Internationale Politikanalyse Europäische Politik, November 2006 Working Group on European Integration* The EU’s New Strategy for Africa: Real and Effective Multilateralism? The 1 European Security Strategy formulates effective multilateralism as method of European foreign policy. What it has in mind is goal-oriented cooperation with other actors, states and international organisations, which governs the coexistence of nations through binding norms. The European Security Strategy lists a number of policy areas to be managed by the European Union: first, clearly definable threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; second, the creation of a secure environment for Europe; and third, Europe’s integration into a system of multilateralism. More specific developments are already underway in the areas of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, both of which are issues of a EU strategy developing European policy against these threats. By the EU Strategy for Africa, drafted by the Commission in October 2005 and adopted by the European Council in December 2005, the EU has made Africa the first geographically confined ‚testing field’ for the practical feasibility of this effective multilateralism. The various European foreign, security, trade and development policies vis-à-vis the neighbour continent are now to be coordinated within the framework defined by the Commission. The actual necessity of a coherent approach is underscored by the ESDP operation in the Congo and efforts to thwart illegal immigration along the outside borders of the EU. The hitherto confused and unsorted canon of the EU’s and its individual member states’ policies towards Africa is now to be controlled by the Commission in order to achieve better efficiency of employed means, more efficient efforts and thus a quicker accomplishment of set goals. * The Working Group on„European Integration“exists for more than ten years. Its members include experts from European institutions, Federal Ministries, i®åÇÉê representations, associations and science. 1. Characteristics of the Strategy for Africa The Strategy for Africa exemplifies how an ideal-typical European foreign policy should function: a) Embedding into a web of international legitimacy The Strategy for Africa centres around the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000. They form the core of European policy towards Africa by which the EU aims at implementing the MDGs as a whole but especially focuses its policy on the areas of education, health and the struggle against HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, food security, access to vital resources such as water and energy, as well as sustainable use of the environment. Concrete steps have been taken in the area of education. The Commission has established a European-African university exchange programme and assists the AU in developing an inter-African exchange programme named Nyerere and modelled after the ERASMUS Programme. In addition, the instrument of budget support is to be increasingly applied in this area. Besides, broad space is given to the two aspects which are regarded as central preconditions for the implementation of the MDGs: security and good governance on the one hand, and a positive economic environment on the other. By its commitment to continually raise European ODA levels up to 0.7 per cent of GNP by 2015 and its declared intention to employ these resources efficiently, the EU follows the international milestones of development cooperation over the last years. Recent developments in Africa, such as the establishment of the African Union(developed out of the Organisation of African Unity), NEPAD(New Partnership for the Economic Development of the Continent, initiated by South Africa and Nigeria) and APRM(African Peer Review Mechanism, see below) are also taken up in the Strategy and are to serve as a point of departure for European-African cooperation.

