A N A LY S I S LABOUR AND SOCIAL JUSTICE WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY The research aims to identify longer-term wage trends and the role of trade unions in Hungary . The impact of labour shortages, migration, government policies and trade unions’ collective bargaining on wage increases in Hungary is evaluated . Zoltán Pogátsa and Máté Ruben Jengibarjan February 2023 The study offers insights to restore reputation, engage employees, and increase the influence of trade unions in Hungary .

LABOUR AND SOCIAL JUSTICE WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Content PART 1. 1.1 1.2 1.3 PART II. 1.1 1.2 THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH 4 THE PROBLEMATIC METHODOLOGY OF MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY 5 Background: The Debate around the Minimum Wage....................... 5 Methodological Issues...................................................................... 6 The Evolution of Productivity and Wages in Hungary......................... 7 THE REASONS FOR LOW TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AND STRIKE ACTIVISM 15 The TOP10 Reasons behind Low Union Membership........................16 Recommendations...........................................................................18 APPENDIX I. – DATABASE OF STRIKES IN HUNGARY IN RECENT YEARS 20 ABOUT THE AUTHORS................................................................... 26 IMPRINT......................................................................................... 26 3

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH The aim of this research has been to identify the longerterm potential of the Hungarian wage trends, as well as the role played by trade unions in these trends. We have undertaken the following: 1. Past wage dynamics – Numerically elaborate recent wage trends in Hungary, in terms of the minimum wage, the average wage, the median wage and wage inequalities. – Compare these wage trends with neighbouring countries in the region, as well as with Western Europe. – Elaborate productivity trends in Hungary, broken down by firm size(large, SME and small), industry and geographical region. – Compare these productivity trends with neighbouring countries in the CEE region, as well as Western Europe. 2. Problematising productivity To demonstrate the questionable results of the productivity index, we shall – Demonstrate how alternative data(profitability and wealth dynamics, bank savings, etc.) shows that Hungarian firms produce enough value added to enable higher wages, exhibiting that official productivity figures are misleading. 3. Trade union participation In order to establish the reasons for low trade union density we shall – Carry out structured interviews with trade union leaders and members of firms where successful attempts to push for higher wages have taken place(strikes, threats of strikes) – Carry out structured interviews with trade union organisers, members and non-unionised employees in firms where it has proved impossible to form trade unions, or where trade unions do exist, but with few members. – Our aim is to establish patterns and motivations for staying away from unions as opposed to joining unions. – Describe how the productivity index is calculated, – Demonstrate how this is distorted by transfer pricing and tax optimisation by firms of various sizes, 4

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY PART 1. THE PROBLEMATIC METHODOLOGY OF MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY 1.1 BACKGROUND: THE DEBATE AROUND THE MINIMUM WAGE There has by now been decades of debate around the issue of wage dynamics in Hungary. On a cautious side liberal economists and business leaders, have continued to argue that Hungary’s wage trends are too fast, exceed the productivity trends, and will therefore result in serial bankruptcies and dramatic negative consequences for the labour market. Left-leaning economists, trade unions and the long serving right-wing government have all argued from different angles that wage trends in Hungary are in fact too slow. In addition, left leaning economists have argued that a low wage economy is unsustainable. It does not allow for enough demand in the economy, and too many firms have relied on cheap labour rather than technological improvements to compete. Left wing sociologists have added that it has a negative effect on social and political processes as well, since an underpaid society cannot sustain a democracy, and is forced into clientalistic relations. The empirical data have vindicated the left leaning side overwhelmingly. There have been many waves of minimum wage increases in Hungary in recent decades, and in no instance have they resulted in a collapse of the labour market, or indeed even sizeable increases in unemployment. In the case of earlier increases there was a minor negative employment effect to go with the massively positive upside in the living standards, as in 2001-2, when even this could have been alleviated by more active labour market policies. In the case of more recent increases of the minimum wage, there have been cases of actual expansion of the labour market corresponding to an enormously positive and widespread impact on the living standards, as in the rises in the minimum wage in the years prior to the Covid crisis. In addition, there has also been a marked and sustained rise in the average wage in Hungary, even though it is still far away from Western European levels. In not a single case have the dramatic negative effects foreseen by the liberal side materialised. Yet the two sides are still entrenched, the empirical developments remainFigure 1 The evolution of the net average wage in Hungary(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 350 000 300 000 250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 5

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Figure 2 The evolution of the gross average wage in Hungary(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 500 000 450 000 400 000 350 000 300 000 250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 ing inconsequential. The liberal side continues the very same rhetoric regardless of having been wrong in so many instances. The rapid wage increases over the last decade have not been led by trade unions. Collective bargaining is very weak in Hungary both at the national level and at the plant level and is effectively absent at the industry level. The long-time right-wing government has curtailed the rights of trade unions with numerous waves of legislation, including, not exclusively, the new Labour Code and the infamous“Slave Law”, while at the same time initiating a series of hikes in the minimum wage for political gain. The membership rate of the Hungarian trade union movement has decreased to below 9%, in comparison to around 30% in Western Europe and significantly above 50% in Scandinavia. 1.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES The liberal side bases its arguments on the concept of productivity. They argue that an economy cannot continuously increase wages in excess of productivity increases. In the terminology of economics, productivity refers to the volume of value added per unit of time(usually hour or year) or per person employed. Since wages are paid out of value added(the remainder being profits), it is obvious that wage dynamics cannot exceed productivity dynamics in the longer run. The problem is that productivity dynamics are mismeasured. Since productivity is based on aggregated measurements of value added, the latter must be measured accurately. However, this is not the case currently. There are two sets of reason for this. The process of wage increase has instead been driven by three factors: labour shortage, labour movement to Western Europe, and vote seeking by the government. Hungary has had an extremely tight labour market for long years now, which has pushed up wages, although mostly not through the collective bargaining efforts of trade unions, but through employees being attracted to higher paid jobs on an individual basis, both domestically and abroad. Labour migration to Western Europe(predominantly Austria, Germany and the UK), has also played a part as a viable alternative. In addition, as a third very important factor, the government has consciously sought to increase the minimum wage to gain the votes of low earners towards the end of parliamentary cycles. This does not mean that there have not been important victories by trade unions in specific cases. However, as a general trend, the picture looks bleak. One reason for inaccurate measurement of productivity is the purposefully distorted reporting of value added by companies. Hungary has what is often referred to as a dual economy, consisting of large multinational enterprises and domestic SMEs. It is well known that large multinational firms engage in transfer pricing, the manipulated shifting of value added and therefore profit(and therefore the tax base) to affiliates in jurisdictions where tax rates are lower. The other part of the economy consists of small and medium sized enterprises. Due to the availability of a very wide range of options to write off expenditure against revenues, the accounting profit of Hungarian SMEs is shown to be modest in official statistics. A high percentage of primary agricultural producers do not even file tax forms. Although they are mostly self-em6

