A N A LYS I S Public broadcasting in Europe Poland – political instrumentalization, structural weaknesses, and the challenges of genuine reform Dr Sonia Horonziak I. Introduction: Political and Social Context of Public Service Broadcasting in Poland The position of public media established during the communist Polish People’s Republic(1944–1989) for years linked the ruling party with the control of the media realm and their content. In the countries that emerged after the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989–1991, a necessary transition toward democratic understanding of public me dia took place, but with a differing results. Poland, at tempting to distance itself from the communist past, be gan to adopt the so-called hybrid-liberal model, which resulted in the process of strong commercialization, trans lating into the tabloidization of media content 1 . This also allowed for the development of external media market plu ralism, rich in commercial stations. However, subsequent years also exposed the growing politicization of the media, a lack of transparency, and the nexus between political, business, and media elites. One of the most significant manifestations of this process, which came to light, was the Rywin affair 2 – a corruption scandal involving politics and media representatives. The ultimate turn toward the politicized media model became increasingly evident in Poland after 2015. 1 B. Dobek-Ostrowska, Polski system medialny. Trzy dekady po upadku komunizmu: dynamika procesu zmian na tle Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, w: Polski system medialny w procesie zmian. Tom 2, ed. J. Kępa-Mętrak, P. Ciszek, Kielce 2022. 2 The Rywin affair— a corruption scandal named after Polish film producer Lew Rywin, who in 2002 was accused of arranging a$17.5 million bribe to influence a new media law, allegedly on behalf of the then prime minister’s Leszek Miller political circle. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 1

The years 2015–2023 in Poland, associated with the politi cal propaganda and media“re-Polonization” strategy 3 of the PiS-led 4 government, left their mark on the image of the public broadcaster in the country and undermined its status as an independent public medium. The consolidation of the control over public service broadcasting, breached its statutory obligations of operation within the public interest, and instead became a propaganda tube for the ruling party 5 . Significant managerial and editorial changes in the public media structures(including the establishment of the National Media Council, pol. Rada Mediów Narodowych 6 ) combined with a constant under mining of alternative media sources resulted in highly bi ased media messaging, discrediting political opponents and portraying any form of opposition as“agents” of for eign, malicious forces 7 . This set of state capture of the public media resulted in a drastic decline in public trust in this institution and its credibility(see. Graph 1). The most visible consequences of these actions occurred during the 2023 parliamentary campaign, when the public media repeatedly violated the Broadcasting Act, which requires the programs of the public broadcaster to be“plu ralistic, impartial and well-balanced”. As indicated by the ODHIR report for the Polish parliamentary elections, during the electoral campaign PiS-led government coverage on TVP1 and TVP2 was limited but overwhelmingly positive, often echoing referendum themes and campaign messages. By contrast, opposition party Civic Platform received far more airtime, most of it sharply negative 8 . For the new KO-led coalition 9 government, establish after 2023 Parliamentary elections, restoration of the impartiality of public media was one of the main electoral promises. However, this proved challenging, primarily due to the previ ous government’s politically motivated management of the state-owned media companies, and support of the PiS endorsed President Andrzej Duda, who opposed any chang es to the public media. This led the new government to take a series of actions that went beyond standard procedures, the legality and transparency of which are questioned 10 . Ultimately, Telewizja Polska(TVP), Polish Radio, and Assessment of the credibility of news and current affairs programs on public television between 2012 and 2023. Question: How do you assess the credibility of news and current affairs programmes broadcast on public television?% Graph 1 Untrustworthy Ambivalent Trustworthy Hard to say 2012 5 7 28 27 23 9 2017 20 12 21 19 15 13 2019 26 12 20 16 15 11 2021 38 11 15 12 13 11 2023 38 9 15 11 15 12 Data and graph based on: Postrzeganie mediów No 132/2023, CBOS, October 2023. https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2023/K_132_23.PDF[Accessed 11.09.2025]. 3 Media„re-Polonization“ strategy(pol. Strategia repolonizacji mediów) was a political project and electoral promise of the United Right government(2015–2023) assuming the limitation of the participation of foreign companies in the media market, primarily targeting Polish private media that opposed the government and establishing the he gemony of the public broadcaster. 4 From November 16, 2015 to December 13, 2023, Poland was governed by the United Right(pol. Zjednoczona Prawica) coalition, which consisted of the two largest rightwing parties: Law and Justice(pol. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and Sovereign Poland(pol. Suwerenna Polska, formerly Solidarna Polska). 5  See: Media Freedom Report 2022, Civil Liberies Union for Europe, Berlin 2022, Germany. 6 National Media Council(pol. Rada Mediów Narodowych) established in 2016 by the PiS-led government is a collegial body responsible, among others, for appointing and dismissing management boards, supervisory boards, and program councils of the public media state companies. 7  See: Poland. Freedom of Expression and Belief, Freedom House 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/freedom-world/2022[Accessed 11.09.2025]. 8 ODIHR. Republic of Poland. Parliamentary Elections 15 October 2023. Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw 2024: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elec tions/poland/548260[Accessed 11.09.2025]. 9  The“KO-led coalition” term is based on the October 15 Coalition formed after the parliamentary election 2023 including(at that time): KO(pol. Koalicja Obywatelska, KO), Poland 2050(pol. Polska 2050), Polish People’s Party(pol. Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) and New Left(pol. Nowa Lewica). 10 Stanowisko Helsińskiej Fundacji Praw Człowieka w sprawie zmian w mediach publicznych, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Warsaw 2023, https://hfhr.pl/aktualnosci/ stanowisko-hfpc-ws-zmian-w-mediach-publicznych[Accessed: 11.09.2025] State of public service broadcasting in Poland 2