Working Group on European Integration The EU’s New Strategy for Africa: Real and Effective Multilateralism? Europäische Politik (11/2006) 2 b) Integrated pursuit of security and developThe Strategy for Africa simultaneously pursues three ment priorities designed to serve the establishment of an economically prospering environment. First, it suggests Already before the dramatic incidents in Ceuta and the creation of a EU-Africa Business Forum which Melilla and the emergence of massive refugee flows could bring together private investors, business entrefrom Africa, the consciousness had been sharpened in preneurs and public clients and is to contribute to the Europe that development and security are closely interstabilisation, harmonisation and better efficiency of the related. Consequently, the Strategy states that safelegal conditions for the economy in Africa in order to guarding security and good governance is a precondiachieve more legal security for investments and comtion for successful development cooperation. Thereby, panies. The second priority set by the Commission lies the causes of the migration flows which are increasin the agricultural sector. This branch – which continingly regarded as threatening also are to be countered. ues to be the most important for the states of subBesides the dreadful economic situation, these causes Saharan Africa – is to be made more productive and are seen in the precarious security situation in many competitive in order to fare better on the world marsub-Saharan states. ket. The Commission’s first step to successively abolish By the Peace Facility for Africa, now secured for its own export subsidies by 2013 is a step in the right three years(but still endowed with insufficient funddirection but comes much too late. The maintenance ing), and a planned Governance Facility in the frameof internal subsidies and the high food safety and enviwork of the Neighbourhood Instrument, the first steps ronmental standards remain hurdles for African exin this area have already been specified. Especially by porters. The third and as yet most specific priority is the Peace Facility, the EU has taken up African initiathe improvement of the infrastructure, thus directly tives in the area of peace and stabilisation and retaking up the MDGs which aim at better access for the sponded to a specific request from the AU. Thereby, people to water, food and energy. The infrastructure African capabilities and capacities of securing peace initiative of the Commission shall serve to facilitate acare to be strengthened. The EU takes up the positive cess to water, telecommunication and energy for comdemocratic developments in Africa and makes use of panies as well and improve transport connections. The the AU-initiated APRM mechanism which provides for lack of competitiveness due to bad or missing access to self-regulation of member states’ governance through transport networks is thereby to be removed. independent African experts. This mechanism is to be By its Strategy, the EU makes clear that now, the instrengthened by a Governance Initiative planned by creased attention Africa has received in 2005 is to be the EU. perpetuated in order to achieve sustainable development. The principle of African ownership, emphasised c) Stronger gearing of development and trade together with a commitment to partnership, also expresses itself in the taking-up of African efforts in the From the perspective of the Strategy for Africa, the second precondition for successful development is a functioning economic environment which can achieve steady growth and will thus appear more attractive for foreign direct investments, make better use of the abundance of natural resources and provide a basic infrastructure. Negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement(EPA) are not only to strengthen Africa’s trade with the EU but also to intensify intraregional trade which is still much more obstructed by tariffs and charges than trade with Europe. The Commission is negotiating these agreements in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement with four regional blocs, pressure from the WTO and the schedule set by the Cotonou Agreement necessitating a quick conclusion of the talks. The EPAs are also to contribute to an improvement of the chances of African producers on the European market and an intensification of intraareas of the AU and NEPAD which are explicitly cited by the EU as partners and impulse givers. In so doing, the EU sets appropriate priorities in the area of the MDGs, security and the economy which meet the requirements in Africa on the one hand and are in accordance with the EU’s capabilities on the other. At the same time, the EU seems to depart from the geographically broad but exclusively economy and tradebased approach it has pursued for decades, for instance, with the agreements of Lomé and Cotonou. The Strategy for Africa also implies a focus on this one continent – initiating a departure from the intercontinental approach of ACP policy- and a parallel expansion of issue areas. Now, development policy is also to accommodate security and trade policy; conditionalities in the areas of the promotion of democracy, human rights and other aspects are becoming ever more important. At the same time, resources are to be regional trade in order to strengthen Africa’s economy.

