Vera Messing – Bence Ságvári Still divided but more open Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis

The European Social Survey(ESS) The European Social Survey(ESS) is an academically driven, cross-national survey that has been conducted across Europe since its establishment in 2001. Every two years, face-to-face interviews are conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional samples. The survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations. The main aims of the ESS are: • to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe, and to interpret how Europe’s social, political and moral fabric is changing; • to achieve and spread higher standards of rigour in cross-national research in the social sciences, including for example, questionnaire design and pre-testing, sampling, data col lection, reduction of bias and the reliability of questions; • to introduce soundly-based indicators of national progress, based on citizens’ percep tions and judgements of key aspects of their societies; • to undertake and facilitate the training of European social researchers in comparative quantitative measurement and analysis; • to improve the visibility and outreach of data on social change among academics, policy makers and the wider public. The ESS data is available free of charge for non-commercial use. In 2005 the ESS was the winner of the Descartes Prize for Research& Science Communication. Following an application to the European Commission which was submitted by the UK on be half of 14 other countries, the ESS was awarded European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) status on 30th November 2013.

3 SU S M u M m A m R a Y ry O o F f f F in IN d D in I g N s GS ▪ Based on data from the European Social Survey(ESS) the analysis explores cross-national differences in perceptions of migration , and discovers factors that may lie behind the immense differences in the acceptance versus rejection of migrants across European countries. ▪ The results show how attitudes have changed from before to after the 2015 migration‘crisis’ , and also draw a wider picture of attitude shifts in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2016/17 . ▪ Overall, the perception of migration in European countries remains neutral and stable – respondents see as many advantages as disadvantages of worldwide mobility. In terms of behaviour, roughly one tenth of surveyed Europeans would unconditionally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and settling in their countries. • Considering the immediate differences in attitudes before and after 2015 migration crisis, the overall level of unconditional rejection has decreased from 15% to 10%. People in the UK, Ireland and Portugal have become significantly more positive about migrants, while only Hungarians and Estonians became significantly more negative . Attitudes in other countries did not change in a significant manner. • In contrast to long-term democracies, in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania negative attitudes are more likely to be turned into negative behavioural or policy expectations. It is suspected that the strength of norms as set by political and public discourse plays a decisive role in determining the degree to which negative attitudes are turned into explicit rejection and exclusion. • The conclusion of our previous study“ widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant attitudes in some countries have little to do with migrants” has been further supported by the present analysis. Anti-migrant attitudes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries where migrants are hardly present, where people d on’t have personal experiences with immigrants but where they lack the feeling of safety and control . • Looking into which values are associated with certain attitudes , two types of values show the strongest correlation: security and humanitarianism . Those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards immigration, while those who value equality and respect of other people are least fearful of migrants. • In most countries (with four exceptions) humanitarian values are more dominant than security. Especially in the Nordic countries(Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are – in general – valued more highly than security. • Looking at how support for certain political parties is associated with attitudes towards migrants, left-wing voters generally tend to have a positive attitude towards migration, centrist voters are broadly neutral, while right-wings voters generally have a negative attitude. However, while those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel, political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes.

4 • Right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general. They seem to provide a terrain on which to openly express the rage fuelled by uncertainty, and to blame migrants . In almost all countries one or two such parties exist, the difference lies rather in how powerful they are. • When looking at the profile of those expressing homogeneously negative attitudes towards migrants we see that it is not the basic demographic profile that makes them unique from the rest of the population but rather their subjective perceptions. Those who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are more likely to have homogeneously anti- migrant attitudes compared to the rest of the population. • The analysis of attitudes towards migration by supporters of right-wing populist parties demonstrates that although their perceptions of the consequences of migration are quite similar(very negative) across countries, the rejection of migrants is very different. These data show the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream politics, matter in terms of transforming aversion into extreme rejection of migrants . Hence, the political power such parties wield – whether in government or in opposition – plays a critical role in determining the degree to which anti-migrant narratives are allowed to become the norm within a society.

5 T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s 1 In I t n ro tr d o u d c u ti c o ti n o . n .. .................. .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 6 2 Co C n o c n e c p e t p u t a u l a a l n a d n t d h t e h o e r o e r ti e c t a ic l a fr l a f m ra e m w e o w rk or . k ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 8 2 2 .1 .1 Co C n o st n r s u t c ru ti c o t n io o n f o a f tt a it t u ti d tu es de .. s ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 8 2 2 .2 .2 Ho H w o d w o d w o e w m e e m as e u a r s e ur a e tti a t t u t d it e u s d t e o s w T a o r w d a s r m ds ig m ra i t g i r o a n ti a o n n d a m nd ig m ra i n g t r s a ? n . t .. s . ? .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 9 2 2 .3 .3 Wh W o h a o re ar t e he th ‘m e‘ i m gr i a g n r t a s n ’ t i s n ’ o in ur ou st r u s d t y u ? d . y .. ? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 10 2 2 .4 .4 Fac F t a o c r t s or li s ke li l k y e t l o y t in o fl i u n e fl n u c e e nc a e tti a t t u t d it e u s d . e .. s ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 11 3 Re R s e u s lt u s lt .. s .. ....................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 14 3 3 .1 .1 Sn S a n p a sh p o sh t o o t n o a n tt a it t u ti d t e u s d . e T s h . e Th rela re ti l o a n ti s o h n ip sh b ip et b w e e tw en ee p n er p c er p c t e io p n tio and a r n e d je r c e t j i e o c n ti . o .. n .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 14 3 3 .2 .2 Att A itu ti d tu e d s e b s ef b o e r f e or a e nd an a d fte af r t t e h r e th 2 e 01 2 5 01 m 5 a m ss a in ss fl i o n w flo o w f r o e f u re ge fu e g s e . e .. s .. .. .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 16 Chan C g h e a i n n g t e h i e n r t e h j e c r t e io je n ct o io f n m o ig f r m an ig t r s a .. n .. t . s ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 16 Chan C g h e a i n n g p e e i r n c p ep er t c io e n pt o io f n m o ig f r m at i i g o r n a . t . i . o .. n ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 17 Who W se h a o t s t e itu a d tt e it s u h d a e v s e h c a h v a e n c g h e a d n ? ge D d r ? iv D ers iv o e f rs at o t f it a u t d ti e tu c d h e an ch ge an .. g .. e ....... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 18 3 3 .3 .3 Bir B d i s r ’ d e s’ ye y v e ie v w ie : w an : al n y a si l s ys o is f t o h f e th c e ha c n h g a e n s g a e t s ti a tu tt d it e u s d a e c s ro a s c s ro ti s m s t e im ... e ............................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 21 3 3 .4 .4 Th T e h r e ol r e o o le f o re f g r i e o g n io s n .. s ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 26 3 3 .5 .5 Pe P rs e o r n so a n l v a a l l v u a e lu s e th s a t t h f a e t e f d ee p d ro p r a o n d an a d nt a in m ti i g m ra ig n r t a a n t t ti a tu tt d it e u s d .. e .. s . ..... ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 28 3 3 .6 .6 An A ti n -m tii m gr i a g n ra t n a t t a it t u ti d t e u s de a s nd an p d ol p it o ic li a ti l c p a o l pu o l p is u m li : sm wh : w ich i i c s h th is e t c h h e ic C k h e i n ck a e n n d a w n h d ic w h h t i h ch e t e h g e g? eg ... g .. ? .. ... 32 Extre E m xt e re n m eg e a n ti e v g e a a ti t v t e itu a d tt e it s u o d n es m o i n gr m at i i g o r n at . i . o .. n ... . . . . . . . .......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 35 4 . Su S m umm ar a y r a y n a d n c d o c n o c n lu c d lu in d g in r g em re a m rk a s rk .. s ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 37 5 4 Re R f ef r er n e c n e c s e . s .. ............... ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... 40 6 5. Ap A p p e p n e d n ix di . x .. ................. .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... 42 Per P c e e r p ce ti p o t n io a n n a d n R d e R je e c je ti c o t n io i n d in e d x ex s e b s y b p y a p r a ty rt p y r p e r fer fer n e c n e c s e i s n i s n e s lec le t c e t d ed co c u o n u t n r t ie ri s e . s ... .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 42 Re R su e l s t u s l o ts f o th f e th lo e g lo is g t i i s c ti r c eg re re g s re si s o s n io e n x e p x la p i l n a i i n n g in e g x e t x re tr m em e n e e n g e a g t a iv ti e ve pe p r e c r e c p e t p io ti n on of o m f m ig i r g a r t a io ti n o . n ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 3 3 The Co E u u n ro tr p y e s a h n e S e o ts ci . a .. l .. S .. u .. r . v .. e .. y ... ( . 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BBaasseedd oonn tthheessee wwee ee In sstt o aa u bb r llii e sshh a e r e l dd ie tt r hh a aa n tt a ““ l pp ys ee i oo s pp o ll f ee f ii a nn c cc to oo r uu s nn t tt r rr i ii g ee g ss e ww ri ii n tthh g aa th ll e aarr a gg c ee ce mm p ii t gg a rr n aa c nn e tt o pp r oo r pp e uu j ll e aa c tt t ii i oo o nn n ,, o ww f iitt m hh i aa gr hh a ii n gg t hh s ll w eevv e ee r ll e oo f ff e gg rr ee e nn d ee t rr o aall d aa a nn t dd a ii f nn ro sstt m iittuu b ttii e oo f nn o aa re ll ttrr t uu h ss e tt,, m lloo a ww ss llee a vv r ee ri ll v oo a ff l cc o oo f rrrr r uu e pp fu ttii g oo e nn e ,, s aa a ss t ttaa t bb h ll e ee,, b ww o ee r ll d ll e pp r ee s rrff o oo f rrmm th iinn e gg E ee U ccoo i nn n oomm 20 yy 1 aa 5 nn . dd Ba hh s iigg e hh d ll o eevv n eell th oo e ff s ss e oocc w iiaa e ll cc e oo st hh a ee b ss l ii i oo s nn he aa d nndd th ii a nn t cc “ lluupsseiiooonnpl((eiinninccllcuuodduiinnnggtrmmiesiiggwrraaitnnhttssa)) lffaeeraagrremmmiiggigrraarattiinootnnpttohhpeeullleeaaatissottn.. ,TTwoo ippthuuttaiitthiiingnhssiilmmevppellleeottfeegrrmmensse,, rppaeelooappnlldee aainrrseeti ff t ee u aa ti rr o ffuu n ll a ii l nn tr cc u oo s uu t, nn l tt o rrii w eess le ww v hh e ee l rr o ee f tt c hh o ee rru bb p aa t ss i ii o cc n tt , iiss a ssuu s ee ta oo b ff le ss , oo w ccii e ee l tt l yy p ii e ss r dd fo aa r mm m aa in gg g eedd e ,, co ww n hh o ee m rree y pp a ee n oo d ppll h ee ig dd h oonn le ’’ v tt e tt l rruu o ss f tt s ee o aa ci cc a hh l oo co tthh h ee e rr si oo o rr n tthh a ee nd sstt i aa n tt c ee l ’’ u ss s ii i nn o ss n ttii ( tt i uu n tt c iioo lu nn d ss i ,, n aa g nn m dd ww ig hh ra ee n rree ts ss ) oo f cc e ii a aa r ll cc m oohh ig ee r ss a iioo ti nn on aann th dd e ssoo le llii a dd s aa t rr . iit T tyy o iiss p ww ut ee i aa t kk i .. n AA s nn im dd p tthh le eeyy te aa r rr m ee s pp , rr p oo e bb o aa p bb l ll e yy ffaeeraaerrff f uu ea ll ii r nn fu gg l ee i nn n ee c rr o aa u ll tt n ee t rr r mm ie ss s ;; w mm h iigg e rr r aa e nn t tt h ss e aa b rree as oo i nn c llyy tis aa s pp u ee e rrff o ee f cc s tt o tt c aa i rr e gg t ee y tt i tt s oo d ee a xx m pprr a ee g ss e ss d tt , hhee w iirr h ff e ee r aa e rr p ss,, e ee o ss p pp l ee e cc d iiaa o ll n llyy ’t iiff t tt r hh u ee s yy t hh ea aa c vv h ee ll o iitt t tt h lle e e r pp o ee r rrss th oo e nnaa st ll a ee t xx e pp ’ ee s rr i ii n ee s nn t cc it ee u ww tio iitt n hh s t , thh a ee n mm d .. w””h WW er ee e cc s oo o nn c cc ia lluu l dd co eed h d e tt s hh i aa o tt n““a ww n ii d ddee so sspp li rr d ee a aa r dd ity aann is dd w hh e oo a mm k. oo A gg n ee d nnii t zz h iinn e gg y aa a nn re ttii p --mm ro ii b gg a rraa b nn ly tt aafettattiirttfuuuddleeinss giinnensseoorammleeteccrmoouusnn; ttmrriiieegssrahhnaatvvseearlleiittottllneelyttooa pddeoorfewwciittthhtammrgiieggtrraatonnttessx;;pttrhheseesyythaaerreeir frreaaatthhrsee,rresaapecccooinnasslleeyqqifuuteehnneccyeehaaannvdde little personal experience with them.” We concluded that “ widespread and homogenizing anti-migrant 11 a hh tt tt i tt t pp u ss d ::// e // s wwww in ww s ..tt o hh m eegg e uuaa c rr o dd u iiaa n nn t .. r cc i oo e mm s // h ww a oo v rr e lldd// l nn it gg t -le iinntt t ee o rraa d cctt o iivvee w //22 it 00 h 1188 m //nn ig oo r vv a //22 n 00 ts //rr ; ee t vv h ee e aall y eedd a -r oo e nnee r -a iinn t -h ffoo e uu r rr a --eeuu c rr o oo n pp s ee e aa q nn u ss-e vv n oo c ttee e -and ppooppuulliisstt 221 MM ht ee tp ss s s : iinn // gg w aa w nn w dd . SS t áá h gg e vv g áá u rr a ii r (( d 22 i 00 a 11 n 88 .c )) o ’’LL m oo / oo w kkii o nn r gg ld bb / ee n hh g ii nn in dd t tt e hh r ee ac cc t uu iv lltt e uu / rr 2 ee 0 oo 1 ff 8 ff / ee n aa o rr v .. / CC 2 rr 0 oo / ss r ss e --nn ve aa a ttii l oo e nn d aa -o ll n aa e nn aa in llyy ss f ii o ss u oo r ff -e aa u tt r tt o iitt p uu e dd a ee n ss s tt oo v ww ot aa e rr ddss p mm o iigg p rr u aa li tt s ii t oonn iinn EEuurrooppee’’ FFrriieeddrriicchh EEbbeerrtt SSttiiffttuunngg,, BBuuddaappeesstt 2 Messing and Ságvári(2018) ’Looking behind the culture of fear. Cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migrat i on in E urope’ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Budapest. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/ 14181-20180815.pdf