the Polish Press Agency state companies were placed into the state of liquidation, which is questioned due to its lack of clear connection with economic aspects. The process of regaining control over public media in Poland was finalized by the re-appointment of positions on the National Media Council, established under the PiS-led government in 2016, by the Civic Coalition-friendly representatives. This main tained the political connection of public broadcasters with the ruling political party, without resolving the far-reaching politicization of the management structures of television companies. Additionally, although the current ruling coali tion emphasizes that the abolition of the National Media Council should be part of the new media law, no action has been taken to date(September 2025) to achieve this. Taking into account the result of the 2025 presidential elections, which won Karol Nawrocki – a right-wing candidate unfa vorable to the government – the law changing the state and situation of public media might not be passed in the form envisioned by the ruling government. II. Systematic Analysis of the Public Broadcasting Services in Poland 1. Public Media: Legal Foundations and Modes of Operation The operations of public service broadcasting in Poland are regulated by various provisions, including the Constitu tion 11 , the Broadcasting Act(pol. ustawa o radiofonii i telewizji) 12 , and the National Media Council Act(pol. usta wa o Radzie Mediów Narodowych) 13 . As per the Broadcasting Act, the public broadcaster in Poland is composed from entities that should operate in the public interest and fulfill a social mission by providing information; make cultural and artistic assets accessible; facilitate the use of educa tion, sports, and scientific achievements; promote civic ed ucation; provide entertainment; and support national audiovisual production. Public service broadcasting in Po land includes Polish Television(TVP, pol. Telewizja Polska S.A.) and Polish Radio(pol. Polskie Radio S.A.) state com panies as well as regional stations of Polish Radio. The constitutional body safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information, and the public interest in radio and television broadcasting is the National Broadcasting Coun cil(KRRiT) 14 . However, since 2016, another institution oper ates in this regard in the country – the National Media Council, which has assumed some of the powers of the KRRiT and is responsible for, among others, appointing and dismissing the governing bodies of public radio and television companies. Moreover, since December 2023, all the public media state companies are put into the state of liquidation. Even though this situation has been going on for over 20 months now(as of September 2025), these companies are still being co-financed from the state budget and the liquidation process has not been lifted (more on this in the III. Chapter). 2. Financing Public Media: Mechanisms, Challenges, and Prospects The basis for financing public media in Poland is the radio and television license fee. Since April 2005, the License Fee Act 15 has been in effect that ensures that collected fees will be transferred to enable public radio and television broad casting entities to fulfill their public mission. The National Broadcasting Council decides annually on the fee level. However, this system, for many years now, is declared inef fective for several reasons. First, Polish Post(pol. Poczta Polska) is responsible for collecting fees, and also oversees compliance with the obligation to register receivers and pay the subscription fee. Polish Post does not perform these services pro publico bono, but for an agreed-upon fee. Therefore, the media receives only a fraction of the collected subscription fees 16 . What is most problematic, however, is that effectiveness in the fees collection in Po land has been at a very low level for years. A 2025 report from the KRRiT shows that only about 38,8% of house holds(4.5 million) have registered their receivers and 32,1% of eligible to pay households and businesses(0.7 million) had paid their license fees by the end of 2024 17 . According to the KRRiT forecast, subscription revenues in 2025 will be even lower than in 2024 and will amount to EUR 142 mil lion. Furthermore, additional inspections to enforce fee col lection are often ineffective – not only are there too few in spectors, but there is no obligation to let them into home or apartment. As the report points out:“a huge challenge for broadcasters is the lack of financial stability, which places public media in a dilemma: mission or commercial ism, and prevents them from being impartial and fulfilling the function of social control and independence from political influence. Furthermore, strong competition in the me dia market in Poland puts public media under constant pressure to compete for audiences.” 18 Although the 2020 amendment to the Broadcasting Act expanded the list of 11 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Dz. U. z 1997 r. Nr 78, poz. 483. 12 Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 r. o radiofonii i telewizji, Dz.U. 1993 nr 7 poz. 34. 13 Ustawa z dnia 22 czerwca 2016 r. o Radzie Mediów Narodowych, Dz.U. 2016 poz. 929. 14 National Broadcasting Council – pol. Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji(KRRiT). 15  Ustawa z dnia 21 kwietnia 2005 r. o opłatach abonamentowych, Dz.U. 2005 nr 85 poz. 728. 16 P. Maślak-Stępnikowska, Finansowanie Mediów Publicznych, Instytut Zamenhofa 2024, https://zamenhof.pl/2024/06/18/finansowanie-mediow-publicznych/[Accessed 13.09.2025]. 17 Sprawozdanie KRRiT z działalności w 2024 roku, KRRiT 2025, https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit/sprawozdania-i-informacja-z-dzialalnosci-w-2024-roku[Accessed: 13.09.2025]. 18  Informacja o podstawowych problemach radiofonii i telewizji w 2024 roku, KRRiT, https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit/sprawozdania-i-informacja-z-dzialalnosci-w-2024-roku [Accessed: 13.09.2025]. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 3

