From Rest M orin ging ana g E R ur nsto elatio opean Princ Se ipled cu Coop rity eratio n

FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe Reichsratsstr. 13/5, A-1010 Vienna https://www.fes-vienna.org/ in Cooperation with GLOBSEC Polus Tower II, Vajnorská 100/B, 831 04 Bratislava, Slovak Republic https://www.globsec.org/ This publication is part of the Cooperative Security Initiative https://www.cooperative-security-initiative.org/ ISBN: 978-3-96250-784-8 Editors: Walter Kemp, Reinhard Krumm Cover Illustration: Daniel Seex Infographics: Florian Müller Copy Editor: James A. Turner Commercial use of all media published by the FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe(FES ROCPE) is not permitted without the written consent of FES ROCPE. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of FES ROCPE or of the organization for which the author works. Restoring European Security: From Managing Relations to Principled Cooperation Editors Walter Kemp, Reinhard Krumm Contributors Günter Bächler, Alexandra Dienes, Olivier de France, Thomas Greminger, Anna Gussarova, Hiski Haukkala, Andrey Kortunov, Łukasz Kulesa, Alexandra Martin, Zachary Paikin, Yauheni Preiherman, Sonja Stojanović Gajic, Fred Tanner, Nathalie Tocci, Tony van der Togt, Simon Weiß, Julie Wilhelmsen

Content Introduction 6 Infographic: Spiralling out of Control? 10 A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable 12 Infographic: Building a Bridge to the Future 24 The Case for Cooperative Security 28 An Agenda for Principled Cooperation 34 Background and Methodology 38 19 Questions& Answers 40 Editors& Contributors 46

Introduction 6 Introduction We are concerned about the security situation in Europe. Instead of co-operation, we see growing belligerence, and even violent conflict. Instead of common solu tions, we see mounting problems and increasing dangers. We have different backgrounds and perspectives, but we share the view that cooperation rather than confrontation is needed to address problems and manage relations. We therefore came together in 2019 to form the Cooperative Security Initiative. By means of a questionnaire, we attempt ed to stimulate people to think about why states need to work together for securi ty and to deal with modern threats and challenges including pandemics, climate change, nuclear proliferation, transna tional organised crime and large flows of people on the move. We also devised a campaign through videos and social media to generate debate and critical thinking about why it is in the interest of states to work together. Through consultations with well-informed professionals and students, we found broad support for our view that states urgently need to work together to resolve conflicts in Europe, while carrying out confidence and security-building meas ures. In the medium term, we argue that states need to return to the negotiating table to hammer out a new generation of arms control agreements, update 7 common principles and commitments to deal with contemporary realities and identify common interests. We urge states to hold a high-level meeting on European security to restore principled cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region by 2025 – the 50th anniversary of the Hel sinki Final Act. Ultimately, these steps will have to be taken by states. But we are all stakeholders in a safer Europe. Therefore, rather than drafting a report that remains consigned to the bookshelf, we hope that these re sults produced by the Cooperative Secu rity Initiative can stimulate debate and action among diplomats, parliamentarians, civil society young people and in the media. We aim to revive interest in, and support for, principled cooperative se curity and help shift momentum in the direction of more constructive relations between states. Introduction

Introduction Alarm Bells and a Call for Action 8 URGENCY REALPOLITIK NOT ALTRUISM • It must not take a major war to restore or build a new European security system. • There are already wars in Europe that involve great powers and a few hot spots that could erupt into violent conflict. • In the past few years, trust, common principles and agreements have been broken. • Each side sees the other as being in decline, yet each side is also increasing its expenditures on military capabilities. • The safety nets provided by arms control agreements and confi dence-building measures are being cut away, while an arms race heats up. Continuation along this trajectory will make a major conflagration, ei ther by accident or by design, more likely. • To deal with transnational threats and challenges – like pandemics, climate change, large flows of people on the move, and organised crime – states need to work together: solidarity is self-interest. Cooperative security is necessity, not altruism. • To safeguard national and European security interests, inter-state relations should become more cooperative: based on respect, meaningful di alogue, and adopting a constructive, problem-solving approach. • To be sustainable and acceptable to all, a cooperative order in Europe must be rooted in commonly agreed principles and commitments: the rules of the road. • Cooperation should not come at any price. In the process of restoring security in Europe, there should be no spheres of influence, nor should deals be made by great powers over the heads or behind the backs of oth er states. Cooperation must be prin cipled and participatory. All countries must be involved in discussions and negotiations on the basis of sover eign equality. NEXT STEPS 9 • In the short term, the priority should• In the longer term, states should be on limiting damage and manag- work towards a high-level event – ing differences peacefully. like a summit on security and coop• In the medium term, newly revamped eration in Europe – that can focus arms control arrangements need to the attention of leaders on the need be agreed. for peace, create meaningful dia • Joint action should not be hindered logue, identify shared interests, con by those who violate the rules or front shared threats and challenges, act as spoilers. In the absence of a reaffirm common principles, and broader consensus, interested coun- agree on new commitments if nec tries should work together in the essary. This summit should result spirit of“flexilateralism”. Coalitions of in a new founding document for Eu the willing that respect international ropean security, built on commonly norms should demonstrate the po- agreed, principled cooperation to tential and benefits of cooperation to serve as the framework for security the broader international community. in Europe. • Peace in Europe is too important to be solely left up to diplomats. It also needs input from parliamentarians, young people, civil society, the private sector and think tanks as well as exposure in the media. Introduction

Spiralling out of Control? Future options for European security 2010 Astana Summit WE ARE HERE 20 10 2010 2020 2019-2021 Cooperative Security Initiative 1990 Charter of Paris 1980 1990 2000 1999 Istanbul Summit 1975 Helsinki Final Act 1970 1980 1990 2000 1995 CSCE becomes OSCE Is there a risk of a nuclear exchange? 22 % 32 % 14 25 % % Should Russia be part of the European security system? Shared values, interests and principles? Cooperative Stabilised Vision for European security in the next 5 to 10 years? Europe Europe Should the United States be part of the European security system? Economic and environmental security? Groun d hog Day Euro Are new pe rules needed? How to prevent and resolve conflicts? Battlegrou nd Europe How to communicate to improve respect and enhance cooperation? Lessons learned from COVID-19 crisis? How to get along with neighbours you do not trust? Security to great powers and smaller states?

