⁄ PER SPEC TIVE In the middle of Zeitenwende: Change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes Simon Weiss Christos Katsioulis 27 February 2023

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis About the authors Alexandra Dienes is a Senior Researcher at the FES Regional Office for International Coope ration in Vienna. She speciali ses in political economy and the foreign policy of Russia and the post-Soviet space. Previ ously, she taught international relations and political economy at the University of Amsterdam, where she is an affiliated research fellow in the Politi cal Science department, and has worked for the European Parliament in Brussels. Simon Weiss is a Senior Researcher at the FES Regional Office for International Cooperation in Vienna. Between 2011-2015 he taught international relations and Russian foreign policy and was a research associate at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Heidelberg. At the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung he focuses on security and defence policy aspects and on questions of arms control in Europe. Christos Katsioulis is the Director of the FES Regional Office for International Cooperation in Vienna. Previously he founded and headed the FES Office in Athens, later he headed the EU Office in Brussels as well as the London Office of FES. Christos has been a regular commenta tor on European affairs in the German as well as international media and a regular contribu tor for the journal Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft. Methodological details Security Radar 2022 Security Radar 2023 What? Representative public opinion poll in 14 countries: Armenia, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States Representative public opinion poll in 4 countries: France, Germany, Latvia and Poland Who? 27,500 respondents surveyed in 14 countries Representative samples in each country 8,063 respondents surveyed in 4 countries Representative samples in each country September-October 2021 October 2022 When? How? CATI(Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) in Armenia CAWI(Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) in the 13 other countries carried out by Ipsos on behalf of FES CAWI(Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) carried out by Ipsos on behalf of FES 3

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Introduction Russia‘s invasion of Ukraine plunged Europe into unchartered waters with no blueprint to act upon, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz remarked at the 2023 Munich Security Conference. For more than a year, a nuclear power has been waging a war on the European continent, attacking not only a sovereign country but also key principles of the international order. Since the beginning of the war, Germany has un dergone unprecedented political changes. On 24 February 2022, the day of the invasion, the newlyelected SPD-led government had been in power for just a few months and found itself compelled to take momentous political decisions in response to the war. Many of the adopted policies were not only controversial but also ran counter to established German foreign policy and broke a number of po litical taboos, such as exporting arms to a conflict zone. Political deliberation was harder than usual because, for the first time in history, the winning party(SPD) had formed a government in coalition with not one, but two parties, the Greens and the Liberals(FDP). The proclamation of the»Zeitenwende«(watershed) by Chancellor Olaf Scholz on 27 February 2022 mar ked the beginning of a profound transformation that is still going on. In many respects Germany started to become a different country. It reversed its Rus sia policy, drastically reduced its imports of Russian fossil fuels and abandoned its restrained military stance by incrementally stepping up military aid to Ukraine, from 5,000 helmets to – eventually – Leopard battle tanks. Germany transformed itself from a heavily criticised laggard to one of the main military suppliers to Ukraine. Naturally, the German public is affected by the war in Ukraine and by political decisions taken in res ponse to it. How exactly has the Zeitenwende changed public opinion in Germany? Which views have been transformed, and which have persisted, despi te the war? These questions are relevant because at times of high uncertainty and tectonic political shifts public opinion may indicate which policies are possible and acceptable and may provide a fra mework for future German foreign policy. It can and indeed should underpin political deliberations. This analysis is based on a comparison of data from our two representative public opinion polls,»Securi ty Radar 2022« and»Security Radar 2023«, carried out in several European countries, including Germa ny. Data collection occurred in autumn 2021, seve ral months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and in autumn 2022, respectively. The data show a fundamental shift in attitudes to Russia, as well as to military spending and weapons deliveries, but at the same time a remarkable con tinuity of a»culture of restraint«. Overall response patterns often mask differences between different groups. A deeper look into the data reveals persis tent societal cleavages along party lines or geogra phical origin. The Zeitenwende has definitely started, but it is not yet clear where we are heading. 4

