Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen* The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries European Integration in the Politics of the Accession Countries In December 2002 the member states of the European Union agreed accession conditions with the candidate countries in Copenhagen; they signed the accession agreement in Athens in April 2003, and on 1 May 2004, 10 more states will enlarge the EU. In most member states enlargement is bound up with hopes that Europe, together with the increase in states, people, and territory, will also acquire more economic and political power. Recently, however, the Iraq war revealed that diversity, also diversity in terms of different inte rests, identity-related attitudes and ideas will not necessarily be entirely beneficial– to the EU or to its decision-making power. The EU did not speak with one voice and lost credibility as a partner of the USA which could be taken seriously, although it had just agreed its first Common Security and Defence Policy. From a party-political standpoint it was indicative that among the signatories of the letter from eight European leaders on Iraq there was one – although himself non-party – prime minister of a socialist-led government(Hungary) and one social democratic prime minister(Poland). Transformation and Integration in Party Competition in the Accession Countries With no longer 15 but in future 25 states this diversity will increase – and of the 10 accession countries 8 are East European, which just over a decade ago began in their foreign policy to strive for a“return to Europe” and not least therefore began to adapt to a social, economic, and political system which the European Union defined as one of the most urgent criteria for accession: democracy, the rule of law, a functioning market economy, and the adoption of community rules, standards, and policies, and so on – in short, the acquis communautaire . With that, accession preparations continued the threefold post-communist system transformation from party dictatorship to democracy, from a planned to a market economy, and from the Eastern bloc to the open, global and European economy. Less smooth has been a fourth system transformation, the construction of a nation state, which six of the eight accession countries had to carry out from 1991 or 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union(the three Baltic states), Yugoslavia(Slovenia), and Czechoslovakia(to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, more so Slovakia). This difficult process of adaptation required a social consensus in the post-communist accession countries which had to be maintained in the face of costs and disappointments which were at first disregarded, but later became palpable. The political parties in Eastern Europe, including those on the Left, many of which emerged from the former state socialist parties, had to help to carry this consensus(or to break it). Although the frustrated electorates in Central and Eastern Europe punished and voted out almost every government after only one term of office, after every transfer of power there were only minor corrections to the policy of reform, system transformation and preparations for accession. In the case of the left-wing parties this was particularly striking, since transformation was basically a liberal project for the introduction of capita lism. The left-wing parties too now had to give their view on the“new” values and requirements of the EU, if they had already included them in their programme or – more in the case of parties still committed to communist objectives – had turned against the EU in its current form. 1 The multipartisan conse nsus is also visible in the fact that the applications for membership were filed by governments of both liberal-conservative and left-wing orientation. * Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 1 See Nick Crook, Michael Dauderstädt, and André Gerrits: S ocial Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Amsterdam 2002, p. 22; James Sloam: Policy Transfer and Programmatic Change in Communist Successor Parties in East-Central Europe, University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies, http://www.igs.bham.ac.uk/research/PolicyTransfer.htm, on: 03.06.2003; Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak: Partie s, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe, SEI Working Paper No 46, Opposing Europe Research Network, Working Paper No. 2, Brighton 2001, p. 11f.

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 2 Table 1: Party-political orientation of governments at the time Doubts concerning the European agreement can of application for EU membership stem from fears concerning their distribution effects (strong in the case of Polish farmers and orthodox Country Date of Ruling coalition Political oricommunists) or their consequences for the survival of application entation national values(strong, for example, among the reliEstonia Czech Republic Hungary 24.11.1995 23.01.1996 31.03.1994 EK+EME+others ODS+ODA+KDUCSL MDF+KDNP+ FKgP Centre Centre-right Centre-right gious right in Poland). Regarding economic interests in respect of protection and distribution, however, the Left can hope, in relation to integration and globalisation, to regain some of the declining influence of the nation state at the European level. 3 A further motive is Latvia Lithuania 13.10.1995 08.12.1995 LC, DPS, LZS LDDP Centre-right Left 4 the choice of a specific variety of capitalism(for example, Rhineland capitalism) by excluding those not compatible with the EU acquis . In this connection the Poland 05.04.1994 SLD+PSL Left left-wing parties are striving to protect the social comSlovakia Slovenia 27.06.1995 10.06.1996 HZDS LDS+SKD Populist Centre-right ponents of the market economy, while liberals wish to avoid a feared return of elements of a planned economy. Source: Nick Crook, Michael Dauderstädt, and André Gerrits: Social Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe , Amsterdam 2002, p. 20. Western European parties in the member states, particularly social democratic ones, have tried to direct their partners in the accession countries towards comLittle has changed as regards this fundamental multipartisan position during the long negotiation phase up to the conclusion of the accession agreement(Table 2). patible development paths. For this purpose, particularly within the framework of the Socialist International (SI) or the Party of European Socialists(PES), the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity was useful, Table 2: Party-political orientation of governments at the conclusion of the accession agreeme nt, end of 2002, Copenhagen which for its part cooperated with foundations close to national political parties(for example, Friedrich-EbertStiftung, Alfred-Mozer-Stiftung, Karl-Renner-Institut, Country Czech Republic Ruling coalition Political orientation CSSD+ KDU-CSL+ US-DEU Centre-left Olof-Palme-Center, Fondation Jean Jaurès). The radical Left(for example, the German PDS through its RosaLuxemburg-Stiftung), too, sought to bind its European partners, even if this was difficult on account of their Estonia EK+ ER Centre-right Euroscepticism(for example, in the case of the KSCM). Hungary Latvia MSzP+ SZDSZ JP+ LPP+ ZZS+ TB/LNNK Centre-left Centre-right If one looks at the course and outcome of the accession negotiations it becomes clear from the host of conflicting de mands and transitional regulations Lithuania LSDP Left agreed in the end that the acquis and the structures Poland Slovakia SLD+ UP+ PSL Left SDKU+ SMK+ KDH+ ANO Centre-right and interests of the accession countries are not congruent. 5 It is beyond the scope of this investigation to seek to understand which parties raised which deSlovenia LDS+ ZLSD+ SLS+ SKD+ DeSUS Centre-left mands and which ones were finally carried through or withdrawn at the conclusion of the negotiations. The stance towards European integration unfolds along both of the axes which typically structure electoral competition: first, the socio-economic axis in respect of which the left-wing parties stand for stronger market regulation and redistribution, and second, the politics of identity axis in respect of which left-wing 2 parties are against authoritarian–nationalist projects. 2 See Herbert Kitschelt et al.: Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation , Cambridge 1999. 3 See Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson: The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration, in: British Journal of Political Science 30, No. 3(2000): 433– 59. 4 See Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice(eds): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage , Oxford 2001. 5 See Michael Dauderstädt: Interessen und Hindernisse bei der EU-Osterweiterung. Die Rolle de s„acquis communautaire” [Interests and obstacles in EU enlargement: the role of the “ acquis communautaire ”], Politikinformation Osteuropa 98, Bonn(FES) 2002; on derogations: European Information Service e u enlargement watch 123(27 February 2003).

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit Connected with this are ideas concerning the further shaping of integration, the“future of Europe”, in both dimensions: first, in terms of the relationship between national sovereignty and supranational European competence, and second, in terms of the exte nsion of“positive integration”, that is, the control and regulation of transnational markets which emerged due to“negative integration”. The Eurosceptical attitude of the former Czech prime minister and current state president Václav Klaus of the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party(ODS) was founded on his economic-liberal rejection, for example, of the Common 6 Agricultural Policy, as well as his desire to defend Czech sovereignty from attacks by“Brussels bureaucrats”. Figure 1 depicts this situation. Figure 1: Accession-country political parties in the European political field Libertarian “cosmopolitan” UW Marketliberal MSzP CSSD Socialprotectionist redistributive FIDESZ ODS KSCM HZDS EK emplary positions which are either fully EU compatible (for example, the Polish Freedom Union UW, the Czech Social Democrats CSSD, the Hungarian Socialist Party MSzP) or more or less in conflict with European positions in one direction or the other, such as the Hunga rian FIDESZ, the Czech ODS, Meciar’s HZDS in Slovakia, the Czech communists, or the Estonian Center Party EK – which before the referendum called on the voters to reject accession – or which lie well outside the EU consensus, such as A. Lepper’s Samoobrona in Poland. All these and many other positions will enrich European politics after accession. The extent to which parties attempt to enhance their profile with a Euro-policy position, and particularly with a stance on EU accession, also depends on the importance of this theme in the society and politics of their country. A big party will not stand out directly against a broad consensus in favour of integration(see Tables 3 and 4), while in a more sceptical environment this can certainly be an option(for example, Estonia). Also important here is whether the parties in question form part of the government or not. In this respect Central and Eastern Europe is not so different from current EU member states since the question of European integration plays a relatively minor role in current electoral competition. No really important and large party is against EU membership or accession. Even in countries whose population is relatively Eurosceptical, such as the UK, Sweden, and Denmark in the current EU, or the Baltic states among the accession countries(see Tables 3 and 4) the big parties are not totally against membership, but rather reject particular policies(for example, the single currency) or the further restriction of national sovereignty. Grey circle: EU acquis Authoritarian nationalist Samoobrona Table 3: Support for EU accession in the candidate countries (as a% of all responses) 1993 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 The grey circle represents the political positions permissible within the framework of the acquis and the Copenhagen Criteria. It leans towards a marketliberal orientation, since the EU is at present characterised more by market integration than by supranational market control and redistribution. Before the Amste rdam Treaty the position of the EU circle was even more inclined in this direction. The elected parties have exEstonia 79 76 29 35 33 39 Poland 80 93 70 63 51 61 Czech Rep. 84 79 43 49 46 50 Hungary 83 80 47 56 60 77 Slovenia 92 79 47 57 41 62 Latvia 78 80 34 40 33 54 Lithuania 88 86 35 40 41 53 6 It was the Common Agricultural Policy which caused Václav Slovakia 84 88 46 62 59 69 Klaus to demand that the EU revise its policy rather than force the candidate countries to adopt it, at which EU CommisSource: Eurobarometer. sioner van den Broek replied that it was the Czech Republic which wanted to join the EU, not the other way round. 3

