A N A LY S I S DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example Intensified immigration and demographic factors have led to an increased ethnic and religious heteroge neity of West European socie ties and pushed the national identity issue to the forefront of political debate, thereby causing a conflict over criteria for membership in the nation. The rise of national identity politics has the potential to se riously jeopardize Western lib eral democracies since identity conflicts are usually followed by intense partisan polarisa tion and could be misused to undermine constitutional or der and subvert democratic institutions. Filip Milačić November 2019 There are three key lessons that West European political actors could learn from Mon tenegrin example: the political inclusion of minorities leads to their stronger identification with a country and maximises their loyalty; a successful forg ing of national identity based on common values is also pos sible in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country; by allowing the possibility of multiple identities, society becomes stronger.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example

Contents Summary 2 1. INTRODUCTION 3 2. GROWING HETEROGENEITY 4 3. NEW POLITICAL COMPETITION 5 IN WESTERN EUROPE 4. THE MONTENEGRIN EXAMPLE 7 4.1. The First Pillar: Institutions of the System 7 4.2. The Second Pillar: Creedal National Identity 8 4.3. Montenegro’s Key Challenges 9 5. CONCLUSION 10 References 12 1

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example Summary For a lengthy period of time the issue of national identity has not been one that has played an important role in the politi cal systems of Western Europe. However, intensified immi gration and demographic factors have led to an increased ethnic and religious heterogeneity of West European socie ties and pushed the national identity issue to the forefront of political debate, thereby causing a conflict over criteria for membership in the nation. This rise of national identity poli tics has the potential to seriously jeopardise Western liberal democracies. Identity conflicts are usually followed by in tense partisan polarisation and could be misused to under mine constitutional order and subvert democratic institu tions. Yet it would be wrong to argue that there is a direct causality between the increased salience of identity politics in the political system and democratic backsliding. How this de velopment will affect West European party systems – and democracies in general – largely depends on the attitudes of the leading political parties. In this context, there are three key lessons that West European political actors could learn from Montenegro, a country that achieved economic and democratic progress despite being a multi-ethnic and mul ti-religious country with no ethnic majority, but only a‘major ity minority’: the political inclusion of minorities leads to their stronger identification with a country and maximises their loyalty; a successful forging of national identity based on common values is also possible in a multi-ethnic and mul ti-religious country; by allowing the possibility of multiple identities, society becomes stronger. 2

DEN JEWEILIGEN KAPITELNAMEN HIER EINSETZEN 1 INTRODUCTION In a March/April edition of Foreign Affairs, Francis Fukuyama argued that“liberal democracy cannot exist without a na tional identity that defines what citizens hold in common with one another“.1 1 Fukuyama’s claim about the impor tance of completed nation-building for a functional democ racy is nothing new since many papers on this topic have al ready been written. What is striking about Fukuyama’s claim is that, contrary to these papers that dealt with newly(re)es tablished democracies, Fukuyama was referring to‘old’ and consolidated Western ones. For a lengthy period of time the issue of national identity has not been one that has played an important role in the politi cal systems of Western Europe. West European societies were predominantly mono-ethnic and mono-cultural socie ties with a quite clear definition of what it means to be, for example, German, Swedish or French. However, this is not the case anymore. Intensified immigration(since the begin ning of the 21st century) and demographic factors have been transforming predominantly homogenous Western societies into heterogeneous ones. This development has pushed the national identity issue to the forefront of political debate and caused a conflict over criteria for membership in the nation. This rise of national identity politics has the potential to seri ously jeopardise Western liberal democracies. As emphasised by Yascha Mounk,“to an extent we prefer to disregard…the functioning of democracy may have depended on(ethnic and cultural) homogeneity”.2 2 Therefore, it is necessary to analyse how this trend developed, the negative results that could accompany it, and the experiences from which one can learn about the successful‘managing’ of societal diversity. 1 Fukuyama, F.(2019) Fukuyama Replies, Foreign Affairs, March-April. 2 Mounk, Y.(2018) The People Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It. Harvard University Press. 3