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY ployed, this does have some effect on wage trends as an alternative in the agricultural sector. It is therefore justified to believe that the real as opposed to the accounting profitability of Hungarian firms is significantly higher than what is being reported to the tax authority, and what appears in value added statistics of the Central Statistical Office. The other reason for the inaccurate measurement of productivity has to do with an endogenous circularity of the productivity-wage relationship. As Martin Myant of the European Trade Union Institute had argued already back in 2016 1 , the measurement of productivity suffers from a serious flaw of endogenous circularity. Whereas mainstream neoclassical theory argues that it is higher productivity that enables higher wages, it fails to recognise that in fact local wages are part of measurements of local productivity. since the value added, as we have outlined, is equal to the differential between the sales price and the sum of material costs, the(ceteris paribus) increase in wages automatically causes this value-added differential to increase as well. Since productivity is currently measured as value-added divided by employee, or alternatively as value added divided by working hours, the eventual productivity statistics will seem to improve as well, even though in fact nothing has changed expect wages. The seat is still being manufactured with the same technology and material inputs. Thus, wages are not only the variable that is explained by productivity, but they are also an explanatory variable of productivity under current rules of measuring the latter. What this means is that other things being equal, a sustained upward trend in wages will result in a sustained upward trend in productivity. As we shall soon see, this is in fact what has happened in Hungary. As we have already mentioned, measuring productivity in an economy relies on measuring aggregate value added (i.e. GDP), which in turn relies on measuring value added at the firm level. However, firm level value added is equal to sales price minus all material costs. This differential, remarkably, includes wages! The example Myant uses is a German carmaker shifting the production of a car seat from high wage Germany to low wage Romania. Same car seat, same technology, but significantly lower wages in Romania. The value added of car seat production now shows up in the statistics of the Romanian plant, and in turn in Romanian GDP. However, due to lower wage costs, the value added of the very same seat, produced with the very same technology, suddenly shows up as being significantly lower. This is the reason for the lower cost(sales price, be it intrafirm of interfirm) that the car manufacturer is trying to achieve within its transnational production chain by shifting production to a lower cost location. Once we recognise the logic of the above example, we must also see that any increase in local wages must also show up in the value-added statistics. Higher wages make the sales price of the final product more expensive, and 1.3 THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGES IN HUNGARY In the following pages we compare Hungarian wages and productivity to different countries. Relevant comparisons might include less developed economies to the Southeast of Hungary, such as Romania and Bulgaria. They might include the Visegrad4(V4) countries, which are at similar levels of development: Poland, Slovakia and Czechia. Finally, they might include more developed economies to the West of Hungary: France, Germany and Austria as well as the Nordic economies of Sweden, Finland and Denmark. 1.3.1 Minimum wages The minimum wage has been steadily increasing in Hungary. When compared to the minimum wage trends to other European economies the Hungarian minimum wage is still lower than in the regional V4 economies. However, when the minimum wage is measured at purchasing power parity, Hungarian minimum wages can be said to be average in a regional comparison. 1 https://www.etui.org/publications/working-papers/unit-labour-costsno-argument-for-low-wages-in-eastern-and-central-europe 7

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Figure 3 The evolution of minimal wages in Hungary(green=gross monthly, orange: annual increase)(Source: Portfolio 2021) Figure 4 Hungarian minimum wages in euros in a European comparison(Source: Eurostat, 2021) 1 800,00 1 600,00 1 400,00 1 200,00 1 000,00 800,00 600,00 400,00 200,00 0,00 Bulgaria Hungary Czechia Poland Germany Romania 8 France Slovakia 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Figure 5 Hungarian minimum wages at purchasing power parity in a European comparison(Source: Eurostat, 2021) 1 600,00 1 400,00 1 200,00 1 000,00 800,00 600,00 400,00 200,00 0,00 Bulgaria Hungary Czechia Poland Germany Romania France Slovakia 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 1.3.2 Productivity differential between small and large firms in Hungary To study productivity, apparent labour productivity is used. Apparent labour productivity is defined as value added at factor costs divided by the number of persons employed. In Hungary, the general trend is that larger firms are far more productive than smaller ones. By comparison, the German economy displays a similar trend, but the differentials are significantly lower. Figure 6 Apparent labour productivity by enterprise size in the Hungarian economy, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 40,0 35,0 30,0 25,0 20,0 15,0 10,0 5,0 0,0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total From 10 to 19 persons employed From 50 to 249 persons employed From 0 to 9 persons employed From 20 to 49 persons employed 250 persons employed or more 9

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Figure 7 Apparent labour productivity in the Germany economy, by enterprise size, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 90,0 80,0 70,0 60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 2014 2015 2016 Total From 10 to 19 persons employed From 50 to 249 persons employed 2017 2018 From 0 to 9 persons employed From 20 to 49 persons employed 250 persons employed or more 2019 1.3.3 Productivity differential between Hungary and other countries depending on firm size Hungarian firms in general are much less productive than Western European and Nordic firms. Hungarian firms are also less productive than firms in the Visegrad Four economies, except for Slovakian firms with up to 9 employees. In all other categories Hungarian labour productivity is lower. Figure 8 Hungarian microfirms are less productive than microfirms in most other economies, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 120,0 100,0 80,0 60,0 40,0 20,0 0,0 2014 Bulgaria Austria 2015 Czechia Poland 2016 Denmark Romania 2017 Germany Slovakia 2018 France Finland 2019 Hungary Sweden 10

