PERSPECTIVE Democratic Expeditions Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience Daphne Halikiopoulou Abstract This paper proposes a framework for comparing and ­assessing the far-right threat. It takes into account different combinations of potential changes across three dimensions:(i) voters,(ii) parties and(iii) institutions. By mapping the ways in which distinct combinations of changes across these three dimensions may lead to a series of different potential outcomes, we identify ­different scenarios of far-right democratic backsliding across different countries. This framework suggests that there is no one-size-fits-all solution and enables the identification of a range of counterstrategies tailored specifically to each configuration. It also highlights a potential trilemma of trade-offs: countering the far right in one dimension may simultaneously strengthen it in another. Policymakers may therefore tailor counterstrategies to the specific configuration of threats in different contexts, focusing on the main source of vulnerability while weighing the potential benefits of targeting the far right in one dimension against the risks of empowering it in another. Introduction The far right is a global phenomenon. Parties and leaders with agendas promoting national sovereignty, prioritising the in-group over the out-group and claiming to speak in the name of»the people« have increased their electoral support in many countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia and beyond. Given the emergence, consolidation and proliferation of these parties and leaders, as well as their entrenchment in their respective systems, there is a pressing need to develop effective contestation strategies. However, the global reach of this phenomenon makes contestation difficult. To understand how to address this phenomenon we therefore need to identify what drives it in different contexts and time-frames. But cross-regional comparisons are challenging as they require striking a balance between in-depth case specificity and generalisability. What works in one case might not work in another. Different contextual characteristics and patterns of far-right success might call for different responses. The need for a broad and generalisable comparative framework therefore is needed for the development of comprehensive ­responses. Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 1

A comparative framework This paper proposes a framework for comparing and assessing the far-right threat, which takes into account different combinations of potential changes across three dimensions:(i) voters,(ii) parties and(iii) institutions(see Figure 1). Each of these dimensions represents a specific arena of political contestation that can determine far-right party success: demand, namely the grievances that make far-right parties appealing; supply, that is, factors related to parties and party systems; and institutions, in other words, the configurations of state authority and societal organisation that shape democratic outcomes. By mapping the ways in which distinct combinations of changes across these dimensions may lead to different potential outcomes, we identify different scenarios of far-right democratic backsliding across different countries. This may enable policymakers to develop a range of counterstrategies tailored specifically to each case, depending on the configuration of the farright threat across the different dimensions. Conceptual framing Voters Figure 1 right parties are those that broadly mobilise peripherals. To measure the»voter« dimension we need to examine indexes that capture the breadth of the far-right voter base and offer information about the size of the peripheral groups. (ii) Parties This dimension captures the resilience of the party system. ­Far-right party success also depends partly on the parties themselves and the ways in which they operate in their domestic political arenas. To understand it therefore we need to consider both internal(party normalisation) and external(party system permissiveness) supply-side dynamics. In terms of internal supply, we know from the literature that far-right parties themselves may largely determine their own electoral fortunes (Mudde 2004) by presenting themselves in a palatable way as legitimate political actors. The literature has shown that farright party normalisation(Valentim 2024) and»civic« national ist normalisation(Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2025) have facilitated this process across a broad number of countries in Europe and beyond. In terms of external supply, far-right party success depends on available political opportunity structures, the permissiveness of the system within which these parties operate(Golder 2016), as well as party system institutionalisation, as institutionalised systems may both ­enable far-right breakthroughs and condition their durability. ­To measure the»party« dimension we need to examine indexes that capture far-right party normalisation, party system permissiveness and party system institutionalisation. Far-right threat to democracy Institutions Parties (i) Voters This dimension captures the resilience of the voter base. ­Far-right party success depends partly on the breadth of these parties’ electorates. We know from voting behaviour literature that major party electoral potential is associated with a mobilisational capacity beyond core voting groups(Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2023). To visualise the breadth of the farright electorate, one might imagine two broad types of voters: those driven by ideology(core voters), who support the far right on principle; and those driven by protest(peripheral voters) who tend to support the far right as a way of expressing their discontent and punishing the establishment(Halikio­ poulou and Vlandas 2022). Given that peripheral voters are the largest group of far-right voters, the most successful far(iii) Institutions This dimension captures the resilience of democratic institutions. Far-right party success ultimately depends on the ability of these parties to take over institutions. For example, entrenched far-right parties specifically target democratic checks and balances, such as the legislature and ­judicial safeguards, as well as civil society organisations and the media. To measure the»institutions« dimension we need to use indexes that consider the robustness of a broad range of democratic institutions at both the starting and end points within a designated time-frame, such as the V-DEM(Coppedge et al. 2023) indexes. Scenarios of democratic backsliding Distinct combinations of changes across these three dimensions may result in a variety of different scenarios of far-right democratic backsliding. Figure 2 presents a five-­ scenario hypothetical nested-triangle visualisation with ­variable angles. Each scenario distorts toward the vertices (voters, parties, institutions). This lets us see which force is most dominant in each threat scenario, and where the main source of vulnerability lies. Each corner represents an»index« of resilience: voter-base resilience, party system resilience and institutional resilience. Higher scores on each dimension Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 2

