PERSPECTIVE PEACE AND SECURITY A COOPERATION OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY The African Union and Regional Economic Communities Amandine Gnanguênon August 2019 Africa’s collective security system was born of the gap between continental ambi­ tions and regional realities. Cooperation between the African Union(AU) and the Regional Economic Commu­ nities(RECs) is of a variable geometry. With the African Peace and Security Architecture(APSA) beset by persistent political and operational challenges, AU member states seek the proper scope of action to counter a variety of threats – knowing that ad hoc coali­ tions weaken the AU-RECs ­relationship.

PEACE AND SECURITY A COOPERATION OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY The African Union and Regional Economic Communities

Contents Collective Security in Africa: From Continental Ambition to Regional Realities 2 AU and RECs: Cooperation and 3 Filling the Operational Gap with Ad Hoc 4 Find the Proper Scope of Action for Changing Geographic 5 List of 7 1

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – A COOPERATION OF VARIABLE GEOGRAPHY COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN AFRICA: FROM CONTINENTAL AMBITION TO REGIONAL REALITIES In 2002, the African Union(AU) set out to update and con­ solidate a collective security system based in the OAU’s con­ tinental ambition that had evolved to suit regional dynam­ ics. The four phases of the OAU(later the AU) and the RECs cooperation continue to define their relationship concerning security. Well before African countries gained independence, coop­ eration and regional integration were seen as indispensable for their development. Many economic groupings existed in 1963, when the OAU was founded. A report by experts counted more than 200 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in Africa. 1 In 1976, the OAU laid the groundwork for pan-African and regional organisations to cooperate by di­ viding the continent into five regions. This institutional divi­ sion established a system of regional rotation for designat­ ing which African states sit on the United Nations Security Council. It also serves as a reference for selecting the 15 members of the Peace and Security Council(PSC) and the five members of the Panel of the Wise – two APSA compo­ nents with representatives from each region. The Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos(1980) started a ration­ alisation process aimed at limiting institutional overlap, re­ source dispersion and quarrels over legitimacy amongst re­ gional institutions. To stimulate continental unity, African leaders signed the Abuja Treaty(1991) establishing the Afri­ can Economic Community(AEC), inspired by the European model. Africa’s regional integration is based on the coordi­ nation, harmonisation and progressive integration of the RECs. Created as cornerstones of the AEC, to begin with there were 14 independent regional and subregional organ­ isations, each governed by specific laws. In 2006, their num­ ber was limited to eight. 2 Since most African countries belong to several organisa­ tions, the process of economically integrating each geo­ graphic area rests on two or more groupings: For example, the West African Economic and Monetary Union(known by its French acronym, UEMOA) and the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), and the Economic Com­ munity of Central African States(ECCAS) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa(CEMAC). The OAU was not able to streamline the organisation – as planned in the 1980s – by coordinating and harmonising ac­ tivities so that just one REC is associated with each region. In 2006, the United Nations Economic Commission for Afri­ 1 Meeting of experts on the rationalization of the regional economic communities(RECs), Ouagadougou(Burkina Faso), 27–31 March 2006, Consultative Meeting of Accra and Lusaka: Consolidated Report. 2 They include: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the East African Community(EAC); the Southern African De­ velopment Community(SADC); the Economic Community of Cen­ tral African States(ECCAS); the Economic Community of West Af­ rican States(ECOWAS); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and the Arab Maghreb Union(UMA). ca(UNECA) confirmed extensive overlap: Of 53 African countries, only seven belonged to one REC, 27 belonged to two RECs and 18 others to three. This overlap, which makes the organisations competitors, is exacerbated when their se­ curity mandates are expanded. The conflicts in Liberia(1989), Somalia(1990) and Rwanda (1993) tested the African states. Intensified fighting and the risk of spill over effects to neighbouring states stimulated RECs(ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community, SADC) to compensate for the OAU’s failure. The OAU declared the ›Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution‹ in 1993 but its efficiency is limited by political and operational constraints. Although the OAU had empowered RECs to act on their own, adding security development nexus to the agenda made the divi­ sion of tasks more confused. This practice of forum shopping illustrates a notion of re­ gional integration based on cost-benefit analysis in which states seek to preserve certain