Analysis Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives Dr. Ahmed Qasim Meften July 2020 Societal challenges are mounting in Iraq due to years of foreign and domestic wars, lack of political and economic stability, and declining oil prices. No significant and effective structural reforms have been carried out over the past two decades, and corruption and cronyism are widespread within the institutions of a state whose administration relies on the principle of political quotas for influential party forces. This study seeks to shed light on the main societal challenges plaguing Iraq in the current phase and to identify the forms and patterns they take. It examines the resulting or expected consequences and implications arising from these challenges in order to dissect and analyze them. In addition, the study explores ways to confront the challenges through policy proposals and recommendations.  1

Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives Dr. Ahmed Qasim Meften July 2020 3

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan The author bears full legal responsibility for the contents of his work, and this work does not reflect the opinion of any governmental body. Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives; Ahmed Qasim Meften AAL Rabee; Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020. 26 pages Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Amman Office P.O. Box 941876, Amman 11194 Jordan Email: fes@fes-jordan.org Website: www.fes-jordan.org Not intended for sale ©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Amman Office All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, distributed, or transmitted, in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, whether by electronic or mechanical methods, including photocopying, recording, or use of any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions expressed in this study do not necessarily represent the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or its editors. Each author bears sole responsibility for the content of the part he wrote. • Cover and internal design: Kamal Qasim

Contents Contents Introduction 6 One: The Coronavirus Pandemic,a Struggle to Handle Contradictions 7 Two: New Government and Difficulties Regaining Community Trust 10 Three: The Demographic Window and Labor Absorption 13 Four: Prolonged Displacement and Obstacles to Return to Place of Origin 15 Five: Course and Outcome of Protests 17 Recommendations and Proposals 20 5

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives 1 Introduction Societal challenges are mounting in Iraq due to years of foreign and domestic wars, lack of political and economic stability, and declining oil prices. No significant and effective structural reforms have been carried out over the past two decades. Corruption and cronyism are widespread within the institutions of a state whose administration relies on the principle of political quotas for influential party forces. As a result of the successive crises and challenges that Iraq has faced, the problems have worsened and deepened in terms of impact and results. These conditions are characterized by pressure on human potential, limited employment, and weak growth, as well as widespread destruction of infrastructure. This means that calls to launch national programs and plans cannot wait. All Iraqis face a set of momentous choices concerning shortterm, medium-term, and long-term policies and programs to develop human and material potential. The variety and pervasiveness of the shocks resulting from extremism, terrorism, violence, insecurity, displacement, epidemics, and diseases in Iraqi society have created overlapping circles of vulnerability and fragility. As a result, risk levels have increased and sustainable livelihoods and security have been undermined, all of which have an impact on the quality and sustainability of life. This study seeks to investigate the main societal challenges plaguing Iraq in the current phase and to identify the forms and patterns they take. It examines the resulting or expected consequences and implications arising from these challenges in order to dissect and analyze them. In addition, the study explores ways to confront the challenges through policy proposals and recommendations. This study relies on observation and monitoring of societal changes(the nature of their formation and interaction), and review of the relevant literature, data, and information. It also conducts interviews with experts in social affairs to gauge their views on diagnosis and treatment. The study seeks to answer the following questions: • What are the main societal challenges dominating the Iraqi scene in the current lived reality? • What are the forms and manifestations of these challenges? • What are the effects and repercussions resulting from these challenges? What are the ways to confront and treat them? 6