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Figure 9 Hungarian small firms show somewhat lower productivity than V4 small firms, but significantly lower productivity than Western comparisons, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 2014 Bulgaria Austria 2015 Czechia Poland 2016 Denmark Romania 2017 Germany Slovakia 2018 France Finland 2019 Hungary Sweden Figure 10 Hungarian middle-sized firms show somewhat lower productivity than V4 comparisons, but significantly lower productivity than Western comparisons, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 70,0 60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 2014 Bulgaria Austria 2015 Czechia Poland 2016 Denmark Romania 2017 Germany Slovakia 2018 France Finland 2019 Hungary Sweden 11

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Figure 11 A similar trend is demonstrated even among larger firms, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 100,0 90,0 80,0 70,0 60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 2014 Bulgaria Austria 2015 Czechia Poland 2016 Denmark Romania 2017 Germany Slovakia 2018 France Finland 2019 Hungary Sweden Figure 12 A similar trend can be observed even amongst very large firms, in euros(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 120,0 100,0 80,0 60,0 40,0 20,0 0,0 2014 Bulgaria Austria 2015 Czechia Poland 2016 Denmark Romania 2017 Germany Slovakia 2018 France Finland 2019 Hungary Sweden All in all, productivity in Hungary and in the V4 region is considerably lower than in Western Europe in all enterprise size categories, in spite of historic efforts at convergence. Hungary displays somewhat lower productivity than the regional average. As for trends, what we see in wages in Hungary is stagnation until around 2016, after which a sharp rise begins. 12

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Figure 13 After years of stagnation there is a sharp rise in the unit labour cost from 2016 onwards(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 2,2 2 NSZ bruttó bér IMS bruttó bér 1,8 1,6 1,4 1,2 1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 When we take a look at productivity in Hungary, we find a similar pattern: stagnation until 2016, followed by a period of rising productivity: Figure 14 Productiviy per employee follows the same trend as wages: stagnation until 2016, followed by a rise(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 1,4 1,35 1,3 1,25 1,2 1,15 1,1 1,05 1 0,95 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 EU27 CZ HU PL SK 13

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN This pattern begs the question of what causes what? Does rising productivity enable rising wages, as standard neoclassical explanations would suggest? Or do rising wages cause the statistical measurement of productivity to increase, as our methodological critique would explain? The problem with the first explanation is that we see no reason why productivity should suddenly increase independently after 2016. All traditional explanatory factors of productivity were negatively influenced by government policy in the period prior to 2016. Sectors such as education and healthcare had suffered from long term underfunding. There were no sudden inflows of high value added foreign direct investment, or outward migration of low value-added labour that could explain the sudden shift of gear in productivity dynamics. In fact, it is much more likely that the causality is in the opposite direction. Due to the gradual saturation of the labour market, employees began to experience rising wages. Hungary advanced from a country of labour surplus to a country of labour shortage. The rising wages in turn showed up in the productivity statistics for the reasons explained in the methodological section. 14

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY PART II. THE REASONS FOR LOW TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AND STRIKE ACTIVISM The second section of the study concentrates on explaining the low trade union membership rate in Hungary, as well as the low willingness of Hungarian employees to take part in the struggle for higher wages and better working conditions. The trade union membership rate of Hungary, currently at around 9%, is very low in an international comparison. In addition, there has been a long-time declining trend. Strikes are also rare in Hungary, although whenever they do occur, they are generally successful. In fact, employees do not even need to actively engage in strikes. Even the threat of strikes seems to be powerful enough to incentivise employers to grant concessions. However, even these encouraging general trends do not motivate Hungarian employees to join unions and engage in strikes. To explore these paradoxical phenomena, qualitative analysis has been used, based on interviews with trade union leaders and activists, in order to arrive at a detailed understanding and interpret the non-quantifiable data. The next section will outline the methodology and sampling of the research, after which the findings will be discussed. Finally, some recommendations for the trade unions will be elaborated. Sampling The interviews were conducted with labour union leaders and members at several levels of the union organizations, including local, regional, and national levels. These structured consultations allowed the researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the characteristics of the current functioning of the unions, revealing how union leaders and members see their role in society, as well as the difficulties they face during their activities. Figure 15 Hungarian trade union membership is extremely low in a European comparison(Source: Eurostat, 2022) 80 Trade Union participation in percentage 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 60 40 20 0 Hungary Austria Germany Year Denmark Sweden Czech Republic 15

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Even though in general Hungarian labour unions are declining in membership, and their internal functioning is not well organized, there are some labour unions which are able to sustain or even increase their membership. Some are also able to engage in an effective bargaining process with their employer, and can even organize strikes with a very high participation rate. In these specific cases their internal dynamics are effective. We have aimed to compare these‘effective’ unions with the less effective ones relying on the most-similar case design. This involves finding a‘pair’ for the effective union and examining what is done differently in the less effective one. Ethics We have conducted the interviews anonymously. Our interview subjects were more willing to express their problems openly, as they were made aware that this would not have a negative impact on their reputation within the organization, and they will be not held accountable for their statements by other members of their unions. Analysis Through the interviews, the researchers have gained a comprehensive understanding of the internal dynamics, practices, and challenges of the Hungarian labour unions. This was then contrasted with the practices and dynamics of Central and Western European labour unions. Therefore, our analysis relies on two-fold comparisons. First, between effective and less effective Hungarian labour unions, based in the same cultural, economic, and regulatory environment. Secondly, between Hungarian and Central and Western European labour unions. Here we considered society wide, political, cultural, attitudinal differences between the countries and between the environments the unions operate in. ised mechanisms of functioning, media coverage and frequent(often nation-wide) strikes facilitate this awareness. In Hungary, this is not the case. The trade union movement during the Soviet-style regime was a mere rubber stamp on the will of the party, where bottom-up initiatives were discouraged. With the change of regime, the institutions of social partnership were created, with a continued role for the trade unions. However, social partnership was so far from the focus of transition, that entire generations have since been socialised into democratic politics without an understanding of their roles. Even nominally leftwing governments often ignored trade unions and social partnerships. Interviewees have stated that many employees still view trade unions as a relic from the past, as a “commie thing”, a“left-wing thing”. Further Hungarian politics still takes the transition and the previous regime as its point of reference, even though over three decades have passed. This association is negative for the majority of voters who vote right wing, and is usually treated as a comical and rather embarrassing part of the country’s past by others. The association of trade unions with the political Left is unfounded because in fact the neoliberal policies of nominally left-wing political parties after transition had also been anti trade unions when they were in power. This also deterred many from joining unions. Until today, the trade union movement is wary of signing any formal agreement with left wing political parties, given that much of their membership does not sympathise with these parties. It does not help that the united political opposition to the Orbán regime is not interested in trade unions. Reregulation of their roles did not feature prominently in the final version of the opposition programme during the 2022 parliamentary election, which was dominated by a right-wing candidate and his liberal economic advisors. This is a grave failure, as their reinstatement as important social partners would be a crucial element of a sustainable post-Orbán socio-political consensus. 1.1 THE TOP10 REASONS BEHIND LOW UNION MEMBERSHIP The interviews have uncovered several reasons for the low commitment to trade unions. Some of these reasons are societal and some operate at the individual level. We shall start with the societal ones. We found the following issues that explain the low union participation. There are several reasons, some are historic, some are contemporary political, and some are due to current structures. 1.1.1 Negative historical association In countries where the development of the trade union movement had been organic, there is nationwide awareness of their roles. Widespread membership, institutional1.1.2 Association with unpopular Left wing political parties It is an indication of the convoluted and confusing nature of Hungarian politics that while, as we have described above, the political opposition parties by and large are not interested in trade unions, paradoxically many employees are reluctant to join unions exactly because they are associated with nominally Left-wing political parties. The distribution of political sympathies amongst potential union members is unlikely to be significantly different from the distribution of political sympathies in Hungarian society in general. In the present political conditions, this means that over half of them are likely to be Fidesz voters, with a significant further share of additional right-wing voters. Amongst these voters nominally Left-wing parties, who had mismanaged the country while in power, are highly unpopular and often outright detested. 16