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example 2 GROWING HETEROGENEITY Since the beginning of the European refugee crisis in 2015, the immigration issue has been one of the hottest topics in West European societies. Yet in analysing this important question it is often forgotten that many West European countries have, for years now, been dealing with high immi gration rates. The refugee crisis has only made this phenom enon more obvious and more salient. Since 2000, the per centage of a foreign-born population in Germany has risen from 11% to 15%; in the Netherlands from 9% to nearly 12%; in France from 10% to 12%; in Sweden from 11% to almost 17%; in Denmark from nearly 7% to 10%; in Austria from 10% to 18%; in Finland from 2% to 6%; in the United Kingdom from 8% to over 13%; in Belgium from 10% to more than 16%; in Norway from 6% to 15%; in Switzerland from nearly 22% to 28%. 3 Rights, Geneva Convention, and Convention on the Rights of the Child), the manoeuvring space for West European coun tries to reduce immigration is limited. Besides the high levels of immigration, demographic factors also substantially contributed to an increasing ethnic and cul tural heterogeneity. Western Europe’s fertility rate dropped below replacement level almost fifty years ago 5 and the lat est Eurostat data from 2017 only confirm this trend. Accord ing to these data, overall fertility in the EU is 1.59 and not a single EU member state is characterised by the 2.1 level need ed to replace the population. 6 Thus it comes as no surprise that, according to some predictions such as David Coleman’s of the University of Oxford, most West European countries will be 15-35% non-white by 2050. 7 I acknowledge that globalisation has strongly contributed to this trend. Globalisation has made inequalities in the world much more visible and this is one of the main driving forces behind such intensified immigration. However, it must also be noted that besides globalisation many other factors are responsible for mass migration, such as family reunification, humanitarian migration, and migration for educational and training purposes. Climate change is also to be regarded as one of the causes of increased migratory movements and the same applies to wars, poverty, and political persecution- a reality in many regions of the world. In addition, the interna tional debate on migration and development has also changed in recent years. Emigration has now been encour aged both by the UN and the migrants’ home countries. Ac cording to the UN, there is an overall more positive assess ment of the impact of migration on development, and for some countries of origin, remittances are an important source of income, accounting for up to one third of the GDP. 4 Since many of these migration factors are regulated by inter national conventions(European Convention on Human 3 Milacic, F. and Vukovic, I.(2018) The Rise of the Politics of the Natio nal Identity: New Evidence from Western Europe, Ethnopolitics; Fu kuyama, F.(2018) Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 4 Angenendt, S.(2017) Development-oriented migration policy. In: In tegration conference of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, March, Berlin. 5 Kaufmann, E.(2018) Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Fu ture of White Majorities. Harry N. Abrams 6 Eurostat,“Plus de 5 millions de naissances dans l’UE en 2017”, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/document s/2995521/9648821/3-12032019-AP-FR.pdf/99bbdb3d-be de-467c-bce0-6e033b488946 7 Coleman, D.(2012) The changing face of Europe, in J. Goldstone, E. Kaufmann and M. Duffy Toft(eds), Political Demography: How Po pulation Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics, Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm 4