funding sources for public broadcasters to include subsidies from the state budget, this is still not a guaranteed form, but rather an optional one. It is also subject to politi cal pressure, as was evident in the presidential blockade of EUR 705 thousand funding for public media in 2023(more on this in Chapter III). What is more, since August 8, 2025 Poland is obliged to implement the EU European Media Freedom Act, EMFA resolution. The EMFA puts in place a new set of rules to protect media pluralism and independ ence in the EU ensuring that media – public and private – can operate more easily across borders in the EU internal market, without political pressure. The new media law an nounced in August 2025 by the Ministry of Culture and Na tional Heritage is expected to include, among other things, the abolition of license fees and the provision of a stable source of financing for public media, however the chances of it being signed by the president are low 19 . 3. Public Media and Society: Reception, Trust, and Audience Dynamics In July 2025 Reporters without Borders published a report revealing the survey on the level of political pressure to the public media, where Poland was categorized as the“ex treme” case, alongside Hungary and Malta(see. Graph 2). Poland also ranked 3 out of 27 EU countries in terms of governmental influence over the editorial boards of public service/state media outlets. There is no doubt that political events surrounding public media, especially during the PiS-led government, have con tributed to a significant decline in trust in the media news in Poland. Although trust indicators have increased from record lows in 2024 – the moment of power change in the country and culmination of the dispute over public media – ​s​ till half of the population does not put faith in the independence and truthfulness of information provided in the media(see Graph 3). If we look only at the public broadcaster, trust in the TVP News television channel(main news channel of the public broadcaster) does not exceed 35%. Low trust and the long-standing crisis of public media in the country also affect viewership. In July 2025, for the first time in history, TV Republika, a conservative and far-right private television station, became the number one TV sta tion in viewership, achieving a 6.81% share. Main public broadcaster TVP1 fell to second place with 6.80%, a 21.1% Pressure on the public media among EU countries I s there any pressure(of any kind: political, economic, etc.) on public service media in your country? Graph 2 10,34 10,34 55,17 24,14 More than half of the RSF survey respondents(16 out of 29) believe there is high pressure on the public media in their country(Greece, Italy, Spain, Czechia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia, Lithuania, Finland, United Kingdom). For over half of the respondents (16 out of 29, or 55.17 percent), the pressure exerted was political in nature, such as interference in governance, or changes in general management (Greece, Italy, Hungary, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Portugal, Austria, Croatia, Netherlands, Lithuania, France, United Kingdom). Extreme – 10.34%(3) – Hungary, Malta, Poland High pressure – 10.34%(3) – Greece, Italy, Spain, Czechia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Cyprus, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia, Lithuania, Finland, United Kingdom Low pressure – 24.14%(7) – Romania, Germany, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, France No pressure – 55.17%(16) – Ireland, Denmark, Luxembourg Source: Pressure on public media. A decisive test for European democracies, Reporters without Borders 2025, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-publishes-new-report-protect-europe-s-public-media[Accessed: 13.09.2025]. 19 Ustawa medialna wysłana, ale prezydent jej nie podpisze.“Szanse równe zeru”, Press[online: 4.09.2025] https://www.press.pl/tresc/89178,ustawa-medialna-wysla na_-ale-prezydent-jej-nie-podpisze_-_szanse-rowne-zeru_[Accessed: 14.09.2025]. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 4

Overall trust score in news in Poland Change over time 2015–2025 Graph 3 56 55 53 47 42 42 48 48 48 39 45 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 regarding both public funding for public media and the subscription fee, given the increasingly low viewing fig ures. Particularly disturbing in this re spect are trends regarding media consumption by young Poles. As report of the Insitute of Public Affairs from 2024 shows, young Poles use social media, including Facebook, YouTube and Instagram as their primary source of information(see: Graph 4). Public television or radio are one of the rar est medium used to gain information about the public affairs. Combined with falling audience figures overall, it appears that public media are reaching less and less sections of society. The weakening of public media often V. Makarenko, Poland. Digital News Report 2025, The Reuters Institute 2025, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox. ac.uk/digital-news-report/2025/poland[Accessed 13.09.2025]. means an increase in the use of alternative sources of information, espe cially among social media channels. drop compared to last year. The drastic drop in viewership The bias of public media broadcaster has become one did not only concern TVP1 but most public television chan- of the key criticisms of the country’s information land nels including TVP Info, which recorded shocking decline scape. Fake news thrives in a society that is losing trust in of