Multipolarism and“Globalplayers” in Asia by Hans-Joachim Gießmann Dialogue and Cooperation 1/2002 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Department for Development Policy - Dialogue on Globalization Hiroshimastr. 17 10785 Berlin Tel.:0049-30-26936-914 Fax: 0049-30-26935-959 Roswitha.Kiewitt@fes.de www.fes.de/globalization The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung or the organisations for which the author works. 01/04/03 18:14

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Multipolarism and'Global Players' in Asia Multipolarism and‘Global Players’ in Asia Hans-Joachim Gießmann The most recent terrorist attacks on the United States of America and the quick international response to them have altered and will further alter the coordinates of global security politics. It may be too early to provide a conclusive answer to the question of whether the challenge of crossborder terrorism will eventually lead to new multilateral patterns of behaviour in security affairs. However, the initial and somewhat surprising commonality of views among the big powers of Asia, Europe and America on how to react to this specific challenge may hint at new chances of improved, yet probably limited, political interaction on a global scale. For years China, Russia, India, Indonesia and other nations have faced the problem of spreading violence, fuelled by either ethnic or religious extremism. The governmental counter-strategies of these nations have usually been criticized by the West, in particular with reference to the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in their home countries. It cannot be excluded that this criticism will become less direct and outspoken in the future, overshadowed by the harsh American counteraction against the terror network of Osama bin Laden. However, the patterns of domestic and cross-border security policies of nations in Asia may also be affected, having an impact on neighbourhood relations and regional stability in an as yet undetermined way. Moreover, any military escalation and the spread of terror and counter-terror into Asia may pose a serious threat to the security situation of most peoples in Asia. There can be no doubt, however, that organized global terrorism, which is motivated by fundamentalism and hatred, poses a crucial challenge, and not only to nation-states and international organizations. It is also linked to farreaching changes induced by globalization in economy, technology, culture and society. Certain uncomfortable questions have to be answered:(1) whether these changes and the reactive methods which have been applied so far to tackle them politically may even have contributed to the further spread of fundamentalism;(2) whether globalization has resulted in significant losses for large groups of people within transforming societies, which people attribute to the politics of the‘rich’ part of the world; and(3) whether or not the spread of political conflicts, triggered by these losses, feeds incentives to either use or tolerate force as a legitimate tool for resisting what is being perceived as a threat to sustainable living conditions for millions of people? Although the United States appears presently to be the main target for cross-border terrorist attacks, it may become an issue for other nations as well. Asia, in particular, could be concerned as the gap between the richest and the poorest groups of Asian society has widened much more than within the societies of Europe or America. A Strong Case for Regional Security-building in Asia At first glance, the basis of post-Cold War security politics has shifted to the strength of nation-states within regionally structured security architectures. However, while few 65

Dialogue+ Cooperation 1/2002 nations have maintained global influence even though‘global players’, whether major in selected areas, only the United States powers, economic actors(e.g. transnational can, and has, acted as a global superpower. corporations), state or non-state Nevertheless, the United States has international institutions or organizations, painfully experienced a relative loss in its may exert significant influence on each of national impact on security matters. At these areas, they can hardly take present security matters are essentially responsibility for solving these issues on driven by globalization and fragmentation. their own. Each issue requires the They can, for the sake of regional stability, cooperation of different actors on different only be tackled through multilateral levels of action. The prospect of solving cooperation. This has become more these issues, however, is not as evident in the case of Asia than in any discouraging as it appears to be at first other part of the world. glance, mainly because any escalation or spread of conflict would be harmful to all Although the significant progress made in international actors’ vested interests, and regional security building in Asia cannot because awareness about the imminent be ignored, certain developments have risks of escalation has grown. triggered a growing concern that this progress may be overturned by parallel Threats to security, however, originate not deteriorating trends, such as the potential only from spreading conflicts, but also from escalation of war and violence in and deteriorating trends that make the around Afghanistan, the difficult cooperative resolution of a conflict more transformation in Indonesia, the situation difficult. The most imminent – and partly in the Kashmir region, the possibility of interrelated – trends can be summarized political backlashes on the Korean as follows: peninsula, the sensitive issue of several territorial claims in East Asia, the ongoing n the growing gap between wealth and arms race, the horizontal and vertical poverty, between prosperity and misery, proliferation of weapons throughout the within the developing societies of Asia; whole region and, last but not least, n the spread of violence, motivated by, growing problems with piracy, cross-border or based on, ethnic, religious or cultural organized crime and the spread of terrorist divergence; threats. Each factor in itself challenges the n xenophobia and the oppression of stability of regional – and probably global human and minority rights; – security. As Howard French has correctly n the weakening competence and ability noted, the region is presently home to many of many states to balance the basic of the most explosive loose ends( IHT , political, social and economic 2000:1, 11), none of which can be tied up equilibrium causing a growing unilaterally. Therefore, the essence of dependence on, and influence on security multipolarism in Asia can be domestic affairs by, foreign states or described in two ways. On the one hand, non-state actors; it is an existing patchwork of relatively n the impact of‘globalization losses’ or independent yet interdependent areas of negative‘globalization effects’ on states, conflict, which may possibly be tackled only such as organized crime, drug on the sub-regional or even local level. And trafficking, environmental degradation, on the other hand, if these conflicts are erosion of cultural values and social not resolved or sufficiently harboured, they identities, alienation, the privatization may pose a threat to many other nations of the monopoly of force, etc. in, as well as beyond, Asia. Nonetheless, 66