A Story of Now: Dealing with the When we asked people what they thought could trigger new conflicts, issues that were mentioned included migration, farUnthinkable right radicalism, an arms race, and military misperceptions. A significant num ber also mentioned Russian aggression. European security is broken. Whereas war in Europe was“unthinkable” just a few In terms of relations between Russia years ago, recently there has been heavy and the West, the central challenge is the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, crisis in and around Ukraine. This con12 a simmering conflict in Ukraine, unrest in stitutes a dangerous intensification of a Belarus and protracted conflicts in other division that emerged much earlier. It is A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable parts of Europe. People are dying, being both a symptom and cause of the break injured, and displaced. In addition, ten- down in trust and a violation of the rules sions are brewing in a number of regions that have governed order in Europe since including the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the end of the Second World War and cer the Mediterranean, and the Arctic. There tainly since the 1990 Charter of Paris for is almost no meaningful dialogue, but a New Europe. plenty of belligerent rhetoric: interstate relations have literally become toxic. Di- Yet many people – including leaders visions and distrust between Russia and – seem to think that, even if flawed, the the West heighten the risk of military in- status quo is acceptable, or there is noth cidents, accidents and escalation – even ing that can be done about it. In relations a nuclear exchange. The safety nets pro- between Russia and the West, both sides vided by arms control agreements and seem to be convinced that they are right, confidence-building measures are being that it is the responsibility of the other side cut away as a new arms race heats up. to blink first, and that time is on their side. A continuation along this trajectory could Moves on the geopolitical chessboard of lead to a major conflagration. At the Europe are seen as part of a zero-sum same time, countries are grappling with game where security can be achieved the health, economic and social impact of only at someone else’s expense. We are the COVID-19 pandemic. There is a per- caught up in a classic security dilemma. vasive sense of uneasiness, loss of con trol and even disbelief at developments The sense of instability is heightened by in many parts of the OSCE area – not to the drama surrounding the COVID-19 cri mention the rest of the world. sis, the unpredictability of actions by the United States and Russia, strains with- working together. Now is the time for in the EU(like Brexit and the challenge cooperative security! posed by illiberal democracies), different viewpoints on how deal with China, as While we live in strange and dangerous well as misinformation and fake news. times, the current mood of crisis should The sense of common values among be a wake-up call: to stop taking for states has eroded, and almost all the prin- granted, or even losing, the security and ciples outlined in the 1975 Helsinki Final normative system that has been built up Act and the Charter of Paris have been since the end of the Second World War. violated. The anniversaries of 2020 should remind us of important milestones in multilater 13 Faith in multilateralism is breaking down. al peace, cooperation and security: the A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable Institutions designed to protect and pro- 75th anniversary of the UN Charter, the mote European security appear either to 50th anniversary of the UN General As be divided by internal strife, or unable to sembly declaration on good neighbourly deal with contemporary challenges like a relations, the 45th anniversary of the Hel pandemic, mass migration, cyber threats, sinki Final Act, the 30th anniversary of the organised crime, or the impact of the en- Charter of Paris, and the 10th anniversary vironment on security. of the Astana summit. Compared to the current world situation, these events and As a result, we are witnessing an“ inflec- consensus-based documents look like tion point” in European security when old high-water marks in the recent history of rules and institutions have been under- international relations. If there is to be or mined, but new ones are not yet in place. der in Europe, these commitments need This is nothing new. Periods of dramatic to be respected and implemented. They change create upheaval. Antonio Gram- continue to form the bedrock for peace, sci wrote in his prison notebooks:“The security and cooperation. Indeed, the old world is dying, and the new world abrogation of many of these commit struggles to be born: in this interregnum, ments and principles over the past two a great variety of morbid symptoms ap- decades and the instability that has fol pear”. Our period of change is character- lowed demonstrates the enduring value ised by a shift from globalisation to coun- of these common agreements. tries erecting walls, and adopting a“me first” approach to sovereignty and foreign But while these principles and commitpolicy. States are trying to go it alone at ments remain vital as“rules of the road”, precisely the time when they need to be we cannot only look back to the past. The

security environment today is different. From“Battleground Therefore, founding principles of pan-Eu ropean security need to be interpreted and applied in the context of modern Europe” to“Cooperative Europe”: possible future realities, and, where necessary, new commitments need to be added to address options for security emerging challenges like cyber security, new technologies, and the impact of the Things that were unthinkable just a few environment on security. Dwelling on or years ago, like a pandemic bringing sociromanticising the way things used to be ety to a halt or war in the heart of Europe, 14 or ought to be is not going to help ad- have suddenly become a reality. Could in dress the ways things really are today. a similar fashion positive things like re A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable building trust and cooperation in Europe, The COVID-19 crisis shows that basic as- slowing down the pace of climate change, sumptions can be overturned quickly, for and reducing the threat of nuclear war better or for worse – that people can rally become thinkable? Or was the relatively together and do things differently for the peaceful decade after 1990 merely an ab sake of survival when there is a sense of erration and things have simply reverted urgency and a common cause. We need to a messy normality? that same sense of urgency and unity when it comes to pulling Europe back We asked people for their views on what from the brink of a major security crisis. European security could look like in the We should not be spectators to the cur- next five to ten years. Responses* can be rent dangerous events. As Marshall Glanz clustered roughly into four possible op has pointed out,“in a story of now, we are tions: Battleground Europe; Groundhog the protagonists and it’s our choices that Day Europe; Stabilised Europe and Coop shape the story’s outcome”. 1 erative Europe. BATTLEGROUND EUROPE 1 https://marshallganz.usmblogs.com/ files/2012/08/Chapter-19-Leading-Change-Leader ship-Organization-and-Social-Movements.pdf * Data presented in this report is based on the analysis of 273 SurveyMonkey® responses as of November 2020. 14 percent of respondents expressed the view that the future will be charac terised by insecurity, with major players dictating the rules of the game, carving out spheres of influence, engaging in an arms race, and countries adopting national or bilateral approaches to resolving an ever-growing range of crises. Fighting rages in several theatres in Europe. This could be termed Battleground Europe – a scenario we must make all possible ef forts to avoid. contained. There is a mix between cooperative and collective security arrangements. This could be termed an improved status-quo option, or Stabilised Europe. COOPERATIVE EUROPE GROUNDHOG DAY EUROPE On a more optimistic note, 22% of re spondents envision a European security One quarter of respondents felt that Eu- system based on cooperation. Such a rope will muddle on much like at pres- system is characterised by states en15 ent: the system is fragmented, the crisis gaging in critical self-reflection and rec A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable in Ukraine simmers on, there is a mul- ognising their self-interest in working ti-speed EU, and a stabilisation in rela- together, greater economic connectivity, tions between Russia and the West – but and a shared understanding of security, no major breakthroughs. Countries take as well as more effective multilateralism. action through ad hoc arrangements, like There is a constructive dialogue between coalitions of the willing, and cooperate in Russia and the West, and joint efforts niche fields. We call this Groundhog Day to resolve conflicts and tackle common Europe – waking up every day to a series threats and challenges. This is obviously of tedious and familiar events. the option that we consider most desirable, and which the Cooperative Security STABILISED EUROPE Initiative is designed to bring back into the debate over European security. Around one-third of all respondents (32%) believe that“partial security” can Some may call this idealistic, even naïve. be achieved in the next 5 to 10 years. In But who is more idealistic: those who this option, the EU becomes more united, think that they can win a tactical nuclear has its own army and has gained more war, or those who want to prevent one? independence from American influence. Who is being more realistic: a leader who Russia is not part of the European secu- seeks to work with others to address rity architecture, but there is dialogue and common problems, or one who thinks peaceful coexistence. The Ukraine con- his country can do everything on its own? flict has been brought to a peaceful reso- Cooperative security is realpolitik based lution. The conflict between Armenia and on norms, not a fantasy. Azerbaijan has been resolved, or at least