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Elements of Zeitenwende The war in Ukraine has markedly increased the level of insecurity and anxiety in Germany. It has height ened threat perceptions across the board. Respon dents are much more worried than a year ago about wars and conflicts, and even consider new wars in Europe likely. Inflation and the rising cost of living constitute the strongest worry, however. People are braced for economic crises and believe that their economic situation will deteriorate in the future. This grim outlook underscores dramatic changes in European security, with an uncertain outcome. Figure 1: Concerns »To what extent are you personally concerned about the following current events?« Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. All figures in% Inflation and rising cost of living* 91 Cyber attacks 58 Decline of 71 social cohesion Coronavirus pandemic 2022 2021 48 74 Climate change Wars and 86 conflicts Germany 58 Uncontrolled immigration International terrorism 64 60 83 Disagreement and conflict within the EU Economic crises *This item was included in 2022 and lacks comparative data. 5

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Military spending One of the biggest policy shifts of the Zeitenwende is the promised increase in the defence budget – in fact, the largest jump in German military spending since rearmament after the Second World War. For years, there was a consensus among German citi zens against increased military spending. Indeed, our poll from autumn 2021 shows that only CDU vo ters were then in favour. This ingrained reluctance reflected a political stance that for many years had fallen short of the NATO target of 2% of GDP. Seven months after the beginning of Russia’s war, however, opinion had shifted fundamentally: now a majority of Germans endorse a bigger defence budget. Vo ters of all parties have increased their support, most strongly SPD voters, followed by Green and FDP voters. CDU voters are, however, still the strongest supporters of increasing the military budget(68%). Furthermore, people in western Germany support this measure more strongly than those in the east of the country. Figure 2: Military Spending »Germany should increase its military spending.« All figures in% 68 64 2022 53 52 ø 54 '22 48 42 40 52 46 43 45 40 37 ø 2021 '21 31 38 29 26 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU West East Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. As things stand, people are worried about their security and support increased defence spending. But politicians need to keep in mind that large defence budgets may be hard to justify if energy prices and inflation remain high, real wages diminish and an economic downturn occurs. In the short term, the negative repercussions were cushioned by a generous social stimulus. But the long-term price of the Zeitenwende may be very high and people may be not prepared to pay it in the shadow of pervasive economic worries. When confronted with a palpable deterioration of living standards, public opinion will almost certainly become less favourable. In the long term, politicians need to reassess the various threats and find a sensible balance between social and military spending. Delivery of weapons, support for Ukraine The Zeitenwende policy has broken a taboo in Ger man politics, namely sending weapons to war zones. Already before Ukraine was attacked, when Russia was amassing troops at the Ukrainian border, some allies began delivering weapons to Ukraine. This was deemed an unthinkable move for Germany and was vehemently opposed by the freshly elec ted Green Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. But in the face of the severity and brutality of Russia’s unprovoked attack, policy was changed in a matter of weeks. Germany began providing weapons and, over the course of the year, has stepped up military support, finally agreeing to deliver Leopard 2 battle tanks in January 2023. The issue of weapons for Ukraine remains contro versial and continues to polarise German society. While 45% are in favour, 43% are against. We did not pose the question in autumn 2021, but Germa ny’s ingrained culture of restraint provides a good 6