Notwithstanding these risks and trends, the possibility of Asia successfully coping with the transformation of the global security system does not look too bad. For example, over time, Asia has experienced growing regional coherence(Naisbitt, 1996:11), which is primarily due to the emergence of a prospering market that is twice as large as that of Western Europe and the United States combined. The growing market coherence on the one hand and growing interdependencies on the other have fostered incentives among the regional actors to seek closer cooperation, as well as a more stable security environment. It is clear, however, that the policies of the major players, namely the United States, other regional powers and not least international organizations and financial institutions, have to contribute in a constructive way if these incentives are to be translated into a stable regional security system. For the time being, however, the prospects for such a‘constructive engagement’ remain uncertain. Multipolarism and'Global Players' in Asia Instead, the recent power and policy shifts of major actors in Asia have even contributed towards sharpening the contradictory trends of homogenization and fragmentation. The most striking shifts concern the reorientation of American engagement in East Asia, the decreasing influence of Russia after the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the undetermined future role of China as a potential regional hegemony. The ability of these nations, including Japan, to manage their national interests in a cooperative way, will have a tremendous impact on the consolidation of existing regional security institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as on the prospect of extending regional integration. On the other hand, the accession of China to the World Trade Organization(WTO) may contribute towards strengthening the idea of a cooperative identity amongst the major players in Asia, including Japan, thereby opening up a path to extended multilateralism also in the area of security policy. A Strong Case for a Multi-layered Regional Security Approach Although several initiatives to create a approach sufficed in the past, it can hardly regional security system sui generis have deal with the requirements of the future, failed in Asia, a strong case can still be especially if new threats and challenges for made for a multi-layered security system. security, such as global terrorism or The complex regional identity, overlapping proliferation, are considered. economic, ethnic and social structures, and also the possibility of searching for faceWhile the ARF approach can, to some saving trade-offs between the various extent, be compared with that of the former interests of all regional actors constitute a Conference for Security and Cooperation sound basis for a broadened architecture in Europe(CSCE), directly cloning of cooperation. The ARF(1994), Asia European experiences may not be the ideal Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) solution for Asia. The founding conditions (1993) and the Association of Southeast of the CSCE differed extensively from Asian Nations(ASEAN)(1967) have those that presently exist in Asia. Yet while become significant regional actors, but they the bipolarism of the Cold War was lack intrusive security mechanisms. So far, occasionally considered an advantage for security matters have usually been dealt with forming the CSCE in the case of Europe, on the bilateral or sub-regional scale, such the heterogeneous multipolarism of as in the case of Korea. Even if such an present-day Asia – in combination with 67