DEN JEWEILIGEN KAPITELNAMEN HIER EINSETZEN 3 NEW POLITICAL COMPETITION IN WESTERN EUROPE In sum, the growing societal heterogeneity is here to stay as we are witnessing an unprecedented transformation of pre dominantly mono-ethnic and mono-cultural societies into multi-ethnic and multicultural ones. This development is dra matically changing the nature of political competition in Western Europe. It has placed the national identity issue at the forefront of political debate as these increasingly hetero geneous societies are now in need of a new common identi ty. This has further caused a new polarisation line within West European party systems which are now characterised by a conflict over criteria for membership in the nation. They have thus become polarised as to the question of who be longs to the‘people’(see figure 1). This, namely, is a struggle between two concepts. On the one hand, a civic concept that emphasises loyalty to legal order and the key values of society – such as tolerance, equal ity, pluralism, a belief in a democratic system, secularism – as the decisive criteria for membership in the nation. Further more, it tolerates a high degree of non-integration and ac centuates those values which could be shared by any citizen regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity. According to this notion, most collective identities are“like shirts rather than skin” 8 , i.e., they are, in theory at least, optional, not inescap able. On the other hand, there exists an ethnic concept that places an emphasis on language, religion, traditions, descent and ethnicity. Ethnicity is a highly exclusive criterion. And while religion, language, and traditions, could be, in theory,‘ac quired’ whereby an‘outsider’ can become an‘insider’, an ethnicised definition of‘the people’ excludes this possibility as it emphasises genetic differences that cannot be assimilat ed. Figure 1 National identity politics polarisation line Left Singularities with Equal Rights Common Values Cultural Homogeneity Right Ethnic Homogeneity 8 Hobsbawm, E.(1996) Identity Politics and the Left, available at: http://banmarchive.org.uk/articles/1996%20annual%20lecture.htm The fact that identity is becoming one of the bases of politics is very menacing to democracy. Identity conflicts are usually followed by an intense partisan polarisation and hostility since political actors do not represent different policies, but rather different worldviews that are often mutually exclusive and non-negotiable. Accordingly, political competition is dominated by a series of zero-sum conflicts which are re garded as existential and possess a winner-take-all logic. In such political systems politicians do not respect the differ ence between an enemy and an adversary, which is a key condition for a democracy to work. 9 So once a‘Schmittian’ version of politics as an opposition between‘friends and en emies’ is inaugurated, the rules of the game are no longer respected and institutions become weapons 10 , which alto gether imperils democracy. However, this threat to democracy is not only limited to the deep polarisation induced by the increasing salience of na tional identity politics. The examples of Hungary and Poland clearly demonstrate that national identity issue offers great potential for its misuse. By portraying themselves as champi ons of national interests and the protectors of the ethnic and cultural composition of the country, the mainstream nation alist political actors in those countries have not only sought to win elections and strengthen their legitimacy. This ac quired legitimacy was then misused to undermine constitu tional order and subvert democratic institutions. Additionly, identity-based exclusionist policies, which are usually advocated by the populist radical right, have an an ti-democratic character. By insisting that only they stand for the‘true people’ and thus represent the‘volonté générale’, the populist radical right parties undermine all institutions of liberal democracy that contest their claim. Having in mind the effect identity politics has on democracy, it comes as no surprise that, according to Fukuyama, the rise in identity politics is one of the chief threats that modern 9 Ignatieff, M.(2013) Enemies vs. Adversaries. available at: https:// www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/opinion/enemies-vs-adversaries.html 10 Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D.(2018) How Democracies Die. Crown: New York. 5

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example liberal democracies face. 11 Yet the gloomy scenario is not something inevitable. In his recent article in Foreign Affairs, Robert Sapolsky argued that neurobiology, endocrinology, and developmental psychology all paint a picture according to which humans have a fundamental need to be part of the collective identity and therefore the categorisation of‘us ver sus them’ is natural to us. 12 Although this in-group/out-group thinking sounds disturbing, it is not necessarily. So if we can not influence the fact that by nature we create boundaries between our group and outsiders, we can influence and shape the criteria for membership in our group. Inter-human relationships thus depend on the fact of whether these crite ria for belonging are inclusive or exclusive. In other words, there is no direct causality between the dom inance of national identity politics in the political system and democratic backsliding. Its impact on democracy largely de pends on the attitudes of the leading political actors: will they see the identity conflict as an opportunity to promote polarisation for their own particular interests or will they em brace a moderate position? Its impact, namely, depends on the degree of agreement between the mainstream political actors over the‘content’ of national identity, i.e., it depends on the existence or non-existence of the generally accepted ‘social glue’ that is necessary for social cohesion. Regarding this, West European countries can learn from the example of a tiny country in the Western Balkans – Montenegro. 11 Fukuyama, F.(2018) Identity. 12 Sapolsky, R.(2019) This is your brain on nationalism: The biology of us and them, Foreign Affairs, March-April. 6

