimarer Republik und der frühen Bundesrepublik angeknüpft. In diesem Sinne bleiben nach der Interpretation Hans-Jürgen Bielings in einer durch antagonistische Interessen geprägten Gesellschaft demokratische Verkehrformen in zweifacher Hinsicht fragil: Zum einen könnten scharfe gesellschaftliche Spaltungs- und Konfliktlinien die politische Stabilität beeinträchtigen, zum anderen würden die Verfahren der demokratischen Repräsentation vielfach nicht hinreichend genutzt und liefen damit ins Leere. Deshalb sei eine Ergänzung des formalen Rechtsstaats durch arbeitsrechtliche, wirtschaftsdemokratische und sozialstaatliche Institutionen vorzunehmen. »Soziale Demokratie« ist hier also nicht parteipolitisch zu verstehen, aber für die weitere Diskussion sehr spannend. Die»soziale Schieflage« der europäischen Einigung ist oft thematisiert worden. Die Kritik daran wird meist nur als politische Forderung formuliert und findet nicht ihren Weg auch in eine sozialoder rechtswissenschaftliche Theorie. Im Gegenteil: Gerade im Bereich der rechtswissenschaftlichen Europadiskussion zeichnen sich die Beiträge seit vielen Jahren durch das nahezu vollständige Fehlen eines Einbezugs der sozialen Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen von juristischen Normen und Entscheidungen aus. An die sozialen Voraussetzungen juristischer Entscheidungen anzuknüpfen, könnte sich auch als Weg für eine selbstbewusste europäische Rechtspolitik der Sozialdemokratie(hier als Partei angesprochen) erweisen: Es müsste dann darum gehen, Rechtspolitik als Politik zur Gestaltung der gesamten Gesellschaft, letztlich als Ermöglichung und Erweiterung von Demokratie zu begreifen – wie es beispielsweise Oliver Eberl mit dem Plädoyer, Demokratie und Sozialstaat als untrennbar für die Entwicklung von sozialer Demokratie zu begreifen, tut. Mit den Versuchen einer»Konzeptualisierung transnationaler Gesellschaftsverfassung« wird der Band um eine weitere grundsätzliche rechtstheoretische Perspektive erweitert. In ihrem Beitrag gehen Andreas Fischer-Lescano und Kolja Möller davon aus, dass Differenz und nicht Einheit zentrales Merkmal moderner Gesellschaften ist. Im Rahmen eines»konstitutionellen Pluralismus« komme es dann auf eine Entscheidung zwischen»technokratischem« und»sozietalem Kollisionsmanagement« an. Rechtskollisionen sollten im Sinne des»sozietalen Kollisionsmanagement« gesellschaftlichen Aushandlungsprozessen überlassen werden, und nicht»technokratisch« durch die Konstruktion von Normenhierarchien auf gerichtlichem Wege entschieden werden. Gerade der im Buch hergestellte Anschluss an die Diskussionsstränge nach Abendroth und Heller ist spannend. Ihn gilt es mit den Debatten über konipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 17

stitutionellen Pluralismus zu verbinden. Die Herstellung von gesellschaftlicher Einheit war schon bei Heller und Abendroth ein komplexes Problem. Wie die im Band versammelten Beiträge zeigen, hat der Grad der Komplexität durch Europäisierung und Internationalisierung weiter zugenommen. Die im Buch vorgestellten Ansätze bieten dabei intelligente Denkanstöße, wie eben nicht der simple(Zu-Kurz-)Schluss eines»Zurück zum Nationalstaat« getroffen werden kann, sondern wie die Realität einer auf verschiedenen Ebenen rechtlich integrierten Gesellschaft theoretisch erfasst und vor allem für eine soziale Gestaltung geöffnet werden kann. Insgesamt bietet der Sammelband daher kritische Wissenschaft im besten Sinne. Thilo Scholle, Ass. iur., Lünen 18 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

constitutional pluralism. The establishment of societal unity was a complex problem for Heller and Abendroth. As the contributions collected in the volume show, the level of complexity has increased with Europeanization and internationalization. The approaches put forward in the book offer intelligent food for thought concerning why the simple – hasty – conclusion»back to the nation-state« cannot be drawn, but also how the reality of a society legally integrated at various levels can be captured theoretically and above all how it can be opened up for measures which shape it in a social direction. All in all, therefore, this collective volume represents critical scholarship at its best. Thilo Scholle, Juridical Assessor(German:»Ass. iur.«), Lünen J. CALLAGHAN/ N. FISHMAN/ B. JACKSON/ M. MCIVOR(eds.): In Search of Social Democracy. Responses to Crisis and Modernisation Manchester and New York 2009 Manchester University Press, 304 pp. P. DIAMOND/ R. LIDDLE(eds.): Beyond New Labour. The Future of Social Democracy in Britain London 2009 Politico’s, 288 pp. M uch has been written recently about the dire state of social democracy, its intellectual emptiness, and the need for programmatic and organizational renewal. After all, in 2010, only five out of 27 member states of the European Union are ruled by social democrats. Britain, France, Germany, and many other states are governed by center-right and liberal parties, with the social democrats trying hard to re-build their credentials in opposition. It seems to be the perfect moment to re-define social democracy and adapt it to a fast-changing global context. Two edited volumes, both published in 2009, approach the topic from different, yet often complementary angles.»In Search of Social Democracy,« edited by John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson, and Martin McIvor, is a collection of academic essays. It presents a critical, yet optimistic and forward-looking alternative to the apocalyptic writings of the moment. The strength of this book lies in its comparative and multidisciplinary approach to social democracy. Divided into three parts, the book strikes the(difficult) balance between the past, present, and future of social democracy and manages to successfully link classic socialist and republican thought with the challenges of modern policy-making in various countries across Europe and abroad. ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 251

