idos confronti

# 2018

IDOS Study and Research Centre
in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

# STATISTICAL DOSSIER ON IMMIGRATION

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

IDOS Study and Research Centre

# *Statistical Dossier on Immigration 2018*

Selected chapters and summaries
from the Italian version

Translation in English by
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

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Via A. Davila 16, 00179 Rome, Italy
tel. +39.06.66514345 - 06.66514502 fax +39.06.66540087
E-mail: idos@dossierimmigrazione.it

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**2018 Statistical Dossier on Immigration**
**Summary sheet**

In an era of mystification and instrumentalization of migration (including politicians), the Statistical Dossier on Immigration (Dossier Statistico Immigrazione), now at its **28th edition**, by means of statistics and a reasoned analysis of reality, continues to be essential for a better understanding of a phenomenon that is destined to concern us more and more in the future - willingly or not.

This edition, edited by IDOS Study and Research Centre in partnership with Centro Studi Confronti and with the collaboration of Unar, has been co-financed by the *Fondo Otto per mille* of the Waldensian Church and the Union of Methodist and Waldensian Churches. More than a hundred researchers and academics, with different skills and cultural backgrounds, have contributed to the drafting of this edition, in a variety of approaches that constitute the wealth of interpretation and content of this volume.

The broad and diversified set of data, from both administrative archives and on the field qualitative surveys, after being carefully processed and correlated, has allowed an analytical, updated and articulated reading of immigration in Italy - something that is now more urgent and necessary than ever.

**A planetary, irreversible and epochal phenomenon**

According to the United Nations, among the 7 billion and 600 million people who make up the world population at the end of 2017, over 1 out of 30 is a migrant (for example a person who stays outside the country in which he was born or is resident). We are talking about 258 million people, 3.4% of all human beings living on the planet.

In just two years this number has increased by 14 million people (they were 244 million in 2015) and is destined to grow again. The UN, in fact, estimate that in 2050, when the population of the Earth will reach 9.8 billion (with an average annual increase of 70 million), the number of migrants will reach 469 million (211 million more than today). By then Africa will have doubled its population from 1.2 billion today to 2-2.5 billion, further increasing its already high "migratory potential".

Of the above-mentioned 258 million migrants, **81.6%** come from the **South of the world** and the great majority (about 230 million) is made up by the so-called "economic" migrants and their families. The unequal distribution of goods and wealth at a worldwide level is still one of the main causes of global migration: even today more than 43% of the entire wealth of the planet, equivalent to US$128 trillion (world GDP at purchasing power parity), is in the hands of only 17% of the world population (1,2 billion people) who living in the North of the world: the remaining 57% of resources are divided among the other 6.3 billion people living in the South. This **inequality** is becoming wider and more extreme, especially when taking into account the average annual wealth per capita: if in North America and the European Union the GDP per capita is $58,000 and 41,000, respectively, in Africa this figure drops to just $5,000 (a ratio of 12 to 1 and 8 to 1, respectively). Considering the world countries, the gap goes from $128,000 US of Qatar, the country with the highest per capita GDP in the world, to just $726 of the Central African Republic, the country with the lowest per capita income on the planet.

However, migration is not only caused by economic reasons. In 2017, the so-called "**forced**" **migrants** rose to 68 million, a remarkable 2.4 million more than in 2016, when their number had already almost doubled compared to 20 years before (they were 33,9 million in 1997). As highlighted by the *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, the big majority of these refugees are internally displaced persons (over 40 million), while 23 million emigrate to other countries (mainly Palestinian refugees and asylum seekers). The remaining 5 million are displaced persons or refugees, who are dealt with by a special agency of the United Nations (Unrwa).

In the world, it has been at least 20 years since internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased more than twice as much as refugees leaving their own country. This shows the growing difficulties - even for those who flee from an immediate danger of death - to cross the borders of their country in order to seek protection. The countries with the highest of number of emigrants are India (with 16.6 million), Mexico (13 million), Russia (10.6), China (10) and Bangladesh (7.5). But among refugees seeking safety outside their own country, 1 in 3 comes from Syria (which has 6.3 million recognised refugees outside its borders, in addition to almost 150,000 asylum seekers, while another 6.2 million are IDPs), followed by Afghanistan and South Sudan (each with about 2.5 million expatriate refugees), and then by Myanmar and Somalia (each with about 1 million).

Moreover, in spite of what people usually believe, the majority of refugees in the world are **received by developing countries**: For the fourth consecutive year, due to the war in neighbouring Syria and the agreements with the EU, Turkey is the country that hosts the largest number of refugees (3.5 million, in addition to 300,000 asylum seekers), followed by Pakistan with 1.4 million (almost all Afghans), Uganda with 1,350,000 (a number that has increased by 400,000 units in a year, of which 1 million comes from South Sudan and 230,000 from the Democratic Republic of Congo), Lebanon with 1 million (mostly Syrians) and Iran with 980,000 (mostly Afghans).

If we consider the incidence of refugees on the resident population, the primacy belongs to Lebanon (with a ratio of 1 refugee for every 6 inhabitants), followed by Jordan (1 out of 14). If we also consider the Palestinian refugees under the mandate of UNRWA, in these two countries the ratio reaches 1 every 4 and 1 every 3, respectively. Turkey ranks third, with 1 refugee for every 23 inhabitants.

In such a context, the recurring slogan “**let’s help them in their Countries**” (which is used by many who would like to quickly dissolve the "problem" of immigration just by closing the borders), on one hand positively highlights the need of greater support for international cooperation, given the global dimension and the structural and multidimensional nature of the phenomenon and its causes, on the other hand would not bring any appreciable results in the short/medium term for what regards the reduction of migration flows. Such a strategy, too, would in any case require the adoption of other, more coherent policies of migration flows and integration, which should be harmonised at international level, as required by the global dimension of the phenomenon.

**Europe and Italy: the non existent invasion**

The Parliament's latest “Jo Cox” report on xenophobia and racism, states that Italy is the country with the highest rate of **disinformation on migration** in the world. It is not

surprising, therefore, that according to a 2018 survey conducted by the Cattaneo Institute, Italians have the most distant perception of reality among European citizens regarding the number of foreigners living in their country, believing their number to be more than twice as many as the actual figure.
On the contrary, according to the latest Eurostat data (Jan 1 2017) there are 38.6 million foreign citizens in the EU28 (21.6 of whom are non-EU citizens), who account for 7.5% of the total population, and in the Eu, Italy **is neither the country with the highest number of immigrants nor the one that hosts the most refugees and asylum seekers**.
With about 5 million foreign residents (5,144,000 at the end of 2017, according to ISTAT), Italy ranks third after Germany (9.2 million) and the United Kingdom (6.1 million), being just a little above France (4.6 million) and Spain (4.4 million).
The incidence on the total population (according to ISTAT data), is also lower than that of Germany (11.2%), United Kingdom (9.2%) and several other smaller EU countries, where this value often exceeds 10% (Cyprus 16.4%, Austria 15.2%, Belgium 11.9% and Ireland 11.8%). The highest incidence is in Luxembourg, where almost half of all residents are foreigners (47,6%).
Eurostat also highlights that the number of immigrants who entered an EU country in 2016 (last available annual data), equal to about 4.3 million, was 8% lower than in 2015, while about 3 million people have in the meantime left an EU country (many of them to move anyway within another country of the EU).
Moreover, despite an increase in global migration, in 2017 the European Union saw both irregular border crossings (9 times less than in 2015) and asylum applications (43.5% less than in 2016) decrease dramatically. As denounced by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2018, there is still the issue of access to the EU by potential beneficiaries of humanitarian protection. Many abuses of migrants by border police have been documented by several subjects in 2017: a network of NGOs has set up a monitoring site for the Balkan route (www.borderviolence.eu); Amnesty International has reported several cases in Ceuta and Melilla; Médecins sans Frontières, thanks to testimonies collected at their clinics in Serbia, denounced the violence suffered by migrants at the hands of the police or border guards in Bulgaria, Croatia and Hungary; we could name a number of other cases.
Contrary to the **belief that our country is besieged and "invaded" by foreigners**, their number in Italy - excluding internal movements - is stable at about 5 million since 2013; moreover, the incidence of foreigners on the Italian population - which is around 8% since 2013 - increases only by a few decimal points per year. This increase is mainly due to the progressive decrease of Italian citizens, who are getting older (25% of the Italian population is over-65s, while among foreigners they are only 1 out of 25) and have an increasingly lower birth rate (1.27 children per fertile woman, compared to 1.97 among foreigners). Moreover, many Italians are now choosing to emigrate again, with almost 115,000 official expatriates during 2017 (the latter is an undersized figure if we consider that many emigrants, when moving abroad, do not bother to report their transfer to the register, as it is not mandatory).
Adding to foreign residents the share of immigrants who, at the date of the survey, were not yet registered in the registries, IDOS estimates that the actual number of foreign citizens regularly residing in Italy is 5,333,000 (26,000 less than the 2016 estimate).

In particular, according to the Ministry of the Interior and ISTAT, there are 3.7 million non-EU citizens living in Italy, a number that has remained substantially unchanged for the last 3 years, partly due to the significant decrease in the number of migrant landings in Italy (119,000, that is 62,000 less than in 2016). This decline became even more pronounced in 2018, so much so that the surge of asylum seekers who crossed the desert and the central Mediterranean Sea to land on Italian coasts, can be considered concluded in 2017, after four years in which a total of about 625,000 refugees have arrived in our country. In 2017, according to UNHCR and IOM data, of the more than 172,000 forced migrants who arrived in Europe by sea, 64% landed in Italy. However, in the first 9 months of 2018, the number of landings in Spain (more than 34,000) and Greece (more than 22,000) exceeded by far those in Italy (less than 21,000, a figure which has dropped by about 80% compared to the same period in 2017).

The near-closure of the central Mediterranean route has also led to a drastic reduction of **unaccompanied foreign minors** (Ufm) who arrived in Italy after being rescued at sea: compared to more than 25,800 in 2016, in 2017 their number fell to about 15,800 and even further in the first 7 months of 2018 (2,900). The number of Ufm hosted in Italy, therefore, has also fallen drastically: just over 13,000 in June 2018, 26% less than in 2017. These minors are mostly male children (93%), between 16 and 17 years old (84%), originating especially from Albania, Egypt, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Eritrea. Among the girls, especially those of Nigerian ethnicity, many are victims of trafficking for sexual purposes. At the same date there were almost 4,700 untraceable Ufm (mainly Eritreans, Somalis and Afghans) who left Italy driven by the desire to reach Germany, Sweden or England, where they have relatives and hope to find better working conditions (data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies).

The tightening on the Mediterranean route is due to the new agreements signed in 2017 between Libya and Italy, which resulted in an increasing number of refugees who are intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard (which is helped by Italy for this purpose, with patrol boats and economic resources) and returned to detention centres in the North African country, where they are once again subjected to violence and torture to extort ransoms (a fact which is now well documented) or are sold to human traffickers, who may in turn resell them as slaves.

This drastic reduction in arrivals, however, was also achieved at the cost of a **dramatic increase of deaths at sea:** according to the IOM, between January and September 2018, 1,728 people drowned in the Mediterranean Sea - 1,260 on the route between Libya and Italy alone - partly because of the reduced search and rescue capacity at sea caused by the Italian policy of delegitimising and excluding NGOs' ships, which were previously engaged in such operations and carried out about 35% of all rescues. According to the IOM, since 2000, out of the 40,000 migrants who died at sea throughout the world, those who died on the route between Italy and Libya were as many as 22,4000.

These data make the **humanitarian corridors** pilot project even more valuable. This project, which was launched in Italy by the Community of Sant'Egidio, the Federation of Evangelical Churches in Italy and the Waldensian Table, in agreement with the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as of July 2018 was able to secure 1,249 asylum seekers of various nationalities (Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Yemenites) from Lebanon to Italy. As of June

2017, about 70% of these refugees had been granted refugee status and no application had been rejected. Also, the Italian Bishops' Conference, in collaboration with the Community of Sant'Egidio and the above mentioned Ministries, has opened a humanitarian corridor in Ethiopia: as of June 2018 327 refugees were accepted, out of 500 expected in 2 years. Meanwhile, this Italian model has been adopted by France and then by Belgium.
Currently, according to UNHCR data, there are 354,000 **asylum seekers** (including those who have not yet obtained a formal recognition or whose application is still pending) and **holders of international or humanitarian protection** living in Italy, 0,6% of the entire population of the country. If, on the one hand, these figures put Italy in third place after Germany (1.4 million applicants for and holders of protection, with the latter alone amounting to approximately 1 million) and France (400,000), on the other hand, the impact on the population is perfectly in line with the European Union average: it is equal to that of France and the Netherlands, and is significantly lower than that of countries such as Sweden (2.9%), Austria and Malta (1.9%), Germany, Cyprus (1.7%) and Greece (0.8%), while all the "new" Eastern European Member States (with the exception of Bulgaria, with 0.3%) do not exceed 0.1%.

**Characteristics, origins and distribution**

While among foreign residents as a whole, **women** are slightly prevalent (52.0%), among non-EU residents only their number is slightly below 50% (48,3%). However, this figure varies considerably from one national community to another.
Foreign residents in Italy come from **almost 200 different countries.** Half of them (2.6 million) are European citizens (1.6 million, 30% from a EU Member state), while a fifth (1 million) comes from Africa and a little less from Asia. There are about 370,000 Americans (7.2%), mostly Latin American citizens (6.9%).
Romanians are the largest community by far (1,190,000 people, equal to 23.1% of all foreign residents), followed by Albanians (440,000, 8.6%), Moroccans (417,000, 8,1%), Chinese (291,000, 5.7%) and Ukrainians (237,000, 4.6%). These first 5 communities cover half of the entire foreign population in Italy (50.1%), while the first 10 communities (which include also the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Moldova and Egypt) cover just under two-thirds (63.7%).
**Central-Northern Italy** continues to have the highest number of foreign residents (83.1%, with the majority in the North West: 33.6%). In particular, Lombardy is the region with the largest number of foreign residents (1,154,000, 22.9% of the country's total), followed by Lazio (679.000, 13,5%), Emilia Romagna (536.000, 10,6%, this region also has the highest proportion of the foreign population compared to the total population: 12,0%), Veneto (487.000, 9,7%) and Piedmont (424.000, 8,4%). 10.8% of all foreigners residing in Italy are concentrated in the metropolitan area of Rome alone, a further 8.9% in the area of Milan (459.000) and another 4.3% in the area of Turin (220.000).
Several characteristics of the immigrant population deserve special attention and are therefore reported in our *Dossier*. First of all, the fact that the number of children born to both foreign parents is constantly decreasing in Italy, since 2013: they were in fact just under 82,000 in 2012 and are now almost 68,000 (2017). On the other hand, due to the fact that the birth rate of the Italian population is also constantly declining, the incidence of new foreign births remains stable at about one-seventh of all annual births in the country (14,8% in 2017).

However, this gradual adaptation of the immigrant population to the reproductive behaviour of the native population has meant that the fertility rate of foreign women, while remaining higher than that of Italian women (as we have already seen) has fallen below the "replacement level" for some years now (2.1 children per fertile woman). For this reason, their contribution to the general birth rate of our country will diminish over time, with serious repercussions on the generational turnover, both in terms of productivity and welfare.
A second important aspect is that, in recent years, **more and more people are leaving Italy to move abroad** - not only Italian citizens but also foreign ones (the latter were 41,000 in 2017, according to the -underestimated- number of cancellations from the registrar) or Italians of foreign origin, i.e. who have become Italian through the acquisition of citizenship (32.000, from 2012 to 2016). In general, while Italian citizens of Asian origin leave Italy to move mainly to another EU country, Latin Americans tend to return to their country of origin. In any case, these two circumstances seem to demonstrate how Italy is worringly becoming less and less a country for young people, whether Italians or foreigners.

**An imperfect integration**

In 45 years of immigration to Italy, the foreign population has become increasingly and structurally integrated into the social fabric of our country: **1.5 million foreigners became Italian citizens**, of whom 147,000 in 2017 (-27.3% compared to 2016, when they were more than 201,000). According to the estimates of IDOS, there are about 1.3 million foreigners born in Italy (the so-called "second generations"), more than a quarter of all foreign residents. Among them, 503.000 are studying in Italian **schools**, making up about two-thirds of the 826,000 foreign students in our country and almost one-tenth (9,4%) of all Italian students (Miur data for the SY 2016/2017).
Many of these "**second-generation**" young people could have become Italian if the Parliament had finally approved the reform of the citizenship law in September 2017. This law was based on the *ius culturae* (although improperly called "*ius soli*") and was certainly not intended for refugees landed in Italy, as many believed (or had been led to believe).
Moreover, among all non-EU citizens regularly present in Italy, as many as 2 out of 3 (2,390,000) hold a **long stay residence permit,** either because they have completed at least 5 years of uninterrupted legal residence in our country (long-stay) or because they have become close relatives of an EU citizen already resident in Italy (usually an Italian citizenship), thus showing a remarkable level of rootedness and stability.
Of the remaining 1,325,000 holders of a temporary permit (35.7%) - a document providing a less secure stay and legal status - 3 out of 4 are for family (39.3%) or work reasons (35.2%), which generally indicate the intention to settle permanently.
In the face of these incontrovertible signs of rootedness, however, many **management and integration problems** still persist**.** At the end of 2017, of the 239,000 holders of a permit for asylum, international or humanitarian protection (around 20% of holders of a temporary permit and 6% of all non-EU residents), there were about 187,000 people in the **national reception system**, most of whom (81% at the beginning of December) were hosted in the Temporary Reception Centres (CAS) despite multiple criticalities and inadequacies found in these structures over the years (sometimes caused by misconduct and/or criminal activities). In particular, it is worrying that the management of these CAS has been defined by direct

assignment for 1,430 out of 9,358 cases (15.3% of the total, as of August 2017), a figure that goes as far as half in Calabria (49,3%) and Molise (43,6%), and is also very high in Sardinia (36,9%) (Source: Chamber of Deputies). On the other hand, only 13.2% of asylum seekers and humanitarian protection holders are hosted in the Sprar centres (which are often referred to as a good national practice, but which the current executive intends to reduce), while the remaining refugees are hosted in first reception centres (5.7%) or in hotspots (0,2%).
In particular, in 2017, the following categories were accommodated in Sprar centres: applicants for international protection (36.1%); holders of national protection (36.0%); holders of subsidiary protection (14.0%); refugees who have been granted refugee status (12.0%) and young people with a permit for minor age (1.9%). Of them, 73% entered Italy by sea, 13% across a land border and 7% by air; 2% came from other European countries or returned to Italy according to the Dublin Regulation, while children born in Italy accounted for 3% of the total. During the year, on the other hand, 9,037 people left the reception centres: 43.1% of them had completed the "integration" process and were found to have reached a certain degree of work and/or housing autonomy.
Several problems related to poor integration and discrimination still persist, even in various areas of social inclusion. For example, there are disparities in access to welfare measures or essential welfare services, such as nurseries, school canteens, baby bonuses and support for poor families. In this regard, several local administrations have passed various ordinances that have been considered discriminatory and therefore promptly rejected by the judges.
Immigrants also find many problems in accessing the **housing market**. This is due to the greater difficulties in taking out a mortgage but also to the discrimination by those landlords who do not want to rent to foreigners. For these reasons, almost 2 out of 3 foreigners live in rented accommodation, often in cohabitation, and only 1 out of 5 in a private house (usually of limited size and in popular or suburban residential contexts). The rest live either with their employers or with relatives and friends, sometimes in overcrowded premises.
Discrimination on the Internet and hate speech have also increased exponentially, often on the basis of distorted representations regarding racial and religious traits of certain communities, particularly as regards the number of Muslims living in Italy. “We are invaded by Muslims”, is often said, but among the foreigners residing in our country that latter are only 1,683,000 (32.7% of the total), whereas Christian immigrants are the majority (2,706,000 or 52.6% of the total, according to IDOS estimates), mainly Orthodox (1.5 million) and Catholics (over 900,000).