Dialogue+ Cooperation 1/2002 growing economic coherence, political pressure for closer cooperation and a long tradition of bilateral pragmatism – may provide a good opportunity for creating a regional security system. As Klintworth noted a decade ago already,‘economic interdependencies are channelling common interests and structures. Economic interdependence has opened up new channels for regional cooperation, confidence building and transparency in security relations between Asia-Pacific states. Most countries are speaking the same language as far as trade, investment and economic cooperation are concerned. This has been matched by a habit of dialogue on a broad range of regional, diplomatic, humanitarian, political, environmental, cultural, security, nuclear, military, intelligence, trade, development and economic issues’(1992: 221-231). The comparative advantage of a multilayered approach in Asia lies in the possibility of trade-offs and the immediate win/win results of cooperation. While it hardly makes sense to search for a unique security system in Asia, the already existing web of organizations and mechanisms may equally serve the purpose if its elements efficiently reinforce each other. Essentially, ten mechanisms form the basis of a multilateral security system: 1. global multilateral state-to-state cooperation(UN) 2. issue-related multilateral state-to-state cooperation(WTO, Missile Technology Control Regime) 3. cross-regional state-to-state cooperation (APEC+) 4. regional state-to-state cooperation (ARF) 5. multilateral ad-hoc state-to-state cooperation(e.g. Cambodia) 6. sub-regional multilateral state-to-state cooperation(ASEAN+) 7. issue-related sub-regional state-to-state cooperation(e.g. the Korean Peninsula) 8. bilateral state-to-state cooperation 9. regional NGO-interaction(e.g. CSCAP) 10.issue-related‘track-two’ cooperation. Multipolarism vs. Multilateralism? Much has been said and written about why detected in East Asia: high levels of military it would not make sense to directly apply confrontation and mistrust between the Europe’s experiences to East Asia: the regional players; competing vested existence of bilateral disputes on territorial governmental interests; a gradual shift in matters; Russia and mainland China’s the distribution of regional power absorption in domestic politics; the projection; growing interest in stable possibility of nuclear blackmail; patterns of cooperation being a prerequisite heterogeneous political, economic, social for increasing economic prosperity and for and cultural structures; asymmetric and diminishing the likelihood of war; and a asynchronous power balances; greater habit of loose dialogue, especially within distances(land and sea) that are to be the framework of the ARF, on a broad range bridged between the centres of strategic of issues that might serve as a basis of decision making; the lack of neutral generic security networking. intermediaries; and the sharp asymmetries of economic performance. However, some The ARF appears to be more comparable of the conditions that led to initial to the Organization for Security and rapprochement in Europe can also be Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) than, for 68

example, ASEAN, which has a much stronger focus on economic cooperation, and which has always ruled out commitments in the realm of military security. However, close cooperation between ASEAN and APEC members with the ARF may provide a supportive economic dimension of cooperation to the ARF. Such a scenario did not take place in the years of the CSCE. The missing link between multilateral economic and political interests, as well as the lack of regional security structures, has frequently made politicians and experts feel that an OSCElike organization, an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia(cf. Gills, 2001), could lead to a more stable environment in East Asia. Yet the analogy itself may lead to wrong conclusions, because the OSCE per se could not be implemented in East Asia. It is more likely Multipolarism and'Global Players' in Asia that the principles and norms underlying the OSCE may be applicable to East Asia, while the mechanisms and instruments must be generated according to the striking challenges in the area. These require a made-to-measure approach. Some should be dealt with by an enlarged audience, others may require bilateral negotiations, or mediation based on good services. The ARF, however, is not likely to transform into a Jack-of-all-trades. This role was, for example, only adopted by the CSCE in Europe at a late point in time, after 15 years of incremental steps and several backlashes. On the other hand, such a role may serve the best security role by harbouring, comprising and curbing the most essential security interests of all major players, as well as those of all other nations and peoples in Asia. References Giessmann, H.J. 2001. Multilateral Regional Security – OSCE Experiences and Lessons . Seoul: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Gills, B.K.‘What CSBMs for Northeast Asia’, OSCE Conference, Seoul, 21 March, mimeo. International Herald Tribune ( IHT ), 16 October 2000. Klintworth, G. 1992.‘Asia-Pacific: More Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities’, The Pacific Review , 5(3). Naisbitt, J. 1996. Megatrends Asia . New York: Simon& Schuster. 69

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