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 4 Table 4: Evaluation of EU membership in the accession counFrom the accession applications(Table 1) through the tries(autumn 2002) accession agreement(Table 2), up to the shaping of the future of the EU at the Convention(Table 6), the Good Bad Neither- Don’t Net most important political parties in the accession coungood know positries have cooperated in European integration. The Left nor bad tive provided five of the members and five of the alternates Estonia Latvia 33 14 38 15 19 at the Convention(out of 24+24 representatives in all), 33 17 39 11 16 not including non-party representatives sent by leftwing governments. Lithuania 41 11 35 13 30 Finally, the political system of the enlarged Europe Poland Slovakia 51 11 27 12 40 will be constructed from the political systems of its 58 5 28 9 53 member states. Only if the respective societies have reasonably compatible ideas concerning the nature Slovenia 40 11 42 7 29 and aims of Europe can European enlargement also Czech Republic 46 9 31 13 37 entail greater political effectiveness. This short study Hungary 59 7 23 10 52 attempts to examine, by way of their programmes and policies, how“amenable” the left-wing parties in the Source: Oskar Niedermayer: Die öffentliche Meinung zur zukünftigen Gestalt der EU. Bevölkerungsorientierungen in Deutschland post-communist accession countries are in this respect. und den anderen EU-Staaten [Public opinion concerning the future of the EU. People’s attitudes in Germany and the other EU states], Bonn 2003, Table A13. Selection of Parties, Methodology and Sources Although the advocates of accession achieved satisfactory, often massive majorities in the referendums, turnouts were often very low. The“yes”-vote as a proportion of all those entitled to vote therefore exceeded 50% only in Lithuania and Slovenia(see Table 5). Table 5: Result of EU-accession referendums in the candidate countries Estonia Latvia Date In (all 2003) favour Turnout 14.9 66.8 64.1 20.9 67 72.5 In favour (as a% of all those entitled to vote) 42.8 48.8 Lithuania 10/11.5 91.1 63.4 57.8 Poland 7/8.6 77.4 58.8 45.6 Slovakia 16/17.5 92.5 52.1 48.2 Slovenia 23.3 89.6 60.3 54 Czech 13/14.6 77.3 55.2 42.7 Republic Hungary 12.4 83.8 45.6 38.2 Source: http://www.mdr.de/eu/aktuell/938582.html In order to get closer to answering this question we investigate the policies, as well as the statements and – if available – programmes of left-wing parties in the Eastern European accession countries(first round): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary. These parties constitute a channel for social communication, serve as vehicles for the most diverse interests and lines of reasoning, transform this into political action and so integrate their electorates in the political system overall. Parties compete – according to Stöss and Neugebauer –“by articulating values, and policies based on those values, which characterise their respective societies”. 7 Beyond that, parties exercise significant influence over the result of a referendum – in our case the referendum on EU accession. 8 7 Richard Stöss and Richard Neugebauer: Postkommunistische Parteiensysteme und demokratische Konsolidierung[Postcommunist party systems and democratic consolidation], http://www2.rz.hu-berlin.de/gesint/forsch/sfb/b3.htm, on: 03.06.2003, p. 9. 8 See Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak: The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States, SEI Working Paper No 51; Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No 6, Brighton 2002, p. 6.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit Table 6: Representatives at the Convention and their party-political affiliation Country Czech Republic Est onia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia GovernGovernment representative ment 2002 Member Alternate Centre-left Centre-right Centre-left Centre-right Left Centre-left Centre-right Centre-left Jan KOHOUT (CSSD) Lennart MERI (Isamaaliit/ non-party) Péter BALÁZS (MSzP) Sandra KALNIETE(LC) Rytis MARTIKONIS (non-party) Danuta HÜBNER (non-party) Ivan KOR ÈO K (non-party) Dimitrij RUPEL (LDS) Lenka Anna ROVNÁ(non-party) Henrik HOLOLEI (Möödukad) Péter GOTTFRIED (close to the MSzP) Roberts ZILE (TB/LNNK) Oskaras JUSYS (non-party) J anusz TRZCIÑSKI (non-party) Juraj MIGAŠ(nonparty) J anez NARÈIÈ (non-party) Country Czech Republic Estonia Representative of the national parliament Member Alternate Jan ZAHRADIL(ODS) Josef ZIELENIEC(USDEU) Petr NE È AS(ODS) František KROUPA (KDU-CSL) Tunne KELAM (Isamaaliit) Rein LANG(ER) Liina TÕNISSON(EK) Urmas REINSALU(ResP) What do we mean by“left-wing parties” or what pa rties are we talking about? Those investigated here are partly the successor parties of the former state socialist parties whose character is now overwhelmingly social democratic, for example, the SLD in Poland, the SDL in Slovakia or the MSzP in Hungary. Partly we are also describing parties which are not“successor parties” in origin, for example, the historical Czech social democratic party(CSSD) which was founded as early as 1878, was merged with the Communist Party in 1948 and in 1990 re-emerged as an independent party; or the Polish Union of Labor(UP) which resulted from a split in the Solidarnosc movement. The KSCM in the Czech Republic represents something of an exception, since it retains the word“Communist” in its name and is committed to corresponding aims. 9 There are a number of other, smaller and de facto less significant parties in Hungary(MSZDP) and Slovakia(SSSD) which we shall not take into account. Table 7 constitutes a list of the parties with which we are concerned. 10 As regards the sources of this work we tried in the first instance to get to grips with the parties’ European policies by means of primary sources, such as party programmes, statements made by senior party figures, interviews, and so on. Whenever the sources were very sparse we had to resort to secondary sources. In general the material was – both qualitatively and quantitatively – very variable, particularly with reference to size and organisational structure and whether they participate in government or are represented in parliament. Hungary József SZÁJER(FIDESZ) Pál VASTAGH(MSzP) András KELEMEN(MDF) István SZENT-IVÁNYI (SZDSZ) Latvia Guntars KRASTS Rihards PIKS(TP)Liene(TB/LNNK) LIEPINA(JL) Arturs Krisjanis KARINS 9 See on terminology: Michael Dauderstädt, André Gerrits and (JL) György Markus: Troubled Transition. Social Democracy in Lithuania Vytenis ANDRIUKAITIS Gintautas ŠIVICKAS East-Central Europe , Amsterdam 1999, the chapter entitled (LSDP)(NS) “Three Roots of Social Democracy in Post-Communist SocieAlgirdas GRICIUS(Union Eugenijus MALDEIKIS ties”, p. 69ff.; Gerd Meyer: Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft of Liberals and Centrists)(Liberal Democrats) – ohne soziales Netz? Parteien, Wählerverhalten und politische Kultur. Konflikte und Konjunkturen der Macht: Das Be iPoland Jozef OLEKSY(SDL) Marta FOGLER, spiel der Sozialdemokraten[Democracy and market economy Edmund WITTBRODT (PO)Genowefa – without a social safety net? Parties, voter behaviour, and (Senat 2001 Bloc*) GRABOWSKA(Klub political culture. Conflicts and conjunctures of power: the exSenacki SLD-UP) ample of the social democrats], in: Der Bürger im Staat , No. 3 Slovakia Jan FIGEL(KDH) Zuzana MARTINAKOVA (1997): 2; Herbert Kitschelt et al.: Post-Communist Party SysIrena BELOHORSKÁ(SDKU) tems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Coopera(HZDS) Boris ZALA(Smer) tion , Cambridge 1999, p. 16. 10 The ensuing presentation draws on: Richard Stöss and Dieter Slovenia Jelko KACIN(LDS) Franc HORVAT(ZLSD) Segert: Entstehung, Struktur und Entwicklung von ParteienAlojz PETERLE(Nsi) Mihael BREJC(SDS) systemen in Osteuropa nach 1989 – Eine Bilanz[Origin, strucSources: Names:(http://european-convention.eu.int/Static.asp? ture and development of party systems in Eastern Europe since 1989 – a balance sheet], in: Dieter Segert, Richard Stöss lang=DE&Content=Candidats_Gouv und http://europeanand Oskar Niedermayer(eds): Parteiensysteme in postkomconvent ion.eu.int/Static.asp?lang=DE&Content=Candidats_Parl). munistischen Gesellschaften Osteuropas [Party systems in the Party affiliation: own research.*Centre-right(among others UW) . post-communist societies of Eastern Europe], Opladen 1997, pp. 405–6. 5

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 6 Table 7: Selected left-wing parties in the post-communist acion in the literature, and on the other hand our conviccession countries tion that societal European-policy discourse was mirState Party Origin Orientation rored in the programmes and speeches of the parties and party elites or that they influenced one another Estonia Estonian S ocial Democratic Labor Party – ESDTP Communist successor party According to their own a ssertion: “social democratic leftwing party“ and so express the basic position of the electorate. The objection that such sources amount to little more than “cheap talk” and that their investigation does not add to our knowledge can be refuted by the fact that it is not the motives of the speaker but the addressee’s inModerates – Möödukad Newly founded Socialparty liberal/social democratic terpretation of a speech act which counts.“The motive of the‘perpetrator’, of the discourse participant, therefore, strictly speaking plays no role as regards the outLatvia Latvian Social Refounded Democratic Work- party+ comSocial democratic come of discourse”. 11 Alongside the primary sources we relied on sources Lithuania ers’ Party – LSDSP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party munist successor party (through merger with the LSDP) Party in exile+ communist Social democratic which describe the European policy of the accession countries in a general fashion. Particularly when the left-wing parties under investigation here participate in government, government actions count as an expression of a position shared or at least tolerated by these parties. – LSDP successor party (through merger with the LDDP) Comparison of Accession Candidates Poland Slovakia Union of the Democratic Left – SLD Labour Union – UP Party of the Democratic Left – SDL Smer(“Direction”) Communist successor party Newly founded party Communist successor party Newly founded party Social democratic Social democratic Social democratic Social democratic tending In what follows we will describe the parties listed above, their embedding in the party system of their respective country and, in particular, their European policy stance. We start with an overview of the composition of parliament, the government parties and the results of the EU accession referendum. Our second step will be to analyse the available statements and programmes of the individual parties. Communist Party of Slovakia – KSS Newly founded Communist party Poland Slovenia Czech Republic Hungary Combined List of Social Democrats – ZLSD Czech Social Democratic Party – CSSD Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – KSCM Hungarian Socialist Party – MSzP Newly founded Social democparty ratic Refounded party Social democratic Communist successor party Communist successor party Communist (orthodox, partly reformed) Social democratic The decision to rely also on primary sources was based on the one hand on the fact the European policy of post-communist or left-wing parties in Eastern Europe has so far been dealt with in only a rudimentary fashBoth of the parties examined here – the“Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej”(Union of the Democratic Left – SLD) and“Unia Pracy”(Union of Labor – UP) have formed a ruling coalition since September 2001, having won 41% of the votes and 193 of the 460 MPs in the Sejm or Parliament, as well as 75 of the 100 Senators. 