DEN JEWEILIGEN KAPITELNAMEN HIER EINSETZEN 4 THE MONTENEGRIN EXAMPLE The last decade of the twentieth century was marked by the bloody break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the stories of war, violations of democratic rules, authoritarian leaders, corruption, organised crime, and socio-economic depression dominated the research of many experts and scholars with respect to the territory of the former Yugosla via. However, by focusing on all these negative stories, a pos itive one was completely neglected. The story of Montene gro slipped past under the radar even though this small country has something to offer. Montenegro turned out to be the only Yugoslav successor state that did not see an armed conflict on its soil 13 even though members of all the groups who fought against each other in the rest of the for mer Yugoslavia can be found living in Montenegro: in the last population census of 2011, 45% identified themselves as Montenegrins, 28% as Serbs, 12% as Bosniaks/Muslims, 5% as Albanians, and 1% as Croats(see Figure 2). Figure 2 Ethnic Composition of Montenegro in the region along the path towards membership of the EU, so far opening all but one of the negotiating chapters. In other words, Montenegro, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country with no ethnic majority, but only a‘majority minori ty’, defies the widespread thesis that diverse countries are poorer and more conflict-ridden than homogenous ones. And all this in the war-torn Balkans! Thus the question arises, how was heterogeneous Montenegro able to firstly, main tain peace and stability in the region caught in the fire of the post-Yugoslav wars and, secondly, achieve considerable democratic and economic progress? This has been an achievement of the Montenegrin political elite and its definition of Montenegrin national identity. A great majority of Montenegrin political actors – both from the government and the opposition – advocated an integra tive national identity that is needed to create a cohesive na tional democratic community. National identity was thus shaped in a way that promoted inclusion and participation, and was based on two pillars. 15 Montenegrins Serbs Bosniaks/Muslims Albanians Croats Rest Furthermore, from one of the least developed parts of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro developed, according to World Bank data, to become the richest country in the West ern Balkans, with a GDP per capita 25% higher than Serbia’s, the second most developed country of the region. 14 This country also joined NATO in 2017 and is the most advanced 13 Montenegro was only briefly directly involved in the war when the units of the Yugoslav People’s Army from Montenegro attacked Du brovnik(October 1991- May 1992). On the Montenegrin territory there were, however, several incidents in which paramilitary units in timidated and expelled the Muslim population. 14 World Bank, GDP per capita, available at: https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ME-BA-AL-MK-RS 4.1. The First Pillar: Institutions of the System In the process of institutionalisation Montenegro avoided the regional pattern of ethnically defined states. It is the only Balkan state constitutionally defined as“civic”. For example, in December 1990, the new Croatian Constitution was adopted, defining Croatia as“the national state of the Croa tian people and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens”. Serbs, the largest national minority in Croatia, thus lost the status of a constitutive na tion. In March 1989, Serbia’s Parliament passed amendments to the Republic’s Constitution abolishing the political auton omy of its provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. This significantly degraded the political status of the Kosovo Albanians, the biggest ethnic minority in Serbia. In spite of the dominance of nationalist ideas throughout the region, being ethnic Montenegrin was not designed to be a superior form of national identity. The first Constitution of Montenegro, adopted on October 12, 1992, defined Monte 15 One must admit that the task was eased due to the fact that 95% of the population speak the same language which is only different in name. As Wimmer argues, common language is a key precondition for successful nation-building as it makes it easier to build political al liances across ethnic divides. 7