**Employment: no competition with Italians and low occupational mobility**

The belief that immigrants are stealing jobs from Italians has been denied for years by reality: of the 2,423,000 employed foreigners in 2017 (10.5% of all employed in Italy), two-thirds are in low-skilled professions or workers ( one third and one eighth of the employees respectively), both in the services sector, where more than two thirds of foreign workers are concentrated (67.4%), and in industry and agriculture (25.6% and 6.1%, respectively). It is not surprising, therefore, that more than a third of these workers are overeducated (34.7%, compared to 23.0% of Italians, a difference of more than 11 percentage points).
In particular, these are the most common jobs among foreign workers: 71% of domestic and family helpers (a sector that employs 43.2% of female foreign workers), almost half of street

vendors, more than a third of porters, 18.5% of workers in hotels and restaurants (mostly cleaning workers and waiters) as well as a sixth of construction workers and farmers. Moreover, immigrant workers are still forced to find a job in niche markets, ueled ation by heavy, precarious, discontinuous, low paid and often seasonal jobs. Usually they have little or no contractual guarantee (undeclared or "grey" work) and, therefore, can become victims of exploitation.

In this context, it is estimated that the **foreign unemployed** are about 406,000, a seventh of all the unemployed in Italy, with an unemployment rate of 14.3% compared to 10.8% of Italians.

The low professional mobility of foreigners, typical of the rigidly stratified Italian market, also forces them to a situation of subordination, which is reflected in the **wage differential**: on average, an Italian employee earns 25.5% more than a foreigner (1,381 euros per month against 1,029), while foreign women earn on average 25.4% less than their male counterparts. With regard to the ueled ation of female workers, the high proportion of young foreigners aged 15-29 belonging to the Neet category (a young person who is no longer in the education system and who is not working or being trained for work) is particularly striking: as much as 44.3%, compared to 23.7% of Italians in the same age group. This figure is related to the alarming phenomenon of female inactivity, which affects immigrant women with lower educational qualifications, especially within some specific communities: Compared to the average of 44.1% for immigrant women in general (43.9% for non-EU women), the inactivity rate of Pakistani, Egyptian and Bangladeshi women is more than 80% (source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policies).

**None of this suggests that immigrants are in competition with Italians for employment or that they are stealing jobs from Italians,** as the dominant rhetoric continues to argue, unfortunately. One effect of this disparity can be observed in the declared **income** differential: in 2016, the incomes declared by foreign citizens were 27.2 billion in total, equal to an annual average per capita of 12,000 euros, almost 10,000 euros less than that of Italians (about 21,600 euros). As the Leone Moressa Foundation points out, foreign taxpayers have paid 3.3 billion euros in income taxes which, added to other income attributable to foreign citizens (including 320 million alone for the issue/renewal of residence permits and the acquisition of citizenship and as much as 11.9 billion for social security contributions), have ensured a total income of 19.2 billion euros for the State. Compared to the 17.5 billion of public expenditure dedicated to immigrants (2.1% of the entire national public expenditure), the total contribution given by immigrants in Italy is therefore positive between 1.7 and 3 billion euros.

It is also noteworthy that in 2017 the number of foreign workers registered with the three **confederate trade unions** (Cgil, Cisl and Uil) was approximately 975,000 (+45,000 compared to 2016), 8.5% of the members. In particular, the trade union categories with the highest incidence of foreign members are those of the construction sector (where they exceed 25%), agriculture (with a slightly lower figure), trade and services (20%), transport and logistics (where on average they exceed 10% of members).

The desire for social redemption, ueled by the frustration of an unsatisfactory labour market, finds its best expression in **self-employment**: in Italy there are almost 590,100 businesses led by immigrants (9.6% of all active businesses), a number that increased even during the years of the economic crisis. Sometimes these companies that can also employ Italian workers.

These and other topics are analyzed and further deepened in the *2018 Dossier*: a tool that year after year aims at developing a more correct and documented awareness of the international and national migration framework.

## 2018 Statistical Dossier on Immigration. Summary data (2017)

| WORLD | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total migrants (millions) | 258 | World income per capita (US $) | 19,916 |
| Impact on world population (%) | *3.4* | South of the World | *11,613* |
| Displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers | 68,500,000 | North of the World | *43,183* |
| of whom refugees | *19,941,347* | EU 28 | *41,308* |
| of whom asylum seekers | *3,090,898* | Italy | *40,600* |
| of whom displaced persons | *39,118,516* | Remittances sent (billion US $) | 613,466 |

| EUROPEAN UNION | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foreign residents (2016) | 38,599,485 | Born abroad (2016) | 57,273,932 |
| of whom non-EU | *21,583,107* | Percentage over total residents (%) | 11.2 |
| Foreigners as a percentage of total residents (%) | 7.5 | Requests for international protection | 712,235 |
| Acquisitions of citizenship (2016) | 994,800 | % Successful applications for protection (grades I – II) | 45.5 e 33.9 |

| ITALY | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total resident population | 60,483,973 | **Foreign employment by sector (%)** | |
| of whom foreigners | *5,144,440* | Agriculture, forestry and fishing | 6.1 |
| Foreigners as a percentage of the total (%) | 8.5 | Industry | 26.5 |
| Foreign women (%) | 52.0 | *- Industry in the strict sense* | *16.8* |
| **Territorial distribution of residents (%)** | | *-Construction* | *9.7* |
| North-West | *33.4* | Services | 67.4 |
| North-East | *24.3* | *-Trade, hotels and restaurants* | *16.3* |
| Center | *26.0* | *-Other service activities* | *51,1* |
| South | *11,8* | Foreign unemployed | 406,000 |
| Islands | *4.5* | Incidence on total unemployed (%) | 14.0 |
| Italian citizens of foreign origin * | 1,500,000 | Foreign unemployment rate | 14.3 |
| **Top 5 communities of residents (%)** | | Italian unemployment rate | 10.8 |
| Romania | 23.1 | Budget costs/benefits for the State (billion e.) | +1.7 |
| Albania | 8.6 | Complaints against foreigners (2016) | 261,269 |
| Morocco | 8.1 | Foreign detainees (as at 03/2018) | 19,811 |
| China | 5.7 | Requests for international protection | 130,119 |
| Ukraine | 4.6 | Successful applications for protection (%)** | 41.6 |
| **Continental areas of origin (%)** | | Migrants landed | 119,369 |
| *Europe* | *50.9* | *Of whom minors (%)* | *14.5* |
| *Africa* | *21.3* | Ufm in reception centres | 13,151 |
| *Asia* | *20.5* | untraceable Ufm | 4,677 |
| *America* | *7.2* | **Religious affiliation of foreigners (%)*** | |
| *Oceania* | *0.0* | Christians | 52.6 |
| Minors out of total residents (%) | 20.2 | - Orthodox | *29.6* |
| Over 65 years of age out of total residents (%) | 4.0 | - Catholics | *17.9* |
| Non-EU stay-permits' holders | 3,714,934 | - Protestants | *4.4* |
| of whom long-stay (%) | 64.3 | - other Christians | *0.8* |
| Mixed marriages (2016) | 18,872 | Muslims | 32.7 |
| Incidence on total marriages (2016) (%) | 9.0 | Jews | 0.1 |
| Foreign students (SY 2016/2017) | 826,091 | Hindus | 3.0 |
| Foreign students born in Italy | 502,963 | Buddhists | 2.3 |
| G2 incidence on total foreign students (%) | 60.9 | Other Eastern Religions | 1.6 |
| Remittances abroad (in thousands of euro) | 5,075,116 | Atheists/agnostics | 4.7 |
| Companies managed by immigrants | 587,499 | Traditional religions (animists) | 1.3 |
| Percentage over total enterprises (%) | 9.6 | Others | 1.7 |
| * IDOS Estimate ** on 81,527 applications | | | |

*SOURCE: IDOS Study and Research Centre. Elaborations based on data by UN, Eurostat, Ministry of Interior, Istat, Miur, Foundation L. Moressa, Unhcr, World Bank, Infocamere, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy*

**Immigration and the presence of foreigners in the Europe of populisms***

*Alessio D'Angelo, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom*

According to Eurostat data, during 2016 the number of persons who had immigrated to an EU country (among the 28 EU countries) totalled approximately 4.3 million (with an almost 8% downturn on 2015). During the same period, approximately 3.0 million people left an EU country. These figures do not represent migratory flows from and toward the EU as a whole, since they also include the movements of people from and toward the various member countries. Indeed, these latter flows, because of the European system of free circulation, are not easy to gauge with precision. Arrivals of non-EU citizens regarded approximately 2 million people: a little less than half of the total. A further 929,000 persons arrived in the country of which they were already citizens (i.e. return migrations and citizens born abroad).

According to data on a national scale, once again it is Germany that received the highest number of entries (regarding both EU- and non-EU immigrants): 1,029,900 in 2016; followed by the United Kingdom (with 589,000), Spain (415,700), France (378,100) and (ranking fifth) Italy (300,800).

The ranking is very similar also for outflows: 533,800 people from Germany, 340,400 from the United Kingdom, 327,300 from Spain, 309,800 from France, 236,400 from Poland and (only) 157,100 from Italy. Overall, for most of the 28 EU countries, inflows exceed outflows, excepting a number of Central and Eastern European countries (namely, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) and Portugal. In terms of population, the most significant incidences were calculated for Sweden (11.9 entries per thousand inhabitants), Germany (9.4) and Austria (8.7). The EU average is barely 3 persons per thousand inhabitants. In fact, for most of Europe, immigration continues to significantly – albeit far from sufficiently – offset the demographic downturn.

Lastly, the data on residence permits provide a useful indication as to types of entry. However, directly linking such residence data to data on flows is an arduous task. The permits issued in 2016 by the 28 EU countries amounted to approximately 3.4 million, with an increase of 733,000 units on the previous year. Of these permits, approx. one quarter (853,000) were issued for work purposes, 23% (779,000) for family reasons, 21% (695,000) for study purposes and the remaining 31% (slightly more than 1 million) for other reasons (many for the purpose of international protection). This latter component is the one that, compared to 2015, displayed the greatest increase (from around 140,000 to 420,000). This component and holders of permits issued for humanitarian reasons account for 14% of all permits issued in 2016.

**Internal and external borders**

On 12 September 2018, in his last *State of the Union* speech, the outgoing President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, announced his intention to create a genuine European border police force, not only with territorial surveillance functions but also empowered to intervene in non-EU countries, and engage in operations for repatriation of irregular migrants. If completed, the Brussels plan would see a significant de facto transfer of

* Excerpt from the chapter "Immigrazione e presenza straniera nell'Europa dei populismi" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 53-59.

competences from national states – a process launched in 2004 with the establishment of Frontex and bolstered in 2017 with Frontex's transformation into a "European coast guard and border agency". Currently, the agency deploys around 1,500 persons. However, the Commission proposal foresees an increase to around 10,000 units before 2020, and provision of a central command endowed with broad-reaching powers. Paradoxically, the latest figures issued by Frontex indicate a significant decrease in irregular entries across Europe's outer borders. The 204,654 figure of 2017 indicates a 60% decrease on 2016, and an 89% decrease on the 1.8 million figure noted at the height of the migration crisis in 2015. This trend is mainly linked to the downturn in arrivals via central and eastern mediterranean EU countries and along the Balkan route. However, irregular entries via the western Mediterranean appear to have increased in number: the 23,063 figure of 2017 more than doubled that of 2016, albeit representing barely 11% of the continental total. We are dealing here mainly with citizens of Algeria, Morocco and the Ivory Coast attempting to cross the very highly militarized Strait of Gibraltar in small boats or to cross into Ceuta – Spain's North African enclave.

**Residing foreigners and integration**

Given the obsession over migratory flows – outflows and, above all, inflows – one can easily lose track of the real situation for the millions of immigrants who, over the decades, have made Europe their place of residence, and have contributed to the continent's economic, social and cultural growth, but who nevertheless are also frequently subject to exclusion and discrimination. Overall, on 1 January 2017, the number of residents of single EU countries with foreign citizenship totalled approximately 38.6 million (Eurostat data). Among these persons, non-EU nationals amounted to 21.6 million, equal to 4.2% of the total population. Another 16.9 million were EU citizens residing in a country other than that of citizenship.

In absolute terms, most foreigners are present in large countries such as Germany (9.2 million, as on 1 January 2017), the United Kingdom (6.1), Italy (5.0), France (4.6) and Spain (4.4). These five countries alone host 76% of the foreigners residing in the EU. In relative terms, however, the primacy remains with small or medium-sized countries such as Luxembourg, where foreign residents account for almost half of the population (47.6%), Cyprus (16.4%), Austria (15.2%), Belgium (11.9%) and Ireland (11.8%). Germany is the only large European country with a percentage of resident foreigners above the EU average (7.5%). In Germany, 11 out of 100 residents don't have the German nationality. In most Member States foreign residents are, in relative terms, mainly non-EU citizens. However, the total for intra-European migration has grown considerably in recent years, particularly toward Germany, France, Belgium and – at least until 2016 – the United Kingdom. The main groups of intra-European migrants include not only citizens of central and eastern countries such as Romania and Poland, but also Italians, the Portuguese and, indeed, Germans.

As for data based on the country of birth, in EU-28 as a whole there were, again on 1 January 2017, 36.9 million people who were born in a non-EU country, while another 20.4 million were born in an EU country other than that of residence. The differential between foreign-born persons and foreigners is largely due to citizenship acquisitions. The latest available data reveal that, during 2016, with a 18% increase on the previous year, 995,000 people (of whom 202,000 in Italy) became citizens of an EU member state. In absolute terms, the largest

increase in naturalizations was noted in Spain (+36,600), followed by the United Kingdom (+31,400) and Italy (+23,600).
Data on the labour market for 2017 show that the unemployment rate among persons aged between 20 and 64 stood at 6.9% for the "native" population and 7.5% for those born in an EU country other than that of residence. However, this rate rises to 13.3% for non-EU citizens. The largest differentials between nationals and foreigners were noted in France, Belgium, Greece and Finland, whose data range from 7.7% to 9.7%, reaching an 11% peak in Sweden. The unemployment rate for young people (aged between 15 and 24) is particularly worrying: 16.2% for the EU-28 native population and 16.5% for migrants born in the EU, vs 27.1% for migrants born outside the EU.
More generally speaking, the migrant population and this is especially the case for migrants of non-European origin - is considerably more at risk of poverty and social exclusion. According to 2016 data, almost half (48.6%) of residents from non-EU countries were faced with this risk, while the mean rate stood at 22.9% for the population as a whole, and, for intra-European immigrants, at 27.9%. This differential, which grew considerably following the economic crisis of 2008-2009, has remained more or less stable over the last five years.

## Italians abroad[*]

*Norberto Lombardi, Cgie, and Franco Pittau, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS*

The stable presence of Italians abroad seems now to have reached the level of that of foreigners residing in Italy (in 2017, 5,114,469 and 5,144,440 respectively). However, it should be emphasized that the total number of Italian residents abroad, which increased by 2.8% on the previous year (140,527 more units), displays a counter-trend with respect to the number of Italians residing in Italy (that, instead, fell during the same period by 202,884 units). The latter downturn occurred despite the 146,605 citizenships acquired by citizens from abroad. In 2017 there were 87,869 persons who registered for the first time on the Aire (Italy's register of Italian citizens residing abroad) as born abroad (the births not necessarily having taken place in the same year). The figure approximates that for children of foreign parents born and registered in Italy in the same year (67,933): these is a very significant number considering that in 2017 the total number of newborns in Italy has again fallen far below the half million mark (458,151). The number of Italians of the second and later generations abroad (2,018,180) is growing − much more than the number of foreigners born in Italy (estimated at around 1.5 million).

The new registrations in the Aire in 2017 came to 242,955 (128,043 men vs 114,912 women).

The outflows, surveyed by Aire, see Italians mainly attracted by the countries of the European Union (44.9%) and America (38.5%; 32.3% by Latin America alone). Africa (2.0%), Asia (2.5%) and non-EU Eastern Europe (0.6%) − despite the significant foreign presence that they have in Italy − only see temporary flows of Italian workers. As we shall see below, the preference for intra-EU migration is also notable among Italians of foreign origin.

Among the persons newly registered in Aire, the prevailing age bracket is 0-17 (32.9%), including not only arriving minors and children born abroad over the year but also a number of persons not registered in a timely manner in the past. We then note, among Italians who settle abroad, the following age brackets: working ages, 30-44 (25.0%), 18-29 (18.5%) and 41-64 (17.0%), as well as persons aged 65+ (barely 6.6%). More specifically, among the 128,193 Italians who were Aire-registered in 2017 as expatriated, 55.9% are aged between 18 and 44, both single and married. One fifth of those moving (19.2%), both together with their family or re-joining their family at a later date, are minors. The almost 10,000 persons registered aged over 65 (7.1%) may have emigrated for the purpose of reunification (presumably as parents) or for the purpose of elective residence (perhaps as retired persons attracted by countries with favourable tax conditions, like Portugal). The data on the 45-65 age group also deserves attention (a fairly large group of 22,896 persons, equal to 17.9%), as a probable indicator of a need to emigrate that is also felt by middle-aged adults.

With reference to the total number of Italians registered as residents abroad, the most frequently noted reason for Aire registration is *expatriation*, regarding slightly more than half of all registered persons (2,656,822).

Limited numbers concern people whose noted reason is *acquiring citizenship as a resident abroad* (via descent from an Italian ancestor). There are 171,838 cases in all, with a 5,365 unit increase on the 166,453 cases of 2016. Indeed, there are hundreds of thousands of applications for recognition of citizenship awaiting processing in consulates, above all in South America (primarily in Brazil), as well as tens of thousands of files awaiting processing at the Ministry of the Interior, relating to

[*] Excerpt from the chapter, "Italiani all'estero: il punto, le nuove emigrazioni e le reti di sostegno" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 85-92.

applications submitted by descendants of inhabitants of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Lastly, 68,743 Italians are registered for *transfer from other Aire lists*. In this case the reason for the initial registration is not indicated in the archive, and there are 198,745 registrations linked to *previous unavailability* (of which, 15,377 registrations were done on 2017): this underscores the difficulties encountered in the alignment of this archive with the data of the consular registry offices.

As regards the migratory movement, recorded in the *Bilancio Demografico Nazionale* (National demographic balance) by Istat (the Italian Institute for statistics), in 2017 the following data were entered:

- 343,440 registrations from abroad, of which only 12.3% concerning Italians (42,369);
- 155,110 cancellations for foreign countries, of which 114,559 concerning Italians (both by birth and by acquisition) and 40,551 regarding foreigners;
- An overall positive migration balance (+188,330 units), which, however, is negative for Italians (-72,190) and positive for foreigners (+260.520).

Currently, no further breakdowns are available. However, by referring to other studies conducted by Istat, it may be noted that in 2016 the most well represented bracket among those who emigrated – since they are mainly jobseekers – is that of the 25-39 year aged (approx. 38,000). Of all those cancelled from registers because of their emigration abroad, almost 30.4% hold a university or post-graduate degree. The young people with this level of training have increased in number from 19,000 in 2013 to 25,000 in 2016.

According to a significant number of studies, the official statistics on the exodus of Italians account only in part for those who effectively leave Italy, and they also enable us to note both the strong push factors for these young persons and the increasing presence of Italians of foreign origin among them.

**Italians of foreign origin move abroad too**

The *2018 Rapporto Istat* (Istat Report 2018) (chap. 3.4) includes an original in-depth study concerning Italians of foreign origin who, after a period spent in Italy, join migratory flows abroad. These persons have acquired a certain statistical significance within this phaenomenon.

To monitor their migratory behaviour, Istat adopted a longitudinal approach, focussing on those who acquired citizenship between 2012 and 2016 and who removed themselves from the municipal offices' registers. Approximately 25,000 moved abroad during this period. However, it is known that not everyone took steps to de-register from their municipalities of residence (as indeed occurs among Italians).

They received citizenship by transmission from their parents or by election in 49.2% of cases (and, therefore, we are mainly dealing with second-generation persons), or by residence in 37.5% of cases (this process mostly regards adults) and by marriage for the remaining 13.3% (mainly women).

For certain communities, acquisition of Italian citizenship is found to be the driving force for further migrations, providing authorisation to move freely among the countries of the European Union.

Naturalized persons, who expatriated between 2012 and 2016, chose countries of the European Union as their preferred destination (almost 19,000, i.e. 75.6% of the 25,000 naturalized emigrants in the five-year period under consideration).

Among the persons of Brazilian origin, the propensity to emigrate is more marked among males, as opposed to other communities (in particular, Italians of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin).