and greater proximity to the edges of the triangle i­ndicate a ­lower far-right threat. Lower scores on these dimensions and greater proximity to the middle of the triangle indicate a greater far-right threat. Multiple combinations of changes across the three dimensions are theoretically possible but not all are empirically possible. We focus briefly on three examples (see Figure 3). Hypothetical nested-triangle visualisation of multiple scenarios Voters Figure 2 Institutions Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Parties Center= higher Far-right threat Three hypothetical scenarios (a) Institutions hold Voters (b) Party system holds Voters (c) Voter base holds Voters Figure 3 Institutions Parties Institutions Parties Institutions Parties Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 3

Scenario(a) shows a case of resilient institutions despite widespread far-right party demand and party system permissiveness. Much of Western Europe, with its long-standing democratic institutions, potentially fits this scenario (hitherto), despite increasingly widespread support for ­far-right parties. Scenario(b) shows a case of party system resilience, despite weaken(ed) institutions and latent far-right party ­demand. Some cases in Southern Europe during the economic crisis, such as Greece, fit this scenario. Scenario(c) shows a case in which the far-right voter base is not as broad and rejection rates are high despite weak(ened) institutions and party system permissiveness. This could be a case in which the far right enjoys disproportionate power as a coalition partner or its performance has been amplified by the electoral or presidential system, but there is still a large group of opponents. Some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, fit this scenario: opposition to Bolsonaro was high and there was substantial mobilisation of non-far-right voters(Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2024). What counter-strategies may be effective? This framework helps us to identify specific strategies in accordance with each dimension, as summarised in Table 1. A counter-strategy trilemma? However, there may be trade-offs to consider when deciding which dimension to prioritise, as a particular strategy might help to strengthen one dimension while simultaneously weakening another. For example: → Galvanisation of non-far-right voters(voter dimension): this strategy might help to weaken the far-right voter base but could backfire if the far right is in power (party-­system dimension) and it responds by further strengthening its executive power or proceeds with faster constitutional/ judicial reforms(institutional ­dimension). Examples include Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland. → Demonisation(party-system dimension): this strategy might help to address the issue of party system Counter-strategies across each dimension Table 1 Dimension Voter dimension Party-system dimension Institutional dimension Strategy Dissuasion of peripherals to »break« far-right coalitions Galvanisation of non–far-right ­voters Demonisation Isolation /cordon sanitaire Confrontation Organisation of parliamentary opposition across party families Legislature safeguards Judicial responses Civil society safeguards Details and examples → Focus on existential issues, distributional conflicts and economic insecurities → Reverse or oppose cuts to key services → Tackle welfare competition, lack of access to public housing and job insecurity(e.g. Cavaillé and Ferwerda 2023) → Organise protests and awareness campaigns to mobilise opposition → Expose the far right as extremist rather than merely»right-wing« → Prevent far-right parties from joining government → Avoid cooperation with far-right parties as this may result in normalisation and exacerbate system permissiveness → Avoid copying the far right on issues that it»owns«(e.g. AbouChadi et al. 2021; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2022). → Communicate party visions that are distinct from far-right messages → Mobilise parliamentary coalitions → Emphasise distinctions between the centre-right and the far right → Implement practices such as electoral monitoring and pursue the effective organisation of parliamentary opposition(Haggard and Kaufman 2021). → Maximise the effectiveness of existing judicial mechanisms: legal sanctions/bans, infringement proceedings and litigation in supranational(e.g. European Court of Justice) and national courts (Blauberger and Kelemen 2016). → Develop early-warning systems, systematic reports and emergency-response campaigns to expose violations of individual rights(Haggard and Kaufman 2021). Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 4

