A N A LYS I S Authors: Prof. Dr. Sead Turčalo and Ioannis Alexandris Editor: Halina Chraščová May 2026 Toolkit on Countering the Far Right in Southeast Europe CHAPTER II The Far Right in Southeast Europe: Redefining Extremism in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

Imprint Publisher Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Dialouge Southeast Europe Kupreška 20 71000 Sarajevo Bosnia-Herzegovina info.soe@fes.de Publishing department Eastern Europe Department Responsibility for content and editing Sarah Hees-Kalyani, Director, FES in Bosnia and Herzegovina Regional Coordinator, FES Dialogue Southeast Europe Selma Šehović, Regional Program Manager, FES Dialogue Southeast Europe Contact Sarah Hees-Kalyani, Regional Coordinator Harun Cero, Program Manager Design/Layout Azra Kadić Front page design Azra Kadić The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.(FES). Commercial use of the media published by the FES is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. FES publications may not be used for election campaignpurposes. May 2026 © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. ISBN 978-9926-576-37-0 ID 69869062 Further publications of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung can be found here: ↗ www.fes.de/publikationen

Prof. Dr. Sead Turčalo and Ioannis Alexandris May 2026 Toolkit on Countering the Far Right in Southeast Europe CHAPTER II The Far Right in Southeast Europe: Redefining Extremism in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape Sarajevo, 2026.

Contents Executive Summary.................................................  3 Global and Geopolitical Drivers of Far-Right Normalisation................  4 The Far-Right in Southeast Europe....................................  7 Key Takeaways....................................................  11 References.......................................................  13 Introduction to Chapter III..........................................  14 Key Takeaways...................................................  15

Executive Summary Across Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation has worked for decades alongside trade unions, civil society organisations, progressive political actors, and engaged citizens to strengthen democracy, social justice, and social cohesion. Our experience in the region tells us something very clear: the far right does not advance only because of its own strength, but also because democratic, progressive alternatives are too often fragmented, abstract, or disconnected from people’s everyday realities. This Toolkit is our response to that challenge. The normalisation of far-right politics in Southeast Europe is no longer a distant warning but a lived condition. Exclusionary ideas have moved from the margins into mainstream political language; fear is presented as “common sense”; and authoritarian practices are justified as pragmatism or protection. In accession countries and EU member states alike, this shift threatens democratic institutions, social solidarity, minority rights, and the very idea that politics can serve the many rather than the few. For FES, countering these dynamics is not only a matter of defending liberal norms, but of renewing the socialdemocratic promise: that democracy must deliver dignity, security, and fairness in people’s daily lives. This is why we believe a practical toolkit is urgently needed. Too many resources on the far right remain either purely analytical or reactive—explaining what the far right is, or why it is dangerous, without equipping democratic actors with the language, strategies, and confidence to engage people where they are. This publication starts from a different premise: that countering the far right begins not with slogans or moral superiority, but with lived experience, shared values, and visible democratic practice. Chapter One grounds the Toolkit in everyday life. By opening with a familiar neighbourhood rather than an abstract theory, it reminds us that democracy, solidarity, and dignity are not distant ideals but things people already practice—often quietly—across the region. Drawing on these experiences, the chapter translates core progressive values into a clear, accessible communication framework that speaks directly to the concerns the far right exploits: security, belonging, fairness, and control over one’s future. From an FES perspective, this approach reflects a longstanding conviction of social democracy: that political imagination must grow from social reality, not be imposed from above. Chapter Two provides the analytical backbone needed to understand what democratic actors are up against. It shows how far-right politics in Southeast Europe has adapted to geopolitical upheaval, crises, and global power shifts, becoming more strategic, more respectable in appearance, and more deeply embedded in mainstream politics. For FES, this analysis is essential because it moves the discussion beyond“extremism” and forces us to confront a more uncomfortable truth: that democracy is being hollowed out incrementally, often with broad public consent. Recognising this process is a precondition for resisting it effectively. Chapter Three demonstrates that resistance is not theoretical. Through concrete examples from Serbia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it shows that democratic pressure can be built even under illiberal conditions—when people organise collectively, remain visible, and act with moral clarity and care. These cases resonate strongly with FES’s work in the region, where we have seen again and again that sustainable change comes from persistence, alliances, and the defence of public goods, rather than from short-lived outrage or elite-driven campaigns. Taken together, this Toolkit reflects the Friedrich-EbertStiftung’s belief that countering the far right is not only about opposing something, but about building something better. It is an invitation to activists, organisers, trade unionists, politicians, and engaged citizens to reconnect democratic politics with everyday life; to speak about security without fear, community without exclusion, and dignity without conditions; and to act in ways that make democracy visible, credible, and worth defending. In a region shaped by crisis, inequality, and democratic fatigue, this is not an optional exercise—it is a democratic necessity. In the changing geopolitical landscape of the 2010s, Southeast Europe(SEE) witnessed a profound reconstruction of what makes right-wing extremism. Historically, the Far Right in this region has often been defined by blatant ethno-nationalist militancy and marginal anti-democratic groups. Today, however, this term encompasses a wider range of actors, including populist radical right-wing parties that operate within the electoral political framework while advocating illiberal, exclusionary agendas. 3