Emigration rates among naturalized persons in the 2012-2016 period amount for Bangladesh to 16.4, for Brazil to 13.9 and for Pakistan to 8.7 per 100 cases of acquisition of citizenship. On the other hand, emigration rates are rather low for Albanians (0.8%) and Moroccans (4.2%), despite the fact that these two communities present the highest number of citizenship acquisitions.
The average age of those who emigrate is 26 for men and 24 for women. Persons of Pakistani origin emigrate when younger (less than 20 years old). Migrants of Brazilian origin (average age of about 33) and Albanians (average age above 29) are older.
As to Italians of Indian subcontinent origin, a more marked propensity to emigrate is noted among those who acquired citizenship through marriage. For Italians of Brazilian origin, the highest emigration figures regard persons who acquired citizenship after 10 years of residence.
For persons of Brazilian origin, who in many cases acquire citizenship by descent from an ancestor of Italian citizenship (Brazil is a country that in the past received a considerable number of Italians), citizenship is recognized just following registration in a municipality in Italy, without the mandatory condition of a previous ten-year residency.
A lower but significant percentage of Italians of foreign origin return to their country of origin. This decision is very common among immigrants who kept also their original citizenship.
An update on transfers to abroad of Italians of foreign origin is provided by the *Bilancio Demografico Nazionale 2017* (2017 National Demographic Balance) issued by Istat (13 June 2018), which notes a constant increase in numbers of such persons (estimated for 2017 at 32,000). If to these Italians we then add offspring born in Italy emigrating with their families, the estimated figure may be 44,000.

**ITALY. Italian citizens abroad, by continent and main country of residence (31.12.2017)**

| ***Continents and countries of residence*** | ***Absolute value*** | ***%*** |
|---|---:|---:|
| *European Union* | *2,111,376* | *4.3* |
| Europe | 2,770,964 | 54.2 |
| Africa | 67,629 | 1.3 |
| Asia | 67,970 | 1.3 |
| *Central and South America* | *1,652,423* | *32.3* |
| America | 2,056,607 | 40.2 |
| Oceania | 151,299 | 3.0 |
| **Total** | **5,114,469** | **100.0** |
| Argentina | 819,899 | 16.0 |
| Germany | 743,799 | 14.5 |
| Switzerland | 614,545 | 12.0 |
| Brazil | 415,933 | 8.1 |
| France | 413,075 | 8.1 |
| United Kingdom | 303,400 | 5.9 |
| Belgium | 267,912 | 5.2 |
| United States | 263,450 | 5.2 |
| Spain | 164,117 | 3.2 |
| Australia | 146,938 | 2.9 |
| Canada | 140,734 | 2.8 |
| Venezuela | 119,713 | 2.3 |
| Uruguay | 97,303 | 1.9 |
| Chile | 58,270 | 1.1 |
| Netherlands | 44,587 | 0.9 |
| South Africa | 34,350 | 0.7 |
| Peru | 33,827 | 0.7 |
| *Other countries* | *432,617* | *8.5* |
| **Total** | **5,114,469** | **100.0** |

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of AIRE data*

**The population of foreigners residing in Italy in early 2018***

*Mauro Albani, Istat*

On 31 December 2017, there were over 5.1 million foreign citizens residing in Italy. Foreigners were mainly to be found in the Central and Northern regions of Italy (83.1%). The North-West is the zone with the highest proportion (33.6%). However, while in the North the foreign population remains rather stable, it is in the regions of the South that significant increases were noted in 2017: + 5.1% compared to 2016 for the South and +3.2% for the Islands. Presences linked to landings contribute to these trends.

In Italy, there are slightly fewer than 200 foreign communities, originating from a variety of countries. The demographic and social characteristics and specific geographic settlement patterns for each of these communities have been here highlighted.

Of the 5.1 million foreign citizens residing in Italy, over 2.6 million (50%) are citizens of a European country; 1.6 million (30%) are citizens of an EU country; and the remainder (1 million, 20%) are citizens of Central and Eastern European countries not belonging to the EU. One million persons are from African states (20%). Most are citizens of North African and Western African countries (12.7% and 7.3%, respectively). In addition, citizens of Asian countries total approximately 1 million (20%). The American continent accounts for approximately 370,000 residents in Italy (7.2%). These are mainly the citizens of Central and South American countries (6.9%). Completing the picture are the citizens of Oceania and stateless persons, whose percentages are very small.

The picture is quite composite, but only 14 communities count more than 100,000 residents. The top ten communities account for 63.7% of the total of foreign residents (3,277,759 individuals), with the top five accounting for 50.1% (2,574,815).

Overall, the resident foreign population grew only slightly in 2017 (+1.9%, a modest upturn compared with that of the previous year). For the top five countries, the ranking by citizenship remains unchanged. However, these diverse communities do present changes.

Numerically speaking, the Romanian community prevails. The Romanian presence in Italy grew most significantly during the second half of the last decade, and then markedly decreased. In 2017, this community displayed a modest +1.8%, accounting for 1,190,091 resident citizens at the close of the year (23.1% of the total). Numerically speaking, again, Albanian citizens trail far behind (440,465; 8.6% of the total), alongside Moroccan citizens (416,531; 8.1%), Chinese citizens (290,681, 5.7%) and Ukrainian citizens (237.047, 4.6%).

Over the last decade, the Moroccan and Albanian communities have grown too, but not as rapidly as Romanian citizens have. Since 2015, their numbers have fallen off, with the trends being reversed (in 2017, -1% and -1.8% respectively). Instead, the growth in numbers of Chinese citizens residing in Italy is ongoing: in 2002, there were almost 70,000; by the end of 2017, the presences had quadrupled. The increase compared to the previous year stands at +3.1%. The emergence of Ukrainian immigration in our country is a fairly recent phenomenon, mainly due to the amnesty issued in 2002 (law no. 189/2002) for domestic and family workers (Ukrainians were the major group among these workers). Since then, this community has grown almost twentyfold. In 2017 the increase stood at +1.1%. Over the last 15 years, the Filipino community has almost tripled in size, standing at 168,000 on 31 December 2017 (+0.8% compared to 2016).

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* Excerpt from the chapter, "La popolazione straniera residente alla fine del 2017. Bilancio demografico" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 95-99.

Referring to the other larger nationality groupings, there were increases in the number of Bangladeshi citizens, who reached 131,967 units (+ 0.8%), Egyptians (+6.0%; 119,513), Pakistanis (+5.5%; 114,198) and Sri Lankans (+2.9%; 107,967). Nigerian citizens have also grown in numbers (+19.8%; 106,069), as the Senegalese (+4.7%; 105,937).
Decidedly positive changes were noted for the less well-represented African communities, such as those of Gambia (+42.0%; 19,567), Mali (+29.6%; 19,134), Ivory Coast (+15.7 %; 30,271) and Cameroon (+9.2%; 14,529). The number of Afghans is also on the rise (+4.6%; 11,738). On these last figures – which are altogether far lower than those of the major nationality groups –, it is clear that, since many of the immigrants belonging to these nationalities arrived to Italy via the so-called "landings", have significantly impacted registration data for those requesting international protection.
Conversely, alongside the Albanians and Moroccans, we note a fall in numbers of Ecuadorian citizens (-3.3%; 80,377), Moldovans (-2.8%; 131,814), Peruvians (-1.7%; 97,379) and Poles (-1.4%; 95,727). The many acquisitions of Italian citizenship (almost 147,000 in 2017) most surely contributed to the fall in numbers of residents from some of the more longstanding nationality groupings that have settled here, alongside emigration not offset by major inflows. Within these communities, in fact, the number of qualifying persons is becoming decidedly significant. These phenomena prevail in the North, which is the part of the country in which most resident foreign citizens live and which is, historically speaking, the area of Italy that experienced the first major migratory inflows.

**Settlement patterns and key demographic characteristics**

Overall, although with a slight prevalence of women, the gender ratio is balanced (as on 31 December 2017, women made up 52.0% of the total). However, the equilibria vary greatly according to citizenship of origin. The communities of a certain numerical significance display clear imbalances, favouring the presence of women, are the Russians (approx. 37,000, of whom 81.5% are women), Ukrainians (237,000; 78.0%), Poles (96,000; 73.6%), Brazilians (48,000; 70.4%) and Moldovans (132,000; 66.4%). Conversely, prevalences of men are found among residents from Senegal (approx. 106,000, of whom only 25.9% are women), Bangladesh (132,000; 26.9%), Pakistan (114,000; 30.4%), Egypt (120,000; 32.7%), Ivory Coast (30,000; 33.4%), Ghana (50,000; 34.4%), Tunisia (94,000; 37.8%) and India (152,000; 40.9%).
The foreign population resident in Italy is a young population. As on 31 December 2016, the average age was 34.2 (compared to 45.9 for the population of Italy). Even in this case, marked differences emerge from one nationality grouping to the next. The age of Romanian citizens, Albanians, Moroccans and the Chinese is estimated to be in line with or slightly below the general mean. For citizens of the Philippines, Georgia and − above all − the Ukraine, the average age is higher (around 37 for Filipinos, 43 for Georgians and 44 for Ukrainians). The citizens of other Eastern European countries, such as the Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Poland (with a mean age of slightly more than 40) are also, compared to the mean age, less young. Conversely, the estimated average age for citizens of Nigeria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Bangladesh and Pakistan stands at under 30. These differences are explained by the varying migratory patterns and the (more or less longstanding) presence of the various foreign communities in Italy. For example, Ukrainian citizens are generally adult women, who arrived as breadwinners (i.e. mothers migrating to Italy in search of a better-paid job, with which they may contribute to the sustenance of family members left behind in their country of origin). A similar pattern is frequently noted for other communities from Eastern European countries (e.g. Georgia, the Russian Federation, Moldova). In

the case of citizens from the countries of Central and North Africa or Central and South Asia, it is instead normal for the families of origin to invest in their young, with the more capable among them emigrating, with greater chances of success.
Differences are also to be found in the family structures of the various nationality groupings residing in Italy. Again, referring to the largest communities, among the families with a foreign head of the household, those with a higher mean number of members – who are in turn foreign – are mainly from Albania, Morocco and China (about three members per family), i.e. about twice the mean size of Ukrainian families. Romanians and Filipinos occupy an intermediate position, with about two members per family.

## Regularly residing non-EU citizens[*]

*Luca Di Sciullo, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS*

In early 2018, the non-EU citizens who live in Italy duly in accordance with regular procedures totalled slightly less than 3,715,000, or about 1 out of 18 of the entire resident population.
Despite the rhetorical references to an invasion of Italy – an invasion that, if true, would be the largest and most prolonged that human history has ever known, since, according to this narrative, it has been unceasing for at least 20 years –, this population remained, compared to 2016, substantially unchanged in number (without considering internal replacement movements).. Including EU citizens, the incidence on the total resident population is about 8% and has been practically stable since 2013. Furthermore, until 2011 it had always been below the European mean figure.
Moreover, nowadays, compared to the mean distribution by age of Italians (a population that has seen a prolonged and gradual aging of its members), the non-EU population appears decidedly younger (and more prolific), with an undeniably positive effect on the country's demographic and productive resilience (this, despite the rigidly ethnicized labour market, which relegates immigrant workers to the least qualified niches, denying mobility and adversely impacting the potentials of this same workforce). In particular:
- minors constitute over a fifth of the total (21.8%, equal to 807,000 young people), with persons younger than 15 (686,000), alone, accounting for 18.5%;
- the level for 18-29 aged people (more than 685,000; 18.4%) is similar to that of 0-14;
- young people aged 30-44, standing at almost 1,190,000 individuals, account for almost a third (32.0%) of all residing persons;
- the last segment of the working-age population, aged 45-64, stands at approximately 867,000; less than one quarter of the total (23.3%);
- seniors aged over 65 are less than 166,000 and constitute barely 4.5% of the overall number (less than 1 in 20 non-EU citizens in Italy).
In other words, 2 out of 5 non-EU immigrants are less than 30 years old; more than 70% are aged less than 45, and the working-age bracket (15-64) accounts for as much as 77.0% of these persons, i.e. over 3 out of 4 (about 2,863,000 individuals) of the entire grouping.
Given the considerable concentration of young age groups, it is not surprising that almost 3 out of 5 (about 1,873,000; 59.1% of the total) are single (male and female), with married people accounting for slightly less than 2 out of 5 (1,480,000; 39.8%). Hence, widows and widowers (19,700), divorcees (under 13,000) and legally separated persons (barely 5,400) account for less than 1% of the total.

### Gender, places of origin and nationalities

Referring to nationality, the breakdown by continental area of origin of non-EU citizens – whose male component, on the whole, represents a slight majority (approx. 1,921,000 individuals; 51.7% of the total) – is as follows:
- less than one third (31.6%, or more than 1,172,000 people) are African: almost 2 out of 3 are Mediterranean African citizens (721,000, one fifth or 19.4% of the total for non-EU citizens in Italy). Mediterranean Africa is certainly not the poorest area of that continent. Here, the numbers of

[*] Excerpt from the chapter "I non comunitari, ovvero l'invasione che non c'è" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 105-111.

Moroccans (443,000), Egyptians (141,000) and Tunisians (108,000) are particularly noteworthy. Accounting for another third (379,000 individuals, and 10% of the entire non-EU group), we have the citizens of West Africa. Slightly over a half are Senegalese (105,000) and Nigerian (104,000). East Africa (46,000 residing persons, mainly Somalians, Eritreans and Ethiopians, with 12,000, 11,000 and 8,500 respectively) and central-southern Africa (26,000, of whom over 15,000 are from Cameroon and 4,800 from Congo) are much less well represented;

- Africans are immediately followed by Asians (1,099,000, or 29.6% of non-EU citizens), half of whom (550,000) are from the Indian subcontinent, with Indians (157,000), Bangladeshis (139,000), Pakistanis (125,000) and Sri Lankans (105,000) clearly prevailing. Among the Asians, a slightly lower number (497,000) come from further East, with the Chinese as the largest group by far (309,000) and the Filipinos at almost 162,000;
- the third largest continental group is Europe (of course, non-EU), with 1,059,000 residing persons, or 28.5% of the total. Here, Albanians form the largest community by far (over 430,000 people, about 2 out of 5 of this entire continental group, and 11.6% of total non-EU residing persons), followed by Ukraine (235,000) and Moldova (approximately 128,000);
- Americans (almost 382,000, or 10.3% of all residing persons) are, in 9 cases out of 10, Latin American citizens (342,000), especially from Peru (92,000), Ecuador (77,000) and Brazil (43,000). As for North America, there are 37,000 United States citizens and 2,300 Canadians (the latter almost equal in numbers to residing persons who arrived from Oceania, among whom the grouping of 1,800 Australians markedly prevails).

Therefore, the non-EU countries with the most numerous communities in Italy (those with at least 100,000 immigrants) are − in descending order − Morocco (443,000), Albania (430,000) and China (309,000) (the top 3 in the ranking), immediately followed by Ukraine (235,000), the Philippines (162,000) and India (157,000) (fourth to sixth in the ranking). Closing the top 10, from seventh to tenth places, we have Egypt (141,000), Bangladesh (139,000), Moldova (128,000) and Pakistan (125,000). The eleventh and twelfth rankings go to Tunisia (108,000) and Senegal (105,000). Sri Lanka (105,000) and Nigeria (104,000) immediately follow these groupings.

These 14 nationalities represent together 2,692,000 residing persons. Alone, they account for almost three quarters (72.5%) of the entire non-EU population in Italy.

It should be noted that, among these nationality groupings, some display a markedly female prevalence: the Ukrainian grouping is made up of women to the extent of almost 4 out of 5 (78.8%), with Moldovans at 2 out of 3 (66.8%) and Filipinos at 3 out of 5 (57.3%). In several other groups, the male component is particularly pronounced: Senegalese and Bangladeshi males stand at approximately 3 out of 4 (74.4% and 72.7%, respectively), Pakistanis and Egyptians, 7 out of 10 (71.7 % and 68.3%), Nigerians, Indians and Tunisians, 3 out of 5 (62.0%, 59.7% and 58.3%, respectively).

In other groupings, gender distribution is more similar to general mean values (which, as mentioned above, sees the male component prevail): 54.2% of Moroccans, 53.2% of Sri Lankans, 51.2% of Albanians and 50.2% of the Chinese are male.

The vast majority of all non-EU citizens (almost 2 out of 3, 64.3%, or 2,390,000 persons) enjoy a status that is not only legal but also stably (since they are not exposed to the arising risk of illegality):

- either because they have completed an uninterrupted regular stay of at least five years in Italy, which has earned them the acquisition of an EU permit for long-term residents (which no longer requires the holder to renew it periodically, since it has no expiry date). This is the case for well

over a half of the non-EU citizens in Italy (56.6%, or 2,103,000 individuals), attesting to the degree of “structural” entrenchment now attained by most of these persons;
- or because they are a close relative of an EU citizen already residing in Italy (almost always an Italian), so that they have acquired the pertaining permit for family members of an EU citizen, which, having no deadline either, ensures a permanent legal status with not required renewal (287,000 cases; 7.7% of all non-EU foreigners residing in in Italy).

The remaining 1,325,000 non-EU citizens residing in Italy (35.7% of the total) are still holders of a “short term” permit (permit with expiry), that expires after a varying period of validity (depending on the reason for which it has been issued). Should such holders intend to prolong their legal residence in Italy, the permit shall require periodic renewal.

As known, the conditions for renewal have remained rigid and prohibitive (especially the condition of submission of a legal contract of work, valid at the time of every extension of stay, which presupposes a long duration employment, a condition quite difficult to gain also by many Italians; all this, furthermore, during a period of crisis both economic and occupational, persisting since 2008, and within an occupational system increasingly based on temporary, flexible jobs). This situation has led over the last few years to fall into illegality for many non-EU citizens who are unable to ensure that they shall meet these requirements every time they must renew their residence permit. Indeed, precisely this part of the immigrant population (about one quarter of the entire regular presence estimated by the *Dossier*) presents a legal status that − due to such constraints − is extremely precarious (periodic risk of a fall into black-economy dealings, with expulsion as a consequence).

**Reasons for residing**

In the light of a long-time closure of borders to non-EU citizens who intend to enter Italy for seeking non-seasonal employment, it is not surprising that:
- there has been an inexorable fall in the number of persons residing who hold a permit for work reasons, with the gradual loss of the primacy of this group (at the beginning of 2017, slightly more than one third of all holders of a short term permit: 35.2%, or 467,000 persons);
- conversely, the relative incidence of the other reasons for stays has risen automatically among such persons, first of all family reasons (mainly reunions with spouses, children and other first-degree relatives), accounting for two fifths (39.3%; 521,000 persons), among residing persons with a short term permit.

These two main reasons for stays – denoting the intention to settle stably in Italy - alone account for as many as three quarters (74.5%) of all non-EU citizens with a short term permit.

Other reasons – among which those that in any case presuppose a certain length of stay (except for the approximately 5,500, 0.4% of the total, who have a permit for elective residence in Italy, having an own house and sufficient financial resources to live stably in the country) – regard, in descending order, study (foreign non Eu students are just a little under 43,000, 3.2% of the total, and, after completing the training cycle, may replace their permit with a work permit (if in meanwhile they found a regular job) or must leave Italy; and religion (25,000 and 1.9%): priests, pastors, nuns, holinesses etc. who generally may stay for some months or years in Italy in order to engage in theological studies and carry out a training linked to their condition.

Less than 16,000 additional non EU residing persons, equal to 1.2% of short term permit holders, entered the country for other reasons. Among those, we find also 8,500 unaccompanied minors, who are holders of an *ad hoc* permit.

In 2018, the extraordinary influx of refugees across the central Mediterranean – which reached its highest peaks in arrivals to Italy between 2014 and 2017 (171,000, 154,000, 181,000 and 119,000 people landing each year, respectively) – may be said to have exhausted itself. Indeed, over the year, approx. 23,000 landed (less than those landed in Spain and Greece in the same time), making for an approximately 80% downturn in arrivals compared to 2017. This "result" was – we must not forget – attained at the cost of a shocking increase in the number of persons drowned in the sea (over 1,300 along the Libya-Italy route), or who were rescued but returned by Libyan coast Guard patrol boats (supplied by Italy) to detention camps in Libya (where between 400,000 and 700,000 migrants live crowded ).

At present, the inflows of refugees, especially in the aforementioned 4 peak years, determined the presence in Italy of slightly more than 239,000 holders of permits concerning an application for asylum or international and humanitarian protection, i.e. less than one fifth of all non-EU citizens with a short term permit (18.1%): barely 1 out of 16 of all non EU residing persons in Italy (6.4%) and more than 1 out of 21 of all foreigners (including EU) residing in Italy (4.6%).