One: The Coronavirus Pandemic, a Struggle to Handle Contradictions 2 One: The Coronavirus Pandemic, a Struggle to Handle Contradictions After the collapse of oil prices, decreasing exports, and economic stagnation, the next immediate crisis is the COVID-19 pandemic. The Iraqi health system was already exhausted when the pandemic began and lacked the testing capabilities necessary to measure the scale of the outbreak in the country. The government proceeded to restrict movement in Baghdad and other governorates, closed mosques, mausoleums, and shrines, and banned gatherings. The number of confirmed cases is nearing 30,000, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Health, and is on the rise. However, due to the limited number of daily tests conducted to detect infections, the effectiveness of these measures will not be clear until the final number of infections and deaths are known. quarantine neighborhoods and cities. While he acknowledges the importance of social distancing, Klinenberg believes it is necessary to mobilize social solidarity by helping the poor and the incapacitated gain access to food, disinfectants, and medications. 1 Social solidarity represents the most important focus for health and security. The reason for the systematic health collapse in some countries is their delay and failure to achieve solidarity by relying solely on physical distancing via home lockdowns. The key to success in managing the crisis in other countries has been their pursuit of two levels of social solidarity: • One, the importance of social distancing for solidarity(i.e., solidarity in distancing to prevent new infections). Eric Klinenberg, an American professor of sociology, published an article on his webpage entitled“We Need Social Solidarity, Not Just Social Distancing: To combat the coronavirus, Americans need to do more than secure their own safety.” This is a social model intended to support measures to cancel gatherings in schools, offices, and public spaces and to • Two, solidarity in helping others who cannot help themselves. Social distancing involves relationships between individuals, family and community 1 Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Shaqair,“Corona…the Social Problem,” Adhwaa Centre for Research& Studies, published on 4/ 27/ 2020 at http://adhwaa. net/?p=18115. 7

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives systems, social values, and cultural practices.• Relative change in values and daily Perhaps the most important phenomena, manners, habits, and practices: For practices, and forms of social interaction example, time spent in leisure and observed as a result of the pandemic are as recreation, travel outside the home, or follows: staying up late with friends; or visits to • Separation of families from each departments and institutions(all of which other: Through electronic alternatives for adopted preventative measures, such as communicating with friends and family, or placing sanitizers in entrances and requiring through direct communication, taking care their use before entry, preventing entry to to socially distance at the allowed distance, public and private places without wearing for example, using words, gestures, masks and gloves, etc.). These activities are and motions without touching, wearing now only done when necessary. Likewise, gloves and masks, and using disinfectants spending on luxury and non-essential items periodically and upon touching objects. is curtailed, and shopping is organized through a family member acting on behalf • Change in relationshi ps within families of the group, or by purchasing from home and among groups: For example, delivery services. People are cautious about foregoing the celebration of events such offering help to strangers or passersby in as weddings, funerals and funeral tents, public places for fear of infection, even if and banquets. Similarly, changes have they have no symptoms. Likewise, people appeared at the level of family roles, need to stand in line to obtain any service especially families in which both spouses or good, while some explicitly demand, work and have not lost their jobs because without shyness or hesitation, that others of the pandemic. These families are not must also stand in line, even if they are able to leave their children, as in the past, elderly or children. Also, the practice of in the care of the nursery, the school, washing and shrouding the dead due to family members, neighbors, or even the corona infection has been entrusted to housekeeper. This has forced them to specialized entities, and their families are care for the children in shifts, or for one of no longer able to carry out their traditional them to give up their job, usually the one practices on such occasions. The dead are with the lower income. In other words, buried in public cemeteries designated gender differences no longer govern for this purpose, and their relatives are the spousal relationship and instead the not allowed to move them to their own family’s interests and meeting its needs cemeteries until a year has passed. is top priority, even if this is a temporary situation. 8

One: The Coronavirus Pandemic, a Struggle to Handle Contradictions • Social relief support for individuals regards the direct interaction needed for who suffer from multidimensional teaching and acquisition, e-learning was poverty and fragility(widows,orphans, the best and only option in the interim. the elderly, people with mental and physical disabilities,the chronically ill,the This does not mean at all that the picture displaced, the poor, and those with no is positive and the pandemic has been income): The support occurred, initially, at properly handled. On the contrary, family the level of individual responsibility on the quarrels have increased, divorce and spousal part of well-to-do citizens or those with abandonment are on the rise, and there are set and continuous incomes(employees of more beggars in the markets and public roads. intermediate ranks and higher). They each Theft, pickpocketing, and abduction are also assumed this responsibility according to increasing. A significant number of individuals their area of residence and geographical disregard quarantine and preventive measures, surroundings(the closest). Civil service especially in poor, popular neighborhoods and organizations, charitable groups, and informal areas. support networks provided by clerics, imams of mosques, and other places of We should also make quick note of the worship also contributed efforts. However, measures adopted by the government and the length of the pandemic and the the crisis cell. They took steps to delay or imposition of curfews reduced that flurry reduce working hours in public and private of activity, especially with the increasing establishments, rapidly imposed curfews numbers of the poor and needy.(full and partial), and continued to pay salaries, pensions, and fixed incomes through • Need to opt for remote learning: the month of June. The government also Schools, universities, and even private conducted preventive awareness-raising lesson groups for some of the final stages campaigns through various media outlets and have relied on e-learning, through internet imposed fines on violators. Despite its robust applications and social media networks, prevention efforts, the government failed to complete the academic curricula and to provide alternatives to the poor, private conduct exams for the current year. sector workers, the underemployed, and day Despite the many difficulties surrounding laborers, leaving them to face their fate with that process, and its shortcomings as their own fragile capabilities. 9