over 70% in viewers 20 . This raises a number of questions traditional sources of information, which in turn deepens Information sources for young Poles aged 16–29, September 2024 How frequently do you use the following sources of information about society and politics? Answers: very+rather regularly Graph 4 Facebook YouTube Instagram Private radio(np. RMF, Radio Eska, Radio Zet, Tok FM) TikTok Publicly available web portals, online only (e.g., Interia, Onet, WP, wPolityce, Niezalezna.pl) Private television channels (e.g., TVN, TVN 24, Polsat, Polsat News) X(f. Twitter) Public television channels(e.g., TVP 1, TVP 2, TVP Info) Traditional print media outlets or their websites (e.g., Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita) Private blogs Public radio(e.g., PR1 i PR2, Trójka, PR24) "Alternative" media(e.g., kresy.pl, Prawy.pl, Strajk.eu) None of the above 17% 13% 12% 12% 9% 9% 51% 45% 69% 67% 63% 39% 33% 31% Young Poles most often obtain information about public affairs and politics from social media, which role has significantly increased over the years. S. Horonziak, F. Pazderski, Młodzi w Europie Środkowej 2024: Polska, Instytut Spraw Publicznych 2025, https://www.isp.org.pl/pl/publikacje/mlodzi-w-europie-srodkowej-2024-wyniki-badania-w-polsce[Accessed: 13.09.2025]. 20  See: Sprawozdanie KRRiT z działalności… State of public service broadcasting in Poland 5

polarization. According to the 2025 Spring Eurobarometer, almost 80% of Poles believes that they frequently encoun ter disinformation 21 . The deterioration of a public broadcaster often means the weakening of a reliable source of information and fertile ground for prevalence of less relia ble sources. 4. Digitalisation and digital competition Technological evolution and digitalization introduced a profound change in the way we consume media today. This also influenced the models of commercialization of public media, which began to compete with their private counter parts. Out of necessity, the Polish public broadcaster also had to adapt to these changes. In 2010, as a subpage of tvp.pl, the“TVP VOD” service, shar ing video on demand content, was launched(although such services had existed on the public broadcaster’s site to a lim ited extent since 2007). In 2023, TVP VOD was additionally integrated with TVP Stream, the previous service enabling watching live television. Although TVP VOD’s market share is not marginal, it does not outperform the largest foreign video on demand service providers. As of April 2025, Netflix took the first place in Poland in terms of the number of users(9.75 million), the average time spent on the platform(5 hours 55 minutes) and the share of time spent using it(over 45%). After it followed MAX, Disney+ and Canal+ online. TVP VOD placed fifth in the ranking with 2,55 million users, average watch time 3 hours 59 mins and a 7,94% share 22 . However, TVP VOD is not lagging behind in all areas. In August 2025, the TVP VOD mobile app recorded the highest average watch time per user. With a watch time of 6 hours and 7 minutes, it sur passed services like Netflix and Player 23 . This application however, despite having 2.86 million users, cannot com pare to the dominant ones on the market(see Graph 5). For this reason, TVP also has its own accounts, among others, on TikTok(396.1K followers@tvp) and Instagram (572K followers@tvp.info), although their reach can hard ly be considered a success. Table 1 Mediapanel Survey Results: Raking of Top Internet Apps: July 2025 Media channel Aplikacja Google Aplikacja Facebook Aplikacja Messenger Aplikacja Youtube Aplikacja Mapy Google Aplikacja Gmail Aplikacja WhatsApp Messenger Aplikacja Temu: Shop Like a Billionaire Aplikacja Wiadomości(Google Inc.) Aplikacja Instagram Aplikacja TikTok Aplikacja Zdjęcia Google Aplikacja Biedronka Aplikacja Allegro Aplikacja Dysk Google Aplikacja Spotify Music Aplikacja Inpost Mobile Aplikacja Żappka Aplikacja Lidl Plus Aplikacja OLX.pl Użytkownicy(Real Users) 25 297 110 21 994 416 20 875 644 19 314 126 19 169 784 18 669 366 17 626 248 14 209 992 13 741 812 11 768 490 11 533 266 10 813 014 10 699 128 8 803 890 8 626 014 8 373 456 8 346 402 8 145 036 7 940 592 7 933 950 Zasięg(internet) 85,12% 74,00% 70,24% 64,99% 64,50% 62,82% 59,31% 47,81% 46,24% 39,60% 38,81% 36,38% 36,00% 29,62% 29,02% 28,17% 28,08% 27,41% 26,72% 26,70% ATS 1h 37m 17s 16h 55m 26s 7h 20m 30s 18h 46m 23s 3h 1m 19s 31m 53s 4h 6m 12s 1h 0m 3s 1h 33m 45s 8h 40m 40s 1d 3h 27m 10s 50m 23s 32m 54s 1h 54m 20s 10m 41s 1h 16m 10s 10m 26s 12m 30s 17m 7s 1h 11m 43s Audyt nie nie nie nie nie nie nie nie nie nie nie nie nie tak nie nie nie nie nie nie 21  Standard Eurobarometer 103 – Spring 2025, Dataset AP, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s3372_103_3_std103_eng?locale=en[Accessed: 14.09.2025]. 22  Największy serwis VoD w Polsce: Netflix, Max czy Disney+? Są najnowsze dane! HDTV.pl, https://hdtvpolska.com/najwiekszy-serwis-vod-netflix-max-disney-plus-rank ing-platformy-polska/[Accessed 26.09.2025]. 23  Wzrost zainteresowania TVP VOD i kanałami w streamingu, TVP.info, https://www.tvp.info/89063096/telewizja-polska-rosnie-w-segmencie-online-sa-nowe-dane[Accessed: 26.09.2025]. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 6

Table 2 Mediapanel Survey Results: Raking of Domains Across All Devices: July 2025 Media channel google.com youtube.com facebook.com interia.pl onet.pl allegro.pl wp.pl temu.com mediaexpert.pl wikipedia.org olx.pl ceneo.pl gazeta.pl weather.com tvn24.pl fakt.pl instagram.com o2.pl filmweb.pl businessinsider.com.pl Użytkownicy(Real Users) 27 251 154 19 801 098 17 207 478 16 252 650 16 086 114 15 004 926 14 420 268 12 466 872 12 183 048 11 364 462 10 298 016 9 992 970 9 503 892 9 296 532 9 185 724 8 645 616 8 598 312 7 629 228 7 242 048 7 048 134 Zasięg(internet) 91,69% 66,62% 57,90% 54,68% 54,12% 50,49% 48,52% 41,95% 40,99% 38,24% 34,65% 33,62% 31,98% 31,28% 30,91% 29,09% 28,93% 25,67% 24,37% 23,71% Wyniki badania Mediapanel za lipiec 2025 – internet, Mediapanel, https://media-panel.