Global and Geopolitical Drivers of Far-Right Normalisation Summary: The rise and mainstreaming of far-right actors in SEE cannot be understood in isolation from the broader geopolitical environment, especially in the context of an increasingly interconnected global landscape. Over the past decade, a series of external shocks, including the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, have further weakened trust in liberal institutions and accelerated the erosion of the post-Cold War multilateral order. This dynamic has been further consolidated by the 2025 US National Security Strategy, which explicitly echoes a willingness to actively reshape Europe’s political trajectory from within. At the same time, shifts in US domestic politics, particularly the resurgence of Trumpism, have provided new ideological legitimacy to European far-right parties. These global dynamics create structural incentives that allow nationalist and exclusionary discourses to be repackaged as“pragmatic realism” across the SEE region. Analysis: While there is no single universal definition for right-wing extremism, it is commonly understood as an ideology that unites authoritarianism, anti-democracy and exclusive nationalism, often associated with xenophobia, racism and populism(Buljubašić, 2022). The very definition of extremism has evolved under the impact of broader geopolitical processes such as the EU integration, or by systemic shocks such as the post-2015 migrant wave, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The current international landscape, marred by the erosion of multilateralism, people’s distrust in liberal institutions and a global drift toward transactional politics, geo-economics, and zero-sum competition between great powers, is providing an environment that is at the same time strengthening and normalising Far Right narratives at both the European and more regional(SEE) level. All of these trends have been already at play for over a decade. However, President Trump’s re-election in the United States has further accelerated the unravelling of the liberal international order – at least as we knew it since the end of World War II – and deepened a global turn toward transactional politics. At the same time, the social backlash against hyper-globalisation has created fertile ground for movements that promise protection from global and external shocks(Rodrik, 2021). Against this backdrop, nationalism is reframed not as extremism but as a pragmatic approach – an alternative to the liberal order now seen as exhausted. By openly rejecting multilateralism and promoting an»America First« agenda rooted in dealmaking, tariffs, and national sovereignty, Trump has normalised the language of transactional politics that many European Far Right parties already embrace. In this sense, the political shift in Washington has served as a legitimising mirror for Europe’s own nationalist actors, allowing them to rebrand protectionism and isolationism as»pragmatic« remedies, responding to the fears, needs, and concerns of their electorate. The political shift in Washington- rejecting multilateralism and promoting an»America First« agenda rooted in deal-making, tariffs, and national sovereignty- has served as a legitimising mirror for Europe’s nationalist actors, allowing them to rebrand protectionism and isolationism as»pragmatic« remedies. Furthermore, Washington’s new MAGA-infused ideological offensive post 2024, seeking to export America’s»culture war« to Europe by publicly intervening in the domestic affairs of European countries and by openly courting European Far Right parties, has given a transatlantic boost to the already growing attention most of these parties enjoy. Through platforms such as X and US-linked think tanks, this offensive portrays the EU as a»woke« organisation run by liberal elites, which, in Trump’s own words,»was formed to screw over the US« and tries to consolidate a transatlantic far-right ecosystem(Zerka, 2025). At the 2025 Munich Security Conference, Vice President JD Vance denounced Germany’s»firewall« against the Alternative für Deutschland(AfD) as incompatible with democracy and warned that Europe’s primary threat stems from its»retreat from shared Western values«(Politico, 2025). AfD leader Alice Weidel immediately endorsed his remarks and met with him 4 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