­permissiveness but may simultaneously undermine the institutional dimension if, for example, the far right engages or threatens to engage in legal action. UK’s Reform party is a case in point: in 2024 the BBC apologised to Reform UK for calling the party»far-right«. Since then, both in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, journalists and media outlets have systematically refrained from using the term»far-right« for fear of legal repercussions (Hope Not Hate 2024). → Isolation/cordon sanitaire(party-system dimension): this strategy might help to tackle the issue of party system permissiveness but may at the same time be used as a campaign strategy by the far right to mobilise more peripheral voters(voter dimension). Given the trade-offs, these strategies have broken down in most countries where they have been used, such as in the case of the Sweden Democrats(SD). → Party bans and legal sanctions(institutional dimension): this strategy can be used specifically in contexts in which far-right parties engage in violent and criminal activities. While it can help to strengthen the institutional dimension, it may also serve to galvanise latent support for the far right(voter dimension). Greece’s Golden Dawn(GD) party is a case in point. The party’s leading cadres were tried and convicted for maintaining a criminal organisation and the party was subsequently outlawed. While this strategy was successful in eliminating GD, latent support(voter ­dimension) was later channelled into votes for other far-right parties with less e­ xtremist ideologies, including the Spartans(subsequently banned), Greek ­Solution, Victory and Voice of Reason. (iii) Assess: consider the trade-offs when deciding which ­dimension to prioritise, as a particular strategy might help to strengthen one dimension while simultaneously weakening another. Conclusions and recommendations The framework presented here provides a structured tool for conducting cross-regional comparisons, mapping far-right success across multiple cases through a visual format, and formalising threat levels across scenarios by grounding each dimension in measurable indicators. This way we may capture not only the magnitude of the threat but also its source; in other words, whether the primary vulnerability or strength in each case stems from the voter base, the party system or the institutional framework. There are three key takeaways from this analysis: (i) Adapt: there is no one-size-fits-all solution, as different threat scenarios may vary according to time and/or country, depending on which dimension is stronger or more vulnerable. (ii) Prioritise: accordingly, we may emphasise counterstrategies, depending on whether the main source of vulnerability or strength in each case and at a particular point in time stems from voter support, party dynamics or institutional fragility. Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 5

References Abou-Chadi, T., Mitteregger, R. und Mudde, C. (2021): Left behind by the working class? Social Democracy’s electoral crisis and the rise of the radical right. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Blauberger, M. and Kelemen, R.D. (2016): Can courts rescue national democracy? Judicial safeguards against democratic backsliding in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(3): 321–336. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229357. Cavaillé, C. and Ferwerda, J. (2023): How Distributional Conflict over In-Kind Benefits Generates Support for Far-Right Parties. The Journal of Politics, 85(1): 19–33. Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C.H., Lindberg, S.I., Teorell, J., Marquardt, K.L., Medzihorsky, J., Pemstein, D., Gastaldi, L., Grahn, S., Pernes, J., Rydén, O., von Römer, J., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-T. and Wilson, S. (2023): V-Dem Methodology v13. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Golder, M. (2016): Far right parties in Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 19: 477–97. Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (2021): The Anatomy of Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 32(4): 27–41. Halikiopoulou, D., Mock, S. and Vasilopoulou, S (2013): The civic Zeitgeist: nationalism and liberal values in the European radical right. Nations& Nationalism, 19(1): 107–127. Halikiopoulou, D., and Vlandas, T. (2022): Understanding rightwing populism and what to do about it. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Available at: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/wien/1911020220517.pdf. Hope Not Hate (2024): Reform UK Are Far-Right: Here’s Why. Available at: https://hopenothate.org.uk/2024/09/24/reform-uk-are-farright-heres-why/[last accessed 16/10/25]. Mudde, C. (2005): The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4): 541–563. Turnbull-Dugarte, S.J., López Ortega, A, and Hunklinger, M. (2025): Do Citizens Stereotype Muslims as an Illiberal Bogeyman? Evidence from a Double-List Experiment. British Journal of Political Science. Vasilopoulou, S. and Halikiopoulou, D. (2023): Democracy and ­discontent: institutional trust and evaluations of system performance among core and peripheral far right voters. Journal of European Public Policy, 31(9): 2397–2421. About Democratic Expeditions This essay is based on the paper presented by the author at the workshop Contesting the Far Right, Safeguarding Democracy: Comparative Insights from Europe and Latin America. Convened by Daphne Halikiopoulou(University of York, UK) and Carlos Meléndez(CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest), the workshop took place at the CEU Democracy Institute in Budapest on 22 and 23 September 2025. It was the second edition of Democratic Expeditions, a series of openly sourced, carefully crafted international research workshops that shed light on underexplored issues of democratic crises and democratizing struggles. The initiative is a joint venture of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s Regional Office on Democracy of the Future in Vienna, the CEU Democracy Institute, and the CEU Department of Political Science. Imprint Published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Godesberger Allee 149 53175 Bonn, Germany info@fes.de Issuing Department FES Regional Office for International Cooperation Democracy of the Future Reichsratsstr. 13/5 A-1010 Vienna Contact Filip Milačić filip.milacic@fes.de Design pertext| www.pertext.de The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) or of the organization for which the author works. Commercial use of media published by the FES is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. Publications by the FES may not be used for electioneering purposes. November 2025 © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Further publications of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung can be found here: ↗ www.fes.de/publikationen FES Regional Office for International Cooperation Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 6