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wyniki-badania-mediapanel-za-lipiec-2025-internet/[Accessed: 26.09.2025]. ATS 1h 59m 28s 8h 34m 26s 3h 28m 42s 47m 53s 1h 29m 36s 54m 18s 1h 18m 14s 15m 24s 6m 56s 10m 55s 50m 35s 2m 37s 18m 1s 2m 16s 19m 26s 17m 34s 20m 49s 21m 47s 6m 51s 9m 9s Audyt nie nie nie tak nie tak nie nie nie nie tak nie tak nie tak tak nie nie tak tak Telewizja Polska public company also has multiple web portals, including the main portal Tvp.pl and additional services such as information portal Tvp.info. However, the public broadcaster’s domains are not even among the top 20 most popular portals in Poland and are outranked by other private media and online web portals. Looking solely at the news portals ranking, Tvp.info ranks third in Poland with 2,56 million users after private televi sion portals Tvn24.pl(10,4 million users) and Polsatnews.pl (5,85 million users). Tvrepublika.pl is right behind it with 1.1 million users 24 . Another important element of the Polish public broadcaster’s digitalization process is the development and imple mentation of the Digital Audio Broadcasting Plus(DAB+) technology. This involves the gradual digitization of the airwaves that allow for the transmission of radio signals in the form of data, offering improved sound quality, addi tional information, and the ability to broadcast multiple stations on a single frequency. By December 2024, total DAB+ coverage in Poland had reached 87.9% of the popu lation and 75% of the territory 25 . Polish Radio is a pioneer in digital broadcasting, as all its programs are currently broadcast digitally. The process of digitization requires new methods and solu tions to attract audiences in the age of artificial intelligence, social media, and streaming platforms. Public broadcasters must therefore balance ways of reaching new audiences, such as young people who don’t need tradition al radio and television. At the same time, their public mis sion cannot be overshadowed by consumer demands. As the National Broadcasting Council(KRRiT) cautioned in a recent report,“the future of public media depends largely on adapting technology and creating programming that aligns with audience expectations and habits” 26 . However, the current structure of public broadcasting in Poland and the significant challenges associated with its politicization and unstable financing largely prevent this goal from being achieved satisfactorily. 24 M. Niedbalski, Tvn24.pl umocnił się na pozycji lidera portali telewizyjnych stacji informacyjnych, Press, https://www.press.pl/tresc/87843,tvn24_pl-umocnil-sie-na-pozyc ji-lidera-portali-telewizyjnych-stacji-informacyjnych[Accessed: 26.09.2025]. 25  Poland, WorldDab, https://www.worlddab.org/countries/poland[Accessed: 26.09.2025]. 26  Informacja o podstawowych problemach…, p. 14. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 7

III. Political changes to the public service broadcasting bodies One of the most significant challenges confronting the Polish public broadcaster is its profound politicization and structural dependence on the ruling political formation. This condition arises not only from inadequately formulat ed legal provisions, but also from successive reforms that have gradually eroded statutory safeguards of independ ence. The weakening of the broadcaster cannot, however, be attributed to isolated incidents; rather, it represents the outcome of a long-term process of institutional decline. Analyzing the trajectory of this deterioration demonstrates that restoring the autonomy of public service media cannot be accomplished through a single legislative intervention. Instead, it necessitates a comprehensive set of systemic re forms aimed at restructuring the interdependent network of institutions and regulatory mechanisms responsible for the governance of the broadcaster. 1. Weakening the role of the National Broadcasting Council The constitutional body safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information and the public interest in radio and television broadcasting is the National Broadcasting Coun cil(KRRiT). Its members are appointed as follows: two members are appointed by the Sejm of the Republic of Po land, one member is appointed by the Senate of the Re public of Poland, and two members are appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland. Their terms are six years. This composition is intended to reduce the possibili ty of concentration of power of one political option, howev er achieving a politicized composition is quite simple in the case of a government with the support of the president, as was the case during the PiS-led coalition rule. It is worth noting, however, that after 2015, the constitutional position of this body was significantly weakened and some of its most important competences were transferred to the Na tional Media Council. In 2015, the PiS-led government pushed through a law stripping the KRRiT of its influence over the composition of the management and supervisory boards of public media companies(TVP and Polish Radio), as well as over the content of these companies’ statutes and transferring this competence to the Minister of the State Treasury. The scope of discretion in exercising the powers granted to the KRRiT by the Constitution was therefore significantly limited, and the institution was de prived of its crucial functions, resulting in the lack of ability to fulfill its constitutional mission. This was confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 December 2016, which stated that depriving the KRRiT—a body estab lished under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland—of its role in appointing and dismissing the governing bodies of public radio and television companies was unconstitu tional 27 . Although the Constitutional Tribunal ordered the restoration of the constitutional order, the judgment was not implemented. In June 2016, the PiS-led government passed a new law on the National Media Council 28 , deem ing the law challenged by the Tribunal lost its binding force in this case. 2. National Media Council as a new decisive power The Act on the National Media Council, established a new body—the National Media Council—and granted it authori ty over the appointment and dismissal of members of pub lic radio and television bodies