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit spent more efficiently, and initiatives from African partners are to be taken up and supported. doubt. b) Coherence and coordination 2. Problems of the Strategy for Africa The new Strategy for Africa is to integrate the development assistance of the EU and its member states a) Imbalanced partnership between into one framework and make it more coherent. This is Europe and Africa one of the core aims of this document which takes the commitment to good governance seriously inasmuch Central to the Strategy for Africa are the words“partas it seeks to do away with lack of coordination, conership” and“African ownership“. However, the conherence and complementarity on the European side. cepts for successful development and the main actors But the two central frictions of European policy toof common efforts are being sought in Europe. Thus, wards Africa are thus only slightly covered up: the Strategy suggests that the AU and its regional First, the Commission should better coordinate structures are sufficiently developed as to be regarded member states’ policies in Africa in line with the objecas partners on an equal footing with the EU. At least, tives agreed upon in the Strategy. By adopting the the AU is repeatedly cited as the EU’s main partner, Strategy for Africa, the Heads of State and Governbut at the same time it is stated that successful intement have approved this step at the December 2005 gration concepts are to be imparted to Africa. At the Summit. However, this is a declaration of intent only present, however, the AU and the regional African orwithout any binding force. It is to be feared that naganisations do not present themselves as equal parttional idiosyncrasies, especially those of the former coners for the EU. For most part, they are still under conlonial powers, will continue to leave their imprints on struction and – especially the regional organisations – the respective national development policies in compeonly partly able to act. Furthermore, the Strategy’s obtition with EU policy towards Africa. The sometimes jective of a long-term increase of development assisfierce struggles over troop contingents to be contribtance funds takes it for granted that these additional uted by member states to European operations(the funds will have a positive effect on Africa without conCongo being the most recent example) expose the sidering the recipient countries’ capacity to make use weaknesses of a coherent policy towards Africa. A sucof them. Already now, some African states have probcess of a multilaterally coordinated European policy lems to make use of all available funds. This is not least towards Africa is decisively dependent on a consea consequence of missing structures in the administraquent implementation of governments’ declarations of tive and economic sector. The problem is further agintent in the sense of the pursuit of common objecgravated by the emphasis on budgetary assistance as a tives. new instrument for which the Union strives to develop Second, the allocation of competences within the own-standing criteria focusing on the needs of the EU with a view to Africa is confusing beyond the norpopulation. The far-reaching re-transfer of responsibilimal bureaucratic level. Northern Africa is part of the ties strengthens the aspect of„ownership“ but simulEuropean Neighbourhood which in all respects falls taneously reduces EU influence. At the same time, under the competence of the DG RELEX and is funded funds for the sector of securing peace are clearly tied from the regular EU budget. All other African states so that the revenues of the Peace Facility must not be are dealt with by the DG DEV in the framework of ACP spent on weapons and pay or training of troops but policy, and funding comes from the European Develonly on health, transport, logistics, and the like. This opment Fund. In addition, there exists a special agreeholds at least for the current three years already apment with South Africa. The Directorates-General for proved since for this time, the funds for the Peace Fafisheries and agriculture and SANCO, but especially the cility are taken from the European Development Fund DG Trade, in charge of negotiating the Economic Part(EEF). Thus, the EU undermines its integrated apnership Agreements and thus playing a decisive role proaches under the Strategy for Africa by its own for the consequent implementation of the Strategy, guidelines for assistance. Furthermore, low funding of have up to now been rather pursuing their own agenthe Peace Facility indicates that the EU’s confidence in das and are only marginally considered in the Strategy the AU may be somewhat shaky since – as visible in for Africa. Sudan and the Congo – in the context of a UN operation, it relies on its own troops or NATO units if in 3

Working Group on European Integration The EU’s New Strategy for Africa: Real and Effective Multilateralism? Europäische Politik (11/2006) 4 c) Civil society involvement oped over many years because China, like Africa, can posture itself as a victim of colonialism and, beyond Despite the Commission’s emphasis that it will put the that, has found a model of development for itself people at the centre of its Strategy for Africa, the which has made it a successful national economy. whole orientation of this document is biased in favour Somewhat simplistically, China’s engagement is of governments. Civil society and political actors such commonly regarded as a provocation to idealists beas political parties, parliamentarians or representatives cause Beijing at any cost purchases the resources in of minorities, are hardly considered, if at all. In the face Africa it