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS expression of people’s lack of safety and security, and a symptom of deep-rooted problems in the expression of people’s lack of safety and security, and a symptom of deep-rooted problems in the society. ” society. ” I e t x i p s re co ss m io m n o o n f s p e e n o s p e le t ’ h s a l t ac th k e o i f n s fl a o f w ety of a r n r e e d f f u u s g e e c e u s rit in y, to an E E d u u r a op s e ym i i n n p 2 t 2 o 0 0 m 1 1 5 5 o c c f a a u d u e s s e e e d p d d r d o e e o e e t p ed p p o o p l l r i i t o t i i c b a le l m f f r r s a a c in tu t r h e e s Iw s t o i c itsh ie i c t n o y tm . ” hm e EoUn asnednsies stth i lal tontheeoifntfhloewkeo y f is r s e u fu e g s eae lo s n in g twohEicuhrodpeebaint e 2 s 0 a 1 n 5 d c id aeuosel o d gi d c e a e l p cla p s o h l e it s icia n lEfura ro ct p u e r a e n s within the EU and is still one of the key issues along which debates and ideological clashes in European po litics crystalize e . . The mass arrival l of people from the Middle-East t and Africa has triggered a rise in pItoilsiticcosmcmryostnalsizeen.sTehtehamtatshseairnrfivloawl oof fpreeofpulgeeefrsominttoheEuMroidpdelein-E2a0st15ancdauAsferidcadeheaps tproiglgiteicraeldfraacritsuereins po litical populism and became a k ey t opic f or po pulist po litical powers. The Economist, , in a lead ar ticle, pwoitlhitiincatlhpeoEpUulaisnmd aisnsdtiblleocnaemoefathkeeyketoypisicsufoerspaolopnugliswthpiochlitdiceablaptoews earnsd. TidheeoElocogincoaml cilsats,hinesailneaEduraorptiecalen, s tates that“ Th e fe a r of migrat i on is pois oning We stern politics. Donald Trump owes his job to i t . Bre xit sptoaltiteiscsthcaryts “ t T a h li e ze fe . a T r h o e f m m a ig ss ra a t r io ri n va is l o p f oi p s e o o n p in le g W fro e m ste t r h n e p M ol i i d ti d c l s e . D E o as n t a a ld n T d r A um fri p ca ow ha e s s t h r i i s g j g o e b re to d i a t. r B is r e ex i i n t wou l d not be happening without it. Strident nationalists wield power in I I t t a a l l y, Hungary, P ola nd and w po o l u it l i d ca n l o p t op b u e li h sm ap a p n e d ni b n e g c w am ith e o a u k t e i y t. to St p r i i c d f e o n r t p 3 n  3 o a p t u io li n st a p lis o t l s iti w ca ie l l p d o p w o e w rs e . r T i h n e I E ta co ly n , o H m u i n s g t, a i r n y a , P le o a l d an a d rti a c n le d , Aus tria and have gained i i nf f luence e e l l sewhere ” 3 . . P P o o p p u u l l i i s s t t a a n n t t i i m m igrant voices in p p o o l l i i t t ics s s p p read r r apidly , A st u a s t t e r s ia th a a n t d “ h Th a e ve fe g a a r in o e f d m i i n g f r l a u t e i n o c n e is el p s o e i w s ohneirneg ” W . P e o st p e u r l n is p t o a l n it t i i c s m . i D g o ra n n a t ld vo T i r c u e m s p in o p w o e li s ti h c i s s s jo p b re t a o d it r . a B p r i e d x ly it , d espite the f act th at mos t Eur opean c ountries s in the mai n bene fit fro m migr ation: the b ulk of econom ic d w e o s u p l i d te n t o h t e b fa e c h t a th p a p t e m ni o n s g t w Eu it r h o o p u e t an it. co S u tr n id tr e i n e t s i n n a t t h io e n m al a is in ts b w en ie e l f d it p fr o o w m er m i i n gr I a ta ti l o y n , : H t u h n e g b a u r l y k , o P f o e l c a o n n d o a m n i d c l iterature e demonstra a t t e e s s that migrat t i i on n is adva 3 ntageous f or the r r eceiving c c o o untry’ ’ s e e c c onomy , bec ause l A it u e s r t a r t ia ur a e n d d e h m a o v n e s g t a ra in te e s d t i h n a fl t u m en ig c r e a e ti l o se n w is h a e d re v”an . t P a o g p e u o l u is s t f a o n r t t i h -m e i r g e r c a e n i t vi v n o g ic c e o s u i n n tr p y o ’s lit e ic c s on sp o r m ea y d, breacpaidulsye, i t pro vides f l e xibility to its labour marke ts and economy , which is a k ey pr econdit t i i on to global idtepsproitveidthees ffalcetxtibhialittymotostiEtsurloapbeoaunr cmouanrktreitess ianntdheemcoaninombeyn, ewfithficrohmismaigkraetyiopnr:ethcoenbduitlkioonf etcoongolombaicl c ompeti i t t i i veness. . ( ( Z Z im im m m e e r r m m a a n n n n an an d d Ka K h a a h n a e n c e 2 c 0 2 0 0 9 0 ) 9) However, mass immigration also makes many cliotemrapteutrietivdeenmesosn.s(tZraimtems e th rm at a m nn igr a a n t d ion Ka is h a a d n v e a c n 2 ta 0 g 0 e 9 o ) u H s o f w or e t v h e e r, re m c a e s iv s in im g m co i u g n ra t t r i y o ’s n e a c l o so no m m a y k,ebsecmaaunsey people anxious; many are afraid of the crowds arriving from predominantly Islamic countries, who pi H te o po w rp e ole v v e ida r, ne m sxi a ofl s ue s sx; i i m bmi m lait i ny g y ra tao ti r o eit n sa a flr l a s a o bido m uo a rf k m e th s ae m rkc a er n ots y w p da e ns o da p r l er e icvo a inn n go xi mf o r u yo, s m ; w m ph a riec n hd y o a ims re ian a a f kn r e a tyl i y d pI o srl f eac t m h o e incd c ci r to o iou w nn d t s rtioe a s r g, r l i wo vi bh n ao g l have left their homes amid horrible conditions of war, armed conflict and hopeless economic hc fr oa o mv m epe p let r if e tti d v o teh m nee in srs a .h n o( t Z l m y ime Is sm la ea m rmm ic ida c n o hn u o n arr t ni r db ie leK s, ac w hoa h nn o deic h ti a o2 v n0 e s0 l 9 e o) ft Hw t o h aw e r i e, r va h er o rm, m me e da s sc a so m inm i f d lmic h ti o gr r aa r n i t b dio le nho c a o pl n seo d le i m t s i s o a n ke s ecos o n f mo w ma a ni r yc , prospects, and have been on the move for many years. These fears are both honestly held and deeppp ar e m oosp e pl d eec c at o sn, n xai f o l n i u c d t sh; a am n v d aenb h ye o ae p rn e e l o e an s f s rtah e ied co mo n fo o tv m hee i f c ocr p ro r m o wa s d p ns e y c ay t re s ra , ivr a isn n .gT d hfr h eo a sme ve fpe b rae e rds e o n amre o i n nbao t nt h ht e lyh m oIsnl o ae v ms e tilcy fo ch r oeu m ldn a ta n rni y eds y d, e ew a eh r p s o. rooted. But this is not the first time Europeans have experienced a mass inflow of asylum seekers. If rh T o h aov e te s e e dle f . e fBt a u r tt s ht a eh r iir e s i b hso o nm t o h et h st o ha n em e f s iird t s ly tht h oim e r l re d ibE a leu n r d coop d neda e in p tis o r hn o as o v t eo d fe . xw B pa u err t ,ie t a h nr i cm s e i de s da no cmo t an t s h fsl e icint fi f r lao s n t wd ti o m hfo e aps E ey u llue ro mss pe see a ce n ok s neo h rsm a . v iI e cf we look at mass refugee flows historically, we find that the most recent peak in the number of asylum wp ex reo p sl e op r oe ie kc n tas c t, e ma d na a dss m hra a ev s fe s ugb in ee f ee lo nf w loown o s f thh a ei s s y tm l o u or m ivcea s l e flyo e ,r k w e me r a s f . nin I y f dy w eth e aar l st o .t o Th k hee a m t seo m sf a et s ar s ersc r ean f r u et g pb e eo e athk flo ihn w otn s hee h s i tn s l t uy o mh ri eb c l a ed l r l a y o , nf w da e sdye f l i eu n pm d seekers, which took place in the 1990s(triggered by the war on the Balkan and armed conflicts in the sr t o h eo a e t ktee t d h rs. e ,B m wuh o t i s tc t hh r is e to c iso en nk t opt p la e tch a ee k if i n n irts t ht h e e ti1m n 9 u e9 m 0Es b u e r(to r rpi o ge f ga a en s rs y e l dh u a m bvye s t e eh e xe k p e we r ra s ire , w nocn h e i td c h h ea t Bm o a o al k ksas p n l i a na c fln e odw in ao t r h mf e aes 1 dy 9 lc 9 uo 0 mn s fls ( i t ec r te i s g k g ien e rs r t. e hI d ef Middle East Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa[Somalia]), was of a similar size and Mw by eid t l h do e loek w Ea a t r smt o I n arsa t sn h r, e eIf B rua a gq l e k aenfdlo a w n A d fsg a hh r ias m ntoi e sr d tiac c an o l,l n ya, f n l w i d c e ts tfhi i en n d t H h toh e ran M t ot i h d fe d A l m e froi E cs a at st r[Se I o r c a em n na , tl I ip r a a e] q )a,k a w n ina d sth A oe f f g n h au a sm n im i b st eil a ar n ro , fs a iaz n se d yla t u h nmd e composition.“… when we look at the total numbers per half a decade and compare the 1990s with the c s H e o o e m r k n p e o rs f s , i A t w i f o r h n ic ic . a h “ [ … S to w o o m h k e a p n li l a a w ] c e ) e , l w i o n o a t k s h o a e f t 1 a t 9 h s 9 e im 0 t s o il t ( a a t r r l i s g n i g z u e e m r a e b n d e d r b s c y o p m t e h r p e h o w a s l i a f t r i a o o n d n e . c “ th a … e d w e B h a a e n l n k d a w n c e o a m l n o d p o a k a r r a e m t t t e h h d e e 1 c t o 9 o n 9 ta f 0 l l s ic n w t u s i m t in h b t t e h h r e e s first half of the 2010s then the number and origin in recent years do not deviate from what Western f M p i e r i s r d t h d h a le a lf lf E a a o s d f t e th c Ir a e a d n 2 e , 0 a I 1 r n 0 a d s q t c a h o n e m d n p A t a h f r g e e h n t a h u n m e is 1 t b a 9 e n 9 r , 0 a a s n n w d d i o t t h r h ig e th in H e i o f n i r r n r s e t o c h e f a n A l t f fr y o i e c f a a th r [ s e S d o 2 o m 01 n a 0 o li s a t ] t d ) h , e e v w n ia a t t s h e o e f f r n o a u m m si b w m e h i r l a a a t r n W s d iz e o e s r t i a e g n r in d Europe experienced two decades ago. On the contrary, the total numbers in the years 2011-15 are E c in o u m r r o e p p c o e s n e i t t x io p y n ea . ri “ r e s … nwc d e o hde n nt o ww t oe d d e loe v oc ia ak t d e aets f t r h o aeg m oto. w tOa h nl a n t tuh W me e bc s eo t rn e s r tpr n aer E ry u h, r at o lhf p ea e td e oe x tc p aal e d r n i eu en ma c nb e de d crso tw min o ptah d ree c ty a he d ea e r1 s s9 a 29 g 00 o 1s . 1wO 1it n 5h t ta h hr e e lower than those in the first half of the 1990s. Furthermore, the sudden increase in numbers in 2014 lf c oi o rws n te tr hr a at r hl y fa , on t f h tt e hho t e o s2 t e a 0i l 1n n 0t u sh m eth b fe e irn r s s tth i h n ea t lnf h u e omf y bt e he a er rs a1n 2 99d 0 0 1 os 1 r. i 1 gFi 5 unr a tihn re rre l m o c w eonr e et r ,y t te h ha a er n ss t ud h do o d s ne e ont in ind t ce h rve e iaa f ts i ee rs fi t rno h nm a u lf mw o bh f ae t rt h s e Win 1 e 9 s2 9 t0e 0 1r s n4 . and especially 2015 had a clear cause, the civil war in Syria, and there were no signs that indifferent aE Fu un r rd t o h ep e sep rm eexc o pia r e e llr , yie t 2 h n0 e c1e s 5d ud ht d wa e do n ad in ec c cle r a e ad a re s sc e aa i u n gsoe n ., u tO m hne be tch r iv s ei i l n cwo 2 na 0 tr 1 ria 4 nr a yS, n yt d rhia e e, sp ato e nt c da ia lth l n l e y urm 2 e 0 bw 1 e 5 ersr h e a inn d ot a hse c ig le yn a esa r tr c hs a a u 2t s 0i e 1n , 1d t ih f1f e 5er c ae iv nr i et l masses of poor migrants from the Global South had been unleashed .”(Lucassen 2018:385) Still, the ml w o a w r ses i r n ets S h y oa r fn ia pt , oh a oo n rs d em t ii h ng e rta r h e net w sfi e rf r s e tomh n a o tlf s h i oe g f n Gt s lho t e h b a 1 t l99S in o0 d us i .t f h f F e u r hr e at n hd t eb m rme a eo s nr s e e u, s nt o lhe f ea p ss o hu o ed r dd . m e ” n i ( g L i r u n a c c n r a e t s s a se f s r e n o i m 2 n 0 n t 1 h u 8 e m :3 G b 8 l e 5 o r ) b s S a i t l n i S ll 2 o , 0 u th 1 th 4 e reception of this new wave of asylum seekers was met with an apocalyptical tone from mainstream r a h e n a c d d ep e b t s e i p o e e n ci o u a f n ll l y t e h a 2 is s 0 h 1 n e 5 e d w h .” a w d (L a u a v c e c a l o s e s f a e r a n s c y a 2 l u u 0 s m 1 e 8 , : s t 3 e h 8 e e 5 k ) e ci r S v s t il i w l w l, a a t s h r m e in e r t e Sy c w r e i i p a th t , i a o a n n d o a t p f h o t e h c r a i e s ly w n p e e t w r ic e a w n l o t a o v s n e ig e o n f f s ro a t m h sy a l m t u i m a n i d n s i s f e t f e e re k re a e n m rs t politicians, and rising, untrammelled fear in public and political discourse that had never before been p m w o a a l s i s t s i m c e i s e an t o s f w , p i a t o n h o d r a r n m is a i i g n p r g o a , c n u a t n s ly tr f p r a t o m ic m a m l t e t h l o e le n d G e l f o f e r b a o a r m l in S m o p u a u t i b h n l s i h c tr a a e d n a d m be p e p o n o li l t u i i t c n i a c le i l a a d n s is h c , e o a d u n .” r d s ( e L ri u t s h c in a a g s t s , h e u a n n d t 2 n r 0 a e 1 m v 8 e m :r3 e 8b l 5e le )fo d Srte f i e llb a , e r teh in e experienced. er p ex u cp b ee l p i r c tiei a on n nc d eod p f. o t l h it i i s c n al e d w is w co a u ve rse of th a a sy t l h u a m d s n e e e v k e e r rs be w fo as re m b e e t e w n i e th xp a e n ri a e p n o c c e a d l . yptical tone from mainstream Iptoislitviictiaalntsh,earnedforriesitnhga,tuwnetruanmdmeresltleadndfewahraint tpruigbgleicrsatnhdepfeoalirtiocaf lmdiigsrcaotuiornse, atnhdatwhhaedthneervseorcbiaelfoatrteitbuedeens Ietxipsevritieanl tcheedr.efore that we understand what triggers the fear of migration, and whether social attitudes towards migrants and migration are actually supporting the rise of anti-migrant discourses and political towards migrants and migration are actually supporting the rise of anti-migrant discourses and political powers in Europe. It is also essential to see which social groups are more likely to perceive migrants as pItoiswveitraslitnhEeurerofopree. tIthiastawlseouensdseernsttiaanl tdowseheatwtrhiigcghesros cthiael gferaoruopfsmariegrmatoioren,liaknedlywtoheptehrecresivoecimaliagtrtaintutsdeass a threat and which may see migration as a potential gain to society. We would like to find individual atotwharerdats manigdrwanhtischanmdamyigseraetimonigararetioacntuaaslalypsoutpepnotriatilnggatihnetorisseoocifeatny.tiW-meigwraonutlddilsickoeutrosefisnadnidndpiovliidtiucaall and societal factors that are likely to play a role in modifying fear of migrants, and consequently feed apnodwesorsciientaElufraocpteo.rsIttihsaatlsaoreesliskeenlytiatol tpolaseyeawrohliechinsomcoiadligfyroinugpfseaarreomf moriegrlaiknetlsy, taonpdecrocnesiveeqmueignrtalynfteseads into policies towards a calmer environment in this respect. ianttohrpeoalticaiensdtwowhiacrhdms aaycaslemeemr eignrvaitrioonnmaesnat pinottehnistiraelsgpaeicnt.to society. We would like to find individual Wanedwsoilclidertaawl faacltoonrsgitthuadtinaarlepliickteulyretoofphlaoywaartotlietuidnems ohdavifeyicnhgafnegaerdodf umriignrgatnhtes,laanstd1c5oyneseaqrsuiennEtluyrfoepeed. W B in a te s o e wp d iol o llid n cire a as c w a to d a e wl m oanr ic dgis l t i ua te dc r ia a nl t am u l r ep e ri , cet w un e rveir p oo r n e f m s h u oe m wn e ta d itnt t it h thu a id t se “ rse a sh tt pa i e t v u ce d t.c e h s a a n r g e e v d e d ry ur s i t n a g b t le he so la c s ia t l 1 c 5 o y n e s a tr r u s c i t n io E n u s ro th p a e t . Based on academic literature, we presumed that“ attitudes are very stable social constructions that change only very slightly and very slowly .”(Messing- Ságvári 201 8:3) And, by and large, they do seem c W h e an w g i e ll o d n ra ly w v a er l y on sl g ig it h u t d ly in a a n l d pi v c e tu ry re sl o o f w h l o y . w ”(aMtteitsusdinegs-h Sá a g v v e á c r h i a 2 n 0 g 1 e8d:3d)uArnindg, bthyealnadstla1r5geye, athrseyindEousroeepme. to be quite stable. However, deep shocks to societies, such as the economic crisis of 2008 in countries t B o as b e e d q o u n ite ac s a ta d b e l m e. ic Ho lit w e e ra v t e u r r , e d , e w ep e s p h r o e c s k u s m t e o d so th ci a e t ti “ e a s t , t s it u u c d h e a s s a t r h e e v e e c r o y n s o ta m b i l c e c s r o is c is ia o l f c 2 o 0 n 0 st 8 ru in ct c io o n u s nt t r h ie a s t that were hit hard, or the refugee crisis in countries which lie along the EU border, can and have t c h h a a t ng w e e o re nl h y i v t e h r a y r s d l , ig o h r tl t y h a e n r d e v fu e g ry ee slo c w ris ly is .” in(Mceosusnintrgi-e S s á w gv h á i r c i h 20 lie 1 8a:3lo)nAgntdh,ebyEUanbdolradreger,, cthaenyadnod sheaevme changed those attitudes. We will show that although attitudes towards migrants are very stable and ctohabnegqeudittehostsaebalett.iHtuodwees.veWr,edweeilpl sshhoowcktshtaot saoltchieotuiegsh, sauttcihtuadsetshteoewcaorndosmmicigcrrainsitssoafre20v0e8ryinstcaobulnetarineds that were hit hard, or the refugee crisis in countries which lie along the EU border, can and have 3 ch Th a e ng w e a d y t fo h r o w se ard at o t n itu im d m es i . gr W at e io w n i t l o l s th h e ow We t s h t a ( t 25 a t lt h h A o u u g g u h st a , t 2 t 0 it 1 u 8 d ) e T s he to E w co a n r o d m s i m st i , g p r . a 1 n 0 t . s are very stable and 3 The way forward on immigration to the West(25th August, 2018) The Economist, p. 10. 3 The way forward on immigration to the West(25th August, 2018) The Economist, p. 10. 7 77 7

8 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 8 have become slightly more favourable in the past one and a half decades in several European countries, profound crises or traumatic events may have an effect on attitudes towards migrants and migration in the short term. We also want to address a critical view on the role of countries. In our earlier analysis we presumed that countries are the primary domains for analysing differences in attitudes. This is a well-attested method in cross- national survey research, since the country’s social, political and historical context is a major determinant of citizens’ attitudes. But this may be a mistake: it is plausible that differences may be greater, for instance, between certain regions of the same country than between countries. Or country affiliation may be less significant in determining attitudes towards migration than other characteristics of the individual. Linking basic human values to attitudes towards migrants and migration is a novelty in our current analysis. We attempt to demonstrate that the prevalence of certain values is in connection with proand anti-migration attitudes, and is therefore – not exclusively, but to a large extent – deeply rooted in our basic personal characteristics. We also provide a brief overview of how political orientation is echoed in the perception of migration in various countries. We show that personal political orientation, party preferences and openness to right-wing populism are important factors in understanding polarization when it comes to the perception of migration. ʹ Measuring attitudes towards migration or migrants across many countries, languages and cultures is a complex task, for the simple reason that people may have very different perceptions of the core concepts of‘ migrant’ and‘ migration’ .(Rustenbach 2010) Also, there may be a variety of forces driving such attitudes. Avoiding a lengthy explanation of the extensive academic and methodological discourses surrounding the problems of measuring attitudes, we will describe four aspects here and argue for the use of three of them in this report. 2.1 C ONSTRUCTION OF ATTITUDES Academic literature discussing the construction of attitudes differentiates between affective(A), behavioural(B) and cognitive(C) components of attitudes(The ABC model).(Berg 2006, Eagly and Chaiken 1998) Although attitudes incorporate these three components, any particular attitude can be based more on one component than another. The affective component refers to the emotional reaction one exhibits toward migrants. Attitudes about hot-button issues – such as politics, sex, and religion – tend to be affectively-based, as they usually come from a person's values.

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS The behavioural component refers to the way one behaves when exposed to migrants. For example, how would someone decide whether to allow or forbid migrants to come and se ttle in his/her country? T T h h e e c b o e g h n a i v ti i v o e ur c a o l m co p m on p e o n n t e r n e t fe r r e s fe to rs t t h o e t b h e e lie w f a s, y k o n n o e w b le e d h g a e v , e a s n w d h t e h n ou e g x h p t o s s t e h d at to w m e i h g a r v a e nt a s b . o F u o t r m ex ig a r m an p t le s. , W ho h w et w h o e u r l w d e so a m re e a o w ne ar d e e o ci f d t e h w e h n e u t m h b er er to a a n l d lo d w iv o e r rs fo it r y b o id f m m i i g g r r a a n n t t s s t in o o co u m r s e o a c n ie d ti s e e s t , t a le nd in a h ls is o /h o e f r h c o o w un th tr e y i ? r presence a ff ects the country’s economy, culture or society. Moreover, the cogni ti ve component of The cognitive component refers to the beliefs, knowledge, and thoughts that we have about migrants. a ttit udes includes two further elements: symbolic and material factors. Material factors refer to the Whether we are aware of the number and diversity of migrants in our societies, and also of how their part of an a ttit ude that considers its consequences on material life, such as the economy and welfare presence affects the country’s economy, culture or society. Moreover, the cognitive component of of the country. For example, people may have nega ti ve a tti tudes towards migrants because they think attitudes includes two further elements: symbolic and material factors. Material factors refer to the migrants pose unfair compe titi on and nega ti vely a ff ect the labour market(pose greater compe titi on part of an attitude that considers its consequences on material life, such as the economy and welfare for jobs) or the welfare system(larger number of people applying for the same welfare provisions). On of the country. For example, people may have negative attitudes towards migrants because they think the other hand, symbolic components of a ttitu des are about the intangible consequences of the migrants pose unfair competition and negatively affect the labour market(pose greater competition presence of migrants, r efl ected in di ff erent belief systems, moral values and worldviews. People may for jobs) or the welfare system(larger number of people applying for the same welfare provisions). On feel nega ti vely about mig rati on because they think that migrants may pose a threat to the majority’s the other hand, symbolic components of attitudes are about the intangible consequences of the culture or religious tradi ti ons. People who are posi ti ve about migrants may think that migra ti on has a presence of migrants, reflected in different belief systems, moral values and worldviews. People may po siti ve e ffect on the country’s culture as it fosters diversity and mu ltic ulturalism. feel negatively about migration because they think that migrants may pose a threat to the majority’s culture or religious traditions. People who are positive about migrants may think that migration has a positive effect on the country’s culture as it fosters diversity and multiculturalism. 2.2 H OW DO WE MEASURE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS ? 9 9 9 2 In .2 this H st O ud W y w DO e w W il E l a M n E a A ly S s U e R th E e A c T o T g I n T i t U i v D e E a S n T d O th W e A b R e D ha S v M io I u G r R al A e T le IO m N en A t N s D of M a I t G ti R tu A d N es T . S ( ? Due to a lack of empirical data we are not able to measure the a ff ec ti ve element of a ttit udes.) The individual level survey data is derived from all eight consecu ti ve rounds of the European Social Survey(ESS). ESS is In this study we will analyse the cognitive and the behavioural elements of attitudes.(Due to a lack considered one of the most trusted intern ati onal datasets, and therefore we believe that currently of empirical data we are not able to measure the affective element of attitudes.) The individual level there is no be tt er publicly-available, compara ti ve and ti me-series dataset by which to measure the survey data is derived from all eight consecutive rounds of the European Social Survey(ESS). ESS is cogn iti ve and behavioural component of a ttit udes in Europe. considered one of the most trusted international datasets, and therefore we believe that currently F th o e r r t e he is a n n o al b ys e i t s t , e w r e pu cr b a l f ic t e ly d -a t v w a o ila s b e l p e a , r c a o te m i p n a d r e a x t e iv s e : and time-series dataset by which to measure the cognitive and behavioural component of attitudes in Europe. 1. The behavioural component will be indicated by the Rejecti on Index(RI) which denotes the For the a s n h a a l r y e si o s f , w th e o c s r e a w fte h d o t w w o o u s ld ep r a e r je a c te t a in n d y e m xe i s g : rants coming from poorer countries outside Europe 1. w Th it e ho b u e t ha co vi n o s u id ra e l ra c t o i o m n p . 4 on W e e nt ar w g i u ll e b t e ha in t d b i y ca u te si d ng by on th ly e th R e eje e c x t t i r o e n m I e nd re e s x p ( o R n I) se w t h o ic m h i d g e ra n t o i o te n s a t s he a s s i h n a g r l e e o in f d t i h ca o t s o e r w w h e o a w re o a u b ld le r t e o je c c a t p a t n u y re m th ig e ra ra n d ts ic c a o li m za i t n i o g n fr o o f m a t p ti o tu o d re e r s. countries outside Europe 2. The cogni tiv e compone 4 nt of a ttitu des will consider both symbolic and material elements. The without consideration. We argue that by using only the extreme response to migration as a percep ti on of the consequences of migra ti on on material life is gauged by the following single indicator we are able to capture the radicalization of attitudes. ques ti on: Would you say it is generally bad or good for[country]’s economy that people come 2. The cognitive component of attitudes will consider both symbolic and material elements. The M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS to live here from other countries? Symbolic elements of a ttit udes will be measured by the perception of the consequences of migration on material life is gauged by the following following ques ti on:“ Would you say that[country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or question: Would you say it is generally bad or good for[country]’s economy that people come enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” Both ques ti ons allow the to live here from other countries? Symbolic elements of attitudes will be measured by the respondent to answer on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 represents the negative extreme in terms following question:“ Would you say that[country]’s cult ural life is generally undermined or of the perceived effect of migration on the country. enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? ” Both questions allow the 10 4 FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTION-INDEX(COGNITIVE ATTITUDES) This index is constructed from a single ques ti on:“To what extent do you think[country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?”(1:Allow many to come and live here; 2: Allow some; 3: Allow a few; 4: Allow none; 8: Don’t know) We recoded responses into a binary variable at individual level, 4 su T m hi m s i a n r d iz e in x g is t c h o o n se st a ru n c s t w e e d r f in ro g m ‘ a a llo s w ing n l o e n q e u ’ e a s s ti a on p : e “ rc T e o n w ta h g a e t o e f x a te ll n r t e d sp o o y n o s u es t . hink[country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe?”(1:Allow many to come and live here; 2: Allow some; 3: Allow a few; 4: Allow none; 8: Don’t know) We recoded responses into a binary variable at individual level, summarizing those answering‘ allow none ’ as a percentage of all responses. c y ESS Rounds