during the conference, while White House adviser Elon Musk in an interview with Die Welt described the AfD as »the last spark of hope«,»representing a political realism that resonates with many Germans who feel their concerns are ignored by the establishment«(Welt, 2024). Trump personally received the Polish nationalist presidential candidate Karol Nawrocki at the White House, effectively endorsing him before his narrow electoral victory in June, while in Romania the nationalist runner-up candidate for the Presidential elections, George Simion, repeatedly emphasised his admiration for President Trump. This ideological shift has now been elevated to the level of codified doctrine in the National Security Strategy(NSS) released by the second Trump administration on 4 December 2025.(The White House, 2025). Interestingly, while the document rhetorically embraces a»predisposition to non-interventionism«, movement, its section on Europe outlines a significantly different approach. A far-right transatlantic network is making ground. While still heterogeneous and often contradictory, it has become denser, more confident, and more strategically aligned than at any point in recent decades. In dire contradiction with the longstanding isolationist rhetoric associated with the MAGA movement, Europe is portrayed as facing a»stark prospect of civilizational erasure«, driven by irregular migration, the erosion of national identities, and the weakening of sovereign authority. Against this said backdrop, the NSS explicitly welcomes the»growing influence of patriotic European parties.« Through these lens, Europe remains central to US national security, not as a liberal partner, but as an ally at risk whose trajectory must be corrected because of a series of perceived»threats from within.« Most notably, the NSS openly calls on the US to»cultivate resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations«, a discourse which could interpreted as an endorsement of political interference in support of nationalist and far-right forces opposed to the European integration project, at least in its current format and dominant ideological layering. Rather than signalling US withdrawal from Europe – a commonly repeated and often simplistic risk among experts in transatlantic affairs – the NSS indicates that the US is seeking to maintain Europe as an ally but all the while reshaping it from within, in its own ideological image. By explicitly descending into the terrain of European domestic politics, the NSS institutionalises practices already visible in the actions and the rhetoric of President Trump, JD Vance and allied figures, ultimately aiming to weaken Brussels’ regulatory authority, including in areas affecting US technology firms. For far-right parties in Southeast Europe, beyond rhetorical encouragement, this doctrinal effectively offers external validation, further lowering the threshold for mainstreaming illiberal and exclusionary agendas. A 2025 FES study by Thomas Greven documents the consolidation of a far-right transnational network, connecting European radical right parties such as the AfD, Fratelli d’Italia, and Vox with extra-European actors like Argentina’s Javier Milei and US figures including Steve Bannon, who advocates»flooding the zone« with disinformation to overwhelm liberal opponents(Greven, 2025). Conferences such as the Conservative Political Action Conference(CPAC) Hungary and CPAC Poland, supported by the Center for Fundamental Rights and Ordo Iuris, have evolved into coordination hubs, closer to the direction of what Bannon envisioned for years as a transnational network of nationalist parties in response to liberal internationalism(Dervis& Conroy, 2018). While this transatlantic network remains heterogeneous and often contradictory, it has become denser, more confident, and more strategically aligned than at any point in recent decades. However, there are limits to this »nationalist internationalism«. Trump’s popularity in Europe remains deeply uneven, suggesting that the»Trump effect« is ambivalent: relatively high in Poland and Hungary, yet strikingly low across Western Europe, where his trade tariffs and anti-EU rhetoric reinforce suspicions of American unilateralism(Le Grand Continent, 2025). When it comes to Southeast Europe, polling in Croatia, Slovenia, and Romania suggests widespread unease with his foreign policy unpredictability, but he seems to be particularly popular in Serbia(Anadolu Agency, 2024). The US blanket tariffs disproportionately affect Europe’s export-oriented economies, including Germany and Italy, undermining the very voters the Far Right claims to defend. For many far-right leaders, alignment with Trump offers symbolic validation but limited electoral payoff. In other words, the challenges of far-right unity are due to inherent contradictions difficult to overcome – their prioritization of national interest could lead to diverging strategic perceptions. This is particularly evident at the foreign policy level: for instance, despite consistently courting the US administration, Poland’s Justice& Law party remains particularly hawkish vis-a-vis Russia, despite Washington’s more transactional approach towards Kremlin. The war in Ukraine remains a defining test for Europe’s political order – and a revealing mirror for the Far Right’s evolving discourse(Alexandris, 2025). As the war drags on, sanctions fatigue, high energy costs, and social discontent have provided a fertile ground for actors portraying 5

themselves as the»rational pro-peace camp«, advocating »dialogue«,»neutrality«, or»strategic autonomy« against what they describe as the EU’s»ideological rigidity«. Farright parties across Europe have exploited sanctions fatigue and cost-of-living pressure to portray the EU’s stance as naïve idealism hurting its own citizens. This trend is largely mirrored in the SEE region. In Serbia and Republika Srpska, pro-Russian rhetoric continues to dominate, questioning the West’s moral authority and amplifying claims that »Europe fights America’s wars«. In Croatia and Slovenia, far-right and Eurosceptic movements frame sanctions as self-defeating and portray the EU as sacrificing national interests for abstract ideals. This line of reasoning feeds into the broader narrative of»pragmatic realism« that now defines much of Europe’s illiberal Right. Meanwhile, the changes in the transatlantic political environment as well as the geopolitical impact of the war in Ukraine have pushed the main political discussion in Southeast Europe towards a growing take on nativist and security narratives, erasing the line between»mainstream« and»extreme«(Wondreys, 2020; Kende& Krekó, 2020). Issues of migration and identity have thus shifted to the centre of political debate, forcing a revaluation of previously taboo ideas. In particular, many contemporary far-right actors in SEE present themselves as legitimate conservatives or patriots, not extremists, although they undermine liberal democratic norms – a tactical adjustment that is in line with Halikiopoulou’s(2018) observation that most radical right-wingers in Europe now accept electoral democracy as such, while undermining its liberal principles from within. In short, the parameters of extremism have shifted: xenophobic and authoritarian views, once on the political fringes, are now increasingly packaged as part of the acceptable spectrum, reflecting the new normal status of the region. The parameters of extremism have shifted: xenophobic and authoritarian views, once on the political fringes, are now increasingly packaged as part of the acceptable spectrum, reflecting the‘new normal’ of the SEE region. Key takeaways Core global drivers: → Erosion of multilateralism and rise of transactional geopolitics → Declining trust in liberal institutions, technocracy, and expertise → Socio-economic insecurity following hyper-globalisation and uneven growth → Identity shocks: migration pressures, cultural insecurity, online polarisation → The war in Ukraine: sanctions fatigue, energy instability, anti-Western narratives → US political shifts: Trumpism, MAGA culture wars, transatlantic ideological export → Growth of a transnational far-right network(US–Europe–Latin America) Implications for far-right in SEE → Far-right actors aim to gain external legitimacy either from actual US endorsements or(more often) by emphasising their allegiance with the Trump administration. → Transactionalism reframes nationalism as pragmatic rather than extreme. → Regional actors often use global crises to justify anti-liberal positions domestically. → External powers(e.g. Russia, certain elements within the US administration) help mainstream illiberal narratives. Why it matters Global drivers might not necessarily be the root cause of the surge of Far Right parties across Europe, given the domestic political and societal particularities. However, they set the tone that national actors use to normalise extremism. Therefore, effective toolkit responses must also integrate geopolitical factors, in addition to their focus on the domestic realm and systematically monitoring ideological flows between Europe and other parts of the world as an early warning function. 6 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