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis reason to assume that a majority would not have approved of such a step back then. Interestingly, SPD voters are most strongly in favour of delivering weapons to Ukraine(62%), followed by Green voters (60%). Conservatives(53%) and Liberals(43%) are less sure. As of February 2023, the German government is firmly committed to supporting Ukraine»whatever it takes« and to continuing military support. But further weapons deliveries, especially of longerrange weapons or fighter jets, will need to be explained to the public carefully and politicians may encounter public resistance. Figure 3: Providing weapons »Germany should provide more weapons to the Ukrainian military.« All figures in% 45 Agree Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. 43 Disagree Combined responses “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree”. The German government’s support for the decision to grant Ukraine EU candidate status is another no table departure from previous policy. Before the war, such a step was deemed unrealistic, at least for the foreseeable future. The public was sceptical, too, as our 2021 poll shows(merely 26% were in favour). Interestingly, Germany was not alone in its rejective stance: in 13 other European countries that we pol led in autumn 2021, none was in favour, with the ex ception of Ukraine itself. Even in Latvia and Poland support did not exceed 45%. But one year into the war, German support for Ukrai nian EU membership has increased strongly. It is still short of an absolute majority, but an impressive 44% are now in favour(40% against). Support has increased in all groups except far-right AfD voters. The strongest proponents are Green voters, who have almost doubled their support within a year (from 32% to 62%). In comparison, in Latvia and Poland support for Ukrainian EU membership has achieved a stable absolute majority. Regarding potential membership of NATO no com parable shift has happened. Endorsement has in deed risen from 25% to 36% but rejection remains much stronger and has even increased, from 38% to 46%. This counterintuitive trend can be explained by the fact that more people have formed an opinion on the matter within the span of a year – the share of»don’t knows« has halved, from 32% to 16%. SPD voters are the strongest proponents of Ukrainian NATO membership, at 48%, up from only 29% a year ago. Again, comparison of German public opinion 62 60 53 43 33 ø 46 '22 45 39 11 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU West East Deviations from 100% result from:“don’t know” and“no answer”. with generally much more supportive Latvian and Polish opinion shows a difference of 20 or more percentage points. Finding a consensus within the alliance on Ukrainian membership may prove challenging in the months and years to come and will be a major challenge for the German government. It is also a question that affects public opinion, because political deliberations and decisions are bound to receive heightened public attention. The increased public support in Germany for Ukrai nian membership of NATO can be put in perspecti ve by responses to the question about a potential further NATO enlargement towards the Russian border: one in two German respondents views that as a potential threat to security in Europe(49%), up from 37% a year before. Almost identical figures 7

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis and the same dynamic pertain to the question on EU enlargement towards the East. These attitudes may be a limiting factor on potential Ukrainian accession to Western institutions and indicate that German support may be even more fragile than the – already sobering – figures suggest. Interestingly, the share of people who do not see EU or NATO enlargement as a threat did not change between 2021 and 2022, remaining at 37% and 35%, respectively. This is also a result of a diminished »don’t know« share. This trend can be observed across many questions and underscores the height ened salience of foreign policy topics and particu larly the war in Ukraine for the German public. Figure 4: Ukraine‘s potential EU and NATO membership All figures in% 2021 2022 2021 2022 »Ukraine should become a member of the European Union.« 56 34 62 32 40 27 51 32 44 27 ø '22 44 ø '21 18 26 12 »Ukraine should become a member of NATO.« 48 29 46 28 28 29 43 33 26 29 ø '22 36 20 '21ø 12 25 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU »The enlargement of the EU towards the East poses a threat to security in Europe.« »The enlargement of NATO towards the Russian border poses a threat to security in Europe.« 40% 47% 37% 49% 2021 2022 2021 2022 Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. Attitudes to Russia and China Another key component of the Zeitenwende is a reversal of what was often described as the»special relationship« between Germany and Russia and the termination of reliance on Russian energy. Public perceptions of Russia have changed funda mentally. Before the start of the war half of the po pulation considered Russia a threat; now it is threequarters. Threat perception has increased across all parties, with Green voters being most suspicious of Russia(87%). Perhaps the biggest shift of opini on has happened among Die Linke(the Left) voters, who prior to the war were the most Russia-friendly group but one year later had almost doubled their 8

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis threat perception. Respondents from eastern Ger many have undergone the same development, and the perception gap with western Germany has nar rowed. By the same token, a majority of 60% think that the interests of the EU and Russia are contradic tory(46% before the war). Voters of all parties have increased their share compared with 2021, Figure 5: Actors posing a security threat most strongly Liberal voters(an increase from 38% to 67%). Overall, Russia’s relentless war against Ukraine seems to have catalysed a convergence of threat perceptions within different segments of German society and may function as a common basis for formulating a new Russia policy. Figures in arrows indicate change compared with 2021. All figures in% 2021 2022 2021 2022 »USA is a threat to peace and security in Europe.« 61 36 39 37 22 24 18 20 24 28 20 26 ø '22 28 23 25 ø '21 24 39 27 »Russia is a threat to peace and security in Europe.« 85 62 87 58 77 52 82 62 69 36 ø '22 76 78 54 40 41 '21ø 51 69 39 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU West East SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU West East +4 28% United States 80% 60% 40% 20% +25 76% Russia 48% +5 China »China is a threat to peace and security in Europe.« 2021 2022 59 42 50 54 45 43 56 49 38 31 ø 47 48 45 '22 51 36 ø '22 43 39 34 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU West East Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. Popular endorsement of sanctions has been im pressive and underscores the extent of the recko ning Russia’s actions have provoked(within one year support has increased from 37% to 60%). Across all parties – except the AfD – strong majorities support the widening of sanctions against Russia, especially 9