10 M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS Messing–Ságvári: Still divided but more open. Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis respondent to answer on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 represents the negative extreme in terms of the perceived effect of migration on the country. M ESSING -S r Á e G s V p ÁR o I : n S d TI e LL n D t IV t ID o ED a B n U s T w M e OR r E o O n PE a N . s M c A a P l P e IN o G f E 0 UR t O o PEA 1 N 0 A w TTI h TU e D r E e S T 0 OW re AR p D r S e M s I e GR n A t T s IO t N h B e EF n OR e E g A a N t D iv AF e TE e R x TH tr E e M m IGR e AT in ION te CR r I m SIS s FIGURE of 1 the DpeISrTcReiIvBeUdTeIOffNecOt FofPmERigCrEaPtTioIOnNo-nINthDeEXco(uCnOtGryN.ITIVE ATTITUDES) 10 10 10 FIGURE re 1 sponDdIeSnTtRtIBoUaTnIsOwNerOoFnPaERscCaElPeToIOf 0N-tIoN1D0EXw(hCeOreGN0 IrTeIpVrEeAseTnTtIsTUthDeEnS)egative extreme in terms of the perceived effect of migration on the country. FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTION-INDEX(COGNITIVE ATTITUDES) Frequency FrequeFnrceyquency (all countries &(aallllEcSoSunR(torailulenscdos&uanltlriEeSsS&RoalulnEdSsS Rounds 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 More negative Neutral More positive Figure 1 demonstrates the M co o m re p n o e s g i a t t e ive index w N e eu c t r a e l ated by M u o s re in p g os t it h iv e e above two questions, supplemented by a third one inquiring about the general evaluation of the impact of migration. 5 The P Fi e g r u c r e e pti 1 on d I e n m de o x n ( s P t I r)artaensgitnhgefrocomm0ptoosi1te00idnedsecxribwees thcereoavteedrallbcyogunsiitnivge ethvealuaabtoiovneoftwmoigrqautieosnt.ioTnhse, vsuaplupelsemofenthteedinbdyeaxtchoirudldonaelsoi M nqb o u r e e ir n gin e rog ga ua t p i b v eo e duthtyhpeot g N h e e e n u t e i t c r r a a a l l l ly ev i a n l t u o at t M i h o r o n e r e e o p fb o ta s hs i e t i i c v im e captaecgtoorifems,igreraptrieosne. 5 ntTihneg p P e er o c p e l p e ti w on ith In ( d 1 e ) x r ( a P t I h)erarnpgoinsigtifvreo,m(20) tnoe1u0tr0adl,eoscrr(i3b)esraththeeorvneeragalltcivoegnoitvievreaellvpaeluracetipotnioonfsmoigf rmatiigorna.tiTohne. (FvFaigilguurereseo1f.)tdheemionndsetxractoeusldthaelsocobme pgorosiutepedindheyxpowtheetcicraelalyteidntobythrueseingbasthicecaatbeogvoerietsw, orepqrueessetniotinnsg, spuepopplleemweinthte(d1)byraathtehrirdpoosniteivien,q(u2ir)inngeuatbroaul,totrhe(3 g ) e r n a e th ra e l r e n v e a g lu a a ti t v i e on oovef rtahlel pimerpcaecpttoiofnms iogrfamtioignr.a 5 tiTohne. I P ( n F e ig r t c h u e i r s p e t r 1 i e o . p n ) o I r n t d , e P x e ( r P ce I ) p r t a i n o g n in In g d f e ro x m (P 0 I) t a o n 1 d 0 R 0 e d j e e s c c ti r o ib n e I s n t d h e e x o ( v R e I) ra w ll il c l o b g e ni u t s iv e e d e a v s a t lu h a e ti m on ai o n f i m nd ig ic r a a t ti o o r n s . o T f he a va tt lu it e u s de o s f t t o h w e a in rd d s e m x c ig o r u a l t d io a n l . so be grouped hypothetically into three basic categories, representing In this report, Perception Index(PI) and Rejection Index(RI) will be used as the main indicators of people with(1) rather positive,(2) neutral, or(3) rather negative overall perceptions of migration. a 2 t . t 3 itud W es H to O w A a R rd E s T m H i E gr ‘ a M ti I o G n R . ANTS ’ IN OUR STUDY ? (Figure 1.) 2.3 W HO ARE THE ‘ MIGRANTS ’ IN OUR STUDY ? I M n i t g h ra is ti r o e n po is rt a , P v er y ce c p o t m io p n le In x d p e h x e ( n P o I) m a e n n d o R n e i j n e v c o ti l o vi n ng In a de la x r ( g R e I) v w ar i i l e l t b y e o u f s c e a d te a g s o t r h ies m . A a l i t n h i o n u d g i h ca t t h o e rs t o er f m a ‘m tt i i g t r u a d n e t s ’ i t s ow e ar ll d d s e m fin ig e r d at in on le . gal and policy contexts, still it is used in many sense s, especially in the Mnoingr-sacthioonlairslya pvuebryliccodmispcoleuxrspeh.eWnohmenentoanlkiinngvoalvbionugtamlaigrrgaenvtsa,ripeetyopolfecmataeygotrhiiensk. Aalbtohuotugshignthifeicatenrtmly 2 ‘ d m i . f 3 i f g e r r a e n W n t t ’ H g is r O o w u A e p R l s l E d o T e f f H i p n E e e o ‘ d M p i l I n e G : l R e so g A a m N l T e a S n m ’ d I a N p y o O t l h i U c i y n R k c S o o T n f U te l D a x b Y ts o ? , u s r ti m ll i i g t r i a s n u t s s e w d o in rk m in a g n i y n s t e h n e se ses,rveiscpeesceiacltloyrinorthine nfaocnto-srciehso,laortlhyeprsubmliacydtihscinokurosfe.thWe hTeunrktisahlkinnegigahbboouutr morigsrhaonptsk,epeepoepr lneemxtadyotohri,nskoambeoumt igsihgtntifhicinakntolyf M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS different groups of people: some may think of labour migrants working in the service sector or in Mseicgornadti+ongeisnaervaetiroyncoyomuptlhexinphmeanrogminealnizoendinveoiglvhibnoguarhlaorogdesvoafrileatrygeofmcaeterogpoorileitsa.nAlatrheoausg, hsotmheetmeramy f ‘m ac i t g o r r a i n e t s ’ , i o s t w he e r l s l d m e a fi y ne th d in in k l o e f ga th l e an T d ur p k o is li h cy n c e o ig n h t b e o xt u s r , o st r il s l h it o i p s k u e s e e p d er in n m ex a t n d y o s o e r n , s s e osm, eesmpeigchiatlltyhiinnkthoef sneocno-nscdh+oglaernlyerpautibolnic ydoisuctohuirnsem. aWrghiennalitzaelkdinngeiagbhobuoturmhoigoradnstos,f plaerogpelemmetaryoptohliintaknabaroeuats,sisgonmifiecamntalyy p d ic ff t e u r r e e n r t e g fu ro g u ee p s f o le f e p in e g op fr l o e: m so th m e e w m ar a i y n t S h y i r n ia k , o a f nd lab st o il u l r ot m he ig r r s a m nt a s y w th o i r n k k in o g f A in fr t i h ca e n se t r r v y i i c n e g s t e o c c t r o o r s o s r th in e M f 5 a T c e h t d e o i f r t o i e e l r l s o r , a w o n in t e h g a e n q r u s S e e m s a ti a o in y n d t w h in a in s g k h al i s o e o f s. a th sk e ed Tu o r f k r i e s s h po n n e d ig e h nt b s o : u “ I r s o yo r u s r h c o o p u k n e tr e y p m er ad n e e a xt w d o o rs o e r o , r so a m be e tt m er i p g l h a t ce th to in l k ive of by people coming to live here from other countries? ” The 0 to 10 scale responses given to the three questions s 5 econd+ generation youth in marginalized neighbourhoods of large metropolitan areas, some may I o n nTht t eh h ef is oimll r o e pw p aic o nt r go t qf u w me e isgtri d oa o tniow n na o ws t ea d rlse e os f a i u n s m e ke m d t e h o d e f u r t p e e s a r p m n o d nd c m o e i n n g v t r s e a : r t “ t i e I o s d n y i , o n u t b o r u c a t o 0 u u n s 1 t e 0 ry 0 r m s e c s a a p d le o e n i a n s w o e r s o d r e p s r e ro t o o v r i b a d e e b h d e a tt r b e m y r o p n E la i S z c S e e d t s o a u n r li d vey r b th e y u s p p s e o c o o n p m d le e p c n a o r t m a s b . in l Q e g u w t e o it s h l t i i v o t e h n e h s e v w r a e l h u f i r e c o s h m o m f o t e t h h a e e s rR u ce r oj e euc t nt h tior e ine c sI o n? g ” d n e T x i h t . e iv T 0 e e c t e h o l n e 1 i m c 0 a s e ll c y n a , t l s e o c r o f e r a s e p t s t o a it n b u s o d e v s e e s g 5 i r v 0 e e i f n n e d t r o ic t a o th te “ e p a t e h p o r o e p e s l i e t q iv u c e o es m ti i o n n g s to o pe n r t c h e e pt i i m on pa o c f t m o i f g m ra ig ti r o a n ti , o w n h w ile er s e co su re m s m be e l d ow up 50 an s d ug c g o e n s v t e a rt n e o d v i e n r t a o ll a n 0 e g 1 a 0 t 0 iv s e c p a e le rc in ep o t r io d n e . r to be harmonized and live here from other countries”. I t understands‘migrants’ in th e widest possible sense. Thus, we have thus comparable with the values of the Rejection Index. Technically, scores above 50 indicate a positive n 5 pe T o r h c i e d ep e fo t a i l o l w o n w h o i a n f t g m i q m ig u r a e a g s t t e i i o o p n n e , w op a h s l il e e a h l s s c a o o d a re s a s k b e b o d e u l o o t f w m re 5 i s g 0 p r s o a u n n g d t g s e e n w s t t s h : a e “ n n Iso a yv n eo s rua w rllc e no r eu in gn g atrt t yi h vme is ap q de u erc e ae s p t wt io ioo n rns , .e a o n r d a it be is tt v e e r r p y la li c k e e t l o y l t i h ve at a by p p e e r o s p o l n e c in om B i e n r g li t n o o liv r e L h o e n r d e o fr n om wi o ll th h e a r v c e ou a n d tr if e f s e ? r ” e T n h t e im 0 t a o ge 10 to sca o l n e e re i s n po A n t s h e e s n g s i , ve a n li t t o tl t e he En th g r l e is e h q v u i e ll s a ti g o e n , s an I o t n al t i h a e n i h m a p r a b c o t r o t f o m w ig n ra o t r io a n C w z e e r c e h su to m w m n e s d hi u p p . a T n h d e c q o u n e v s e t r i t o e n d i m nt e o a a su 0 r i 1 n 0 g 0 t s h c e ale be in h o a r v d io er ra to l e b l e em ha e r n m t o o n f iz a e t d ti a tu nd des thus comparable with the values of the Rejection Index. Technically, scores above 50 indicate a positive is somewhat more specific: It inquiries about“ people from the poorer countries outside Europe ”. Here perception of migration, while scores below 50 suggest an overall negative perception. again, though, respondents may respond to the question with quite different conceptions in mind, whether they visualise South-East Asian IT workers, Syrian/Afghani war refugees or desperate North 11

Messing–Ságvári: Still divided but more open. Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis picture refugees fleeing from the war in Syria, and still others may think of Africans trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in dinghies. 11 11 In this report we do not define the term migration, but use responses provided by ESS survey respondents. Questions which measure the cognitive element of attitudes refer to“ people coming to live here from other countries”. I t understands‘migrants’ in th e widest possible sense. Thus, we have no idea what image people had about migrants when answering this question, and it is very likely that a person in Berlin or London will have a different image to one in Athens, a little English village, an Italian harbor town or a Czech township. The question measuring the behavioral element of attitudes is somewhat more specific: It inquiries about“ people from the poorer countries outside Europe ”. Here again, though, respondents may respond to the question with quite different conceptions in mind, whether they visualise South-East Asian IT workers, Syrian/Afghani war refugees or desperate North Africans fleeing across the sea. This is definitely a significant weakness in measuring attitudes towards migrants with surveys and questionnaires. But, as of today, no better method of measurement has been developed which is comparative across countries, regions and time. 2.4 F ACTORS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES In order to identify factors which potentially influence attitudes we must briefly turn to some theoretical literature. Fortunately, there is a rich academic literature discussing and testing potential triggers of anti- or pro-migrant attitudes. This also means, however, that we are forced to select a few theories from among many; those which we think are applicable to Europe(or some of its regions) and the present. The following figure summarizes the theoretical concepts we use in this analysis: on the left it presents those attitude components which we aim to measure(2.2), and on the right it lists various predictors of attitudes based on the most significant theories described below.

12 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 12 FIGURE 2 THEORETICAL CONCEPT OF THE ANALYSIS COMPONENTS OF ATTITUDES SYMBOLIC MATERIAL COGNITIVE COMPONENT P ERCEPTION I NDEX (PI) BEHAVIOURAL COMPONENT R EJECTION I NDEX (RI) AFFECTIVE COMPONENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION PREDICTORS/FACTORS OF PRO/ANTI-MIGRANT ATTITUDES CONFLICT& COMPETITION Subjective level of current fi nanci al situation Fear of financial difficulties in the near future ETHNIC MINORITY & ANCESTRY Belonging to an ethnic minority Having foreign born parents POLITICAL PARTICIPATION& LEANING Alienation from politics Right/left-wing leaning LOCUS OF CONTROL Satisfaction with government/economy Personal and institutional trust Feeling of physi cal security INDIVIDUAL VALUES SOCIAL ISOLATION Openness to change vs. Conservation Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence Interpersonal trust Social connections DEMOGRAPHY One of the most applied and tested theories considers the economic rationale behind attitudes about migration. Conflict or Competition Theory (Levine and Campbell 1972) postulates that negative attitudes are essentially rooted in perceived competition for scarce goods. Anti-immigrant attitudes stem from the perception that immigrants pose a threat to the host society’s economy, labour market or welfare systems. The perceived economic threat is related to the view that majority and minority groups are locked in a zero-sum competition for economic resources. Thus, in times of economic hardship, anti-immigrant attitudes are likely to surge. Using the ESS dataset we will be able to check whether current economic distress and fear of financial troubles in the near future on an individual level, or economic hardship on a macro level(such as the economic crisis in 2008/09) have marked people’s attitudes. Another significant theory explains attitudes in terms of actual experience with migrants. Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport 1954) suggests that a lack of knowledge and experience with a group is likely to increase fear of that group, while direct contact(friends, colleagues, neighbours, schoolmates etc.) is likely to dismantle negative attitudes. However, intergroup contact has a positive effect on attitudes only if both groups have equal status, there is cooperation, a common goal, and support by social and institutional authorities. We have provided evidence in our previous study that one of the most important predictors of anti-migrant attitudes is actually the lack of migrants in the country, as well as a lack of direct relationships with migrants. Yet another theory explains attitudes towards migrants in terms of political participation and political leaning .(Espenshade and Hemstead 1996) and suggests that left versus right political leaning is also associated with pro-/anti-immigrant attitudes, meaning that the more right-wing a political leaning one has, the more likely one is to reject the idea of migrants coming and settling in one’s country. The

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 1 1 3 3 main drive behind this linkage is the value system of the individual. Our data provides rich information on political participation and affiliation. And fi nally, a recent theory explai ns pro- and ant t i i -m igrant at titu des in term s of the perceptio n of control . Harell l et al (2 017) argue that t he feel ing of contro l is one of t t h h e e m m o o s s t t i i m m p p o o r r tant e e x x p p lanator y factors fo r att t i i tude s toward s and accep tance of mi grants. They use t he con cept of locus of c c o o ntrol, which refers to a set o o f b b e e l l iefs a a bout the causes of events(for e e xample losing one’s job) or c c o o n n dit t i i ons (for examp le bei ng poo r) to either interna l or externa l sourc es (Lefc ourt, 1 9 91; Rot hbaum, Weisz, & Snyder , 1982; Rotter, , 1 1 9 9 6 6 6 6 ) ) . T T h h e e a a r r g g u u ment i i s a a s s f f o o l ll o o w w s: C C i i t t i i zens w w ho b b e e lieve they are p p e e rsonally responsib b l l e e for what happen n s s in their lives, , and are t hus ca pable of effectin g ch ange in their live s and the wi der s ociety they live in, are l ess h ost i le t o wards i mmigrants. These citizens are less likely to feel threatened by th e chan ging social milieu surrounding g them m . . The feeling of being“in c ontrol” of on e’ s own econ omic or soc ial sit uat i on, i n contra st to f f e e elings of i i n n s s ecurity and u u npredic tability y , le ads to less f e ar o o f f th th e e un u k n n k o n w ow n n an a d nd thu th s u m s o m re o o re pe o n p a e t n tit a u t d ti e tu s d a e ro s u a n r d ou im nd mig m r m ati g o r n a . tion. Another level of the perception of control relates to the wider community: people who feel that the government is in Another level of the perception of control relates to the wider community: people who feel that control of the social and economic processes in the country, including migration – both its inflow and the government is in control of the social and economic processes in the country, including migration migrant’ s inclusion – are likely to feel less threatened about migration. And the third level of control – both its inflow and migrant’s inclusion – are likely to feel less threatened about migration. And the refers to migrants themselves: if someone feels that migrants are agents of their social inclusion and third level of control refers to migrants themselves: if someone feels that migrants are agents of (have the potential to) become contributing members of society, s/he will be less likely to feel their social inclusion and(have the potential to) become contributing members of society, s/he will threatened by migration and thus reject migrants in general. In short, perceptions of control – as be less likely to feel threatened by migration and thus reject migrants in general. applied to citizens, the government and immigrants – have an important impact on attitudes toward i I m n m sh ig o r r a t, nt p s e . r B c a e s p e t d io o n n s t o h f is co th n e tr o o r l y, – w a e s u a s p e p E li S e S d d t a o ta ci t ti o ze a n n s a , ly t s h e e t g h o e v i e m rn p m ac e t n o t f a h n o d w im m m uc i h gr r a e n s t p s o – nd h e a n v t e s p an erc im ei p ve ort t a h n e t m i s m el p v a e c s t t o o n b a e tti in tud co e n s t t r o o w l a o r f d th im ei m r i l g iv r e a s n , ts a . n B d as th e e d o pe n rc th ep is ti t o h n eo o r f y, th w e e d u e s g e re E e SS to da w ta hic to h g a o n v a e ly r s n e m t e h n e t i i m s p in ac c t on o t f ro h l o o w f m m u aj c o h r r s e o s c p ie o t n a d l e a n n t d s e p c e o r n c o e m ive ic t p h r e o m ce s s e s l e v s e , s o t n o a b t e tit in ud c e o s n t t o ro w l a o r f ds th m ei i r gr l a iv n e t s s , . T a h n i d s t w h i e ll p b e e rc m e e p a ti s o u n re o d f i t n h d e ir d e e ct g l r y e , e us to in w g h va ic r h io g u o s v i e n r d n ic m at e o n r t s i o s f in sa c t o is n f t a r c o t l io o n f . m W a e jo a r ls s o oc e ie m t p al lo a y n i d nf e o c r o m n a o t m io i n c o p n ro b c a e s s i s c e i s n , d o iv n id a u tt a i l tu h d u e m s a t n ow va a lu rd e s s: m o i p g e r n an t t o s. ch T a h n is g w e v il s l . b c e on m s e e a rv s a u t r i e v d e, in h d um ire a c n t i l t y a , r u ia s n in v g s. va se ri c o u u ri s ty in -f d o i c c u a s to ed rs . U of n s fo a r ti t s u f n a a c t ti e o ly n , . w W e e w a il l l s n o o e t m be pl a o b y le in t f o or e m xa a m ti i o n n e o th n e b r a o s le ic o i f n t d h iv e id p u er a c l e h p u t m ion an of v m alu ig e r s a : n o ts p a e s n a t g o en ch ts a o n f g t e h v e s ir . i c n o c n lu se si r o v n at i i n ve th , e hu d m ev a e n lo it p a m ria e n nt v o s. f s a e n c t u ir / i p t r y o -f o m c i u g s r e a d nt . U at n ti f t o u r d tu e n s, a a t s el E y S , S w d e o w es ill n n o o t t co b l e le a c b t l s e u t c o h e d x a a ta m . ine the role of the perception of migrants as agents of their inclusion in the development of anti-/promigrant attitudes, as ESS does not collect such data.

14 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 14 3.1 S NAPSHOT ON ATTITUDES . T HE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND REJECTION Firstly, we give an overview of the most recent data(2016/17) concerning a ttit udes towards migrants in Europe, and its two components by country. The Percep ti on Index(PI) represents the cogn iti ve component of a ttitu des, namely how people feel about the consequences of mig rati on and migrants for their countries, while the Rejec ti on Index(RI) embodies the behavioural element of a ttit udes and represents a kind of policy approach: whether respondents would reject the arrival and se ttli ng of migrants in their countries(for details see Chapter 2.2.). The fi gure below summarizes the scores of the two indexes by countries, as C m O ea G sur N ed I i T n I th V e E lat A est N ro D und B o E f t H he A E V SS I s O urv U ey R . AL FIGURE 3 REJECTION VS. PERCEPTION REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES BY COUNTRY ESS R8(2016/17) Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) A USTRIA 20 45 B ELGIUM 9 54 C ZECH R EPUBLIC 31 38 E STONIA 27 46 F INLAND 8 60 F RANCE 13 50 G ERMANY 6 58 H UNGARY 62 34 I RELAND 11 59 I TALY 18 41 L ITHUANIA 25 49 N ETHERLANDS 8 56 N ORWAY 2 57 P OLAND 14 53 P ORTUGAL 8 56 S LOVENIA 14 44 S PAIN 7 57 S WEDEN 2 63 S WITZERLAND 7 59 U NITED K INGDOM 9 57 A VERAGE VALUE FOR 20 COUNTRIES : 12 A VERAGE VALUE FOR 20 COUNTRIES : 53 (Ba s ed on popula ti on weight)

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 1 1 5 5 We see that the overall per cepti on of mig rati on in Europe(green do tt ed line on the right), is on average neutral(53). That is, people see as many advantages as disadvantages to worldwide mobility. We may say that, based on the sole values of the indicator, more countries have a posi ti ve(55+) percep ti on of migra ti on(ten countries altogether) than those which are, on average, nega ti ve(four countries score below 45). As to how people would behave – concerning the Rejec ti on Index – the large-scale picture is that 12% of surveyed Europeans would uncond iti onally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe(see blue do tt ed line on the left). Again, acceptance is a more common a ttit ude than rejec ti on: in ten countries out of twenty, less than 10% of the popu lati on would forbid migrants to se ttle in their countries while, in only four countries is this share higher than 20%. Another noteworthy fact about the chart is how d isti nct the cogni ti ve and behavioural a ttit ude components are. To put it simply: how much do nega ti ve percep ti ons transform into n egati ve policy expect ati ons for individuals? While the cogn iti ve element of a ttit udes(PI) fl uctuates only moderately between countries, its behavioural element(i.e. the rejec ti on of migrants) does show very signi fi cant outliers, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania. Countries with similar levels on the Percep ti on Index may have quite di ff erent levels of rejec ti on(i.e. Lithuania and France, Slovenia and Estonia, Norway and Ireland or Hungary and the Czech Republic). According to Figure 3, general a tti tudes towards migrants in Italy, Austria and Slovenia are rather nega ti ve, but s til l the upfront rejec ti on of migrants and migra ti on is less widespread than in, for example, post-communist Bal tic countries. On the other hand, although in Hungary and the Czech Republic a ttit udes are slightly more nega ti ve than in Austria and Italy, rejec ti on of migrants(from poorer countries outside Europe) di ff ers signi fi cantly in these countries. We suspect that the strength of norms as set by poli ti cal and public discourse is decisive in determining the degree to which nega ti ve a tti tudes are transformed into explicit rejec ti on and exclusion. Also, the rela ti onship between RI and PI does not follow similar pa tt erns in old and new EU member states. Compared to long-term democracies like Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland, in countries such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania, nega ti ve a tti tudes are more likely to be turned into nega ti ve policy expecta ti ons. It is also important to note that overall country-level percep ti on and rejec ti on has no direct connec ti on to the actual share of nonEU28 migrants. In most European countries their share varies from less than 1% to 6-8%, but this is not refle cted in the level of per cepti on and rejec ti on.(Figure 4) FIGURE 4 PERCEPTION AND REJECTION INDEX VS. SHARE OF NON-EU28 MIGRANT POPULATION ESS R8(2016/17) Perception Index (RI) Rejec ti on Index (RI) 65 SE FI 60 IE NO DE CH 55 NL UK ES PL PT BE 50 FR LT 60 HU 50 40 CZ 45 AT SL 40 IT CZ 35 HU 30 EE 30 LT EE AT 20 IT SL IE FR 10 PL PT UK ES DE CH BE NL FI 0 NO SE 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% Share of non-EU28 migrant popula ti on(as of January 1, 2017) Share of non-EU28 migrant popula ti on(as of January 1, 2017)

16 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 16 3.2 A TTITUDES BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2015 MASS INFLOW OF REFUGEES Change in the rejection of migrants Considering the events of the 2015 migra ti on crisis, the following ques ti on arises: How did the in fl ow of asylum seekers affe ct a ttit udes towards mig rati on? Based on the last two cons ecuti ve rounds of ESS data from 19 countries, the level of rejec ti on between 2014/15(before the fl ow of mass migra ti on to Europe occurred) and 2016/17(a fter the migra ti on shock) has signi fi cantly decreased in Europe: from 15% to 10% of the popu lati on rejec ti ng the arrival and se tt ling of migrants from poorer countries outside Europe. Certainly, there are important di ff erences between countries, but the actual exposure to the in fl ow of asylum seekers in 2015-16 has limited explanatory power. Results show that out of 19 countries, nine saw no signi fi cant change in the share of people uncondi ti onally reje ctin g the idea of migrants se ttli ng in their countries. These countries include post-communist states such as the C z e ch R epublic, Estoni a, L ith uania and Po land, where an ti-migrant a ttit udes had been rela ti vely strong earlier, and countries in the centre of the con ti nent such as German y, A us tria and S witzerland and the Nordic countries( Nor way and Sweden ) where reje cti on was already very low(making it almost impossible to decrease further). FIGURE 5 CHANGE OF REJECTION INDEX(RI) BETWEEN E C S h S a R n 7 ge (2 o 0 f 1 R 4/ e 1 je 5) c t A i o N n D I E n S d S e R x 8 ( ( R 2 I 0 ) 1 b 6 e / t 1 w 7) een 2014/15 and 2016/17 100 +14 90 80 +3 +2 +1 -2 -1 +0 -1-1 +0 70 62 -5-5 -7 -5 -7 -10 -9 60 -13 -13 48 50 40 30 28 31 29 27 26 25 18 20 19 18 21 18 22 21 20 13 14 14 13 15 13 14 11 9 9 8 8 8 77 7 76 10 3 2 22 0 more rejetci on l e ss rejecti on RI:Round7(2014/15) RI: Round8(2016/17) RI: Change between R7-R8 In another nine countries out of 19 there has been a considerable decrease in the share of those who uncond iti onally reject migrants arriving from poorer countries outside Europe and se ttl ing in their countries. These include Spain, P or tugal, Belgiu m, the Nethe rlands and F r a nce. Remarkably, the largest drops in rejec ti on were recorded in the United Kingdom and Ir eland(13% and 10% respec ti vely), countries where immigra ti on, especially from Eastern European countries, was sub stantia l from 2004 on, and later became a cri ti cal issue in domes ti c poli ti cs. Among all countries surveyed there is only one in which the share of those who reject migrants has increased signi fi cantly. This is H ungar y , where rejec ti on was by far the highest even before 2015(48%). Now, uniquely in Europe, almost two thirds of the popu lati on would reject without further considera ti on the se ttli ng of all migrants from poorer countries outside Europe.