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives 3 Two: New Government and Difficulties Regaining Community Trust Political trust is an interactive relationship and culture of political and factional alignment, to a complex organizational structure between the exclusion and isolation of the other. 2 two or more parties, arising from an urgent need for interaction between the government Citizens’ trust in government fluctuates based and members of society. This relationship on a set of factors and causes, such as the requires mutual reliance to achieve certain performance level of government institutions goals. In order to create this trust, the and the diversity and quality of the services relationship between the parties must be they offer, as well as the unemployment rate, free from anxiety, fear, and tension. Trust is the ability to find a job, economic growth, described as confidence in or reliance on the the inflation rate, social well-being, and ability or participation of the masses in public political and security stability in the country. affairs. Likewise, the level(high or low) of political and administrative corruption among government Jack Citrin believes that a lack of trust is officials is considered a major factor in raising represented by hostility towards political or lowering trust. and social leaders and governmental and systemic institutions, expressed by a feeling In the years 2017- 2018, Iraq has not of resentment in public opinion towards the successfully fought corruption from the system because of the failure of government international perspective. According to the to respond to the needs or expectations of Corruption Perceptions Index, published by citizens. This situation leads to the erosion of Transparency International, Iraq scored only political legitimacy. Similarly, some literature 16/ 100 during the years 2013- 2015, rising notes that the absence of political trust 2 between members of the political class is an indicator of the ruling elite’s saturation with a Muhammad Hassan Al-Dhahiri,“Symposium on human rights in Yemen: A study of presidential discourse between the spoken and the silent,” National Committee for Human Rights, 11- 12 May 2008. 10

Two: New Government and Difficulties Regaining Community Trust to 17/ 100 in 2016. The country was ranked general election was 42.05%. In Baghdad 166th out of the 167 countries on the index. Governorate(population 8 million, equal In other words, Iraq remains at the bottom of to about 24% of the population of Iraq), the Corruption Perceptions Index. 3 the voter participation rate was 33%. In the central and eastern Euphrates The Kadhimi government is currently facing governorates the voting rates were as a formidable challenge and a heavy legacy follows: Wasit 38%, Najaf 40%, Karbala accumulated since 2003, inherited from 40%, Basra 40%, Maysan 42%, Dhi Qar previous governments. The people are fed up 43%, Muthanna 45%, al-Qadisiyyah with the claims and promises of politicians that 45%, and Babil 48%. 4 are merely words with no means of achieving them on the ground. Given the short period 2. Violation of laws and evasion of fees, of time and the thorny and complex issues taxes, and charges for services(water, involved, a successful approach will mean electricity, municipal services, etc.). During sweeping aside previous taboos. On the other the period 2013- 2016, the contribution hand, leaving them in place will doom this to GDP of the electricity and water sectors democratic experiment to failure in the face of(to name a few) remained nearly stable public pressure and calls for change. Working in Iraq at 1.1%, 5 and has remained so in hard to achieve reforms, while ignoring the subsequent years. people and not listening to them, will certainly have a heavy toll, resulting in more protests, 3. Negative assessment by Iraqi citizens of the violence, and confrontation of the authorities. government’s public policies and decisions It may also lead to abandonment of the ballot and of political figures and officials, via box and undermining the legitimacy of the opinions expressed on TV and radio talk authorities and peaceful transfer of power. shows and through posts, comments, Perhaps the best indicators of lack of trust articles, and video clips published on social between Iraqi citizens and government officials media platforms. are the following: 1. Weak participation and voting in elections. 4. Public opinion polls and surveys, The voting rate in the last parliamentary which measure public approval of the elections in 2018, was 44.52% of the government’s performance, the decisions total number of eligible voters(24 million), 4 Infographic:“Total number of voters and final while the rate of participation in the participation rate in Iraqi parliamentary elections,” Al Sumaria News, 05/ 13/ 2018, https:// www.alsumaria.tv/infograph-details/268409/ 3 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National infographics/alsumaria-news. Development Plan, 2018- 2022, Baghdad, June 5 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National 2018, p. 42. Development Plan, 2018- 2022, op. cit., p. 27. 11