11 Britta Joerißen and Bernhard Stahl(eds): Europäische Auße npolitik und nationale Identität. Vergleichende Diskurs- und Verhaltensstudien zu Dänemark, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien und den Niederlanden [European foreign policy and national identity. Comparative discourse and behavioural studies on Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands], Dokumente und Schriften der Europäischen Akademie Otzenhausen, Münster 2003, p. 406. See also: Anna M. Grzymala-Busse: Redeeming the Communist Past. The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe , Cambridge 2002, p. 285; and in contrast: Herbert Kitschelt et al.(1999), p. 135.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit The SLD is the social democratic reformed successor party of the old state socialist party. It won the election in 1993 and the government which it led together with the Polish Peasant Party made the Polish accession application in 1994. During its 1993–97 term of office and also since 2001 it has de cisively driven the Polish reform and EU preparation process. The SLD prime minister(1995–96) Józef Oleksy sat as representative of the parliament in the European Convention. During the accession negotiations the party was better able to reach agreement with the EU than its conservative predecessor, since unlike them it did not have to take account of strong Eurosceptical forces within its own camp. 12 In the EU Accession referendum on 7 and 8 June 2003, 77.45% voted in favour of accession to the European Union and 22.55% against. The turnout was 13 58.85%. Before the referendum four of the parties represented in parliament had backed accession – the SLD, the“Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe”(Polish Peasant Party – PSL), the“Platforma Obywatelska”(Citizens’ Platform– PO) and“Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc”(Law and Justice – PiS). Among the opponents of accession were the two national-conservative parties, the“Liga Polskich Rodzin”(Polish Families League – LPR) and the “Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”(Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland – S). 14 Union of the Democratic Left – SLD The SLD was founded before the parliamentary elections in 1992. It consists of around 30 groupings, including the“Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”(Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland – SdRP) and the“Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazkow Zawodowych”(All-Polish Accord of Trade Unions – OPZZ). 15 The SLD is an alliance of successor parties of the former Communist Party, but it no longer describes itself – in contrast to the Union of Labor(UP) – as openly left-wing and clearly distances itself, particularly in terms of economics, from its former socialist objectives. 16 The SLD has even been criticised as“cryptoliberal” by its current coalition partner, the UP, which on account of its trade union past(Solidarnosc) represents a stronger social-protection orientation. 17 In the Polish party spectrum, however, they represent – just like the weak liberal Right – pro-European positions, while a large part of the religious Right and rural parties range from sceptical to positively anti-European. The Alliance called on its voters before the referendum to vote in favour of accession. 18 Our description of the SLD’s European policy stance is based on statements by the Polish Foreign Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz(SLD), and the President of the Sejm’s[lower chamber of parliament] European Committee, Józef Oleksy(SLD). These statements concentrate above all on security and the EU’s Eastern policy. They emphasise the significance of the EU as a community with shared values, but this – both quantitatively and qualitatively – plays a comparatively minor role. Three“institutions of security” in particular are associated with the security aspect: the USA, NATO, and both the common foreign and security policy(CFSP) and the common European security and defence policy (ESDP). Foreign minister Cimoszewicz makes it clear that the security of Poland is the principal goal of Polish foreign policy and that the guaranteeing of this security is directly linked to NATO membership. He also supports the development of the CFSP and the ESDP, while underlining that one aim of this development should be support for the USA. That is, Europe should not become“stronger” for its own sake or a counte rweight to the USA, but rather in order to be a stronger 12 See Niels von Redecker: Polen[Poland], in: Werner Weidenfeld und Wolfgang Wessels(eds): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Fallstudien [Communist and post-communist parties in Eastern Europe. Selected case studies], München 2002, pp. 70f. 16See Kai-Olaf Lang: Polens Demokratische Linksallianz – eine Integration , Berlin/Bonn 2002, p. 421. 13 See http://www2.ukie.-gov.pl/eng.nsf/0/D39E3D507607FEDAC1256D41002FEF52, on: 15.07.2003. post-postkommunistische Partei? Vom Bündnis SLD zur Partei SLD[]Poland’s Alliance of the Democratic Left – a post-postcommunist party? The SLD: from alliance to party, Aktuelle 14 See Henning Tewes: Polen vor dem Referendum[Poland before the referendum], http://www.kas.de/publikationen/2003/1925_dokume nt.html, Analysen des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 4(2000): 3. 17 See Janusz Bugajski: Political Parties of Eastern Europe. A on: 15.07.2003. 15 See Klaus Ziemer and Claudia-Yvette Matthes: Das politische System Polens[Poland’s political system], in: Wolfgang Ismayr Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era, Armonk and London: The Center for Strategic and International Studies 2002, p. 172. (ed.): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas [The political systems of Eastern Europe], Opladen 2002, pp. 215f. und Dieter Bingen: Die“Sozialdemokratie der Republik Polen”(SdRP) in 18 According to Mildenberger within the leadership populist antiWestern voices occasionally make themselves felt; see Markus Mildenberger: Der Europäische Integrationsprozess aus Sicht der“Demokratischen Linksallianz”(SLD)[“Social Democracy der Beitrittskandidaten Polen, Tschechien und Slowakei[The of the Republic of Poland” in the“Alliance of the Democratic European integration process from the viewpoint of accession Left”(SLD)], in: Gerhard Hirscher(ed.): Kommunistische und candidates Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia], DGAPpostkommunistische Parteien in Osteuropa. Ausgewählte Jahrbuch 2000 , p. 187. 7

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 8 partner of the USA, because Europe’s security in turn our European partners to define the policy toward depends upon the USA and the transatlantic coopera23 Eastern Europe exactly in this fashion” tion. 19 For this reason a European security and defence identity should be kept within NATO structures and not detached from the alliance. 20 Cimoszewicz makes it clear that Poland is striving to become the main partner not of the European countries but of the USA: There are no developed ideas concerning the future structure or“finality” of the EU in the statements of SLD members. Only the President of the Sejm’s European Committee, Józef Oleksy(SLD), has anything to say on that subject within the framework of a debate “Through cooperation and dialog with the USA we on the future of Europe. Here too, however, he only will strive to exert adequate influence on decisions vaguely endorses a federal system, while the details concerning the policy of NATO towards the states will only be discussed after Eastern enlargement. 24 of Central and Eastern Europe, especially on the issues regarding the further enlargement of the Alliance and its partnership with Russia. In this way we Unia Pracy – Union of Labor(UP) would like to consolidate the image of Poland as the main partner of the United States in the region The UP was founded in 1992 after the merger of some and one of the most important partners of the USA smaller parties belonging to the left wing of Solida rin Europe.” 21 nosc. It describes itself as the only Polish party which is This verbal confirmation of Polish solidarity was shortly followed by deeds when Prime Minister Leszek Miller (SLD), with seven other European leaders, signed the letter“Europe and America must stand united”, which supported the US position on Iraq. 22 The second main emphasis of Polish European policy is the relationship with the non-EU-accession countries of Eastern Europe. For all the importance which Poland attaches to its relationship with the West it has a strong interest in not shutting out“the East” and once more having to endure a division of the continent. Asked what it meant when the President of the European Commission Prodi on a number of occasions mentioned that Poland was important for the EU in relation to influence in the East Cimoszewicz replied: openly left-wing and is oriented towards Western European social democratic and socialist parties. Its economic policy orientation differs markedly from that of the SLD, and the UP feels itself – in keeping with its name – to be committed to the interests of the workers. In 1996 it was admitted to the Socialist International(SI) along with the SdRP. 25 Only half a page of the UP’s programme is devoted to European policy. The UP endorses EU accession but only on condition that Poland’s importance – in comparison with the other accession countries – is also taken into consideration in the EU, that Poland is not treated as a second-class EU member, and is not overburdened materially or financially. 26 Its attitude is ne ither that of a Eurosceptic nor that of a Euroenthusiast. “We attach particular importance to building a civic society – a fundamental guarantee that all democratic tendencies will be lasting,[…]. Poland’s task will consist in explaining, motivating and directing 19See Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz: Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Lecture by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, FriedrichEbert-Foundation Berlin, 12 March 2003, http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php, on: 03.07.2003. 20 See Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz: Information from the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the fundamental directions of Polish foreign policy(presented at the 16th Session of the Sejm on 14 March 2002, http://ww.polandembassy.org/Policy/p4-1.htm, on: 16.07.2003. 21 Ibid. 22 See Jose Maria Aznar, Jose-Manuel Durao Barroso, Silvio Berlusconi, Tony Blair, Péter Medgyessy, Leszek Miller, and Anders Fogh Rasmussen: Europe and America must stand united, 30.01.2003, http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english/1433_5777.htm, on: 16.07.2003. Czech Republic The current Czech government was elected in June 2002. It is a coalition between the“Ceská strana sociálné demokratická”(Czech Social Democratic Party – CSSD), the“Krest’anská a demokratické unie – Ceskoslovenská strana lidová”(Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party – KDU23 Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz interviewed by “Warsaw Voice”, May 2003, http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php, on: 03.07.2003. 24 See Center for International Relations: The Future of Europe in the Opinion of Polish Politicians. Transcript of a Debate, Reports& Analyses 1, 2002. 25 See Parteienlandschaft in Polen. Eine Übersicht[The party landscape in Poland: an overview], http://www.dpg-brandenburg.de/nr_20/parteienlandschaft.html, on: 20.06.2003. 26 See Unia Pracy: Po Pierwsze Praca. Program unii Pracy, http://www.uniapracy.org.pl/Program%20Upto.doc, on: 16.07.2003.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit CSL), and the“Unie Svobody – Demokratická unie” (Freedom Union – Democratic Union – US-DEU). The Social Democrats emerged from the election as the strongest party with 30.2% of the vote, in front of the conservative“Obcanská demokratická strana”(Civic Democratic Party – ODS) with 24.47%, and the neocommunist“Komunistická strana Cech a Moravy” (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – KSCM) with 18.51%. The KSCM is the only Czech party which increased its share of the vote. In the referendum on EU accession on 13 and 14 June 2003 the Czech people returned a clear majority in favour: 77.3% of the voters said“yes” to the EU with a turnout of 55.2%. 