The Far-Right in Southeast Europe Summary: In Southeast Europe, a the gradual blurring of boundaries between the Far Right and the mainstream happening. Ideas that once stayed at the margins, especially around immigration, minority rights, and national sovereignty, have moved into the rhetoric and policy choices of centre-right and even centrist parties. This“mainstreaming” happens when established politicians repeat frames first developed by radical actors, such as presenting Muslim refugees or migrants as existential threats to national identity or public security(Kaya, 2018). The 2015–2016“migrant crisis” acted as a catalyst: it strengthened new radical-right groups and pushed mainstream parties to harden positions on borders and asylum, shifting the overall political spectrum to the right(Halikiopoulou, 2018; Wondreys, 2020). The region’s Far Right is no longer limited to fringe extremists. It also includes illiberal populists and ethnic nationalists embedded in institutions and everyday politics. In Serbia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnonationalism is often co-opted by governing actors, reducing the distance between“extremists” and the establishment (Rrustemi, 2020). Similar dynamics appear elsewhere, including Montenegro’s post-2020 political realignment, where nationalist and pro-Russian factions gained leverage with important mobilisation by the Serbian Orthodox Church(Atlantic Initiative, 2023). Across the region, far-right strategies increasingly rely on rebranding: softer public language about“culture”,“security”, and“traditional values” hides harder messages for core supporters(Wodak, 2020). The result is an expanded Overton window, weakened liberal-democratic norms, and increased social polarisation (Camus& Lebourg, 2017; Mudde, 2019). Analysis This process of blurring the boundaries between the Far Right and the political mainstream is one of the most striking developments in Southeast Europe. Radical rightwing ideas of the extreme Right no longer remain isolated on the margins. They permeated the rhetoric of CentreRight and even centrist parties on key issues, particularly immigration, minority rights and national sovereignty. In practice, this has led mainstream politicians to adopt and reproduce narratives that originated on the extreme Right, such as portraying Muslim refugees and other migrants as existential threats to national identity or security(Kaya, 2018). The migrant influx through the Balkans in the middle of the decade served as a catalyst: for example, the so-called»migrant crisis« of 2015-2016 not only fuelled the rise of new radical right-wing groups, but also forced established parties to harden their position on borders and asylum(Wondreys, 2020). This trend, which scientists have identified as a contagious effect or mainstreaming of radical right-wing agendas, has led to a tangible shift to the right in the general political spectrum(Halikiopoulou, 2018; Wondreys, 2020). The rise of»illiberal NGOs« imitating the vocabulary and tactics of liberal civil society in order to normalise exclusionary goals is also noted (Džihić et al., 2018). Today, the southeast European Far Right includes not only the fringe extremists, but also segments of illiberal populism and ethnic nationalism rooted in institutions and everyday politics. In Serbia and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethno-nationalism has been co-opted by the authorities, erasing the distinction between extremists and the establishment. Rrustemi(2020) notes that institutions in Serbia and Croatia tacitly accept far-right attitudes because ethno-nationalism is already intertwined with public policies. In Montenegro, the 2020 elections brought together an eclectic coalition in which Serbian ultranationalists and pro-Russian factions had a significant influence, with the crucial mobilisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church – which brought the far-right agenda (Serbian nationalism, Eurasian landmark) to the centre of politics(Atlantic Initiative, 2023). In countries such as Greece and Bulgaria, centre-right leaders are increasingly embracing nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric to contain electoral gains by far-right movements. The result has been a»radicalisation of the mainstream«, where policies once considered extreme – for example, absolute refusals to house refugees or draconian measures against NGOs helping migrants – have become accepted by governing coalitions(Wondreys, 2020; Minkenberg et al., 2021). The fundamental narratives of the Far Right are no longer confined to skinhead rallies or obscure pamphlets, but are reflected in parliaments and television debates. This mainstreaming dynamic fulfils the central goal of far-right actors: making their oncemarginal worldview look»normal« and»patriotic« rather than extremist. 7