needs to establish itself as a great power. Acof Africa’s massive governance problems, the intranstually, it is true that the Chinese government encourparency of decision-making processes or the exploitaages companies to purchase oil, metals, minerals, tion of profits from the few lucrative economic wood, cotton and other raw materials everywhere in branches by a small group, this approach misses the the world because the Chinese economy is dependent realities of the African continent. The EU instruments on imports of these resources. However, it is thereby already in existence or in planning are hardly able to ignored that Western companies participating in the alleviate this shortcoming and to adequately promote exploitation of Africa’s raw materials are also interactors who are not in government, exert pressure from ested in profits and not in objectives of development within or seek to control elected representatives. policy. At any rate, for countries rich in resources, ChiStrengthening civil society, including an independent nese competition has brought an unexpected influx of press(whose situation differs strongly across individual money. The causes of the lack of progress in the decountries), is indispensable for correcting despotism velopment of African countries despite these incoming and corruption. But it is also indispensable for citizens’ funds, however, lie not with other countries but with participation. The African Peer Review Mechanism also the way in which this new potential is used by the is an instrument in which governments participate volcountries affected for their own economic developuntarily and which is thus unable to fulfil the expectament and the struggle against poverty. tions linked with it. A harmonisation of member states’ As the main problems for the EU in regard of development assistance in terms of coordination and a China’s growing influence in Africa, the following arstrict commitment to the Commission’s instruments eas can be identified which may be added to the EU would grant the governments in office in Africa a key Strategy for Africa: role in the economic, political and administrative build• political differences and lack of coordination of ing-up of their communities, a task in which they for strategies with a view to conflicts in African counmost part have failed over the last decades to the distries or failed states(Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, advantage of their citizens. Somalia); • misjudgement or ignorance of Chinese interests and d) Lack of a strategy vis-à-vis China in Africa opportunities of influence in Africa; • lack of transparency of Chinese loans(e.g. to AnThe EU Strategy for Africa only marginally considers the fact that the increased worldwide demand for resources has brought about stronger engagement in Africa by international actors. Whereas cooperation with the US is largely uncomplicated due to its longterm tradition and similar(though not identical) objectives, China now is an established actor in Africa which pursues a different strategy: The EU views Africa primarily from a donor perspective and only secondarily as a development-oriented trading partner, whereas China is predominantly interested in resources, trade and political influence. As a consequence of this competition, African partners are confronted with a wider gola) and development cooperation(China stands outside the OECD – DAC); • lack of regulations or respect of rules of competition and governance problems; • insufficient dialogue about the objectives pursued separately by both sides: the EU and China each support the AU and efforts to secure peace, promote dialogues with African companies or chambers of commerce and the building-up of infrastructure; • different„conditionalities“ of development cooperation; this enables African governments to play their partners off each other. spectrum of partners, offering them„multiple choice“ i.e. the opportunity to choose those partners who offer the best prospects for profits and impose the fewest conditions. This constitutes a lasting danger to the relations between the EU and Africa which have devel-

Internationale Politikanalyse International Policy Analysis Unit 3. Approaches to Develop Europe’s Policy overestimated. Incongruent parallel structures towards Africa Further of development cooperation in Europe and Africa(e.g. ACP institutions in which Northern EU documents on foreign policy bearing the name Africa is not represented) should be reconsid„Strategy“ in their title are growing in number, the ered and be brought into synergy with the Strategy for Africa being just one of the most recent new AU structures. examples. However, a set of common objectives is dis5. Beyond that, a stronger focus should be put cernible only in small part. While the European Security on seeking cooperation with nonStrategy’s goal is effective multilateralism, the Strategy governmental actors, business and labour asfor Africa goes one step back and seeks to describe sociations, as well as consumers and groups how a European development policy for Africa which is either benefiting or suffering from trade and multilaterally coordinated and makes more efficient investment; more flexible and less governuse of applied means could look like. It appears central ment-focused development cooperation that the EU and its member states, which together are should be the objective. the largest donors in Africa, apply their instruments in 6. With a view to cooperation with China, a diaa concerted, coordinated and coherent fashion in the logue on Africa already begun on an ad hoc future, and thus far more efficiently. Foreign and secubasis could be intensified and move