»Beyond New Labour. The Future of Social Democracy in Britain,« as the title promises, takes stock of New Labour’s legacy and outlines future challenges, but also looks beyond the rim of the teacup. It is more policy-oriented, which is hardly surprising, considering that both editors, Patrick Diamond and Roger Liddle were advisers to the Labour government and currently work for the centerleft think tank Policy Network in London.»Beyond New Labour« is critical of New Labour’s achievements in office, and calls for»new thinking.« However, Diamond and Liddle state that»the problems« social democracy needs to address have changed in nature – perhaps profoundly, but there is no need to question either fundamental goals or the basic means. The renewal of New Labour is yet to take place and, according to the editors, there are four major intellectual challenges that a period of renewal needs to address and develop: a sufficiently sophisticated critique of the market; a more coherent response to the rise of individualism in our societies; greater clarity with regard to Labour’s approach to equality; and a redefinition of the role of the state. Both books remind the reader that questions of equality, redistribution, freedom, and democracy are at the very heart of the social democratic project. Both stress the need for a re-definition of equality – or social justice, as Patrick Diamond labels it. Looking for an alternative to New Labour’s Third Way approach, Kevin Hickson(»In Search of Social Democracy,« Chapter 11) recommends the work of British socialist politician and theorist Anthony Crosland(»The Future of Socialism,« 1956). In particular, Crosland’s concept of equality, which entails more than just equality of opportunity, but also equality of outcome(income and wealth) is still central to the social democratic project in Britain, Hickson argues convincingly. Patrick Diamond, in the volume edited by himself and Roger Liddle (Chapter 8), agrees that New Labour needs to radically re-define the notion of equality. However, he argues that Crosland’s approach to equality»is based on an ideological world-view and a set of assumptions that are likely to be inadequate for the future,« without referring to the original text. Diamond then outlines a basis for a»new political and policy strategy,« focusing on the importance of education for citizens of all age groups, extended asset ownership, a fairer tax and benefits system which would assist individuals in dealing with new social risks, and changing structures of work and welfare in order to»attack inequalities in access to cultural capital in the family and beyond.« »Beyond New Labour« gives a critical account of social reality in Britain and rightly challenges common phrases such as»Broken Britain.« In particular, Mary Daly’s critique of New Labour’s family policy is thought-provoking(Chapter 7). Daly argues that, despite considerable achievements, the Labour government’s family policy appears rather narrow. It was driven mainly by socio-economic motives, while questions such as gender equality and the protection of the family as a valued social institution were neglected. Moreover, she demonstrates that New Labour’s reform process had strong moral and normative undertones, focusing 252 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010

on the»problem family« rather than all families. Here, a comparison with other European countries could be insightful, for example Germany, where child poverty is prevalent. Some of the most horizon-broadening essays from»In Search of Social Democracy« are arguably the ones taking a comparative perspective. For example, Ashley Lavelle(Chapter 1) and Norman Flynn(Chapter 2) compare social democratic policies in different western European member states and Australia since the 1970s. However, the authors’ conclusions are quite different. Lavelle argues that, without a return to the economic growth levels of the 1950s and 1960s, social democratic parties will not be able to implement redistributive policies again and that, consequently, the»neo-liberalisation of social democracy is here to stay.« Norman Flynn presents a more optimistic picture. Comparing fiscal policies, social spending, and economic performance in France, Germany, and the uk since 1970, Flynn discovers more similarities than differences between the three countries. He comes to the conclusion that, despite high unemployment and fiscal deficits, the welfare state will not experience crisis as long as the economies remain competitive and the eu provides protection for European businesses against completely free competition from low-wage economies. Against the background of deepening European integration it is indispensable to look at social democracy from a European angle. This is what Gerassimos Moschonas(»In Search of Social Democracy,« Chapter 9) does when he asks why social democratic parties do not follow a more radical, left-wing»Social Europe«agenda at eu level. Moschonas takes an institutionalist approach and states that the»multiplicity of power centers of European governance« makes it difficult for national political parties to make an impact. He argues that the eu poses a»role« problem for social democratic parties in particular. The reason is that the control of the market and capitalism entails a»strong central authority« and a strong political force capable of pursuing policies that are different from the market’s. In such a polycentric system, the argument goes, ideological and programmatic renewal is not encouraged. Moreover, and in my opinion more importantly, social democratic parties across the eu are quite heterogeneous in their programs and do not coordinate their activities sufficiently. While Moschonas raises very important issues which clearly deserve academic attention, the picture he paints is gloomy to the point of fatalism. Couldn’t it be that their status as opposition parties allows social democratic parties across the eu 27 a more constructive, open dialogue, more room to maneuver? Both are well-written and thought-provoking books for social democrats in need of renewal. The two edited volumes complement each other quite well. One provides a more theoretically-informed historical perspective, while the other offers practical guidance for future policy-makers in Britain, and also abroad. Both books are forward-looking. In her afterward to»In Search of Social Democracy,« Nina Fishman critiques the narrow horizons of western European social ipg 4/2010 Rezensionen/Book Reviews 253

democratic politicians. However, she leaves the reader with a positive outlook on social democracy’s future, stating that, as long as they remain»self-confident and vital,« social democratic parties will be able to influence non-market solutions, as has happened in the past. Isabelle Hertner, Teaching and Research Assistant, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of London 254 Rezensionen/Book Reviews ipg 4/2010