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis among Green voters(up from 46% to a whopping 81%). This highlights the principled stance that Green voters display on many issues throughout the survey. Figure 6: Sanctions »Sanctions against Russia should be widened.« 81 All figures in% 75 2021 2022 63 ø '22 53 52 60 48 46 47 ø 31 32 '21 37 24 21 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. The same pattern concerns the respective interests of the EU and China: just as before the war, some 48% of German respondents think that they are contradictory. Liberal voters stand out with a 12% increase in their agreement. This indecisive stance should serve as a reminder for German policymakers: while the war in Ukraine dominates the agenda for now, systemic competition with China is likely to move centre stage in the longer run, with a price tag that the public remain only dimly aware of. The United States is not considered a threatening actor but there is still deep-seated scepticism among a stable share of respondents in Germany. About a quarter think that the United States is a threat and still want to cooperate more with Russia, against all evidence. Many of these people vote AfD or live in eastern Germany, where threat perceptions of the United States have increased from 27% to 39% within a year. In contrast to the reckoning with Russia, no Zeitenwende seems to have occurred(at least as yet) in relation to China. Threat perceptions overall have increased only slightly(from 43% to 48%), although the disillusionment among SPD voters is impressive (a jump from 42% to 59%). Liberal voters even think that the threat from China is slightly smaller. Figure 7: Contradicting interests This is a cause for alarm for the Western alliance in the context of a renewed transatlantic bond and unity in response to the war being waged against Ukraine. »The interests of the European Union and the interests of Russia are in principle contradictory.« All figures in% »The interests of the European Union and the interests of China are in principle contradictory.« 2021 2022 2021 2022 68 54 69 54 67 38 66 56 48 35 ø '22 60 50 45 ø '21 46 56 50 54 54 52 40 52 54 47 31 56 53 '22ø 48 ø '21 47 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. 10

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Decoupling without burning bridges Another crucial element of the German Zeitenwende is a reshuffling of economic relations. The scope of sanctions against Russia and the extent of decou pling from the Russian economy and its energy re sources is unprecedented. Perhaps the most sym bolic step was the termination of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, for years defended by successive German governments against the staunch criticism of allies. The extent and speed of these policy changes is un expected from such an industrial export-oriented economy as Germany. The German public backs the reversal of economic policy but does not seem to want to burn all bridges. A paradoxical picture emerges. On one hand, a ma jority realise the benefits of(inter)dependence and that German prosperity depends on the well-being of other countries. On the other hand, a large majori ty are prepared to curtail economic ties with Russia and even to ban Russian energy resources, even at the cost of rising prices. Green voters stand out with the most principled stance, followed by SPD and CDU. FDP and Die Lin ke voters do not support a ban on Russian energy resources. AfD voters reject decoupling policies and do not acknowledge economic interdependen cies to the same degree as other voters, in line with the isolationist stance they project throughout the survey. The public backing of decoupling policies is remar kable given how pervasive economic worries are. However, the sustainability of support for decou pling may prove fragile, especially if China is taken into the equation. Public support for decoupling from China is as high as support for distancing from Russia(64% in favour). But the repercussions and long-term costs are still not clear to respondents. This poses a challenge to politicians who need to carefully balance the benefits of interdependence against the risks associated with it, and bear in mind the social costs for the people. Figure 8: Prosperity versus economic decoupling »Germany should reduce its dependency on Russia even if this has a negative impact on living standards.« All figures in% »Germany should ban imports of oil and gas from Russia even if this leads to further price increases.« 85 80 75 69 67 ø 70 '22 63 68 54 ø 45 '22 39 49 33 16 »The prosperity of my country is in many respects linked to the well-being and positive development of other countries.« 70 71 71 ø 67 '22 60 64 ø 47 '21 58 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. 11