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 1 1 7 7 Change in perception of migration As for the cogni ti ve component of a ttitu des, we see very similar changes, tho ugh with smaller ampli tu des. The Percep ti on Index(PI) shows a similar seq u ence of co un tries. Changes from 2014/15 to 2016/17 have a similar d irecti on, tho ugh with less intensity than the Rejec ti on Index: signi fi cant (over 5%) increases in the level of fear are recorded only in Hungar y , and Estonia , while in the UK, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Belgi u m , a considerable increase in posi ti ve a ttitu des are observed. FIGURE 6 CHANGE OF PERCEPTION INDEX(PI) BETWEEN E C S h S a R n 7 g ( e 2 o 01 f 4 P / e 1 r 5 c ) e A p N ti o D n ES In S d R e 8 x ( ( 2 P 0 I 1 ) 6 b / e 1 t 7 w ) een 2014/15 and 2016/17 100 90 +7 +8 +7 80 +1 +0 +4 -1 +1 +2 +4 -1 +1 -1 -3 -3 -2 -3 70 66 63 -5 -7 59 60 60 58 59 59 58 58 57 57 57 57 56 60 53 54 54 55 54 54 52 50 49 50 50 49 46 45 50 49 51 48 47 44 38 38 41 40 34 30 20 10 0 more pos itive more nega tive PI:Ro und 7(2014/15) PI: Ro und 8(2016/17) PI: Change between R7-R8 FIGURE 7 CHANGE IN PERCEPTION(PI)& REJECTION(RI) INDEXES BETWEEN ESS R7(2014/15) AND ESS R8(2016/17) PERCEPTION INDEX REJECTION INDEX NEGATIVE POSITIVE change in percep ti on INCREASE of rejec ti on DECREASE –2,7 +0 +1,1 +0,7 –4,9 –2,7 +6,6 +8,3 +2,1 –0,9 +3,7 –0,8 –0,8 +1,2 +0,2 –2,5 –7,2 –2,8 –7 –1 –2 –1 –10 –13 –5 –9 –1 +1 +3 –5 +0 +2 +14 –5 +7,4 +3,6 –13 –7 The nu mbers refer to the absol u te change of PI and RI between R7 and R8. Sta ti s ti cally signi fi cant changes are marked with frames.

18 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 18 Whose attitudes have changed? Drivers of attitude change Looking into the pro fi les of those countries where a signi fi cant change in a ttit udes towards migrants has occurred since 2014/15, we may be able to iden ti fy some of the poten tial f actors that might have contributed to quick and sharp changes of a tti tudes. P o rtugal and Spain are countries in which the popu lati on, on average, became signi fi cantly more favourable towards migrants, in terms of both the cogn iti ve and behavioural components of their a tti tudes. We see that although all demographic groups became more acc epti ng of migrants, still the change is larger among older, less-well educated, rural people who are on the lowest ladder of the income scale.(Figure 8) Exploring subjec ti ve measures of the society’s state of welfare, we see very important varia ti ons that could explain changes of a ttit udes. Feelings of both the Spanish and Portuguese popu lati on have become more favourable: people have a somewhat higher level of trust and are somewhat more satisfie d with public services such as educa ti on and the health system. The greatest improvement, however, relates to the evalu ati on of the government, the economy and democracy in general. Compared to 2014/15, people in Spai n are 25% more satisfie d with the working of the economy and 21% more sa tisfie d with the government, while 36% of Portuguese are more sa tisfie d with how the economy and democracy performs and 67% are more satisfi ed with the government. Thus, based on the theory of control, people in these countries feel that they have – to certain extent – regained control over their country’s poli tica l and economic ope rati on. FIGURE 8 CHANGES IN REJECTION INDEX(RI) BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS BETWEEN ESS R7(2014/15) AND ESS R8(2016/17) IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN S TATUS I NCOME QUANTILE S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER S PAIN R EJECTION I NDEX (R OUND 8- 2016/2017) C HANGE R OUND 7-8 Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 7-6 7-9 1-8 7-2 5-6 7-4 6-7 10-8 12-13 11-8 5-4 2-5 6-6 7-2 8-11 6-4 7-8 10-5 6 -14 11 -9 8 -8 6 -7 2-8 4+0 6-4 2-3 7-8 10-13 12-8 P ORTUGAL R EJECTION I NDEX (R OUND 8- 2016/2017) C HANGE R OUND 7-8 G ENDER A GE P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 6 9 0 4 5 6 8 13 10 12 3 3 6 7 10 2 5 12 13 10 8 3 2 7 1 12 10 8 -14 -13 -8 -6 -19 -8 -15 -10 -21 -15 -9 -3 -12 -13 -13 -7 -12 -13 23-17 -16 -12 -3 -12 -5 -13 -5 -6 -17 -13 S UBJECTIVE INCOME I NCOME QUANTILE S TATUS In I I r r e e l l a nd w w e e s s e e e e a a sim sim ila il r ar ph p e h n e o n m om en e o n n on (F ( ig Fi u g r u e re 9) 9 : ) a : lt a h l o th u o g u h g a h ll a d ll em de o m gr o a g p r h ap ic h g ic ro g u r p o s up b s ec b a e m ca e m m e o m re ore accep ti ng g o o f f m m ig ig ra ra n n ts ts , , th th e e la l r a g r e g s e t s c t h c a h n a g n e g i e s o is b o se b r s v e e r d ve a d m a o m ng on th g e t a h r e e a m re os m t v o u s l t n v e u ra ln b e le ra g b r l o e up g s ro i u n p s s oc in iety: r s e o t c i i r e e t d y , : e r l e d t e ire ly d p , eo ld p e le rly re p p e o o rt p i l n e g r ev p e o r r y t d in a g y e fi v n e a r n y c d ial y d f i i ffi na c n u c l t i i a e l s d . ifficulties.

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS FIGURE 9 CHANGES IN REJECTION INDEX(RI) BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS BETWEEN ESS R7(2014/15) AND ESS R8(2016/17) IN THE UK AND IRELAND 1 1 9 9 19 U F NI I TE G D URE 9 R EJECTION I NDEX (R OUND 8- 2016/2017) C HANGE R OUND 7-8 I RELAND R EJECTION I NDEX (R OUND 8- 2016/2017) CHANGES IN REJECTION INDEX(RI) BY DEMOGRAPHC GROUPS K INGDOM BETWEEN ESS R7(2014/15) AND ESS R8(2016/17) IN THE UK AND IRELAND C HANGE R OUND 7-8 G ENDER G ENDER Male 10-12 Male 11-12 Female 9-13 Female 11-8 S I T N A C T O US ME QUANTILE S U I B N JE C C O TI M V E E I Q N U C A O N M TI E LE P LACE S O U F BJE E CT D I U V C E ATIO P L N ACE OF E DUCA A TI GE ON G EN A D G E E R U NITED K INGDOM LIVING INCOME LIVING 14-19 6 R EJECTION I NDEX (R 20 O U 29 ND 8- 20 6 16/2017) 30-39 8 4 M 0a 4 le 9 6 10 Fe 5 m 0a 5 le 9 8 9 6 14 0 1 6 9 9 6 11 20 7 0 2 + 9 6 20 Low educ 3 a 0 ti o 3 n 9 8 17 Medium educ 4 a 0 ti o 4 n 9 6 9 High educ 5 a 0 ti o 5 n 9 4 8 Metrop 6 o 0 lit a 6 n 9 8 11 To 7 w 0 n + 10 20 Low edu V c i a ll t a io g n e 10 17 Living comfortably M on ed p i r u e m sen e t du in c c a o t m ion e 9 9 Coping on p H r i e g s h en ed t u in c c a o ti m on e 4 9 Di ffi cult on pre M se e n tr t o i p nc o o lit m a e n 8 15 Very di ffi cult on present inc T o o m w e n 9 10 Vil F la ir g s e t 1 1 0 1 Living comfortably on present i S n e c c o o m nd e 9 12 Coping on present inc T o h m ir e d 7 9 Difficult on present in F c o o u m rt e h 7 15 Very difficult on present inc F o i m fth e 6 9 Paid w F o ir r s k t 8 11 Edu Se ca c t o i n o d n 3 12 Unempl T o h y i e r d d 7 8 R F e o t u i r r e t d h 7 14 Other inac F t i i f v th e 6 12 Paid work 8 -8 C HANGE R O -1 U 0 ND 7-8 -8 -18 -12 1 1 3 3 -16 -8 -10 -8 -13 -8 -1 8 16 -13 -9 -16 -11 -13 -8 -1 -1 4 3 -16 -8 -14 -9 -15 -11 -31 -13 -18 -14 8 8 -18 -14 -15 -12 -31 -6 -18 -12 -8 -5 -18 -15 -1 -1 3 2 -12 -6 -12 S I T N A C T O US ME QUANTILE S U I B N JE C C O TI M V E E I Q N U C A O N M TI E LE P LACE S O U F BJE E CT D I U V C E ATIO P L N ACE OF E DUCA A TI GE ON G EN A D G E E R I RELAND LIVING INCOME LIVING 14-19 5-6 R EJECTION I NDEX (R 20 O U 29 ND 8- 201 7 6/2017) -1 C 3 HANGE R OUND 7-8 30-39 10-7 4 M 0a 4 le 9 9 11-1 2 11 Fe 5 m 0a 5 le 9 1 1 1 2 -8 8 6 14 0 1 6 9 9 5 14-9 -6 20 7 0 2 + 9 7 18-1 4 13 Low educ 3 a 0 ti o 3 n 9 10 21-9 -7 Medium educ 4 a 0 ti o 4 n 9 9 12 -11 -7 High educ 5 a 0 ti o 5 n 9 4 12 -9 -8 Metrop 6 o 0 lit a 6 n 9 9 14 -10 -9 To 7 w 0 n + 11 18-14 -12 Low edu V c i a ll t a io g n e 13 21-9 -8 Living comfortably M on ed p i r u e m sen e t du in c c a o t m ion e 4 12 -10 -7 Coping on p H r i e g s h en ed t u in c c a o ti m on e 4 13 -9 -6 Di ffi cult on pre M se e n tr t o i p nc o o lit m a e n 9 17-12 -10 Very di ffi cult on present inc T o o m w e n 11 26-19 -12 Vil F la ir g s e t 13 18-12 -8 Living comfortably on present i S n e c c o o m nd e 4 15 -10 -6 Coping on present inc T o h m ir e d 7 13 -11 -6 Difficult on present in F c o o u m rt e h 4 17-12 -10 Very difficult on present inc F o i m fth e 1 -1296 -9 Paid w F o ir r s k t 9 18-1 2 11 Edu Se ca c t o i n o d n 6 15 -6 6 Unempl T o h y i e r d d 7 17 -11 -6 R F e o t u i r r e t d h 4 13-13 -10 Other inac F t i i f v th e 1 16 -9 -8 Paid work 9-11 Education 3-5 Education 6-6 S TATUS S TATUS Unemployed 8-15 Unemployed 17-6 A s s o o m m e e w w h h a a t t d d i ff if e fe r R r e e e ti n re n d t t p p ic i t c u t r u e r 14 e em em er e g r e g s e o s f o 13 t f he th U e K U : t K h : e th la e rg l e a s r t ge c s h t an c g h e an is R g eti e m red i e s as m u e re a d 1 s 3 u a r m ed on a g m -13 r o u n ra g l, r w ur o a r l k , ing Other inactive 12-12 Other inactive 16-8 a w g o e rk p in e g op a l g e e w p h e o p a le re w n h o o l a o r n e g n e o r y lo o n u g n e g r , y w o h u o ng p , o w s h se o ss po m ss o e d s e s ra m te od e e d r u at c e a t e i o d n uc a a n ti d on ex a p n e d ri ex n p ce ri fi e n n a c n e cial d fi i n ffi a c n u c l i t a ie l s di o ff n ic a ul d ti a e il s y o b n as a is; d t a h il i y s i b s a t s h i e s; d t e h m is o i g s ra th p e hic de th m a o t g v r o a t p e h d ic fo t r h B a r t e v x o it te to d t f h o e r l B a re ge xi s t t t e o xt t e h n e t. la (A rg la e b s r t ese A somewhat different picture emerges of the UK: the largest change is measured among rural, working et xt a e l n 2 t 0 . 1 (A 8; la o b r re Ec se on e o t m al is 2 t 0 2 1 3 8 . ; 0 o 2. r 2 E 0 c 1 o 9 n 6 o ) m In i t s h t e 2 s 3 e .0 t 2 w . o 20 c 1 o 9 u 6 n ) t I r n ie t s h , e h s o e w t e w v o er c , o w u e nt d r o ies n , o h t o s w ee ev a e s r i , m w i e la d r o in n cr o e t ase age people who are no longer young, who possess moderate education and experience financial i s n ee sa a tisf i a m c i t l i a o r n in w c i r t e h a t s h e e in ec s o a n t o is m fa y ct o io r n go w v i e t r h nm th e e n e ta c l o p n e o r m fo y rm or an g c o e ve a r s n w m e en d t o al in p S e p rf a o in rm a a n n d c P e o a rt s u w ga e l, d n o o i r n any difficulties on a daily basis; this is the demographic that voted for Brexit to the largest extent.(Alabrese s S o p c a i i e n tal n o d r P g o o r v t e u r g n a a l n , n ce or fa a c n t y or so th c a ie t t c a o l 6 u o l r d g e o x v p e la rn in an th c e c fa h c a t n o g r e th in a a t t c t o it u u l d d e e s x . p W la e in th t e h r e e c fo h r a e n t g e e n i d n t a o tt a it g u r d ee s w . ith et al 2018; or Economist 23.02.2019) In these two countries, however, we do not see a similar increase i W nt e er t p h r e e r t e a f t o i o r n e s t t e h n a d t t t h o is a m gr a e s e siv w e it c h ha i ng te e r i p n re a ta ti t t i u o d n e s s t t h o a w t a t r h d i s s m m ig a r s a s n iv t e s m ch a a y n b g e e a i t n le a a t s ti t tu p d ar e t s ia t l l o y w d a o r w ds n to in satisfaction with the economy or governmental performance as we do in Spain and Portugal, nor any w m h ig a r t a w nt e s r m ef a e y r t b o e a a s t p l o e s a t s -B t r p e a x r it i v a o ll t y e d s ow be n ri t n o g: w N h a a m t e w ly e t r h e a f t er al to ho a u s g p h o t s h t e -B B r r e e x x i i t t v v o o te w so a b s e t r o in a g g : r N eat m d e e l g y ree societal or governance factor that could explain the change in attitudes. We therefore tend to agree with tr h i a gg t e a r l e th d o b u y gh fe t a h r e o B f r m ex ig it ra v n o t t s e ( w al a so s t e o m a p g h r a e s a iz t e d d e a g n re d e se tr n ig sa g t e i o re n d al b iz y ed fe b a y r o th f e m m ig a ra ss nt m s e (a d l i s a o 7 ), emp an h y as r i e z a e l d ized interpretations that this massive change in attitudes towards migrants may be at least partially down to t a h n e d p s o e t n e s n a tia o l n ly al g iz ra e v d e b c y o t n h s e eq m u a e s n s c m es e o d f ia t 7 h ) e , m U a K n ’s y e re xi a t li f z r e o d m th th e e p E o U ten an ti d all g y a g th ra e v r e d co o n v s e e r q t u h e e n c c o e u s r o se f t o h f e the what we refer to as post-Brexit vote sobering: Namely that although the Brexit vote was to a great degree l U e K n ’ g s th ex y it an fr d o p m ai t n h f e ul E c U ou a r n s d e o ga f t t her B e r d e o xi v t e n r e t g h o e ti c a o ti u o r n s s e t o h f at h m e ig le ra n t g i o th n y a a lo n n d e p c a a i nn fu o l t c b o e u b rs la e 7 m o e f d th fo e r B t r h e e xi U t K’s triggered by fear of migrants(also emphasized and sensationalized by the mass media), many realized p n r e o g b o l t e ia m ti s o . ns that migration alone cannot be blamed for the UK’s problems. the potentially grave consequences of the UK’ s exit from the EU and gathered over the course of the l A e s ng fo th r y H a u n n d ga p r a y i , nf w u h l c e o re ur a s l e re o a f d t y he ve B r r y ex n it e n ga e t g i o ve tia a t t i t o i n tu s d t e h s at to m w ig a r r a d t s io m n i a g l r o a n n e ts ca h n a n v o e t b b e e c b o l m am e e e d ve fo n r m th o e r U e K’s p h r o o s b ti l l e e m , w s. e see that all d d emograph ic gro ups may be c c haracter ized by a h h o o mogeneou sly h igh an d increasin n g g l l e e v v e e l l s s o o f f f f e e a a r r a a n n d d re re je je c t c i t o io n n . . As for Hungary, where already very negative attitudes towards migrants have become even more hostile, we see that all demographic groups may be characterized by a homogeneously high and increasing levels of fear and rejection. 6 h tt ps://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/02/23/b riti sh-voters-are-unimpressed-by-theresa-maysbrexit-deal 7 Clarke, H. D., Goodwin, M.,& Whiteley, P.(2017). Why Britain voted for Brexit: an individual-level analysis of t 6 h h e tt 2 p 0 s 1 :/ 6 /w re w fe w re .e n c d o u n m om vo is t t e .c . o P m ar / l g ia r m ap e h n ic ta -d ry et A a ff il/ a 2 ir 0 s 1 , 9 7 / 0 0 ( 2 3 / ), 2 p 3 p /b . r 4 i 3 ti 9 sh -4 6 vo 4 t . ers-are-unimpressed-by-theresa-maysb So re g x e i l t o -d la e , a D l .(2018). Brexit, Agenda Se tti ng and Framing of Immigra tio n in the Media: The Case of the Daily Mail. 7 LS C E la U rk n e d , e H rg . r D a . d , u G a o t o e d P w o i l n it , i c M al ., R & ev W ie h w it , e 1 l , e p y, p P . . 1 ( 2 2 8 0 17 4 ) 2 . Why Britain voted for Brexit: an individual-level analysis of the 2016 referendum vote. Parliamentary Affairs , 70 (3), pp. 439-464. Sogelola, D.(2018). Brexit, Agenda Setting and Framing of Immigration in the Media: The Case of the Daily Mail. LSE Undergraduate Political Review , 1 , pp. 128-142

20 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 20 FIGURE 10 CHAN G E S IN RE JE C TION INDEX( RI) BY DEMOGRAPHI C C G G R R O O U U P P S S BETWEEN ESS R7(2014/15) AND ESS R8(2016/17) IN AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY A USTRIA R EJECTION I NDEX (R OUND 8- 2016/2017) C HANGE R OUND 7-8 G ENDER A GE P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low education Medium education High education Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Difficult on present income Very difficult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fifth Paid work Education Unemployed Retired Other inactive 23 17 13 19 24 19 19 20 22 29 21 9 18 17 23 19 19 25 38 29 20 19 18 9-6 20 5 34 22 12-6 +3 +0 +7 -1 +6 +1 +0 +1 +2 +6 +1 +3 +2 +0 +1 +4 +1 -1 +4 +9 +0 +4 +8 +2 +2 +4 +2 S UBJECTIVE INCOME I NCOME QUANTILE S TATUS H UNGARY R EJECTION I NDEX (R OUND 8- 2016/2017) G ENDER A GE P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low education Medium education High education Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Difficult on present income Very difficult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fifth Paid work Education Unemployed Retired Other inactive 63 62 56 62 61 65 58 64 65 65 64 51 61 59 67 54 62 62 68 64 58 66 63 63 63 48 45 66 61 S UBJECTIVE INCOME I NCOME QUANTILE S TATUS C HANGE R OUND 7-8 +14 +16 +14 +26 +15 +17 +9 +15 +8 +10 +16 +12 +16 +11 +18 +12 +17 +14 +7 +9 +8 +23 +14 +17 +18 +6 -4 +13 +16 Ho wever, , t t h h e change is alarming as the homogeneously extreme level of rejection and f ear in Hun g ary i s a result of i i ncreasing host ility am ong gr oups which h a d earl ier bee n mor e accep ting of migr ants, and whi ch f orm the mo st able p ar t o f th e so ci ety and its future : th e yo u ng(20 2 9 y ears old), upper middle class, metropoli i t t a a n n cit t i i z z e e n n s s . . T T h h u u s s , , t t h h e e incr r e e a a s s e e in n hostili i t t y y is diff i cult to exp lain i n terms of e e c c onomic hardship or co mpet i t i on theory. Al so, if we c c h h e e ck s s u u b b j j ect t i i ve f f a a c c tors t t h h a a t m m i i g g h h t t i i n n f f l l u u e e nce a a c c c c eptance of mig rants ac cording to th eories descri i b b e e d d i i n n Chap p t t e e r r 2.4 4 , , we see that t he gene rally l ow leve l of trust and ver y low level o o f s s o o c c i i a a l e e m m b b e e ddedne ss (low numbe r of p p ersonal connec t i ons an d activi t i es) m a y explain some of th e differenc es of at t t t i i tudes compare d to other Europea n coun tries. However, the differences in th ese ch aracteristic c s s from m other EU member-states are not la rge en ough to explai n the extremely large gap in at t t t i i tudes towards migrants betwee n Hungary and the rest o o f f E E u u r r o o p p e e . . As we postulated in our previous research, the hostile attitudes towards migrants in Hungary may be As we postulated in our previous research, the hostile attitudes towards migrants in Hungary may attributed to several intersecting factors: low number of migrants and consequently a lack of contact, be attributed to several intersecting factors: low number of migrants and consequently a lack of personal experience and knowledge about migrants, together with the generally low levels of trust contact, personal experience and knowledge about migrants, together with the generally low levels and social cohesion which characterise Hungarian society. A society in such a state has proved an of trust and social cohesion which characterise Hungarian society. A society in such a state has extremely fertile terrain for the manipulative, anti-migrant propaganda that the Hungarian proved an extremely fertile terrain for the manipulative, anti-migrant propaganda that the Hungarian government put into action in early 2015 and has kept operating since then. This propaganda includes government put into action in early 2015 and has kept operating since then. This propaganda elements of false public consultation with manipulative questions supporting widespread negative includes elements of false public consultation with manipulative questions supporting widespread beliefs, multiple and extensive publicity campaigns explicitly raising fear of migrants, and biased, negative beliefs, multiple and extensive publicity campaigns explicitly raising fear of migrants, and extremely intense and hostile government discourse and media coverage of migrants by probiased, extremely intense and hostile government discourse and media coverage of migrants by progovernment media. By now(as of 2018) the government has succeeded in presenting migrants as the government media. By now(as of 2018) the government has succeeded in presenting migrants as preeminent threat to the Hungarian nation, and convinced a large share of the population that the preeminent threat to the Hungarian nation, and convinced a large share of the population that rejecting migrants and migration in general is not only morally acceptable but also a patriotic and rejecting migrants and migration in general is not only morally acceptable but also a patriotic and advantageous act.(Cantat and Rajajam 2018, Bernáth and Messing 2015 and 2016; Georgiou and advantageous act.(Cantat and Rajajam 2018, Bernáth and Messing 2015 and 2016; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017) Zaborowski 2017)

