Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit X Frieden und Sicherheit Sven Biscop The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a“More Active” EU Report from the 1 st European Strategic Forum, Warsaw 2006 Januar 2007

Frieden und Sicherheit (01/2007) Sven Biscop The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a“More Active” EU 2 Content Introduction: The European Strategic Forum Äó=píÉÑ~åáÉ=cäÉÅÜíåÉê …… . ………………...………...… 1 Courage and Capabilities for a “More Active” EU Äó=pîÉå=_áëÅçé ........................................................... 3 Global Crisis Management......................................... 3 Permanent Prevention................................................ 4 Conclusion: More Active – Less Divided..................... 5 Summary...................................................... backside ISBN 978-3-89892-608-9 Herausgeber: Stefanie Flechtner Internationale Politikanalyse Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung D – 53170 Bonn Internet: www.fes.de/ internationalepolitik E-Mail: Stefanie.Flechtner@fes.de

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a”More Active“ EU Introduction DR Congo to the monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia. However, the strategic and political purpose of The European Strategic Forum – Constructing a European security policy remains rather vague. Though Common Security Culture in Europe the European Security Strategy constituted an important step forward in framing a common approach to The European Security Strategy of 2003 calls for an security, it offers, as some participants highlighted, active, capable and coherent EU security policy and for more general principles than a real strategy for action. a common‘strategic culture’ in Europe. Since then Furthermore, the political will in Europe to engage in much progress has been achieved, particularly with resecurity operations abroad seems to be rather on the gard to the institutions and capabilities of European decline as fears of military and political overstretch and security policy. Yet the construction of a common sedoubts about mission success are growing. Therefore, curity culture remains a critical challenge. Too often strengthening the strategic and political focus in the EU is hampered by a lack of strategic consensus Europe’s security policy is both a key lesson learned between Member States on where, how, when and for and an important challenge ahead for the EU. what reasons the EU should engage in security operations. Exploring the cases of EU engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan and Belarus the debate at The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, one of the leading Warsaw centred specifically on two themes: Partnerpolitical foundations in Europe, has long been at the ship and Prevention. Working in partnership is a key forefront of progressive debate in European foreign component of the European approach to security, and and security policy. Within its wide array of activities an important means of advancing the EU concept of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation has created a new flag‘effective multilateralism’. Yet choosing the right partship event to promote a common strategic culture and ners – on a local as well as the international level – innovative thinking in European security policy: the remains a demanding task. Participants at Warsaw bìêçéÉ~å=píê~íÉÖáÅ=cçêìã. pointed out that in security policy, partnerships should be built for the long term. In operational practise, The European Strategic Forum is an exclusive highhowever, partners are often selected on the basis of level roundtable that brings together parliamentarians, short-term benefits, without taking into account the government officials and experts from the Member implications of these partnerships for the long-term States and the EU to discuss the future of European process of stabilisation and peace building in the resecurity policy. The objective of the Forum is to build a gion. security policy network in which progressive voices from new and old Member States meet and examine Within the European approach to security, prevensecurity concepts and policies for Europe. tion is a clear priority. However, participants acknowledged that present EU structures, particularly the intergovernmental mode of decision-making in ESDP, is The European Strategic Forum, Warsaw, not conducive to the implementation of pro-active, 14 September 2006 preventive security policies. Besides, in political terms prevention is rather difficult to‘sell’, as its success, the On 14 September 2006, the first European Strategic non-occurrence of crisis, often remains unappreciated Forum was held at Warsaw on‘The International Secuin the political and public realm. rity Engagement of the European Union – Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead’. The EU’s international To move from reactive to pro-active security policies security engagement is increasing rapidly, with new remains a key challenge for the EU. But only by force1 missions reaching from the military operation in fully pursuing this strategic shift will Europe be able to

Sven Biscop The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a“More Active” EU Frieden und Sicherheit (01/2007) 2 focus~åÇ= strengthen its international security engagement. In the following text, Sven Biscop, participant in the European Strategic Forum and Senior Research Fellow at the Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, explores ways and means of meeting the challenge of a‘more active’ EU. píÉÑ~åáÉ=cäÉÅÜíåÉê=