The number of asylum seekers and protected persons – representing 0.6% of the total population of Italy (around 60 million residents) – is one of the lowest in the EU. This probably means that, if the Dublin Regulation review would be approved (with a *mandatory* redistribution of quotas of asylum seekers among EU countries, in proportion to the total population of each country), Italy would have had to host more persons of this grouping.

## **Estimations concerning the religious affiliations of immigrants in Italy[*]**

*Luca Di Sciullo, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS*

For any given population, ascertaining the breakdown by religious affiliation of its members is a decidedly complicated task, given the inevitable vagueness of the notion of "religious affiliation" itself.

On the one hand, we note that it is impossible to directly detect and gauge the religious affiliation of a given population, since this is a sensitive information that cannot be acquired directly; on the other hand, "religious affiliations" can only be understood in a broad sense, given the wide range of their manners of expression.

Application of an estimation method that wants to be as reliable as possible must therefore take as analytical criteria the belonging to a socio-territorial context whose cultural values we can assume to be related to certain specific religious traditions ingrained in that context (religious traditions whose values and ideals, in accordance with their diffusion, are presumed to have marked the vision and cultural behaviour of those born into, and educated according to, that given area).

Despite some unavoidable margins of approximation, the approach that IDOS has adopted over several years, regarding the foreign population residing in Italy, is based on projecting, for each national community, the percentages of distribution of religious affiliations attested by the most authoritative international socio-demographic study sources, regarding the overall population in the corresponding country of citizenship (and perfecting this projection by the application of corrective measures when flows originate predominantly in areas and regions in which the distribution of the population by religious denominations displays – with respect to the mean values for the entire country– a significant prevalence of certain affiliations over others).

Starting out from this method, it became clear that at the beginning of 2018 the absolute majority of the approximately 5,144,000 foreign residents in Italy are Christians (2,706,000 people; 52.6% of the total) and that slightly less than one third are Muslim (1,683,000; 32.7%). These are the two religions that prevail by far among foreign citizens living in Italy (an average of 6 out of 7 of these citizens belong to one or the other).

Prevailing among Christians are the Orthodox, who make up approximately 3 out of 5 Christians (1,523,000, 29.6% of all foreign residents), while Catholics (918,000) represent over one third of the foreign Christians, i.e. almost one fifth (17.9%) of the entire foreign population. Following these, there are the Protestant churches – with about 224,000 people (slightly less than one tenth of the entire Christian population, and 4.4% of all foreign residents) – and other Christian denominations not ascribable to the three main lineages (39,900, less than 1% of all resident immigrants).

It's quite significant that almost 3 out of 10 foreign Muslims living in Italy (28.9%) are European, almost all coming from the Balkan and Central-Eastern area (primarily from Albania, followed by Moldova and Kosovo); more than a half (52.7%) are Africans, especially from the Northern area (37.8%), with Moroccans leading the way, followed at a distance by Egyptians and Tunisians, and the East area (13.6%), in which the Senegalese and Nigerians predominate. Accounting for slightly less than one fifth (18.5%), we have Asians, especially from the Indian sub-continent (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in particular).

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[*] Excerpt from the chapter,"Il fattore R (religione) nell'universo migratorio" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 196-200.

Among Christians, the European component accounts for as many as 3 out of 4 (74.8%), rising to almost all (97.7%) among the Orthodox alone (while the European component accounts for more than 2 out of 5 among Catholics and more than a half among Protestants; 43.5% and 56.6%, respectively); the African component accounts for about 1 out of 20 (4.9%), but exceeds one fifth (20.7%) among the Protestants alone; the Asian component accounts for 1 out of 13 (7.6%), with a peak of almost one fifth among Catholics (17.9%). The American component (almost exclusively represented by Latin Americans) accounts for approximately 1 out of 8 (12.6%), with a peak of one third (32.9%) among Catholics alone.

Given the above premises, it is hardly surprising that the major grouping immediately following upon the two main religious affiliations is that of foreign agnostics or atheists, who are estimated at almost 242,000 (of these, over 3 out of 5 – 60.8% – are Asian, almost all Chinese, and approximately 1out of 3 – 32.0% – are European), with an incidence of almost 1 out of 20 among the foreign residents. This is the category that, perhaps more than any other, most convincingly shows how false is the equation "immigrants = (Muslim) religious fundamentalists = (potential) terrorists".

In descending order, far below, we have the Hindus (in all, 152,500; 3.0% of all resident foreigners in Italy), Buddhists (117,200; 2.3%) and the followers of other Eastern religions (83,700; 1.6%). These, in all three cases, consist almost entirely in Asians (Hindus and Buddhists from the countries of the Indian subcontinent, followed, in the case of Hindus, by Mauritians and, in the case of Buddhists, especially by the Chinese and Thais; the adepts of other Eastern religions are solely Chinese).

A small portion is then made up by adepts of ancient traditional religions, once inappropriately labelled as "animist" (65,300 adepts, barely 1.3% of the entire resident foreign population: mainly western and central-southern Africans and the Chinese), as well as Jews (calculated at approximately 4,600, merely 1 in every 1,000 non-Italian residents). In addition to Israelis, these Jews are mainly citizens of Eastern Europe, and especially Ukrainians.

The remaining portion (87,400 people, 1.7% of the reference group) belongs to various other religious faiths that cannot be categorized among those listed above.

By way of conclusion, Italian society is becoming increasingly variegated and complex, also in terms of its religious beliefs, not only due to the variety of faiths but also due to the various manners of living connected to these faiths, with an extremely wide range of mentalities, even among "practitioners" and "non-practitioners", variously noted in all cases. Such variegation and complexity is ensured and defended by the principle of religious freedom, also stated by the Italian Constitution, overcoming any political exploitation and reductive identity-based propagandising arguments.

## Students in Italy with foreign citizenship*

*Ginevra Demaio, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS*

Data from the Ministry of Education, University and Research (the Italian shortly so called MIUR) attest to a total of 8,741,828 students enrolled in Italian schools in the academic year 2016/2017, among whom 826,091 are foreign citizens (502,963 were born in Italy and therefore are the so called "second generations").

For some years so far, there has been a downturn in numbers of students enrolled in Italian schools. Last year, the Ministry of Education already noted a general decrease of about 100,000 units. And if we also compare the data for academic year 2016/2017 with that for 2015/2016, we note an overall decrease of 85,065 units (-1.0%).

This result is entirely due to a decrease in Italian enrolling students (-96,305 in one year, or -1.2%), while students with foreign citizenship continue to grow in numbers, albeit only moderately (+11,240; +1.4%), among whom those born in Italy increased in number also over the last year (+57,568 units: +12.9%).

The demographic decline afflicting Italy, therefore, produces effects also in fields such as schooling, since a population that tends to make fewer children will trigger mechanisms that, over time, interrupt the cycle of generational turnover. If the presence of immigrant children had previously served to offset such developments in schools, it may now be reasonably concluded that we have reached a stage at which foreign students, despite their growth in numbers, can no longer compensate the downturn among Italians. This despite the fact that , compared to the population of Italian citizens, foreign residents count a decidedly greater proportion of minors and of young people between 18 and 29 years (20.6% vs 17.6% and 16.0% vs 11.8%).

**ITALY. Students in Italy who are foreign nationals: total, newly enrolled and born in Italy (academic years 2007/08-2016/17)**

| *Academic Year* | *Foreign* | *Yearly variation (%)* | *Entering for the first time* | *Yearly variation (%)* | *Born in Italy* | *Yearly variation (%)* | *Incidence (%) of foreign students on the total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007/2008 | 574,133 | - | 46,154 | - | 199,120 | - | 6.4 |
| 2008/2009 | 629,360 | 9.6 | 40,956 | -11.3 | 233,033 | 17.0 | 7.0 |
| 2009/2010 | 673,800 | 7.1 | 35,328 | -13.7 | 263,632 | 13.1 | 7.5 |
| 2010/2011 | 710,263 | 5.4 | 27,572 | -22.0 | 299,541 | 13.6 | 7.9 |
| 2011/2012 | 755,939 | 6.4 | 28,554 | 3.6 | 334,284 | 11.6 | 8.4 |
| 2012/2013 | 786,630 | 4.1 | 22,836 | -20.0 | 371,332 | 11.1 | 8.9 |
| 2013/2014 | 803,053 | 2.1 | 30,825 | 35.0 | 415,672 | 11.9 | 9.0 |
| 2014/2015 | 814,208 | 1.4 | 33,054 | 7.2 | 450,429 | 8.4 | 9.2 |
| 2015/2016 | 814,851 | 0.1 | 34,048 | 3.0 | 478,522 | 6.2 | 9.2 |
| 2016/2017 | 826,091 | 1.4 | 23,654 | -30.5 | 502,963 | 5.1 | 9.4 |

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the Ministry of the Education – Studies and Planning Office*

* Excerpt from the chapter, "Gli studenti con cittadinanza straniera in Italia" in *Dossier Statistico immigrazione 2018*, pp. 228-233

**Foreign students by level of education and region of settlement**

While distribution by level of education for students with foreign citizenship shows them to be present at all levels of education, the figures and the statistical impact of enrolled students as a whole vary from level to level.

The 36.6% of the total 826,091 enrolled students with foreign citizenship attend primary school (302,122); 23.2% attend high school (191,663); 20.3% attend junior secondary school (167,486); and the remaining 20.0% attend preschool (164,820).

The mean incidence of these persons on the total student population stands at 9.4%. However this figure, examined level by level, significantly changes, especially at the preschool level, not only because of the greater presence of children of immigrants for certain levels but also for a corresponding downturn in Italian student numbers. The incidence of foreigners falls below the mean value only in high schools (7.1% of enrolled students). Conversely, foreigners exceed the mean incidence of 9.4% at all other levels: 9.7% in the junior secondary schools; 10.7% in preschools; and 10.8% in primary schools. The higher percentage rates are therefore noted for the lower levels of education.

**ITALY. Students in Italy who are foreign nationals and who were born in Italy, by level of education (academic year 2016/17)**

| *Schooling level* | *Foreign* | *%* | *of whom, born in Italy* | *of whom, registered for the first time* | *%* | *% foreigners / tot.* | *% born in Italy / foreigners* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Preschool | 164,820 | 20.0 | 140,671 | - | 0.0 | 10.7 | 85.3 |
| Primary | 302,122 | 36.6 | 221,643 | 9,303 | 29.4 | 10.8 | 73.4 |
| Junior secondary | 167,486 | 20.3 | 89,129 | 7,600 | 37.4 | 9.7 | 53.2 |
| Senior secondary | 191,663 | 23.2 | 51,520 | 6,751 | 33.2 | 7.1 | 26.9 |
| **Total** | **826,091** | **100.0** | **502,963** | **23,654** | **100.0** | **9.4** | **60.9** |

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the Ministry of the Education – Studies and Planning Office*

The data show a split-in-two country. On the one hand, we have the North-West and the North-East (reaching incidences of 14.0% and 13.8%, respectively) plus Central Italy (11.2%), and, on the other, the South and Islands (3.2% and 3.1%, respectively).

Equally differentiated is the incidence of the “second generations”: among foreign students, those born in Italy are 502,963 as a total. If in general they already represent more than 3 out of 5 foreign students (60.9%) in the country, higher peaks can be observed when the analysis is further focussed. Taking into consideration the level of education, the 60.9% rate rises to 73.4% and 85.3% in primary schools and preschools, respectively.

The Ministry of Education also records the number of foreign students who enrolled in the national school system for the first time (23,654 for the academic year 2016/2017, 2.9% of all foreign students). This is a rather small number (in 2014/2015 alone they were slightly more than 33,000). Even in this case, the figure changes when it’s differentiated by level of school, rising to 3.5% in high schools and to 4.5% in junior secondary schools (3.1% in primary schools). Such a datum suggests that we are dealing above all with children of immigrants who reunited during their adolescence, or with unaccompanied minors, and in any case with newly arriving students assigned directly to a class as close as possible to their age. Distribution on a national level among the various levels of education, assigns the highest quota of new enrolments (39.3%) to primary schools, 32.1% to junior secondary schools and 28.5% to high schools (pre-schooling is not considered here since there can be no first enrolments at this level).

**Main nationalities of foreign students**

To give an idea of the variety of origins, cultures, languages and traditions represented in the Italian school classes, we may simply note that foreigners who enrolled in Italian schools represent slightly more than 190 countries of citizenship.

While classes include foreign students from practically all countries worldwide, it is nevertheless also true that certain areas of origin are quantitatively prevalent and that these areas are in general the most well-represented among immigrants in Italy. We can only consider that the top 4 national groups of foreign students alone account for half of the entire number (51.1%). The Romanians are the most numerous (158,428), alone accounting for almost one fifth of the total for foreign students (19.2%). The Albanians rank second, with 112,171 enrolled students (13.6% of the total). Moroccan students also total more than 100,000 (102,121; 12.4%). The Chinese rank fourth (49,514; 6.0%). Immediately below, we have in order: Filipinos, Indians and Moldovans exceeding the 3% mark; Ukrainians, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Tunisians, Peruvians and Ecuadorians, exceeding the 2% mark; the remaining countries (around 180 nationalities) have percentages that don't reach the 2%.

There are no significant variations in the percentages of females among foreign students linked to nationality (mean value: 47.9%).

However, the main national groups differ in their own distribution among levels of education. This is due to differences linked to the age of the members and the migratory paths of each foreign group. With respect to the mean distribution of foreigners among the four levels of education, certain national groupings display higher percentages for certain levels of education, and others percentages below the mean. Namely:

- for preschools (compared to a mean value for foreign children of 20.0%): Nigeria (29.7%), Afghanistan (28.3%), Bangladesh (26.5%), Sri Lanka (23.7%), Algeria (23.5%), Morocco (23.3%) and Burkina Faso (23.1%);
- for primary schools (compared to a mean value of 36.6%): Bangladesh (44.3%), Algeria (43.3%), Nigeria (42.5%), Pakistan (42.0%), India (41.1%), Morocco (40.5%) and Egypt (39.8%);
- for junior secondary level schools (compared to a mean value of 20.3%): Mauritius (26.7%), Cape Verde (26.0%), Dominican Republic (25.8%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (25.7%), Brazil (25.2%), El Salvador (25.1%), Serbia (25.0%), China (24.5%), Colombia (24.1%), Philippines (23.8%), Croatia (23.8%) and Bulgaria (23.1%);
- for high schools, which (compared to a mean value of 23.2%): Argentina (52.5%), Brazil (41.0%), Poland (36.6%), Colombia (35.9%), Mauritius (34.9%), Russia (34.3%), Bolivia (34.2%), Peru (33.5%), Ukraine (33.1%), Ecuador (32.5%), Moldova (31.0%), Cape Verde (31.0%), Dominican Republic (30.2%), Philippines (29.3%) and Ivory Coast (29.2%).

**Schooling lags and streaming in high schools**

The focus published by MIUR on students with non-Italian citizenship during academic year 2016/2017 (Miur, *Alunni con cittadinanza non italiana. A.s. 2016/2017*, Statistica e Studi, March 2018, pp. 50 ff.) observes that more than 40% of 14-year-old students with non-Italian citizenship lag behind in their courses, and that young people aged 18-24, above all, are most at risk of non-completion of schooling (early school-leaving).

The reasons for this phenomenon, and for the greater incidence among foreign students (compared to native students), are manifold. In many cases, we note lacks in linguistic competences and inability on the part of families to follow up their children in their studies.
But the MIUR sees lags also generated by the educational institutions themselves, due to inclusion of foreign students in lower level classes than their age would require or to a school making system that may lead these students to non-admission to the higher classes or to repeat the same class education for th next years.
The outcome, reported by MIUR, is that, during academic year 2016/2017, major gaps were found, compared to previous years, between Italian and foreign students. Among Italians, those lagging behind, in respect of attendance, account for 10.0%, while the rate rises to 31.3% among students with non-Italian citizenship. The greatest gap is found in high schools, where the quotients reach 20.9% and 59.1% for Italians and foreigners, respectively.
Moreover, the MIUR Report also points out that the first year of high school studies represents the most delicate step with respect to the prospect of students' lagging behind. The Report also highlights that the highest lag rates is observed in vocational and technical institutes. The fact that these institutions are also the most frequented by students with foreign citizenship contributes to probability of occurrence of lags and educational shortfalls here.
The data on enrolments, in fact, show a higher propensity of foreign students to attend technical and vocational schools among the higher education institutions. Admittedly, this propensity has, over the years, been partially attenuated. However, on comparison with the propensities of Italian students, this situation persists. In fact, Italians mostly go on to secondary school (48.5%), followed by technical institutes (31.6%) and vocational schools (19.9%); among enrolled students with foreign citizenship, most instead go on to technical institutes (37.5%), and slightly fewer go on to vocational schools (34.7%). The remaining portion choose secondary schooling (27.8%). Foreign students therefore choose secondary schooling less frequently (by 20%) than their Italian fellows (72.2% of foreigners choose – or tend toward – technical and vocational schools).

## Employed and jobless foreigners in 2017*

*Elisa Marzilli, Federica Pintaldi, Maria Elena Pontecorvo, Mauro Tibaldi, Istat, Servizio Sistema integrato lavoro, istruzione e formazione*[1]

Over the last year, in Europe, the increase in the number of employed persons has been more marked among foreigners (+4.9% vs +1.2% for the autochthonous workforce). Foreigners now total 7.9% of the EU's workforce (7.6% in 2016). However, the trend is affected by the overall increase in the population with citizenships that are not that of the country of residence, vis-à-vis the basic stability of the autochthonous population. Moreover, the employment rate for the 15-64 age bracket rose by 1% in both components, while the gap remained unchanged, that sees the indicator for foreigners lower by 5.6% compared to nationals. Among women, the gap is on the rise, albeit only slightly, reaching 9.2%.

The downturn in levels of joblessness was more marked in the autochthonous population (-10.9% vs -6.2%), which led to an increase in the proportion of foreigners among the jobless, overall (13.5% vs 12.9% in 2016). However, the unemployment rate is falling off more markedly among foreigners (-1.3% vs 0.9% for the autochthonous population), narrowing the gap with the national component (12.4% and 7.2%, respectively). The increase in the employment rate for foreigners is noted in all EU countries, with the exceptions of Hungary, Malta, Bulgaria, Greece and Denmark (the latter being the only country in which there is a downturn for this indicator also regarding the national citizenry). In any case, notable setbacks remain for foreigners, particularly in Bulgaria and Germany, where the gap stands more than 14%. The downturn in the unemployment rate for foreigners is noted in all countries (except Malta). It is more pronounced in Slovenia and Portugal (-4.3% and -3.5%). Everywhere, this indicator is more marked among foreigners than in the autochthonous population, with the exceptions of the Czech Republic and Cyprus. The highest − albeit narrowing − gaps are noted in Sweden and France (15.6% and 9.5%).

**ITALY. Activity rate, employment rate and unemployment rate for foreigners and nationals, by gender in Europe and in Italy: % values (2017)**

| *Geographic zones* | *ACTIVITY RATE (15-64 AGE BRACKET)* | | | *EMPLOYMENT RATE (15-64 AGE BRACKET)* | | | *UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (15-64 AGE BRACKET)* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Foreigners* | *Nationals* | *Total* | *Foreigners* | *Nationals* | *Total* | *Foreigners* | *Nationals* | *Total* |
| | **MALE** | | | | | | | | |
| Eu28 | 80.7 | 78.7 | 78.9 | 71.2 | 73.1 | 72.9 | 11.6 | 7.0 | 7.4 |
| Italy | 82.9 | 74.2 | 75.0 | 72.4 | 66.5 | 67.1 | 12.6 | 10.1 | 10.3 |
| | **FEMALE** | | | | | | | | |
| Eu28 | 62.4 | 68.3 | 67.8 | 54.0 | 63.2 | 62.4 | 13.4 | 7.4 | 7.9 |
| Italy | 60.2 | 55.4 | 55.9 | 50.2 | 48.8 | 48.9 | 16.4 | 11.9 | 12.4 |
| | **TOTAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Eu28 | 71.4 | 73.5 | 73.3 | 62.5 | 68.1 | 67.7 | 12.4 | 7.2 | 7.6 |
| Italy | 70.8 | 64.8 | 65.4 | 60.6 | 57.7 | 58.0 | 14.3 | 10.8 | 11.2 |

*Source: Eurostat, Labour force survey*

### Italian labour market

According to Istat (*Rilevazione annuale sulle Forze Lavoro*) in 2017, for the third year in a row, Italy saw growth in employment, accompanied by a downturn in joblessness. The number of employed persons continues to increase (+1.2%), with a return to values approximating those of

* Excerpt from the chapter "Occupati e disoccupati stranieri nel 2017: la Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro Istat" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018,* pp. 255-263.