27 The share of“yes”-votes by individual party was as follows: 28 Political party Share of“yes“-votes party takes a position on the European value system, European identity, economic and political integration, and the institutional character of the EU. The Czech prime minister Vladimir Spidla(CSSD) favours stronger integration in such areas as common foreign and security policy and environmental policy and at the same time emphasises the need to strengthen the supranational element of the EU: “the Czech Republic[…] will support that the future European Community will continue[…] integration in areas of vital common interest(common foreign and security policy, refugee and immigration policy, solutions of environmental problems, protection of outer borders,[the fight against crime] and the fight against terrorism).[…] Therefore we support the preservation of the strong, initiative[-taking] role of 30 [the] Commission[…]” US 92 ODS 86 KDU-CSL 84 CSSD 82 KSCM 37 Other(non-party.) 71 At the same time, his party emphasises – and this can appear in one respect complementary and contradictory in another – the strengthening of the European Parliament and of the national states, which should have equal weight with the EU, the national and cultural identities of the individual states, and the principle of subsidiarity. The high proportion of“yes”-votes among ODS voters is astonishing given the frequent statements of long-time ODS president Václav Klaus criticising Europe and also the distance which the ODS maintains in rela29 tion to many European policies and structures. Presumably most opponents abstained. Czech Social Democratic Party(CSSD) The CSSD is pursuing an unequivocally pro-European course. This also gives it a favourable position in relation to its main opponent, the ODS. Within the framework of speeches given by high-ranking party members, party resolutions and election programmes the “The CSSD supports a deepening of economic and political integration in Europe[through] a gradual strengthening of the democratic and federative elements in its development and the respecting of the national and cultural independence of individual states and regions.[…] the CSSD presumes that it is necessary to strengthen the status of the European Parliament and the European Commission in a sys31 tem of EU bodies” It is not easy to trace a clear line between the endorsement of stronger integration and supranational elements and the strengthening of nation states against the European Union. On the one hand, the CSSD regards as positive the development of economic integration along the lines of the single currency and also political integration, such as the common foreign and security policy(CFSP) and the common European secu27 See Frankfurter Rundschau online: Schweik zieht in die Welt hinaus[Swejk goes out into the world], http://www.fraktuell.de/30 Vladimír Spidla: Draft of the address of Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Vladimír Spidla at the parliamentary miniconressorts/nachrichten_und_politik/international/?cnt=231869 (16 June 2003), on: 20.06.2003. 28 See Kristina Larischová: Zum Ausgang des EU-Referendums in ference organised by the Committee for European Affairs of the Danish Parliament in Copenhagen, 9 September 2002, “Czech Republic on the way to the EU – efforts and results”, der Tschechischen Republik[On the result of the EU referendum in the Czech Republic]. Kurzbericht, Prag(18 June 2003), p. 3. http://www.vlada.cz/1250/eng/vlada.htm, on: 03.07.2003. [Note: this English translation is taken from the website] 31 Congress Resolution XXX: On the future form of the Euro29 See Kai-Olaf Lang: Tschechische Positionen zur künftigen pean Union, 11.04.2001, http://www.cssd.cz/vismo/dokuGestalt der Europäischen Union[Czech positions on the futu- menty2.asp?u=422010&id_org=422010&id=22045, re form of the EU]. SWP-Studie S1, January 2002, Berlin, pp. on: 10.06.2003.[Note: this English translation is taken from 9–17. the website]. 9

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 10 rity and defence policy(ESDP), considering them to be both sides, 38 and the Czech Republic is not coming as absolutely necessary for the formation of a European just a“recipient-country” to the EU, but: identity. 32 The advent of the EU as a more united, stronger actor alongside the USA and the urgency of its intervention in international conflicts are also stressed. 33 On the other hand, the CSSD wants to see the influence of the nation states – whether politically, culturally or identity-related – guaranteed and pleads this cause vehemently: “The party will never advocate entry to a community “The CSSD is convinced that the Czech Republic will not enter the EU only with open hands but will contribute to the development of the EU by means of its dynamically blossoming economy, advanced agriculture, educated and creative workforce, rich and diverse culture, the rapidly improving state of its environment and high consumer protection stan39 dards.“ in which the voice of the Czech Republic would not be heard and in which it couldn’t influence the 34 range of issues that directly concern it.“ The CSSD leaves no doubt concerning whether the Czech Republic will be a“self-confident and independent” 40 EU member, as Spidla put it after the posiThe equally strong emphasis on the national and the tive outcome of the EU referendum in June 2003. European identity must by no means be taken as con- The protagonists of the CSSD’s foreign policy, fortradictory: on the one hand, it could be a matter of the mer foreign minister Kavan and former prime minister construction of“multiple” identities, and on the other Zeman, in 2001 represented unequivocally federal poit can be attributed to the fact that the Czech identity sitions as regards the future of Europe. They wanted is very closely linked to the European one. It is continu- an economically and socially strong Europe with both ally stressed that the Czechs have always been part of social justice and ecological sensitivity. They supported the European 35 family, that the Second World War the“Community method” and rejected resort to flexi“ripped the Czech lands out of Europe”, 36 and that the opportunity had now offered itself to return to Europe, ble integration for the creation of an“exclusive hard core”. 41 and to declare loyalty to the principles of“ human rights, legal order and social justice ”. 37 It appears that the socialist period is regarded as something of an in- The Czech Republic’s Neo-Communists(KSCM) termezzo which divided the Czechs both historically and culturally from their European roots. In this con- The KSCM advocates European integration but is nection, however, the CSSD always adds that the strongly opposed to the EU in its current form. 42 The Czech Republic’s accession to the EU is a matter of KSCM expressly emphasises that the Czech Republic’s mutual“give and take”, Western and Eastern Europe future does not lie in isolation; that integration, both depend on one another, a merger is in the interests of economic and political, is one of its central issues; and that the development of this integration will lead to 32 See Czech Social Democratic Party: Integration of the Czech Republic into the European Union, 18.02.2000, http://www.cssd.cz/vis mo/dok umenty2.asp? u=422010&idorg=422010&id=1046, on: 10.06.2003 und Resolution XXX of the congress: On the future form of the European Union, 11.04.2001, http://www.cssd.cz/vismo/dokumenty2.asp?u=both greate r economic efficiency and cultural enrichment. At the same time, it takes the view that the European Union is not capable of handling this development in the right way: 422010&id_org=422010&id=22045, on: 10.06.2003. 33 See Czech Social Democratic Party: Position of the Czech S ocial Democratic Party on the Situation in the Middle East, 6 April 2002, http://www.eurosocialists.org/upload/publications/59ENCzechMiddleEast.pdf, on: 20.06.2003. 34 Czech Social Democratic Party: Congress Resolution XXX: On 38 See Karel Vodicka: Das politische System Tschechiens[The political system of the Czech Republic], in: Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas [The political systhe entry of the Czech Republic into the European Union, 11.04.2001, http://www.cssd.cz/vismo/dokumenty2.asp?u=422010&id_org=422010&id=21945, on: 10.06.2003. tems of Eastern Europe], Opladen 2002, p. 270. 39 Czech Social Democratic Party: Congress Resolution XXX: On the entry of the Czech Republic into the European Union, 35 See Vladimír Spidla, cited in: Frankfurter Rundschau , 16.06.2003. 36 Vladimír Spidla, cited in: Die Welt online: Die Tschechen sagen 11.04.2001, http://www.cssd.cz/vismo/dokumenty2.asp?u=422010&id_org=422010&id=21945, on: 10.06.2003. 40 Vladimír Spidla , cited in: International Herald Tribune : Czech votJa zu Europa[The Czechs say yes to Europe], http://www.welt.de/data/2003/06/16/118997.html?prx=1, on: 16.06.2003. ers say‘yes’ to EU, http://www.iht.com/cgibin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleId=99560, on: 16.06.2003. 37 Czech Social Democratic Party: Congress Resolution XXX: On the entry of the Czech Republic into the European Union, 11.04.2001, http://www.cssd.cz/vismo/dokumenty2.asp?u=41 See Kai-Olaf Lang, op. cit., pp. 20–22. 42 See Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia: Political Programme, http://www.kscm.cz/news.asp?menu=1&necld=422010&id_org=422010&id=21945, on: 10.06.2003. 376&necld2=376resources, on: 18.06.2003.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit “However, it[the KSCM] does not overlook the tion of accession. 50 In the International Herald Tribune harsh pressures in the present European Union, the KSCM president was quoted as follows on the outwhich are aimed at restricting social certainties, or come of the referendum: the mushrooming bureaucracy and rising profits of the biggest transnational monopolies, made at the expense of wide sections of the population. We re“People can expect to be disillusioned. The conditions we negotiated for our country are bad.” 51 ject the EU in its current form.” 43 Deputy leader Václav Exner expressed himself in similar Although the project of economic and political integration should not be in the hands of the EU as currently fashion at a press conference at KSCM party headquarters: constituted the KSCM does accept, for example, the “We continue to take the view that the accession Social Charter, EU environmental policy, and aid proconditions negotiated by the Czech government, grammes for regional development. 44 However, the like the accession conditions negotiated by the new party rejects the European Central Bank. 45 One area member states in general, are unfavourable. The which according to the KSCM should not be integrated into the EU – and definitely not in NATO – is outcome of the referendum has done nothing to 52 change that.” security and defence policy. The Communists regard the OSCE as an alternative which could constitute“a realistic and efficient structure of European security”: 46 Slovakia “It[the KSCM] emphatically rejected NATO membership and promoted the Organisation for Security Since the last general election in September 2002 Sloand Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) as an alternavakia has been governed by a coalition consisting of tive.” 47 the centrist“Slovenska demokraticka a krestanska The KSCM pleads consistently against the further “Americanisation” of the European continent and for the creation of an alternative to the EU, for a“common project for a socialist Europe”. 48 In so far as the common European security and defence policy(ESDP) serves the purpose of developing an independent European policy separate from the American line the KSCM supports it. 49 As regards the referendum on EU accession, to begin with it was mainly the Communists who came out strongly in support of the people being given the opportunity to decide. In the course of the national debate on EU accession the KSCM’s formulations became increasingly clear and ended up by calling for the rejecunia”(Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – SDKU), the Hungarian minority party“Strana madarskej koalície”(Party of the Hungarian Coa lition – SMK), the Christian-Democratic“Krestanskodemokratické hnutie”(Christian Democratic Movement – KDH) and the liberal“Aliancia nového obcana”(Alliance of a New Citizen – ANO). This broad coalition was necessary in order to prevent the return to power of Vladimir Meciar and his populist“Movement for a Democratic Slovakia” (HZDS), which, despite heavy losses was, with almost 20% of the vote, still the strongest party at the 2002 election. Meciar, with his nationalist–authoritarian policy, had long blocked further EU integration. As a result Slovakia was not included in the Luxembourg group of first candidates in 1997. In 1998, however, a 43 See Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia: Political Programme, http://www.kscm.cz/news.asp?menu=1&necld=376&necld2=376resources, on: 18.06.2003. 44 See Vladimír Handl: Die Tschechische Kommunistische Partei: Orthodoxes Fossil oder erfolgreiche neo-kommunistische Protestpartei?[The Czech Communist Party: Orthodox fossil or successful neo-communist protest party?], Analysen der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Politikinformation Osteuropa , No. 105 (October 2002), p. 12. 45 See Kai-Olaf Lang, op. cit., p. 29. 46 From the report of the Central Committee of the KSCM on broad democratic coalition managed to remove Meciar (as had previously been achieved in 1994, but only temporarily). The SDL was part of both coalitions(1994 and 1998). At the referendum on 16 and 17 May 2003 the Slovaks showed that they were to some extent weary of voting: only 52% of the electorate, a mere 2% above the minimum 50% required for the vote to be valid, party activities since the 4th party congress, cited in: Vladimír Handl(2002), p. 12. 47 See Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia: Political Pro50 See Kristina Larischová(note 28 above), p. 3. 51 Miroslav Grebenícek, cited in: International Herald Tribune : gramme, http://www.kscm.cz/news.asp?menu=1&necld=- Czech Voters Say‘Yes’ to EU, http://www.iht.com/cgi376&necld2=376resources, on: 18.06.2003. bin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleId=99560, 48 Ibid. on: 16.06.2003. 49 See Kai-Olaf Lang, op. cit., p. 29. 52 See http://www.radio.cz/de/artikel/42176 11