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit Sven Biscop* Global Crisis Management Courage and Capabilities for a“More Active” EU In 2003 the EU adopted the European Security Strategy, the first ever strategic document providing longterm guidance for the whole of EU foreign policy. The Strategy calls for the EU to be‘ ãçêÉ=~ÅíáîÉ’ in pursuing its strategic objectives, through a ÜçäáëíáÅ approach utilising‘the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities’.‘Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’ should produce‘a world of well-governed democratic states’. This overall method and objective can be described as‘ ÉÑÑÉÅíáîÉ= ãìäíáä~íÉê~äáëã’. * And active the EU has become. In late 2006, no less than 11 civilian and military crisis management operations are ongoing within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) across the globe, including the Balkans, Palestine, Sudan, DR Congo and Aceh. Together, these involve about 8,000 troops and 500 civilians. Many more troops from EU Member States, up to 80,000 in total, are deployed in other frameworks, notably in Lebanon, where the EU has taken the lead in providing troops for a reinforced UNIFIL; in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan; and, still, in Iraq. In terms of preventive diplomacy, the‘EU-3’(France, Germany and the UK) are leading negotiations on nuclear proliferation with Iran. The EU with its Member States is already a global security actor to be reckoned with, much more so than many people realize. Yet this‘activeness’ also raises a number of questions. Why is the EU active in these cases and not in others? Which criteria determine ïÜÉå and ïÜÉêÉ the EU as such engages in crisis management, militarily and diplomatically? And must not the EU look ÄÉóçåÇ crisis management and become‘more active’ in its day-to-day policies as well? The Strategy states unequivocally:‘As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product[…] the European Union is inevitably a global player’. Not only is it the duty of the EU, given its weight, to‘share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’, but the view of the EU as just a regional actor ignores the dynamics of an interdependent globalized world, in which ultimately Europe can be secure only if the world is secure. Furthermore, for multilateralism to be effective, it must be enforceable:‘We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken’. But if the EU is very active in crisis management and preventive diplomacy, and puts great emphasis on the central role of and need to support the UN Security Council, it does not always behave as a ÖäçÄ~ä actor. tÜÉêÉ: The Member States are certainly not averse to deploying their forces, but the large majority are deployed in the Balkans, in Europe’s backyard where the EU and its Member States logically assume responsibility, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a follow-up to the interventions – one rather more controversial than the other – initiated by the US and a number of EU Member States. The large contingent in Lebanon provides an enormous opportunity to increase the EU’s standing in the Middle East, if the diplomatic follow-up is assured. But it contrasts sharply with the 1,000 troops of EUFOR RDC reluctantly deployed in DR Congo, a country the size of Western Europe and with little or no infrastructure which it could not seriously hope to cover. In reality, therefore, in case of serious trouble EUFOR RDC would look more like a classic evacuation operation, ready to take out European citizens in case of trouble. The same reluctance applies to Darfur: only after the African Union took on the operation did the reluctance to intervene give way to intense EU–NATO competition to gain visibility through second-line support for the AU. Contributions to UN operations, Lebanon aside, are minimal: in mid-2006 the EU-25 accounted for only about 2,750 out of over 63,000‘blue helmets’, just 4.4%. * Senior Research Fellow at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels and Professor of European tÜÉå: Although most Member States do put their Security at Ghent University. In 2005 he published qÜÉ=bìêçJ forces in harm’s way in national, NATO or coalition-oféÉ~å=pÉÅìêáíó=píê~íÉÖó=Ó=^=däçÄ~ä=^ÖÉåÇ~=Ñçê=mçëáíáîÉ=mçïÉê the-willing operations, and although legally the Peters(Ashgate). berg Tasks include operations at the high end of the 3