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Interests still trump values Does the Zeitenwende imply a shift towards a valu es-based foreign policy? Not really, despite a series of momentous political decisions driven to a con siderable degree by moral considerations. Just like before the war, people in Germany tend to favour an interest-based foreign policy over a values-based one by a margin of about 12%. Green voters stand out as the only group that clearly favours a values-based foreign policy(66%, compa red with 50% on average in Germany). The strong emphasis on values among Green voters runs like a golden thread through the survey, conspicuous in questions on sanctions(Greens are the biggest pro ponents), taking sides in conflicts abroad(Greens have increased their support from 54% to 68% wit hin a year) or cooperation with non-like-minded states for the sake of promoting peace(Greens de creased their support from 60% to 48%). Figure 9: Interests versus values All figures in% 2021 2022 2021 2022 »Foreign policy should represent Germany’s own interests without restrictions.« 63 66 50 43 70 65 71 69 59 54 85 75 ø '22 62 ø '21 61 »Foreign policy should enforce values, even if this poses disadvantages.« 57 52 66 53 57 49 57 51 43 46 ø '22 47 50 ø 34 '21 47 SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. Persistence of a culture of restraint Some fundamental changes have undoubtedly oc curred in Germany. But at the same time the country is not reinventing itself and does not question every tenet of its foreign policy. Specifically, the German culture of restraint is remarkably persistent and dis plays high continuity in our surveys. In this sense Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock was premature when she proclaimed»the end of the culture of res traint« in February 2022. The war has not changed ingrained German scep ticism regarding military intervention. Solid majori ties across the board are against military interven tion in conflicts, with only CDU voters being split on the matter. In the course of the war overall German rejection has even increased, from 51% to 56%. Re jection is strongest among Die Linke and AfD voters. Military foreign policy means are considered neither effective nor legitimate – diplomacy is favoured across the board. 12

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Figure 10: Military interventions »Germany should, if necessary, pursue military interventions in conflicts.« All figures in% 38 40 33 36 39 35 44 45 23 24 ø '21 35 30 ø '22 16 32 2021 2022 37 33 25 28 Strongly agree & somewhat agree 2021 2022 West East Strongly disagree & somewhat disagree 52 53 SPD 56 53 48 58 Grüne FDP 47 45 CDU/ CSU 65 69 Linke ø '21 51 57 '22ø 56 76 AfD Figure 11: Efficiency versus legitimacy of foreign policy instruments All figures in% Do you think the following means are effective for solving foreign policy crises? Do you think the following means are legitimate for solving foreign policy crises? 31 2022 29 2021 69 67 51 52 80% 60% 40% 20% Military intervention 2022 22 2021 24 Diplomatic negotiations $ Economic sanctions 0% 0% Somewhat agree Strongly agree 20% 40% 83 81 66 66 60% 80% 13

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Figure 12: Peace versus Justice The most important thing is to stop the war as soon as possible, even if it means Ukraine losing control of some areas to Russia. All figures in% Neither nor The most important thing is to punish Russia for its aggression, even if it means that more Ukrainians are killed and displaced. 41 24 19 Deviations from 100% result from:“don’t know” and“no answer”. In a similar vein, overwhelming majorities believe that peace should be a policy priority in Germany. With regard to ways of ending the war, German re spondents clearly favour peace over justice(41% vs 19%), opting for ending the war as soon as possi ble, even at the cost of territorial losses(as oppo sed to punishing Russia for its aggression, even at the cost of further killing and destruction). Coupled with a clear German rejection of sending troops to Ukraine(75% are against and only 13% in favour, a consensus shared across parties), this indicates an awareness of escalation scenarios and a desire to avoid being dragged into the war. 2021 2022 Figure 13: Peace as a priority »Peace in Europe should be a policy priority in Germany.« All figures in% 93 93 95 96 89 91 92 93 94 93 '2ø2 90 82 82 ø '21 88 In their deliberations about further support for Ukraine German politicians need to keep in mind the persistence of the culture of restraint and the clear red line of not sending troops. They need to weigh the benefit of each step against the risk of escalation. It is unclear whether in the long term peace can be achieved with more weapons, as some leaders have recently suggested. Most importantly, as the war drags on, politicians should provide their voters with a persuasive strategy for how to avoid being drawn into it and the likely prospect of stopping the fighting. SPD Grüne FDP CDU/ Linke AfD CSU Combined responses“strongly agree” and“somewhat agree”. 14