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS 3.3 B IRDS ’ EYE VIEW : ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES ATTITUDES ACROSS TIME 2 2 1 1 21 3 In .3 orde B r IR to D u S ’ n E d Y er E st V a I n E d W lo : n A g N e A rL t Y er S m IS t O re F n T d H s E in CH at A ti N tu G d E e S c A h T a T n I g T e U w D e ES in A c C re R a O se S d S T th IM e E time span of our analysis to capture the transformations that might have taken place in the last decade and a half. Figure 1In1 obredloewr tsohouwndsethrsetaonvderlaolnl rgeesru-tltesrmforttrheendpsopinulattioitnusdeofc1h5ancoguenwtreiesinpcarertaicseipdattihneg itnimalel esipgahnt roofunodusr oanf athlyesissutrovecaypbteutrweetheent2r0a0n2sf/o3rmanadti2o0n1s6t/h1a7t.m 8 ight have taken place in the last decade and a half. Figure 11 below shows the overall results for the populations of 15 countries participating in all eight rounds Figures 11 indicate a great deal of stability in the 8 Perception Index(PI)(cognitive element of attitudes) of the survey between 2002/3 and 2016/17. ranging between 51 and 55 points on a 100-point scale. This score shows that, in general, people in Europe have judged migration to have advantages and disadvantages in roughly equal measure, and Figures 11 indicate a great deal of stability in the Perception Index(PI)(cognitive element of attitudes) there are no significant changes in terms of how attitudes are formed by symbolic and existential ranging between 51 and 55 points on a 100-point scale. This score shows that, in general, people in elements. Both the 2008 economic crisis and the mass arrival of refugees in 2015 have not changed Europe have judged migration to have advantages and disadvantages in roughly equal measure, and the generally stable and neutral attitudes to migrants and migration in 15 Europen countries from a there are no significant changes in terms of how attitudes are formed by symbolic and existential macro perspective. Similarly, the direction of attitudes in terms of material versus symbolic elements elements. Both the 2008 economic crisis and the mass arrival of refugees in 2015 have not changed (see page 7) shows meaningful differences only between the first and last rounds of the survey, the generally stable and neutral attitudes to migrants and migration in 15 Europen countries from a suggesting no evidence of any major or rapid shift. Furthermore, the Rejection Index(RI) varies across macro perspective. Similarly, the direction of attitudes in terms of material versus symbolic elements a limited range, reaching its maximum(15%) in 2014/15, and its minimum(10%) in 2002/3 and in (see page 7) shows meaningful differences only between the first and last rounds of the survey, 2016/17. suggesting no evidence of any major or rapid shift. Furthermore, the Rejection Index(RI) varies across a limited rangeC,HrAeNacGhEinINg iPtEsRmCaExPiTmIOuNmA(N15D%R)EiJnEC2T0I1O4N/15, and its minimum(10%) in 2002/3 and in FIGURE 11 2016/17. BETWEEN ESS R7(2014/15) AND ESS R8(2016/17) FIGURE 11 CHANGE IN PERCEPTION AND REJECTION 52 BETWEEN 5 E 1 SS R7(2014/ 5 15) AND ESS 5 R 3 8(2016/17) 52 54 53 55 11% 10% 12% 12% 11% 11% 12% 14% 52 51 51 53 52 54 53 55 more material 55% 11% 58% 10% 6 1 0 2 % % 5 1 8 2 % % 6 1 0 1 % % 5 1 8 1 % % 5 1 8 2 % % 6 1 1 4 % neutral more symbolic more material 55% 58% 60% 58% 60% 58% 58% neutral 34% 33% 28% 30% 29% 31% 30% 61% 25% Pe rce p tio nmo I r n e d s e y x mbolic REJECTIREOJENCTIONPERCEPTEIROCENPTION 34% 33% 28% 30% 29% 31% 30% 25% Pe rce p tio nIndex 10 15 15 13 14 14 15 10 Round 1 (201002/3) Rou1n5d 2 (2004/5) Rou 1 n 5 d 3 (2006/7) Rou 1 n 3 d 4 (2008/9) Rou 1 n 4 d 5 (2010/11) Rou 1 n 4 d 6 (2012/13) Rou 1 n 5 d 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (201 1 6 0 /17) Re je ctio nIndex Re je ctio nIndex Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Looking at (2 t 0 h 02 e /3) overa (2 l 0 l 0 c 4/ h 5) ange (2 o 00 f 6/ t 7 h ) e be ( h 20 a 08 v / i 9 o ) ural (2 c 01 o 0 m /11 p ) one (2 n 01 t 2/ o 13 f ) attit (2 u 01 d 4/ e 1 s 5) (Rej ( e 20 c 16 t / i 1 o 7) n Index) we see a somewhat smaller but still significant level of stability, with a 5% increase in refusal from 2002 to 2004 and a 5% increase of acceptance around Europe from 2014/15 to 2016/17. The lowest share of refusal Looking at the overall change of the behavioural component of attitudes(Rejection Index) we see a somewhat smaller but still significant level of stability, with a 5% increase in refusal from 2002 to 2004 8 an Th d e a c 5 ou % n i t n ri c e r s e i a n s c e lu o de f a B c e c lg e i p u t m a , n S c w e i a tz r e o r u la n n d d, E G u e r r o m p a e n f y r , o S m pa 2 in 0 , 1 F 4 in / l 1 a 5 nd to , F 2 ra 0 n 1 c 6 e / , 1 U 7 n . i T te h d e K lo in w gd e o s m t s , h H a u r n e g o ar f y r , efusal Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia. Any indicators calculated for these 15 countries are far from an“European average,” and as such, any generalizing conclusions describing the E 8 uTrhoepceoaunnstirtiueastiinocnluhdaeveBetolgbiuemfo, Srmwiutlzaetreladnwdi,tGhecramutainoyn,. Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia. Any indicators calculated for these 15 countries are far from an“European average,” and as such, any generalizing conclusions describing the European situation have to be formulated with caution.

22 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 22 was measured in 2002(10,4% of the popula ti on rejected migrants from poorer countries outside Europe) which has increased to 15% by 2004/05, triggered most likely by the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 with ten new – rela ti vely poor, mostly post-communist – countries. It is likely that insecuri ti es a ttached to the enlargement and its effe ct on migra ti on fl ows, as well as unclear consequences for the economy, labour market and general European norms, had an important role in the slightly rising rejec ti on of mig rati on. Between 2004 and 2012 the share of those reje ctin g migra ti on remained stable. Looking into this index we may fi nd again that the refugee crisis of 2015 has not brought about increasing refusal within Europe, while in contrast the share of people who would accept migrants from poorer countries from outside Europe increased somewhat from 2014/15 to 2016/17. Based on the overall data for 15 European countries over a period of 15 years, we argue that the overall percep ti on of migra ti on, and also the propor ti on of those suppor ti ng the explicit rejec ti on of migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe, has not changed radically. In add iti on to the overall European picture, it is also important to look at how a tti tudes have fl uctuated in each country. Based on the levels and changes in the behavioural component of a ttit udes(Rejec ti onIndex) we d isti nguished between four groups of countries:(1) those countries in which the acceptance of migrants has always been high and has not changed signi fi cantly over the course of the examined time period;(2) those countries in which the level of r ejecti on was modest with some fl uctua tion;(3) countries where acceptance towards migrants has been rela ti vely low but has very signi fi cantly increased a ft er 2014/15;(4) countries with increasing levels of refusal. In the fi rst group of countries, the general a ttit ude towards migrants has, by European standards, been con ti nuously very po siti ve since 2002, independently of whether we look at behavioural or cogn iti ve components.(Figure 12) The common characte risti c of these countries is that they are the wealthiest socie ties on the con ti nent, with a r elati vely high share of immigrants(16,5% in S weden, 12% in Norway , and 18% in Switzerla n d ), although in contrast to Nor wa y and Sweden , Switzerland is not a welfare state, and their migra ti on policies also di ff er to a great extent: S wit ze rland is among those countries which score low on the Migrant Integra ti on Policy Index(MIPEX), while Nordic countries typically o ff er a great deal of services and inclusion support to newcomers. FIGURE 12 COUNTRIES WITH STABLE POSITIVE ATTITUDES AND ACCEPTING MIGRANTS REJECTION-INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1(2002/2003) AND ESS R8(2016/2017) 60 N ORWAY S WEDEN 50 S WITZERLAND 40 Rejection Index (RI), % 30 20 10 0 R OUND 1 (2002) R OUND 2 (2004) R OUND 3 (2006) R OUND 4 (2008) R OUND 5 (2010) R OUND 6 (2012) R OUND 7 (2014) R OUND 8 (2016)

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS The second group of countries are those in which attitudes towards migrants have been moderate, and have fluctuated over the past 15 years. This group includes such traditional destination countries as Germany , S pai n, the Netherlands, B e lgium or France , 9 as well as Sloveni a, Po land and Finland. The second group of countries are those in which attitudes towards migrants have been moderate, and have fluctuCaOtUedNToRveIErSthWeITpHasMt 1O5DyEeSaTrsL.ETVhEiLs OgrFoRuEpJEinCcTluIOdNesWsuITcHh tSrOadMitEioFnLaUlCdTeUstAinTaIOtiNon countries FIGURE 13 9 as Germany, Sp R a EJ i E n C , T t I h O e NN IN e D t E h X e B rl E a T n W d E s E , N B E e S l S gi R u 1 m (20 o 0 r 2 F /2 ra 00 n 3 c ) e A , ND a E s S w S R e 8 ll ( a 2 s 01 S 6 l / o 2 v 0 e 1 n 7) ia, Poland and Finland. 2 2 3 3 23 Rejection InRdejeexc(tiRIo),n I%ndex (RI), % 60 FIGURE 13 50 60 40 50 30 40 COUNTRIES WITH MODEST LEVEL OF REJECTION WITH SO B M elg E ium FLUCTUATI F O in N land REJECTION-INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1(2002/2003) AND ESS R8(2016/20 F 1 ra 7 n ) ce Netherlands Slovenia Belgium Germany France Spain Finland Poland Netherlands Slovenia Spain Germany Poland 20 30 13 14 10 9 20 7 7567 0 10 R OUND 1 (20702) R OUND 2 (20904) R OUND 3 (20706) R OUND 4 (2008) 5 R OUND 5 (2010) 6 R OUND 6 (20712) 13 R OUND 7 (2014) 14 R OUND 8 (2016) 0 The rejectio R n OUN in D 1 dex in R t O h U e ND s 2 e coun R t O r U i N e D s 3 has f l R u O c U t N u D 4 ated, , R r O a U n ND g 5 ing be R tw OU e ND e 6 n appr R o OU x N i D m 7 ately y R 7 O % UND a 8 nd 20%, (2002)(2004)(2006)(2008)(2010)(2012)(2014)(2016) but with the exception of Poland it has decreased since the 2015 refugee cris s i i s s . . B B y y and large we see three small peaks s in the curves represen n t t in n g g att i tudes. . One peak is in 2004(extended to 2006), the The rejection index in these countries has fluctuated, ranging between approximately 7% and 20%, second in 2008-10 0 and a third in 201 4. Flu ctuat i ons may be explain ed by countryspecific and E uropebut with the exception of Poland it has decreased since the 2015 refugee crisis. By and large we see level factors. The increas s e e in n the refusal of migration and d migrants s in 2004 4 is probab b l l y y du u e e to the fear three small peaks in the curves representing attitudes. One peak is in 2004(extended to 2006), the and uncertain n t t y y resul l t t i i n n g g from the massive enlargemen n t t of the Eu ropean Un ion a nd its conseque nces second in 2008-10 and a third in 2014. Fluctuations may be explained by country-specific and Europefor domestic labour markets. . The increase e in refusal was especially y shar r p p in Germ m a a n n y y , where it d oubled level factors. The increase in the refusal of migration and migrants in 2004 is probably due to the fear within two years(from 8% to 18 8 %) ) . W W e se e e e s s e e v v e e r r al intersecting factors that might explain this increase. and uncertainty resulting from the massive enlargement of the European Union and its consequences On the one hand increasing economic problems(the rising indebtedness of the state) and peaking f O o n r d t o h m e e o s n t e ic h la a b n o d u i r n m cr a e r a k s e in ts g . T e h c e on in o c m re ic as p e r i o n b r l e e f m us s a ( l t w he as r e is s i p n e g c i i n a d lly eb sh te a d rp ne in ss G o e f rm th a e ny s , ta w t h e) er a e n i d t d p o e u a b k l i e n d g unemployment rates in the first half of the 2000s may have influences attitudes towards migrants. On w un it e h m in p t l w oy o m ye e a n r t s r ( a f t r e o s m in 8 t % he to fi 1 rs 8 t % h ) a . l W f o e f s t e h e e s 2 e 0 v 0 e 0 ra s l m in a t y er h s a e v c e tin in g fl f u a e c n to c r e s s t a h t a ti t t m ud ig e h s t t e o x w p a la rd in s t m hi i s gr in a c n r t e s a . O se n . the other hand, this time period was characterized by a surge in popularity of the nationalistic far-right O th n e t o h t e he o r n h e an h d an , t d hi i s nc ti r m ea e s p in e g ri e o c d o w n a o s m c i h c a p ra ro c b te le ri m ze s d ( b th y e a r s i u si r n g g e i i n n d p e o b p t u e l d a n ri e t s y s o o f f th t e he na s t t i a o t n e a ) li a s n ti d c f p a e ra r k ig in h g t NPD party which was covered extensively by the media. Also, uncertainties about the management of u N n P e D m p p a lo rt y y m w e h n i t c r h at w e a s s in co th v e er f e ir d st e h x a te lf n o s f iv t e h l e y 2 b 0 y 0 t 0 h s e m m a e y d h ia a . ve Al i s n o fl , u u e n n c c e e r s ta a i t n ti t t i u es de a s b t o o u w t a t r h d e s m m a ig n r a a g n e t m s. e O n n t migration seemed to play a role, though these were settled by the Immigration Act, which entered into t o h f e m o i t g h r e a r ti h o a n n s d e , e t m hi e s d tim to e 1 p 0 p la e y ri a od ro w le a , s t c h h o a u r g a h ct t e h r e iz s e e d w b e y r a e s s u e r t g tl e ed in b p y o t p h u e la Im rit m y o ig f r t a h ti e o n n a A ti c o t n , a w li h s i t c ic h f e a n rt r e ig re h d t force in January 2005. Since then there has been a constantly-increasing trend towards the N in P to D f p o a r r c t e y w in h J i a ch nu w a a r s y c 2 o 0 v 0 e 5 r . e 1 d 0 e S x i t n e c n e si t v h e e ly n b t y he th re e h m a e s d b ia e . e A n ls a o, c u o n n c s e ta rt n a t i l n y t -i ie n s cr a e b a o s u in t g th t e re m nd an t a o g w e a m rd e s nt th o e f acceptance of migrants in Germany; even the arrival and integration of over a million refugees in m ac i c g e ra p t t i a o n n c s e ee o m f m ed ig t r o an p t la s y in a r G o e le r , m th a o ny u ; gh ev t e h n es t e h w e e a r r e ri s v e a t l tl a e n d d by in t t h e e gr I a m ti m on igr o a f ti o o v n e A r c a t, m w i h ll i i c o h n e r n e t f e u r g e e d e i s nt i o n Germany in 2015/16, pla 1 c 0 ing burdens upon Germany’s politics, institutions and society, has not altered f G o e rc rm e a i n n y J i a n n 2 u 0 a 1 r 5 y /1 2 6 0 , 0 p 5 la . cin S g in b c u e rd t e h n e s n up th o e n r G e e h rm as an b y e ’ e s n po a liti c c o s n , i s n t s a t n it t u ly t io in n c s re a a n s d in s g oc t ie re ty n , d ha t s o n w o a t r a d l s te t r h e e d this trend. This very clear trend supports to a great extent the theory about the significance of the a th cc is ep tr t e a n n d c . e T o h f is m v i e g r r y an c t le s a i r n t G re e n rm d a su n p y; po e r v t e s n to th a e g a r r e r a iv t a e l x a t n en d t in th te e g t r h a e ti o o r n y o a f bo o u v t er th a e m si i g ll n io if n ica re n f c u e ge o e f s th in e perception of control. Many Germans became fearful of migrants when they expected a large rise in G pe e r r c m e a p n ti y o i n n o 2 f 0 c 1 o 5 n /1 tr 6 o , l p . l M ac a in n g y b G u e r r d m e a n n s s u b p e o c n a G m e e rm fe a a n r y fu ’s l p o o f l m iti i c g s r , a i n n t s s tit w u h ti e o n ns th a e n y d e s x o p c e ie c t t y e , d ha a s la n r o g t e a r lt is e e re i d n this trend. This very clear trend supports to a great extent the theory about the significance of the perception of control. Many Germans became fearful of migrants when they expected a large rise in 9 In these countries the share of migrants is also moderate, with the highest in Germany(12,5%) and lowest in France(5,7%)(ES(9%), B(11%), SI(8%), Germany(12,5%) FI(6,5%), Fr(5,7%), NL(11%). 10 The law(The Immigration Act entered into force on January 1, 2005.) allows highly qualified non-EU-workers s 9 uInchthaessseciceonutnisttrsieosrtthoeps-lheavreel m of amnaiggre a r n s t t s o is o a b l t s a o in m a o r d e e s r i a d t e e n , c w e it p h er th m e it h o ig f h u e n s l t im in it G ed er d m u a ra n t y io (1 n 2 a ,5 t % th ) e a o n u d t l s o e w t. est in (Fhr a tt n p c s e :/ ( / 5 w ,7 w % w ) . [ (mE S ig( ( 9r 9 a% % ti)o ) ,n , B B p(o ( 1 1 li1c 1 %y % .)o ) , , rSg S I/ I (a ( 8 8 r%t % ic) ) ,l , eG D /eg ( re 1 mr 2 ma ,5 na % yny ) (1F i2 I m, ( 5 6 m% ,5 ig) % rFa ) I , t(i F o6 r ,n5 ( 5 %t , r 7 )a, % nFs ) ri , t( N i5o L ,n7 ( )% 11 ), % N ) L ]. (11%). 10 The law(The Immigra tion Act entered into force on January 1, 2005.) allows highly qualif f i i ed nonE E U U w w o o r r k k e e r r s s such as scient i sts or top-level managers to obtain a r e sidence permit of unlimited durat i on at the outset. (ht tps:/ / w ww .migrationpolic y .org/article / germ an y-immigration-transition)

24 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 24 arrivals from CEE countries and as soon as the government introduced a new regulatory and management system for mig rati on, these fears abated. The increase in anxiety around migra ti on in the 2008-2010 period in several countries( S pa in, Finla nd and France ) may probably be explained by economic hardship and rising unemployment following the 2008 fi nancial crisis(this phenomenon is especially salient in Spain and France, and to some extent in Finland by 2009.) Poland is an interes ti ng case, atypical of Central East European countries with a history of communism: although there has been an increase in the rejec ti on of migrants a ft er 2012, the general level of the RI stayed rather moderate, in line with several old EU member-states. The third group of countries include Ireland, the UK and Por tugal. In these countries the level of refusal of migrants has been somewhat higher than in the countries of group 2, but what makes them d isti nct is the fact that a very explicit increase in acceptance occurred between 2014/15 and 2016/17. FIGURE 14 COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST DROP IN REJECTION AFTER 2014/15 REJECTION INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1(2002/2003) AND ESS R8(2016/2017) 60 Ireland Portugal 50 United Kingdom 40 Rejection Index (RI), % 30 20 10 0 R OUND 1 (2002) R OUND 2 (2004) R OUND 3 (2006) R OUND 4 (2008) R OUND 5 (2010) R OUND 6 (2012) R OUND 7 (2014) R OUND 8 (2016) We believe that the change in a ttit udes in the UK and Ireland may be explained by di ff erent factors than in P or tugal. The popul ati on of Por tugal su ffere d the a ft ermath of the 2008 economic crisis, which extended from 2009 to 2012. The increase in the propor ti on of the popula ti on rejec ti ng migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe from 2010 to 2012 may be a ttri buted to the economic hardship people experienced as a direct consequence of the crisis. The diminishing RI in Por t u ga l goes hand in hand with changes in major economic indicators, such as the growth of GDP and the decreasing rates of unemployment from 2012 on. Here the theory explaining a tti tudes in terms of economic compe titi on may provide a reasonable explan ati on. This is hardly the case for the UK, however, since although it experienced an economic recession similar to Portugal’s, it only lasted one year(2009). As explained in the previous chapter, the UK has not su ff ered dram ati c and extended economic or social turmoil in the past 16 years in a way comparable to Por t u ga l or Spain . The decrease in the share of popu lati on that is open to migrants between 2006 and 2016/17 may rather be a ttri buted to the extremely n egati ve media portrayal of migrants, especially those arriving from post-communist EU member states such as Romania, P oland, Slovakia and Bulgaria. This was one of the factors that served as a trigger for the majority of Britons vo ti ng for the UK to leave the EU. A ft er 2014/15, however, in

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 2 2 5 5 the course of the debate over the consequences of Brexit, Bri ti sh people may have realized that migra ti on is not the most important cause of the problems they experience, and become more aware of the advantages it brings to Bri tish e conomy and society. The fourth group of countries are those in which the popu lati on has become more nega ti ve towards migrants and migra ti on. This group includes four countries: Austria, C zech Republic, Lithuan ia and Hungar y . In fact, Hungar y is in a category of its own: its already high refusal rates have rocketed since 2014. With 62% of the popu lati on rejec ti ng migrants uncond iti onally, Hungar y is even more ho stil e to migrants than non-EU countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Turkey or Israel, where the category of “migrants from poorer countries, outside Europe” certainly has a di ff erent and quite acute meaning. We have discussed the possible reasons for this extreme level of ho stili ty earlier. FIGURE 15 COUNTRIES WITH INCREASING LEVELS OF REJECTION REJECTION INDEX BETWEEN ESS R1(2002/2003) AND ESS R8(2016/2017) Austria 60 Czech Republic Hungary 50 Lithuania Italy 40 Rejection Index (RI), % 30 20 10 0 R OUND 1 (2002) R OUND 2 (2004) R OUND 3 (2006) R OUND 4 (2008) R OUND 5 (2010) R OUND 6 (2012) R OUND 7 (2014) R OUND 8 (2016) Both the C zech Republic and Lith uania have a rela ti vely high rejec ti on index by European standards, but again, in these countries TCN migrants from poorer countries may trigger historic fears of an in fl ow of Russian and post-USSR migrants. However, the rejec ti on of migrants has increased somewhat since 2012. And fi nally Austria(being the only non-post-communist country) is quite unique in this group of countries: a rela ti vely high share(20%) of its popu lati on rejects TCN migrants coming from poorer countries, and this share has increased since 2002/03(although ESS data was not collected during the period from 2008 to 2014). Unfortunately, we don’t have ti me-series data for Italy, just individual ti mepoints: 2002, 2012 and 2016. Despite this, we recognize that besides Austria, Italy is the other non-CEE country where a ttit udes are signi fi cantly more nega ti ve than in the rest of the old EU member-states. We suspect, but cannot establish using ESS data, that the high level of rejec ti on in 2016/17 is a temporary situa ti on brought about by the 2015 refugee crisis(and its mismanagement by the EU, which hit Ital y hardest in Europe).“Nega tiv e sen ti ment about im migratio n has been heightened by concerns about security, the percei ve d loss of control of Italy’s borders, and the failure of author iti es to manage migra tio n effectiv ely.”(Dixon et. al. 2018)