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example negro not as an ethnic state. The preamble of the Constitu tion referred to“citizens of Montenegro”. Moreover, ten arti cles of the 1992 Constitution defined“Special Rights of National and Ethnic Groups”, including: protection of identity (Article 67); the right to use their mother tongue and alpha bet as well as the right to education and information in their mother tongue(Article 68); the right to establish educational, cultural, and religious associations with the material assis tance of the state(Article 69); the right to a proportional rep resentation in public services, state authorities and in local self-government(Article 73); etc. The new Constitution of 2007 only confirmed the inclusive civic concept of the state. According to it, Montenegro is a civic state as the constitutive people are the citizens of Montenegro, and not a particular ethnic group. The preamble sets out the nations and minori ties in Montenegro – Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniaks, Albani ans, Muslims, Croats, and others – and also emphasises the values of multiculturalism, peace and tolerance. Furthermore, while the state language is defined as Montenegrin(Art. 13), Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian, and Albanian are all in official use. However, the civic state concept goes far beyond a mere mention in the Constitution. What was‘promised’ in the Constitution must also be implemented. A strong civic na tional identity should thus imply the existence of functional institutions and a broad and inclusive political participation. Accordingly, the state must have the capacity to provide or dinary citizens with public goods so that they see their own interests in the existence of state institutions. This is particu larly important in states, where citizens do not share the same ethnicity, religion and/or descent. The capacity to pro vide public goods, Andreas Wimmer argues, leads to suc cessful nation-building by encouraging citizens to develop loyalty and political support for the state. 16 Despite some serious shortcomings, foremost regarding the rule of law, Montenegrin institutions proved to have the ca pacity to provide public goods. Montenegro is the only coun try of the Western Balkans with very high human develop ment according to the UN Human Development Index of 2018. 17 Moreover, institutions’ performance was particularly visible within economic development. The Montenegrin GDP per capita grew from 1,627 US Dollars in 2000 to 7,784 US Dollars in 2017. 18 Furthermore, and perhaps most important to the forging of a national identity, people living in Monte negro receive benefits from institutions as Montenegrin citi zens, not as members of a particular ethnic community. In addition to the state’s capacity to provide public goods, Montenegro has been characterised by the political inclusion of its minorities(with the exception of the Roma population). The affirmative action principle concerning electoral rep 16 Wimmer, A.(2018) Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come To gether While Others Fall Apart. Princeton University Press. 17 UN Human Development Index, 2018, available at: http://hdr.undp. org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_up date.pdf 18 World Bank, GDP per capita, available at: https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ME resentation of minorities, the establishment of the Ministry for protection of the rights of minorities with the aim“to protect and preserve rights of persons belonging to national and ethnic groups”, and the participation of minorities in the Government even at times when their votes were not need ed for the constitution of the parliamentary majority are only some prominent examples of it. The latest examples show recent transformations into separate municipalities: Petnjica (an area within the town of Berane, predominately populat ed by Bosniaks/Muslims) and Tuzi(an area within the state capital Podgorica predominately populated by ethnic Albani ans). Such an inclusive power arrangement engendered among minorities a sense of shared political destiny that has led to their stronger identification with the country. It thus comes as no surprise that not a single, strong ethnic party was able to play a pivotal role in the party system and this clearly demonstrates that citizens prefer the civic concept of the state. However, sometimes, such as during economic and political crisis, institutions can underperform and their output can al so cause dissatisfaction within the population. A country, which national identity is built solely around its institutions and depends on their performance, could face difficulties. Therefore, national identity must also have a second pillar. 4.2. The Second Pillar: Creedal National Identity If the first pillar is the‘body’ of national identity, then the second is its‘soul’. The second pillar refers to the creedal part of national identity. The creedal pillar is essential because, as already emphasized, human beings have a fundamental need to belong to and be part of a collective identity. Yet in order to forge a strong national identity the creedal pillar must reflect the idea of an inclusive national community and cannot be based on exclusive criteria. It should be built around the civic values that bind the great majority of the citizens and provide a‘social glue’ that is necessary for the functioning of an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society. In the case of Montenegro, the values of antifascism, as a common denominator of all ethnicities in Montenegro, and values of pluralism in the form of the promotion of multiple and complementary identities provided the ground for the creedal identity. The inclusive values of antifascism were set as the backbone of Montenegrin civic identity whereby the possibility of the pluralism of identities was enabled. Accord ingly, besides being an ethnic category, being Montenegrin is also regarded as a civic category. Subsequently, one could be both Serb and Montenegrin, Bosniak and Montenegrin or Albanian and Montenegrin. By permitting multiple identities loyalty to the country is maximised and enhanced, which the latest Eurobarometer has confirmed. According to it, 90% of Montenegrin citizens feel attached to the country. 19 19 Eurobarometer 91, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontof fice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/ standard/surveyky/2253 8