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Germany in the EU context Figure 14: Sending troops The war is a dramatic challenge to and the biggest test yet of European unity. Germany’s Zeitenwende did not happen in a vacuum and impacts the coun try’s relations with its EU neighbours. Our polls show that Russia’s war against Ukraine has induced chan ges in people’s perceptions that put Germany on a path of convergence with its Eastern neighbours, notably Poland and Latvia. The convergence can be traced in worries, threat perceptions and responses to the Russian aggression, ranging from sanctions to weapons deliveries. There are even majorities in all four countries for building a European army. Ho wever, behind this unity major differences remain. They pertain to strategic questions of dealing with China, pathways towards ending the war as well as future organisation of security in Europe. This is exemplified by the question on Ukraine’s poten tial membership of the EU and NATO: Latvians and Poles are strong supporters, while Germans and French are much more sceptical. These differences are exacerbated by the lack of mutual trust between the countries of the»Weimar triangle« – comprising Germany, France and Poland – which was once expected to lead the EU. Coupled with the belief of some German respondents(38%) that their own country is merely going along with the decisions of other EU member states rather »Germany should send troops to Ukraine.« All figures in% 13 Agree 75 Disagree Combined responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree”. Combined responses “strongly disagree” and “somewhat disagree”. CDU/ SPD Grüne FDP CSU Linke AfD ø 76 73 69 73 75 '22 82 92 Deviations from 100% result from:“don’t know” and“no answer”. than taking an active role in the common security policy(28%), this may prove a brittle foundation for making the EU a strong actor capable of shaping its neighbourhood and providing for its own security. Figure 15: Role of countries in current EU security policy »What role do you believe Germany has in current EU security policy?« It is blocking a common EU security policy It is merely going along with the decisions of other member states It is taking an active role in a common EU security policy Don't know Germany 8 38 28 24 France 10 21 31 36 Latvia 14 13 38 23 Poland 28 15 25 28 Deviations from 100% result from:“no answer”. All figures in% 15