political alliances and capital­ ise on the advantages of belonging to many groups. For ex­ ample, in 2002, CEMAC’s Multinational Force of Central Af­ rica(which is known by its French acronym, FOMAC) was created largely because its French-speaking dimension and that France would support its roll-out. In 2003, ECCAS cre­ ated a political organ, the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa(COPAX), which gives it competence in secu­ rity matters. But it wasn’t until 2008 that the ECCAS Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) replaced FOMAC. Each region has its fair share of competition. However, it’s interesting to note the rap­ prochement of the SADC, the East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a tripartite treaty(2008). Overlapping memberships are often linked to a country’s geographic or strategic position. Thus Angola, which en­ sures the security of Central Africa and is a southern African economic partner, is positioning itself as a pivotal state. 3 The Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa’s second largest country, which is located at the crossroads of many regions, belongs to four RECs. Ad hoc coalitions have stimulated the practice of having multiple affiliations. Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali prefer to cooperate militarily with the G5 Sahel – although they belong to ECOWAS. Some organisations, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission(LCBC) whose members were attacked by Boko Haram, gained enough political traction to serve as frameworks for military opera­ tions in spite of their weak capacities and general lethargy. Far from being considered ›empty shells‹, regional group­ ings are tools that states can activate at a particular mo­ ment. However, resorting to ad hoc coalitions negatively af­ fects AU-RECs relations. 3 This term designates states with key geographic and/or demographic positions and strategic economic, military and cultural assets. They are called pivots because they are caught between overlapping spheres of power and influence, and covet such advantages. 2

AU and RECs: Cooperation and competition Figure 1 The continent divided into five regions by the OAU NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Madeira(PT) Canary Islands (ES) Western Sahara (undetermined status) MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA MEDITERRANEAN SEA LIBYA EQYPT SEA RED CAPE VERDE MAURITANIA SENEGAL GAMBIA GUINEA-BISSAU GUINEA MALI BURKINA FASO NIGER CHAD SUDAN ERITREA DJIBOUTI ARABIAN SEA SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA IVORY COAST GHANA NIGERIA TOGO BENIN CAMEROON CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA SOM ALIA Ascension Island (UK) SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE EQUATORIAL GUINEA SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Saint Helena (UK) GABON REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO UGANDA RWANDA BURUNDI KENYA TANZANIA ANGOLA NAMIBIA ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE MALAWI IQUE MB OZA M BOTSWANA Mo zam bique Channe l MADAGA SCAR INDIAN OCEAN COMOROS ISLANDS Mayotte (FR) SEYCHELLES MAURITIUS Réunion (FR) Morocco left the OAU in 1984 and has belonged to the AU since 2017. In 1976, Mauritania belonged to the West African region but has been part of the North African region since 2004. South Sudan joined the AU in 2011. © GNANGUENON| Eric Gaba(CC BY-SA 3.0) ESWATINI LESOTHO SOUTH AFRICA AU AND RECS: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION In its capacity as a system of collective security, APSA con­ sists of the: Although the AU co-opts the OAU’s achievements and ob­ jectives regarding security, it aims to become a major player in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa. A­ PSA’s creation was the occasion to put in place ›clear blueprint and neatly assembled structures, norms, capacities, and procedures‹ 4 . Far beyond creating new mechanisms, one AU challenge is to successfully transpose a two-tiered model for regional integration – that did not function economically – into the security field. Given the role that some RECs played in conflict management in the 1990s(ECOWAS and SADC), the AU accords them key roles in implementing APSA. –– Peace and Security Council(PSC), a political body mod­ elled on the United Nations Security Council, which meets at least once a month; –– African Standby Force(ASF), which has five pre-posi­ tioned regional forces; –– Continental Early Warning System(CEWS) for collecting and analysing data; –– Panel of the Wise(PoW), who have a preventive and mediatory role; –– Military Staff Committee, which advises the PSC on mil­ itary issues; and the –– Peace Fund. 4 Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-general of the OAU(1989– 2001), ›The Architecture for Peace and Security in Africa‹ speech at The Third African Development Forum in Addis Ababa(Ethiopia), ­ 3–8 March 2002. Since 2002, considerable progress has been made regarding APSA’s operationalisation(recruiting staff, purchasing equip­ ment, and reforming administrative and financial procedures). 3

