

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDER

TRUMP 2.0 AND LATIN AMERICA

Deportations, Externalised Borders, Trade Wars,
and Democratic Erosion

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What policies will Donald Trump adopt towards Latin America in his second presidency? His campaign promises included mass deportation of “illegal” immigrants, increasing import tariffs and action to curb Chinese engagement in the region.



Deportations would cause humanitarian crises while the associated loss of remittances would lead to economic and political instability in affected countries. Pressure on Latin American governments to reject China may generate unexpected tensions. Authoritarian politicians in Latin America will emulate attacks on democracy in the United States. Democratic actors in Latin America, the United States and Europe need to come up with shared strategies to resist the rise of the far right.

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TRUMP 2.0 AND LATIN AMERICA – DEPORTATIONS, EXTERNALISED BORDERS, TRADE WARS, AND DEMOCRATIC EROSION

Republican President-elect Donald Trump has never shown much interest in Latin America.¹ During his first term he used import tariffs to pressure the Mexican government to curb migration and threatened to send special forces to fight organised crime. He also threatened to stop development aid to Central American countries that failed to control the flow of migrants to the United States. His administration imposed additional sanctions on Venezuela, recognised exiled opposition leader Juan Guaidó as president, and obstructed Norwegian-led negotiations. Trump even toyed with the possibility of armed intervention in Venezuela.

Latin America is linked to the United States by geography, demographics, investment, trade and transnational organised crime. But it is generally absent from or tangential to in discussions of US national security.

On the other hand, Latin America is highly relevant in the context of migration, demographic change and domestic politics. Trump won a record share of the “Latino” vote in the recent presidential election, confirming an existing trend of conservative sections of the community shifting their allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party.

It is forecast that by 2060 more than one in four Americans will be Latino. Wessel (2024) spells it out: “By 2050, the Census Bureau projects the number of non-Hispanic whites will be falling, the number of African Americans will have grown by roughly 30 percent, the number of Hispanics by 60 percent and the number of Asian Americans will have more than doubled.” Meanwhile, “the non-Hispanic white population will decline from 58.9% to 44.9% in 2060” (Flores, 2023).

PRIORITIES AND KEY ISSUES

Latin America will be affected by almost all of Trump’s major foreign and security policies (Russell, 2024). The five most prominent are:

- 1) To improve the US trade balance by imposing import tariffs (by 20 per cent overall and 60 per cent for China).

- 2) To pressure Latin American countries to curb migration to the United States.
- 3) To require Latin American countries to increase their defence spending and to pay for the arms they receive from the United States. In some cases, Washington could demand that Latin American countries pay for the presence of US forces on their territory.
- 4) To demand that allies support the United States in its multiple confrontations with China and Russia.
- 5) To delegitimise and weaken the multilateral system, especially the United Nations.

INCREASING IMPORT TARIFFS

Higher tariffs would have a serious impact on exports to the United States from Mexico and other countries in the region. The Trump administration could also link the level of tariffs on Mexican products to the Mexican government’s willingness to curb crime and migration.

Tariffs are being used as a political weapon. In November 2024, Peruvian President Dina Boluarte and Chinese President Xi Jinping inaugurated the Peruvian deep-water port of Chancay, built with Chinese funding. Mauricio Claver-Carone, adviser to Trump’s transition team and controversial former president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), said that the tariffs Trump promised to impose on Chinese products should also be applied to all goods transiting through Chancay. Similarly, he said, China should be prevented from using the port to evade tariffs on its exports to the United States.

Transshipment via Mexican ports is also of concern to the United States. Trump’s first-term trade war with China (which Joe Biden continued) has made Mexico the United States’ largest trading partner. Raising tariffs will make Latin American countries think twice before allowing China to build another port on their territory, Claver-Carone said. However, it is unclear how much of the cargo passing through Chancay would actually be destined for the United States, as the port is intended primarily for trade between South America and Asia (Bloomberg, 2024).

¹ For reasons of space, this text uses Latin America generically to include South and Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

Global uncertainties, tensions with China and a desire to cut costs by reducing the distance between production sites and markets, have led 90 per cent of US companies operating in China to relocate some or all their production in recent years. Reshoring is a trend (Boston Consulting Group, 2024) and Mexico, India and Southeast Asia are rapidly emerging as manufacturing powerhouses for US corporations (Bloomberg, 2024). While Trump wants US companies operating in China to return to the United States, imposing higher tariffs on imports would punish hundreds of companies operating in Mexico and raise consumer prices – and inflation – for US consumers.