16 What is your vision for European security in the next 5 to 10 years? A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable 32% Stabilised Europe 25% Groundhog Day Europe 22% Cooperative Europe 14% Battleground Europe 8% Unassignable Our survey also highlighted the potential of involving stakeholders often excluded from debates on international security, such as women and young people. Interestingly, female respondents were more optimistic about the future of European security than males. Furthermore, students were more optimistic than experts. A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable What is your vision for European security in the next 5 to 10 years? Vision Battleground Europe Groundhog Day Europe Stabilised Europe Cooperative Europe Unassignable No answer Total Female(n=96) 8.3% 16.7% 34.4% 25.0% 11.5% 4.2% 100% Male(n=172) 17 14.0% 27.9% 27.9% 18.6% 5.8% 5.8% 100% Vision Battleground Europe Groundhog Day Europe Stabilised Europe Cooperative Europe Unassignable No answer Total Experts(n=92) 12.0% 28.3% 27.2% 22.8% 6.5% 3.3% 100% Students(n=81) 8.6% 16.0% 38.3% 24.7% 7.4% 4.9% 100%

HOW IMPORTANT ARE SHARED Europe. Moving forward, we believe that it VALUES FOR SECURITY AND will be important to identify common in COOPERATION? terests as well as common values: what is vital is that states follow common rules. The cross-tabulation of answers to the Having different values should not be an question as to whether shared values impediment to constructive dialogue and are essential for the European security even cooperation as long as all sides architecture and the question concerning stick to the same rules. visions for the European security archi tecture are quite instructive. Respond A PLACE FOR RUSSIA AND THE 18 ents who are more pessimistic about the UNITED STATES IN A EUROPEAN future of European security also tend to SECURITY SYSTEM? regard shared values as being essential for cooperation. This suggests that they Where do the Russian Federation and the see a less likely prospect of shared values United States fit into possible future sce in the next 5 to 10 years, and therefore narios for European security? One could greater insecurity. Conversely, those who argue that by the time of the Ukrainian do not regard shared values as essential crisis Russia had failed to emerge, or be for cooperation are more likely to imagine treated, as a strong stakeholder in Europea Stabilised Europe or even a Cooperative an security; and precisely this fact made A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable Are shared values essential for cooperation? Essential Not essential Unassignable No answer Total Battleground Europe Groundhog Day Europe 57.1% 31.4% 8.6% 2.9% 100% 60.9% 39.1% 0% 0% 100% Stabilised Europe 50.6% 49.4% 0% 0% 100% Cooperative Europe 53.6% 46.4% 0% 0% 100% the crisis seem less of a risk from the that Russia’s participation should be perspective of the Kremlin. On the other conditional: for example it should“re hand, the illegal annexation of Crimea and turn Crimea to Ukraine”,“stop undermin Russia’s role in the war in eastern Ukraine ing the security and sovereignty of its as well as cyber-attacks, interference in neighbours”,“embrace European values elections and the poisoning of opposition and play by the commonly agreed rules”. figures make it hard – even for those who At the same time, it is worth noting that favour cooperation – to accept Russia shared values do not seem to be an obas a potentially reliable partner. The ex- stacle to Russia being part of the Euro traordinary challenge at hand is therefore pean security system. Almost 60% of to find a suitable and acceptable role for respondents who said that shared values 19 Russia in the European security order, but are essential to cooperation also said that A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable in a way that creates security for all. Two- Russia should be part of the European thirds of respondents to our qualitative security system. Less surprisingly, 76.6% survey believe that Russia should be part of respondents who adopted a more of the European security system, and de- pragmatic approach(and answered that tail why: it is a participating state in the shared values are not essential for coop OSCE, a major nuclear power, and faces eration) said that Russia should be part of threats similar to those confronting many the European security system. As William countries in the rest of Europe. Hill pointed out, this means that the states of North America and Europe will have to “find a place for the Russia we have, rath Should Russia be part of the European security system? er than the Russia we wish we had”. 2 For Russia, it means demonstrating a willingness to play by the rules and be a reliable and constructive partner. History shows that it is hard to achieve peace with Russia in Europe, but there will be no durable peace in Europe without Russia. 67% yes 33% no Mirroring the answer to the question on Russia in Europe, around two-thirds of re spondents say that the US should be part That being said, most respondents said 2 W. Hill(2018): No Place for Russia. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 395