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – A COOPERATION OF VARIABLE GEOGRAPHY However, the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 is a reminder that the lack of coordination between the AU and RECs continues to be one of the main hindrances to effectively preventing and managing conflicts. Before reviewing the main challenges, some advances in strengthening the AU-RECs relationship deserve mention. Liaison offices have been opened in the RECs and liaison of­ ficers from six RECs are present at AU headquarters to pro­ mote regular exchanges and share information; the results are encouraging. Following President Paul Kagame’s report (2018), the first mid-year coordination meeting of the AU and the RECs was held in July 2019. Three factors account for why the AU-RECs relationship oscillates between coop­ eration and competition: the lack of an agreed definition of the cooperative framework, regional mechanisms identical to those of APSA and rivalries exacerbated by simultaneous military arrangements. First and foremost, the nature of the AU(OAU)-RECs rela­ tionship is all the more difficult to define because it is gov­ erned by numerous texts: The Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos(1980); the Abuja Treaty(1994); the Proto­ col Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council(2003); the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs(signed in 1998 and updated in 2007); the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordi­ nating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of East­ ern and Northern Africa(2008) Yet none of them presents definitions for subsidiarity 5 , comparative advantage 6 and re­ gional and continental complementarity – principles that are interpreted differently by the parties. Simply affirming stand­ ards does not generate a coherent common approach. To be sure, AU member states have adopted a Common African Defence and Security Policy(CADSP). Nevertheless, their pri­ orities and considerations are still dictated by national politi­ cal strategies. As for the RECs, after being given the means, they prioritise developing instruments and policies to reach their own goals without seeking to coordinate with the AU. Coordination faces a third difficulty: competition between the security apparatuses. Each REC is responsible for creat­ ing its regional component of the ASF. Since 2003, despite the partners mobilisation(staff, logistics and finance), this has not been sufficient to compensate for operational defi­ ciencies. In 2013, the ECOWAS Standby Force(ESF) could not be deployed to Mali in a timely manner – although it had been certified in 2010. In order to conceal its difficulties managing the crisis, the AU suggested an interim mecha­ nism – the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Cri­ ses(ACIRC) until the rapid deployment capability(RDC) of the ASF would become fully operational in 2015. Tailored to AU needs, ACIRC excludes the RECs from the political deci­ sion-making process that is needed to deploy the ASF. The ACIRC project also points up the rivalries between the RECs, who claim their historical legitimacy, and the AU, which as­ serts its primacy in conflict management. With the ESF ruled out and the ACIRC lacking any practical application, the G5 Sahel member states decided to launch their own joint force in. However, its attempts to respond to the Sahel crisis face the same operational obstacles regarding deployment and severe political constraints. APSA was a new type of structure in Africa that fell victim to its notoriety. Unreasonable hopes caused it to be targeted for unequalled amounts of support by numerous technical and financial partners(TFP). Amongst its main backers was the European Union(EU), which has provided nearly EUR 2.7 billion since the African Peace Facility(APF) was created in 2004. The gap between the objectives and the means to achieve them has only been partly filled by a succession of capacity-building programmes. APSA’s multitude of actors have made it a framework for cooperation that is too com­ plex to adapt in real time to the challenges to human secu­ rity that require considering multiple factors of insecurity (political, economic, social, environmental, health, etc). The conflagration in the Sahel and its regional and international repercussions, such as migration and violent extremism, are devastating for the African states and their partners who have long been committed to getting APSA off the ground. Cooperation between the AU and the RECs meets with an­ other obstacle that is linked to the way the political, military and diplomatic structures imitate each other institutionally: Each REC has a political organ that is identical to the AU’s Peace and Security Council(PSC). For example, the SADC has an Organ on Politics Defence and Security that is man­ aged on a Troika basis, while ECOWAS has its Mediation and Security Council and ECCAS its Council for Peace and Secu­ rity in Central Africa. The military sector and mediation also have regional mechanisms identical to the AU’s MSC and PoW. Cooperation is at best sporadic; more often, compe­ tencies and activities overlap. 5 The principle of subsidiarity means that a superior decision-making authority is favoured if the level below cannot do it more efficiently. 