Sven Biscop The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a“More Active” EU Frieden und Sicherheit (01/2007) 4 spectrum of violence, politically the Member States are over 400,000 quasi non-deployable conscripts, capabilstill extremely divided over the EU’s ambition in this ity gaps in terms of‘enablers’(strategic transport, field. As Member States remain divided, in crisis situacommand, control and communications), slow transtions the EU level is more often than not out of the formation from territorial defence to expeditionary loop. Consequently, even though the EU has proven warfare. In view of the need for rotation only one third that it can mount high-risk operations if the political of the available forces can be deployed at any one will is present, most EU-led operations are of lower intime, so the EU-25 can field 70–80,000 troops. This is tensity and often smaller in scale. The still very young what the EU-25 effectively are doing today, so a subESDP needs a number of successes to legitimize itself, stantial increase in deployments is only possible in the hence the tendency to select operations with a large medium to long term, in function of the ongoing chance of success. To some extent therefore the crititransformation of European armed forces. cism is justified that the EU takes on important but mostly‘easy’ operations, in the post-conflict phase, in response to the settlement of a conflict – a criticism Permanent Prevention which can of course be applied to the international community as a whole. One must thus question Global security depends on more than crisis managewhether the Member States are willing to fully accept ment and preventive diplomacy. In line with the holistic the implications of the strong EU diplomatic support approach of the Strategy, long-term permanent prefor the principle of‘responsibility to protect’(R2P) that vention policies seek to~îçáÇ conflict and crisis in the was endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in Sepfirst place. tember 2005. R2P implies that if a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the ‘Effective multilateralism’ must in fact be read as a perpetrator of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes very éêçÖêÉëëáîÉ foreign policy agenda: ensuring that or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must every individual on earth has access to the core‘global give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of public goods’: the international community. In such cases, the Security Council must mandate intervention, if necessary by • physical security or freedom from fear; military means, which by definition implies high• economic prosperity or freedom from want; intensity operations. • political participation(democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law); In spite of the global ambitions expressed in the • social well-being(access to health care, education Strategy, Member States are thus reluctant to commit and a clean and hazard-free environment). large numbers of troops to long-term, large-scale operations outside their immediate periphery or where no To these four‘goods’, ÉîÉêóçåÉ is indeed entitled – direct strategic interests are at stake – where‘the risks hence they are‘global’ or‘universal’ – and it is the reare too high and the stakes are too low’. There is more sponsibility of the public authorities to make sure willingness to implement more specific rapid reaction everyone effectively has access to them – hence they operations, of relatively smaller scale and limited duraare‘public’. tion, but for high-intensity operations Member States still habitually look to other frameworks than the EU. In this regard too the EU is very active, notably in its Proactive – military~åÇ diplomatic – intervention, in bilateral relations with third countries, via the method the early stages of a crisis, remains difficult to accomof‘positive conditionality’. Through policy frameworks plish. such as the European Neighbourhood Policy vis-à-vis its neighbouring countries and the Cotonou Agreement It must be taken into account that in spite of the vis-à-vis the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, large overall numbers of European armed forces – the the EU is putting the holistic approach into practice. By EU-25 have over two million men and women in unilinking them to market access and economic and form – the percentage of deployable capabilities is acfinancial support, the EU aims to stimulate economic, tually rather limited. For the EU-25 it is estimated at political and social reforms, as well as security cooperajust 10%. Many issues have to be addressed: the low tion, so as to address the root causes and durably cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabilichange the environment that leads to extremism, crisis ties, unnecessary intra-EU duplications, the presence of and conflict. When fully implemented,‘positive condi-

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit tionality’ thus is a very intrusive approach, aiming in ing it. This requires both more political courage and effect to export the EU’s own societal model, but more, as well as better capabilities. based on persuasion rather than coercion. 1. There are, sadly, too many conflicts and crises for But if‘positive conditionality’ as a theory seems the EU to deal effectively with all of them, certainly sound enough, practice often lags behind, certainly in in a leading role. Prioritisation is therefore inevitacountries that do not – immediately – qualify for EU ble. Two sets of criteria seem to determine when membership. The carrots that would potentially be and where the EU must lead, or make a substantial most effective in stimulating reform, such as opening contribution to, diplomatic and military intervention, up the European agricultural market or setting up a up to and including the use of force, if necessary system for legal economic migration, are those that and mandated by the Security Council. The interthe EU is not willing to consider, in spite of imperative vention must be éêç~ÅíáîÉ – the EU should be a true arguments suggesting that Europe actually needs such éÉ~ÅÉã~âÉê. On the one hand, if anywhere in the measures. At the same time, conditionality is seldom world the threshold for activating the R2P mechaapplied very strictly. The impression created is that the nism is reached, the EU, in view of its support for EU favours stability and economic – and energy – inthe principle, should muster the Åçìê~ÖÉ to contribterests over reform, to the detriment of Europe’s‘soft ute to its implementation. On the other hand, the power’. Surprisingly perhaps, in the Mediterranean EU must also contribute to the resolution of conneighbours, for example, public opinion mostly views flicts and crises that are of real strategic importance the EU as a status quo actor, working with current refor Europe or, as the EU is a global actor, for the gimes rather than promoting fundamental change, world. This would certainly include the Balkans, the whereas, perhaps even more surprisingly after the inMiddle East and the Gulf, but a debate seems in orvasion of Iraq, the United States is seen as caring more der to further clarify these strategic interests. What sincerely about democracy and human rights. would Europe’s role be in case of conflict in North Korea, or in the Caucasus, or if vital energy supplies This lack of EU soft power should not be underestiwere cut off? mated. Rather than the benign, multilateralist actor which the EU considers itself –‘the one that did not 2. At the same time, the collective security system of invade Iraq’ – in many Southern countries it is first and the UN, and therefore the EU itself, as its main supforemost seen as a very aggressive economic actor. For porter and with two permanent members of the Semany countries, the negative economic consequences curity Council in its ranks, can be legitimate only if it of dumping and protectionism – which often cancel addresses the threats to ÉîÉêóçåÉÛë security. Too out the positive effects of development aid – are far much selectivity undermines the system. Although it more important and threatening than the challenges cannot always play a leading role, the EU must of terrorism and proliferation that dominate the Westshoulder a significant share of the responsibility for ern foreign policy agenda, and therefore determine the global peace and security by playing an active role image of the EU far more. In the current difficult interin the Security Council~åÇ by contributing capabilinational climate, the EU model is urgently in need of ties to UN crisis management and peacekeeping enhancing its legitimacy. operations, either as UN-led blue helmets or on ‘sub-contracted’ EU-led missions. If automaticity of availability of troops is difficult, a political decision Conclusion: More Active – Less Divided could be made on the order of magnitude of a reasonable European contribution, in function of which In the European Security Strategy, the EU has adopted the EU can then act as a‘clearing house’ for Mema very progressive foreign policy concept. The emphaber States’ contributions. If the commitment in sis on partnership and prevention through working Lebanon is a positive example, the current contribujointly for enhanced access to the core‘global public tion of less than 3,000 blue helmets for the rest of goods’ offers an alternative‘European way’ in contrast the world, and two Battlegroups on stand-by for to other, more unilateralist and military approaches. operations primarily – but not exclusively – at the The Strategy thus offers both a sound concept and an request of the UN, means that the EU is punching ambitious agenda, which is still valid and therefore below its weight. does not have to be updated. But the EU must indeed become ãçêÉ=~ÅíáîÉ in fully and sincerely implement5