On November 25 Trump said he will impose a 25 per cent tariff on all imports from Canada and Mexico unless they stop illegal migration and drug trafficking, with “an additional 10% tariff, above any additional tariffs” on Chinese goods. The levies could be imposed using executive powers to override the USMCA free trade agreement that Trump signed with Canada and Mexico during his first term as president (Williams, 2024).

The neoliberal policies envisaged by Trump and his team will also mean cutting and abolishing government regulations. “Tax cuts and increased spending are likely to mean higher budget deficits in the US,” says Columbia University professor Mauricio Cárdenas (2024). This will lead to “higher inflation, higher interest rates and a stronger dollar for a longer period of time”. As Cárdenas notes: “In Latin America, this means lower capital inflows to the region, weaker currencies and higher interest rates,” which will worsen the outlook for economic growth. “The region is not expected to grow above 3% in the coming years.”

The US market is important to the region, and is the main destination for Central American agricultural exports. The United States accounts for roughly 31 per cent of the LAC region’s merchandise imports and 45 per cent of its merchandise exports. Most of this trade is with Mexico, which in 2023 accounted for 77 per cent of US imports from the region and 62 per cent of US exports to the region. Major US imports from the LAC region include motor vehicles and parts, mostly from Mexico. The LAC region, which includes some of the world’s leading tax havens, currently accounts for 16 per cent of total US foreign direct investment. In 2021, majority-owned foreign affiliates of US-based multinational enterprises employed 2.8 million workers in the LAC region, more than half of them in Mexico (Congressional Research Service, 2024).

CONTROVERSIAL MASS DEPORTATIONS

Migration was a headline issue during Trump’s presidential campaign, including threats of mass deportations. Many US citizens with Latino origins felt that the threat of deportation would not affect them and voted Republican in opposition to Democratic policies that they perceived as favouring illegal immigration. For many Latinos, who have struggled hard to become a legal part of American society, the per-

ception that the Democrats will allow illegal immigrants to enter and receive benefits (and even amnesties) is seen as a comparative disadvantage.

If Trump makes good on his promise to carry out mass deportations, the consequences will be severe. Maureen Meyer, vice president of the NGO Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) lays out the risks:

“Although funding and logistical hurdles may limit the scale of deportations, Mexico and other countries in Latin America, which as a region account for about 7.87 million of the estimated 11 million undocumented migrants in the country – and the majority of beneficiaries of numerous other temporary legal status programmes – will need to prepare for large numbers of deportees and the economic impact of reduced remittances.”

Meyer (2024)

Of the estimated 11 million people living illegally in the United States, more than four million are Mexican, two million are from Central America, over 800,000 are from South America and 400,000 are from the Caribbean. All those economies would be hit hard by the loss of remittances. If deportations are carried out and new taxes are imposed on remittances (as several US states are considering) economic and political instability in the region will increase (Birke, 2024). The impact would be felt most acutely in Mexico – which is the largest recipient of US remittances (about \$60 billion per annum, equivalent to almost 4 per cent of GDP) – and in Central American and Caribbean countries. Nicaragua receives remittances equivalent to about 28 per cent of GDP, Honduras 26 per cent, El Salvador 24 per cent, Guatemala 20 per cent, Haiti 18 per cent and Jamaica 17 per cent (Brown, 2024).

The nomination of Marco Rubio, a conservative Cuban-American Republican senator from Florida, as Secretary of State in the future Trump administration will have serious implications. Rubio is a hardliner on security and could work with other proposed appointees (radical right-winger Pete Hegseth as future Secretary of Defence, extremist Trump lawyer, Pam Bondi as Attorney General, and Trump’s migration adviser and xenophobic ideologue Stephen Miller) to carry out deportations by declaring a state of emergency and using military force (Savage and Gold, 2024).

The state of Texas is offering a parcel of ranch land near the US-Mexico border to be used as a staging area for possible mass deportations. In parallel, the Republican Party is discussing revoking the citizenship of naturalised US citizens.