In some cases, mainstream parties have even formed coalitions with openly radical right-wing parties, thereby allowing the Far Right to directly influence politics and legitimacy. This convergence has eroded the sanitary cordon that has traditionally kept extremists out of power, normalising the far-right rhetoric in everyday politics. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish »acceptable« conservative nationalism from the more powerful ethno-nationalism of the extreme Right. This is precisely the ambiguity that the far-right strategists nurture. By integrating nativist and exclusionary frameworks into popular discussion, political elites have inadvertently(and sometimes intentionally) expanded Overton’s window of acceptable speech, undermining liberal democratic values in the process(Camus& Lebourg, 2017; Mudde, 2019). The fundamental narratives of the Far Right – from anti-Muslim paranoia to hyper-nationalist nostalgia – are now finding a wider audience than ever, no longer confined to skinhead rallies or obscure pamphlets, but are reflected in parliaments and television debates. This mainstreaming dynamic fulfils the central goal of farright actors: making their once-marginal worldview look »normal« and»patriotic« rather than extremist(Kaya, 2018; Mudde, 2019). Extreme right-wing actors in Southeast Europe have shown remarkable ability to adapt their rhetoric, target audiences and narratives in line with changing conditions. Learning from the broader European radical Right, they often moderately change their tone in public while retaining hard messages for their base. For example, many far-right leaders are now avoiding obvious references to racial superiority or fascist ideology, instead framing their agendas in terms of cultural defence, sovereignty and traditional values. They portray themselves as guardians of the national heritage and security of»ordinary people«, not as aggressors. This is a deliberate rebranding: on the front line, these actors speak the language of law for the »native« majority – highlighting issues such as the protection of Christianity or the preservation of local customs, while on the back side they continue to trade conspiracy theories and distasteful prejudice(Wodak, 2020). By replacing explicit racist or antisemitic topics with arguments about»culture« and»security«, the extreme Right expands its appeal and bypasses easily condemnation. Islamophobia has become a central theme, reflecting a broader shift in the discussion of the European Far Right. Muslims and migrants have become their favourite »scapegoats«, portrayed as a menacing outside group that can unite different supporters through fear of a common »other«(Kaya, 2018). In Southeast Europe, this trend is easily recognisable: even in countries with small new migrants, far-right narratives vehemently oppose the threat of Islamisation or»migrant invasions«, invoking history (Ottoman heritage, 19th-20th century demographic politics) to reinforce today’s fears. These actors adapted their messages to local contexts – for example, in the societies of majority Orthodox Christianity(Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece or Romania), the rhetoric of the Far Right often links religion and nationalism, portraying themselves as defenders of faith against Western liberalism and Eastern (often Muslim) influences. Youth discontent is a particular focus of the Far Right. The smart use of social media, patriotic youth camps and online propaganda allowed far-right groups to recruit young supporters by targeting them with antiestablishment messages or the feeling of belonging to a higher cause. The Far Right in Southeast Europe has adopted a flexible and, at times, chameleonic style, oscillating between calculated moderation and incitement to provocations, depending on the audience. This adaptive strategy has been key to their growing impact across the region. Far-right parties are also adapting to target specific voter anxieties: economic grievances, corruption and scepticism towards the EU are woven into their narratives along with the usual ethno-nationalism. They present themselves as anti-elite outsiders, promising to fight for the»forgotten« working class or rural communities that globalisation has left behind. This populist combination of social anger with nationalist political identification has expanded the base of the extreme Right beyond the traditional hard core of ultranationalist militants. To reach its goals, the Far Right in Southeast Europe has adopted a flexible and, at times, Chameleonic style, oscillating between calculated moderation and incitement to provocations, depending on the audience. In doing so, far-right actors manage to attract both mainstream voters, by portraying themselves as»conservative patriots«, and an extremist fringe group, by signalling more radical goals beneath the surface. This adaptive strategy has been key to their growing impact across the region. The normalisation and mainstreaming of the Far Right in SEE carry far-reaching social and political implications. Socially, one immediate effect is the rise of xenophobia and polarised relationships among groups. Far-right parties and the media have exploited anxieties about immigration and cultural change, portraying migrants, refugees and even long-standing minority groups as existential threats to national identity and social stability. This has significantly increased public expressions of xenophobia, Islamophobia and antisemitism, undermining tolerance norms across the region(Wondreys, 2020; Kende& Krekó, 2020). Communities that were already marginalised – such as Roma or Muslim minorities in some settings – face increased hostility and are target to hate crime as far-right narratives become more widespread. 8 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Using historical myths and political memory, far-right actors further deepen divisions: they glorify the mythical past of ethnic homogeneity or heroism while accusing liberal»multiculturalism« of today’s social problems, inciting to hatred towards those considered foreigners or traitors(Couperus et al., 2022). Society is becoming increasingly divided into»us« versus»them« mentalities, leaving less and less common space for dialogue. A significant loser in this environment is civil society and pluralistic debate. In areas where the Far Right has significant power – whether in government or in shaping public opinion – civil society organisations, independent journalists and human rights defenders are often targeted. Liberal NGOs or critical media are often slandered as »foreign agents« or as elitist saboteurs of the nation, reflecting tactics used in other parts of Eastern Europe (Kim, 2022). Such pressure can stifle civilian activism and reduce the space for dissent, further consolidating the narratives of the extreme Right. Over time, social cohesion weakens: trust among communities declines, and the notion of inclusive civic identity is replaced by an exclusive ethno-nationalist identity supported by both the Far Right and mainstream actors who opportunistically coalition with it. Politically, mainstreaming radical right-wing discussions contributes to democratic regression and institutional erosion in parts of the region. When the marginal ideas of the Far Right acquire official legitimacy, they usually undermine the liberal foundations of democracy – the rights of minorities, the rule of law, and checks and balances. For example, the»radicalisation of the mainstream«(Wondreys, 2020) pressures moderate governments to adopt tough policies that undermine judicial independence or the protection of minorities, all in the name of»majority will« or national security. Political leaders from the mainstream who take on the rhetoric of the Far Right may believe that they are stabilising the system by absorbing extremist fervour, but, in reality, this tactic legitimises anti-democratic tendencies from within. The long-term impact may be a gradual emptying of democracy. Studies show that the rise or empowerment of radical right-wing forces correlates with measures that weaken democratic norms: restricting media freedom, politicising courts, or laws targeting vulnerable groups(Minkenberg et al., 2021). In Southeast Europe, there are more and more cases where the ruling parties are copying the illiberal agendas of the Far Right – whether it is the repression of migrants at the borders with excessive use of force, the refusal to implement EU human rights directives, or flirting with changes to the constitution that establish ethnocentrism. Political leaders from the mainstream who take on the rhetoric of the Far Right may believe that they are stabilising the system by absorbing extremist fervour, but, in reality, this tactic legitimises anti-democratic tendencies from within(Halikiopoulou, 2018). The longterm impact may be a gradual emptying of democracy: elections continue to be held, but the range of acceptable political debates is narrowing and leaning towards an illiberal political orientation, independent institutions are collapsing under populist-nationalist pressures, and minority communities recognise that their rights can be negotiated for political opportunism. Moreover, the influence of the Far Right has geopolitical and regional repercussions. Many radical right-wing parties in Southeast Europe are strongly Eurosceptic or at least critical of the EU; their rise complicates EU-Balkan relations and the cohesion of the Union itself. For EU member states in the region(e.g. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece), the normalisation of harsh positions on issues such as asylum or LGBTQ rights sometimes puts them in conflict with EU norms and laws, straining the spirit of European integration(Akbari& Mujadidi, 2024). Also, countries aspiring to join the EU in the Western Balkans face a paradox: radical right-wing movements undermine the democratic reforms needed for accession, while at the same time using frustration with the lingering EU accession process to win support. Another aspect is the shift towards external authoritarian influences. Some far-right actors in Southeast Europe look up to authoritarian figures such as Vladimir Putin, RecepTayyip Erdogan or Aleksandr Vucic, perceiving them as models of strong nationalist leadership. This orientation can distort the formulation of foreign policy or at least public opinion, making them more prone to anti-Western propaganda and less committed to liberal internationalist solutions. In fact, the mainstreaming of the Far Right in Southeast Europe not only affects domestic politics but also the regional trajectory in the global arena, potentially creating a bloc of states that are more inclined to align with illiberal powers and less cooperative on international challenges such as human rights or migration. All in all, these developments show a regional landscape in which the Far Right is no longer a marginal phenomenon, but an integrated, albeit destabilising, part of the political and social order. The southeast European experience so far illustrates how far-right ideologies can quickly gain respectability when broader conditions – economic insecurity, migration pressures, geopolitical rivalries – allow nationalist-populist narratives to flourish. The boundaries between extremism and acceptable politics have become increasingly porous, raising difficult questions about how to protect democratic values in an era of normalisation of the Far Right. Crucially, the case of Southeast Europe is not isolated; it resonates with patterns observed across Europe and beyond. The blurring and mainstreaming of the Far Right in this region serve as a microcosm of a broader 9