6 Comparative advantage assumes that if many organisations are in­ volved, their strengths and weaknesses must be compared in order to identify which of them can most efficiently and competently prevent and resolve a conflict. FILLING THE OPERATIONAL GAP WITH AD HOC COOPERATION In the end, the choice of whether to put the AU, a regional organisation or an ad hoc coalition on the front line appears to result less from the lack of a clear strategy than from the opportunism of certain states who want to exert influence at the regional and/or continental level. These political strat­ egies, along with institutional constraints, are detrimental to establishing a coherent cooperative framework for the AU and the RECs. Ad hoc cooperation frameworks are used to compensate for the lack of the logistic, human and financial capacities needed to manage conflicts in Africa, but ulti­ mately their complexity undermines their effectiveness. In view of the lessons of the operations in Mali and the Cen­ tral African Republic, practice finally superseded theory. The interventionist model with the deployment of one REC, that 4

FIND THE PROPER SCOPE OF ACTION FOR CHANGING GEOGRAPHIC THREATS was first replaced by the AU and then the UN force to take over, seems to illustrate the principle of comparative advan­ tage. Alternating between partnership and competition, the political players’ lack of coordination made managing some conflicts more complicated. This was the case for the ECOW­ AS and AU relationship in Ivory Coast and Mali, as well as that of ECCAS and the AU in Central Africa, SADC and the AU in Madagascar, and IGAD and the AU in Sudan. Bur­ dened by bureaucratic and political ponderousness – for which they are partly to blame – states decided to defend their national interests by(re)using less restrictive frame­ works. In 2015, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin and Chad created a Multinational Joint Task Force(MNJTF) to fight Boko Haram. Although it was the AU that authorised the in­ itiative, the force is supported by the Lake Chad Basin Com­ mission, which finally overcame its lethargy. Other struc­ tures are created ex nihilo, like the G5 Sahel, which has come to represent. Starting as a simple group of states aiming to coordinate their development and security policies, between February 2014 and December 2015, the G5 Sahel was legally estab­ lished as an international organisation whose member coun­ tries – Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad – pledge their readiness to deploy troops to jointly fight inse­ curity at their borders. They agreed to pool their real and mutual advantages to confront transregional threats. The decision to create a new ad hoc coalition expresses their wish to stand out in the already crowded landscape of Sahel institutions(ECOWAS, Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region – CEMOC, the Nouakchott Process, etc). The hype about the G5 Sahel is reminiscent of the early excite­ ment about APSA. Although the G5 Sahel is considered to be the most appropriate framework for responding to secu­ rity challenges, the decision of its institutionalisation raises questions. The capacity development of its permanent secretariat re­ assures technical and financial partners but could cause the G5 Sahel to lose its flexibility and rapid decision-mak­ ing –advantages that set it apart from other well-estab­ lished institutions like ECOWAS and the AU. Its survival chances in the security jungle depend as much on external support and the»personal equation« in between its mem­ ber states. The history of the AU, like that of the RECs, shows that institutionalisation is no guarantee for longterm effectiveness. Instead it accentuates centralised deci­ sion-making mechanisms, bureaucratic heaviness and de­ pendence on international funders. Following the princi­ ple, ›He who pays the piper calls the tune‹, it also does not prevent member states that contribute the most financially from seeking to influence decision-making. tions, groups or individuals neutralised, contingents formed, money spent etc). Even if the cost in human lives remains high, needs for funds, training, equipment and the like are shared, covered by complicated financial arrange­ ments and/or borne by international partners, as in the case of the African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM), created in 2007. Ad hoc coalitions, like the operations car­ ried out in the APSA framework, are all similar: African states and their partners tinker with institutions in order to find the ›proper scope‹ for responding to conflicts that have no geographic limits. FIND THE PROPER SCOPE OF ACTION FOR VARIABLE GEOGRAPHY THREATS Criminality, jihadism and piracy all challenge the OAU’s re­ gional division of Africa. In reaction, many variations have been considered in the framework of APSA, or outside it. Firstly, UN missions took over AU operations after interven­ tions by RECs in Mali and Central African Republic. ECOW­ AS and ECCAS also stepped up their interregional collabora­ tion to combat maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Fi­ nally, ad hoc frameworks for action that are considered more flexible were revived(LCBC and the International Con­ ference on the Great Lakes Region) or created from scratch (G5 Sahel). Although cooperation frameworks differ, all these initiatives have one thing in common: They are seek­ ing a compromise between a national response, which is in­ effective if confined within a state’s borders, and regional or continental solutions, which still lack the collaborative spirit needed. It is always difficult for institutions to make an organisation’s geographic perimeter coincide with that of the threat. As the multitude of strategies for the Sahel shows, the defini­ tion of the contours changes with the actors. ECOWAS has been ›disqualified‹ from participating because Chad and Mauritania are not members. What should be done if the ji­ hadi threat spreads to the African coast – make the G5 Sa­ hel bigger? Create a new ad hoc coalition of Sahel G5 coun­ tries and coastal countries? Create a cooperative forum for the G5 Sahel and another organisation like the Conseil de l’Entente? However the question is posed, the discussion seems more than ever to be about coordinating regional in­ itiatives. That is why building ad hoc coalitions puts consid­ eration about strengthening relations between the AU and the regional associations back on the agenda. Some recom­ mendations can be formulated about how the cooperation might evolve with regard to the nature of the security land­ scape. Strengthening the capacity of African states at the nation­ al, regional and continental levels has created a surplus of staff(recruiting and financing positions by technical and fi­ nancial partners), logistics(purchasing equipment), policy (seeking visibility) and funding. The creation of coalitions shows that priority is given to military operations whose profitability is easier to calculate(the number of military ac­ DEVELOP ROADMAPS FOR THE AU AND EACH OF THE 8 RECS Most of the texts that refer to the cooperation between the AU and the regional organisations use the term ›RECs‹ ge­ nerically although they do not constitute a homogeneous group. Regional groupings, including RECs, develop in dif­ 5

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – A COOPERATION OF VARIABLE GEOGRAPHY ferent policy, economic and social environments that affect their relationships with the AU. In consideration of this vari­ ety, the AU could draw up a roadmap for each of the eight RECs and the Protocol of 2008 updated in line with the commonalities that come to light in the eight documents. This approach could then be applied to regional mecha­ nisms that are likely to cooperate with APSA. That would permit ad hoc coalitions to be part of this category, as men­ tioned in the Protocol of 2008, and trigger thoughts about how to plan long-term work in keeping with APSA. Each roadmap would serve as a framework for REC representa­ tives to the AU and the AU in the regions: defining the ac­ tivities, objectives and priorities for cooperation. Annual joint AU-REC summits would provide the opportunity to evaluate the results every year at the political level. ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE END OF REC STATUS AFTER 2028 Behind the issue of AU-RECs cooperation lurks a question that no state wants to address so as to not disturb the sta­ tus quo: With more than 200 African IGOs, why do eight re­ gional groupings have special status? The RECs were creat­ ed to serve as pillars for establishing the AEC in 2028. It is high time for African states to think about what will become of them after that date. MAKE THE APSA A FRAMEWORK FOR CONSULTATION To avoid further weakening the AU-RECs relationship, Afri­ can states must coherently articulate how their ad hoc coa­ litions relate to APSA because using such coalitions instead of RECs turns the states into competitors. With states’ dif­ ferent interests sometimes winning out, it is hard to estab­ lish a climate of trust for discussing a collaborative frame­ work: Their levels of engagement reflect regional power balances. In turn, the lack of cooperation causes states to disengage from the RECs and the AU in favour of non-bind­ ing frameworks for action. APSA is well suited to be a plat­ form for networking the various regional initiatives. The AU has real added value in its numerous tools and standards that African states can put to good use, while the AU’s spe­ cial relationship with the UN makes it indispensable for de­ ploying peace-support operations(PSOs). Finally, it is neces­ sary to reflect on practical ways to coordinate with technical and financial partners. African states could propose a ›coor­ dination hub‹ like the one the EU proposed in its policy for Sahel regionalisation in order to have a forum for verifying that partner offers respond to African needs, and that they propose solutions – and avoid duplication. THE IMPOSSIBLE(CON)QUEST OF THE PROPER SCOPE OF ACTION There is no internationally accepted definition for the Sahel or any other region of Africa. Nevertheless, colonising coun­ tries, African heads of state, and regional and international organisations have tried to define its contours. Each actor perceives the boundaries of the regional space differently according to their needs, interests and perceptions. At first, resorting to ad hoc coalitions may appear to be the best way to respond to security challenges. However, this solution is illusory because it is tied to the agenda of states and their partners who focus on over-militarization of instruments used to manage conflicts. This option obscures the reality that some border-states are fuelling local violence. Technical and financial partners should pressure African states to in­ vest in conflict prevention – in accordance with their original commitments. This involves closing the persistent gap be­ tween information gathering and rapid response, and in­ cluding local communities in the mechanisms. Civil society could help the AU and the RECs draft scenarios to pre-empt regional threats that go beyond traditional state-centred an­ alytical models. 6