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives and laws it issues, and the style and 7. Low participation of citizens, civil society practices of political and party leaders, organizations, and local governments in usually result in low and negative ratings. setting priorities and identifying projects for implementation. Results of relevant 5. Frequent demonstrations and gatherings, studies carried out by the Iraqi Ministry of and the type and manner of slogans, Planning show that the rate of participation banners, and phrases expressed by the of citizens in setting priorities has reached public in protests to show their discontent a very low level(13%), followed by civil with the government and political elites. society organizations(10%) and local governments(17%). Effective democratic 6. Quick retraction, under public pressure, experiments require boosting opportunities of decisions and draft laws by the for political participation for all members government, is proof of the government’s of society. 6 bungling and haste and its failure to take well-calculated and planned steps. It also confirms the weakness and incapacity of the government to move forward with its approaches and projects. 6 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan, 2018- 2022, op. cit., p. 77. 12

Three: The Demographic Window and Labor Absorption 4 Three: The Demographic Window and Labor Absorption International studies indicate that the actual productivity of workers in the governmental sector does not exceed 18 minutes per eight hours of work, in the best of circumstances. Governmental sector workers number approximately four million, with another three million on government pensions. There are also 1.3 million beneficiaries of the social protection network, all of whom receive fixed salaries, wages, or financial benefits from the government. All in all, including dependents, the government helps fund about half of the Iraqi population of approximately 40 million people. On the other hand, in the same context, about 12 million Iraqis receive no salary or benefits from the government. Most of them struggle to work in the private sector on fixed wages or through piecemeal or irregular work. As a result of the government’s recent decisions to avert the Corona pandemic and its implementation of curfews and a comprehensive lockdown since the beginning of March until now, most of these individuals have suffered from unemployment and interrupted work. The bloated number of public employees in Iraq is the largest in the world, with about one employee serving every ten citizens, a ratio unmatched anywhere else in the world. Their salaries represent about 25% of GDP. Likewise, the average income of a government employee is twice the average per capita income in GDP: the average annual income of a government employee is about USD 10,000, while the average annual income of a typical citizen is about USD 5,000. This leads to what is known as Baumol’s cost disease and has a negative impact on the private sector, whose workers work eight full hours for lower salaries and wages than government sector workers. This causes the active labor force to prefer to seek work in the government sector, and thus the private sector has been abandoned and lags behind, while the government sector represents an undemanding job with a good income. 7 7 Meeting with Dr. Mazhar Muhammad Salih, financial affairs advisor to the Prime Minister, member of the Ministerial Council for Economy, former governor of the Central Bank of Iraq, and current member of the bank’s board of directors, in a symposium entitled“The financial crisis in Iraq: Challenges and solutions,” Rewaq Baghdad Center for Public Policy, 06/ 05/ 2020, 9:00 p.m. 13

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives Approximately 350,000 job seekers join the workforce each year, but they are neither absorbed into the lagging and ineffective private sector, nor into the bloated government sector with its disguised unemployment. This cumulative, exponential number compounds the plight of workers and increases the challenges of the resulting socioeconomic situation. These numbers are boosted by the significant demographic growth in Iraq due to the absence of family planning policies. Iraq, described as a“young nation,” has one of the highest rates of population growth in the world: those aged 17 and under make up about 50% of the population, and the youth workforce aged 35 and under makes up about 60% of society. 8 experiencing for the last two years poses complex societal problems, such as the following: accumulated dependency; unemployment; delaying or foregoing marriage; high divorce rates; family issues, separation, and abandonment; neighborhood and regional conflicts; crimes and misdemeanors; hostilities and agitation; and frustration and grumbling among the youth. Ultimately, this leads to radical attitudes and an urge to protest, demonstrate, and carry out violence against government institutions, authority, and security forces for their failure to plan and implement real, tangible solutions for the problems that have been mounting from 2003 until now. Thus, the(unabsorbed and unused) demographic dividend Iraq has been 8 “Iraqi Ministry of Planning,“Economically active people make up the largest percentage of the population in Iraq,” official website of the Ministry, 12/ 03/ 2018, https://mop.gov.iq/news/view/ details?id=69. 14