[1] The opinions given are the authors' own and are not to be attributed to Istat.

2008, while the joblessness figure falls to below 3 million (-3.5%). In this context, even foreign citizens experience a positive trend within the labour market.

In 2017, the number of employees with foreign citizenship of 15 years of age and over stood at 2,423,000 (1,344,000 men and 1,079,000 women): 10.5% of the total of employed persons (an incidence stable over the 3 intervening years). Employment continues to grow (+ 0.9%), but to a lesser extent than in the previous year (+ 1.8%) and compared to the rate for Italians. Net of demographic effects and with our focus on the 15-64 age bracket, the situation is instead more favourable to foreigners, with a greater increase in the employment rate: +1.1% vs +0.7% for Italians (60.6% and 57.7%, respectively).

While employment growth among Italians is more marked among women, among foreigners the trend is more encouraging for men: the employment rate of male immigrants is growing by 1.5%, compared to 0.5% for Italians and 0.6% for foreign women. In absolute terms, employment of foreigners increases only among the over 50s, due to the progressive aging of foreigners residing in the area. Furthermore, the employment rate continues to rise more markedly for 15-34 years old (+1.5%), compared both to Italians in the same age bracket (+0.6%) and foreigners in other age brackets. Within each territorial division, the gap obtaining with autochthonous persons continues to narrow. It does so, however, as a result of diverging mechanisms: in the North it is because the indicator − although greater for Italians − increases more markedly among foreigners; while, in the South, it is because the rate − which is higher for foreigners − improves more markedly for Italians.

In 2017, jobless foreigners totalled 406,000 (194,000 men and 212,000 women): 14.0% of the total number of jobseekers (a rate that has been declining over the last 3 years). The decrease in the number of unemployed persons regarded foreigners to a greater extent (-7.1% vs -2.9% for Italians), and especially men. Likewise, the unemployment rate falls among foreigners, to 14.3% (-1.0%) vs 10.8% for Italians (-0.4%). While, in absolute terms, the downturn in unemployment is noted in age groups up to 49 in both cases, the unemployment rate decreases among foreigners within all age groups, and particularly between the ages of 35 and 49 (-1.2%). Conversely, for Italians, among the over-50s, the unemployment rate rises (+0.2%).

53.1% of foreign jobless persons have been jobseeking for at least 12 months, vs 58.6% of jobless Italians. Unemployment decreases more markedly among those who still live with their family of origin, whether foreign or Italian: in the latter families, the offspring continue to represent the most significant portion of the aggregate value (44.5% vs 15.9 % among foreigners). The incidence of parents is greater among foreigners, constituting 46.8% of the unemployed (+1.5% vs 2016), a rate that reaches 52.4% for women (+1.0%).

Over the last five years (2013-2017), recovery in the employment rate was similar both for Italians and foreigners (+2.4% and +2.3%). However, while for Italians this indicator has returned to levels close to those of 2008 (-0.4%), for foreigners − who were more severely impacted by the crisis between 2008 and 2013 − such results remain beyond their reach (-6.4%). This has meant that, in employment terms, the advantage enjoyed by foreigners vis-à-vis Italians has diminished over time. While, in 2008, the employment rate for immigrants was about 9% higher than for the autochthonous grouping, in 2017 the difference had fallen to below 3%. The condition of foreigners compared to that of Italians has worsened in unemployment rate terms. During the crisis, this latter indicator rose more markedly for foreigners, broadening the gap by 2% in 2008 and by nearly 4% in 2017, in favour of the autochthonous grouping.

**Employment of foreigners in Italy: sectors, skills, academic qualifications, remuneration**

In 2017, foreign workers were mainly employed in services, as labourers and workers with low-skilled manual tasks. Among these foreigners, in fact, the quotient of persons employed in services grew at a faster rate than it did among Italians, reaching 67.4% (66.4% in 2016 and 57.5% in 2008). A large proportion of foreign women (43.2%) are employed in household or family care services, and most men are employed in industry, construction and commerce. Moreover, in some sectors the incidence of foreigners on the total is less than 2% (public administration, credit and insurance, education, information and communication), while in others it stands significantly in excess of mean value of 10.5%: 16.6 % in construction, 16.9% in agriculture, 18.5% in hotels and restaurants, and 71.0% in domestic services.

Approximately two out of three of foreign workers engage in unskilled or labouring tasks. Only 7% engage in activities for which they are professionally qualified. This situation varies little as the years spent in Italy increase, and likewise as the years of seniority in employment increase.

Geographical disparities also obtain for foreigners: low-skilled jobs involve less than one third of foreign workers in the North as opposed to approximately the half in the South; in the North, employment is more frequent in industry in the strict sense (22.3% vs 6.3% in Southern Italy) and is more frequent as labourers in the South. In the South, employment tends to the agricultural sector and, above all, commerce (19.4% vs 8.4% in the North).

The incidence of foreigners in individual occupational groups fluctuates from 2.2% (qualified professions) to 10.3% (commercial jobs and clerical posts), and from 13.2% (labouring) to 33.1% (unskilled jobs). Approximately 2/3 of domestic workers and carers, almost the half of street vendors and more than one third of porters are foreigners.

By way of confirmation of a picture of inclusion of immigrants in a secondary labour market, we also note the low quality of the jobs: 897,000 foreigners perform work that requires the lowest level of education that they have attained; 34.7% of foreign workers are over-educated (vs 23.0% of Italians). This is a decidedly large gap, but one that is gradually narrowing (from 21.3% in 2013 to 11.7% in 2017), as a function of a slight increase in over-educated Italians and a decrease in over-educated foreigners. Geographically speaking, the proportion of over-educated foreigners is lower in the South (where levels are very close to those for Italians), as a function of the lower educational qualifications of the immigrants residing there. While, for Italians, over-education is noted as people enter the labour market, in the case of foreigners this condition does not change as a function of either age or worker seniority.

The incidence of underemployed workers, or the incidence of those who claim they have spent fewer hours at work than they would have desired, is higher among foreign workers (9.0% vs 3.7% of Italians). At the same time, albeit to a lesser extent over the last year, the total number of underemployed persons continues to fall more markedly among foreigners, thus narrowing the gap (from 5.6% to 5.3% in 2017). However, this narrowing regards men; the gap between foreign and Italian women is instead widening.

Turning to educational qualifications, the portion of underemployed persons among foreigners decreases only modestly as a function of rising levels of education (from 8.3% of employees with, at most, a junior secondary school leaving certificate, to 7.7% of graduates), as opposed to Italians (from 5.3% to 2.6%). Under-utilization of the immigrant workforce, as also for the Italian workforce, is more frequently noted in regard to low-skilled jobs, amounting to 13.8% for unskilled jobs and 5.1% for skilled jobs (among Italians, 9.4% and 2.3%, respectively).

Drawbacks for foreigners are also reflected in net monthly salaries received by employees, which in 2017 were on average 25.5% lower than those of Italians (1,029 euros vs 1,381 euros). However, compared to 2016, a decrease in disparity (-1.7%) was noted. The pay gap varies from one geographic area to the next, rising from 23.9% in the North to 33.8% in the South. However, foreign women at a greater disadvantage in all areas. For foreign women, the gender pay gap is also

higher. Foreign women earn 25.4% less than their male counterparts (the gap stands at 19.1% for Italian women).
The pay gap increases as the level of education rises, rising from 8.7% for those in possession of a primary school leaving certificate to 17.1%, for those with a junior secondary school leaving certificate, and on to 25.8% for graduates. Likewise, pay gaps increase with age. 55-64-year-old foreigners earn on average 548 euros less than Italians (-35.7%); this gap narrows for the 35-44 age group (-331 euros; or 23.9% less) and narrows again to 159 euros (-13.4%) among young people aged 25-34. Not even seniority will improve salary conditions: in 2017, the average salary of foreigners ranged from 807 euros for those who had been employed for no more than 2 years to 1,062 euros for those who had been working for at least 20 years (for Italians, 942 and 1,474 euros). The disparity is even greater for women: 734 euros (no more than 2 years) and 888 euros (at least 20 years, i.e. -31.2% compared to Italian women).
In short, although 2017 has seen a narrowing of the gaps between Italians and foreigners in the quality of the work done, the challenges for non-Italian citizens remain formidable.

**The national groupings prevailing among foreign workers**

Analysis of the main communities, compared to the previous year, indicates occupational situations that are improving above all for Peruvians and Ukrainians, who saw greater growth of the employment rate and a more marked fall in the unemployment rate. Signs of recovery are also to be found in the Moldovan community, with the employment rate rising to 67.9% (+3.4%) and an unemployment rate falling to 14.0% (-0.9%). For Moroccans, who were the most affected by the crisis – a grouping also characterized by low female occupational participation –, the employment rate remains the lowest (45.2% vs 60.6%, the mean value among foreigners), and the unemployment rate continues to rise (22.1% vs 14.3%, the mean value). This rate is the highest among all major communities. The occupational situation for Macedonians has also worsened, with a 2.8% employment rate downturn, to stand at 49.7%. The unemployment rate rose by 3.7% (i.e. to 20.9%).
The Albanian and Romanian communities – dramatically impacted by the years of economic recession – show an improvement. In the case of the Albanians, while the rise in the employment rate (53.8%; +1.2%) regards both gender components, the fall in the unemployment rate (17.5%; -2.9%) is owing only to the women. In the case of Romanians, the increase in the employment rate (63.5%; +0.4%) regards men (stability is noted for women). The fall in the unemployment rate (13.9%; -1.1%) regards both components. Despite low female presence in the labour market, the Indian community also shows signs of recovery, with an employment rate on the rise and an unemployment rate of 10.4% (down 2.2%).
The labour market indicators for the Chinese community, which in recent years has suffered less from the economic recession, are rather stable. Compared to 2016, there was a slight increase both in the employment rate (72.7%, +0.3 points) – thanks to greater participation by women – and in the unemployment rate. The slight setback suffered by the Filipino community is ongoing. While maintaining the highest value among the major national communities, the employment rate is nevertheless falling (79.3%; -1.3%). Only among men is there an increase in the unemployment rate.
Moreover, in 2017, female participation in the labour market varies considerably among communities, with higher female employment rates for Filipinos (78.2%), Peruvians (70.3%), the Chinese (66.7%), Ukrainians (65.9%) and Moldovans (65.6%), and very low employment rates for Moroccan and Indian women (23.1% and 19.3%, respectively).

Generally speaking, work placement for foreigners by national group continues to depend on cultures of origin and on the methods of entry into the labour market. In fact, concentration within occupational niches is a consequence of societal networking mechanisms. It follows that the Filipino community continues to largely focus on domestic services and services for families, as well as cleaning services for offices and commercial premises. Ukrainian, Moldovan and Peruvian women continue to be employed mainly in the field of personal home care and as domestic helpers. Moroccan men are mainly employed in trade (street vendors) and, to a lesser extent, in goods handling (as porters) and agriculture (as farm labourers), while the few employed Moroccan women mainly provide personal assistance and domestic and cleaning services. Albanian men work mainly in construction, while the women work as domestic helpers, cleaners for cleaning services and servers. Among the Romanians, men are employed above all in construction as labourers and as unskilled workers, and in transport as truck drivers. Romanian women provide services to families as carers and as domestic helpers, or join cleaning services (offices and commercial premises). Macedonian men, too, work mainly in the construction and transport sectors (as labourers and truck drivers). Indians continue to work mainly in the agricultural sector (farm workers and unskilled animal husbandry jobs). The Chinese community is characterized by a high proportion of self-employed workers (49.1%, vs a mean value of 13.1%). They are mainly engaged in trading (retailers and sales staff), in catering (bartenders and managers of bars, catering establishments etc.) and in the textile industry (tailors). In addition, Chinese men often work in restaurants as cooks, and the women as servers.

Due to their high educational qualifications, Ukrainian workers (over 54% of whom employed in low-skilled jobs in 217), to the greatest extent, take on jobs that are not aligned to their educational qualifications. Significant incidences of over-education are also found among the Moldovans (47.1%) and Romanians (44.5%), although in both cases this phenomenon is regressing (in 2014 the over-educated made up about the half of the employed persons). The proportion of the over-educated among the Filipinos (43.4%) and among the Peruvians (38.8%) is considerable, but decreasing. In these communities, we also note the highest jobless rates (13.9% and 14.0%). The Chinese present the smallest quotient of over-educated persons (7.1%). This is due to their lower educational qualifications. They present more self-employed workers, as well as the lowest joblessness figures of all (2.6%). Lastly, if we consider the average monthly remuneration of employees, Moldovans, Macedonians, Romanians and Albanians are, among men, those with the highest average earnings; among women, such earners are Chinese and Moldovan. Conversely, the salaries of Albanian, Filipino and Moroccan women fail to reach 800 euros. Among men, Filipinos are notably penalized, with salaries of less than 1,000 euros.

**Foreign households and employment levels**

Families residing in Italy with at least one foreign member amounted to 2,467,000 in 2017 (3,000 fewer than in 2016). More than 70% are made up of families solely of foreigners, accounting for almost 7.0% of the total number of resident families. Almost half are single-member households and just under 30% are couples with children.

After the basic stability noted between 2015 and 2016, the quotient of foreign families with at least one member of working age (15-64 years), in which there are no employed persons, fell to 14.2%, while the quotient made up of households with only one employee increases slightly (63.7%). The fall in the quotient of families in which at least one member is jobseeking continues: from 16.5% in 2016 to 15.7% in 2017.

Filipinos and Chinese display a more positive situation in terms of the number of employed persons in families with at least two members: almost three out of four of Filipino families and over three out of five of Chinese families include more than one employed member. Conversely, Indian and Moroccan families are the least likely to enter the labour market.

Among couples with children, the quotient of single-income families is growing once more (54.1% compared to 53.1% in 2016). The number of foreign families with at least one jobless member falls to 21.4% (from 23.0% in 2016). This incidence rose from 12.9% in 2008 to its peak value in 2013 (25.4%), after which, as from 2014, the rate fell off. Over the years, however, the gap has broadened vis-à-vis the same typology of Italian families (2.6% in 2008; a peak 9% rate in 2013; a fall to 5.8% in 2016; and a rise to 6.5% in 2017).

**ITALY. Activity rate, employment rate and unemployment rate for foreigners and Italians, by gender and by geographic region: % values (2017)**

| *Geographic region* | ACTIVITY RATE (15-64 AGE BRACKET) | | | EMPLOYMENT RATE (15-64 AGE BRACKET) | | | UNEMPLOYMENT RATE | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Foreigners | Italians | Total | Foreigners | Italians | Total | Foreigners | Italians | Total |
| | **MALE** | | | | | | | | |
| Northern Italy | 84.4 | 78.3 | 79.0 | 75.7 | 74.0 | 74.2 | 10.3 | 5.2 | 5.9 |
| *NW Italy* | *84.7* | *78.1* | *78.9* | *75.7* | *73.5* | *73.7* | *10.6* | *5.8* | *6.4* |
| *NE Italy* | *84.0* | *78.5* | *79.1* | *75.7* | *74.8* | *74.9* | *9.8* | *4.5* | *5.1* |
| Central Italy | 83.9 | 76.7 | 77.6 | 71.1 | 70.3 | 70.4 | 15.2 | 8.2 | 9.1 |
| Southern Italy | 76.8 | 68.0 | 68.4 | 63.8 | 55.5 | 55.9 | 16.8 | 17.9 | 17.9 |
| **Italy** | **82.9** | **74.2** | **75.0** | **72.4** | **66.5** | **67.1** | **12.6** | **10.1** | **10.3** |
| | **FEMALE** | | | | | | | | |
| Northern Italy | 59.9 | 65.3 | 64.6 | 50.2 | 60.6 | 59.2 | 16.1 | 7.1 | 8.3 |
| *NW Italy* | *59.0* | *65.3* | *64.4* | *49.1* | *60.3* | *58.7* | *16.6* | *7.6* | *8.7* |
| *NE Italy* | *61.1* | *65.4* | *64.8* | *51.6* | *61.1* | *59.8* | *15.4* | *6.5* | *7.7* |
| Central Italy | 64.6 | 61.9 | 62.3 | 54.4 | 55.5 | 55.3 | 15.6 | 10.2 | 11.0 |
| Southern Italy | 54.6 | 40.6 | 41.4 | 44.0 | 31.6 | 32.2 | 19.2 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| **Italy** | **60.2** | **55.4** | **55.9** | **50.2** | **48.8** | **48.9** | **16.4** | **11.9** | **12.4** |
| | **TOTAL** | | | | | | | | |
| Northern Italy | 71.3 | 71.9 | 71.8 | 62.0 | 67.4 | 66.7 | 12.9 | 6.1 | 6.9 |
| *NW Italy* | *71.0* | *71.8* | *71.7* | *61.5* | *67.0* | *66.2* | *13.3* | *6.6* | *7.4* |
| *NE Italy* | *71.7* | *72.0* | *72.0* | *62.7* | *68.0* | *67.4* | *12.4* | *5.4* | *6.3* |
| Central Italy | 73.5 | 69.3 | 69.9 | 62.1 | 62.9 | 62.8 | 15.4 | 9.1 | 10.0 |
| Southern Italy | 65.3 | 54.2 | 54.8 | 53.6 | 43.5 | 44.0 | 17.8 | 19.4 | 19.4 |
| **Italy** | **70.8** | **64.8** | **65.4** | **60.6** | **57.7** | **58.0** | **14.3** | **10.8** | **11.2** |

*SOURCE: Istat, Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro*

**ITALY. Underemployed persons, over-educated persons and net monthly salaries of foreigners and Italians, by gender, geographic area: % values and absolute values in euros (2017)**

| *Indicators* | MALE | | FEMALE | | TOTAL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Foreign* | *Italian* | *Foreign* | *Italian* | *Foreign* | *Italian* |
| **NORTH** | | | | | | |
| Underemployed (%) | 8.7 | 2.5 | 11.8 | 3.8 | 10.1 | 3.1 |
| Over-educated (%) | 27.4 | 20.7 | 42.4 | 22.2 | 34.0 | 21.3 |
| Net monthly salary (euros) | 1,248 | 1,610 | 924 | 1,270 | 1,102 | 1,448 |
| **CENTRAL** | | | | | | |
| Underemployed (%) | 7.4 | 3.2 | 9.8 | 4.4 | 8.5 | 3.7 |
| Over-educated (%) | 34.8 | 24.9 | 49.4 | 26.7 | 41.8 | 25.7 |
| Net monthly salary (euros) | 1,124 | 1,530 | 831 | 1,238 | 974 | 1,393 |
| **SOUTH** | | | | | | |
| Underemployed (%) | 5.5 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 5.0 |
| Over-educated (%) | 17.8 | 23.2 | 35.4 | 25.0 | 25.3 | 23.9 |
| Net monthly salary (euros) | 900 | 1,335 | 736 | 1,102 | 824 | 1,244 |
| **ITALY** | | | | | | |
| Underemployed (%) | 7.9 | 3.3 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 9.0 | 3.7 |
| Over-educated (%) | 27.8 | 22.3 | 43.4 | 23.9 | 34.7 | 23.0 |
| Net monthly salary (euros) | 1,169 | 1,511 | 872 | 1,223 | 1,029 | 1,381 |

*SOURCE: Istat, Rilevazione sulle forze di lavoro*

**Qualified migrations inside and ouside the European Union***

*Antonio Ricci, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, and Benedetto Coccia, Istituto di Studi Politici "S. Pio V"*

In a historical phase in which disinformation and fake news spread like wildfire when immigration is the topic of public discourse, the migration of highly qualified workers has also become a matter of controversy: according to a recent "Pew Research Center" survey (January 2019) Italy is the country that is least favorable to the entry of highly qualified immigrants: over 50% of those interviewed declared themselves against and only 35% in favour. Much more open approaches were found, however, in the United Kingdom (85% of respondents favorable), in Germany (81%) and in France (68%). Anyhow the Italian society is not currently subject to particular "immigration stress": in 2018 it received an overall low quota of new entries (14% of the total) and therefore the "European refugee crisis" itself seems now to be out of place. As underlined by the European Commission in March 2019, it is time to debunk the persistent myth of a current migratory crisis.