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 12 found their way to the polling booths, although they derlined the political significance of European unificacame out surprisingly strongly in favour of accession: tion and of the European Social Model and called for 92.5% of voters backed EU accession. 53 According to surveys the Slovak people associate the EU with“prosthe incorporation of the Charter of Human Rights in the European Constitution. 57 perity” and hope to find a solution to their economic The SDL called for the direct and general election of and social problems through EU accession. 54 the EU President, transformation of the Council into a In Slovakia the Left is deeply split and weak, not chamber of nations, strengthening of the European least because their electoral potential was for a long Parliament’s co-decision-making rights, and a Eurotime drawn off by the HZDS. The two Socialist Interna- pean Constitution which would contain fundamental tional member parties, the historical Social Democrats rights and the division of powers between the institu(SDSS) and the successor party of the former Commu- tions. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which must nists, the SDL, are no longer represented in parliament. be incorporated in the Constitution, must be binding The SDSS has never achieved an important political and reflect the European Social Model. The SDL was role in its own right, but only as part of a coalition, for against an additional chamber of national parliaments example, with the SDL. In parliament the Left is represented by the orthodox Communists(KSS) and a new since institutionally it would represent a retrograde step. 58 party,“Smer”(“Direction”). The Party of the Democratic Left(SDL) Since the 2002 election the Party of the Democratic Left 55 (SDL), whose share of the vote fell from over 13% to 1.4%, is no longer represented in parliament. 56 However, the SDL was prominently represented in both anti-Meciar coalitions, in 1994 and 1998. Up to 2002 the party provided the finance minister, Brigita Schmögnerova, who drew much criticism for her reform-oriented austerity measures, and the defence minister. Internal party conflicts led to the resignation of Schmögnerova and ultimately to electoral defeat. The SDL was always one of the driving forces behind Slovakian EU accession. At the first meeting of the National Convention on the Future of Europe both Jozef Migaš, at that time Speaker of the Parliament and SDL party chairman, and Peter Weiss, at that time chairman of the parliament’s foreign policy committee and SDL founding chairman, spoke. Migaš was in favour of a Europe of citizens, federal structures, and a strengthening of the European Parliament. Weiss un53 See http://www.eureferendum.sk/, on: 28.07.2003. 54 See Christoph Thanei: Wahlen zum slowakischen Parlament. Regierungsmehrheit für die Mitte-Rechts-Parteien[Slovak pa rliamentary elections. Government majority for the centre-right parties], KAS-AI 10/02, p. 99. 55 On the structure and history of the party see: Wolf Oschlies: Die Kommunistische Partei der Slowakei[The Communist Party of Slovakia], in: Gerhard Hirscher(ed.): Kommunistische und postkommunistische Parteien in Osteuropa. Ausgewählte Fallstudien [Communist and post-communist parties in Eastern Europe. Selected case studies]. Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen 14, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München 2000, pp. 47–66. 56 See http://www.slowakei-net.de/politik/wahlen2002.html, on: 04.07.2003. The New Left – Smer “Smer”(Direction) was founded only in 1999. Party Chairman Fico regards Blair and Schröder and their “Third Way” as his models and accordingly sees his party as centre-left or“modern social democratic”. The party has also been known as“Smer – tretia cesta“: Smer – The Third Way. Smer was the third placed party in the 2002 election, with 15% of the vote. Former chairman of the SDSS Boris Zala joined Smer and is a deputy member of the European Convention. Smer’s foreign and European policy are outlined in a party document as follows: “SMER is oriented towards the European system of values and is committed to the Slovak Republic becoming a firm part of European value space. Smer’s foreign policy aims are good bilateral relations with individual states and an effective position in multilateral relations on the basis of international organisations and associations of states. In this conne ction, SMER fully supports purposeful and effective integration of Slovakia in the European Union and 59 NATO.” With particular reference to EU accession Smer’s position is as follows: 57 See Vladimír Bilík: Slovakia's Future of Europe Debate. Ms. Research Center of the SFPA(based on"Slovakia and a Discussion on the Future of the European Union", Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 3, No. 1(Spring 2002), pp. 14–31 and published as“Slovakia’s Future of Europe Debate” in: Paul Luif (ed.) Regional Partnership and the Future of the European Union. Wien: OIIP Arbeitspapier 41, November 2002, pp. 91–99. 58 See ibid., synoptic table . 59 Smer-Bulletin, Ms., provided by FES’s Bratislava office.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit “Fulfilment of the fundamental requirements for the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union pursuant to Smer’s foreign policy programme is a key medium-term priority in respect of Slovak foreign policy. Since 2000, EU accession negotiations and further preparations for membership have been under way simultaneously – these two processes are complementary. The negotiations themselves strongly emphasise the connection between the negotiations and candidate country accession preparations. In tandem with the accession negotiations the candidate country’s progress is closely monitored. As a result, it is Smer’s view that efforts must be stepped up in all areas as regards prepara60 tion for EU membership.” vote and was able to send 6 representatives to parliament. The direct successor party of the Communist Party of Estonia, the“Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatiik Tööpartei”(Estonian Social Democratic Labor Party – ESDTP) received a mere 0.4% of the votes. The referendum on 14 September 2003 resulted in a“yes”-vote of 66.8% – with a turnout of 64% – which clearly exceeded earlier public opinion polls. In June 2003 EU euphoria was still restrained: 48% favoured accession in an opinion poll, 44% were against, and 7% were undecided. 62 The Estonian Centre Party had mobilised against accession before the referendum, although previously it had participated in accession preparations, because it believed that Estonia’s interests were not being adequately protected. The Orthodox Communists(KSS) Estonia’s Social Democrats – Möödukad With ratification of the accession agreement after the referendum all the parties with parliamentary represe ntation voted in favour of EU accession – only the Communists(“Komunistická strana Slovenska” – KSS) decided against ratification, since they would have liked better accession conditions for Slovakia and warned of a loss of Slovakian sovereignty and ide n61 tity. On its website – www.kss.sk – the Party has nothing to say about European policy. It attempts to show that capitalism has set Slovakia back in comparison with socialism(employment, household income, various production indicators, foreign debt, and so on). On foreign policy it criticises international organisations such as the WTO, IMF, OECD, and so on, as lackeys of global capitalism(without mentioning the EU) and regards the“war against terrorism” as an imperialist conspiracy. Estonia Möödukad has existed as a party since 1996, although as an alliance of parties – comprising the“Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Partei”(Estonian Social Democratic Party – ESDP) and the“Eesti Maakeskerakond”(Estonian Rural Center Party – EMK) – it made its debut in the parliamentary election of 1992. In the previous government Möödukad held five key positions, including the foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves. 63 His European policy views are described here in detail as being representative of his party. Three areas are of particular significance in the statements of the former foreign minister: EU security policy, enlargement, and the canon of common values. He emphasises, for example, that he is above all interested in institutionalised membership of NATO and the EU in order to strengthen Estonia’s security – and protection from Russia. It is striking that whenever he talks about EU security policy he mentions NATO in the same breath and would also like to see the military development of the EU take place only in a“transatlantic context”. 64 In fact, Ilves also underlines the significance of European culture, Estonia’s belonging to“European The most recent parliamentary election in Estonia took place on 2 March 2003. A liberal-conservative ruling coalition was formed from“Party Union of Republic Res Publica”(ResP),“Eesti Reformierakond”(Estonian 62 See: http://elis.ee/research.asp?type=0&action=30&what=100108 &id=100108 on: 15.07.2003. For further information see: http://www.vvk.ee/rh03/yldinfo/englinfo.stm, on: 15.07.2003; Reform Party – ER) and the“Eestimaa Rahvaliit”(Estonian People’s Union – Rahvaliit). The social democratic party“Möödukad”(the Moderates) got 7% of the and Mikko Lagerspetz and Konrad Maier: Das politische System Estlands[Estonia’s political system], in: Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas [The political systems of Eastern Europe], Opladen 2002, p. 102. 63 In more detail in: Crook, Dauderstädt, and Gerrits 2002, pp. 75f. 60 Ibid. 64 Toomas Hendrik Ilves: Besinnung auf gemeinsame transatlan61 See tische Werte[Reflections on common transatlantic values], in: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/07/01072003165226. Internationale Politik 6/2001, asp, on: 04.07.2003. http://www.dgap.org/IP/ip0106/ilves, html; on: 20.06.03. 13