and the Polish Press Agency. Theoretically, the Council assumed these powers from the minister responsible for the State Treasury, but in reality, these are the original powers of the National Broadcasting Council(KRRiT). The composition of the new body intro duced into the public media system has been questionable from the outset 29 , as its composition is directly dependent on the parliamentary majority. The Council consists of five members, three of whom are elected by the Sejm and two members are appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland, on the basis of candidates nominated by the oppo sition camps, provided, however, that if all opposition clubs refrain from nominating their representatives to the new body, the president may appoint the members inde pendently. Moreover, unlike the composition of the KRRiT, a member of the National Media Council may be a politi cian and simultaneously hold a parliamentary or senatorial mandate. The National Media Council quickly became a supportive body for the government, appointing new boards of public media companies, which quickly redirect ed the public broadcaster’s activities toward biased and propaganda-driven messages. The Commissioner for Hu man Rights 30 has repeatedly intervened in the matter of public media, emphasizing that public media in Poland fail to maintain the pluralism, impartiality, balance, and inde pendence of coverage that they were supposed to guaran tee by law. He also cited independent analyses from vari ous research centers, including the Polish Language Coun cil, which in one report indicated that“TVP News does not convey objective information to citizens, but its own vision of the events discussed.[...] The linguistic and communica tion practices in the News tickers are often manipulative – the broadcaster’s persuasive influence on the audience is hidden and pursues the broadcaster’s particular goals, without considering the broadly understood and inclusive 27  See: Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 13 grudnia 2016 r. sygn. akt K 13/16, Dz.U. 2016 poz. 2210, Sejm RP. 28  Ustawa z dnia 22 czerwca 2016 r. o Radzie Mediów Narodowych… 29  See: L. Jaskuła, Problemy w wykonywaniu zadań przez Krajową Radę Radiofonii i Telewizji w kontekście utworzenia Rady Mediów Narodowych, Studia Prawnoustrojowe 58/2022. 30 Sytuacja w mediach publicznych. Ponowna odpowiedź MKiDN, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich 2024, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-media-publiczne-sytuacja-potrze bna-nowelizacja-mkidn-ponowne-odpowiedz[Accessed: 13.09.2025]. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 8

concept of the common good.” 31 This situation has led to a significant decline in public trust in the public media and has set a dangerous precedent for disrupting the balance of political and civic forces in the country, tilting support from public funds towards the ruling camp. This advantage was particularly felt during the 2023 parliamentary elec tions, when public media were openly used to support the ruling camp’s election campaign. ODiHR’s analysis indicat ed that“The political reporting of the main public media (TVP1, TVP2, TVP Info, Jedynka) often presented socio-po litical events in a manipulative and distorted manner pro moting the ruling party, the government, and its policies. It conversely and consistently attacked the main opposition KO and its leader, and rarely mentioned other contesting parties, further deepening the political polarization in soci ety.” 32 After KO-led coalition won the parliamentary elec tions in 2023, they immediately announced that they would take steps to restore the independence of public media in the country, however, to date, no changes to the law re garding the both institutions have been introduced. 3. The state of liquidation of the Polish public broadcasting companies On December 19, 2023, the Sejm, now having a majority of KO-led coalition votes, adopted a resolution on“restoring legal order and the impartiality and reliability of public me dia and the Polish Press Agency” 33 . This resolution sparked a series of protests by PiS MPs and journalists associated with the previous ruling camp. On the same day, back then Minister of Culture and National Heritage, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, citing the Commercial Companies Code, dis missed the authorities of public media, including TVP, by passing the National Media Council, which was staffed at that time by members associated with the previous ruling camp. Although the Commercial Companies Code grants the owners of companies(in this case, the State Treasury) the possibility to dismiss the Management Boards and the respective Supervisory Boards, the conclusion allowing the application of the Commercial Code in this case was not reconcilable with the systemic interpretation derived from the general model of public radio and television. The posi tion recognizing the competence of a government repre sentative to dismiss and appoint members of the bodies managing the activities of public radio and television com panies raised doubts among constitutionalists and specialists, especially in the light of previous judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal 34 . When Piotr Zemła, the newly ap pointed head of TVP’s supervisory board, arrived at the tel evision building, he was blocked by, among others, PiS MPs. The blockade of the TV station led, among other things, to the disappearance of the main news channel TVP Info from the air for the first time in the history. The method of implementing changes in the boards of public media companies was also questioned by President An drzej Duda. Referring to the illegality of an attempt to take over the public media, he decided to veto the act imple menting the budget act 35 , questioning the financial re sources allocated by the new government to public broad caster. In response to this action, the Minister Sienkiewicz decided to put Telewizja Polska S.A., Polskie Radio S.A. and Polska Agencja Prasowa S.A. into liquidation to secure the continued operation of those companies 36 . The liquida tion state