In this context is rooted the present study, carried out by IDOS Study and Research Centre with the support of the "S. Pio V" Institute of Political Studies, who intended to analyze the question of qualified migrations from, to and within the European Union, not as a threat but as a very topical issue, emphasizing its positive and negative aspects. In times of high unemployment and quick social changes, the more legal migration represents a difficult cause to promote, the more it is important to manage it within a framework transparent, strictly objective and oriented to the interests of the EU citizens.

Immigration management is in fact much more complex than what initially perceived by public opinion and then implemented by policy-makers through border closure policies. Yet in 2015, in the midst of the humanitarian refugee crisis, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker recalled in the European Agenda on Migration 2015 (COM (2015) 240 final) that the entry of highly qualified workers is fundamental in front of the economic and demographic challenges that the Old Continent is called to face in the long term. The European population is ageing and, in the absence of immigration, the workforce will fall by 17.5 million people over the next decade. Therefore, not only the sustainability of social protection systems, but also, more generally, the continental economy will increasingly depend on an effective integration of highly qualified migrants.

Within the EU, shortages of workforce have already been found in key sectors such as science, technology, engineering and health. By 2020 it is estimated a deficit of 756 thousand highly qualified professionals in telecommunications and about 1 million in the health sector including doctors, nurses, dentists, midwives and pharmacists. Unfortunately, these deficits cannot be filled by the 12 million long-term unemployed in the EU because, in more than half of the cases, they have a low level of skills.

Taking into consideration an EU labor market characterized by 3.8 million vacancies (Eurostat, III quarter 2018), employers are struggling to find professionals with the needed skills, both for economic (the implementation of new technologies requires new professional skills) and demographic reasons (the ageing of the population has reduced the available workforce).

Member States are therefore called upon to consolidate their skills and, to cope with the immediate need for qualified manpower, also by committing themselves to find more and more immigrant workers. A goal that is not easy at all, considering that 68% of international migrants with a high

* Summary of IDOS research: *L'Europa dei talenti. Le migrazioni qualificate dentro e fuori l'Unione Europea/Europe of talents. Qualified migration inside and outside the European Union*, IDOS-Istituto di Studi Politici "S. Pio V", Rome, 2019.

education profile prefer to settle in a non-European country (OECD). Globally, more dynamic economies (from China to the United States) lead the competition for talent. Even Japan, one of the most traditionally reluctant immigration countries, has recently changed its approach by providing incentives for highly qualified immigrants.

**A "steeplechase": EU policies and highly qualified flows**

In assessing the impact of current regulations, the European Commission estimates that, if regulated more efficiently, the entry of new highly qualified workers into the EU would bring about a gain of over 6 billion euros. Nevertheless, the EU labour market is currently having troubles in fully exploiting the talents of immigrants already present, thus wasting billions of euros every year (as reported by ENAR network in 2013 *Hidden talents, wasted talents* Report).

Brain waste, that is the under-use of immigrant workers with respect to their level of education and skills, finds fertile ground when migration is dictated by conditions of necessity. There can be multiple contingent motivations, such as language barriers or adaptation difficulties, but the crux are the policies pursued by the institutions as well as is fundamental the access to the information necessary for the recognition of qualifications. To add complexity to the issue, it also raises the paradox that employers would prefer to check on-the-job skills rather than certified qualifications.

The same rules in force for obtaining a visa or residence permit can vary significantly from one Member State to another, making the recruitment of talents a sort of "steeplechase".

**A "drop into the ocean": the experience of the EU Blue Card**

Following Directive 2009/50/EC, a highly qualified worker can be admitted through the issuance of an EU Blue Card which provides for fast-track entry procedures, subject to the satisfaction of a series of common requirements among the Member States such as: i) a binding job offer (with a salary whose amount corresponds to at least one and a half times the average annual gross salary in the Member State concerned), ii) a health insurance, iii) documents certifying the possession of the qualifications in the case of regulated professions. Therefore this stay permit allows third-country nationals and their family members to enjoy the same treatment as nationals, in particular as regard the working conditions, social security and recognition of qualifications.

In practice, however, the current application of the Directive seems to be not very satisfactory. Between 2012, the effective year of full implementation, and 2017 were just over 90 thousand the EU Blue Cards overall issued within the Union and it is easy to deduce from the low number of renewals that many of the beneficiaries may have already left the EU. Of these 24,305 were released in 2017. Despite the constantly increasing trend, the numbers remain low, also because of the competition exercised by the parallel national systems is strong. Furthermore, the directive seems to work only in Germany where took place 84.5% of total releases issued across the EU in 2017.

The contribution of the EU Blue Cards represents literally a "drop into the ocean" compared to the global competition for talents that sees for example the United States per se accepting an average of 200 thousand a year.

In June 2016, the European Commission launched a comprehensive review proposal aimed mainly at addressing the shortcomings of Directive 2009/50/EC and at extending its scope of application, also by including beneficiaries of international protection and non-EU family members of EU citizens. Specifically, the proposal provides for: i) more flexible admission conditions (providing for a lower salary threshold, a minimum duration of 6 months for the initial contract, simplified rules for new graduates and workers in occupations where there is a shortage of workforce and the equivalence between professional experience and formal qualifications); ii) generally faster and more flexible procedures (also through rapid procedures for ad hoc employer categories); iii) broader rights (through more flexible access to the labor market, also for autonomous workers, immediate family reunification, facilitated access to EU long-term residence permit); iv) easier travels within the EU; v) the abolition of parallel national regimes intended, like the EU Blue Card, for highly qualified workers.

Among the various measures, it deserves to be mentioned the objective of intervening to avoid the brain waste of skills and human capital at the expense of highly qualified beneficiaries of international protection and asylum seekers, hitherto excluded from access to the EU Blue Card. In perspective, the measure would facilitate the labor integration of this vulnerable group of migrants, regardless of the eventual positive outcome of the asylum application.

**The prospects of "budding talents": the international students**

According to Eurostat in 2017 there were over half a million (530,113) new study permits issued in the EU as a whole, of which 33.9% of the total in the United Kingdom, 14.9% in France, 9.2% in Germany, 7.5% in Spain and 6.5% in Poland. The most significant increases in the 2008-2017 period occurred especially in the new Member States: in Malta and Slovenia the flows increased by 7 times, Poland 6 times, Latvia 5 times, Slovakia 4 times, etc. Despite a few cases going against the trend (such as Italy and Greece, one third less for each), the described framework demonstrates a progressive internationalization of the European university system.

The majority of international students, after completing their studies in one of the EU member countries, in the light of the opportunities offered, mostly prefer to leave: according to the OECD, over around 1 million international students the percentage of those who decide to remain in the EU varies between 16.4% and 29.1%.

According to Eurostat, in the decade 2008-2017, more than half a million (513,529) study-to-work conversion practices were completed in the EU. Of the 50,659 conversions recorded in 2017, one third belongs to France (32.2%), followed by Germany (23.8%) and the United Kingdom (12.0%). In Italy the conversion practices carried out in the 2008-2017 decade were just 1,684, of which 182 in 2017. National data are conditioned by the fact that the conversion can only take place within the quotas established by the eventual Flow Decrees.

Finally with the Directive 2016/801/EU it was intended, in particular, to improve: i) the effectiveness of procedural guarantees (terms for processing of applications and obligation to justify the refusal), ii) the scope of the mobility clauses (in reference to students admitted to an EU country interested in continuing their studies in a different Member State), iii) the right to a job search period of at least 9 months after completing their studies.

**The EU "mobile migrants" at high risk of deskilling**

At the beginning of 2017, according to Eurostat, 16.9 million EU citizens work or live in another Member State and 2 million are cross-border commuters, either workers or students crossing borders on a daily or weekly basis. The recent and prolonged eurozone crisis seems to have played a further stimulating role especially in the southern countries of the EU, more affected by the austerity measures and the progressive dismantling of technical-scientific infrastructures (a *deja-vu* of what happened over the years Ninety in Central and Eastern European countries).

It is not uncommon, especially in post-communist Europe, that the young generations who first fed the so-called "internal brain flight" (or the flight from the public to the private sector) subsequently proposed themselves as intra-EU migrants in search of salaries appropriate to their qualifications. The scholars who highlight the limited possibilities of economic and social development in the countries of origin deriving from the departure of their "brains" contrast with the school of those who instead emphasize the positive aspects: the “return skills”, the financial and social remittances, the socio-economic contacts and the scientific collaborations gained, the contribution to raising the level of competitiveness and, finally, the same impossibility for the countries of departure to fully exploit the potential of their own “brains”.

A 2018 study by the European Commission notes that between 2004 and 2016 the number of highly qualified EU migrants almost tripled, reaching almost 3 million in 2016 (Isced 5-8). Additional 3.6 million EU migrants are mid-qualified workers (Isced 3-4).

About a third of the highly qualified EU mobile workers have entered professional, scientific and technical activities (12.0%), healthcare (11.0%) and education (10.6%); the remaining part: construction (12.7%), manufacturing (11.9%), wholesale and retail trade (9.5%), etc. Summing up, it stands out the prevalence of sectors that tend to be little or nothing qualified.

The need to accept a condition of deskilling or brain waste on the part of a growing number of highly qualified young EU mobile migrants must be analysed considering the difficulties of accumulating wealth that is experiencing almost an entire generation, which must face not only unemployment risks, but also a growing job instability, a relatively higher cost of living than the salary and, in general, a great insecurity towards the future.

**A typical case of “brain waste”: the qualified migrations to Italy**

As reported in February 2019 by a joint report by the Ministry of Labor, Istat, Inps, Inail and Anpal: “to reach the employment rate of the EU-15 average (in 2017 equal to 67.9%, against 58.0% of Italy) our country should have about 3.8 million additional employees. The Italian employment gap concerns mainly skilled jobs and specific sectors such as healthcare, education and public administration”.

Out of 5,144,440 foreign residents (EU and non-EU), already registered at the end of 2017, the number of foreign workers is substantial and slightly increasing. They were 2,423,000 at the end of 2017, with an incidence of 10.5% the total of the employees. Several times it has been pointed out that their insertion is marked by the replacement of Italians in the deficit and less attractive sectors, following a spontaneous “subaltern placement model”.

For almost two-thirds (62.8% in 2017) these are unskilled or working-class professions, while just 7.2% perform qualified roles. As a result, immigrants are often over-educated with respect to the tasks performed (34.7% against 23.0% of Italians), while 1 in 14 is underemployed or works part-time. Their salary is 22.9% lower than that of Italians engaged in similar jobs and, among other things, seniority is of little help in obtaining professional recognition.

During the years the followed the 2008 economic crisis, immigrants played a role of “social safety net” for the benefit of Italians. From 2008 to 2017, their unemployment rate increased by 5.8 points compared to 4.2 points for Italians, (while the final rates in 2017 are, respectively, 14.3% and 10.8%). In addition, thanks to the age differential, the benefits that they provide to the pension system are relevant. In the light of what has been described above, Italy therefore proposes itself as a typical case of brain waste, a waste of qualitative resources that unfortunately is evident also to the detriment of young Italians.

Due to the peculiar conditions of the Italian labour market, neither before the crisis nor (understandably) during the crisis or even after the crisis the influx of skilled workers from abroad has taken off. The residence permits issued to highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card holders according to Article 27 quater of the Immigration Consolidation Act, but also special cases of qualified workers according to Article 27 and Article 27 ter, researchers and reunified family members) increased from 2,500 in 2009 to just 6,000 in the two-year period 2011-2012, while in the

following five years the number fell to just over 5,000. In particular, it struggles to take off the EU Blue Card (just 301 new releases in 2017).
In light of the data reported, the real problem seems to consist in the absence of a strategy capable of attracting skilled workers in various sectors and this happens because they are not so dynamic as to employ the new Italian recruits and complete them with those arriving from abroad.
So far the Italian policy-makers seem to have been satisfied to accept the advantages that the current migration situation ensures (according to the most qualified estimates, the benefit for the national budget was more than 2 billion euros in 2015). But an exporting country like Italy, facing global competition, should not be satisfied with this temporary advantage without setting qualitative goals, starting from the full exploitation of the skills of resident immigrants.

**The "new emigration": official data and effective consistency**

According to the OECD, Italy has risen to the eighth place in the world among the countries of emigration. The main destinations remain the traditional ones, but the growth rates confirm a certain atomization towards new destinations (such as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe or the Scandinavian countries).
As regard data related to cancellations to abroad from the population register (Istat), the latest consolidated data for 2017 indicate 114,559 expatriates and 42,369 repatriations. Provisional data for 2018 suggest a further growth of movements in both directions (120 thousand expatriates vs. 47 thousand repatriations). This is the maximum number of expatriates registered in the current decade, but also a real return to the past, that is, to the numerical levels of the early Seventies, when the expatriations exceeded 100 thousand units, but otherwise than now they were largely compensated by repatriations.
According to the Register of Italians residing Abroad (Aire), the stable presence of Italians abroad exceeded 5 million in 2017 (5,114,469). The most common reason for enrollment in the Aire is expatriation, which affects just over half of all members (2,656,822). If the number of new entrants to the Aire for expatriation differs relatively little from the annual number of cancellations to abroad from the population register detected by Istat (128.193 vs. 114.559 in 2017), the situation changes when we compare such data with the statistics on the new Italian subscribers of the population registers in various European countries.
A comparison with the national statistics of the top 5 destination countries showed an enormous underestimation of the number of Italians settled abroad due to the failure to cancel from the national population registers before leaving and/or to the late (eventual) non-registration in the Aire register. From our calculations we can see how the real flow of expatriation (above all within the Schengen area) is 4 times higher than that recorded by Istat in the case of Spain, or 2.5 times in the case of Germany and the United Kingdom.
Taking the 2008-2017 decade into consideration, the cancellations from the Italian population registers for transfer to Germany amount to a total of about 115 thousand, but at the same period the Italians registered in German population registers are almost 400 thousand.
From the comparison between the various sources (national, international and main countries of settlement) - and following the example of the most recent studies - it is therefore possible to estimate a revaluation coefficient of Italian emigration that varies from a minimum of 2.5 times to a maximum of 3 times. Considering the approximately 114 thousand canceled to abroad in 2017, we can estimate a gap between 290 thousand and 350 thousand new expatriates per year, a flow quantitatively similar to what is happened in the immediate post-war period.

**EUROPE. Italian annual expatriates (2017)**

| *First 5 countries* | *Canceled to abroad (Istat/Population register)* | *New enrolled for expatriation reason (Aire)** | *New enrolled abroad (National sources**)* | *% difference National sources on Istat/Pop. reg.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | 20,593 | 18,538 | 56,748 | +175.6 |
| Germany | 18,524 | 20,007 | 51,471 | +177.9 |
| France | 12,422 | 12,897 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Switzerland | 10,498 | 11,931 | 16,471 | +56.9 |
| Spain | 7,165 | 7,395 | 28,793 | +301.9 |

* Aire: Register of Italians residing Abroad

** United Kingdom: Office for National Statistics (Ons) - National Insurance Number (NINo), Sept. 2017; Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis); France: no register of population; Switzerland: Federal Office of Statistics; Spain: Instituto Nacional de Estadìstica (Ine)

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of various sources*

## Half a million graduates among the new Italian emigrants between 2008 and 2017

The numerous sources of information all suffer from problems of incompleteness.

According to the Labor Force Survey over almost 1 million two hundred thousand Italians of working age (15-64 years) who habitually reside in another EU Member State, 30.6% are graduates (Isced 5-8); 36.3% received a secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education degree (Isced 3-4); and the remaining 32.0% refers to pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education (Isced 0-2). Overall, there are 359,000 “mobile” graduates, but it is not known how many actually perform highly qualified jobs and how many suffer from over-qualification.

Through appropriate in-depth analysis on a large representative sample, Istat indicated the share of secondary school and university graduates compared to the number of people who had been canceled from the national population registers. University graduates from 3,500 in 2002 rose to around 28,000 in 2017 and holders of a secondary school diploma from 10,000 in 2002 to around 33,000 in 2017. The emigration of educated and presumably young people (altogether over 60,000 secondary school and university graduates), who would have left Italy just in 2017, is even more significant in a country like Italy, which is notoriously “poor” in providing new graduates. Cumulatively between 2002 and 2017 emigrated 193,426 university graduates and 258,189 secondary school graduates. Net of returns, the migratory balance shows a net loss of the Italian population in majority with a medium-high educational qualification.

Finally, the Istat *Rapporto sulla conoscenza 2018* (Report on Knowledge 2018) reports that in 2016 graduates are 30.8% among Italians over 25 enrolled in the Aire during the year, and 37.4% among those who enroll from abroad (that means after having moved from a country to another). Once again this is an evidence of the high mobility of people qualified or along the course of higher education.

Applying to the aforementioned quantitative estimate - 290/350 thousand new expatriates in 2017 - the percentage coefficient of graduates expressed by the weighted average of Labor Force Survey, Istat and Aire data, the estimate of highly qualified Italian emigrant is equal to a range from 90 thousand to 108 thousand units. In the medium term, between 2008 and 2017, it would be at least half a million graduates who left Italy to seek their fortune abroad. Of these, at least one third no longer returned to Italy.

The annual loss to be attributed to the emigration of young Italians “under 40” would be, according to Confindustria (the General Confederation of Italian Industry), equal to 1% of GDP; according to the OECD a public expenditure of at least 140 thousand dollars for each I level graduate that emigrates; 160 thousand dollars for each II level graduate; and 230 thousand dollars for a PhD holder.

These considerations would be incomplete if another element were not introduced. The loss suffered with departures is not compensated by the Italian emigrants who return, which account for a third or less of those who have left and are usually placed in more advanced age groups, but not even with the arrivals of non-Italian educated people coming from abroad, among which the share of individuals with a degree or a tertiary degree is lower than among Italians and in the most recent period has been reduced.
According to the OECD *Indicators of Talent Attractiveness*, in 2019 Italy is among the least attractive countries for highly qualified workers, not offering an environment that can generate a multiplier effect of economic and social development. The same migration policies, that are more favorable to them, turn out to be frustrated by long and complicated procedures.

**The prospects of an Italian system apparently "trapped in a poorly qualified balance"**

The professional prospects of a graduate in Italy are undermined by two paradoxes: i) the blocking of the function of "social elevator" that should be exercised by the education, which nowadays very rarely allows an improvement of youth social condition. It does not help either the modest demand from the labor market, nor the systematic de-legitimization of the value of studying promoted by certain political and media areas, nor the inadequate public expenditure forecasts for research and development (in 2015 equal to 1.3% of GDP, against an EU average of 2.0%); ii) the widespread phenomenon of over-qualification (according to the OECD, 19% of working graduates are over-qualified and 35% are employed in a sector that is not consistent with their profile).
It can be understood, therefore, why 31% of the people who obtained a doctorate in an Italian university would not make the same choice and 71% believe that, only by leaving Italy, could they have better opportunities to establish themselves with the PhD achieved (AlmaLaurea 2018 survey).
It seems to lack the prospects, not the quality: just to give an example, according to the OECD, Italy is the third EU country by number of scientific publications, after the United Kingdom (which is in sharp decline) and Germany, and the fifth worldwide.
In the medium-short term, however, the situation should radically change. According to the EU agency Cedefop, between 2016 and 2030 not only the workforce in Italy is destined to increase by 6.8%, but 95% of new jobs will involve highly qualified positions so as to fear the risk that demand will exceed offer.
As reminded by IDOS Research and Study Centre and "S. Pio V" Institute of Political Studies, by publishing this volume dedicated to qualified migrations, it would be appropriate as soon as possible to put again the question of new flows planning at the centre of the political agenda.