Four: Prolonged Displacement and Obstacles to Return to Place of Origin 5 Four: Prolonged Displacement and Obstacles to Return to Place of Origin The 2014 displacement caused by the entry of terrorist groups(ISIS into Mosul Governorate on 10 June 2014), and the extension of their control over a number of Iraqi governorates, represented a large and unprecedented displacement. This differed from the repeated waves of displacement that occurred from the founding of the Iraqi state until the time of ISIS’s entry. During the first four weeks of the invasion, about 500,000 families were displaced, and the number increased to about 1,035,413 families, totaling about 5.6 million IDPs through the end of 2018. 9 As a result, IDPs experienced a sharp decrease in their income linked to the loss of their property, savings, and job opportunities. It was natural for the poverty rate among displaced families to increase from 23% to 38%, and then to 42%, 10 i.e. one out of every three current IDPs is poor. This estimate represents those displaced outside the borders of their governorates, and as such, it represents a minimum estimate of poverty among the displaced. Furthermore, a report published by Iraq’s Ministry of Migration in May 2020, showed a peak number of 174 camps distributed across 13 governorates, with a population of approximately 150,992 families, representing 15% of the total number of IDPs. Meanwhile, current research data show that the number of camps has decreased to 77, with a population of about 61,980 families, representing 9% of the total number of current IDPs. In other words, 97 camps have closed, and about 89,012 families have left the camps. 11 Although the Iraqi government announced official victory over the terrorist groups and the liberation of all Iraqi territory at the end of 2017, almost three years later the proportion of households displaced remains high: 50% of the total number of IDPs remain displaced(in camps and host communities.) 9 Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced, Department of Information and Research, Information Technology Division,“Statistics of Displaced Persons from Emergency Displacement in Iraq,” Baghdad, 2018, p. 5. 10 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan, 2018- 2022, op. cit., p. 15. 11 Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displaced, Department of Information and Research, Geographic Information Systems Division, Report on IDP Camps in Iraq, May 2020, p. 7. 15

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives Prolonged displacement refers to cases that have gone beyond the initial emergency stage but do not have solutions in the near future. They are not always in a static state. Rather, the so-called displacement is often due to periods of increase and decrease in the number of displaced persons or changes within the displaced community through repeated relocation and change of place of residence. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees defines prolonged displacement as a situation in which more than 25,000 refugees or IDPs have been forced to live in exile for a period of more than five years. 12 According to this definition, we find that approximately half of the IDPs in Iraq today-i.e. more than 2.5 million people-are cases of prolonged displacement, having spent six years in host communities. IDPs usually find themselves in unsettled situations, exposed to harassment and exploitation, and in a continual state of fear. The levels of sexual and physical violence in IDP camps remain a source of major concern. Women, children, the elderly, and the disabled are considered the most vulnerable groups. Likewise, IDPs, especially those living in camps, are forced to depend on assistance that does not go beyond subsistence levels. Thus, they lead lives of poverty, frustration, and lost hope. The extended duration of the IDP crisis may 12 Gil Loescher and James Milner,“Understanding the challenge,” Forced Migration Review, No. 33, September 2009, Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford, p. 10. lead to indirect consequences. Over the course of time, the government’s participation in solving the problems of those living in the camps has decreased, especially given the conditions of the country’s current financial crisis. Accordingly, IDPs have begun to compete with the inhabitants of host communities for scarce resources, which is an increasing source of insecurity. In the same way, decreased assistance for the camps may lead some IDPs to adopt coping strategies such as banditry, prostitution, pickpocketing, and crimes and misdemeanors. According to field observations, research, and investigation into the conditions and circumstances of the environments of origin of the displaced, four issues have come to light that represent real obstacles to the return of the remaining displaced persons, namely: • Sectarian and political tensions: Babil, Diyala, and parts of Saladin governorates. • Tribal tensions: Saladin and al-Anbar governorates. • Ethnic and political tensions: Nineveh and parts of Diyala and Kirkuk governorates. • Lack of or weak infrastructure and services in areas of origin, along with destruction or theft of homes, real estate, and private property. These issues need thorough study, analysis, and classification to propose appropriate solutions. They also need official government interventions, international aid, and community mobilization to remove, dismantle, and address them. 16