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Attempts by opposition politicians from these parties to take part in workplace struggle, or to co-opt former trade union leaders into their parliamentary fractions are therefore seen as signs of political collusion between unions and these unpopular politicians. Independent trade unions sometimes attribute their relative popularity to their strictly non-political line. 1.1.3 The stigma of ineffective and corrupt leadership in the recent past Due to some trade union leaders who rather looked after their personal interests than those of the members, unfortunately all trade union leaders gained a lasting reputation for self-interest. 1.1.4 Political pressure by the Orbán government The current Hungarian government actively pressures employees not to join trade unions and perpetuates a negative discourse about trade unions in general, which discourages people from becoming active members. The anti-trade union stance and legislation of the government trickles down to the level of employees. Becoming a trade union member becomes a disadvantage in the workplace, or even a politically dangerous activity. Strike laws have severely curtailed the possibilities of industrial action in several professions, such as the police, public servants, teachers, medical staff and public transport. lute amount of their 1% contributions also rises, and many feel that they can save money by not remaining members. It does not help that in recent decades the local branches of the trade unions, when unable to deliver on their core functions, have taken on auxiliary roles to make themselves attractive. Thus, for generations of employees, trade union membership fees financed excursions, common celebrations(Womens’ Day and Santa Claus events are often mentioned as examples), and even social assistance. Thus, many members who fail to see the core functions of the union, or no longer believe in them, expect a more immediate“return” upon their“investment”. This leaves less than adequate funding for the core functions of the union. Local branches often complain that they do not have adequate income to pool a strike fund. Other unions, however, assert that employees have proved willing to strike even without a strike fund in recent years. For the time being, the Hungarian trade union movement is caught up in a vicious spiral. The lower their membership, the less revenues they receive in the form of membership fees. The less income they have, the less they are able to perform, and thus they become even less attractive to potential employees, leading to a further loss of membership and support. This vicious spiral can only be reversed and turned into an upwardly, virtuous spiral by concentrating more on the core functions of trade unions and making members understand why these are more important than an immediate return of their fees in the form of community events. 1.1.5 Lack of understanding of the role of the trade unions It is difficult for trade unions to stay visible outside of periods of strike or wage negotiation. It has often happened, for instance, that trade unions have managed to achieve an open ended(indefinite term) collective agreement, after which they suddenly became useless in the eyes of the employees. It is also often the case that employees are not aware that the many benefits, rules and regulations circumscribing their work had been won by the trade unions. Sadly, there is often little to no awareness of these being trade union achievements amongst those represented. 1.1.6 There has been a general increase in wages even without the trade unions It does not help the society-wide image of trade unions that even though they have been neglected by the government, both average wages and minimum wages have increased markedly during the last decade. Employees simply do not see a role for the unions in circumstances where wages rise anyway due to the will of the government, which seeks political gain from raising the minimum wage. Others see minimum wages rising as a consequence of“market processes”, nation-wide labour shortage, etc. While there is evidently some truth in these opinions, trade unions are still crucial actors in social partnership. In practice, the largest waves of inflow into the trade unions usually occur whenever employees see the trade union as useful and active, especially during strikes and wage negotiations. Major exit flows often take place, however, at the end of wage negotiations, whenever employees are not satisfied with the results reached. Thirty-two years after transition, it is still a widespread complaint that employees do not see what they get in return for their membership fees. As wages rise, the abso1.1.7 Inadequate visibility There are quite simply far too many employees who are not even aware that trade unions exist or play a role. It is difficult for trade unions to stay visible outside of a strike or wage negotiation season. It has often happened, for instance, that trade unions have managed to achieve an open ended(indefinite term) collective agreement, after which they suddenly became useless in the eye of 17