**Self-employment-entrepreneurial activities of immigrants***
*Maria Paola Nanni, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS*

Over the last few years, immigrant entrepreneurship has taken on a prominent role with respect to the equilibria of the Italian entrepreneurial system. The considerable growth of independent activities managed by workers of foreign origin (+29.4% between the close of 2011 and the close of 2017) has in fact contributed to mitigating the marked contraction of the rest of the entrepreneurial base. While concentrating on the less attractive and profitable ambits (which areas are more accessible in economic terms), these players also frequently play a key role in fostering the current "restructuring" processes and in serving otherwise unmet needs. Consider, for example, the variegated world of artisans – which, on the generational turnover front, is in great difficulty – where more than one out of eight of businesses are led by immigrants (13.6% at the end of 2016); or the district networks and fragmented production systems within which they operate. On another level, we may consider the gradual expansion of the ranges and types of products and services that are made available, particularly in large urban areas, or the supporting role that even modestly structured activities can offer, with respect to fostering international trade.
In order to analyse participation of migrants in the entrepreneurial fabric of Italy, the main statistical reference sources that we can turn to are Business Registers – providing an institutional archive that gathers together all the information recorded in the lists of Chambers of Commerce. This work entails sifting the data on the parties involved on the basis of birth in Italy or elsewhere (ascertainable via the taxpayer's code). Using this criterion, the archives enable us to investigate this phenomenon from two differing angles: that of the characteristics of entrepreneurs themselves, identified starting out from their assigned offices or posts, and that of the companies that these entrepreneurs start up and manage.
"Imprese a conduzione immigrata" (immigrant-managed businesses) – or, to simplify matters, "immigrant businesses" – were defined as all companies whose owner (in the case of individual concerns) or whose majority of shareholders and directors (in the case of corporate entities) were born elsewhere than within Italy's national borders. On the other hand, in order to arrive at a profile for these entrepreneurs, we consider the group of proprietors of individual businesses who were born abroad (individual concerns represent the clearly prevailing form of enterprises among immigrants who chose self-employment).

**Companies managed by immigrant workers, between growth and frailty**
The marked dynamism of migrants continues to be reflected in the remarkable growth of the independent concerns that they manage. In 2017, too, the balance was positive, between companies started up and companies that ceased activities, resulting in an increase of over 16,000 vs 2016 (+2.8%). This trend runs counter to that displayed by the rest of the country's entrepreneurial base, which remains basically unchanged (+474; + 0.0%), engaged as these businesses are in the hard struggle to survive in the face of the downturns of recent years. A general trend thus emerges toward slight recovery, compared to the beginning of the decade, in full continuity with the first signs of a turnabout, as from 2015. Between 2011 and 2017, the independent activities of migrants

* Excerpt from the chapter "Le attività di lavoro autonomo e imprenditoriale degli immigrati" in *Dossier Statistico immigrazione 2018*, pp. 296-302.

in Italy grew in number uninterruptedly (more than 133,000 units; +29.4%) while, over the same period, the number of companies managed by Italian-born individuals fell off by 2.7% (i.e. by slightly more than 153,000 units). Only in 2017 was the trend, for the first time, not negative.
Following these developments, as also seen in the sphere of employee labour, self-employment-entrepreneurial activities of immigrants definitively established themselves as a structural component of the economic-productive fabric of this country. At the close of 2017, this development regarded almost 590,000 companies, or a tenth of all the independent activities registered at Italian Chambers of Commerce (9.6%). This result is of considerable importance, displaying growth year by year. Six years earlier, at the end of 2011, the said value stood at 7.4%. More specifically, immigrant workers continue to stand out for their greater propensity toward starting up new independent activities. As has been the case over the last few years, in 2017 too, about a sixth of all the new companies registered in the Chambers of Commerce (16.2%, or almost 58,000 new companies) can be ascribed to the entrepreneurial spirit of these persons: an incidence that is much more marked than for companies as a whole registered at the close of the year (9.6%), and considerably greater also than that of the group of companies that ceased operations during the same period (11.3%, or more than 38,000). This marked dynamism, on the occupational front, and the forceful drive towards self-employment among workers of foreign origin, should therefore be underscored. This development did not come to a halt, and it manifested itself even during the darkest years of the crisis. During this period, the marked socio-economic vulnerability of the immigrant population also served as a driver for entrepreneurship. When faced with yet further barriers to employment, starting up activities based on self-employment may be seen as a valid response and a strategy of "resistance", as a plan for self-employment that exploits possible channels of opportunity, providing openings for an escape from the marginal and subordinate roles to which migrants – even qualified migrants – are generally relegated within Italy's system of employment. All these points toward a triggering of fruitful mechanisms of social advancement.

**ITALY. Total sum of enterprises managed by immigrants and by persons born in Italy; absolute and percentage values (2011-2017)**

| *Indicator* | *2011* | *2012* | *2013* | *2014* | *2015* | *2016* | *2107* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ENTERPRISES MANAGED BY IMMIGRANTS* | | | | | | |
| Number of enterprises | 454,029 | 477,519 | 497,080 | 524,674 | 550,717 | 571,255 | 587,499 |
| Yearly variation (%) | - | 5.2 | 4.1 | 5.6 | 5.0 | 3.7 | 2.8 |
| % of total sum of enterprises | 7.4 | 7.8 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 9.4 | 9.6 |
| | ENTERPRISES MANAGED BY PERSONS BORN IN ITALY | | | | | | |
| Number of enterprises | 5,656,045 | 5,615,639 | 5,564,880 | 5,516,513 | 5,506,930 | 5,502,508 | 5,502,982 |
| Yearly variation (%) | - | -0.7 | -0.9 | -0.9 | -0.2 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
| | TOTAL SUM OF ENTERPRISES | | | | | | |
| Number of enterprises | 6,110,074 | 6,093,158 | 6,061,960 | 6,041,187 | 6,057,647 | 6,073,763 | 6,090,481 |
| Yearly variation (%) | - | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |

** Enterprises whose owner, in the case of individual concerns, or whose majority shareholders and directors were born abroad*
*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of Unioncamere/infocamere*

### Distribution by legal status and sector of activity

The specific weaknesses noted in the socio-economic profile of the foreign population in Italy also help us explain the prevalent approach of migrants to the system of independent labour, or, in other words, their preference for simple and inexpensive forms of enterprise and for segments and sectors of activities that do not necessitate excessively burdensome capital outlay.

Unsurprisingly, the great majority of enterprises managed by foreign-born workers are individual concerns: 78.6% (462,000) vs the mean value of 52.7%. Then come joint-stock companies (13.1%; 77,000), partnerships (6.6%; 39,000) and cooperatives, consortia and other corporate entities (1.7%; 10,000). Joint-stock companies are growing at the fastest pace, favoured by the introduction of the simplified limited liability joint-stock company ("società di capitale a responsabilità limitata semplificata"), with reduced costs. These increased in number by a tenth (+10.6%) in 2017 (more than 7,000 new companies). The percentage increase of individual concerns stood at +1.9% (almost 9,000 new companies).

Involvement of migrants in innovative start-ups (registered in the dedicated section of the Business Register) is also on the rise. At the end of 2017, 253 such entities were noted (3% of the total number), with a predominantly immigrant social structure. The figure rises to 1,088 (13% of the total) if we consider all such concerns that include at least one citizen of foreign origin.

Distribution by sector of activity – while remaining characterized by the "traditional" key roles played by trade (almost 210,000 companies; 35.7% of the total) and construction (133,000; 22.6%) – also reflects gradual change (i.e. a gradual process of "opening up" to a variety of ambits of activity). Above all, a move is noted toward hospitality and catering services (47,000; 7.9%), a segment that now engages more companies than does manufacturing (46,000; 7.8%), followed by "noleggio, agenzie di viaggio e servizi alle imprese" (rental, travel agencies and services to businesses) (33,000; 5.7%), these being the two segments that, also in 2017, displayed the highest growth rates (+5.7%, in both cases). Indeed, we note that the segment of services to businesses displays the highest incidence for immigrant-led activities with respect to the total (16.9%). For a considerable period, this position was held by construction (15.9%).

The marked push towards self-employment noted in recent years has translated into a slow, ongoing process of diversification of the overall scenario in terms of activities undertaken and types of businesses chosen by workers of foreign origin.

**The countries of origin of the proprietors of individual concerns**

As to areas of origin of these entrepreneurs, generally speaking, the available data indicate that almost eight out of ten of such enterprises are managed by non-EU migrants (78.9%). However, in order to outline the scenario, in terms of the leading countries represented, one must resort to data concerning the owners of individual concerns (in all, almost 462,000), indicating presences that reflect only in part the 'pecking order' of the largest national communities within the Italian immigration landscape. The most numerous entrepreneurs of this kind are born, in fact, in Morocco (14.8%), China (11.3%) and Romania (10.7%), which three groups alone account for more than one third of the total. If we add also those born in Albania (6.9%), Bangladesh (6.7%), Senegal (4.2%), Egypt (4.0%) and Pakistan (3.5%), their incidence reaches 60% of the total. These few communities, therefore, appropriate for themselves a fairly significant role as protagonist, with – as is well known – specific distribution by segment of activity and, often, marked tendencies towards concentration within given sectors (however, these tendencies are gradually diminishing in force). Thus, those born in Senegal (87.7%), Morocco (71.1%), Bangladesh (64.7%) and Pakistan (57.3%), in well over half of the cases, engage in commerce. The focus of those born in Albania (71.0%) and Romania (61.7%) is decidedly upon construction. However, these incidences have been gradually diminishing over recent years. On the other hand, although themselves mainly oriented towards certain given sectors, those born in China and Egypt move toward a wider range of ambits of activity, with a tendency toward, among the Chinese, trade (37.7%), manufacturing (33.8%) and hospitality/catering (13.6%), and, among the Egyptians, toward construction (41.2%), trade (19.4%) and hospitality/catering (15.2%).

**Migrants and remittances: protagonists in the global economy***

*Lorenzo Luatti, Oxfam Italia researcher*

## The international context

According to the estimates published by Ifad, global remittances toward developing countries increased over the last 10 years (2007-2016) by 51.0%. In 2017, 200 million migrants sent 613 billion dollars to their countries of origin in remittances (466 billion dollars to developing countries), providing support for approximately 800 million persons worldwide. This figure more than triples the total amount of official development aid distributed annually worldwide. Ifad also estimates that between 2016 and 2030, 6,500 billion dollars in remittances shall be sent to developing countries, thus affecting over 1 billion people (whether issuing or receiving remittances). Almost half of this sum goes to rural areas, and above all to countries without access to traditional welfare structures, and where poverty and hunger are more widespread. Households spend about 75% of the remittances that they receive on basic necessities such as food, education and medical assistance. The remaining 25% (more than 100 billion dollars) may be invested in tangible and financial resources such as savings, or development of small commercial enterprises by means of which families can plan for and secure their own future. These productive activities may also create jobs and transform economies, especially in rural areas. Remittances therefore take on a strategic value, both for migrants as individuals and for their communities (remittance dealings within the spheres of the individual-family, community and entrepreneurial activity).

As highlighted by World Bank data, after 2 consecutive years of decline, remittance flows to developing countries increased by 8.5% in 2017, displaying a sort of "rebound" effect. This was the case in all continental areas: remittance flows in Europe and Central Asia increased by 20.9%; in Sub-Saharan Africa by 11.4%; in the Middle East and North Africa by 9.3%; in Latin America and the Caribbean by 8.7%; and in East Asia, the Pacific and South Asia, each by 5.8%. According to the World Bank, this trend would continue also into 2018, with flows of remittances towards developing countries up by 4.1%, for a total of 485 billion dollars. The "rebound" effect is driven by the economic growth in remittance flows in the EU, the Russian Federation and the United States; driven also by the increase in oil prices and a strengthening of the euro and rouble against the US dollar. However, certain risks remain in the long term. In many countries from which remittances are sent, anti-immigration sentiment is on the rise, and immigration policies are becoming more stringent. Structural constraints, such as "de-risking", are being adopted by international correspondent banks, alongside greater regulatory requisites applied to money transfer operators, hindering growth of what are termed 'rimesse formali' (i.e. remittances via banks, the post office or money transfer services).

**WORLD. Remittances (billions of dollars) sent to developing countries (2014-2016), estimate (2017) and forecast (2018-2019)**

| *Area* | *Absolute values (billions of dollars)* | | | | | | *Growth (%)* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *2014* | *2015* | *2016* | *2017* | *2018* | *2019* | *2015* | *2016* | *2017* | *2018* | *2019* |
| Industrialised countries | 444 | 440 | 429 | 466 | 485 | 503 | -1.0 | -2.4 | 8.5 | 4.1 | 3.7 |
| Eastern Asia and Pacific | 121 | 126 | 123 | 130 | 135 | 140 | 3.9 | -2.6 | 5.8 | 3.8 | 3.6 |
| Europe and C Asia | 52 | 41 | 40 | 48 | 51 | 53 | -21.6 | -2.4 | 20.9 | 6.0 | 4.8 |
| Lat. America and | 65 | 68 | 74 | 80 | 83 | 87 | 6.1 | 7.5 | 8.7 | 4.3 | 4.2 |

* Excerpt from the chapter, "Migranti e rimesse, protagonisti nell'economia globale" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 28-35.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caribbean | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Middle East and North Africa | 54 | 51 | 49 | 53 | 56 | 57 | -5.3 | -4.8 | 9.3 | 4.4 | 3.3 |
| Southern Asia | 116 | 118 | 110 | 117 | 120 | 123 | 1.5 | -6.1 | 5.8 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 37 | 36 | 34 | 38 | 41 | 43 | -2.5 | -4.6 | 11.4 | 7.0 | 5.6 |
| World | **598** | **582** | **573** | **613** | **642** | **667** | **-2.6** | **-1.5** | **7.0** | **4.6** | **3.9** |

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the World Bank*

**Remittances in Italy**

For over a decade now, the Bank of Italy has periodically published data on the remittances sent abroad by immigrants in Italy, enabling observation, over time and from a key observation point, of the financial behaviour of foreigners in Italy.

In 2017, the ongoing trend toward stabilization was maintained after the collapse of 2013 (-19.0% vs 2012), and for the first time in 9 years overall values were ‘in the black’ again – albeit to the very modest ‘tune’ of (1,484,000 euros, or +0.01%). The overall volume of remittances remained above 5 billion euros (equal to three tenths of a percentage point of the GDP), far from the peak of the 2008-2011 period, when remittances exceeded 7 billion per year (or almost half a percentage point of the GDP). The key factor is again, above all, nationality. The Chinese, in just 7 years, reduced to a tiny fraction the value of the sums sent. In 2012, the great sum of 2.7 billion euros, in all, was sent to China. This sum fell to just 137 million in 2017 (2.7% of the total), with, once again this year, a significant 42.5% downturn compared to the 2016 figure accompanied by a further downward shift in the general ranking (to the eleventh place). Among the manifold causes of this ‘rout’ – for the Chinese and their remittances –, we note more stringent anti-money laundering laws, greater scrutiny on the part of operators and authorities, deployment of more advanced instruments for detection, and the economic crisis. If we exclude these flows to China, the overall picture looks very different, and is one of constant growth.

Among foreign communities, the Romanians sent the largest share of savings in 2017 (approximately 708 million euros; -8.8% on 2016), followed by Bangladesh (532 million; + 9.5%), the Philippines (325 million; -2.8%) and Senegal (309 million; + 10.8%). Then come the citizens of India, Morocco, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (more 200 million euros for each community), marking major percentage increases on 2016, especially for the Sri Lankans and Pakistanis (between 15 and 16%). For all major South American national groupings there was a general downturn in their remittances: Peruvians and Ecuadorians (both at -8.0%); Dominicans (-10.7%); Brazilians (-11.7%); and Colombians (-2.1%). Indeed, the continents of America and Europe (albeit, for the latter, to a lesser extent) display a negative trend (-8.4% and -3.1%, respectively), while Asia (despite the Chinese “rout”) and Africa, especially, see growth (1.9% and 7.6%, respectively). In this latter regard, the performance data that were collected by the Bank of Italy point to the role played by “small” savings sent periodically by asylum seekers who have been accepted into Italy over recent years. Such findings, despite the absence of specific studies, were supported by empirical evidence and the testimony of many operators in the sector of care provision and hospitality for asylum seekers.

In terms of geographical areas of origin of the remittances, 2017 does not show significant changes. Northern and Central Italy maintain their primacy (54.0% and 27.2%). However, Central Italy, due to the constant downturn for the Chinese remittances, is falling further in the national ranking.

**ITALY. Remittances (,000 euros) of foreign citizens: recipient continental areas (2011-2017)**

| *Continental area* | *2011* | *2012* | *2013* | *2014* | *2015* | *2016* | *2017* | *%* | *Var. 16-17* | *Var. 11/17* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **EU-15** | **203,604** | **177,518** | **161,046** | **163,910** | **150,153** | **145,397** | **148,872** | **2.9** | **2.4** | **-26.9** |
| **New EU-13** | **1,031,368** | **928,641** | **971,297** | **989,798** | **949,073** | **870,658** | **794,683** | **15.7** | **-8.7** | **-22.9** |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 479,309 | 437,548 | 448,452 | 464,672 | 448,891 | 456,758 | 483,964 | 9.5 | 6.0 | 1.0 |
| Europe (other) | 14,419 | 11,764 | 10,405 | 9,623 | 7,532 | 4,075 | 3,914 | 0.1 | -4.0 | -72.9 |
| **Europe** | **1,728,700** | **1,555,471** | **1,591,200** | **1,628,003** | **1,555,649** | **1,476,888** | **1,431,433** | **28.2** | **-3.1** | **-17.2** |
| N. Africa | 388,659 | 315,008 | 312,379 | 325,584 | 341,116 | 349,821 | 362,137 | 7.1 | 3.5 | -6.8 |
| W. Africa | 402,529 | 355,895 | 383,058 | 412,758 | 448,569 | 501,627 | 556,869 | 11.0 | 11.5 | 39.0 |
| E. Africa | 28,259 | 27,451 | 29,782 | 30,056 | 31,212 | 33,204 | 33,076 | 0.7 | -11.1 | 4.5 |
| Central and southern Africa | 27,692 | 27,467 | 28,313 | 31,155 | 29,995 | 33,612 | 36,552 | 0.7 | 8.7 | 32.0 |
| **Africa** | **847,139** | **725,821** | **753,532** | **799,553** | **850,892** | **918,264** | **988,634** | **19.5** | **7.6** | **16.6** |
| W. Asia | 82,903 | 85,787 | 85,339 | 90,894 | 95,086 | 109,707 | 126,513 | 2.5 | 15.3 | 52.6 |
| Central and Southern Asia | 679,569 | 613,898 | 862,141 | 896,174 | 1,038,212 | 1,220,379 | 1,355,568 | 26.7 | 11.1 | 99.5 |
| E. Asia | 3,159,612 | 3.064,773 | 1,462,260 | 1,167,787 | 936,190 | 597,897 | 483,436 | 9.5 | -19.1 | -84.7 |
| **Asia** | **3,922,084** | **3,764,458** | **2,409,740** | **2,154,855** | **2,069,488** | **1,927,983** | **1,965,517** | **38.7** | **1.9** | **-49.9** |
| N. America | 25,278 | 26,869 | 27,810 | 34,056 | 28,052 | 29,320 | 28,498 | 0.6 | -2.8 | 12.7 |
| Central and southern America | 867,987 | 757,956 | 716,751 | 710,508 | 744,468 | 718,208 | 656,414 | 12.9 | -8.6 | -24.4 |
| **America** | **893,265** | **784,825** | **744,561** | **744,564** | **772,520** | **747,528** | **684,912** | **13.5** | **-8.4** | **-23.3** |
| **Oceania** | **3,016** | **2,488** | **2,685** | **2,807** | **2,917** | **2,969** | **2,789** | **0.1** | **26,4** | **24,4** |
| Unclassified | 188 | - | 44,005 | 3,377 | - | - | 1,831 | - | - | - |
| **Total** | **7,394,398** | **6,833,116** | **5,545,759** | **5,333,285** | **5,251,656** | **5,073,632** | **5,075,116** | **100.0** | **0.0** | **-31.4** |

N.B. Data retrieved during July 2018.