Five: Course and Outcome of Protests 6 Five: Course and Outcome of Protests Protests expressing economic and social grievances and complaints about deteriorating public services have become a semipermanent feature of Iraqi life, although they have decreased for the most part since 2019. Security abuses in demonstration areas in late September and October caused a new wave of demonstrations in the country. The protests, which began peacefully before they stopped due to the pandemic, led to road blockages, infrastructure damage, and the death of nearly 400 victims, including civilians and security forces, and forced Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi to submit his resignation in late November. 13 One of the main issues causing the protests in Iraq is the state’s abandonment of its former role as an institution responsible for developing and modernizing society. Instead, the state became a breeding ground for identity politics and ethnic and sectarian representation. The state is no longer charged with the responsibility of fostering the progress of society because there is no longer any meaning for progress in the 13 Kirk Sowell,“Looming Challenges for Iraq’s New Government,” Sada: Middle East Analysis, April 2, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/81444. first place(or the consumerist understanding of progress has become prevalent). The Iraqi state has become a space represented by ethnic and sectarian identities and conflicts among influential political forces. It fluctuates between the Hugo Chavez model(a state of aid and benefits mired in poverty) and the model of some Central American countries, where fragile states are contested by mafias and gangs, and violence represents a major rent-seeking activity. This is exacerbated by the failure of the state and its inability to administer social needs. 14 Corruption and incompetence in managing resources, and the absence of separation of the official and unofficial, have led to a tremendous waste of resources that could have prevented the crisis from getting worse. Were it not for this waste, Iraq could have alleviated issues of long-term consequence, such as water shortages and climate change, as well as simpler issues such as electricity, improving the transportation sector, developing electronic 14 Harith Hasan,“Beyond security: Challenges facing Iraq,” Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, 7/ 20 / 2018, http://www.achariricenter.org/stabilizationgovernance-and-socioeconomic-challenges-in-iraqar/. 17

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives management, and planning green space. It degrees, engineers, medical professionals, must also be said that the social culture has lawyers, political science graduates, etc. contributed to the deepening of some of these crises: for example, the destruction of 3. The prevalence of protests has decreased remaining green areas and encroachment on in a limited number of governorates in public lands to establish unplanned housing southern Iraq(Dhi Qar, Wasit, Maysan, complexes that bypass the water, electricity, Basra) and, to a limited extent, in Baghdad, and sewage networks. Karbala, and Najaf. Similarly, the number of participants has decreased. The In recent weeks, Iraq has seen a renewed pavilions and tents are empty, and the sitwave of popular demonstrations against in is no longer dominant, replaced instead the country’s deteriorating economic, by massive and intermittent gatherings on social, and health conditions, such as certain days under specific mechanisms rising unemployment, the degradation of and practices. government services, and the quota system by which Kadhimi was appointed prime minister. 4. The protestors have abandoned the The eruption of demonstrations at this time practice of blocking roads and entrances of highlights the depth of the crises that Iraq has public institutions in favor of forcing heads witnessed for years. A shift has been observed of institutions and departments in the in the course and nature of these protests, the governorate to submit their resignations most notable of which are the following: under threat. They have also attacked oil 1. The waning influence and role of political companies and kidnapped their foreign leaders, religious leaders, and their workers, in addition to attacking the supporters on the course of the protests headquarters of political parties and (in real time) as a result of the pandemic the homes of officials and members of and their preoccupation with the financial parliament. crisis and the divvying up of positions and filling of ministries in the Kadhimi 5. The main slogan of the demonstrations government. has changed from“We want a nation,” to“Deadline for a nation.” This slogan, 2. The protests have become dominated by originally launched from the city of a youthful and popular character, as the Nasiriyah in the governorate of Dhi Qar participation of elite and professional in southern Iraq, gained the support of groups decreased, such as intellectuals, demonstrators in Baghdad, Karbala, and media professionals, holders of advanced Najaf. 18