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN the employees. It is also often the case that employees are not aware that many benefits, rules and regulations circumscribing their work had been won by the trade unions, but there is no awareness of this amongst those represented. 1.1.8 Lack of organizational learning and memory(training) Trade unions are often unable to adopt to the changing circumstances of today’s labour market. These circumstances call for labour unions to innovate, learn and adopt to these. But the institutional structure is missing in the unions. They are not used to asking their members or the employees at the firms for their input on what they would want to see labour unions do. It is especially critical that major Hungarian trade unions have proved unable to develop a formal internal training system. Over a number of terms, trade union leaders at both the federal and the industry level have pledged to install a stable formal system of training for union staff, as well as new members. This has never materialised. Trainings are haphazard, with no institutional continuity or permanency. This critically jeopardises the institutional memory and the collective knowledge of the Hungarian trade union movement. rights and competencies of trade unions are rolled back or revoked, there is no collective sense of humiliation. 1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS Based on our study, a number of recommendations can be formulated in order to improve the situation of trade unions in Hungary. a. Most importantly, the federal level of the unions should engage in a large-scale awareness raising campaign about the role of social partnership and trade unions in a Western democracy. b. Equally important, the federational level of the unions should undertake the task of institutionalising regular, systemic, formal and permanently institutionalised training for functionaries. This would ensure an even preparedness of trade union staff in areas such as the role of social partnership, legal issues, communicational skills, public relations, etc. We estimate the cost of such a centralised, formal, permanent institution to be around HUF 40-50 million per year. It should be financed by contributions from the branch unions and should be accountable to them. The above have been societal reasons for the lack of support for Hungarian trade unions. Now we shall enumerate the more individual reasons. 1.1.9 Individual paths to personal gain preferred to collective stance There is widespread reluctance for common action in Hungarian society in general, not only in the domain of the labour market. This nationwide passivity and individualism also manifests itself in the case of trade unions. Employees in general, even union members, do not have much faith in collective action. Therefore, they prefer individual paths, such as: – Attempting to achieve individual gains by maintaining a good relationship with bosses – Accepting or actively seeking overtime work, which is often better paid, but in the long run leads to exhaustion and a rapid deterioration of one’s health status – Changing jobs often in the circumstances of nation-wide labour shortage, which weakens local trade unions due to significant fluctuation. c. Trade unions should conduct surveys regularly to assess the needs and opinions of its members. d. Trade unions should also revive the successful research institute they had operated in the 1990s. The legal foundation behind the institute still exists. Western trade unions all rely on such research institutes, which gives them both a better reputation for professionalism, as well as more visibility in the media. Such an institute would better counteract the neoliberal dominance of the Hungarian economics profession in domestic public debates. e. Collective agreements currently are automatically applicable to non-members as well. The trade union movement refers to this as the freeriding problem. The system could be improved if all those covered by the collective agreements would have to pay an annual collective agreement fee of 1%- equivalent to a membership fee.(No trade union should be allowed to undercut this rate.) This would incentivise employees to enter the union, as in this case payment would enable them to influence decisions, while the alternative of staying outside would not. 1.1.10 No sense of ownership In contrast to Western democracies, where generations of trade union members had struggled to achieve labour rights, Hungarian workers had received them“from above” during the Communist period. This gives them no sense of ownership, of achievement. Thus, when the f. The financial independence of the federal level, which plays a central role in national institution and reputation building. At the moment, this level is financially dependent on state financing. Many employees(correctly) believe local staff are paid by the employer, and top leaders by the state. It would be worth considering paying all union staff at all levels directly from the union budget. 18

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY APPENDIX I. DATABASE OF STRIKES IN HUNGARY IN RECENT YEARS Kik sztrájkoltak Tungsram dolgozói mind az 5 telephelyen Pedagógusok Demokratikus Szakszervete (PDSZ) Vegyipari Dolgozók Szakszervezete(VDSZ) a GE Aviation gyárban B.Braun Medical kft gyöngyösi gyárában a Vasas Szakszervezet Makói Continental gumigyárban a munkások Mikor volt 2022.02.24. 2022.január.31 2021.06.10 2021.03.10 Feb.21 Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében Sztrájk A sztrájkoló tanárok nem tartották meg a tanítási nap első 2 óráját 2 órás figyelmeztető sztrájk három napon át, március 10től 12-éig minden műszakot érintve, kilenc alkalommal 2-2 órás sztrájk előbb kettő, nyolc majd huszonnégy órás sztrájkot, míg végül márciusban határozatlan idejű sztrájkot tartottak a gyár dolgozói Hányan vettek részt 26 782 Az épp dolgozó 200 alkalmazott 10 százaléka csatlakozott a munkabeszüntetéshez. 1600 ember dolgozott ös�szesen a gyárban Fő követelések Mennyire volt sikeres Kollektív szerződés felmondása ellen, 3 legfontosabb pont: a felmondási időt, a végkielégítést és csoportos létszámleépítés esetén a vállalatnál dolgozó házastársak védelmét Magasabb bérek, munkaterhek csökkentése, Ne küldjék fizetés nélküli szabadságra azokat a dolgozókat, akik nem oltatják be magukat koronavírus ellen Magasabb éves bérnövekedést.munkavállalói érdekképviselet szerint az éves szinten mindössze 2 százalékos béremelési ajánlat nevetségesen kevés. A 2% helyett a munkások 4%-ot követelnek. Nem volt sikeres. Nem értek el semmilyen érdemleges változást a sztájkoló tanárok. Emellett a Fővárosi Ítélőtábla, első fokon, jogellenesnek találta a sztrájkot. Sikeres volt, megállapodtak, a munkások megkapták a 4%-os bérelemlést Bérek növekedése és satbil munkahelyi körülmények. Részletesebben: a munkabeszüntetésre „azért kerül sor, mert a február 23-án szinte 100 százalékos részvétellel megtartott eredményes figyelmeztető sztrájkot követően sem vette a munkáltató figyelembe a munkavállalók elégedetlenségét, azóta sem tett új ajánlatot, az álláspontok érdemben nem közeledtek.” A szakszervezet meggyőződése ugyanakkor, hogy a munkáltatónak is figyelembe kellene vennie,„a COVID nemcsak a gazdaságot érintette hátrányosan, hanem a munkavállalókat is, így nem várható el, hogy csak a munkavállalók viseljék az azzal járó terheket. Az infláció a korábbi éveknél jóval magasabb, így a nettó bérek nem érnek már annyit, mint akár tavaly ilyenkor és további emelkedő inflációval számolhatunk. Nem hárítható minden gazdasági kockázat a munkavállalókra.” Jobb munkakörülmények, a 2020 nyáron egyoldalúan felrúgott kollektív szerződés visszaállítása és újratárgyalása Nem volt sikeres, a gyár kitartott az eredeti bérajánlata mellett A sztrájk végén a munkáltató abban állapodott meg a munkavállalókkal, hogy év végéig visszaállítja az általa tavaly nyáron egyoldalúan felrúgott kollektív szerződést, és új kollektív szerződés tárgyalásába kezd a szakszervezetekkel. 19