26 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 26 ON_NEW 3.4 T HE ROLE OF REGIONS In the introduc ti on we promised to inves ti gate the role of na ti on states in explaining di ff erences of a ttit ude in Europe. In this sec ti on we present geographic a ttit ude pa tt erns at a sub-n ati onal level. The following charts show the distribu ti on of the Percep ti on and Rejec ti on Indexes in Europe at the level of regions(NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 where sample sizes allowed). FIGURE 16 REGIONAL AVERAGES OF PERCEPTION AND REJECTION INDEX NUTS2 OR NUTS3 LEVELS DEPE R ND E IN J G E O C N T A I V O A N ILA _ BL N E E SA W MPLE SIZES, ESS R8(2016/2017) PERCEPTION INDEX 30 60 REJECTION INDEX more posi ti ve more nega ti ve low high Avg. Mean 0% 40% itude(generated) and Latitude(generated) and Latitude(generated). F M or a p p a b n a e se La d t o it n u L d o e n ( g g i e t n u e d r e a ( t g e e d n ) e ( r 2 a ): te D d e ) t a a n il d s L a a r t e itude(generated) and Latitude Y. For pane Latitude(g T e h n e er b at i e g d p ): ic C t o u lo r r e sh t o e w ll s s a u v s er t a h ge at o , f M by ea a n n . d De l t a a r il g ( s g e a e , r n e b e s r o h a u t o e w n d n d ). f a o F r r o i r R e p e s g a o i n o e f n L n . a T a t h i t e t i u o d d a n e ta ( s g i t e s a n fi t e l e r t a e s t r – e e d d t ) h (2 e ): p D o e l t i a ti l c s a a l re co sh m ow m n u fo n r ity of a keeps PERCEPTION INDEX(REGIONAL). COUNTRY. For pane Latitude(generated): Color shows average of Mean. country – have the largest impact on how people think about migrants and migra ti on in general. The Details are shown for Region. The data is fi ltered on Measure, which keeps di ff erences between countries are m R o E r J e ECT e I x O p N l I i N ci D t EX th (R a E n GIO th N o A s L) e . Th b e e v t i w ew ee is n fi lt r e e re g d io o n n s C . OU T N h T e R r Y e , w a h r ic e h k s e o e m ps e signi fi cant lessons, however, if we look 23 m of o 2 r 3 e m c e lo m s b e er ly s. at the map. In certain countries, di ff erences in a ttit udes, even if modest, seem to crystalize along lines of capital metropolitan areas and the rest of the country. Examples of this are France, Spain, and to some extent the UK and the Czech Republic. In other countries, di ff erences of at titu des draw a south-north(Italy or the UK) or east-west line(Austria and Germany). The forth group of countries are those where a ttitu des towards migrants are, in a geographical sense, rather homogeneously distributed, meaning people share similar a ttit udes irrespec ti ve of which part of the country they live in. This pa tt ern is typical for countries on the extreme: Sweden, Norway and Finland being the most acc epti ng of migrants and Hungary being the most unacc epti ng, along with Estonia and Lithuania. The following table includes a list of 20 regions where people are on average most acc epti ng or unaccep ti ng of migrants:

geographical sense, rather homogeneously distributed, meaning people share similar a ttit udes i M rr e e ss s in p g e – c S t á i g v v e ár o i: S f ti w ll h di i v c id h ed p b a u r t t m o or f e t o h p e en. c M o a u p n pi t n r g y Eu t r h o e p y ean li a v t e tit i u n d . es T t h o i w s ar p d a s t m t e ig r r n ati i o s n t b y ef p o i r c e a a l n f d o a r ft c er o t u h n e t m r i i g e r s at o io n n c t r h is e is extreme: Sweden, Norway and Finland being the most acc epti ng of migrants and Hungary being the most unacc epti ng, along with Estonia and Lithuania. M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS The following table includes a list of 20 regions where people are on average most acc epti ng or unaccep ti ng of migrants: 27 27 FIGURE 17 REJECTION BY REGIONS OF EUROPE MEAN OF REJECTION INDEX FOR TOP20 AND LAST 20 NUTS-2/NUTS-3 REGIONS IN EUROPE ESS R8(2016/17) TOP 20 LAST 20 No. Region Rejection No. 1 Dél- Dunántúl(HU) 76% 105 2 Nyugat- Dunántúl(HU) 71% 106 3 Észak- Magyarország(HU) 68% 107 4 Közép- Dunántúl(HU) 67% 108 5 Közép- Magyarország(HU) 59% 109 6 Dél- Alföld(HU) 58% 110 7 Észak- Alföld(HU) 52% 111 8 Kirde-Eesti(EE) 51% 112 9 Taurages apskritis(LT) 50% 113 10 Moravskoslezsko(CZ) 43% 114 11 Telšiu apskritis(LT) 42% 115 12 Strední Morava(CZ) 38% 116 13 Vilniaus apskritis(LT) 37% 117 14 Praha(CZ) 35% 118 15 Oberösterreich(AT) 34% 119 16 Jihovýchod(CZ) 31% 120 17 Severozápad(CZ) 28% 121 18 Estonia(EE) 27% 122 19 Jihozápad(CZ) 27% 123 20 Kesk-Eesti(EE) 27% 124 Region Lisboa(PT) Nord-Norge(NO) Vestlandet(NO) Agder Og Rogaland(NO) Rheinland-Pfalz(DE) Oslo Og Akershus(NO) Niedersachsen(DE) Canarias(ES) Sør- Østlandet(NO) Hedmark Og Oppland(NO) Stockholm(SE) Västsverige(SE) Övre Norrland(SE) Mellersta Norrland(SE) Norra Mellansverige(SE) Trøndelag(NO) Åland(FI) Hamburg(DE) Bremen(DE) Saarland(DE) Rejection 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% For large F c o o r u s n m tr a i l e l s co d u u n e t t r o ie t s h d e u i e ns t u o f t fi h c e ie i n n t su sa ff m ici p e e nt si s z a e m in p s l t e ea si d ze o o f f N N U U T T SS 2 -2 le le ve ve l d l d a a ta ta w w a a s s u u se se d d in in st s e te a a d d o o f f N N U U T T S S -3 -3 . . The most important lesson to be drawn from this list is that the top and last 20 regions cover no more than five or six countries each. There is little else here to surprise us: the seven most migrant-rejecting regions in Europe are all in Hungary, and are followed by Estonian, Lithuanian, Czech and Austrian regions. The list of the most accepting regions includes a number of Norwegian, Swedish, and German regions, as well as one region from Portugal(Lisboa) and Spain(Canarias).

28 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 28 3.5 P ERSONAL VALUES THAT FEED PRO AND ANTI MIGRANT ATTITUDES The European Social Survey provides an excellent opportunity to study basic human values which feed, among many other things, attitudes towards migration. Values are broad, abstract principles that guide individuals’ beha viour and opinions(such as honesty, freedom, equality, beauty, wisdom etc.).“ In using the term values, we mean something similar to conceptions of the desirable that influence the ways people select action and evaluate events .”(Schwart z and Bisky 1987) Values stem from primary agents of socialization: first and foremost from family, but also from peers and school. We create our values – what is important to us – based on what we learn from our parents and family, and from peers who are important to us. The ESS includes an entire questionnaire block which maps individual human values based on a carefully-developed, complex methodology, tested and accepted by the scholarly community. We will use this set of questions to find out what kind of values influence attitudes towards migration and migrants. The figure below shows how strongly attitudes about migration(PI) correlate with the complex set of questions mapping various aspect of basic human values. V ALUES FIGURE 18 CORRELATION OF BASIC HUMAN VALUES AND PERCEPTION INDEX ESS R8(2016/17), SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENT Important to live in secure and safe surroundings -0.17 Important to follow traditions and customs -0.15 Important to do what is told and follow rules -0.12 Important to behave properly -0.11 Important to get respect from others -0.09 Important to be rich, have money and expensive things -0.07 Important to show abilities and be admired -0.04 Important to be successful and that people recognize achievements -0.04 Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention -0.03 Important to seek fun and things that give 0.02 Important to try new and different things in life 0.04 Important to have a good time 0.06 Important to make own decisions and be free 0.07 Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close 0.08 Important to seek adventures and have an exiting life 0.08 Important to care for nature and environment 0.09 Important to help people and care for others well-being 0.09 Important to think new ideas and being creative 0.09 Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities 0.21 Important to understand different people 0.23 -0.23-0.18-0.13-0.08-0.03 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.27 Two types of values crystalize very explicitly at the two ends of the correlation list: security and humanitarianism. Agreement with the first two statements – the importance of secure surroundings, the importance of a strong government ensuring safety – signals a strong value attributed to stability and externally-provided physical safety. The two statements at the bottom of the list signal a strong value attributed to humanitarian values, such as understanding, respecting and treating one another equally. This means that these two types of values have the strongest(statistically significant) relationship with attitudes towards migration, but in a contrary direction: those who attribute great significance to security tend to be the most negative towards migration, while those who value equality

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS and respect of other people are the least fearful of migrants. In addition to these two types of values, we see that valuing traditions and societal behavioural rules and norms also relatively strongly correlate with the rejection of migrants. These values incorporate the wish for strong societal rules, and respect of other people are the least fearful of migrants. In addition to these two types of values, hierarchy and authority. Other basic values, such as wealth, enjoying life, competition and we see that valuing traditions and societal behavioural rules and norms also relatively strongly competence, do not seem to have a meaningful relationship with how people think about migration correlate with the rejection of migrants. These values incorporate the wish for strong societal rules, and migrants. hierarchy and authority. Other basic values, such as wealth, enjoying life, competition and Tcohme pfoeltleonwcien,gdcohnaortt ssheeomwstothheavreelaatimonesahniipngoffulartetiltautdioensshtoipwwaritdhs hmoiwgrapteioopnle(btohtihnkitasbcoougtnmitiigvreatainodn banedhamviiogurarnaltse. lements) and the significance attributed to two distinguished types of basic human values: security 11 and humanitarianism 12 . The following chart shows the relationship of attitudes towards migration(both its cognitive and behavioural elSeEmCeUnRtIsT)Ya/HndUMthAeNsITigAnRifIiAcaNnIScMe aVtAtrLiUbuEtSeVdSt.oREtJwEoCTdIOisNtinAgNuDishPeEdRCtEyPpTeIsOoNf basic human va F l I u G e U s R : s E e 1 c 9 urity E 1 S 1 S a R n 8, d 20 h 1 u 6 m /1 a 7 nitarianism 12 . 2 2 9 9 29 N OT IMPORTA N TOT IMPORTANT N OT IMPORTA N TOT IMPORTANT FIGURE 19 SEC S U E R C I U TY R /H IT U Y MANITARIANISM VALUES VS. REJECTION HU AND PERCEPTION MANITARIANIS M ESS R8, 2016/17 Rejection Index(RI) Perception Index(PI) Rejection Index(RI) Perception Index(PI) 0 12 59 SECURITY 1 5 70 Rejection Index(RI) Perception Index(PI) 0 32 38 HUMANITARIANISM 1 33 38 Rejection Index(RI) Perception Index(PI) 2 0 1 1 2 0 59 64 2 0 39 32 38 31 75 59 70 31 33 24 3481 4 2 1 0 59 64 4 2 39 22 38 43 5 3 8 7 5 5 8 9 5 3 24 17 41 45 64 190 559 64 2215 4347 7 5 10 8 54 58 7 5 17 13 45 50 8 6 13 9 51 55 8 6 15 10 47 53 IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 97 1130 5054 97 138 50 58 10 8 18 13 46 51 10 8 10 8 53 61 9 13 50 9 8 58 The 10 chart demonstr 1 a 8 tes clearly 46 the direct and almost 10 linear relationship 8 between th 61 ese two sets of values and the rejection versus acceptance of migrants. The more people yearn for security the more negative their perception of the consequences of migration is, and hence the more they reject the idea The chart demonstrates clearly the direct and almost linear relationship between these two sets of values and the rejection versus acceptance of migrants. The more people yearn for security the more negative their perception of the consequences of migration is, and hence the more they reject the idea 11 The composite measure for security is constructed by the mean value of answers to the following two questions: Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is o 11 rTishenoctomlikpeoysoitue. measure for security is constructed by the mean value of answers to the following two ques • tionsIt: is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his Now I wilslabfreiteyf.ly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is • not lIitkies yimoup.ortant to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to • bIteisstimropnogrstaonit tcoanhidmefteonldivietsincistiezceunrse. surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his 12 The comsapfeotsyit.e measure for humanitarianism is constructed by the mean value of answers to the following two q • uesIttioisnism: portant to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to • Hbe stthrionnkgs istoisitimcapnodrteafnetntdhiatst ecivteizreynpse. rson in the world should be treated equally. He believes 12 The comevpeorysiotenemsehaosuulrdehfaovreheuqmuaanl iotaprpiaonrtisumnitisiecsoinsltifreu.cted by the mean value of answers to the following two q • uesIttioisnism: portant to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with • Htheetmh,inhkessitiilsl wimapnotsrtaonutnthdaetrsetvaenrdytpheermso.n in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. • It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.

30 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 30 of any migrant coming and se ttli ng in their country. The more peop le fi nd respect for others and equ al ity between peop le important, the more posi ti ve their a ttit udes towards migrants are. Individu al v al ues bui l d v al ue systems that drive peop l e’s ac ti on and behaviour. Thus, we need to study v al ues in re lati on to one another. Therefore, we constructed an index that shows the v al ue a ttr ibuted to humanitarianism and security in juxtaposi ti on. We deduced the mean v al ue of answers given to ques ti ons measuring security and those measuring humanitarianism. As such, we were ab le to categorize peop l e into three cohorts:(1) those who a tt ribute a signi fi can tl y higher v al ue to security than to humanitarian v al ues(purp le);(2) those who a tt ribute signi fi can tl y higher v al ue to humanitarian v al ues than to security(ye ll ow) and(3) those who a ttri bute simi l ar importance to both v al ues(not shown on the chart). The fo ll owing chart gives us an idea of the presence and importance of these two sets of v al ues in ESS countries: FIGURE 20 HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY VALUES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN COMPARISON TO REJECTION OF MIGRANTS ESS R8, 2016/17 more humanitarianism more security Rejec ti on(RI) country average 160% 100 140% 62 50 120% 31 27 25 20 18 14 14 13 11 9 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 2 2 0 100% 15% 20% 11% 13% 14% 9% 8% 9% 12% -50 4% 9% 6% 4% 6% 7% 6% 8% 5% 3% 25% 80% -100 60% -150 40% 57% 20% 42% 44% -200 37% 31% 29% 37% 33% 36% 16% 14% 10% 13% 16% 18% 27% 22% 0% 7% 10% 6% -250 We see that in most countries(with four excep ti ons) humanitarian values are more dominant than security. Especially in the Nordic countries(Sweden, Norway and Finland), the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, humanitarian values are – in general – valued more highly than security. These are l ikewise the European countries in which a ttitu des towards mig rati on and migrants are most posi ti ve. There are, however, a few countries in which peop le a tt ribute more v al ue to security than to equ al ity and respect for others. These countries in cl ude some post-communist socie ties such as Hungary, the Czech Repub l ic and Lithuania, but als o I tal y(and in Austria the v al ues are a l most even). These are precise l y the countries in which the rejec ti on of migrant is strongest in Europe. We may con cl ude that the apprecia ti on of these two sets of va l ues is an important exp la n ati on for why peop l e either reject or are open to migrants. In real l ife, of course, these v al ues are not mutua lly exc l usive. It is not the case that in certain countries security is l ess important than humanitarianism or vice versa. We suggest that security is one of our basic needs, and is al so re flec ted in our v al ues. When somebody fee ls secure in his/her l ife, he/she

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 3 3 1 1 might devalue its importance because it is taken more or less for granted. In such circumstances, humanitarian values may come to the fore. However, in those countries where people feel more insecure, security appears as an important human need that is also manifested in values, giving security priority over humanitarianism. The question, however, is where these values stem from. In our previous analysis we showed that out of many demographic, societal, economic and subjective factors, the perception of safety and the level of trust(both trust in institutions and individuals) proved to have the strongest relationship with attitudes towards migrants, both on an individual level and on the level of countries. It is to be expected that in countries where people do not feel safe – either in terms of direct physical safety or in a broader feeling that stability is lacking – the value of security becomes more important than in countries where people feel safe.

32 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS 3.6 A NTI MIGRANT ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL POPULISM : WHICH IS THE CHICKEN AND WHICH THE EGG ? 3.6 A NTI MIGRANT ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL POPULISM : WHICH IS THE C HICKEN AND In our W int H ro IC d H uc T ti H on E w EG e G co ? nnected a ttitu des towards migra ti on with rising populism on the con ti nent. In this chapter we o ffe r a closer look into how poli tical orienta ti on and populism feed into an ti-migrant a ttit udes, and contrast this with left-wing party support. The poli tical la ndscape in Europe is changing In our introduction we connected attitudes towards migration with rising populism on the continent. rapidly, with diverging world-views and polariz ati on of voter groups. Fears and fru strati ons linked to In this chapter we offer a closer look into how political orientation and populism feed into anti-migrant migra ti on have become symbols for this general feeling of uncertainty. We live in a world of highly attitudes, and contrast this with left-wing party support. The political landscape in Europe is changing unpredictable futures, in which tectonic shi ft s in global power rela ti ons, pol itica l crises, armed rapidly, with diverging world-views and polarization of voter groups. Fears and frustrations linked to con fl icts, revolu ti onary developments in technology and environmental challenges are confusing migration have become symbols for this general feeling of uncertainty. We live in a world of highly enough to make citi zens more recep ti ve to simpli stic explana ti ons. According to recent research unpredictable futures, in which tectonic shifts in global power relations, political crises, armed “ Populist par ties ha ve mor e than trip le d their support in Europe in the last 20 y ear s. … two d ec ad e s conflicts, revolutionary developments in technology and environmental challenges are confusing ago, populist par tie s we r e larg ely a marginal for ce, a cc oun tin g for just 7% of vo te s a cros s th e c on tine nt; enough to make citizens more receptive to simplistic explanations. According to recent research in the most r ece nt na tio nal electio ns, on e in four vot e s c ast was for a populist party.” 13 Using recent “ Populist parties have more than tripled their support in Europe in the last 20 years. … two decades research on populism in Europe 14 to categorize populist p arties across the con ti nent, we tried to ago, populist parties were largely a marginal force, accounting for just 7% of votes across the continent; establish the degree to which an ti-migrant feelings are linked to support for poli tical p 1 o 3 pulism 15 . The in the most recent national elections, one in four votes cast was for a populist party. ” Using recent analysis of the conne cti on betwee 1 n 4 vo ti ng for a populist party and a ttit udes towards migrants resulted research on populism in Europe to categorize populist parties across the continent, we tried to in a very obvious conclusion: those with nega ti ve a tti tudes towards migrants and migra ti on are 1 m 5 uch establish the degree to which anti-migrant feelings are linked to support for political populism. The more likely to vote for right-wing populist par ti es. analysis of the connection between voting for a populist party and attitudes towards migrants resulted B in u a t fi f v i e rs r t y , o le b t v u io s u e s st c a o b n l c is lu h s a io g n e : n t e h r o a s l e o w ve it r h vi n e e w ga o t f iv h e ow att s i u tu p d p e o s rt to fo w r a le rd ft s m an ig d ra ri n g t h s t a -w nd in m g p ig o r l a it t i i c o s n c a o r r e re m la u t c e h s w m i o th re a l t ik ti e tu ly d t e o s v t t o o o t w w e a a f r o r d d r s s ri m g m h ig i t g r r w a a n i n n t t s g s a p a n o n d p d u m l m i i s g t ig r p a r a t a i r t o i t o n ie n . s . F . i F g i u g r u e re 21 20 (ne d x e t m p o a n g s e t ) ra d t em s o th n e str a a s t s e o s ci t a h t e i o a n ss b o e c t i w at e io e n a b t e t t it w u e d e e n s a to tt w it a u r d d e s s m to ig w r ar n d t s m (R i e g j r e a c n t t i o s n (R a e n je d c P ti e o r n ce a p n t d i o P n er In ce d p e t x i e o s n ) I a n n d d ex th e e s) s a u n b d je t c h t e i v s e u e b v je a c lu ti a v t e i o e n va o l f u o a n ti e o ’ n s But first, let us establish a general overview of how support for left- and right-wing politics correlates p o o f l o i t n ic e a ’s l o p r o ie li n ti t c a a ti l o o n ri f e o n r t a a l t l i c o o n u f n o t r ie al s l p c a o r u ti n c t i r p i a e t s i n p g a i r n tic th ip e a E ti S n S g in in it t s h e e ig E h S t S h i r n ou it n s d e ( i 2 g 0 h 1 th 6/ r 1 o 7 u ) n . T d h ( e 2 q 0 u 1 e 6 s / t 1 i 7 o ) n . with attitudes towards migrants and migration. Figure 20 demonstrates the association between w Th e e e q m ue p s lo ti y o e n d w h e er e e m a p s l k o e y d ed th h e er r e es a p s o ke n d e t n h t e s r t e o sp p o la n c d e en th ts em to s p e l v a e ce s t o h n em a se ca lv l es o o f n ‘r a ig s h c t a ’ le an o d f‘r le ig f h t’ t’ w a i nd g attitudes towards migrants(Rejection and Perception I ndexes) and the subjective evaluation of one’s p ‘le o f li t t ’ ic w a i l n o g ri p e o n l t it a i t c i a o l n o . r W ien e ta u t n io d n er . s W ta e nd un t d h e at rs th a e nd co th n a c t ep th t e of co ‘l n e c ft e ’ p a t n o d f ‘r le ig f h t’ t’ an m d ay ‘ri h g a h v t’ e m q a u y ite ha d v i e ff e q r u e i n te t political orientation for all countries participating in the ESS in its eighth round(2016/17). The question c d o if n fe n r o e t n a t ti c o o n n s n in ot d a i t ff io e n re s n in t c d o i u ff n e t r r e i n es t . c ( o A u s n p t e r l i u e n s. d ( e A t sp al e 2 lu 0 n 1 d 3) e N t e a v l e 2 r 0 th 1 e 3 l ) e N ss e , v e e v r e t n he if le t s h s e , e ac v t e u n al if m th e e an a in ct g u o a f l we employed here asked the respondents to place themselves on a scale of‘right’ and‘left’ wing r m ig e h a t n a ing d o le f ft ri i g s h n t o a t n t d he le s f a t m is e n , o th t e th re e la s t a i v m e e p , o t s h i e ti o r n ela o t n iv s e uc p h os a it s io ca n le o i n s r s o u o ch te a d i s n ca s l i e m is la ro p o r t e e d d is i p n o sim ti o il n a s r political orientation. We understand that the concept of‘left’ and‘right’ may have quite diff erent a p n re d d v is a p lu o e s s it . io (P n i s ur a k n o d e v t a a lu l 2 e 0 s. 1 ( 1 P ) iurko et al 2011) connotations in different countries.(Aspelund et al 2013) Nevertheless, even if the actual meaning of right and left is not the same, the relative position on such a scale is rooted in similar predispositions and values.(Piurko et al 2011) 32 32 13 h tt ps://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interac ti ve/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-votepopulist 14 h tt ps://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/20/measuring-populism-how-guardian-charted-risem 13 e h t t h tp o s d : o // lo w g w y w.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-votep 15 o T p h u e lis fo t llowing de fi n iti on was used for the concept of populist par tie s“ Par tie s that e ndors e th e s e t of id e as t 14 ha h t t s p o s c : i / e / t w y w is w u . l t t h i m eg a u t e a l r y d s ia e n p . a c r o a m t e / d w i o n r t l o d/ t 2 w 0 o 18 h / o n m o o v/ g 2 e 0 n / e m o u e s as a u n r d in a g n -p ta o g p o u n lism tic -h g o ro w u p gu s, a “ r t d h ia e n p u ch r e ar p t e e o d p -r le is ” e v e rsus “ m th e e th c o o d r o ru lo p g t y e lit e”, and whi c h argu e that po litic s should b e an e xpr e ssion of th e volonté générale, or g e n e ral 1 w 5 i T ll h , o e f fo th ll e ow p e in o g p l d e e . f “ in (M itio u n dd w e a 2 s 0 u 1 s 4 e ) d for the concept of populist parties“ Parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argue that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale , or general will, of the people. “(Mudde 2014)