Should Russia be part of the European security system? 2% n/a A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable of the European security system. Until recently, this was the conventional wisdom in North America and Western EuShould the United States rope. After all, since the Second World War, the US has been a key guarantor of sta bility in Europe. But disengagement from Europe during the Trump administration, be part of the European security system? putting NATO in question, and withdrawal from key arms control agreements has raised questions about America’s long20 term commitment to European security and respect for treaties. Furthermore, the dysfunctional US-Russia relationship 70% yes 30% no A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable over the past twenty years has become Many respondents perceived the US as a a risk factor for European security and is traditional partner that subscribes to simhampering the ability of the sides to deal ilar values and has a unique military and with global threats and challenges that economic capacity. However, the rethey have in common. This risk can only sponses also noted that within the Eurobe mitigated through diplomacy and a pean security system the US should“be dialogue in which all stakeholders partici- have as an equal partner rather than a pate – Americans, Russians, and all other sovereign”,“stop confusing its economic countries in Europe, no matter their size interests with security”, and“actively sup or position on the map. port EU integration and strategic autonomy”. In short, both proponents and critics Are shared values essential for cooperation? of the US seem to be saying that if Amer icans are to recommit to full participation in a system for managing European secu rity, they should do so on the basis of Yes No clearly defined mutual interests with the majority of European states, and trans parency in responsibilities and expectaNo 39.5% 22.5% tions. Yes 59.9% 76.6% No answer 0.6% 0.9% Total 100% 100% RESOLVING THE SECURITY Interestingly, a significant percentage DILEMMA (59%) of people who replied to our sur vey do not think that their country should Having the United States and Russia as strengthen its military potential and purpart of a cooperative security system sue national security interests regardless should help to resolve the security di- of the reaction of others. While we do not lemma, since they would both be key claim that our set of respondents is nec stakeholders in the European security essarily representative of a broad spec order. These great powers should also trum of public opinion in the countries realise their self-interest in working with concerned, this result, obtained from a their neighbours and other countries with section of well-informed professionals 21 a stake in European security, and vice ver- and students of politics, suggests that sa. At a minimum, they should find a way people are less belligerent than their leadto coexist peacefully. ers and there could be grassroots support for a more cooperative approach to secu rity and space for exploring alternatives Should your country to the militarisation of security policies. strenghten its military potential and pursue national security interests regardless of the reaction of others? If this is the case, and yet countries need to defend themselves, how is it possible to break out of the security dilemma? The answer has been provided by states themselves: in 1999 at the OSCE Istanbul Summit. On that occasion, OSCE heads of state and government agreed that: 59% no 18% depends 21% yes “Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its securi ty arrangements, including treaties of alli ance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the

security of other States. Within the OSCE sue areas that have not been the main fo no State, group of States or organization cus of existing agreements, for example can have any pre-eminent responsibility on cyber security, the impact of climate for maintaining peace and stability in the change on security, and dealing with OSCE area or can consider any part of the transnational threats. The very process OSCE area as its sphere of influence.” of working on these new rules and agree ments could help improve cooperation. Creating a broader sense of community is one way for states to buy into a less As such, a number of factors point to the confrontational approach to security. need for a more cooperative approach to 22 Such a vision was expressed a decade security: the need to avoid conflict, reduce 23 ago in December 2010 at the Astana tensions, manage relations peacefully, A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable A Story of Now: Dealing with the Unthinkable summit, where OSCE heads of states re- and work together to address common committed themselves to“the vision of threats and challenges. While a more a free, democratic, common and indivis- cooperative approach to security is both ible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security necessary and thinkable, is it do-able? We community stretching from Vancouver need to(re)start a process towards coop to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed princi- erative security. ples, shared commitments and common goals.” Do the leaders of the 57 OSCE states still share this vision? If so, they need to work out how to get there together. If not, then a different unifying agenda needs to be devised. Are new rules and agreements needed to deal with Surprisingly, almost two-thirds(64%) of respondents to our survey think that new rules and agreements are needed to contemporary threats and challenges to security? deal with contemporary threats and challenges to security. This should provide a pause for reflection to those who think that the existing normative framework is sufficient. 64% yes 28% no The respondents believe that new rules 7% unassignable n/a and agreements should be sought in is-

Building a bridge to the future How we can succeed despite big challenges NUCLEAR WAR INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM VIOLENT EXTREMISM POPULISM tive Europe Coo E p u er r a op e e abilised ay Europ d S h t o p g e D Groun nd Euro ttlegrou Ba MIGRATION USE OF FORCE ARMS RACE PANDEMICS TERRORISM CLIMATE CHANGE € TRANSNATIONAL CRIME CYBER THREATS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Building a bridge to the future How we can succeed despite big challenges NUCLEAR WAR INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM VIOLENT EXTREMISM POPULISM tive Europe Coo E p u er r a op e e abilised ay Europ d S h t o p g e D Groun nd Euro ttlegrou Ba MIGRATION FUTURE USE OF FORCE HORT-TE R M S Demilitarization Manage relations peacefully Preserve and respect treaties MID-TER M Prevent incidents and accidents Dialogue on security Conflict resolution Implement CSBMs Restraint LONG-TERM Arms control Addressing common challenges together High-level event Security community Connectivity ARMS RACE ! PANDEMICS TERRORISM CLIMATE CHANGE € TRANSNATIONAL CRIME CYBER THREATS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RECIPRO CITY TRUST TRANSPARENCY DIALOGUE RESTRAINT RESPECT DE-ESCALATION

The Case for Cooperative Security our survey. More than two-thirds feel that their country cannot protect its sovereignty without the help of others – which implies that cooperation is vital for na tional security. If the aim is cooperative security, what does that mean? Cooperative security is both a process and an objective: states working together for the same end in a constructive, collaborative way. Unlike collective security which is defensive Can your country protect its sovereignty and security without the help of others? (an alliance against something/someone), cooperative security is a more out ward-looking concept. It comes into play when the security question at hand is not 28 who we should defend ourselves against, but who we need to cooperate with in orThe Case for Cooperative Security der to address particular issues. Climate change and environmental degradation, regulating the impact of technology(like artificial intelligence) on our lives, coping with large flows of refugees and migrants, pandemics, arms control, transnational 66% no 22% yes organised crime, cyber threats, and nuclear safety: these are issues on which 11% maybe states need to work together. Indeed, on several global issues, either there is The COVID-19 crisis is a stark warning. a cooperative solution or no solution at The virus does not care about borders or all. As UN Secretary General Antonio Gu- propaganda. The spread of this pandem terres put it in his address to the 75th ic has shown the importance of coopera session of the UN General Assembly, tion within communities, between states, “In an interconnected world, it is time to and as an international community. Narecognize a simple truth: solidarity is tional solutions are insufficient: either to self-interest.” Tellingly, this point is stop the spread of the virus, or to develop shared by most people who took part in a remedy. n/a The Case for Cooperative Security This crisis shows that our survival de- not respect borders, even great powers pends on truth, trust and cooperation. have a self-interest to cooperate. In short, enhanced cooperation between both great powers and small and mediTo what extent are shared values, including democracy and the rule of law, essential for um-sized states is needed to pool re sources and capabilities to the mutual benefit of all the actors involved. Such cooperation can be facilitated through participation in multilateral organisations. cooperation? Cooperative security works best when there are shared values, but this is not a prerequisite. Indeed, a significant per centage(41%) of people who took part in our survey said shared values are not essential for cooperation. That being said, a significant number of female respond 29 ents(70%) believe that shared values are essential for cooperation. 58% essential 41% not essential Cooperative security is particularly attrac tive for small and medium-sized coun tries: there is safety in numbers, and ad vantages in pooling resources. And for neutral countries, cooperative security offers many of the benefits of being in an alliance without having to take sides. It is no coincidence that neutral and nonaligned countries were the bridge-builders during the Helsinki process and the Cold War. But in an inter-connected world of complex and major challenges that do Looking deeper into the qualitative re sponses, a number of respondents made a distinction between“thin” and“deeper” cooperation. Cooperation to a limited ex tent or on a select range of issues may be possible without shared values, but the intensity of cooperation is usually great er when there is shared understanding of the rule of law, common principles, and democracy. Furthermore, security can be built through cooperation: it is not necessary to feel se cure or trust each other in order to start talking and working together. In fact, the very process of dialogue and inter-action