Sven Biscop The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a“More Active” EU Frieden und Sicherheit (01/2007) 6 3. All of these commitments require ÇÉéäçó~ÄäÉ milipolitical courage to further the EU project against tary capabilities that the EU is currently lacking. EU certain established interests. Member States should abandon the national focus that still drives them to strive after full capacity at 6. Implementing the holistic approach requires the acthe national level. Rather than at the level of each tive cooperation of all global powers. The UN collecindividual Member State, the EU-25 together must tive security system can work only if all permanent become capable. In fact, a wider political decision is members actively subscribe to it and refrain from in order, translating the European Security Strategy paralysing or bypassing the Security Council. Condiinto a military level of ambition based on the full tionality can work only if it is not undermined by acmilitary potential of all Member States: how many tors that disregard human rights and other considforces should the EU-25 be able to muster for crisis erations in their international relations. Another demanagement, as well as for long-term peacekeepbate therefore concerns how the EU can persuade ing; what reserves does this require; and what castrategic partners like Russia and China, and the US, pacity must be maintained for territorial defence? that‘effective multilateralism’ – as understood by Within that framework, éççäáåÖ, by reducing intrathe EU – is in their long-term interest. European duplications, can produce much more deployable capabilities within the current combined 7. This holistic approach cannot be efficiently impledefence budget. mented without changes in the EU machinery. An EU Foreign Minister and European External Action 4. The EU must also muster the Åçìê~ÖÉ to effectively Service would allow integration of the security, poapply conditionality. Admittedly,‘positive conditionlitical, social and economic dimensions in all foreign ality’ requires an extremely difficult balancing act, policies, from the creation to the implementation especially vis-à-vis countries with authoritarian reand evaluation of policy. An EU Foreign Minister gimes and great powers like Russia and China: with a stronger mandate would also strengthen the maintaining partnership and being sufficiently critiEU’s capacity for preventive diplomacy. cal at the same time. But in that difficult context, the EU should show more consistency and resolve in 8. Finally, the European Security Strategy can only reacting to human rights abuses, which should visimove from a concept to consistent and resolute acbly impact on the relationship with any regime. tion if the EU acts as one. As long as the EU remains A much enhanced image and increased legitimacy divided between‘Atlanticists’ and‘Europeanists’, will follow, notably in the eyes of public opinion, neither the EU nor NATO can be effective actors. which is a prerequisite for the gradual pursuit of Only a united EU has the weight to deal with the further-reaching political, economic and social rechallenges of the globalized world and become a forms. But has the EU really solved the dilemma of consistent and decisive actor, in an equal partnerstability versus democracy? A debate also seems in ship with the United States. order on desired end-states, especially of the Neighbourhood Policy. Is our aim incremental progress while maintaining existing regimes, or full democratization – and if the latter, are our instruments sufficient to achieve that goal? 5. More generally, the progressive agenda of the European Security Strategy risks losing credibility if the EU does not draw the full conclusions from it, notably for its international trade policies. If an exclusive focus on hard security undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of a policy, so does a onedimensional focus on trade, without a link to the political and social(including ecological) dimensions. Rethinking trade and agricultural policies – and migration policy – again demands leaders with enough