phenomenon, one that will shape global politics in the coming years. As we increasingly turn to analysing the role of the radical Right on the world stage, especially after recent key events such as the US elections, the experience of Southeast Europe is a cautionary foreword. It emphasises that when extremist rhetoric and actors gain space in the mainstream – either in the parliaments of the Balkans or in the corridors of Western power – the result is a profound change in discussion and politics that challenges the very foundations of liberal democracy. 10 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Key Takeaways → Mainstreaming is the core trend in the SEE. Radical-right themes are increasingly“contagious” and travel into mainstream party agendas, especially on migration, minorities, and sovereignty. → The“sanitary cordon” that was established against radical-right parties is eroding. In some cases, mainstream actors cooperate with radical-right parties, giving them legitimacy and influence over policy. → Rebranding of the radical-right parties broadens appeal. Openly racist or fascist language is often replaced by frames of“cultural defence”,“law and order”, and“protecting tradition”, while extremist content remains for internal audiences. → Islamophobia is a unifying narrative at the radical-right spectrum. Muslims and migrants are used as scapegoats, often linked to historical memory and identity politics, even where actual migration numbers are limited. → Civil society becomes a target, while hostile rhetoric toward independent media and human rights groups narrow civic space and reduce pluralism. → Policy positions once seen as extreme are normalised. Examples include blanket refusals to host refugees and harsh measures against NGOs assisting migrants. → Democratic quality across the refion declines gradually. The danger is often not sudden collapse but a slow “emptying” of liberal democracy: elections continue, but rights, oversight, and institutional checks weaken. → The regional impact is also geopolitical. Euroscepticism and attraction to illiberal“strongman” models are highly likely to shift foreign-policy orientations and complicate EU relations. Core drivers → Migration and border politics as a trigger as seen in the 2015–2016 crisis which intensified securitised narratives and pushed established parties toward tougher border/ asylum positions. → Electoral competition and strategic adaptation is occuring. Mainstream parties adopt far-right frames to stop vote losses, but this can unintentionally legitimise and amplify illiberal ideas. → Institutionalised ethno-nationalism. Where nationalism is already embedded in public policy, far-right attitudes can be tolerated or“absorbed” by institutions. → Religious and identity mobilisation. In some contexts, religious institutions can become powerful political mobilisers, shifting nationalist agendas toward the centre. → Economic grievances and distrust in elites. Corruption, inequality, and feelings of abandonment are reframed into nationalist-populist stories that promise protection for the“ordinary people.” → Digital recruitment and youth outreach. Social media, online propaganda, and youth-oriented patriotic initiatives help recruit supporters and build community identity. → Geopolitical rivalries and anti-Western messaging. Some far-right actors align their discourse with narratives favourable to illiberal external powers, reinforcing Euroscepticism and polarisation. → Civil society imitation and norm manipulation.“Illiberal NGOs” copy liberal vocabulary and tactics to make exclusionary goals appear legitimate and civic-minded. Implications for the SEE region 1. Social cohesion and intergroup relations The mainstreaming of far-right frames alters the social grammar of belonging by turning identity into a security question and difference into a risk category. When migrants, Muslims, Roma, or other minorities are routinely portrayed as threats, this encourages affective polarization and a moralized“us versus them” worldview in which compromise looks like betrayal rather than politics. Over time, such narratives erode bridging social capital and weaken everyday coexistence, because public debate becomes structured around suspicion, grievance, and symbolic boundary-making rather than shared interests. The likely result is not only more stigma and sporadic hate incidents, but also a deeper transformation of civic identity, from inclusive citizenship to conditional membership defined by ethnicity, religion, or“cultural conformity”. 11