can build trust. However, relations must eign equality. All countries must be in be guided by common rules and princi- volved and negotiations and decisions ples that the parties themselves have de- should be taken together on the basis of veloped and agreed to, and there must be consensus. Cooperative security requires a common interest in security. The rules a degree of empathy: to understand that are there to ensure fairness, and to bring the other side may have a different his about a degree of predictability. This is tory and culture as well as different per a defining feature of principled coop- ceptions and interests, but wants to be eration. Rather than just making deals treated with dignity and respect. in a transactional way that benefits one or both of the parties at the expense of This approach requires the various sides international law, existing principles and to listen to one another, to be transparcommitments and even the sovereignty ent and constructive, and to not seek to of other countries, principled cooperation enhance their security at the expense of is anchored in commonly agreed princi- others. It requires trust-building steps, ples like those in the UN Charter and Hel- predictability, reciprocity, and pragma30 sinki Final Act. These have to be seen as tism based on common principles. the fundamental sine qua non for cooper The Case for Cooperative Security ative security. Cooperative security does not mean condoning the other side, comproCooperative security is an approach to mising for the sake of compromise, or conceptualising security policy which en- sacrificing one’s values, principles or courages states to jointly identify and pre- interests. On the contrary, it is based vent threats – both national and transna- on the assumption that states coltional – rather than counter them through laborate out of self-interest: there is deterrence or the use of force. It relies on a pay-off from working with others establishing elements of common threat – benefits that cannot be derived by act perceptions, the demonstration of re- ing alone. Thus, cooperative security is straint by all parties, the privileging of dia- based on the national and collective interlogue, conflict-prevention, rules-based in- ests of states rather than altruism. teraction, good neighbourly relations, and a gradual move towards – at a minimum Cooperative security will not necessarily – peaceful coexistence. This can create lead to perpetual peace – although that the basis for joint action if necessary. would be nice. Rather, it is designed to prevent war and to manage relations Cooperative security is based on sover- peacefully. Cooperative security is based on a longer-term perspective rather than er. All sides need to talk about their grievone-off transactions. This longer-term ances and concerns, admit mistakes, or perspective coupled with a comprehen- correct false impressions. This will not be sive set of issues on the agenda means easy. The alternative is that leaders keep that states have an incentive to work to- shouting in their echo chambers. This will gether in order to keep the process go- not bring peace. Indeed, there is no curing, to get a pay-off, whereas the cost of rent or historical precedent that suggests defection could mean retaliation on other that reducing or cutting off dialogue will issues or at a future stage in a way that somehow dissuade or change bad beis disadvantageous to that state. Indeed, haviour. the credibility of any future agreement is harmed if existing agreements fail to be In the current environment, it is unrealistic honoured(hence pacta sunt servanda ). to expect states to identify a common set In short, reciprocity with a future-oriented of interests on which they can agree. But perspective enables cooperation to thrive. they could at least agree on what they want to avoid, namely war. That would Unfortunately, trust has reached such a be a good basis on which to start talk31 low point at the moment that even talking ing. As Willy Brandt said,“peace is not The Case for Cooperative Security to the other side is considered disloyal. everything, but without peace, everything Opposing parties fear that their own ven- is nothing.” At a minimum, states should tures at cooperation will be misused or reaffirm – in words and deeds – the instrumentalised by the other side. As a common principles and commitments to result, countries are closed off from each which they have agreed, and start brainother, blowing hot air into their own bub- storming about new ones not yet covered bles and beating the drums of war. Exter- by existing agreements. nal threats are played up to distract attention from problems at home. This may In terms of joint action, progress should help to firm up internal cohesion, but it be made where progress is possible, sends belligerent signals across the bor- among a group of countries that are der, fuelling the very perception of threat willing and able to act in order to uphold that is being talked up at home. common principles, commitments and decisions. This may require different co We need to get back to the basics. States operation formats working on different need to speak with one another. To listen. issues at different times. On some issues Show respect. Show a degree of empathy cooperation will be“thicker”, on others – to understand the viewpoint of the oth- the common basis will be thinner. The

challenge will be to find the right constel- that must be defended, reformed, and lation at the right time, to deliver, while revamped with more flexible contact at the same time linking in to formal in- groups on different crises to provide the ter-governmental institutions and inter- necessary agility and flexibility needed to national laws for the sake of legitimacy. address urgent crises. This may weakThere are precedents for such coalitions en the inclusive regional nature of an of the willing, or what could be called“se- organisation like the OSCE, but frankly, curity cooperatives” – on a case by case participating States seem to have done basis, states contributing according to that already. More flexible and innovative their means, and joining in. arrangements – based on common prin ciples and commitments – would over So European security cooperation in the come gridlock, restore faith in the ability next decade will likely rely on constant of states to act, and in the process both ad hoc arrangements, especially sub-re- strengthen cooperation and demonstrate gional ones, and including ones that never its benefits. looked realistic before. Such a system of 32 “ flexilateralism” may well resemble an 33 “interwoven spaghetti bowl” of formal The Case for Cooperative Security The Case for Cooperative Security multilateral frameworks and institutions