Five: Course and Outcome of Protests 6. Some protest coordinators are feeling the way it was formed. This came about the euphoria of victory due to measures initially due to fears of the Coronavirus, adopted by the Kadhimi government, and it gives ample opportunity to achieve among them the formation of a high-level promised reforms. fact-finding committee of experts that will hold accountable the perpetrators Moreover, the government will have to of attacks and killings of demonstrators. organize early elections in response to the The new Prime Minister has also recruited demonstrators’ demands. However, new protest figures as candidates to occupy elections will likely be the easiest challenge for positions or to work in his office and in the government, given that elections can be some governmental institutions and avoided for a good reason, i.e. COVID-19, and agencies. postponed to a later time. During that period (from the day the new government takes office 7. Most protest coordinators have decided until the elections are held), the government not to escalate the current situation and will be put to the test in its management of are tending towards calm and giving the the concurrent financial, political, security, Kadhimi government time despite their and health crises. objection to some of its members and 19

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives 7 Recommendations and Proposals 1. In order to expand the institutions that B. The Ministry of Health should recruit provide health and social services to medical personnel(who wish to help) vulnerable population groups(the elderly, from among retirees, private sector the chronically ill, people with special workers, and unemployed graduates, needs, etc.) and improve their performance, to join its personnel working on the expand the support provided to families front line to treat hospitalized patients. caring for members of these vulnerable C. The Council of Ministers should groups, increase the percentage of those instruct the Ministries of Health and covered by social protection systems, and Industry& Minerals to conduct a control the Corona pandemic by reducing comprehensive study of the medical the number of infections, treating the ill, equipment needs, manufacture and decreasing the number of deaths, we them locally in their laboratories and propose the following: facilities, and provide the Ministry of A. The Council of Ministers should direct Health with these products. It should donation funds to be opened, through distribute some of them free of charge bank accounts promoted in the media, to citizens from impoverished areas and authorize Iraqi banks to collect that are seeing increasing infections. remittances or direct cash donations made by politicians, businessmen, and 2. Restoring confidence comes gradually and the affluent. This is provided that these not all at once(the one-and-a-half-year sums are collected for the use of the period ahead of the Kadhimi government crisis cell and the Ministry of Health, and parliament is not sufficient), but this and taking into account transparency does not prevent serious work to restore in the process of disbursing donations public confidence. In this regard, we to provide medical and treatment propose the following: supplies. 20

Recommendations and Proposals A. Quickly adopt the addenda to the election law in order to satisfy public aspirations. B. Hold the corrupt accountable(at least second and third line corruption), return stolen funds to the state treasury, refer perpetrators for prosecution, and subsequently announce this in a transparent manner. C. Review recruitment and appointment procedures and criteria to ensure the nomination and selection of honest, competent, and independent persons to fill vacant public offices in ministries. D. Establish control over all border crossing points and subject them to the central government to prevent corruption and impose the prestige of the state. Organize their administration in order to maximize non-oil state resources. 3. In order to deal with the issue of the return of the displaced to their areas of origin and resolve the obstacles preventing this, the Prime Minister should direct the formation of a supreme committee headed by the Ministry of Migration and Displaced, with membership from the relevant authorities: National Security Advisor; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defense; governors of Nineveh, Saladin, al-Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Babil; representatives of the concerned areas in the governorates of origin of the IDPs; tribal dignitaries from the concerned areas; clerics from the concerned areas; Sunni and Shia representatives; a representative of the supreme religious authority in Najaf; a representative of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers; and any other relevant body as proposed by the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The purpose of forming the committee is to resolve tribal and regional problems in governorates and regions that have witnessed tribal division and involvement with terrorist groups and crimes committed against the people of these areas(murder, displacement, kidnapping, car bombings, house demolitions, rape, etc.). This will help ensure that accountability and justice are achieved, problems are resolved in the environments of the displaced persons, and that there is neither impunity on one hand, nor revenge operations on the other. To reach a political solution regarding the disputed areas among powerful political forces that are reluctant to return the displaced, the Supreme Committee should designate sub-committees by region to work on identifying and classifying problems, collect the necessary information and data, and make proposals and recommendations to the Supreme Committee for its role in providing the supplies and conditions necessary for their implementation. 21