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACIRC AMISOM APSA ASF AU CADSP CEMAC CEN-SAD COMESA COPAX EAC ECCAS ECOWAS ESF FOMAC IGAD IGO LCBC MICOPAX MNJTF MSC OAU PSC REC SACU SADC TFP UEMOA UMA African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises African Union Mission in Somalia African Peace and Security Architecture African Standby Force African Union Common African Defence and Security Policy Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa Community of Sahel-Saharan States Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa East African Community Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Standby Force Multinational Force of Central Africa Intergovernmental Authority on Development Intergovernmental organisation Lake Chad Basin Commission Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic Multinational Joint Task Force Military Staff Committee Organisation of African Unity Peace and Security Council Regional Economic Community Southern African Customs Union Southern African Development Community Technical and Financial Partners West African Economic and Monetary Union Arab Maghreb Union LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 7

imprint ABOUT THE AUTHOR IMPRINT Amandine Gnanguênon obtained her doctorate in politi­ cal science from the University of Auvergne, and conducts research for the Centre Michel de l’Hospital(Clermont Fer­ rand I). She teaches ›Strategic Cultures: The African case‹ at National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations (INALCO) and regularly lectures at the NATO Defense Col­ lege. In 2017, she contributed to edit the first handbook on conflict analysis for the United Nations Office for West Afri­ ca and the Sahel(UNOWAS). From 2012 to 2017, she direct­ ed the ›Guerre&Po‹ project on political reconstruction in war zones(www.guerre-et-po.fr). Hosted by the African Worlds Institute(IMAF) of the School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences(EHESS), the project was selected for the 2012 Paris Émergence(s) programme, which supports new fields of research. Amandine Gnanguênon headed the Re­ gional Security Mission(West Africa) at the French Embassy in Dakar(2015), was a senior researcher at the Dakar office of the Institute for Security Studies(ISS) in 2014 and headed the Africa programme at the Institute of Strategic Research de l’École Militaire(IRSEM) in Paris from 2010 to 2013. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung| Africa Department Hiroshimastr. 17| 10785 Berlin| Germany Responsible: Dr Manfred Öhm, Head of the Africa Department Tel.:+49-30-269-35-7446| Fax:+49-30-269-35-9217 http://www.fes.de/afrika To order publications: Caroline.Lemmer@fes.de Commercial use of all media published by the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung(FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works. This publication is printed on paper from sustainable forestry. ISBN 978-3-96250-383-3

A COOPERATION OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY The African Union and Regional Economic Communities At its creation in 2002, the African Union (AU) set itself the task of updating and consolidating the political and economic project begun by the Organisation of Af­ rican Unity(OAU). The African Peace and Security Architecture, better known by its acronym ›APSA‹, presented the opportu­ nity to organise the normative instru­ ments adopted between 1963 and 2001. The AU does not follow the OAU’s policy of investing in prevention, however: It prefers costly peacekeeping operations. The AU’s main challenge is not to create new mechanisms but rather to introduce a type of two-tiered regional integration – that had not worked economically – in­ to the security sector. In the 1990s, the Regional Economic Communities(RECs), which were intended as the pillars of re­ gional economic integration, became in­ dispensable in managing conflicts. With the AU and the RECs oscillate between partnering and competing, their lack of coordination has made it harder to pre­ vent and manage some conflicts. APSA was supposed to redefine their relation­ ship but has instead become a system of collective security that goes all out build­ ing human, logistical and financial capac­ ities. So states concerned about protect­ ing their interests prefer to work in ad hoc coalitions. A national response is ineffective if con­ fined within a state’s borders on one hand, while international partners sup­ port institutional ›deals‹ on the other. At­ tention must therefore be given to the challenges specific to the AU-RECs rela­ tionship and the ›proper‹ scope of action for responding to changing threats. Further information on the topic can be found here: https://www.fes.de/en/africa-department