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Kik sztrájkoltak Önkormányzati dolgozók Ortopéd Cipőkészítők Szövetsége Pedagógusok Szakszervete (PSZ) Baleseti sebészek/ Péterfy Kórház Manninger Jenő Baleseti Központ Légiforgalmi irányítók a HungaroControlnál CONTROL Magyar Légiforgalmi Irányítók Szakszervezete /Hungarocontrol Metro áruházak dolgozói KASZ/ Metro áruházak VDSZ/ Sanofi Chinoin dolgozói a cég budapesti, csanyik-völgyi és veresegyházi telephelyén MKKSZ/ Kormány Köztisztviselők sztrájkja PDSZ Operaházi Dolgozók Szakszervezete/ Opera Wescast kipufogógyár Mikor volt 2020. 09. 02 2020.08.17 2019.11.30 2019.05.03. 2019.04.17 2019.04.17. 2019.04.17 2019.04.12. 2019.04.09. 2019.04.09 2019.03.14. 2019.03.14 2019.03.14. 2019.03.14. 2019.03.12 Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében háromnapos sztrájk munkalassító sztrájk ugusztus 17 és 23 között Utcai tüntetés és sztrájk fenyegetés Részleges sztrájk 2 órás sztrájk, és további sztrájkfenyegetés Figyelmeztetősztrájk déltől 4-ig sztrájkolnak a dolgozók Figyelmeztetősztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk 2 órás figyelmeztető sztrájk Sztrájk munkabeszüntetés Szolidaritási sztrájk Sztrájk(20 perc) határpzatlan idejű, de csak 1 nap volt Hányan vettek részt Felhívni a figyelmet a szakam alulfinanszírozottságáról, mivel 10 éve megszabott hatásági áron kell dolgozniuk 84 n.a. 10 áruház, 180 fő, 50%/2400 90% 98,6%, 783 fő/2000 termelési részen a munkavállalók 98,6%-a sztrájkolt. 7500/17 000 7500 1 iskola a férfikórus 70, a női kórus 50 százaléka, illetve pár zenekari zenész 300/1200 ös�szesen Fő követelések Bérnövekedést és az életpályamodell hiányának pótlását. Emellett az önkormányzati forrásokat érintő kormányzati elvonások az önkormányzati intézményekben dolgozó szociális, kulturális, oktatási, egészségügyi és hivatali alkalmazottak foglalkoztatási biztonságát is veszélyeztetik. többletterhek, pedagógus óraszámok csökkentése, minden iskolai dolgozóra – pedagógus és nem pedagógus végzettségűre – kiterjedő béremelés, a bérek vetítési alapjának minimálbérhez kötése, túlmunkák kifizetése, kiszámítható jogalkotás. Nagyobb együttműködés a kormány és a pedagógus szerszervetez köszött. béremelés 21 pontos követelések a munkakörülményeikkel, illetve munkaidő beosztási kérdéssekkel kapcsolatosak Munkakörülmények, munkaidő- beosztás Bérrendezés béremelés béremelés Bérrendezés: a szakszervezet minden munkavállalónak 30 000 ft béremelést szeretne elérni jogszabályok, munkafeltételek terheiket növelő új törvény ellen tiltakoznak MKKSZ sztrájk mellett Kollektív szerződés, 35% béremelés. béremelés Mennyire volt sikeres Nem volt annyira sikeres Nem tudtak változásokat elérni a tanárok n.a. Sikeres volt, megállapodtak a munkások és a vezetőség és ezért elmaradt a további sztrájk megállapodás sztrájk megállapodás a munkáltató meghallgatta, komolyan vette, a felek érdemi tárgyalást folytattak és megfogalmazták szándékukat a közös megállapodásra tárgyalás Sikeres volt 20

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Kik sztrájkoltak Hankook dolgozói VDSZ/ Hankook Dunaújváros Vasas/ Wescast Életre Tervezett Munkavállalók Szövetsége (ÉTMosz)/ SEGA(Starters E-Components Generators Automotive Hungary) Győri Tesco Életre Tervezett Munkavállalók Szövetsége (ÉTMosz)/ SEGA(Starters E-Components Generators Automotive Hungary) Starters E-Components Generators Automotive Hungary Kft. miskolci gyárában Kereskedelmi Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete (KDFSZ) Kereskedelmi Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete (KDFSZ)/ Tesco Győri bérszámfejtő részleg Győri Audi gyár Audi Hungaria FüggetlenSzakszervezet (AHFSZ)/ Audi ELTE/ EMMI Multinacionális CégekDolgozóinak Szakszervezete(MCDSZ)/ Villeroy& Boch Magyarország Kft. Hódmezővásárhelyi Villeroy & Bochnál Hopi Hungária gépkocsivezetői Mérnökök és Technikusok Szabad Szakszervezete (MTSZSZ)/ CabTec Kft. MKKSZ/ Kormány Miskolci Bosch gyárban Mikor volt 2019.03.12 2019.03.06. 2019.03.06. 2019.02.13 2019.02.07 2019.02.07. 2019.02.06 2019.02.06. 2019.02.05. 2019.01.28 2019.01.18. 2018.11.14. 2018.04.06. 2018.04.03 2018.03.09 2018.03.08. 2018.02.15 2018.02.15 Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében 10 napos sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk munkabeszüntetés Figyelmeztetősztrájk 2 órás figyelmeztető sztrájk Sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk 6 napos sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk(Információs sztrájk) Sztrájk(54 óra) általános sztrájk általános sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk(3 nap) több napos sztrájk Hányan vettek részt Majdnem mindenki 291/297 50/1600 10% 100% 40 fő 100%, 40 fő 4000 100%, 4000 fő/ 13 200 n.a. 30% Több, mint a fele/ 450 fő 112 hivatalban 7312 fő Fő követelések Mennyire volt sikeres bérrendezés, minden alkalmazott béremelése bértárgyalás Sikeres volt, megállapodtak sztrájk Béremelés sztrájk alapbér-emelést, lojalitási és karácsonyi bónuszt, öt év munkaidő esetén jubileumi jutalmat követelnek a kínai tulajdonú cég vezetésétől. Egyoldalú béremelés, több embert kirúgtak béremelés Béremelés Részben sikeres, voltak a végén tárgyalások, de a sztrájk közben a kötelező egészségügyi adatszolgálltatások elmaradtak. Ezért kijöttek a hatóságok sztrájk béremelés átképzési hozzájárulás, végkielégítés és félévi bér átképzési hozzájárulás, végkielégítés és félévi bér n.a. sztrájk béremelés béremelés Sikeres volt, megállapodás született Sztrájk a társadalmi nemek szak megszüntetése miatt, a tanszabadság, az egyetem függetlenségének megőrzése érdekében 12 százalékos béremelés semmi tárgyalás béremelés béremelés béremelés béremelés béremelés Tárgyalás volt a szakszervezet és a munkálltató között Sikeres volt, a kamionosok kiharcolták az év elejére is visszamenőleg a béremelést Egyoldalú béremelés (10%-ból 5%) semmi 21