remains to this moment(September 2025) and the public media are operating with additional state fund ing. In the meantime, the composition of the National Me dia Council has been changed, and as of December 2024, its chairman is Wojciech Król, MP from the Civic Platform (KO). The new composition of the Council, having the ma jority of the current ruling party, officially repealed the res olution of the previous composition of the National Media Council, legitimizing the changes made earlier. Although liquidation is a state that should end after any necessary actions have been taken to carry out the liquida tion process, in 2025 public broadcasting services are oper ating under similar principles as before. In August 2025 Marta Cienkowska, The Minister of Culture and National Heritage, announced that a new media law is already pre pared and it will, among other things, dissolve the National Media Council, reduce the number of public television channels, and introduce a new, more transparent and de politicized method of electing public media management boards. After its introduction, the state of liquidation of public media is to be abolished. However, the adoption of this law depends not only on the ruling majority but also on the support for the changes of the new president of Po land – Karol Nawrocki, elected in 2025. There is also no certainty that the proposed changes will actually strength en the guarantees of political independence for appointment process of both the KRRiT and the supervisory boards of public television and radio companies’ members. The new government’s actions to date have been aimed 31  Sprawozdanie o stanie ochrony języka polskiego za lata 2016-2017, Druk nr 3324, Rada Języka Polskiego 2019, https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/C4B224C28DB 9367BC12583CB0032CA99/%24File/3324.pdf[Accessed: 13.09.2025]. 32  Republic of Poland. Parliamentary Elections 15 October 2023. Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, ODIHR, Warsaw 2024: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elec tions/poland/548260[Accessed 11.09.2025]. 33  Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 19 grudnia 2023 r. w sprawie przywrócenia ładu prawnego oraz bezstronności i rzetelności mediów publicznych oraz Polskiej Agencji Prasowej, M.P. 2023 poz. 1477, Sejm RP. 34  Stanowisko Helsińskiej Fundacji Praw Człowieka w sprawie zmian w mediach publicznych, Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka 2023, https://hfhr.pl/aktualnosci/stanow isko-hfpc-ws-zmian-w-mediach-publicznych[Accessed 13.09.2025]. 35  In Polish law, the proper implementation of the budget requires the adoption of a so-called act implementing the budget act(pol. ustawa okołobudżetowa), which regu lates, among other things, the allocation of funds to individual budget parts. While the president cannot block the budget act itself, the budget-related act is subject to veto like any other act. 36  Komunikat Ministra Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego, Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego 2023, https://www.gov.pl/web/kultura/komunikat-ministra-kultu ry-i-dziedzictwa-narodowego[Accessed 13.09.2025]. State of public service broadcasting in Poland 9

more at“regaining” control over the public broadcaster than at actually restoring independence from the ruling po litical party. IV. Key Findings and Policy Recommendations Between 2015 and 2023, public media in Poland were subject to intense politicization and instrumentalization under the PiS-led government, which undermined their statutory obli gations and eroded public trust. The establishment of the National Media Council and politically motivated manageri al changes entrenched state capture, leading to biased cov erage and violations of the Broadcasting Act. The 2023 par liamentary campaign highlighted the scale of partisanship, with the public broadcaster acting as a propaganda tool rather than a pluralistic medium. Although the new KO-led coalition pledged to restore impartiality, its actions have faced legal and political resistance, especially from the presi dent and PiS-aligned institutions. Moreover, subsequent de cisions made by the ruling coalition revealed its desire to free public media from the influence of the previous govern ment rather than to introduce regulations making the public broadcaster independent from the political influence of any ruling party. The ongoing liquidation of state-owned media companies and contested governance reforms illustrate both the urgency and complexity of systemic change. Looking ahead, without a broad political consensus and a new media law, the independence and credibility of public service me dia in Poland remain uncertain. Recommendations: Since the main challenge facing public media in Poland is their lack of impartiality and dependence on political influ ence, changes should primarily aim to ensure the greatest possible independence, impartiality and professionalism of the public broadcaster. → The procedure for selecting members of the management and supervisory boards of public broadcasting companies should limit the possibility of political influence and rules’ circumvention by focusing on the transparency of the set selection criteria and unbiased appeal process to limit political influence on the elected members. → The National Media Council, as a body duplicating the existing National Broadcasting Council(KRRiT) and be ing politicized, should be abolished. However, its aboli tion should be accompanied by changes implemented within the KRRiT itself. → National Broadcasting Council(KRRiT) should be depo liticized, primarily by changing the method of electing Council members, making it independent from ruling government. → The state of liquidation of public media in Poland should be lifted while ensuring a stable source of financing, inde pendent of political pressure and in accordance with the requirements of the European Media Freedom Act. → Consideration should be given to transforming the coun try’s public media financing system. It would be advisa ble to allocate a fixed portion of the budget to the pub lic media. At the same time, the