beyond rity policy-related aspects of policy towards Africa, the level of senior officials. Besides obvious even the issue of energy safety increasingly discussed differences of interests, the political problems within the EU, and cooperation with other partners mentioned above for most part result from such as the US, China, India and others in Africa are mutual ignorance and divergent perspectives. not sufficiently considered in this Strategy. They thus can only be solved by intensified, A strategic policy towards Africa should consider Commission-coordinated dialogue with China the following aspects: and the AU which as yet exists only punctually. China has signalled its preparedness for 1. One of the EU’s objectives, implementation of such a dialogue, though restricted to five arGood Governance, should start with the EU iteas of development cooperation(participation self. Coordination and complementarity of nain EU calls for tenders, vocational and admintion-state policies would be the first necessary istrative training, struggle against HIV/AIDS step. National governments play a key role for and Malaria, struggle against illiteracy and achieving this, for their preparedness to acjoint ventures in the textile industry). Of cept such coordination will be decisive for a course, this is clearly insufficient. Therefore, success of the Strategy. Europe should go on the offensive in these 2. Trade policy could much better be brought in dialogues, making demands with a view to line with development objectives. For this, the governance and human rights areas cited Europe should analyse and reduce its own in China’s own documents on Africa and protectionism and its effects on developing combine this with concrete proposals for Chicountries and thus achieve substantial cohernese participation in European initiatives. ence across its policies. To train its African trade partners up to a level enabling them to effectively assert their interests is an essential 4. Conclusions component of keeping the promise of African „ownership“. The European Strategy for Africa is only partly suited as 3. The introduction and enforcement of envian application of the European Security Strategy vis-àronmental or food standards must be accomvis a larger region. Hence, the EU as an actor in Africa panied by a communication strategy vis-à-vis has been unsuccessful in globally and effectively empartners in developing countries which also bedding its policy in a multilateral framework because makes offers to promote and adapt the existit pursues its relations predominantly bilaterally and ing production. This is the only way to avoid from a development policy perspective. European insudden turnover losses or even the collapse of terests are hardly articulated in the Strategy whereas companies. other actors behaving strategically, especially China, 4. Focusing on the AU is certainly correct, but its but also the US, which are exerting increasing ecopresently limited capacities should not be nomic and political influence in Africa(partly at the ex5

Working Group on European Integration The EU’s New Strategy for Africa: Real and Effective Multilateralism? Europäische Politik (11/2006) 6 pense of the Europeans), are not considered. This reflects a certain naivety or narrow-mindedness, as well as unrealistic expectations with a view to the EU’s partners in Africa – especially the AU. The EU is having a hard time in areas where power and influence rather than economics or international norms and governance are at stake. However, in some areas, such as the „struggle“ over Africa’s resources, this is the reality with which the EU has to cope if it seeks to effectively act as an international actor. Bringing this„struggle“ back into regulated competition would already be a success. However, the European Strategy for Africa also shows some home-made shortcomings with a view to the interior dimension which endanger its long-term success. The frictions between the Commission and individual member states will surface even more evidently in political action„in the field“ than in agreeing on the main guidelines in Brussels. The governments of African partner countries will further be able to play the different European positions off against each other and to exploit these differences since the decisive actors reside in the national capitals, not in Brussels. First and foremost, the coordination aimed at necessitates the improvement of intra-European processes. The Commission can disclose differences make adhortations and propose new orientations, but this will only marginally influence the direction of local actors. The approach to leave decision-making to the Commission delegation or a member state on the spot as„lead donor“ hints at the way which would enable the EU to make use of member states’ experience, their traditional ties and developed structures. All too often, the effective multilateralism envisaged by the EU and now also set to be cast in a new Strategy(sic!)„Europe in the World“ by an expert working group of the President of the Commission, runs aground on intra-European arrangements or the(lack of) preparedness of member states to stick to made commitments. This even applies to areas in which one would assume that the long-year experience gathered in the context of EU treaties and institutions should make an unproblematic European policy possible, e.g. in development policy. If the declarations of intent in the area of development assistance are not transformed into effective cooperation on the spot, the cacophony of European policy towards Africa will continue –the only difference being that there is now a conductor desperately struggling to bring some order into chaos.