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 3 3 3 3 P ERCEPTION I NDEX (PI) R EJECTION I NDEX (RI) FIGURE 21 REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION MEASURED ON A LEFT-RIGHT SCALE ESS R8, 2016/2017, ALL COUNTRIES(WITH POPULATION WEIGHT) 70 L EFT 65 C ENTRE 35 R I GHT 30 60 25 55 A VERAGE (PI) 20 50 15 45 A VERAGE (RI) 40 10 35 5 30 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 P OLITICAL ORIENTATION (0-10 SCALE , 0= LEFT , 10= RIGHT ) The chart shows a very clear pattern: those who self-identify as left-wing have a generally positive attitude towards migration, those in the centre of the political scale are relatively neutral, and those on the right have a generally negative attitude towards migrants. This is no surprise. However, the gradient of the curve is notable: those self-identifying with the left are equally positive about migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel; i.e. people who position themselves to the extreme of the scale have very similar attitudes to those who think of themselves as moderately left-wing. At the right-wing end of the scale we see a very different picture: the gradient of the curve is steep, meaning that political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes. The next chart shows attitudes towards migrants(perception and rejection indexes) among supporters of centre-left and populist right-wing parties in nine countries:

34 migration, irrespective of how left-oriented they feel; i.e. people who position themselves to the extreme of the scale have very similar attitudes to those who think of themselves as moderately Messing–Ságvári: Still divided but more open. Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis left-wing. At the right-wing end of the scale we see a very different picture: the gradient of the curve is steep, meaning that political right-wing extremism correlates with extreme anti-migrant attitudes. M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS The next chart shows attitudes towards migrants(perception and rejection indexes) among supporters of centre-left and populist right-wing parties in nine countries: FFIIGGUURREE 2222 A USTRIA A USTRIA G ERMANY G ERMANY F RANCE F RANCE REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES AMONG SUPPORTERS OF REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES AMONG SUPPORTERS OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST AND SELECTED CENTRE-LEFT POLITICAL PARTIES RIGHT-WING POPULIST AND SELECTED CENTRE-LEFT POLITICAL PARTIES PARTY PREFERENCES BASED ON THE ITEM“WHICH PARTY DO YOU FEEL CLOSER TO” PARTY PREFERENCES BASED ON THE ITEM“WHICH PARTY DO YOU FEEL CLOSER TO” ESS R8(2016/17) ESS R8(2016/17) Rejection Index(RI)| Perception Index(PI) Rejection Index(RI)| Perception Index(PI) FPÖ 48 24 FPÖ 48 24 SPÖ 15 50 SPÖ 15 50 A F D 21 31 A F D 21 31 SPD 4 62 SPD 4 62 F RONT N ATIONAL F RONT N ATIONAL PS PS 35 35 7 7 27 27 59 59 H UNGARY H UNGARY I TALY I TALY N ETHERLANDS N ETHERLANDS P OLAND P OLAND S WEDEN S WEDEN U NITED K INGDOM U NITED K INGDOM F IDESZ F IDESZ J OBBIK J OBBIK MSZP MSZP L EGA (L EAGUE ) L EGA (L EAGUE ) PD PD P ARTY FOR F REEDOM P ARTY FOR F REEDOM P VD A/L ABOUR P ARTY P VD A/L ABOUR P ARTY L AW AND J USTICE L AW AND J USTICE U NITED L EFT U NITED L EFT S VERIGEDEMOKRATERNA S VERIGEDEMOKRATERNA SAP SAP UK I NDEPENDENCE P ARTY UK I NDEPENDENCE P ARTY L ABOUR P ARTY L ABOUR P ARTY 75 75 73 73 38 38 30 30 30 30 43 43 32 32 8 8 29 29 48 48 23 23 5 5 38 38 59 59 16 16 6 6 48 48 59 59 10 34 10 34 2 63 2 63 33 33 6 6 35 35 62 62 34 IInn eeaacchh ccoouunnttrryy,, ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff cceennttrree--lleefftt ppaarrttiieess eevvaalluuaattee mmiiggrraattiioonn mmoorree ppoossiittiivveellyy,, wwhhiillee ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff ppooppuulliisstt rriigghhtt--wwiinngg ppaarrttiieess hhoolldd vveerryy nneeggaattiivvee vviieewwss.. DDaattaa oonn tthhee aattttiittuuddeess ooff aallll ppaarrttyy ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ((sseeee AAppppeennddiixx CChhaarrtt 55..22)) sshhooww vveerryy cclleeaarrllyy tthhaatt ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff rriigghhtt--wwiinngg ppooppuulliisstt ppaarrttiieess((ssuucchh aass AAffDD iinn GGeerrmmaannyy,, FFrroonntt NNaattiioonnaall iinn France 1166 , France, tthhee LLeeaagguuee iinn IIttaallyy,, aanndd tthhee SSwweeddiisshh DDeemmooccrraattss)) hhaavvee ssiiggnniiffiiccaannttllyy mmoorree nneeggaattiivvee aanndd eexxcclluussiioonnaarryy aattttiittuuddeess ttoowwaarrddss mmiiggrraannttss tthhaann ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff aannyy ootthheerr ppaarrttiieess oonn aa nnaattiioonnaall lleevveell.. TToo ppuutt iitt ppllaaiinnllyy,, tthheessee ppaarrttiieess ggaatthheerr aanndd ffeeeedd tthhaatt ppaarrtt ooff tthhee ppooppuullaattiioonn wwhhiicchh iiss vveerryy nneeggaattiivvee ttoowwaarrddss mmiiggrraannttss aanndd mmiiggrraattiioonn iinn ggeenneerraall.. RRiigghhtt--wwiinngg ppooppuulliisstt ppaarrttiieess sseeeemm ttoo pprroovviiddee aa tteerrrraaiinn oonn wwhhiicchh ttoo ooppeennllyy eexxpprreessss tthhee rraaggee ffuueelllleedd bbyy uunncceerrttaaiinnttyy,, aanndd ttoo bbllaammee mmiiggrraannttss.. IInn aallmmoosstt aallll ccoouunnttrriieess oonnee oorr ttwwoo ssuucchh ppaarrttiieess eexxiisstt,, tthhee ddiiffffeerreennccee lliieess rraatthheerr iinn hhooww ppoowweerrffuull tthheeyy aarree.. TThheeyy aarree ttiinnyy iinn SSwweeddeenn aanndd NNoorrwwaayy,, ssmmaallll bbuutt ssiiggnniiffiiccaanntt iinn GGeerrmmaannyy aanndd FFrraannccee,, llaarrggee iinn IIttaallyy aanndd AAuussttrriiaa aanndd eevveenn hhoolldd aa ssuuppeerr--mmaajjoorriittyy ggoovveerrnnmmeenntt iinn HHuunnggaarryy.. TThheerree iiss aallssoo aa ssiiggnniiffiiccaanntt ccrroossss--ccoouunnttrryy ddiiffffeerreennccee bbeettwweeeenn aattttiittuuddeess ttoowwaarrddss mmiiggrraattiioonn aammoonngg ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff lleefftt--wwiinngg ppaarrttiieess :: wwhhiillee iinn mmoosstt ccoouunnttrriieess lleefftt--wwiinngg ppaarrttyy ssuuppppoorrtteerrss aarree ssuuppppoorrttiivvee ooff mmiiggrraattiioonn,, iinn AAuussttrriiaa aanndd IIttaallyy tthheeyy aarree aatt mmoosstt nneeuuttrraall,, aanndd iinn HHuunnggaarryy eevveenn tthhee ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff lleefftt-wwiinngg ppaarrttiieess((MMSSZZPP aanndd DDKK)) rreejjeecctt mmiiggrraannttss aatt aa lleevveell cchhaarraacctteerriissttiicc ooff ssuuppppoorrtteerrss ooff rriigghhtt--wwiinngg ppooppuulliisstt ppaarrttiieess iinn ootthheerr ccoouunnttrriieess.. 16 16 Rassemblement National(National Rally) since June 2018 Rassemblement National(National Rally) since June 2018

M ESSING -S ÁGVÁRI : S TILL DIVIDED BUT MORE OPEN . M APPING E UROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MIGRATION CRISIS Messing–Ságvári: Still divided but more open. Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis 35 35 The chart of a ttitu des towards migra ti on of su pporters of right-wing po pu list pa rties also(Fig u re 23 2 ) demonstrates another notable phenomenon: altho u gh their perc epti ons of the conseq u ences of migra ti on(PI) are qu ite similar(very nega ti ve) in di ff erent co un tries, the rejec ti on of migrants is very di ff erent: rejec ti ng any kind of migra ti on is most explicit in H u ngary, while in other co un tries even the more nega ti ve percep ti on of migra ti on by su pporters of right wing po pu list par ti es(FPÖ, FN, LN) r esul ts in a smaller share of those rejec ti ng migrants. This data shows the degree to which dominant norms, set by mainstream poli ti cs, matt er in terms of transforming aversion into an extreme rejec ti on of migrants. In Hung ary, where FIDESZ gained a su per majority in the parliament(with less than half of the po pu lar vote) and ini ti ated an open an ti-migrant hate campaign and policies in 2015, an ti-migrant a ttitud es have become the overwhelming norm. We would argue that the poli ti cal power such par ti es wield, whether in government or in opposi ti on, plays a cri ti cal role in determining the degree to which an ti-migrant narra ti ves are allowed to become the norm within a society. FIGURE 23 REJECTION AND PERCEPTION INDEXES BY SUPPORTERS OF POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES PARTY PREFERENCES BA P SE O D P ON U TH L E I I S TE T M P “W A HIC R H T PA I R E TY S D I O N YO E U U FEE R L C O LOS P ER E TO” OF THE ESS R8(2016/17) Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) A F D(DE) FPÖ(AT) F RONT N ATIONAL (FR) I NDEPENDENCE P ARTY (UK) F IDESZ (HU) J OBBIK (HU) L EGA (L EAGUE )(IT) P ARTY FOR F REEDOM (NL) L AW AND J USTICE (PL) S VERIGEDEMOKRATERNA (SE) 21 48 35 33 75 73 32 23 16 10 31 24 27 35 30 30 29 38 48 34 Extreme negative attitudes on migration A noteworthy fi nding of o u r research is that in certain co un tries there are a considerable nu mber of individ u als whose a ttitu des towards migra ti on are extremely and homogeneo u sly nega ti ve. To u nderstand more closely who these people are, we tried to iden ti fy their demographic and a ttitud inal pro fi les. With this in mind, we narrowed in on those respondents who selected solely the val u e 0, on a 0 to 10 scale, to all three qu es ti ons eval uati ng the e ffec t of migra ti on(on the economy, on cu l tur al life and on the co un try in general), and cons titut e the Percep ti on Index we u sed thro ugh o u t the report.

36 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 36 The number of people with such extreme an ti-migrant a tti tudes reached 5% in four countries: Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic and Italy.(Figure 23 4 ) FIGURE 24 EXTREME PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION SHARE OF THOSE WITH THREE EXTREME NEGATIVE RESPONSES ON MIGRATION, PI=0 ESS R8(2016/17) EXTREME PERCEPTIONS ON MIGRATION (SHARE OF THOSE WITH 3 EXTREME NEGATIVE RESPONSES ON MIGRATION, PI=0) 8.7% 8.5% 6.0% 5.2% 3.6% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9% 2.2% 2.0% 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% So who are they, and how do they di ff er from the rest of the popula ti on? Using log istic al regression and checking for hard(demographic) and subjec ti ve(a ttit udes and percep ti ons) factors, we see that interes ti ngly it is not the basic demographic pro fi le that makes them unique from the rest of the popu lati on. Although age(being younger) and obtaining te rtia ry educa ti on in fl uence the chance(by greatly decreasing the likelihood) of having extreme an ti-migrant a ttitu des(Figure 25 4 ). Where they di ff er very substan tial ly from the rest of the popula ti on is in their subjec ti ve pe rcepti ons: To a much greater extent they feel alienated from poli tics, have a right-wing poli ti cal orient ati on, lack trust, and hold individuali stic, security-focused values rather than a humanitarian focus. Also, they describe themselves as having fi nancial di ffic u lties to a much greater extent than others in society. All in all, we may say that people who feel poli tical ly disempowered, fi nancially insecure and without social support are the most likely to become extremely nega ti ve towards migra ti on and migrants. FIGURE 25 EXTREME PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION SHARE OF THOSE WITH THREE EXTREME NEGATIVE RESPONSES ON MIGRATION, PI=0 F ACTORS THAT INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HAVING EXTREME NEGATIVE PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION ü Having severe fi nancial di ffic u lti es ü Feeling unsafe at night in home surroundings ü Po litical aliena tio n: no in fl uence on po litic s at all ü Po litical orienta ti on(right wing) ü Low level of interpersonal trust ü Feeling h u a n p h p a y pp (+ y 1 (+ o 1 n o 0 n -1 0 0 –1 sc 0 a s le ca ) le) ü Importance of security-focused personal values ü Older age F ACTORS THAT DECREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HAVING EXTREME NEGATIVE PERCEPTION ON MIGRATION ü Having te rti ary level educa tio n ü Having foreign born ancestry ü Placing high importance on humanitarian personal values ü High level of trust ü Being younger

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 3 3 7 7 Our study inves ti gated cross-n ati onal di ff erences in a ttit udes towards migra ti on and migrants across European space and ti me, and aimed to discover factors that may lie behind the immense di fferen ces in the acceptance or rejec ti on of migrants across European countries. This paper is a con ti nua ti on of our previous study, en ti tled’Looking Behind the Culture of Fear. Cross-Na tio nal Analysis of A ttitu des towards Migra tio n in Europe’( Messing and Ságvári 2018), which iden tifie d the most important macroand micro-level factors in fl uencing a ttitu des, based on 2015 data. One important conclusion of the analysis is that a ttit udes towards migra ti on in Europe have generally become more posi ti ve in most countries since the 2015 refugee crisis. The level of rejec ti on between 2014/15(before the fl ow of mass migra ti on to Europe occurred) and 2016/17(a fter the migra ti on shock) has decreased from 15% to 10%. Thus, in general, popular a ttit udes do not support the fl ourishing an ti-migrant populist poli tical discourse, and by the same token, increasingly loud an ti migrant populist narr ati ves have not boosted the reje cti on of migrants. People on the con ti nent have not become more fearful of migrants; on the contrary, in most countries they have become slightly more po siti ve about them. Outliers include Portugal, Belgium, the UK and Ireland, where people have become signi fi cantly more open and posi ti ve about migrants compared to the pre-migra ti on crisis period, and Hungary, where general a ttit udes towards migrants have signi fi cantly deteriorated. If we look at longer term trends we see a notable stability of a ttitu des: over a period of 16 years, based on data from 15 European countries, the overall percep ti on of migra ti on, as well as the share of those suppor ti ng the explicit rejec ti on of migrants coming from poorer countries outside Europe, have not changed radically. A tti tudes may have changed within shorter periods of ti me in certain countries, but in the longer run they have remained stable across the con ti nent. Short-term changes in at titu des were brought about by the uncertain ti es of large-scale poli tica l changes, such as the enlargement of the EU in 2004, economic or labour market crises(2008), or traum atic events such as terrorist a tt acks. Comparing country-level data reveals that the greatest nega ti ve change in a ttit udes towards migra ti on was caused by the overwhelming an ti-migrant government campaign in Hungary. This is the only country in which a very signi fi cant increase in fear and rejec ti on of migrants has taken place since 2015. Referring to the most popular theories, our analysis found that the economic explan ati on for a ttitu de change may apply only in some countries and at certain periods of ti me, such as in Spain, Portugal and Ireland, where a ttitu des changed hand in hand with the GDP decline and growth a ft er the 2008 economic crisis. S til l, contact and control theories apply best to Europe’s a tti tudinal map and its changes. The conclusion of our previous study“ widespread and homogenizing an ti-migrant a ttitu des in some countries ha ve litt le to do with migrants” has been further supported by the present analysis. An ti-migrant a ttit udes are strongest and are likely to increase further in countries where migrants are hardly present, where people don’t have personal experiences with migrants but where they lack the feeling of safety and control. By control we are referring to two levels of control: the feeling people have of being in control of their own lives, and the feeling that the government is in control of migra ti on. The importance of the latter is shown by the case of Germany, where an ti-migrant a ttit udes increased signi fi cantly between 2002 and 2004, probably due to the combina ti on of the uncertain tie s brought about by the 2004 enlargement of the EU and the feared mass in fl ow from new EU member-

38 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 38 states in the east, and the economic situation(high unemployment, increasing state debt and the rise of the far-right, ultranationalist NPD). However, as soon as the government introduced a set of legislation ensuring the controlled management of migration within the enlarged EU, anti-migrant attitudes abated. The same holds for Italy and Austria in 2015, which along with Germany took in the bulk of the incoming refugees in 2015. Austria and Italy are the only old-EU Member States where anti migrant attitudes have increased significantly since 2015, most likely due to the feeling that the European Union mismanaged the refugee crisis and failed to ensure a fair distribution of refugees within Europe. Germany has probably forestalled the rise of anti-migrant attitudes by investing significant resources into managing and integrating newcomers, as well as receiving strong support from civil society in this respect. However, long-term attitudes towards migrants seem to be a function of the general feeling of safety and control people feel over their own lives and futures. Our previous analysis, based on data from before the 2015 inflow of refugees – a calm moment for attitudes in Europe – concluded that attitudes “are rather a consequence and expression of people’s lack of safety and security, and a symptom of deep-rooted problems in the society ”. This conclusion has been further supported by looking at individuals whose attitudes are extreme. We found that people who extremely and homogeneously reject migrants do not differ in their demographic characteristics from the rest of the population. However, they differ from the rest of the population in their subjective perceptions of control: to a much greater extent they feel that they have financial difficulties, are alienated from politics, lack trust, and hold security-focused, individualistic values. All in all, we may say that people who feel politically disempowered, financially insecure and without social support are the most likely to become extremely negative towards migrants. When analysing changing attitudes we find a similar pattern: Those countries in which people became more trusting of their country’s institutions, and more satisfied with the performance of their governments, democratic institutions and national economies, were the most likely to become more accepting of migrants. Our analysis revealed that, by and large, regional differences within countries are minor, and primarily the borders of national states – the political community of a country – frame the map of attitudes in Europe . Thus, our primary hypothesis about the greater role of regions than countries was disproved. The country context matters a lot also in terms of how the negative perception of migrants(PI) is turned into negative action expectations(RI). With similar perceptions of migration and its consequences to the host society, people living in different countries develop radically different levels of rejection of migrants. We suggest that the level to which negative perceptions of migration result in(unconditional) rejection is a function of the general norms characteristic of the country, and are brought about by political and media discourses, historical experiences and dominant social values. The analysis of how values influence attitudes proves that attitudes towards migration(PI) correlate very strongly with a complex set of questions mapping various aspect of basic human values, but there are two sets of values that crystalize very explicitly: security and humanitarianism . The more people yearn for security, the more negative their perception of the consequences of migration is, and hence the more they reject the idea of any migrant settling in their country. The more people find respect for others and equality between people important, the more positive their attitudes are. Values are also closely related to political preferences, so it is no surprise that attitudes towards migrants and political preferences correlate strongly. What is noteworthy in this respect is the difference at the two ends of the political scale: while those who self-identify with the left are equally positive about migration,

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m M i IG g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 3 3 9 9 irrespective of how left -o riented they feel, t hose at t he r ight wing end of th e sca le sho w that more extreme id ent i f i cat i on wi th rig ht wing ideology correlates with increasingly extreme ant t i i -migrant at titude s. Proje ct i ng the map of p p o o l l i i t t i i cal p p r r e e f f e e r r e e n n c c e e s a a n n d d a a t t t t i i t t u u d d e e s s t t o o w w a a r r d d s s m m i i g g r r a a n n t t s s t t e e ll l s s u u s s t t h h a a t t r r ig ig h h t t wing p p o o p p u u l l i i s s t t p p a a r r t t ie ie s s g g a a th th e e r r th t a h t a p t a p r a t r o t f o t f h t e h p e o p p o u p la u t l i a o t n io w n h w ic hi i c s h v i e s ry ve n r e y g n at e i g v a e t t iv o e w t a o r w ds a m rd i s gr m an ig t r s a a n n t d s m an i d gra m t i o gr n a i t n io g n en in er g a e l. n I e n ral. m I o n s a t l a m ll o c s o t u a n l t l r c ie o s u o n n tr e ie o s r o tw ne o o su r c t h w p o a s rt u ie ch s e p x a is r t i , e t s he ex d i i s f t f , er t e h n e c d e if li f es re r n at c h e e l r ie in s h ra o t w he p r o in w h e o rf w ul p t o h w ey er a f r u e l . t T h h e e y y a a re re . T t h in e y y i a n r N e o ti r n w y a in y, N s o ig r n w if a ic y a , n si t g i n n if S ic w a e n d t e in n, S G w e e r d m e a n n , G y e a r n m d a F n ra y n a c n e d , F la r r a g n e ce in , I la ta r l g y e a in d Ita A l u y s a tr n ia d a A n u d st e ri v a e a n n h d o e ld ve a n s h u o p ld er a -m s a u j p o e ri r t y m g a o jo v r e i r t n y m go en ve t r i n n m H e u n n t g i a n ry H . u T n h g e ar p y. er T c h e e pt p io e n rce o p f ti t o h n e c o o f n t s h e e q c u o e n n s c e e q s u o e f n m ce ig s ra o t f io m n ig ( r P a I) ti a o r n e ( q P u I) it a e re sim qu il i a t r e ( s v i e m ry ila n r e ( g v a e t r iv y e n ) e a g m at o iv n e g ) v a o m te o r n s g of vo ri t g e h r t s w of in r g ig p h o t p w u i l n is g t c p o o u p n u t l r is ie t s c a o c u r n o t s r s ie E s u a ro c p ro e s . s St E i u ll, ro th p e e. re S j t e il c l, ti t o h n e o r f e m je i c g t r i a o nts of is m ve ig r r y a a n l t ik s e is : R v ej r e y ct a i l n ik g e a : n R y e k je in c d tin o g f m an ig y ra k t in io d n o is f mo ig s r t a e ti x o p n lic is it m in o H st un e g xp ar li y c , it w i h n il H e u in ng o a t r h y e , r w c h o i u le nt i r n ie o s, th e e v r en co th u e nt m rie o s r , e e n v e e g n at t i h ve p m e o rc re p n t e io g n at o iv f e m p ig e r r a c t e io p n tio b n y s o u f p m p i o g r r t a e t r i s on o b f y r s ig u h p t po w rt in e g rs o p f op ri u g l h is t t -w p in a g rti p e o s pu (F li P s Ö t , pa F r N ti , es L ( N F ) PÖ re , s F u N lt , s LN in ) re a su s l m ts a i l n le a r s s m ha a r l e ler o s f ha t r h e os o e f u th n o c s o e nd u i n ti c o o n n a d ll i y ti r o e n je a c ll t y in r g e m jec ig ti r n a g nt m s. i T g h ra is n d ts a . ta Th a i g s a d in at s a ho a w ga s i t n he sh d o e w gr s e t e h t e o d w e h g i r c e h e d t o o m w in h a i n ch t n d o o r mi s n , a s n e t b n y or ma s, in s s e tr t e b a y m m p a o i l n it s ic tr s e , a m m at p te o r lit i i n cs t , e m rm a s tte o r f i t n ra t n e s r f m or s m o in f g tr av n e s r f s o i r o m n in in g to av a e n rs e io x n tre in m to e a re n je e c x ti t o re n m o e f m re i j g e r c a ti n o t n s . of migrants.