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Kik sztrájkoltak Autóelektronikai Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete(HaDFSZ)/ BOSCH Hatvani Bosch gyár dolgozói MKKSZ/ Kormány Tesco alkalmazottai Kereskedelmi Alkalmazottak Szakszervezetének(KASZ), Kereskedelmi Dolgozók Független Szakszervezete (KDFSZ)/ Tesco Máv Start utasellátó sztrájk Fogorvosok(Nagy Ákos, Keszthely)/ EMMI VDSzSz Szolidaritás/ MÁV-Start Utasellátó Központ Opera dolgozói VDSZ/ Continental Makó MKKSZ/ Kormány Vízügyi igazgatóságon dolgozók Vasas/ Velux Szakszervezet/ Richard Fritz Kft., Aszód(török) Audi motorgyár alkalmazottai Vasas/ Mercedes MKKSZ/ Kormány MKKSZ/ Kormány Mikor volt 2018.02.12. 2018.02.05 2018.01.12 2017.09.11 2017.09.09 2017.09.04 2017.09.01 2017.08.29 2017.08.28 2017.08.04 2017.07.17. 2017.07.11 2017.05.13. 2017.02.07. 2017.01.26 2016.11.24 2016.09.14 2016.06.22 Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében figyelmeztetősztrájk Hányan vettek részt 508/2200 (a műszak 90%-a) Fő követelések béremelés Mennyire volt sikeres Egyoldalú béremelés munkabeszüntetés Sztrájk(2 nap) általános sztrájk Sztrájk 98 hivatal, 7000 fő Minden tizedik tesco bezárt 120 áruház/ 206 üzlet van, mintegy 20 ezer munkavállaló béremelés és munkahangulat javító változások is megtörténtek Béremelés béremelés Béremelés, létszám feltöltése péntek 16 órától 24 óráig szombatra pedig 10 órától 24 óráig Sikeres volt a munkások elérték a követeléseik nagy részét semmi Nagyon sikeres volt a Tesco megemelte a béreket megállapodás általános sztrájk Sztrájk, petíció, aláírásgyűjtés Sztrájk bérrendezés 3000 aláírás, a rendelőkegyharmada n.a. Tárgyalásokhoz vezetett a sztrájk Csak sürgősségi ellátás, a praxis pénzemelése miatt Leépítés ellen. 1 m-s emelés felfüggesztés este 5órás sztrájk, de nem mradt el az aznapi előadás, úgyhogy nem volt teljesen sztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk(2 óra) A főigazgató tvasszal megszüntette a kollektív szerződést és nem hajlandó újat kötni. Bérrendezés, túlórák rendes megfizetése 100 kazános van összesen 100 település 5000 Fő Csak Sztrájk fenyegetés volt Mivel végül megtartották az előadást ezért részben elmaradt a sztrájk Kazánosok rosszul lettek, hőség- munkakörülmények 25 százalékos azonnali bérkiegészítés, ennek alapbérbe épülése után 2018. januárjától újabb 12 százalékos emelés, a harmadik évben 7 százalékos béremelés, vagy a 9 éve változatlanul 38 650 forintos illetményalapot 60 ezer forintra emelni, július elseje legyen a Közigazgatás Napja béremelés Figyelmeztetősztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk 2 órás sztrájk Összesen 1000 n.a. 1500 Bértárgyalás, béremelés béremelés béremelés megegyezés semmi Sikeres volt a KORMÁNY növelte a béreket n.a. Megállapodás, 10% Sikeres volt Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk(egész nap) 60 168 hivatal, 5900 fő Sztrájk(2 óra) 100 alapszervezet, 15%, 4700 fő béremelés 30 százalékos béremelés 30 százalékos béremelés és életpályamodell az önkormányzati tisztviselők számára tárgyalás Önkorm. illetményalap meghatározási jog egyoldalú kormányzati intézkedéssel semmi 22