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Conclusion Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated political developments in Europe and Germany and triggered transformative processes in the realms of defence, alliance cooperation, energy transition and EU enlar gement. One year since Chancellor Scholz’s seminal speech in the Bundestag proclaiming a watershed in European security and German foreign policy, the Zeitenwende has undoubtedly started to manifest itself not only in politics but also in the minds of Germans. Sustainability of public support The extent and speed of the changes occurring in German policy is not to be underestimated, given its history. The culture of restraint is deeply ingrai ned into German institutions, policies and percepti ons, framed as a»principled scepticism« towards the use of military means, as well as a reluctance to move without previously building a consensus among allies. Basic underlying tenets include»war never again«,» Auschwitz never again« and»always embedded in alliances«. This legacy has not been called into question in the minds of the German people. But it may be at odds with political decisi ons that may set Germany on the path to becoming (once again) the greatest military power in Europe, with a related requirement, if not an aspiration, to lead, even against resistance of partner countries. The post–Second World War legacy not only shaped a strong military force-averse, pro-European stance in Germany but also solidified a worldview that can be characterised as»peace by interdependence«, based on the assumed improbability of war bet ween mutually dependent trade partners exempli fied by European integration. The underlying premi se of German economic and trade policy – peaceful relations through intertwined economies – has been severely shaken by the war but still seems to enjoy support among Germans. In this context, the significance of Germany’s eco nomic decoupling and people’s support for it is not to be underestimated. However, we are at the very beginning of the process, when the long-term costs and consequences are not yet clear, whether for politicians or the broader public. Energy prices are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future and may put a huge strain on German competitiveness, putting many jobs at risk. And while decoupling from Russia appears doable, reducing dependence on China, Germany’s main trade partner and, increa singly, competitor, will probably prove far less feasi ble and more costly, affecting peoples’ livelihoods more directly. Overall, the economic transformations associated with the Zeitenwende may prove the biggest chal lenge for an export champion heavily reliant on its energy-intensive industrial base and largely depen dent on fossil fuels and global value chains. German taxpayers and voters are not yet aware of the huge upcoming costs and may be less willing to bear them than a snapshot of opinion from autumn 2022 suggests, especially if coupled with high(and fur ther rising?) military expenditure. So far, people broadly support the new German foreign policy. This support is impressive, given the huge challenges at hand. But the Zeitenwende is not yet complete and some hard choices await society and political leaders. Much depends on the outcome of the war. People in Europe, but also the combatants seem to be in for a long haul. No de cisive turn of the tide on the battlefield has been achieved in recent months, and no prospect of a diplomatic settlement is in sight. Neither escalation nor protracted conflict can be ruled out. Finding a settlement that is palatable to the Ukrainian peop le, preserves the remainder of the rules-based order and reduces the risk of a resumption of hostilities or renewed Russian attacks is a huge challenge. A cautious conclusion can be drawn from our polls that German public opinion seems to have been trai ling tectonic policy shifts rather than heralding them. Very serious political decisions, some of which in volved amending the constitution, happened very quickly and were not preceded by an adequate pu blic debate. On the contrary, public deliberations 16

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis focussed rather on the weapons systems delivered to Ukraine than on the long-term consequences of the Zeitenwende for Germany. This was made pos sible by the economic cushions provided by the go vernment against the immediate effects of the war. The ability to soften the effects could change soon, because the Liberal coalition partner is insisting on adhering to the debt brake provisions in the coming years. This could set investments in defence over against social expenditure. In this context, with the security situation highly volatile and the long-term economic repercussions uncertain, public support for government policies and willingness to pay the price may wither. That could hamper the govern ment’s long-term ability to continue its support for Ukraine – militarily and financially – as it crucially depends on the continued backing of the voters. Young people Young people in Germany(18–29 years old) demon strate slightly different response patterns from older generations(particularly those 40+). Young respondents are the only age group with no majority in favour of increased military spending (41%, compared with 52% on average). Compared with the 2021 poll, young people have hardly changed their views, while other age groups have shifted their opinion fundamentally from rejection to endorsement. Young respondents seem to put somewhat more faith in a future together with Russia and China than older people. This is visible in slightly higher support for collaboration with these countries and a slightly lower perception of contradictory interests. While overwhelming majorities of young people think that Russia is a threat, the share is somewhat lower than among older and especially the oldest respondents. Notably, before the war opinions were almost identi cal across age groups. In a similar vein, young respondents are less in favour of decoupling from Russia and China(possibly be cause they are more aware of the negative economic consequences). Similarly, young people are not incli ned to take sides in case of a conflict abroad(39%, compared with 55% on average). More alarmingly, multilateral international organi sations such as the UN and the OSCE garner less support among young respondents than among older ones. The same trend was observed in 2021. Scepticism of the United States is also more wide spread among young respondents: 36% regard the country as a threat to European security, compared with the average of 28%. Perhaps most disquietingly, the pervasive German culture of restraint is less pronounced among young respondents. Endorsement of military interventions (41%) is much higher than among the 50+ generation (25%). Young people view military instruments of foreign policy as more effective and more legitima te than older respondents, as they did in 2021. In response to the war raging in Ukraine, a readiness to send troops among the young is twice the average (26% compared with 13%). On the bright side, young people stand out as a strongly pro-EU age group. This includes strong sup port among young respondents for Ukrainian membership of the EU. An absolute majority favour such a step, unlike among other age groups(52%, compared with 44% on average). A much stronger endorsement of Ukrainian EU membership was observed among young people already in 2021, when overall levels of support were low. A combination of a strong pro-European stance and less scepticism of military instruments does not seem to translate into strong support for a European army, however. Young people’s support has increased slightly in the course of the war(from 46% to 49%), but still falls short of a majority and is lower than the 2022 average(53%). Last but not least, young respondents more than other age groups trust German leadership in EU security policy(36% compared with 26% on average). 17