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 14 cultural space”, and the return to“old European Communist Party Successor – The Estonian Social Deroots”, 65 and calls accession a form of“self-colonisa mocratic Labor Party(ESDTP) tion”, 66 although here too he makes the connection with the USA in that he qualifies these values as trans- The ESDTP has no government responsibilities, having atlantic. 67 Apart from that he clearly subordinates the been unable to get even one representative elected to community with shared values, with reference to EU parliament. It describes itself as the last“ openly leftist accession, to the security aspect: political party ” in Estonia, and as a“ social democratic “A quick glance at the cards shows that a common cultural past is not a satisfactory guarantee of a secure future. On this basis we are striving for the institutionalisation of the return of Europe to Estonia through our membership of the European Union and NATO. 68 left-wing party ”, 72 and identifies its own party programme with that of the New European Left Forum (NELF). Therefore, also due to the lack of sources, a brief look at NELF’s European stance would be useful here. This too is quite vague on the subject of European policy; in sum it demands the following, among other 73 things: Compared with the standpoints of other Eastern Euro• a non-military security concept in the compean states a strong USA- and NATO-centred orienta- mon European security and defence policy tion is revealed 69 here. In this way the EU is not fun-(ESDP); damentally devalued, but it does lose at least legiti• to strengthen democracy by enshrining the macy and significance among the population, which right to Europe-wide referendums and the opinion polls on EU accession of June 2003 clearly Europe-wide petitions in the Constitution. demonstrate(see above). The third aspect is enlargement. Ilves draws a line in the sand between the countries which will join the EU Latvia in 2004 and“the rest”. He strongly contrasts the successes and reforms of the current accession countries, Latvia elected its current parliament on 5 October the result of a motivation enhanced by the prospect of 2002. The conservative government consists of the EU, with the problems of the non-EU-accession“Jaunais laiks”(New Era – JL),“Latvijas Pirma Partija” countries(“ metastizing corruption,[…] organized (Latvia’s First Party – LPP),“Zalo un Zemnieku Savicrime, illegal immigrants ” 70 ). In order to prevent these eniba”(Alliance of Greens and Farmers – ZZS) and problems from spreading to the EU he again calls for a“Apvieniba‘Tcvzemei un Brivibai’”(For Fatherland and tight security net, strong borders, and rapidly devel- Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement oped strategies on how the EU will deal with its“new” Union – TB/LNNK). neighbours in the East. 71 This is obviously not an ap- The Social Democrats(Latvian Social Democratic peal for increased EU enlargement but motivated by a Workers’ Party:“Latvijas Socialdemokratu Stradnieku sense of the strong need for security. Partija” – LSDSP) originated in the merger of the reform communist“Latvijas Demokratiska Darba Partija” (Latvian Democratic Workers’ Party – LDDP) and the “Latgales Demokratiska Partija”(Latgallian Democratic Party- LDP). Since the 2002 election they have not been represented in parliament, having received only 65 Ibid. 66 Toomas Hendrik Ilves: The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe, in: Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003 , ed. Andres Kasekamp, Tallinn 2003, p. 185. 67 Toomas Hendrik Ilves: Besinnung auf gemeinsame transatlantische Werte[Reflections on common transatlantic values], in: Internationale Politik 6/2001, http://www.dgap.org/IP/ip0106/ilves, html; on: 20.06.03. 68 Ibid. 69 See Kristi Raik: Does the European Union Still Matter for Esto4.8% of the vote, below the 5% cut-off point. The referendum on EU accession was held on 20 September 2003. With a very good turnout of 72.5%, 67% voted in favour of EU accession. According to Schmidt, the main aim of Latvian foreign policy is EU and NATO accession. Riga expects above all protection of its sovereignty against a possinia’s Security? Positioning Estonia in CFSP and ESDP, in: Est onian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003 , ed. Andres Kasekamp, Tallinn 2003, p. 176. 72 Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party: 70 Toomas Hendrik Ilves: The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe, in: Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003 , ed. Andres Kasekamp, Tallinn 2003, p. 186. http://www.esdtp.ee/inglise.htm, on: 10.06.2003. 73 See NELF XXIV: European Convention on the Future of Europe (Draft), Helsinki-Tallinn, 6–8 June 2003, 71 Ibid., particularly pp. 196–200. http://www.hot.ee/esdtp/drafts.html, on: 12.06.2003.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit ble Russian“desire for revenge”. 74 Separate sources or The LSDP’s statements on European policy – here statements concerning the LSDSP’s standpoint, which drawn from speeches by Prime Minister Brazauskas would be particularly valuable in this context, are not(LSDP) and Defence Minister Linkevikius(LSDP, foravailable. As a result, we cannot say anything on the merly LDDP) and from party and government prosubject. grammes – are almost without exception related to security policy. The advantage s which the European Union might expect from Lithuania’s accession are Lithuania briefly listed – all in the field of military“know-how” from many years of cooperation with Russia 77 – otherThe most recent parliamentary election in Lithuania wise security is even more in the foreground than in took place on 8 October 2000. The coalition led by the case of its Baltic neighbour Estonia. In this respect current prime minister Brazauskas emerged as the Lithuania puts its trust not in European security and winner, consisting of the“Lietuvos demokratine darbo defence policy but in that of NATO. Similar to the Polpartija”(Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party – LDDP), ish SLD the LSDP argues that the common European the“Lietuvos socialdemokrato partija”(Lithuanian So- security and defence policy(ESDP) should not be decial Democratic Party– LSDP), the“Naujosios demok- veloped as a counterweight to NATO, that it should ratijos partija”(New Democratic Party – NDP) and the not lay the foundation stone of a Euro-Atlantic security “Lietuvos ruso sajunga”(Union of Russians in Lithuania system, but that this task should remain with NATO, – LRS). The coalition won 31.1% of the vote and pro- underpinned by ESDP. Consolidating American envides 51 of the parliament’s 141 MPs. It forms the gagement on European soil is one of the central objecgovernment together with the social-liberal“Naujoji tives of LSDP foreign and defence 78 policy. sajunga”(New Union – NS), which won 19.6% of the In this connection the LSDP’s website is also intervote. esting. This contains a section on the European Union The Lithuanian voters’ endorsement of accession in whose contents – the future role of Lithuania in the the referendum on 10 and 11 May 2003 was surpris- world in general and in Europe in particular – are ingly unequivocal. More than 90% of the vote was in wrapped in the mists of obscurity while the following favour, and only 9% against. Opinion polls had pre- section on NATO cites concrete advantages and interdicted a“yes”-vote of only around two-thirds. Even ests for Lithuania. For example, Lithuania’s interest lies the worry that the 50% turnout required by the Con- in“ defending oneself against potential, although not stitution would not be achieved proved to be mispresently expected, dangers ”; the advantages would placed: around 64% of Lithuanians took part in the be as follows: referendum. 75 “Integration into NATO[has] many[advantages]. NATO grants its members substantial security gua rThe Lithuanian Social Democratic Party(LSDP) antees that lead to a more desirable and active investment environment since[it is] safe and[chara cIn the wake of the last election the socialist LDDP and the social democratic LSDP merged into a single party, though still bearing the name of the social democrats, terised by] higher security. Thus it is evident that NATO improves a country’s economic growth[pros79 pects]...” the LSDP. The LDDP was the direct successor organisa- Even in the otherwise very detailed government tion of the Communist Party, while the LSDP was programme Lithuania’s integration in the European founded much earlier, in 1896; it was prohibited in the wake of the Putsch in 1926, and from 1944 onwards operated in exile. The official refounding of the Social Democratic Party took place in August 1989. 76 Systeme Osteuropas [The political systems of Eastern Europe], Opladen 2002, p. 168. 77 See Linas Antanas Linkevicius: Northeast European Security after the 2004 Dual Enlargement: The End of History? Vilnius 74 Thomas Schmidt: Das politische System Lettlands[Latvia’s political system], in: Wolfgang Ismayr(ed.): Die politischen SysRoundtable 2003, 6 and 7 June. Keynote Speech by L. Linkevicius, Minister of Defence. Life after Enlargement, http://www.lrv.lt/main_en.php?cat=16&gr=1&sub=8&d=2001, teme Osteuropas [The political systems of Eastern Europe], Opladen 2002, p. 144. 75 see: on: 03.07.2003. 78 Ibid.; see also: USIS Washington File, 15 January 1998,“Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania hold Briefing Jan. 15”, http://www.euro.lt/index.php?LangID=7?TopMenuID=127&La http://www.fas.org/man/nato/national/98011503_wpo.html, ngID=7, on: 28.07.2003. on: 07.07.03. 76 Joachim Tauber: Das politische System Litauens[Lithuania’s 79 Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, www.lsdp.lt[original Engpolitical system], in: Wolfgang Ismayr(ed.): Die politischen lish translation from website], on: 12.06.2003. 15

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 16 Union is not given proportionate attention. Here too the Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party. 82 It was es“transatlantic relations” are regarded as the mainstay tablished in May 1993 and is also a member of the Soof European security, and the common foreign and cialist International and the Party of European Socialists security policy(CFSP) and the common European secu-(PES). In the absence of ZLSD statements we shall draw rity and defence policy(ESDP) serve to support these on corresponding PES and SI sources in describing the relations. 80 ZLSD’s position on European policy. In our view this is Such themes as European identity, enlargement, a justifiable modification of our approach, particularly deepening political integration, and even the signifi- because the ZLSD itself within the framework of its last cance and nature of the European community of congress referred to the resolutions of the PES and SI shared values are either not taken up at all by the LSDP congresses. 83 or only casually. The ZLSD is unequivocally pro-European and one of the strongest advocates of Slovenia’s EU accession. At the same time, it regards itself, more than any of the Slovenia other post-communist or left-wing parties discussed in this paper, as duty-bound to stand up for a socially The current Slovenian government was elected in Oc- just, democratic and transparent EU. The ZLSD considtober 2000, a four-party coalition consisting of“Libe r- ers itself to be“ the only messenger of European social alna Demokracija Slovenije”(Liberal Democrats of Slodemocracy in Slovenia ”. 84 Its policy priorities – which venia – LDS), the“Zdruzena Lista socialnih demokra- were also represented at the last PES congress in Berlin tov”(United List of Social Democrats – ZLSD), the – therefore lie in the strengthening of the EU’s democ“Slovenska Ljudska Stranka”(Slovenian People’s Party ratic structures, that is, strengthening of the European – SLS+ SKD) and finally the“Demokratièna stranka Parliament at the expense of the Council, implementaupokojencev Slovenije”(Democratic Party of Slovenian tion of the subsidiarity principle and of the participaPensioners – DeSUS). The United Social Democrats tory element through more citizen participation in dewere the third-strongest party after the LDS and the cision making, more rights for workers and socially disconservative SDS(“Socialdemokratska Stranka advantaged groups, and so on. Alongside this the Slovenije”, Social Democratic Party of Slovenia). They party always emphasises that individual states or sociehave three ministers in the cabinet, the minister of the ties are no longer in a position to meet these chalinterior, the minister for labour, the family and social lenges alone in the face of globalisation and the meshaffairs, and the culture minister. ing of traditional policy fields(foreign, security, ecoThe referendum on EU accession took place on 23 nomic, environmental and development policy). Europe March 2003 and resulted in a surprisingly clear major- must therefore become a strong and united actor in ity in favour of Slovenia’s entry into the EU. With a order, on the one ha nd, to be able to cope with curturnout of around 60% just under 90% voted“yes” rent political and societal problems in Europe, and on and only 10.4% were against. The referendum on Slo- the other, to be an equal partner to the USA, internavenia’s entry into NATO took place at the same time, tional organisations and transnational 85 actors. resulting in 66% of the votes in favour and 34% The ZLSD also constitutes an exception in that it against: although the outcome clearly favoured joining does not give priority to either the economic or the seNATO it expressed a certain lack of enthusiasm, curity policy benefits of EU accession, but rather – heightened by the war in Iraq, which the majority of alongside“Social Europe” – accords“Europe as a Slovenians opposed. 