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY Kik sztrájkoltak Pedagógus Szakszervezet (PSZ), az Oktatási Vezetők Szakszervezete, valamint a Magyar Közoktatási és Szakképzési Szakszervezet/ EMMI PDSZ/ EMMI Vasas/ Autoliv Tanítanék, Civil KözoktatásiPlatform/ kormány Miskolci Tömegközlekedési Dolgozók Szakszervezete/ Miskolci Városi Közlekedési (MVK) Zrt. akarják kikényszeríteni. Vasúti Dolgozók Szabad Szakszervezete/ MÁV ÉŐDSZ Szakszervezet/ JNT Security Kft. ELTE oktatók/ EMMI Élelmezésipari Munkavállalók Független Szakszervezete(ÉMFSZ)/ Pick Zrt. Győri buszvezetők/ ÉNYKK Élelmezésipari MunkavállalókFüggetlen Szakszervezete(ÉMFSZ)/ Pick Zrt. Multinacionális CégekDolgozóinak Szakszervezete(MCDSz)/ Lagermax Autótranszport Kft. Taxisok/ Főtaxi, Főváros Operaházi Dolgozók Szakszervezete/ Opera Vasas/ Dunaferr Vasas/ Dunaferr Vasas/ Dunaferr Szolidaritás Autóbusz-közlekedési Szakszervezet/ Kapos Volán, OrangeWays GSZSZ/ Budairport Hunalpa/ Malév AKSZSZ/ Orangeway Buszsofőrök/ T&J Busz Projekt Kft. Vasas/ Ganz Röck Mikor volt 2016.04.20. 2016.04.15. 2016.03.31. 2016.03.30. 2016.02.17. 2015.10.20. 2015.04.21 2015.04.20. 2015.02.26. 2015.02.11. 2015.02.10. 2014.07.07. 2013.08.16. 2013.06.01. 2013.02.20. 2012.04.12. 2012.04.02. 2011.12.13. 2011.05.11. 2011.03.23. 2011.03.10. 2010.12.16. 2010.09.03 Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében Sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk(1 óra) Sztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk(információs sztrájk) Sztrájk(5.5 óra) Sztrájk Figyelmeztető sztrájk(1 óra) Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk(fél óra) Sztrájk Sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk Figyelmeztető sztrájk(1 óra) Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk Hányan vettek részt 1185 iskola 25 201 fő n.a. 700/2400 300 iskola, 15 ezer ember(diákokkal, szülőkkel) n.a. n.a. 50 fő, 8,5% május 6-án 54 287 főből n.a. 200 n.a. 170 110/ 200 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1734/ n.a. 151/ n.a. 42/ n.a. n.a. 2/ 200 70 20% 370/ 370 Fő követelések Oktatás, pedagógusbérek Az oktatás tarthatatlan helyzete miatt béremelés közoktatás átalakításáért. A Tanítanék Mozgalom szervezte polgári engedetlenséghez„Kockás nap” elmaradt tavalyi béremelés, az évek óta visszatartott prémium, a diszkrimináció megszüntetése, a szakszervezetekkel való kulturált, rendszeres egyeztetés Fertőzésveszély miatt Gyékényesen leállt az éjszakás és a nappalos tolatócsapat béremelés Szakok megszüntetése elleni tiltakozás drasztikus teljesítménynövelés, ki nemfizetett plusz munka miatt. Üzemkezdettől 5.30-ig, elmaradt bérfizetés miatti spontán leállás. Béremelés, teljesítménykövetelmények csökkentése Béremelés, bérmegállapodás Leadó emelése ellen Béremelés, kollektív szerződéskötés Béremelés, szociális juttatások, bérmegállapodás Bér- és szociális megállapodás létrehozása Bér- és szociális megállapodás létrehozása Elmaradt bérek kifizetése Bérrendezés Pihenőidő szabályozása béremelés n.a. Elmaradt bér, kilépések lehetővé tétele,tárgyalás Mennyire volt sikeres semmi semmi megállapodás semmi semmi takarítás Felfüggesztés, újajánlat semmi megállapodás Kifizették a béreket sztrájk n.a. megállapodás n.a. megállapodás megállapodás sztrájk Bírósági perek n.a. megállapodás AB beadvány n.a. Felszámolás 23

ZOLTÁN POGÁTSA AND MÁTÉ RUBEN JENGIBARJAN Kik sztrájkoltak Hunalpa/ Malév Munkavállalók/ Pannon Szárnyas Vasas/ Ganz Röck Vasas/ Ganz Röck VDSZSZ/ MÁV Cargo VDSZSZ BKV szakszervezetei/ BKV LESZ/ Malév GH Mikor volt 2010.09.03. 2010.04.17. 2010.02.17 2010.02.11. 2010.01.22. 2010.01.14. 2010.01.12 2010.01.11 Mit csináltak a sztrájk keretében Figyelmeztetősztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk Szolidaritási sztrájk Sztrájk Sztrájk Hányan vettek részt 16/ 200 200/ 200 370/ 370 370/ 370 n.a. 3%-os részvétel(4 óra) cc.3000/ n.a. 30-35 fő műszakonként/ n.a. Fő követelések Bérek megőrzése, tárgyalások, munkafeltételek Elmaradt bér kifizetése, tárgyalás Elmaradt bér kifizetése, tárgyalás Elmaradt bér kifizetése Létszámleépítés ellen BKV-sok mellett Kollektív szerződés megújítása, béremelés, juttatások rendezése Kollektív szerződés megújítása, béremelés Mennyire volt sikeres megállapodás n.a. Részleges kifizetések Később kifizették a béreket Kisebb elbocsátás megállapodás megállapodás 24

ABOUT THE AUTHORS IMPRINT Dr. Zoltán Pogátsa is an economist at the University of Sopron, Hungary. He specialises in political economy and economic development. He is the author of seven books and numerous professional studies and articles. Ruben Jengibarjan is an MA student in Political Science at the Central European University, he completed his undergraduate studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University College London. Publisher: Office Budapest Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 1056 Budapest| Fővám tér 2–3. Tel.:+36-1-461-60-11| Fax:+36-1-461-60-18 budapest@fes.de https://budapest.fes.de/ Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the authors work. The FES cannot guarantee the accuracy of all data stated in this publication 25

WAGE BARGAINING AND THE POTENTIAL OF WAGE DYNAMICS IN HUNGARY The aim of the research is identifying the longer-term potential of the wage trends in Hungary and the role of trade unions in this process. Wage trends and productivity are closely connected and the study tries to answer the question if wages should be low in order to increase productivity or rather grow to promote it. In Hungary, the upward trend in wages have led to a sustained increase in productivity and not to the collapse of the labour market. However, measuring productivity is problematic; productivity is based on aggregated measurements of value added, the latter must be measured accurately which is not the case currently. Productivity differential between Hungary and other countries depends on firm size. Hungarian firms in general are much less productive than Western European and Nordic firms.(If we can believe productivity statistics, which, as stressed above, is not the case.) Nevertheless, after 2016, a sharp rise in productivity can be observed. Due to the gradual saturation of the labour market, employees began to experience rising wages. Hungary advanced from a country of labour surplus to a country of labour shortage. Wage increases have been driven by three factors: labour shortage, labour movement to Western Europe, and vote seeking by the government and not by collective bargaining led by trade unions. Wage increase has not been driven by collective bargaining led by the trade unions. The trade union membership rate of Hungary, currently at around 9%, is very low in an international comparison. In addition, there has been a long-time declining trend. Strikes are also rare in Hungary, although whenever they do occur, they are generally successful. The study summarises the reasons for the low membership figures and give advice on what trade unions can do in order to restore their reputation, how they could reach out to employees and increase their influence. For more information visit: https://budapest.fes.de/