Latin America (and Mexico in particular) will largely reject the social and economic costs of such a policy, as well as the potential humanitarian disaster of mass deportations. And, as *Newsweek* reports, “the deportation plan is causing widespread ‘panic’ among [US] farmers at risk of losing workers and business. Agricultural output will fall between \$30 and \$60 billion if Trump’s flagship policy is carried out, according to the American Business Immigration Coalition (ABIC)” (Rahman, 2024).

The Republicans will control both houses of Congress from January 2025 and will be able to pass legislation to fund deportations. During the Trump and Biden presidencies they promoted the “stay in Mexico” rule to keep asylum seekers out until their court date, as well as policies to return refugees to supposedly safe third countries.

Rubio will increase the pressure on Colombia and Venezuela. Republicans are wary of Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s leftist past and his criticism of the United States. Growth in coca production could see Colombia lose its certification as a partner country in the fight against drug trafficking. Similarly, the economic cooperation granted by Barack Obama after the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC could be withdrawn.

Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado has maintained political ties with Rubio for a decade. After the fraudulent elections of July 2024, she is now calling on him to put “maximum pressure” on President Nicolás Maduro to step down. This poses a serious dilemma for the future Trump administration. If it imposes more sanctions, the number of Venezuelan migrants to the United States will increase. But if it does not, some of its voters and politicians in states such as Arizona and Texas will be disappointed. Meanwhile, Trump and Argentine President Javier Milei have already forged an alliance against the United Nations and the left. Rubio’s relationship with Lula da Silva’s government in Brazil is a significant unknown.

EXTERNALISING THE BORDER

Trump initiated cooperation with third countries to control migration during his first presidency and President Biden continued the practice. Externalising migration control means relocating restrictive controls outside the destination country’s physical borders. This involves cooperation by third countries, whether or not they share physical borders with the destination country. Similar policies have been or are being implemented by the European Union, Australia and the United Kingdom.

These plans, which have been criticised by human rights activists and the UN, are concealed within other policies. The United States has drawn up plans for military cooperation with various countries in the region, ostensibly to combat transnational organised crime. But this is also a strategy for externalising migration control by securitising Latin America’s borders. Tonatiuh Guillén, former commissioner at the National Migration Institute, believes that “the treatment of migrants arriving [in Mexico] will continue to be militarised and the country is not prepared to receive the Mexicans that Donald Trump will deport” (Aguayo, 2024).

Trump’s immigration adviser Stephen Miller has stated that the new administration will reinstate the policy of separating immigrant minors from their families, imprisoning them and then deporting them separately, which had been forbidden by President Biden (Stillman, 2021). During the first

Trump administration Miller created a complex set of rules and agreements between Washington and the border states that can now be revived (Dickerson, 2023).

The Obama, Trump and Biden administrations all returned illegal immigrants to their countries of origin or to third countries. In many cases, as US research institutes, lawyers and NGOs report, there were deficiencies concerning security and human rights. Nor do Mexico and Guatemala have the capacity to process thousands of asylum claims. Migrants and refugees returned to Mexico or Guatemala face threats from gangs and criminal groups (often the same threats that led them to flee in the first place). On the other hand, these policies may lead to changes in individuals’ migration strategies without causing a noticeable overall reduction in irregular migration (Ambrosius and Velásquez, 2024).

INCREASING DEFENCE SPENDING

The global trend for US allies to increase their military spending coincides with a “*mano dura*” (hard hand) policy towards organised crime by leaders who make a point of courting the armed forces, as in the case of President Javier Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador and, increasingly, President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador. These hard-line policies involve weakening civilian control and accountability over the military and curtailing the reach of the judiciary.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military spending in Central America and the Caribbean “went up by 54 per cent over the decade 2014–23. Rising crime levels have led to increased use of military forces against criminal gangs by some countries in the subregion, most notably Mexico. Mexican military expenditure reached \$11.8 billion in 2023. Spending fell by 1.5 per cent between 2022 and 2023, but has risen by 55 per cent since 2014” (Tial et.al., 2024). “At \$50.7 billion in 2023, military spending in South America was almost unchanged (–0.3 per cent) from 2022. Brazil is the largest spender in the sub region” (ibid.).