81 community with shared values” qualitatively higher worth than“Market Europe”. The slogan“multiplicity The United List of Social Democrats – ZLSD The ZLSD is an amalgamation of the Social Democratic Union, the Party of Democratic Renewal, and part of 80 See Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania for 2001–2004, Vilnius 2001, http://www.lrv.lt/engl/docs/Braz_2001a.doc, on: 04.07.2003. 81 See: http://www.rvk.si/referendum/eu-nato/eng/ und http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oee/slovenie/referendum/default2.htm, on: 28.07.2003. 82 See Igor Luksic: Das politische System Sloweniens[Slovenia’s political system], in: Wolfgang Ismayr(ed.): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas [The political systems of Eastern Europe], Opladen 2002, p. 624; and Janusz Bugajski: Political Parties of Eastern Europe. A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era , New York 2002, pp. 652f. 83 See ULSD: The 4th congress of the United List of Social Democrats, Ljubljana 25 June 2001, http://www.eurosocialist.org/upload/publications/60ENSloveni a.pdf, on: 20.06.2003. 84 Ibid. 85 See PES: Security in Change, http://www.pes-congress.de/en/document/berlin_declaration.html, on: 29.07.2003.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit in unity” is important in this connection – the identity of individual nations should be maintained in or alongside the European identity, though not to the detriment of citizens’ identification with the EU. However, to this end, according to a meeting of the Socialist International’s Committee for Central and Eastern Europe, the EU should establish appropriate democratic decision-making structures in order to facilitate such identification: “[…] the Committee underlines[how important it is] that citizens fully identify with the process of European integration and urges the EU to equip itself with the instruments of participation which will confer full democratic legitimacy on the process of European integration.” 86 Hungary In April 2002, 41.1% of the Hungarian electorate voted for the coalition consisting of the“Magyar Polgári Párt”(Hungarian Civic Party – FIDESZ) and the “Magyar Demokrata Fórum”(Hungarian Democratic Forum – MDF), 42.1% for the“Magyar Szocialista Párt”(Hungarian Socialist Party – MSzP) and 5.5% for the“Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége”(Alliance of Free Democrats – SzDSz). The government was formed from the MSzP and the SZDSZ, which accounted for 198 out of 386 MPs. The Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy ran as a non-party candidate on the MSzP list. Medgyessy was one of the eight European leaders who signed the letter on preserving US–European unity in the face of the Iraq issue, which in the meantime has become a cause for regret in MSzP circles. The Hungarian referendum on EU accession took place on 12 April 2003. While the 45.62% turnout was disappointingly low, the“yes”-vote was unexpectedly high: just under 84% voted in favour of EU accession. 87 In advance of the poll every party with parliamentary representation had endorsed accession, with the exception of the extreme-right“Magyar Igazság és Elet Pártja”(Hungarian Truth and Life Party – MIÉP), although it was in parliament only until the 2002 election. 88 The Hungarian foreign minister, László Kovács(MSzP), was quoted as follows after the conclusion of the referendum: “The referendum was binding, its result was historic. Accession to the Union is the result of the accumulated work of four parliaments and five governments, and the citizens.” 89 Hungary’s Social Democrats – The Hungarian Socialist Party(MSzP) Support for the European Union in Hungary is founded on a broad national consensus which encompasses all serious political parties and the general 90 public. The MSzP – in coalition with the SZDSZ – therefore encounters no significant opposition in this area. However, Viktor Orbán(FIDESZ) after his election victory in 1998 announced that he would represent Hungary’s national interests in relation to the EU more decisively than the preceding centre-left government of the MSzP/SZDSZ coalition. Although he quickly made the necessary legal amendments he once remarked that it would not be a catastrophe for Hungary if it did not join the EU. The MSzP’s statements on European policy encompass the full spectrum, from common security policy conception to European identity and community of shared values. Decisive are the statements made by foreign minister Kovács(MSzP), Hungary’s EU Integration website set up by the Foreign Ministry, Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament Katalin Szili(MSzP) and the MSzP’s party programme. On Hungary’s EU Integration website one finds a FAQ or list of Frequently Asked Questions, one of which concerns why Hungary should join the European Union: “First of all, it means security in the external environment. After long centuries of foreign rule, independence and security are treated as fundamental values by the Hungarian nation.” 91 Two aims are fundamentally connected – according to the MSzP – with the striving for security: strengthening 86 Socialist International Committee for Central and Eastern Europe, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 12–13 July 2002, http://www.89 László Kovács: On the EU Referendum, 12 April 2003 http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/Kulugyminiszterium/EN/news/kovacs_eu_referndum, on: 25.06.2003. socialistinternational.org/6Meetings/SIMEETINGS/SICEE/July02/ljubljana-e.html, on: 07.07.03. 87 For further information on the referendum, see: 90 See Agnes Batory: Hungarian Party Identities and the Que stion of European Integration, SEI Working Paper No. 49. Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No. 4, Sushttp://www.valasztas.hu/outroot/de/10_0.html, on: sex 2001, p. 13. 16.07.2003. 91 Hungary’s EU integration website: Why Does Hungary Want 88 See“Referendum mit Schönheitsfehler“[Flawed referendum], to Join the EU? http://www.kum.hu/euint/faq1.html, on: http://www.dw-world.de, on: 16.07.2003. 25.06.2003. 17

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 18 of the common European security and defence policy in establishing meaningful cooperation between interand cooperation between the USA and the EU. How- governmental and supranational institutions. 96 Asked ever, the Hungarian MSzP takes a different direction what kind of EU Hungary hopes for, the EU Integration from the Polish SLD in its arguments. While the SLD website answers – without coming up with construcwould like to see Europe developed as a strong partner tive ideas which actually might have to be implemenof the USA the MSzP calls for a united and strong EU ted – that Hungary wants an efficient, transparent, and in order to develop an efficient European crisis man- open EU. agement system on the European continent. At the In her speech at the Hungarian Embassy in Berlin on same time, it sees that there is a considerable quantita- 9 May 2003 the Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, tive and qualitative discrepancy between US and Euro- Katalin Szili(MSzP), emphasised not the“technical” – pean defence resources and recognises the need for as she called them – details but the idealistic ones. It is American engagement on European soil. time that the accession countries identify with Europe’s “the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)[…] is expected to provide benefits as well as new responsibilities for Hungary. Due to its ge ographical location, Hungary is deeply interested in establishing an efficient European crisis management system. This will bring effective and fast an92 swers to possible cha llenges.” new character. At the same time, however, she reminded the current EU member states that they too should take care not to lose sight of the ideal of a united 97 Europe. However, she stopped short of going into detail concerning the identity of Europe and its characteristics; in common with Kovács, who also speaks of cooperation and the independence of national and European identities, without even explaining Besides this, Hungary declares itself ready to cooperate these concepts in outline: actively in the implementation of European Security and Defence Policy. 93 However, the concrete form of this cooperation remains open. According to Kovács, the European security dimension is not sufficient to ensure global security and so transatlantic cooperation is inevitable. 94 Ideas on the structural constitution of the EU “The enlargement of the Union will further enhance the national, ethnic and cultural diversity within the organization. Rather than being in contradiction, national and European identities complement each other. We are for a European Union where each 98 and every nation is able to preserve its ide ntity.” among MSzP members are still very vague. However, it is interesting that, in contrast with almost all other states, the MSzP says that it is ready to surrender rights Conclusion of sovereignty in favour of European institutions. “In the view of the Socialists, there is no other way of modernisation for Hungary and more broadly Central Europe than joining the process of European integration as soon as possible, voluntarily giving up part of sovereignty and transferring that to the insti95 tutions of European integration.” In terms of the electoral competition within the accession countries’ political systems the parties of the democratic Left are the clearest advocates of European integration. Opponents on nationalist grounds are to be found overwhelmingly on the Right, although the orthodox Czech and Slovakian Left link arguments about sovereignty with left-wing ideological positions Foreign Minister Kovács, on the other hand, simply emphasises that the EU is an organisation of a“peculiar kind” and that the challenge for the future consists 96 See László Kovács: Presentation by Mr László Kovács, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, delivered at Columbia University, New York, 12 September 2002, http://www.kum.hu/Archivum/Korabbiszoviovoi/2002/KovacsL/92 Ibid. 93 See Hungary’s EU integration website: Relations between Hungary and the European Union, http://www.kum.hu/euint0912ColKl.htm, on: 25.06.2003. 97 See Katalin Szili: Die Rede der Präsidentin des Ungarischen Parlamentes, Frau Katalin Szili, zu EU-Angelegenheiten vom 9. /huneu_rel.html, on: 25.06.2003. 94 See László Kovács: Presentation by Mr László Kovács, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, delivered at CoMai 2003 in der Ungarischen Botschaft Berlin[Speech by the Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, Mrs Katalin Szili, on European affairs at the Hungarian Embassy in Berlin, 9 May lumbia University, New York, 12 September 2002, http://www.kum.hu/Archivum/Korabbiszoviovoi/2002/KovacsL/0912ColKl.htm, on: 25.06.2003. 2003], http://www.ungarische-botschaft.de/nem/szili.html, on: 25.06.2003. 98 László Kovács: Presentation by Mr László Kovács, Minister of 95 MSzP(1994): Kihívások és válaszok: Tézisek a nemzetröl, A határon túli magyarsagról[Challenges and responses: theses about the nation and about(ethnic) Hungarians beyond the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, delivered at Columbia University, New York, 12 September 2002, http://www.kum.hu/Archivum/Korabbiszoviovoi/2002/KovacsL/borders], cited in: Agnes Batory 2001, p. 19. 0912ColKl.htm, on: 25.06.2003.