An Agenda for Principled um-term ones that can contribute to a safer Europe in the longer term. These measures should not be considered a Cooperation blueprint for solving all of Europe’s prob lems. Rather, they set out a framework for action to manage relations more peaceWhen setting an agenda for cooperation fully and move states towards a more co in the future, let’s not go back to normal. operative approach to security. The basis Normal wasn’t working. The past dec- throughout should be principled cooperaade, if not the past two(since the crisis in tion – as a means and an end. Kosovo in 1999), has been characterised by bickering, selfishness, short-sighted ness, and the breaking of commitments and trust. This has led to unsustainable approaches to security and development SHORT TERM: DAMAGE CONTROL AND STABILISING RELATIONS and violations of the rule of law – even war.• States need to exercise restraint and tone down their rhetoric. Instead In an ideal world, states would act in the of monologues, states need to en interests of the global commons, and gage in meaningful dialogue: to look the pan-European security community. 34 They would work together, live in peace for opportunities to communicate good will, and show an interest in enAn Agenda for Principled Cooperation and prosperity and enjoy common ben- gagement to manage relationships efits as a result. Realising such a vision in a peaceful way. – shared by 57 OSCE participating states• Existing treaties should be preas recently as the Astana Summit in De- served to stop the existing security cember 2010 – is a long way off, but it is system from unravelling, and exist a noble aspiration that should remain as ing organisations should be shielded a beacon on the hill. from political quarrels. • Renewed efforts should be made But we cannot afford to wait and simply at the highest level to resolve the hope for a better future. The roof of our crisis in and around Ukraine and the common European home is burning and conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The we face serious global challenges. There- aim should be to be to put an end fore, a number of short-term measures to the fighting and improve the lives are urgently needed, followed by medi- of civilians who are suffering. Medi ation formats themselves can help process also needs a goal rather to strengthen trust and cooperation than being open-ended. Such a goal among the mediators, including could be preparing the way for an great powers, for example France, OSCE Summit in 2025(the 50th an the Russian Federation and the Unit- niversary of the Helsinki Final Act). ed States as co-chairs of the Minsk• States should look for ways to take Group. joint action to prevent and address • Modalities should be agreed to pre- the threats and challenges identified vent and deal with incidents and ac- in the process of Structured Dia cidents in the air and at sea. logue, inter alia through OSCE deci • No more time should be lost in im- sion-making bodies and executive plementing existing CSBMs in good structures(like institutions, secretarifaith and modernising the Vienna at and field activities). Document. 2021 will mark the 10th• Discussion should be initiated on anniversary since the last update – arms control, focusing on specific a process that is supposed to take destabilising weapons systems(e.g. place every five years. short-range nuclear weapons, ballis• The“New START Treaty”, signed in tic and cruise missiles, hypersonic 2010, should be renewed by the US systems), capabilities, and broader and Russia. limitations for conventional military posture. Like in 1972, an open-ended discussion at the OSCE or between 35 An Agenda for Principled Cooperation MEDIUM TERM: BRIDGE DIFFERENCES interested states could be initiated on both the principles and scope of a broad arms control regime in Europe, • States should engage in a frank, and on specific destabilising weap open and constructive exchange on ons or military capabilities. threats and challenges to security and identify issues of common inter est and concern. The existing Structured Dialogue in the OSCE needs to be made more dynamic. This could be achieved by more engagement from capitals, but also by involving parliamentarians, civil society, and think tanks in some sessions. The

LONG-TERM: A SECURITY COMMUNITY BASED ON PRINCIPLED COOPERATION portant to be left to the diplomats (alone). The pan-European peace project will need the involvement of all: addressing the concerns and interests of all states and their citizens. • There should be work towards a• There also needs to be a focus on high-level event – like a summit on energy security, water security and security and cooperation in Europe management, while looking at Eu– that can focus the attention of lead- rope as a common economic and ers on the need for peace, create environmental space. States should meaningful dialogue, identify shared not be forced to have exclusive rela interests, tackle shared threats and tions with either the EU or the Eurachallenges, reaffirm common prin- sian Economic Union, and instead ciples, and agree on new commit- develop good relations(like free ments if necessary. This summit trade agreements) with both sides. should result in a new foundational Greater connectivity is needed both document for European security. as a counter-balance to China, and to • Taking into account the world situa- cooperate with China(Belt and Road tion and its recent trajectory, in the Initiative). next 5 to 10 years Europe has a special responsibility to cope with four 36 main challenges: climate change, An Agenda for Principled Cooperation COVID-19 and recovery from the pandemic, migration, and the nuclear threat. These should be at the centre of a common, unifying pan-European and trans-Atlantic peace project. • The aim should be to envision a European peace order that is shaped by democratic institutions, fundamen tal freedoms, environmental sus tainability, and trustworthy security arrangements based on cooperative interdependence and not on military competition and nuclear deterrence. • Peace and cooperation are too imThere will have to be some synchroni- should never cease working to peacefully sation of these processes. Without de- end the conflicts. creasing current tensions and addressing the most urgent challenges, there is In conclusion, in should be recalled that little point in devising grand schemes for overcoming differences, managing rela a future European security system. But tions peacefully, and adopting a cooper without a joint understanding regarding a ative approach have been possible in the (realistic) future common objective there past, even in dark times. The process of will be little incentive for some of the détente and dialogue in the early 1970s, actors to get involved and invest in the marking the beginning of the Helsinki immediate steps. The process must be process, began just a few years after inclusive and participatory. the Prague Spring was crushed in 1968. While one must be realistic about the It is not realistic to de-couple the crisis in number of hurdles that stand in the way Ukraine from tensions between Russia of cooperative security in Europe today, and the West, and vice versa. Therefore, one should not be so fatalistic or rigid to it would make sense to pursue an intensi- wait for conditions to change – because fied dual-track approach toward the crisis. failing to engage in dialogue and de-es The dialogue is not likely to produce im- calate tensions could make the situation mediate results, but can gradually change even worse. It should not take a war to the overall momentum in relations be- rebuild the European security system – tween Russia and the West. Meanwhile, as was the case in 1815, 1919 or 1945. 37 An Agenda for Principled Cooperation greater attention should be focused on Governments must realise that they have modest, incremental steps aimed not so a self-interest in cooperating: to deal much at resolving the crisis with a magic more effectively with the crises of today, solution as at preventing further esca- and to prepare for threats on the horizon. lation and easing the burden on people Principled cooperative security is the best directly affected by the conflict. Such an option in order to bring about a more staapproach implies a gradual upgrading ble world and a more secure Europe. of confidence-building measures on the ground, international cooperation on humanitarian aid, and enhanced communication between the parties. Russia and the West can work with their respective local partners to generate more flexibility on these matters, but, at the same time,