2. Democratic governance and rule of law Politically, the normalization of radical-right agendas pushes systems from liberal-democratic constraints toward a more majoritarian, security-centered logic in which rights and oversight become negotiable. Once“exceptional” measures, tightening asylum, restricting NGOs, disciplining media, are justified as necessary for national survival, institutional erosion can proceed through legalistic steps rather than overt coups, making democratic backsliding harder to contest in real time. This dynamic incentivizes governing parties to treat independent courts, regulators, and watchdogs as obstacles to be captured or neutralized, while civil society is reframed as a foreign proxy rather than a democratic counterweight. The long-term danger is a hollowed democracy: elections persist, but pluralism shrinks, accountability weakens, and minority protections become contingent on shifting political bargains. 3. Regional geopolitics and EU integration At the regional level, far-right mainstreaming acts as a geopolitical amplifier. It converts domestic identity politics into foreign-policy posture by linking sovereignty claims to Euroscepticism and“civilisational” narratives. For EU candidates, this creates a structural paradox, accession requires deep democratic reforms, yet illiberal actors mobilise frustration with slow enlargement to delegitimise those reforms, reducing the credibility of conditionality and encouraging performative compliance. For EU member states in the region, tougher stances on asylum and rights can generate recurrent friction with EU norms, weakening internal cohesion and creating openings for external actors to exploit polarisation and distrust. In this way, the far right is not only a domestic ideological force but also a factor shaping alignment choices, resilience against disinformation, and the region’s strategic trajectory within an increasingly contested European order. Why it matters The mainstreaming of the Far Right in Southeast Europe matters because it quietly reshapes the boundaries of legitimate politics and, in doing so, changes both public expectations and policy options. When mainstream parties adopt narratives first developed by radical actors, especially on migration, minorities, religion, and sovereignty, they widen the Overton window and make exclusionary ideas appear“normal” or“patriotic” rather than extremist. This has direct consequences for democratic quality: liberal safeguards such as minority protections, independent institutions, media freedom, and civic space become easier to weaken under the language of “security” and“majority will,” producing gradual democratic regression rather than dramatic breakdown. In a region already marked by unresolved identity disputes, postconflict memory politics, and fragile intergroup trust, these shifts can intensify polarisation, increase intolerance, and reduce the room for compromise, outcomes that are not only normative concerns but also practical risks for stability and conflict management. Finally, the issue is geopolitically significant: far-right and illiberal agendas often complicate EU accession reforms and can create friction with EU norms among member states, while also opening additional space for external illiberal influences and anti-Western narratives, thereby affecting the region’s strategic alignment and the wider European security environment. 12 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