In the middle of Zeitenwende: change and continuity of public attitudes in Germany Alexandra Dienes · Simon Weiss · Christos Katsioulis Eastern Germany Thirty-five years since the reunification of Germany, differences in public opinion between east and west remain marked. Respondents in eastern Germany oppose increased milita ry spending and further weapons deliveries to Ukraine, display an ingrained scepticism towards the United States and NATO, and are strong proponents of a pragmatic foreign policy (cooperation with non-like minded states). The culture of restraint is more pronounced among respondents from the East. Moreover, eastern Germans are eager to stay out of the war in Ukraine(53% think that no third country should intervene in the war, in contrast to a mere 35% in West Germany). Prior to the war eastern Germans’ views of Russia were systematically more benign than those of western Germans. This has changed radically in the course of a year, and the extent of rethinking Russia’s role is often stronger among people from the East, thus narrowing the gap to the West. But differences in perceptions persist, with western Germans remaining the more pronounced»Russia hawks«. policy(36% compared with 26% on average). Political parties Strong differences of opinion along party lines are striking in Germany. A comparison of response patterns in our polls allows several observations. Social democratic voters overall seem to back the strong policy changes introduced by the SPD-led government. Their shift of views on Russia and China is the strongest across all parties. They have also changed their opinions more dramatically than others on the increased military budget. SPD voters are the strongest backers of the OSCE. Green voters follow similar patterns to Social Democrats and display the strongest values-based approach to foreign policy issues. They are sceptical of military measures, however, and display the strongest pro-EU and pro-Ukraine stances. Conservative(CDU/CSU) voters have changed their opinions, too, but not to the same degree as voters to the left of the political spectrum. They are the strongest proponents of an interest-based approach to foreign policy and are least restrained regarding military instruments, interventions and military spending. Liberal voters, next to conservatives, seem to be more focused on the negative economic repercus sions of economic decoupling policies and are less prepared to decouple from Russia and China. Their views seldom coincide with those of voters of the other two coalition parties, the Greens and the SPD. Voters for Die Linke have clearly changed their attitude towards Russia but do not seem to have abandoned a peace-driven stance. Attitudes to NATO and the United States tend to be sceptical. AfD voters display an isolationist stance and are the only group that do not seem to have changed their opinion of Russia. 18

FES ROCPE in Vienna Established in 2016, the FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe(FES ROCPE) addresses today’s profound challenges to European security. It also works closely with the OSCE towards revitalising cooperative security. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was a watershed moment for security in Europe and has rendered obsolete previous visions of European order. A new Cold War or even more unstable relations between Russia and the West are the probable outcome of this war, creating an environment of confrontation and containment in Europe. At the same time, planetary challenges such as climate change or pandemics continue to threaten peace and security and require cooperative approaches. In these uncertain times, FES ROCPE continues to develop new ideas under the aegis of solution-oriented policymaking, together with experts, politicians and policy planners from Eastern Europe, Russia, the EU and the US. The aim is to tackle interconnected security challenges, contribute to conflict resolution and strengthen the idea of common and indivisible security in Europe in the spirit of the Paris and Istanbul Charters(1990/1999). It is our belief that organisations such as the FES have a responsibility to come up with new ideas and to introduce them into the political process in Europe. Our activities include: - regional and international workshops aimed at developing new concepts on stabilising the security situation in Europe, dealing with conflicts and achieving lasting peace in Europe; - maintaining a regional network of young professionals working on de-escalation, cooperation and peace in Europe; - regular public opinion polling on security matters; - cooperation with the OSCE in the three dimensions of security: the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human. ISBN: 978-3-98628-365-0 FES Regional Office for International Cooperation Cooperation and Peace Reichsratsstr. 13/5, A-1010 Vienna Phone:+43 1 890 38 11 205 https://peace.fes.de Responsible: Christos Katsioulis Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.