Background and Methodology Europe, which was already bad, became worse as a result of war between Arme nia and Azerbaijan, political tensions in Belarus, and an organisational crisis withThe Cooperative Security Initiative(CSI) in the OSCE. began in early 2019 out of concern among a group of policy analysts about The Initiative is led by the FES Regional Of the need for a more cooperative approach fice for Cooperation and Peace in Europe to security and the inability of states to ef-(based in Vienna), and GLOBSEC(based fectively use existing cooperative security in Bratislava) and is supported logisti organisations, like the OSCE, to resolve cally by the OSCE Secretariat. Financial conflicts and work together on issues of support was provided by Slovakia and common concern. the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Experts were chosen on the basis of their expertise on CSI was inspired by the priorities of Slova- issues of European security and cooper kia’s Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2019, ation, and an effort was made to ensure namely conflict prevention, a safer future, geographic and gender balance. and effective multilateralism. It was also designed to give an impetus to the OSCE The participating experts involved in this during its year of anniversaries in 2020, Initiative do not pretend to have all the and generate new ideas and instil a sense answers to the problems of European of urgency into multilateral frameworks security. Indeed, it was decided to pose dealing with pan-European security that questions to the public. The questions had become acrimonious and gridlocked. were phrased in a way to question as 38 sumptions and viewpoints, point out CSI has taken on greater relevance as a possible consequences of current trajec Background and Methodology result of the COVID-19 pandemic. That tories, and provoke people into thinking crisis has demonstrated the need for about why cooperation is important. The countries to work together to tackle experts devised 18 questions – a 19th problems that do not respect borders. It was added on COVID. A questionnaire has also highlighted weaknesses within was circulated to all official represent states and the international system that atives of all OSCE participating states need to be addressed in order to deal with and made available to the public on a this crisis and build back better. Further- website built for this purpose. Answers more, during the time period of this Initi- were submitted online using Surveyative(2019-20), the security situation in Monkey®(see page 40-41). 301 partic ipants responded to the survey. Most dia and the general public about why corespondents came from Germany, the operation is so important for security in Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Unit- Europe. This includes a number of videos ed States as well as Belarus and Serbia. and interviews as well as messages on Male respondents were over-represent- social media that can be viewed at https:// ed, comprising 63% of all those taking www.cooperative-security-initiative.org/. part. In terms of age, the relative majority The campaign on Twitter, Facebook and of respondents were between the ages YouTube was launched in April 2020 and of 21 and 40. In terms of occupations, lasted until September that year. respondents to the survey were mostly experts and students, followed by public Four meetings of CSI initiators and par servants, private sector employees and ticipating experts have taken place in perpersons in the diplomatic service. Since son: after launching CSI in Bratislava in the questions required respondents to June 2019, experts of the initiative met in write a short statement in response, the Vienna and Bratislava in August and Nodata set consists of qualitative data. In vember 2019. One month later the initial addition to a content analysis of the an- results were presented at the OSCE Min swers to each question, a system was isterial Meeting in Bratislava. The experts created to codify each answer(wherever also provided written submissions to the possible) and with the help of MAXQDA® process. Several video conferences were the responses were analysed from a held in 2020. The outcome of those con quantifiable perspective. Additionally, se- sultations led to this report. The experts lected coded questions were cross-tabu- also used their networks and events held lated with other coded questions as well at their institutes to raise awareness of as sociodemographic data to show how CSI and the importance of cooperative 39 answers to one question related to those security. of another. This report is not the end of the process. In addition to the questionnaire, CSI de- Rather, it is seen as yet another output of veloped a campaign to increase aware- the CSI aimed at stimulating debate and ness of what cooperative security is and action to promote greater security in Euwhy it is needed. The goal was to reach rope through cooperation. an audience beyond the bubble of diplo matic relations and generate debate and a groundswell of support among civil society, youth, parliamentarians, the meBackground and Methodology

19 Questions & Answers 40 19 Questions & Answers 19 Questions & Answers 41

19 Questions & Answers 42 19 Questions & Answers 19 Questions & Answers 43

19 Questions & Answers 19 Questions & Answers 44 45 19 Questions & Answers What in your opinion are the three most important lessons to be learned from COVID-19 for improving cooperation in Europe and beyond?