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit Stefanie Flechtner Demokratie ist die beste Antwort im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=aÉòÉãÄÉê=OMMS Arbeitskreis Europa Gesamteuropäische Aufgabenkonföderation: Neuer Schwung für die Nachbarschaftspolitik der EU mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=gìåá=OMMS= Dauderstädt, Lippert, Maurer Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2007: Hohe Erwartungen bei engen Spielräumen bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Stefanie Flechtner Hauptsache im Einsatz? Zur Konzeption der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik = cêáÉÇÉå=ìåÇ=páÅÜÉêÜÉáí, gìåá=OMMS Jana Zitzler Plädoyer für eine europäische Mindestlohnpolitik mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Arbeitskreis Europa Bessere Rechtsetzung – das neue Mantra? mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=^éêáä=OMMS= Jo Leinen Die Kosten der Nicht-Verfassung mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Stefan Collignon Europa reformieren – Demokratie wagen bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=^éêáä=OMMS= Winfried Veit Avantgarde und Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik. Für ein Europa der konzentrischen Kreise bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=kçîÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Helmut Kuhne Die wachsende Europa-Skepsis der Deutschen – Ursachen und Dimensionen im europäischen Vergleich bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=^éêáä=OMMS= Michael Ehrke Ungarische Unruhen – ein Symptom der zentraleuropäischen Beitrittskrise? mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=lâíçÄÉê=OMMS= Henning Klodt Schreckgespenst Arbeitsplatzexport – Auslandsinvestitionen und inländischer Arbeitsmarkt mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=pÉéíÉãÄÉê=OMMS= Anthony Giddens Die Zukunft des Europäischen Sozialmodells bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=j®êò=OMMS= Michael Dauderstädt Sind unsere Löhne zu hoch? Schlaflose Nächte in der Basarökonomie däçÄ~äáëáÉêìåÖ=C=dÉêÉÅÜíáÖâÉáíI=cÉÄêì~ê=OMMS= Busemeyer, Kellermann, Petring, Stuchlik Politische Positionen zum Europäischen Wirtschaftsund Sozialmodell – eine Landkarte der Interessen [also available in English] = bìêçé®áëÅÜÉ=mçäáíáâI=^ìÖìëí=OMMS= Diese und weitere Texte sind online verfügbar: http://www.fes.de/internationalepolitik Heinz-J. Bontrup Keynes wollte den Kapitalismus retten. Zum 60. Todestag von Sir John Maynard Keynes däçÄ~äáëáÉêìåÖ=ìåÇ=dÉêÉÅÜíáÖâÉáíI=^ìÖìëí=OMMS= Bestellungen bitte an: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Internationale Politikanalyse Katja Lass Die Gesundheitsreform in den Niederlanden z.Hd. Ursula Müller D – 53170 Bonn – ein Vorbild für Deutschland? mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=^ìÖìëí=OMMS= E-Mail: info.ipa@fes.de Tel.:+49(228) 883-212 Michael Dauderstädt Fax:+49(228) 883-625 Euroland: Zutritt für Arme verboten? mçäáíáâJfåÑçI=gìåá=OMMS= 7

X Frieden und Sicherheit Sven Biscop The International Security Engagement of the European Union – Courage and Capabilities for a”More Active” EU I n 2003, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy, the first ever strategic document providing long-term guidance for the whole of EU foreign policy. The Strategy calls for the EU to be‘more active’ in pursuing its strategic objectives, through a holistic approach utilising‘the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities’. And active the EU has become. In late 2006, no less than 11 civilian and military crisis management operations were ongoing within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP) across the globe. Yet this‘activeness’ also raises a number of questions. Why is the EU active in these cases and not in others? Which criteria determine when and where the EU as such engages in crisis management, militarily and diplomatically? And must not the EU look beyond crisis management and become‘more active’ in its day-to-day policies as well? These questions were at the center of debate at the first European Strategic Forum of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Warsaw, 2006. The Forum is a new security policy network in which progressive voices from new and old Member States meet and examine security concepts and policies for Europe. In its report, Sven Biscop, participant in the European Strategic Forum, addresses these questions and explores ways and means of meeting the challenge of a‘more active’ EU.