References Alexandris, I.(2025), The rise of the radical right and Euros ceptic political forces and the impact on the EU’s enlargement, Hellenic Foundation for European& Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), https://www.eliamep.gr/en/new-narra tives-of-eu-integration-the-rise-of-radical-right-and-eurosceptic-political-forces-and-the-impact-on-the-eus-enlargement-policy-ioannis-alexandris/(accessed, 03.11.2025) Anadolu Agency(2024). US election: Serbians rooting for Trump’s return to the White House, https://www.aa.com.tr/ en/americas/us-election-serbians-rooting-for-trump-s-return-to-the-white-house/3380857(accessed 28.10.2025) Akbari, E.,& Mujadidi, N.(2024). Immigration and Its Im pact on Europe’s Societal Security: Examining the Rise of Far Right Parties(2014--2024). Atlantic Initiative.(2023, 11. decembar)._Links between the Balkan farright and the war in Ukraine_(Policy Paper No. 5). Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative. Die Welt(2024), Warum Elon Musk auf die AfD setzt – und warum er dabei irrt, https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article254982012/Warum-Elon-Musk-auf-die-AfDsetzt-und-warum-er-dabei-irrt.html(accessed 03.11.2025) Buljubašić, M.(2022)._Violent rightwing extremism in the Western Balkans: An overview of countryspecific challenges for P/CVE_. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the Eu ropean Union(Radicalisation Awareness Network-- RAN). Camus, J.,& Lebourg, N.(2017). Far Right Politics in Eu rope. Couperus, S., Tortola, P.,& Rensmann, L.(2022). Memory politics of the far right in Europe. Dervis, K.& Conroy, C.(2018), Nationalists of the world, unite?, Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nationalists-of-the-world-unite/(accessed 02.11.2025) Džihić, V., Pudar Draško, G., Turčalo, S., Beshku, K.,& Cer ovac, I.(2018)._Overcoming the democratisation deficit in the Western Balkans: A road to(no)where?_Belgrade: Frie drichEbertStiftung(FES), Belgrade Office. Greven, T.(2025). The Global Radical Right. Transatlantic Networks, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, available at: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/international/21846.pdf Halikiopoulou, D.(2018). Mainstreaming of Far Right Ideas in Europe(analysis of contagion effects on policy). Kaya, A.(2018). Right-Wing Populism and Islamophobism in Europe and their Impact on Turkey--EU Relations. Turkish Studies. Kende, A.,& Krekó, P.(2020). Xenophobia, prejudice, and right-wing populism in East-Central Europe. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. Minkenberg, M., Florian, A., Végh, Z.,& Zobel, M.(2021). Depleting democracy? The radical right’s impact on minority politics in Eastern Europe. Int. Political Science Review. Mudde, C.(2019). The Far Right Today. Politico(2025). JD Vance attacks Europe over migration, free speech, https://www.politico.eu/article/us-vice-president-jd-vance-attack-europe-migration-free-speech/(accessed 28.10.2025) Rodrik, D.(2021). Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 13. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev-economics-070220-032416(accessed 28.10.2025) Rrustemi, A.(2020)._Farright trends in South Eastern Eu rope: The influences of Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania_. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). Veljan, N.(2024)._Digital dynamics of radicalization: Trac ing farright extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Southeast Europe_. Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative. Wondreys, J.(2020). The“refugee crisis” and the transfor mation of the far right and the political mainstream: the extreme case of the Czech Republic. East European Poli tics. Zerka, P.(2025). Reality show: Why Europe must not cave in Trump’s culture war, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/publication/reality-show-why-europemust-not-cave-in-trumps-culture-war/(accessed 28.10.2025); 13

Introduction to Chapter III Chapter Three brings the Toolkit to life by showing that countering the far right is not just an idea—it is something people do, together, every day. Drawing on concrete experiences from Serbia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, this chapter highlights how communities, civil society actors, and activists turn principles like solidarity, equality, and dignity into real-world practice. It shows that democratic resistance thrives not through slogans or fleeting outrage, but through persistence, visible presence, and careful collaboration. These examples remind us that even in difficult, illiberal contexts, ordinary people can create pressure for change, protect public goods, and nurture spaces where democracy is lived rather than preached. For FES, these stories confirm what we have seen across the region: lasting progress comes from action rooted in shared values, mutual care, and practical solutions that make democracy tangible in everyday life. 14 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

Key Takeaways: The far right in Southeast Europe is no longer confined to extremist fringes, its ideas and narratives have increasingly entered mainstream politics through the normalisation of nationalism, anti-migrant rhetoric, illiberalism, and “security” discourse, gradually eroding liberal-democratic norms from within. Global geopolitical shifts— including Trumpism, the erosion of multilateralism, economic insecurity, the war in Ukraine, and transnational far-right networks, have strengthened and legitimised far-right actors in Southeast Europe by reframing exclusionary nationalism as “pragmatic realism” rather than extremism. The mainstreaming of the far right weakens democracy and social cohesion over time, by polarising societies, targeting civil society and independent media, shrinking civic space, undermining minority rights and institutional checks, and pushing the region toward illiberal and Eurosceptic political trajectories. 15

About the Authors: Ioannis Alexandris - EU Affairs and Geopolitical Risk Consultant and Research Fellow at the Wider Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy(ELIAMEP). Prof. Dr. Sead Turčalo - Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo Editor Halina Chraščová - Owner and Founder of the CAMR Centrum pre analýzy monitoring reporting 16 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.

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Toolkit on Countering the Far Right in Southeast Europe CHAPTER II The Far Right in Southeast Europe: Redefining Extremism in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape Across Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans, far-right politics has moved from the margins into the mainstream, reshaping public discourse through exclusionary narratives, fear, and authoritarian tendencies presented as “common sense.” This Toolkit responds to that reality by offering not only analysis, but practical strategies for democratic actors seeking to reconnect politics with people’s everyday lives. Rooted in the values of democracy, solidarity, dignity, and social justice, it explores how the far right adapts, gains legitimacy, and expands its influence across the region—while also highlighting concrete examples of resistance, collective action, and democratic resilience from Serbia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ultimately, this publication is an invitation to activists, organisers, trade unionists, politicians, and engaged citizens to build democratic alternatives that are visible, credible, and grounded in lived experience. Further information on this topic can be found here: ↗ fes.de