DEN JEWEILIGEN KAPITELNAMEN HIER EINSETZEN The majority of Montenegrin politicians thus both acknowl edged the particular identities, cultures, and histories of dis tinct ethnicities living in Montenegro and pursued a unifying national creed. In fact, this approach has not just been fol lowed by the contemporary Montenegrin political elite alone. Montenegro has a long tradition of the promotion of multi culturalism, which dates back to the time of King Nikola’s reign around the end of the 19 th and beginning of the 20 th centuries. For example, when Montenegro became inde pendent in 1878, King Nikola visited newly acquired territo ries(the towns of Podgorica and Niksic) and urged the Mus lim population not to leave Montenegro, thereby promising them the same rights the Christians enjoyed, even calling them“new Montenegrins”. 20 This also continued later since the expulsion of Muslims of the kind seen in Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece after the Balkan wars(1912-1913) did not occur in Montenegro. Furthermore, the idea of unity of various eth nic/national, religious, and linguistic identities was also at the top of the political agenda of the Montenegrin Communist Party. cians must stop instrumentalising the national identity issue for their personal/party gains and also make additional ef forts to promote the pluralism of identities. This is vital since the civic and inclusive approach is the only one that can also accommodate the interests of the pro-Serbian population in Montenegro which voted against Montenegro’s independ ence in the 2006 referendum. This, of course, only applies to those individuals who are not‘seduced’ by ethnic Serbian nationalism. A decrease in the numbers of those who ques tion the existence of an independent Montenegrin state would alleviate the identity-based divisions in Montenegrin society, which would be very beneficial to democracy in gen eral. 4.3. Montenegro’s Key Challenges By building its national identity on these two pillars Monte negro has managed to maintain stability and achieve consid erable progress in very unfavorable conditions. However, in order to secure further democratic and economic develop ment, Montenegrin national identity must be consolidated. With respect to the first pillar, Montenegrin institutions must be strengthened so that they can provide more goods. This, above all, means additional efforts to establish the fully func tioning rule of law. As this year’s European Commission pro gress report on Montenegro emphasises, the country is still struggling in the fight against corruption, clientelism, and organised crime. 21 Montenegrin politicians must be aware that here the existence of the country is at stake. Not only because without strong institutions there can be no success ful civic national identity – and a country as ethnically heter ogeneous as Montenegro can only exist as a civic state – but also because the establishment of the fully functioning rule of law would most likely lead to EU membership of the coun try. Montenegro, embedded in the European project, would further mean a final victory for European/civic values and, thus, the consolidation of Montenegrin statehood. Regarding the second pillar, the policies of civic and multiple identities must constantly be defended, nurtured, and pro moted. A political we based on civic values is never a natural phenomenon, let alone in an environment such as the West ern Balkans, where ethnic nationalism projects are alive and, unfortunately, not a thing of the past(this includes Montene gro, too). Therefore, the unifying antifascist narrative must be further embedded in education, the media, and culture and the development of grassroots organisations to uphold the creedal identity must also be encouraged. Moreover, politi 20 Tuzovic, H.(2019) Knjaz Nikola je Becir-bega na Cetinju proglasio voj vodom, Pobjeda, 30.5.2019. 21 European Commission’s Montenegro 2019 progress report, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/fi les/20190529-montenegro-report.pdf 9

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THE CHALLENGES OF N D A E T N IO J N E A W L E I I D LI E G N E T N IT K Y A P P O IT L E IT L I N C A S M IN EN W H ES IE T R ER E N IN E S U ET R Z O E P N E Learning from the Montenegrin Example 5 CONCLUSION When the West shows significant interest in the Balkans, this usually means that there is a crisis in the region. In line with this logic, the current attention of Western leaders towards the region is due to the unresolved Kosovo issue and the in creased tensions that it is causing. The unofficial proposals of Serbia’s and Kosovo’s leadership regarding the landswap (based on ethnic criteria) between the two countries was again used by some as an argument that multi-ethnic de mocracy is not possible in the Balkans. Yet the example of Montenegro not only proves otherwise, but also demon strates that increasingly ethnically and religiously heteroge neous West European consolidated democracies could learn from it. Having in mind Montenegrin experience, it would be wrong to argue that there is a direct causality between the increased salience of identity politics within the political system and democratic backsliding. How this development will affect West European party systems – and democracies in general – largely depends on the attitudes of the leading political parties. In other words, there are three key lessons that West European political actors could learn from the Montenegrin example: Firstly, the political inclusion of minorities and their participa tion in the decision-making processes on various levels lead to their stronger identification with the country and maxim ise their loyalty. Therefore, besides the inclusive and broad political participation of minorities, an equal treatment of all citizens and the fight against institutional or structural dis crimination must be an indispensable part of national identi ty forging. The chances for the successful integration of new comers into West European societies will be much higher if they perceive that“we are all in the same boat” and have a shared political destiny. Secondly, Montenegro can serve as an example that also in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country it is possible to forge a successful national identity based on common values. Key values can be a strong societal linking bond and this stands in contrast to the claims of the populist radical right and some conservatives that national identity can only be built around common culture, traditions, customs and ethnicity. Thirdly, the Montenegrin example also demonstrates that by allowing the possibility of multiple identities society becomes stronger, and not weaker, as is claimed nowadays by many West European politicians. 10