Javier Milei’s government in Argentina has proposed increasing defence and security spending to between 0.8 and 1 per cent of GDP in 2025. This would amount to around US\$6.2 billion, double the US\$3 billion spent in 2024 (Padinger, 2024).

CONFRONTING CHINA

The Trump administration will focus on countering China’s influence. The task is not simple. It will be a complex operation involving federal, state and local policies to attract private investors. Meanwhile, Chinese investment is increasingly welcome in the LAC region where the United States is perceived as having lost rather interest over the past three decades (O’Neil, 2024).

In June 2022, eleven countries in the LAC region signed the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity to work with Washington on economic, anti-corruption and sustainability issues. Twenty-one Latin American countries are part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Significantly, the Brazilian government announced an expansion of its economic cooperation with China during the G20 meeting in November 2024. At the same time, China's SpaceSail is set to launch a satellite service in Brazil to compete with Elon Musk's Starlink. This is a double challenge from Lula da Silva's government: to Musk's tech empire and to the United States itself. The deal follows a bitter dispute between Musk and the Brazilian authorities, which temporarily banned X earlier this year after accusing the company of spreading anti-democratic disinformation.

A report by the Inter-American Dialogue elaborates:

"China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has played a prominent role in sectoral growth in parts of the region over the past 20 years—especially in South America's largest markets, where Chinese companies historically focused on the region's vast agricultural and extractive resources. From 2003 to 2022, Chinese FDI totalled \$187.5 billion in LAC, still well below U.S. or European FDI flows during the same period. But Chinese companies are growing their presence in the region as they pursue targeted opportunities in nearly all LAC nations.

The nature of Chinese FDI in the region is changing in notable ways, however, and with still-unforeseen implications for the region and its many other international investors."

Myers et al. (2024)

The large-scale infrastructure projects that characterised the BRI are no longer foremost:

"In many parts of the region, Chinese interest in canals, rail, and other major transport and energy infrastructure is being replaced by a growing emphasis on innovation, whether in information and communication technology (ICT), renewable energy, or other emerging industries—consistent with Beijing's laser focus on its own economic upgrading and global competitiveness."

Myers et al. (2024)

Paradoxically, China's position could be strengthened if the Trump administration pushes too hard on trade and immigration. Certain governments in the region believe they can play the two powers off against each other. In today's multipolar world, the flexibility and fluidity of alliances means that countries in the South will always find a partner to protect them as needs require.

On the security front, the priority of the Pentagon's Southern Command is to strengthen alliances with militaries in

the region and to deter any Chinese presence. General Laura Richardson, then commander of US Southern Command said in 2023 that China

"has the capability and intent to eschew international norms, advance its brand of authoritarianism, and amass power and influence at the expense of these democracies," Gen. Laura Richardson, commander of US Southern Command, said on Wednesday. "The PRC has expanded its ability to extract resources, establish port, manipulate governments through predatory investment practices, and build potential dual-use space facilities — the most space facilities in any combatant command region."

Britzky (2023)

Xulio Ríos of IGADI (Galician Institute for International Analysis and Documentation) points out that "military cooperation is an important area for the development of Beijing's relations with its strategic partners and has four main axes in which it is increasing: declarations that undermine Washington's strategic primacy; cooperation in strategic areas; military exchanges; and the donation and sale of military equipment and armaments" (Ríos, 2024).

THE PROBLEMATIC CASES

Mexico is the most complex aspect of US-Latin American relations. Migration, organised crime in both countries, arms trafficking, nearshoring and competition with China form a demanding agenda. In his first presidency, Trump stepped up policies to cut off migration and threatened to intervene militarily in Mexico with special forces, repeating the threat in his latest campaign. Mexico's experienced diplomatic corps will now face an aggressive and volatile administration north of the border.

Organised crime across the Mexico-US border involves trafficking of drugs (particularly deadly fentanyl), people and arms. The illicit arms trade is facilitated by lax controls in the United States, which are exploited by Mexican criminal cartels. The Mexican cartels are also expanding their activities to Europe. A joint report by Europol and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (2022) shows that "Mexican cartels and EU-based criminal networks have been working together to traffic both methamphetamine and cocaine from Latin America to the EU. This new form of criminal collaboration also extends to the production of methamphetamine and cocaine hydrochloride in some EU Member States" (Europol, 2022). The Republican Party's tendency to roll back regulations could reduce the effort put into intelligence, police and judicial cooperation and information mechanisms.