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan& Iraq Office - Societal Challenges for Iraq’s Lived Reality: Policy Perspectives 4. The government should take advantage enterprises that will employ new workers of the demographic window spatially(at and help decrease unemployment. the governorate level) by adopting a scale for ranking investment priorities so that 5. Relevant agencies should implement the governorates that have reached the social distancing measures for a long demographic window stage are ranked time, perhaps up to another year or more, first. This will be done by coordinating without affecting services or the economy and integrating spatial development(regional and global experiences may be policies at the national and local level for consulted). During the pandemic, the each governorate in order to promote Ministries of Communications, Higher investment in human resources. Ministries Education, and Education must develop (of Planning, Finance, Labor and Social infrastructure and internet networks in Affairs) should pursue economic policies order to operate virtually, as well develop for the banking and lending sector that and build the educational and teaching include a development funds model to capabilities of staff and students by introduce sovereign bonds sold to citizens involving them in free, required distance with remunerative profits that encourage courses. The ministries must also develop the purchase of such bonds. Such bonds skills by using internet technology that also put to use people’s savings, take enables teachers to work online effectively advantage of the hard money supply, and efficiently. and direct lending to small and medium 22

About the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung- Jordan& Iraq The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a non-profit organization committed to the values of social democracy. It is the oldest political foundation in Germany, founded in 1925 as the political legacy of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected German president. The goal of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Jordan & Iraq is to promote and encourage democracy and political participation and support progress toward social justice and gender equality. We also contribute to environmental sustainability, peace, and security in the region. Likewise, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Jordan& Iraq office supports building and strengthening civil society and public institutions in Jordan and Iraq. We work extensively with civil society institutions and across the political spectrum to establish platforms for democratic dialogue, hold conferences and workshops, and issue policy papers on current political issues. Dr. Ahmed Qasim Meften Dr. Moftin is an instructional lecturer at the University of Baghdad, College of Arts, Department of Sociology, and a professor in the field of social research methods and approaches. He is also the director of the research and studies department at the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and a research associate at the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies since 2003. Dr. Moftin’s interests focus on the topics of displacement, migration, refugees, ethnicities, social harmony, social issues, and the formulation of policy, public opinion polls, and field surveys. Dr. Moftin has published works, books, and research, including Sociology of Displacement: An Approach to the Binary of Sect and Clan in Iraq, Baghdad, House of Cultural Affairs Social Studies Series, 2015; Research Methods in Social Sciences, Baghdad, Lana Library, 2018; The Public Domain and Building Tolerance: A Framework for Iraqis and an Introduction to Creating Coexistence; and Approaches to Social Harmony Among the Arabs and Kurds of Iraq(publication pending).

Due to years of foreign and domestic wars and a lack of political and economic stability, societal challenges are deepening in Iraq. No significant and effective structural reforms have been carried out over the past two decades, and corruption and cronyism are widespread within the institutions of a state whose administration relies on the principle of political quotas for influential party powers. As a result of Iraq’s exposure to a succession of crises and challenges, the problems have worsened and deepened in terms of impact and results. These conditions are characterized by pressure on human potential, limited employment, and weak growth, as well as widespread destruction of infrastructure. This urgently calls for building national programs and plans that put everyone at a crossroads in terms of short-term, medium-term, and long-term policies and programs to develop human and physical potentials. The variety and pervasiveness of shocks resulting from extremism, terrorism, violence, insecurity, displacement, epidemics, and diseases in Iraqi society have created overlapping circles of vulnerability and fragility, thus increasing risk levels and undermining sustainable livelihoods and security, all of which reflect on the quality and sustainability of life. This necessitates the formulation of political proposals and recommendations to counter these problems. For more information on this subject: www.fes-jordan.org