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS REFERENCES 4 Fukuyama, F. (2019) Fukuyama Replies, Foreign Affairs, March-April. 5 Mounk, Y. (2018) The People Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It. Harvard University Press. 5 Milacic, F. and Vukovic, I. (2018) The Rise of the Politics of the National Identity: New Evidence from Western Europe, Ethnopolitics; Fukuyama, F. 6 (2018) Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar, Straus and Giroux Angenendt, S. (2017) Development-oriented migration policy. In: Integ 7 ration conference of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, March, Berlin. Kaufmann, E. (2018) Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities. Harry N. Abrams 8 Eurostat,“Plus de 5 millions de naissances dans l‘UE en 2017” , availa ble at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9648821/3-12 032019-AP-FR.pdf/99bbdb3d-bede-467c-bce0-6e033b488946 9 Coleman, D. (2012) The changing face of Europe, in J. Goldstone, E. Kaufmann and M. Duffy Toft(eds), Political Demography: How Popula tion Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics, Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Hobsbawm, E. (1996) Identity Politics and the Left, available at: http:// banmarchive.org.uk/articles/1996%20annual%20lecture.htm Ignatieff, M. (2013) Enemies vs. Adversaries. available at: https://www. nytimes.com/2013/10/17/opinion/enemies-vs-adversaries.html Levitsky, S. and Ziblatt, D. (2018) How Democracies Die. Crown: New York. Fukuyama, F. (2018) Identity. Sapolsky, R. (2019) This is your brain on nationalism: The biology of us and them, Foreign Affairs, March-April. Montenegro was only briefly directly involved in the war when the units of the Yugoslav People‘s Army from Montenegro attacked Dubrovnik (October 1991- May 1992). On the Montenegrin territory there were, however, several incidents in which paramilitary units intimidated and expelled the Muslim population. World Bank, GDP per capita , available at: https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ME-BA-AL-MK-RS Wimmer, A. (2018) Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come To gether While Others Fall Apart. Princeton University Press. UN Human Development Index , 2018, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf World Bank, GDP per capita, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ME Eurobarometer 91, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/standard/ surveyky/2253 Tuzovic, H. (2019) Knjaz Nikola je Becir-bega na Cetinju proglasio vojvo dom, Pobjeda, 30.5.2019. European Commission’s Montenegro 2019 progress report , availa ble at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/fi les/20190529-montenegro-report.pdf

IMPRINT ABOUT THE AUTHOR IMPRINT Dr. Filip Milacic obtained his PhD at the Humboldt University under the supervision of Professor Wolfgang Merkel. Before joining the OSCE he worked as a lecturer and researcher at the University of Montenegro and the University of Rijeka. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung| Office in Belgrade Dositejeva 51| 11000 Belgrade| Serbia Responsible: Dr. Max Brändle| Director, Regional Office for Serbia and Montenegro Phone+381 11 3283 285 www.fes-serbia.org To order publications: info@fes-serbia.org Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-EbertStiftung(FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Die in dieser Publikation zum Ausdruck gebrachten Ansichten sind nicht notwendigerweise die der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Diese Publikation The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not wird auf Papier aus nachhaltiger Forstwirtschaft gedruckt. reflect the opinions of the OSCE. The OSCE is not responsible for the content nor any inaccuracies, misinterpretations or fabrications that may be contained in this paper.

THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE Learning from the Montenegrin Example Intensified immigration and demo graphic factors have led to an increased ethnic and religious heterogeneity of West European societies and pushed the national identity issue to the fore front of political debate, thereby caus ing a conflict over criteria for member ship in the nation. The rise of national identity politics has the potential to seriously jeopardize Western liberal democracies since iden tity conflicts are usually followed by in tense partisan polarisation and could be misused to undermine constitution al order and subvert democratic institu tions. There are three key lessons that West European political actors could learn from Montenegrin example: the politi cal inclusion of minorities leads to their stronger identification with a country and maximises their loyalty; a successful forging of national identity based on common values is also possible in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious coun try; by allowing the possibility of multi ple identities, society becomes stronger. More information about this subject: www.fes-serbia.org