There is also a large market for trafficking in animal species, oil, gold, mercury and other minerals. Drug trafficking is intense, particularly in heroin, cocaine, cannabis and fentanyl. Criminal organisations are expanding their activities in cybercrime, financial fraud, extortion of companies by

threatening to destroy or publish their data, and massive capital flight. In general, neither country has effective legislation to combat such crimes (Global Organized Crime Index, 2024).

Security expert Sergio Aguayo of the Colegio de México says that Mexico's demographic weight in the United States (where 38.8 million residents are Mexican or of Mexican descent) and the Mexican lobby in US domestic politics gives it a strong hand: Washington needs Mexican cooperation in many areas, and President Claudia Sheinbaum must play to her strengths.²

In Brazil, Lula da Silva's government formed an implicit alliance with Kamala Harris (by explicitly supporting her candidacy) in defence of democracy and against the rise of the far right. The latter has grown stronger across the region through massive use of social networks, says Brazilian professor Monica Hirst, taking advantage of a favourable electoral calendar and, in the case of Brazil, exploiting the anti-Lula vote of 30 million evangelicals in Brazil (Hirst, 2024).

Brian Winter, editor of *Americas Quarterly*, believes that "Trump's victory breathes new life into Bolsonaro's movement and his hopes of staging an improbable comeback – and overturning the court rulings that bar him from running in 2026. Brazil is an unknown quantity: you have *Bolsonaristas* with influence in Trump's world trying to push the idea that Lula da Silva is anti-democratic and anti-Western, and that Brazil should be sanctioned. We'll soon see if they get any space" (Winter, 2024). In November 2024 the Brazilian Federal Police charged Bolsonaro and 37 others – retired members of the armed forces and civilians, including a member of Milei's campaign – with violent overthrow of the democratic rule of law, coup d'état and criminal association.

In Colombia, Trump is likely to put pressure on the government of Gustavo Petro because of the increase in cocaine production and the "Paz Total" negotiations with political and criminal non-state armed actors. The US Congress is likely to reduce or eliminate funding supporting the 2016 peace process with the FARC guerrilla group. The Republicans, says Maureen Meyer of WOLA, "are not interested in human rights programmes or the climate crisis, and they want to end support for organisations that educate about sexual and reproductive rights, access to abortion, and funds that support gender equality, racial diversity, vulnerable groups, and LGBTQI identities".³

In the case of Venezuela, some experts believe that Trump could take a pragmatic approach, following Biden's line of trying to negotiate a deal with the government of Nicolás Maduro to facilitate a transition in exchange for some kind of US legal immunity for him and his immediate circle (opening the door to exile in a third country).

But Republicans in Congress and future Secretary of State Marco Rubio may be inclined to heed opposition leader María Corina Machado, who said to the *New York Times*:

"Maduro is now so weak – rejected by his own people, suffering from fractures within his party – that a renewed pressure campaign by Trump and his allies could actually push the Venezuelan autocrat to negotiate his own exit."

Turkewitz (2024)

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THREAT

As Trump fills key positions in his administration, it is becoming increasingly certain that two areas will be seriously affected: democracy and human rights. In the case of Latin America, subversion and discrediting of the democratic system have worsened over the past decade. According to the new report by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), *The Global State of Democracy 2024*, the number of countries with declining rather than improving democratic performance has increased for eight consecutive years. The declines affect both traditionally strong democracies and fragile governments (International IDEA, 2024).

In this context, journalists, human rights defenders, advocacy groups and other elements of civil society are particularly vulnerable.