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M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 4 4 1 1 L UCASSEN , L.(2018) Peeling an onion: the“refugee crisis” from a historical perspec ti ve, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41:3, pp. 383-410. L EFCOURT , H. M.(1991). Locus of control. Academic Press. M ESSING , V., S ÁGVÁRI , B.(2018) Looking Behind the Culture of Fear. Cross-na ti onal analysis of a ttit udes towards mig rati on. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/ 14181-20180815.pdf M UDDE , C.(2004), The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposi ti on, 39: 541-563. P IURKO , Y., S CHWARTZ , S. H.,& D AVIDOV , E.(2011). Basic personal values and the meaning of le ft-right poli tical orienta ti ons in 20 countries. Pol iti cal Psychology, 32(4), 537-561. R OTHBAUM , F., W EISZ , J. R.,& S NYDER , S. S.(1982). Changing the world and changing the self: A twoprocess model of perceived control. Journal of personality and social psychology, 42(1), 5. R OTTER , J. B.(1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological monographs: General and applied, 80(1), 1. R USTENBACH , E.(2010). Sources of Nega ti ve A ttit udes toward Immigrants in Europe: A Mu lti-Level Analysis. Interna tio nal Migra tio n Review, 44(1), 53–77. h tt ps: // doi.org/ 10.111 1/ j.17477379.2009.00798.x S CHWARTZ , S. H.,& B ILSKY , W.(1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. Journal of personality and social psychology, 53(3), 550. Z IMMERMANN , K. F.,& K AHANEC , M.(2009). Interna ti onal migra ti on, ethnicity and economic inequality, in W. Salverda, B. Nolan and T. M. Smeeding(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford, pp. 455-490

42 M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 42 6 APPENDIX P ERCEPTION AND R EJECTION INDEXES BY PARTY PREFERENCES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES FPÖ ÖVP SPÖ NEOS G RÜNE A LL VOTERS AUSTRIA Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 48 24 20 43 10 52 2 55 2 66 20 46 A F D FDP CDU/CSU SPD D IE L INKE B ÜNDNIS 90/ D IE G RÜNEN A LL VOTERS GERMANY Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 21 31 5 55 7 57 3 64 3 69 1 73 5 61 FN(F RONT N ATIONAL ) LR(L ES R EPUBLICAINS ) UDI(U NION DES DEMOCRATES INDEPENDANTS ) PCF(P ARTI C OMMUNISTE F RANCAIS ) MPF(M OUVEMENT POUR LA F RANCE ) A UTRE ( PRECISEZ ) PS(P ARTI S OCIALISTE ) MODEM(M OUVEMENT D ÉMOCRATE ) EELV(E UROPE E COLOGIE L ES V ERTS ) PG(P ARTI DE G AUCHE ) A LL VOTERS FRANCE Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 35 10 9 12 2 5 4 7 6 1 12 27 48 50 51 54 61 61 62 63 68 52 F RATELLI D 'I TALIA - A N L EGA N ORD F ORZA I TALIA M OVIMENTO 5 S TELLE P ARTIDO D EMOCRATICO (PD) A LL VOTERS ITALY Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 43 21 32 29 16 36 17 40 5 54 16 43 J OBBIK (J OBBIK M AGYARORSZÁGÉRT M OZGALOM ) F IDESZ (F IDESZ M AGYAR P OLGÁRI P ÁRT ) MSZP(M AGYAR S ZOCIALISTA P ÁRT ) DK(D EMOKRATIKUS K OALÍCIÓ ) LMP(L EHET M ÁS A P OLITIKA ) A LL VOTERS HUNGARY Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 73 30 75 30 43 42 42 48 20 49 66 34 L AW AND J USTICE K UKIZ '15 P OLISH P EASANTS ' P ARTY C IVIC P LATFORM M ODERN P OLAND D EMOCRATIC L EFT A LLIANCE A LL VOTERS POLAND Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 16 48 22 52 5 52 3 62 2 63 5 65 11 54 S VERIGEDEMOKRATERNA K RISTDEMOKRATERNA M ODERATA SAMLINGSPARTIET S OCIALDEMOKRATERNA C ENTERN F OLKPARTIET LIBERALERNA M ILJÖPARTIET DE GRÖNA V ÄNSTERPARTIET A LL VOTERS SWEDEN Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 10 34 64 3 64 1 65 6 65 71 1 73 77 3 64 P ARTY FOR F REEDOM R EFORMED P OLITICAL P ARTY 50PLUS C HRISTIAN D EMOCRATIC A PPEAL S OCIALIST P ARTY P EOPLE ' S P ARTY FOR F REEDOM AND D EMOCRACY L ABOUR P ARTY P ARTY FOR THE A NIMALS C HRISTIAN U NION G REEN L EFT D EMOCRATS 66 A LL VOTERS NETHERLANDS Rejec ti on Index(RI)| Percep ti on Index(PI) 23 9 10 6 8 4 7 1 3 3 7 38 47 53 56 57 58 60 60 61 64 68 57

M M es E s S i S n IN g G – S S á Á g G v V á Á r R i: I : S S t T il IL l L d D iv IV id ID e E d D b B u U t T m M o O r R e E o O p P e E n N . . M M a A p P p P i I n N g G E E u U r R o O p P e E a A n N a A t T t T i I t T u U d D e E s S t T o O w W a A r R d D s S m MI i G g R r A a T t I i O o N n B b E e F f O o R r E e A a N n D d A a F f T t E e R r T t H h E e M m IG ig R r A a T t IO io N n C c R r IS i I s S is 4 4 3 3 R ESULTS OF THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION EXPLAINING EXTREME NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF MIGRATION Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Age(each+1 year) Having secondary educa ti on(compared to primary) Having ter ti ary educa ti on(compared to primary) Place of residence in metropolitan area(compared to mid-size town) Place of residence in rural areas(compared to mid-size town) Having foreign-born ancestry Belonging to any ethnic minority of the given country Having severe fi nancial di ffi cul ti es Feeling insecurity about personal future Social embeddedness: having frequent social connec ti ons Feeling unsafe at night in home surrounding Poli ti cal aliena ti on: no in fl uence on poli ti cs at all Poli ti cal orienta ti on(le ft-centre-right, base: le ft) Below average level of interpersonal trust Sa ti sfac ti on with life(+1 on 0-10 scale) Feeling happy(+1 on 0-10 scale) Dominance of conservative vs. open to change personal values Dominance of self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence personal values Constant .080.038 .060.082 -.691.111 -.023.094 -.085.085 -.790.139 .162.173 .356.087 .146.110 -.093.082 .443.079 .934.077 .618.079 1.181.077 -.030.021 -.061.023 -.037.096 .516.081 -4.109.224 4.372 .545 38.693 .060 1.013 32.179 .882 16.953 1.784 1.284 31.593 147.930 60.680 234.860 2.024 7.312 .145 40.123 336.838 1.037* 1.460 1.000* 1.807 1.314 1.000* 1.348 1.000* 1.182 1.257 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.155 1.007* 1.703 1.000* 1.000 1.083 1.062 .501 .977 .918 .454 1.176 1.428 1.158 .911 1.557 2.544 1.855 3.257 .970 .941 .964 1.674 .016 Variables with signi fi cant explanatory power are highlighted

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis H UNGARY PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level 44 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 70 PERCEPTION (PI) More pos itive overall percep ti on 45 45 45 41 41 41 34 more material neutral more symbolic 62 39 40 36 48 45 43 25 REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Round 1 (2002/3) Round 2 (2004/5) Round 3 (2006/7) Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work In educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 35 33 36 36 33 32 36 35 33 32 33 41 33 36 33 38 34 34 32 34 37 34 32 33 33 39 39 34 37 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 63 62 56 62 61 65 58 64 R 65 65 64 51 61 59 67 54 62 62 68 64 58 66 63 63 63 48 45 66 61 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis G ERMANY PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 55 50 50 55 54 59 59 58 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More pos itive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 7 Round 1 (2002/3) 18 Round 2 (2004/5) 17 Round 3 (2006/7) 10 Round 4 (2008/9) 10 Round 5 (2010/11) 6 Round 6 (2012/13) 7 Round 7 (2014/15) 6 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 59 57 61 61 56 58 58 57 57 56 55 62 63 56 56 61 56 50 45 54 55 57 58 61 58 63 54 57 56 6 5 2 3 3 4 7 8 10 4 7 4 5 7 5 4 6 10 9 9 5 4 3 5 1 8 9 5 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) R 22 45

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis U NITED K INGDOM PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 47 48 46 47 47 48 49 57 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More pos itive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level 46 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 15 Round 1 (2002/3) 14 Round 2 (2004/5) 17 Round 3 (2006/7) 21 22 22 17 9 Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 58 56 62 64 60 60 54 55 48 48 56 64 60 56 55 60 56 52 46 52 55 59 59 65 59 56 52 53 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 10 9 6 6 8 6 8 11 R 20 17 9 4 8 10 10 9 9 15 9 11 12 7 7 6 8 3 8 14 12 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis B ELGIUM PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) NUTS-1 level ESS Round 8(2016/17) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 49 48 50 52 49 50 50 54 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages NUTS-1 level ESS Round 8(2016/17) © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 13 Round 1 (2002/3) 19 Round 2 (2004/5) 14 Round 3 (2006/7) 12 15 18 13 9 Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 53 54 57 57 57 53 52 52 47 48 51 61 57 53 52 58 52 47 48 50 51 52 55 61 55 57 57 49 51 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 9 10 1 3 8 8 11 12 R 17 14 11 3 6 10 10 5 11 14 21 14 11 12 7 3 7 1 8 15 13 47

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis F RANCE PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 50 48 48 51 48 48 49 50 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level 48 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 13 16 15 12 13 16 18 13 Round 1 (2002/3) Round 2 (2004/5) Round 3 (2006/7) Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 51 49 54 54 53 52 48 49 46 44 48 60 55 52 45 56 48 44 49 47 48 48 52 60 52 57 51 46 49 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 12 14 9 9 10 12 17 13 R 16 21 14 5 8 12 18 9 13 21 19 17 16 15 8 5 11 8 20 15 18 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis A USTRIA PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 54 48 47 48 45 NO DATA 0 0 0 more material neutral more symbolic REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 9 Round 1 (2002/3) 13 Round 2 (2004/5) 12 Round 3 (2006/7) 0 Round 4 (2008/9) NO D 0 ATA Round 5 (2010/11) 0 Round 6 (2012/13) 18 Round 7 (2014/15) 20 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 44 46 48 53 44 44 46 42 41 40 45 53 50 46 42 49 44 41 29 43 46 46 45 48 46 59 39 41 43 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 23 17 13 19 24 19 19 20 R 22 29 21 9 18 17 23 19 19 25 38 29 20 19 18 9 20 5 34 22 12 49

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis S WITZERLAND PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 58 56 57 60 59 59 58 59 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level 50 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 3 Round 1 (2002/3) 6 Round 2 (2004/5) 7 Round 3 (2006/7) 6 Round 4 (2008/9) 10 Round 5 (2010/11) 6 Round 6 (2012/13) 7 Round 7 (2014/15) 7 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 60 58 53 58 61 61 60 59 55 55 54 64 60 56 59 57 57 62 59 56 59 61 63 59 58 56 57 59 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 7 7 5 4 3 7 8 7 R 14 8 9 4 4 7 8 7 7 7 10 8 10 8 4 3 7 2 7 11 3 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis C ZECH R EPUBLIC PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 44 43 44 40 42 38 38 NO DA 0 TA more material neutral more symbolic REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 12 Round 1 (2002/3) 22 Round 2 (2004/5) NO DA 0 TA Round 3 (2006/7) 22 26 24 28 31 Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 37 38 45 42 39 37 34 33 34 38 37 41 37 40 37 42 39 32 27 33 34 37 39 43 38 46 33 33 38 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 31 30 20 26 32 33 33 35 R 29 32 32 23 32 30 29 25 27 37 51 42 35 34 27 21 31 19 41 35 27 51

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis E STONIA PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-3 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure B: Country and regional averages NUTS-3 level ESS Round 8(2016/17) 52 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER REJECTION (RI) More people who reject PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 43 45 47 47 51 51 46 NO DA 0 TA more material neutral more symbolic NO DA 0 TA Round 1 (2002/3) 39 Round 2 (2004/5) 31 Round 3 (2006/7) 33 32 30 29 27 Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 45 46 51 50 47 47 46 42 42 40 44 53 48 46 43 56 47 38 36 41 42 46 49 54 47 55 43 40 44 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 27 27 20 17 20 24 30 34 R 36 36 29 17 24 27 30 14 23 40 49 40 33 25 17 14 23 14 23 38 33 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis S PAIN C OUNTRY PROFILE Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 54 56 55 53 53 56 54 58 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 8 Round 1 (2002/3) 9 Round 2 (2004/5) 15 Round 3 (2006/7) 16 Round 4 (2008/9) 14 13 14 7 Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 58 57 60 59 61 57 61 54 52 51 61 60 59 56 61 57 54 56 53 56 59 60 60 64 54 54 51 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 7 7 1 7 5 7 6 10 R 12 11 5 2 6 7 8 6 7 10 6 11 8 6 2 4 6 2 7 10 12 53

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis F INLAND PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 60 58 60 61 58 61 59 60 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level 54 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 9 Round 1 (2002/3) 12 Round 2 (2004/5) 12 Round 3 (2006/7) 10 Round 4 (2008/9) 16 15 10 8 Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 58 62 61 58 62 60 60 61 59 56 57 65 65 59 56 64 59 56 50 56 59 59 63 63 61 63 54 59 57 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 9 6 2 2 4 6 11 9 R 13 10 10 4 5 7 10 5 9 5 19 9 9 9 5 5 6 2 12 11 7 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis I RELAND PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 53 58 59 54 49 53 53 60 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 6 Round 1 (2002/3) 8 Round 2 (2004/5) 8 Round 3 (2006/7) 20 17 21 13 11 Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 61 58 55 63 62 62 58 56 57 49 58 62 61 57 65 58 53 47 54 57 62 65 62 61 57 59 52 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 11 11 5 7 10 9 12 14 R 18 21 12 4 9 11 13 4 13 17 26 18 15 7 4 1 9 6 17 13 16 55

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis I TALY C OUNTRY PROFILE Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 50 44 50 41 NO DATA 0 0 0 NO DA 0 TA more material neutral more symbolic REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level 56 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 9 Round 1 (2002/3) 18 Round 2 (2004/5) 0 Round 3 (2006/7) NO DATA 0 Round 4 (2008/9) 0 Round 5 (2010/11) 12 Round 6 (2012/13) NO DA 0 TA Round 7 (2014/15) 18 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 61 58 55 63 62 62 58 56 57 49 58 62 61 57 65 58 53 47 54 57 62 65 62 61 57 59 52 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 11 11 5 7 10 9 12 14 R 18 21 12 4 9 11 13 4 13 17 26 18 15 7 4 1 9 6 17 13 16 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis L ITHUANIA PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages The Percep on Index(PI) ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-3 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 48 51 52 49 NO DATA 0 0 0 0 more material neutral more symbolic REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-3 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 0 Round 1 (2002/3) NO DATA 0 0 Round 2 (2004/5) Round 3 (2006/7) 0 Round 4 (2008/9) 26 25 17 19 Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 49 49 57 51 54 47 47 46 48 52 46 51 50 46 50 54 50 45 45 44 52 50 49 47 49 57 46 48 47 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 29 22 21 22 20 24 28 31 R 26 28 28 20 20 29 27 20 24 29 32 28 26 22 26 30 25 20 29 28 24 57

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis N ETHERLANDS PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 52 51 54 56 55 56 54 56 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level 58 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 9 Round 1 (2002/3) 17 Round 2 (2004/5) 15 Round 3 (2006/7) 10 Round 4 (2008/9) 13 13 13 8 Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 56 56 56 58 55 55 56 56 56 51 54 63 60 55 55 58 55 50 46 53 54 55 57 60 56 59 57 56 51 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 8 8 8 6 6 7 9 10 R 9 13 8 3 6 8 9 6 11 8 11 12 8 7 8 3 7 6 12 8 12 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis N ORWAY PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) The Percep on Index(PI) NUTS-2 level Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 54 53 55 57 56 59 57 57 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 5 Round 1 (2002/3) 7 Round 2 (2004/5) 6 Round 3 (2006/7) 4 Round 4 (2008/9) 5 Round 5 (2010/11) 4 Round 6 (2012/13) 3 Round 7 (2014/15) 2 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 56 58 58 57 61 59 57 56 54 51 53 63 62 57 54 58 55 55 45 55 56 58 59 60 59 60 56 54 51 3 2 0 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 3 1 3 2 3 2 2 7 8 3 3 1 1 3 2 1 0 4 5 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) R 59

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis P OLAND PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 53 55 60 60 59 61 55 54 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-1 level 60 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 7 Round 1 (2002/3) 9 Round 2 (2004/5) 7 Round 3 (2006/7) 5 Round 4 (2008/9) 6 Round 5 (2010/11) 7 Round 6 (2012/13) 13 Round 7 (2014/15) 14 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 54 54 56 53 56 56 54 53 50 51 55 59 57 55 52 59 55 50 33 47 54 54 55 61 56 56 52 51 53 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 15 13 5 11 10 14 13 19 R 23 20 11 7 8 11 20 8 13 20 45 22 15 10 7 4 12 7 22 19 15 © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis P ORTUGAL PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 46 43 49 50 47 44 50 57 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 22 Round 1 (2002/3) 27 Round 2 (2004/5) 30 Round 3 (2006/7) 27 Round 4 (2008/9) 36 24 21 8 Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 59 55 63 58 57 57 59 57 52 54 59 63 60 56 55 64 57 50 54 54 53 57 57 64 59 62 51 54 58 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 6 9 0 4 5 6 8 13 R 10 12 3 3 6 7 10 2 5 12 23 13 10 8 3 2 7 1 12 10 8 61

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis S WEDEN PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 63 60 62 63 66 63 66 63 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level 62 S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF LIVING E DUCATION A GE G ENDER 2 Round 1 (2002/3) 4 Round 2 (2004/5) 3 Round 3 (2006/7) 3 Round 4 (2008/9) 2 Round 5 (2010/11) 1 Round 6 (2012/13) 2 Round 7 (2014/15) 2 Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First S ec ond Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educ a ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 61 65 66 65 65 63 63 64 60 56 60 70 66 64 58 65 61 59 48 61 59 62 63 69 65 66 68 61 57 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 3 4 5 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 0 3 2 2 3 0 1 0 3 4 2 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) © 2019 Bence Ságvári

Mapping European attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis S LOVENIA PROFILE C OUNTRY Figure A: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level The Percep on Index(PI) Rejec on Index(RI) ranging from 0 to 100(%) denotes the share of those who would reject any migrants coming from poorer countries outside Figure C:--Index Between Round 1(2002/3) and Round 8(2016/17) 47 46 47 47 44 49 47 44 more material neutral more symbolic PERCEPTION (PI) More positive overall percep ti on REJECTION (RI) More people who reject Figure B: Country and regional averages ESS Round 8(2016/17) NUTS-2 level © 2019 Bence Ságvári S TATUS I NCOME S UBJECTIVE INCOME P LACE OF E DUCATION LIVING A GE G ENDER 11 16 17 14 13 15 19 14 Round 1 (2002/3) Round 2 (2004/5) Round 3 (2006/7) Round 4 (2008/9) Round 5 (2010/11) Round 6 (2012/13) Round 7 (2014/15) Round 8 (2016/17) Figure D: PERCEPTION(PI) Male Female 14-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Low educa ti on Medium educa ti on High educa ti on Metropolitan Town Village Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Di ffi cult on present income Very di ffi cult on present income First Second Third Fourth Fi fth Paid work Educa ti on Unemployed Re ti red Other inac ti ve 44 44 48 47 46 47 42 42 37 39 41 52 47 49 41 49 41 34 29 33 42 45 48 54 46 52 44 38 42 Round 8(2016/17) REJECTION(RI) 14 13 5 7 8 7 19 17 R 25 22 14 6 12 11 15 9 14 23 34 27 17 8 5 7 11 4 9 21 17 63

7 ABOUT THE AUTHORS VERA MESSING sociologist, senior research fellow Center of Social Sciences, HAS and CEU, Center for Policy Studies Vera Messing is a senior reseach fellow at the Center of Social Sciences, HAS and a research fellow at CEU, Center for Policy Studies. She earned her PhD studies in Budapest, Corvinus Uni­versity in 2000. She has over 15 years of experience in empirical research on ethnicity, minorities, social exclusion, media represen­tation of vulnerable groups and ethnic conflicts. Her work focuses on comparative understanding of different forms and intersections of social inequalities and ethnicity and their consequences. BENCE SÁGVÁRI sociologist, senior research fellow Center of Social Sciences, HAS and International Business School (IBS) Bence Ságvári holds a PhD in Sociology. His interests lie in: youth and youth policy, empirical research methods on values and attitudes, social aspects of digital technology, use of big data and network analysis in social sciences, cross-national survey research methods. Currently, he is the national coordinator for the European Social Survey(ESS) in Hungary. 8 IMPRINT © Copyright 2019, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional project“Flight, Migration, Integration in Europe” H-1056 Budapest, Fővám tér 2-3, Hungary Tel.:+36-1-461-60-11 Fax:+36-1-461-60-18 E-Mail: fesbp@fesbp.hu http://www.fes-budapest.org/en/topics/flight-migration-integration-in-europe/ Responsible: Timo Rinke Cover photo: www.istockphoto.com/Maica Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works. ISBN 978-615-81071-2-9