Editors & Contributors Editors for the Austrian and the Italian Chairman ship of the OSCE. Since his retirement Walter Kemp is Senior Fellow at the from the Foreign Service, he has served Global Initiative against Transnational as an adviser and senior mediator to the Organized Crime. In 2018 and 2019 he Swiss MFA. established and led the Strategic Policy Support Unit in the OSCE Secretariat. He Alexandra Dienes is a Senior Research has had a long experience in the OSCE in- Fellow at FES ROCPE. She specialises in cluding as Senior Adviser to OSCE Chair- political economy and the foreign policy manships, the Secretary General and of Russia and the post-Soviet space. Pre High Commissioner on National Minor- viously, she taught international relations ities, and he supported the OSCE Panel and political economy at the University of Eminent Persons, both in 2005 and in of Amsterdam, where she is an affiliated 2014/15. research fellow in the Political Science department, and has worked for the Eu Reinhard Krumm is the founder and di- ropean Parliament in Brussels and the rector of the FES Regional Office for Co- German Development Agency GIZ. operation and Peace in Europe in Vienna. He started out as a journalist in the 1990s, Olivier de France is Research Director at working as dpa correspondent in the Bal- The French Institute for International and tic states and Moscow correspondent Strategic Affairs(IRIS) in Paris, where he for Der Spiegel magazine. He joined the runs the European Affairs Programme. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 2002, serving He teaches political theory at Paris VII as director of the offices in Tashkent and University, and European geopolitics at Moscow, later heading the Department of Sorbonne University in Paris. Central and Eastern Europe in Berlin. Thomas Greminger was Secretary GenContributors eral of the OSCE(2017-2020). Ambas sador Greminger has held numerous senior management positions during his 46 Günter Bächler was Ambassador of career at the Federal Department of For Switzerland to Georgia. In 2016 he was eign Affairs(FDFA). From 2010 to 2015, nominated as a Special Representative he was the Permanent Representative of of the German Chairman in Office of the Switzerland to the OSCE, serving as Chair OSCE for the South Caucasus. In 2017 of the Permanent Council during Switzer and 2018 he served in the same function land’s 2014 OSCE Chairmanship. Anna Gussarova is Director of the Cen- Alexandra Martin heads the Brussels tral Asia Institute for Strategic Studies office of GLOBSEC. In May 2018 she be (CAISS), managing CAISS research and came Strategic Forums Director at GLOBpublic activities. At the same time, she SEC, where she leads efforts to organise works on a permanent basis as a leading major policy meetings. She previously expert on transnational and cyber securi- worked as Political Officer for the OSCE ty, violent extremism and deradicalisation. Mission to Skopje, with the German Mar shall Fund Washington Office from 2015 Hiski Haukkala is currently a Professor to 2017 and served as Operations Officer of International Relations at the Faculty with the EU Monitoring Mission in Geor of Management and Business, Tampere gia between 2012 and 2014. University, Finland, and a non-resident Policy Expert at the Center for the Gov- Zachary Paikin is a Researcher in EU Forernance of AI at the Future of Humanity eign Policy at CEPS in Brussels, a Non Institute, University of Oxford. Previously resident Research Fellow at the Institute he served as a Foreign Policy Advisor. for Peace and Diplomacy in Toronto, and Senior Visiting Fellow at the Global Policy Andrey Kortunov is Director General of Institute in London. He also serves on the the Russian International Affairs Council Minsk Dialogue’s Expert Council and is a (RIAC), a non-profit partnership estab- collaborator with the Network for Strate lished by order of the President of the gic Analysis, funded by Canada’s Ministry Russian Federation. Previously he was of National Defence. Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies. He is the founder Yauheni Preiherman is the Founder and and first president of the Moscow Public Director of the Minsk Dialogue Council Science Foundation. on International Relations. His main research interests include the foreign poli Łukasz Kulesa is Deputy Head of Re- cies of small states, international affairs search at the Polish Institute of Interna- in Eastern Europe, and Euro-Atlantic and tional Affairs(PISM). His research inter- Eurasian security. Yauheni is a regular ests include nuclear and conventional contributor to the Eurasia Daily Monitor 47 deterrence and arms control, NATO and by the Jamestown Foundation(USA), Russian security policy. Previously he Valdai Discussion Club(Russia), Global worked as Research Director at the Euro- Brief(Canada) and other Belarusian and pean Leadership Network(London). international publications. Editors & Contributors

Editors & Contributors Sonja Stojanović Gajic is Director of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, a in dependent think-thank for security stud ies in the Western Balkans. She is author of a methodology for measuring securi ty sector reform in a transitional society from the perspective of civil society and chief methodologist for regional collabo rative research on the progress of secu rity sector reform in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedo nia, Montenegro and Serbia. Fred Tanner was until recently Senior Adviser of the Director of the Conflict Pre vention Center/ OSCE in Vienna. 20132016 he was Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General and OSCE Project Leader of the“Panel of Eminent Persons for European Security as a Common Pro ject”. He served on the UN Secretary Gen eral’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Previously he served as Director of the Geneva Centre(GCSP). Anna Lindh award for the study of Euro pean Foreign Policy. Tony van der Togt is Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands, and has published a number of works on EU/NATO-Russia re lations, Wider Europe and Greater Eurasia. As a former diplomat, working on and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, he now also works as Strategic Policy Adviser in the European Department of the Dutch MFA. Simon Weiß is a Senior Research Fellow at FES ROCPE. He focuses on security and defence policy aspects in the region and on questions of arms control in Eu rope. Between 2011-2015 he taught in ternational relations and Russian foreign policy and was a research associate at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Heidelberg. Nathalie Tocci is Director of the Istituto Julie Wilhelmsen is a Senior Research Affari Internazionali and Honorary Pro- Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of In fessor at the University of Tübingen. She ternational Affairs and former head of is Special Advisor to EU High Represent- the Russia program at the Norwegian ative and Vice President of the Commis- Defense Research Establishment. Wil 48 sion Josep Borrell. As Special Advisor to helmsen has been editor of the journal HRVP Federica Mogherini she wrote the International Politik. She was previously European Global Strategy and worked on a member of the Norwegian Government its implementation. She has been a mem- Expert Group for the Defence of Norway. ber of Eni’s Board of Directors since May 2020. Nathalie is the 2008 winner of the Special thanks Many colleagues and institutions were Chairperson-In-Office during the Slovak involved in the exciting process of prepar- chairmanship. Our thanks belong to Aming and executing this report. We would bassador Rastislav Káčer, former chair like to thank Sebastian Starystach from man of our partner GLOBSEC as well as the Max-Weber-Institute of Sociology/ Roger Hilton, research fellow at GLOB University of Heidelberg for his support SEC. This publication would not have in crunching numbers of the survey. The been possible without our copy editor secretariat of the Organisation for Secu- James A. Turner, the tireless work of Hol rity and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) ger Michel and his colleagues from the was always helpful in promoting the agency Laut und Deutlich, the great work initiative intellectually and institution- of infographic designer Florian Müller 49 ally, especially Luca Fratini, director of and illustrator Daniel Seex. Last but not the OSCE Secretariat, Anton Vushkarnik least, many thanks to our colleague Julia from the strategic advisory group of the Zöllner, who helped to facilitate a smooth OSCE secretariat and Diana Alpysbaye- process. va, as well as Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Editors & Contributors

The Cooperative Security Initiative(CSI) began in early 2019 out of concern among a group of policy analysts about the need for a more cooperative approach to security and the inability of states to effectively use existing cooperative security organisations, like the OSCE, to resolve conflicts and work together on issues of common concern. The Initiative was led by the FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe(based in Vienna) and GLOBSEC(based in Bratislava) and was assisted logistically by the OSCE Secretariat. Financial support was provided by Slovakia and the Friedrich-EbertStiftung. Participating experts were chosen on the basis of their expertise on issues of European security and cooperation, and an effort was made to ensure geographic and gender balance. This publication is part of the Cooperative Security Initiative. https://www.cooperative-security-initiative.org/  @FES_ROCPE