"Their role ...in protecting checks and balances and promoting accountability has never been more important. The civic space they need to do their work is at great risk amid attacks on independent media, disinformation and threats of retaliation emanating from the president-elect and his allies"

Isacson et al. (2024)

The systematic offensive against multilateralism, especially the UN and international law, is an essential part of Trump's aggressive nationalism. As the Council on Foreign Relations (2024) notes:

"The United States remains the largest donor to the United Nations. It contributed more than \$18 billion in 2022, accounting for one-third of funding for the body's collective budget." But, it points out: "The Trump administration sought to pare down or completely eliminate voluntary contributions to many UN programs, targeting peacekeeping operations and several specialized agencies. Trump rejected the globalism of the United Nations and viewed certain programs as contradictory to his administration's agenda on Israel, abortion, and other policy areas"

Isacson et al. (2024)

Christopher Sabatini of the Americas Programme at Chatham House believes that "the incoming Trump administration threatens to contribute to the undermining of regional insti-

² Interview with the author, 10 October 2024.

³ Interview with the author, 20 September 2024.

tutions designed to defend citizens' rights, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and its Inter-American Human Rights System". Both, he says, "have evolved over decades into staunch defenders of civil and political rights. Right-wing populists pose the greatest threat, possibly with the tacit or explicit support of the Trump administration." (Sabatini, 2024).

THE WAY AHEAD

Trump's triumph will strengthen the far right in Latin America, Europe and the United States with an "Argentina-Florida-Spain axis" that promotes the "free circulation of political malpractice", predicts Monica Hirst.⁴ In the case of Argentina, Milei presents himself as the "Trump of Latin America" and closely follows Trump's playbook. He has denounced the UN's 2030 Agenda as an instrument of the left, threatened to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and withdrawn Argentine troops from the UN mission in Lebanon; and his diplomats refuse to make any statement supporting gender and identity policies. In return, he hopes that Trump will help him obtain a 15-billion-dollar loan from the IMF to relieve the Argentine economic crisis.

Trump's attack on democracy is a domestic problem with international ramifications, and vice versa. In response to the rise of far-right politicians, parties and organisations, political and civil actors must forge alliances to defend democracy, reform the multilateral system and construct a democratic agenda. Central issues for international collaboration include climate change (strengthening COP meetings), the energy transition, peaceful resolution of armed conflicts, the global food crisis, and reforming the international financial system. These are all demands raised by the Global South, and others.

Maureen Meyer of WOLA sums up the prospects for civil society in the face of reduced official funding from the United States:

"Civil society organisations in Latin America and the Caribbean and around the world that support human rights, anti-corruption efforts, judicial independence, diversity, gender equality, reproductive rights, and the environment will find fewer friends in leadership positions in the administration and Congress."

Meyer (2024)

Civil society organisations will need to develop creative strategies against the erosion of rule of law and liberal values, including fake news and abuse of social media. They must prepare for the possibility of serious attacks, including violence and legal bans. Right-wing offensives in countries including the United States, Argentina and Brazil show that the distinction between domestic and international politics has disappeared. Attacks on civil rights advocates – including femi-

nists, environmentalists, marginalised identity groups and journalists are part and parcel of an assault on the multilateral system, the rule of law and the UN system. Likewise, international organised crime and tax evasion weaken democratic institutions and relations between states.

There are complex challenges and complicated times ahead. In Latin America, the United States and Europe there is an urgent need for dialogue on strategies and coordination between democratic actors – political parties, trade unions, civil society organisations, churches, private philanthropic institutions, the private sector, and the EU.

⁴ Interview with the author, 14 October 2024.

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TRUMP 2.0 AND LATIN AMERICA

Deportations, Externalised Borders, Trade Wars, and Democratic Erosion



During his election campaign Donald Trump threatened to carry out mass deportations of “illegal” immigrants (most of whom come from the Latin America/Caribbean region). And he promised to raise tariffs on imports from all over the world, particularly targeting Mexico.



Latin America will be affected by almost all of Trump’s major foreign and security policies: imposing import tariffs; pressure to curb migration; demanding increases in defence spending and US arms purchases; requiring allies to support multiple US confrontations with China; and delegitimising and weakening the multilateral system, especially the United Nations.

As Trump fills key positions in his administration, it is increasingly obvious that democracy and human rights will be seriously affected. In Latin America, attacks on the democratic system have worsened over the past decade.



Civil society organisations need to develop creative strategies against fake news and abuse of social media, and prepare for the likelihood of serious attacks including legal bans. Right-wing offensives in countries including the United States, Argentina and Brazil show that the distinction between domestic and international politics has disappeared.

Further information on the topic can be found here:
<https://www.fes.de/lateinamerika>