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit (against“international capital” and“imperialism”). Thus the attitudes of the post-communist or leftHowever, in the latter field the orthodox communists see that only a united Europe would have a chance of going its own way, which is simply no longer possible wing parties in Central and Eastern Europe reflect the conflicts which the current EU has to cope with; these conflicts will continue due to the size of enlargement – for individual countries. The social objective of all leftwing forces is to preserve a European welfare-state model from the forces of globalisation. an additional ten states – not to mention its heterogeneity. It may prove difficult for EU integration that only two of the eight parties under examination here idenIf one looks at the foreign policy standpoints of individual parties more closely one may discern a clear dividing line between – roughly speaking –“Atlantitify it as a central theme, and even then in an area which, for example in comparison to economic integration, in any case has a long way to go. The hope of cists” and“Europeans”. The first put the security issue in the foreground and emphasise the need for American engagement on European soil, the integration of the Left that the accession of the post-communist states will strengthen ideas of this kind in the EU must rely solely on the Slovenian ZLSD, and will, because of European security structures in NATO, and cooperative transatlantic relations, essential for Europe’s security. In this group we find above all the Polish SLD, the Lithuathe latter’s minor importance, in all likelihood be disappointed. nian LSDP, and also – more moderate – the Estonian Möödukad party. What they all have in common is the absolute priority of national and European security; their belonging to Europe’s community of shared values, or the aim of reinforced political integration are of marginal concern or do not come up for discussion. It is interesting in this connection that both communist successor parties, the SLD and the LSDP, are among the Atlanticist“hardliners”, having fully distanced themselves from their earlier aims, and compared with the current members of the EU no longer belong on the Left, but rather among the conservatives. On the other,“European” side are found the Czech CSSD and the Hungarian MSzP. Their party programmes are markedly different from the other pa rties. Both make political integration the main emphasis and advocate the reinforcement of supranational structures with the European Union – even, in the case of the MSzP, at the expense of national sovereignty. The second point of emphasis on their EU agenda is European identity, to which the Czechs and the Hungarians apparently feel more strongly bound than the Poles or the Baltic states. The Slovenian ZLSD and the Czech KSCM are exceptions. The first is the only party to emphasise a socially just, democratic Europe, and classical social democratic objectives. The KSCM, on the other hand, is in favour of deeper European integration but is opposed to the EU in its present form and in that way – in fact it is the only one to do so – declares its loyalty to the communist ideas which stem from its past as a state party. At the last elections both the ZLSD and the KSCM were among the most successful parties in terms of percentage of votes. The ZLSD is part of the government, while the KSCM is enjoying increasing popularity among the electorate. 19

Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 20 List of Abbreviations LC LDDP ANO CFSP Aliancia Nového obcana(Alliance of a New Citizen)(Slovakia) Common Foreign and Security Policy LDDP Latvijas Ce ï š(Latvia’s Way) Latvijas Demokratiska Darba Partija (Latvian Democratic Workers’ Party) Lietuvos demokratine darbo partija (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party) CSSD Ceská strana sociálne demokratická LDP (Czech Social Democratic Party) Latgales Demokratiska Partija(Latga llian Democratic Party)(Latvia) DeSUS DPS EK EME EMK ER Demokratièna stranka upokojencev Slovenije(Democratic Pensioners’ Party of Slovenia) Demokratiska Partija„Saimnieks“ (Democratic Party Master)(Latvia) Eesti Keskerakond(Estonian Center Party) Eesti Maarahva Erakond(Estonian Rural People’s Party) Estonia Eesti Maa Keskerakond(Estonian Rural Center Party) Eesti Reformierakond(Estonian Reform Party) LDS LPP LPR LRS LSDP LSDSP Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije(Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) Latvijas Pirma Partija(Latvia’s First Party) Liga Polskich Rodzin(Polish Families League) Lietuvos ruso sajunga(Union of Russians in Lithuania)(Lithuania) Lietuvos socialdemokrato partija (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) Latvijas Socialdemokratu Stradnieku Partija(Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party) ESDP Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Partei(EsLZP tonian Social Democratic Party) Latvijas Zala Partija(Latvian Green Party) ESDP ESDTP EU FIDESZ European Security and Defence Policy Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatiik Tööpartei (Estonian Social Democratic Labor Party) European Union Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Párt(Alliance of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party) LZS MDF MIeP MSzP NATO Latvijas Zemnieku Savieniba(Latvian Agrarian Union) Magyar Demokrata Fórum(Hunga rian Democratic Forum) Magyar Igazság és Elet Pártja(Hungarian Justice and Life Party) Magyar Szocialista Párt(Hungarian Socialist Party) North Atlantic Treaty Organization FKgP Független Kisgazda Földmunkás és Polgár Párt(Independent Smallholder’s Party)(Hungary) NDP NELF Naujosios demokratijos partija(New Democratic Party)(Lithuania) New European Left Forum GASP GESVP Common foreign and security policy NS Common European security and defence policy Nsi Naujoji sajunga(New Union)(Lithuania) Nova Slovenije(New Slovenia) HZDS JL JP Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) Jaunais laiks(New Era)(Latvia) Jauna Partija(The New Party)(Latvia) ODS OPZZ Obcanská demokratická strana(Civic Democratic Party)(Czech Republic) Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazkow Zawodowych(All-Polish Accord of Trade Unions) KDH KDNP Krestanskodemokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement) (Slovakia) Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People’s Party) OSZE OSCE PES Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europe Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Party of European Socialists KDU-CSL KSCM (Hungary) Krest’anská a demokratické unie – Ceskoslovenská strana lidova(Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party) Komunistická Strana Cech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)(Czech Republic) PiS PO PSL Rahvaliit Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc(Law and Justice)(Poland) Platforma Obywatelska(Citizens’ Platform)(Poland) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe(Polish Peasant’s Party) Eestimaa Rahvaliit(Estonian People’s Union)

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit ResP S SDKU SDL SdRP SDK SDS(S) SI SLD SLS+SKD SMK SzDSz TB/LNNK TVB UP US-DEU UW ZLSD ZZS Ühendus Vabariigi Eest – Party Union of Republic- Res Publica(Estonia) Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej(SelfDefence of the Polish Republic) Slovenska Demokraticka a Krestanska Unia(Slovak Democratic and Christian Union) Strana demokratickej l’avice(Party of the Democratic Left)(Slovakia) Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej(Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) Slovenska Demokraticka Koalicica (Slovak Democratic Coalition) Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije (Social Democratic Party of Slovenia) Socialist International Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej(Democratic Left Alliance)(Poland) Slovenska Ljudska Stranka(Slovenian People’s Party) Strana mad’arskej koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja(Party of the Hunga rian Coalition)(Slovakia) Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége(Alliance of Free Democrats)(Hungary) Apvieniba“Tcvzemei un Brivibai”/LNNK(For Fatherland and Fre edom/Latvian National Independence Movement Union)(Latvia) Tevzemei un Brivibai(Fatherland and Freedom Coalition)(Latvia) Unia Pracy(Union of Labor)(Poland) Unie Svobody – Democratická unie (Freedom Union – Democratic Union) (Czech Republic) Unia Wolnosci(Freedom Union) (Poland) Zdruzena Lista socialnih demokratov (United List of Social Democrats) (Slovenia) Zaio un Zemnieku savieniba(Alliance of Greens and Farmers)(Latvia) Bibliography Batory, Agnes: Hungarian Party Identities& the Que stion of European Integration, SEI Working Paper No. 49. Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No. 4, Sussex 2001. Bingen, Dieter: Die„Sozialdemokratie der Republik Polen“ (SdRP) in der„Demokratischen Linksallianz“(SLD), in: Gerhard Hirscher(ed.): Kommunistische und postkommunist ische Parteien in Osteuropa. Ausgewählte Fallstudien , München 2002, pp. 67–101. Bugajski, Janusz: Political Parties of Eastern Europe. A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era , New York 2002. Crook, Nick, Michael Dauderstädt, and André Gerrits: Social Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe , Amsterdam 2002. Dauderstädt, Michael, André Gerrits, and György Markus: Troubled Transition. Social Democracy in East-Central Europe , Amsterdam 1999. Dauderstädt, Michael: Interessen und Hindernisse bei der EU-Osterweiterung. Die Rolle des„acquis communautaire, Politikinformation Osteuropa 98, Bonn(FES) 2002. Grzymala-Busse, Anna M.: Redeeming the Communist Past. The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe , Cambridge 2002. Hall, Peter A. und David W. Soskice(ed.): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage , Oxford 2001. Handl, Vladimír: Die Tschechische Kommunistische Partei: Orthodoxes Fossil oder erfolgreiche neo-kommunistische Protestpartei? Analysen der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Politikinformation Osteuropa , No. 105/October 2002. Joerißen, Britta, and Bernhard Stahl(eds): Europäische Außenpolitik und nationale Identität. Vergleichende Di skurs- und Verhaltensstudien zu Dänemark, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien und den Niederlanden. Dokumente und Schriften der Europäischen Akademie Otzenhausen, Münster 2003. Kitschelt, Herbert et al.: Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation , Cambridge 1999. Lagerspetz, Mikko, and Konrad Maier: Das politische System Estlands, in: Wolfgang Ismayr(ed.): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas , Opladen 2002, pp. 69–107. Lang, Kai-Olaf: Polens Demokratische Linksallianz – eine post-postkommunistische Partei? Vom Bündnis SLD zur Partei SLD, Aktuelle Analysen des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 4/2000. Lang, Kai-Olaf: Tschechische Positionen zur künftigen Gestalt der Europäischen Union, SWP-Studie S1, Berlin, January 2002. Larischová, Kristina: Zum Ausgang des EU-Referendums in der Tschechischen Republik. Kurzbericht, Prague, 18.06.2003. Luksic, Igor: Das politische System Sloweniens, in: Wolfgang Ismayr(ed.): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas , Opladen 2002, pp. 603–38. 21

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Michael Dauderstädt& Britta Joerißen The European Policy of Left-wing Parties in Post-communist Accession Countries Europäische Politik (03/2004) 24 Websites http://elis.ee/research.asp? type=0&action= 30&what=100108&id= 100108, on: 1 5.07.2003.[Opinion polls on EU accession in Estonia] http://www.vvk.ee/rh03/yldinfo/englinfo.stm, on: 15.07.2003.[Information on Estonia’s accession negotiations] http:// www2.ukie.-gov.pl/ eng.nsf/0/D39E3D507607 FEDAC1256D41002FEF52, on: 15.07.2003.[Information on the EU accession referendum in P oland] http://www.dpg-brandenburg. de /nr_20/parteienlandschaft.html, on: 20.06.2003.[Overview of the party landscape in Poland] http://www.valasztas.hu/outroot/de/10_0.html, on: 16.07.2003.[Information on the referendum in Hungary] http://www.spd-bruessel.de/arbeitskreise/erweiterung/Lettland%2020030317.doc: Lettland im Aufholprozess[Latvia in the process of catching up], on: 28.07.2003. http://www.euro.lt/index.php?LangID=7?TopMenuID= 127&LangID=7, on: 28.07.2003.[Information on the referendum in Lithuania] http://www.slowakei-net.de/politik/wahlen2002.html, on: 04.07.2003.[Information on the parliame ntary election in Slovakia] http://www.eureferendum.sk/, on: 28.07.2003.[Information on the referendum in Slovakia] http://www.rvk.si/referendum/eu-nato/eng/, on: 28.07.2003[Information on the EU and NATO refe rendums in Slovenia] http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oee /slovenie /referendum/default2.htm, on: 28.07.2003.[Information on the EU and NATO referendums in Slovenia]