viability of maintaining the television and radio license fee should be consid ered. While maintaining it, the fee collection system should be transformed and the public broadcaster’s mandate strengthened through regular reports on investments and innovations covered by the license fee. About the author Dr. Sonia Horonziak is a program director at the Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw and analyzes the challenges facing democra cy and the rule of law in Poland and Central Europe, with a par ticular focus on elections, disinformation, and the media. List of Illustrations Graph 1. Assessment of the credibility of news and current affairs programs on public television between 2012 and 2023 (TVP1, TVP2, TVP Info). Graph 2. Pressure on the public media among EU countries. Graph 3. Overall trust score in news in Poland. Change over time 2015-2025. Graph 4. Information sources for young Poles aged 16-29, September 2024. Graph 5. Mediapanel Survey Results: Raking of Top Internet Apps: July 2025. Bibliography Civil Liberties Union for Europe(2022): Media Freedom Report 2022, Berlin, https://www.liberties.eu/f/KBEEq5(14.11.2025). CBOS(2023): Postrzeganie mediów Nr. 132/2023, https://www. cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2023/K_132_23.PDF(11.9.2025). Dobek-Ostrowska, B.(2022): Das polnische Mediensystem: Drei Jahrzehnte nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus: Dyna mik des Wandels vor dem Hintergrund Mittel- und Osteuropas, in: Kępa-Mętrak, J.; Ciszek, P.(Hrsg.): Das polnische Mediensystem im Wandel, Band 2, Kielce. European Union(2025): Standard Eurobarometer 103: Spring 2025, Dataset AP, https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/ s3372_103_3_std103_eng?locale=en(14.9.2025). Freedom House(2022): Poland: Freedom of Expression and Belief, https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/freedom-world/2022 (11.9.2025). State of public service broadcasting in Poland 10

HDTV.pl(2025): Największy serwis VoD w Polsce: Netflix, Max czy Disney+? Są najnowsze dane!, https://hdtvpolska.com/na jwiekszy-serwis-vod-netflix-max-disney-plus-ranking-platformypolska/(26.9.2025). Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka(2023): Stanowisko Hel sińskiej Fundacji Praw Człowieka w sprawie zmian w mediach publicznych, https://hfhr.pl/aktualnosci/stanowisko-hfpc-ws-zmi an-w-mediach-publicznych(13.9.2025). Horonziak, S.; Pazderski, F.(2025): Młodzi w Europie Środkowej 2024: Polska, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, https://www.isp.org.pl/ pl/publikacje/mlodzi-w-europie-srodkowej-2024-wyniki-badaniaw-polsce(13.9.2025). Jaskuła, L.(2022): Problemy w wykonywaniu zadań przez Kra jową Radę Radiofonii i Telewizji w kontekście utworzenia Rady Mediów Narodowych, in: Studia Prawnoustrojowe 58(2022). KRRiT(2025): Sprawozdanie KRRiT z działalności w 2024 roku, https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit/sprawozdania-i-informacja-zdzialalnosci-w-2024-roku(13.9.2025). Makarenko, V.(2025): Poland: Digital News Report 2025, The Reuters Institute, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digi tal-news-report/2025/poland(13.9.2025). Maślak-Stępnikowska, P.(2024): Finansowanie Mediów Pub licznych, Instytut Zamenhofa, https://zamenhof.pl/2024/06/18/fi nansowanie-mediow-publicznych/(13.9.2025). Mediapanel(2025): Wyniki badania Mediapanel za lipiec 2025 – internet, https://media-panel.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wyniki-bada nia-mediapanel-za-lipiec-2025-internet/(26.9.2025) Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego(2023): Komu nikat Ministra Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego, https://www. gov.pl/web/kultura/komunikat-ministra-kultury-i-dziedzictwa-nar odowego(13.9.2025). Niedbalski, M.(2025): Tvn24.pl umocnił się na pozycji lidera por tali telewizyjnych stacji informacyjnych, Press, https://www.press. pl/tresc/87843,tvn24_pl-umocnil-sie-na-pozycji-lidera-porta li-telewizyjnych-stacji-informacyjnych(26.9.2025). ODIHR(2024): Republic of Poland: Parliamentary Elections 15 October 2023: Limited Election Observation Mission Final Re port, Warschau, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/po land/548260(11.9.2025). Press(2025): Ustawa medialna wysłana, ale prezydent jej nie podpisze:„Szanse równe zeru“, 4.9.2025, https://www.press.pl/ tresc/89178,ustawa-medialna-wyslana_-ale-prezydent-jej-nie-pod pisze_-_szanse-rowne-zeru_(14.9.2025). Rada Języka Polskiego(2019): Sprawozdanie o stanie ochrony języka polskiego za lata 2016–2017, Druk nr 3324, https://orka. sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/C4B224C28DB9367BC12583CB 0032CA99/%24File/3324.pdf(13.9.2025). Reporters without Borders(2025): Pressure on Public Media: A Decisive Test for European Democracies, https://rsf.org/en/rsfpublishes-new-report-protect-europe-s-public-media(13.9.2025). Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich(2024): Sytuacja w mediach pub licznych, Ponowna odpowiedź MKiDN, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/ content/rpo-media-publiczne-sytuacja-potrzebna-nowelizac ja-mkidn-ponowne-odpowiedz(13.9.2025). TVP.info(2025): Wzrost zainteresowania TVP VOD i kanałami w streamingu, https://www.tvp.info/89063096/telewizja-polskarosnie-w-segmencie-online-sa-nowe-dane(26.9.2025). WorldDab(2025): Poland, https://www.worlddab.org/countries/ poland(26.9.2025). Imprint Publisher Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Warsaw ul. Poznańska 3/4, 00–680 Warszawa https://polska.fes.de/ Content responsibility Dr. Max Brändle, Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Warsaw Contact polska@fes.de Title illustration Till Lukat The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.(FES). Commercial use of the media published by the FES is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. FES publications may not be used for elec tion campaign purposes. March 2026 © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e. V. ISBN 978-83-64062-88-9 Further publications of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung can be found here: ↗ www.fes.de/publikationen State of public service broadcasting in Poland 11