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the Bank of Italy*

**ITALY. Remittances (,000 euros) of foreign citizens: the top 29 recipient countries (2016-2017)**

| *Country* | *2016* | *%* | *2017* | *%* | *Var. % 16-17* | *Country* | *2016* | *%* | *2017* | *%* | *Var. % 16-17* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Romania | 777,110 | 15.3 | 708,495 | 14.0 | -8.8 | Brazil | 106,128 | 2.1 | 93,706 | 1.8 | -11.7 |
| Bangladesh | 486,559 | 9.6 | 532,654 | 10.5 | 9.5 | Moldova | 77,081 | 1.5 | 85,804 | 1.7 | 11.3 |
| Philippines | 334,939 | 6.6 | 325,603 | 6.4 | -2.8 | Colombia | 69,621 | 1.4 | 68,131 | 1.3 | -2.1 |
| Senegal | 279,069 | 5.5 | 309,069 | 6.1 | 10.8 | Ivory Coast | 50,939 | 1.0 | 58,211 | 1.1 | 14.3 |
| India | 274,712 | 5.4 | 293,439 | 5.8 | 6.8 | Ghana | 48,274 | 1.0 | 52,588 | 1.0 | 8.9 |
| Sri Lanka | 244,806 | 4.8 | 280,276 | 5.5 | 14.5 | Tunisia | 51,203 | 1.0 | 51,307 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Morocco | 270,037 | 5.3 | 277,221 | 5.5 | 2.7 | Russia | 45,873 | 0.9 | 45,757 | 0.9 | -0.3 |
| Pakistan | 200,336 | 3.9 | 232,452 | 4.6 | 16.0 | Spain | 38,924 | 0.8 | 39,131 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| Peru | 200,766 | 4.0 | 184,762 | 3.6 | -8.0 | Bulgaria | 40,847 | 0.8 | 39,120 | 0.8 | -4.2 |
| Ukraine | 143,267 | 2.8 | 153,733 | 3.0 | 7.3 | Poland | 37,788 | 0.7 | 33,631 | 0.7 | -11.0 |
| China | 238,103 | 4.7 | 137,023 | 2.7 | -42.5 | Egypt | 27,716 | 0.5 | 32,850 | 0.6 | 18.5 |
| Albania | 123,745 | 2.4 | 128,074 | 2.5 | 3.5 | Mali | 24,773 | 0.5 | 32,820 | 0.6 | 32.5 |
| Ecuador | 130,708 | 2.6 | 120,087 | 2.4 | -8.1 | Serbia | 18,555 | 0.4 | 29,036 | 0.6 | 56.5 |
| Georgia | 94,287 | 1.9 | 110,021 | 2.2 | 16.7 | France | 25,764 | 0.5 | 28,751 | 0.6 | 11.6 |
| Dominican R. | 105,097 | 2.1 | 93,850 | 1.8 | -10.7 | **World** | **5,073,632** | **100.0** | **5,075,116** | **100.0** | **0.0** |

N.B. Data retrieved during July 2018.

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the Bank of Italy*

## Economic and fiscal impact of immigration[*]

*Fondazione Leone Moressa and Andrea Stuppini, Regione Emilia Romagna*

In order to collate the "costs" and "benefits" of the presence of immigrants in Italy, we must observe the direct monetary flows: on the one hand, tax and social security contributions, and, on the other, the portion of public services used by immigrants.

Data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) - Department of Finance, on tax returns for 2017 (tax year 2016), show that taxpayers born abroad stand at approximately 3.7 million, declaring incomes for more than 51 billion euros. This calculation, however, is based on the country of birth of the workers, so it also includes Italian citizens born abroad. To overcome this limitation and estimate only taxpayers with foreign citizenship, the MEF data were cross-referenced with data relating to foreign workers, provided by ISTAT in its *Rilevazione Continua sulle Forze di Lavoro* (continuous survey of labour forces) (Rcfl 2016). Thus, the average income declared by all persons born in the same country was ascribed to the employed persons of each nationality, enabling an estimate according to which the taxpayers of actual foreign citizenship who declared their incomes in Italy came to 2.3 million. It follows that in Italy, foreign citizens declared incomes in 2016 totalling 27.2 billion euros and paid personal income tax (Irpef) amounting to 3.3 billion.

On analysis of the main nationalities, these groupings essentially reflect the distribution of immigrant presences in Italy: four nationality groupings among the top ten are European (Romania, Albania, Ukraine and Moldova) and four are Asian (China, Philippines, India and Bangladesh). South America and Africa are represented, instead, only by Peru and Morocco.

**ITALY. Estimate of incomes and personal income tax (Irpef) by nationality of taxpayer (Tax returns 2017, fiscal year 2016)**

| *Top 10 countries by number of employed persons* | *Foreign employed persons 2016* | *Estimate for taxpayers, by nationality* | *Estimated total incomes (bn euros)* | *Mean incomes per capita (euros)* | *Estimated total Irpef (bn euros)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Romania | 596,034 | 586,389 | 6.3 | 10,720 | 0.7 |
| Albania | 173,787 | 170,150 | 2.4 | 13,844 | 0.3 |
| China | 146,303 | 143,909 | 1.5 | 10,364 | 0.3 |
| Morocco | 143,667 | 136,037 | 1.7 | 12,257 | 0.1 |
| Ukraine | 127,441 | 123,576 | 1.1 | 9,038 | 0.1 |
| Philippines | 105,321 | 104,113 | 1.8 | 11,200 | 0.1 |
| Peru | 91,068 | 89,236 | 1.1 | 12,799 | 0.1 |
| Moldova | 76,157 | 73,582 | 0.8 | 11,146 | 0.1 |
| India | 61,665 | 60,689 | 0.8 | 12,764 | 0.1 |
| Bangladesh | 61,390 | 55,902 | 0.6 | 10,957 | 0.1 |
| **Foreigners** | **2,324,543** | **2,264,224** | **27.2** | **12,016** | **3.3** |

*SOURCE: Fondazione Leone Moressa.* Processing of data of *Istat Rcfl and Ministry of Economy and Finance (Mef) – Department of Finances*

Analysis of mean declared incomes confirms that there is a gap between Italian and foreign taxpayers. Taxpayers born in Italy declare on average 21,647 euros (nearly 10,000 euros more than foreign taxpayers: 12,016 euros).

[*] Excerpt from the chapter, "L'impatto economico e fiscale dell'immigrazione" in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2018*, pp. 312-319.

**ITALY. Estimated fiscal impact of foreign taxpayers (Dichiarazioni 2017 (tax returns 2017), Anno Imposta 2016 (fiscal year 2016)**

| | *Born in Italy* | *Born abroad* | *Foreigners (estimate)* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Number of taxpayers issuing tax returns | 36.6 million | 3.7 million | 2.3 million |
| Incomes declared (bn euros) | 791.8 | 51.2 | 27.2 |
| Personal income tax paid in (bn euros) | 148.6 | 7.5 | 3.3 |
| Mean income per capita (euros) | 21,647 | 13,888 | 12,016 |
| Mean personal income tax (Irpef) per capita (euros)* | 5,229 | 3,162 | 2,336 |
| Mean personal income tax (Irpef) rate (Irpef /Income) | 18.8% | 14.7% | 12.1% |

** Mean Irpef calculated with reference only to taxpayers who effected the tax payment.*
*SOURCE: Fondazione Leone Moressa. Processing of data of Istat Rcfl and Ministry of Economy and Finance (Mef) – Department of Finances*

## Tax and social security payments made by immigrants

Personal income tax revenue (3.3 billion euros) represents the main component of tax revenue attributable to foreign taxpayers in Italy. However, there are also other receipts for the public purse, for which it is also possible to estimate the quotient attributable to immigrants.
For example, indirect taxation of consumption should be considered, which can be estimated by applying a mean rate of 10% (as per a survey on consumption). If we assume that the income of foreign families that is spent on consumption subject to VAT regards 90% of expenses (excluding remittances, rent, mortgage and other items not subject to VAT), the total value of indirect consumption tax amounts to 2.4 billion euros.
Then there are fuel taxes, which can be calculated on the basis of Aci[1] and Ministry of Transport data. According to Aci data, the total car fleet in Italy in 2016 amounted to 50 million vehicles (of these, about 6% were owned by foreign citizens). If we assume expenditure sustained per capita by the latter as amounting to 300 euros per year (a most conservative estimate, considering lower displacement specifications and lower annual distances covered), we arrive at approximately 950 million euros per year.
To this sum we may add about 240 million per year deriving from lottery games and lotteries, obtained through an estimate of 5 euros average per month for 4 million foreigners aged 18 and over, residing in Italy in 2016.
A further source of income for the state coffers consists in expenses sustained for issuance and renewal of residence permits (on average, amounting to 200 euros per capita). Since the permits expiring in 2016 totalled 1.6 million, it may be assumed that at least 1.4 million were issued for the first time or were renewed during that year, resulting in an estimated sum of about 280 million euros. Also to be considered are the approx. 40 million euros generated by the 201,000 acquisitions of Italian citizenship (average per capita expenditure: 200 euros).
By summing up all the items listed above, we find 7.3 billion euros paid in by foreign citizens in 2016.
Lastly, in addition to tax revenues, social security contributions must also be considered. These contributions, although not genuinely a tax, still represent for the immediate future a form of replenishment of the State's coffers. On the basis of MEF and ISTAT data, it may be estimated that the 2.4 million foreigners employed in Italy paid in a total of 11.9 billion euros.
On adding tax revenues and social security contributions together, it appears that foreign taxpayers secured for the State receipts amounting to 19.2 billion euros during 2016.

[1] The Automobile club d'Italia (usually known by its acronym Aci) is a non-economic, self-financed statutory corporation of the Italian Republic, with the task of promoting and regulating the car sector and to represent car owners' interests in the country.

**Estimation of public spending for immigration: mean costs by sector**

In terms of public spending, the share attributable to immigrants can be estimated by means of two differing calculation methods: “mean” cost, determined by the ratio between total costs and total quantities produced, or “marginal” costs, understood as a measure of the increase in costs following an increase in quantity produced.

Taking into consideration the sectors of the welfare system and of reception and security, which absorb almost all expenses incurred due to immigration, we find few variations vis-à-vis the immediately preceding years, with the exception of reception and processing of asylum seekers and refugees.

In the health sector, on the methodological front, we may refer to a research conducted by the Emilia-Romagna Region concerning healthcare spending on immigrant users. This research, regarding 2015, confirms that the average cost for hospitalization of immigrant citizens is lower than for Italians (2,426 euros vs 3,521). This disparity is of course owing to lower average ages. Immigrant admissions mainly regard obstetrics or midwifery (generally a few days and at most once a year per woman). Admissions for Italians generally regard elderly patients, and hence treatments are more frequently provided and are of a longer duration. Research indicates that health expenditure attributable to immigrants amounts to 6.4% of the total, vs an incidence of the foreign population in the region of 12.1%. These data, tallying with the national estimate for the last few years, generated expenditure in 2016 amounting to approximately 4.1 billion euros.

In the school sector, excluding universities, expenditure amounted to 44.8 billion (one of the lowest in Europe, and mainly accounted for by staff costs). The number of students of non-Italian nationality exceeded 815,000 units (9.2% of the total number of registered students), entailing expenditure totalling 3.8 billion euros. The percentage figure of foreign students determines the average cost while the structure of public investments remains unchanged.

The third sector is that of services and of social work at the municipal level, the cost of which has remained for years at the 7 billion euros mark, of which about 600 million relating to immigrants, especially within the sectors of minors and of poverty (the prospect of verifying, in the future, the impact of national and local measures, such as inclusion income, shall prove most interesting).

Items relating to integration of immigrants (Italian courses, intercultural mediators, etc.) account for merely 2.5% of the expenditure (approximately 190 million euros a year). This is a very modest figure, which, however, must be added to the items for which immigrants may be considered users of general services.

The fourth sector, housing, is the issue that nowadays sparks the most heated controversy not only over immigrants’ access to local public services but also regarding reduced use of resources. Indeed, given the basic removal of the social fund for rent, the only item charged to the public budget concerns the presence of immigrants in public housing. On this issue, an article published by the authors on *LaVoce.info* in October 2017 explains why the percentage of immigrants is very high, among applications for occupation of public housing (the percentage falls off, moreover, in the rankings for assignment). The reasons are lower incomes; very few persons with their own home; and absence of family networks and of back-up from others (one need only consider the question of guarantors available for stipulating mortgage agreements).

Even in the light of all the observations above, the presence of immigrants among the beneficiaries of public housing schemes comes to approx. 8.5%, aligned with the median incidence for the population (8.3%), with public expenditure calculated at approx. 200 million.

The fifth sector is that of justice (courts and prisons), for which the total expenditure has reached 7.8 billion euros. Considering the high incidence of foreign persons convicted and incarcerated (30%), we arrive by mean cost method at an estimated 2 billion euros for the immigrants' component. However, in this case (as also in the case of schools) the major cost item is staff, and the increase in numbers of foreign incarcerated persons does not translate into higher public investments.

The sixth sector examined covers tasks falling within the competences of the Ministry of the Interior, grouped under the name "immigrazione, accoglienza e garanzia dei diritti" (immigration, reception and guaranteed rights), totalling 3.6 billion in 2016. This general item covers all the segments of the fragmented Italian asylum system. In regard to the Sprar ("Sistema di protezione per i richiedenti asilo e rifugiati", or protection system for asylum seekers and refugees), the Corte dei Conti (Court of Auditors) announced the official figure of 265 million euros for 2016, following an estimate standing at 400 million (also including minors). 2016 was one of the years with the highest number of coastal landings, entailing relief operations conducted at sea (around 900 million euros) plus health operations (about 220 million) as well as schooling (about 267 million): costs that have all increased since 2015. In small part, aid is provided via European resources which, for the period 2014-2020, were grouped into two funds: the Fami ("Fondo asilo, migrazione e integrazione" or Asylum, migration and integration fund), with 54 million euros earmarked for Italy, and Fsi (the "Fondo sicurezza interna" or Internal security fund), with 9 million per year for Italy. The resources earmarked for CIE ("Centri di identificazione ed espulsione" or Centres for identification and expulsion) are decreasing (standing now at less than 90 million euros, due to closure of a number of these centres). Lastly, as part of the overall calculation of 3.6 billion euros, also including European resources, the costs pertaining to agreements with various religious creeds must also be considered.

The seventh and final sector examined regards direct monetary transfers. Expenses related to social assistance (redundancy funds, mobility, unemployment, family allowances) are estimated at 2.4 billion euros; expenditure for immigrants' pensions does not exceed 800 million euros. It must be remembered that immigrants over the age of 65 are estimated at approx. 150,000 out of 16 million pensioners (less than 1%). Although the effects of the economic crisis have tailed off somewhat, immigrant beneficiaries of INPS (social security) payments come to about 20% of the total.

Overall, total expenditure at average costs over the three-year period considered ranges from 14.7 to 17.5 billion (i.e. 2.1% of Italian public spending).

**ITALY. Estimated receipts and expenditure in billions of euros (mean cost, tax year 2016)**

| *Receipts* | *2016* | *Expenditure* | *2016* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal income tax (Irpef) revenue | 3.3 | Health | 4.1 |
| Taxation of consumption | 2.4 | Education | 3.8 |
| Taxation of fuel | 1.0 | Social services | 0.6 |
| Lotto and Lotterie (lottery practices) | 0.2 | Housing | 0.2 |
| Taxation for permits and citizenship papers | 0.4 | Justice | 2.0 |
| ***Total tax receipts*** | ***7.3*** | Ministry of the Interior | 3.6 |
| Social security payments | 11.9 | Economic transfers | 3.2 |
| ***Total receipts*** | ***19.2*** | ***Total expenditure*** | ***17.5*** |
| ***Balance (Receipts - Expenditure) +1.7 billion euros*** | | | |

*SOURCE: Fondazione Leone Moressa. Processing of data of Istat, Ministry of Economy and Finance (Mef) and Court of Audit*

# Statistical Addenda

**EUROPEAN UNION Foreign population, migration and acquisitions of citizenship**

| Country | Foreigners | Foreigners | Foreigners 2017 | | | Born abroad 2017 | | Immigration | | Acquisitions of citizenship 2016 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2007 | 2012 | a.v. | % of pop. | Non-EU | a.v. | % on pop. | entries 2016 | rate (A) | a.v. | rate (B) |
| Austria | 793,364 | 946,610 | 1,333,239 | 15.2 | 673,207 | 1,649,008 | 18.8 | 129,509 | 14.9 | 8,530 | 0.6 |
| Belgium | 932,161 | 1,197,598 | 1,346,358 | 11.9 | 455,108 | 1,876,726 | 16.5 | 123,702 | 10.9 | 31,935 | 2.4 |
| Bulgaria | 25500 | 39,432 | 79,395 | 1.1 | 64,074 | 145,390 | 2.0 | 21,241 | 3.0 | 1,626 | 2.0 |
| Czech Rep. | 296,202 | 422,966 | 510,841 | 4.8 | 302,579 | 465,056 | 4.4 | 64,083 | 6.1 | 4,561 | 0.9 |
| Cyprus | 118,100 | 172,427 | 140,384 | 16.4 | 29,738 | 173,791 | 20.3 | 17,391 | 20.5 | 4,660 | 3.3 |
| Croatia | Na | Na | 45,951 | 1.1 | 30,086 | 539,588 | 13.0 | 13,985 | 3.3 | 3,973 | 8.6 |
| Denmark | 278,010 | 358,714 | 484,934 | 8.4 | 274,990 | 668,090 | 11.6 | 74,383 | 13.0 | 15,028 | 3.1 |
| Estonia | 236400 | 206,558 | 196,344 | 14.9 | 179,888 | 192,535 | 14.6 | 14,822 | 11.3 | 1,780 | 0.9 |
| Finland | 121,110 | 181,697 | 242,003 | 4.4 | 143,757 | 348,986 | 6.3 | 34,905 | 6.4 | 9,375 | 3.9 |
| France | 3685544 | 3,944,725 | 4,638,556 | 6.9 | 3,050,884 | 8,155,670 | 12.2 | 378,115 | 5.7 | 119,152 | 2.6 |
| Germany | 7,207,716 | 6,342,394 | 9,219,989 | 11.2 | 5,223,701 | 12,105,436 | 14.7 | 1,029,852 | 12.5 | 112,843 | 1.2 |
| Greece | 887,600 | 921,447 | 810,034 | 7.5 | 604,813 | 1,250,863 | 11.6 | 116,867 | 10.8 | 33,210 | 4.1 |
| Ireland | 498,706 | 551,314 | 564,884 | 11.8 | 138,315 | 796,410 | 16.6 | 85,185 | 18.0 | 10,038 | 1.8 |
| Italy | 2,938,922 | 4,052,081 | 5,047,028 | 8.3 | 3,509,089 | 6,053,960 | 10.0 | 300,823 | 5.0 | 201,591 | 4.0 |
| Latvia | 432,951 | 324,288 | 279,446 | 14.3 | 273,333 | 251,465 | 12.9 | 8,345 | 4.2 | 1,957 | 0.7 |
| Lithuania | 32,240 | 22,865 | 20,117 | 0.7 | 13,313 | 127,351 | 4.5 | 20,162 | 7.0 | 176 | 0.9 |
| Luxembourg | 198,213 | 229,870 | 281,246 | 47.6 | 40,795 | 270,010 | 45.7 | 22,888 | 39.7 | 3,315 | 1.2 |
| Malta | 13,401 | 20,302 | 54,321 | 11.8 | 24,073 | 69,576 | 15.1 | 17,051 | 37.9 | 1,495 | 2.8 |
| The Netherlands | 597,552 | 697,741 | 914,997 | 5.4 | 413,401 | 2,137,234 | 12.5 | 189,232 | 11.1 | 28,534 | 3.1 |
| Poland | 44,431 | 85,829 | 210,328 | 0.6 | 180,334 | 651,845 | 1.7 | 208,302 | 5.5 | 3,684 | 1.8 |
| Portugal | 434869 | 436,822 | 397,731 | 3.9 | 279,562 | 876,300 | 8.5 | 29,925 | 2.9 | 25,104 | 6.3 |
| United Kingdom | 3,659,900 | 4,884,417 | 6,071,093 | 9.2 | 2,444,555 | 9,293,729 | 14.1 | 588,993 | 9.0 | 149,372 | 2.5 |
| Romania | Na | 73,706 | 114,462 | 0.6 | 60,600 | 421,801 | 2.1 | 137,455 | 7.0 | 4,527 | 4.0 |
| Slovakia | 32,125 | 70,727 | 69,695 | 1.3 | 14,687 | 186,217 | 3.4 | 7,686 | 1.4 | 484 | 0.7 |
| Slovenia | 53,524 | 85,555 | 114,438 | 5.5 | 95,718 | 245,369 | 11.9 | 16,623 | 8.1 | 1,297 | 1.1 |
| Spain | 4,449,431 | 5,236,030 | 4,419,621 | 9.5 | 2,485,761 | 6,024,698 | 12.9 | 414,746 | 8.9 | 150,944 | 3.4 |
| Sweden | 472,329 | 646,095 | 841,165 | 8.4 | 505,332 | 1,783,179 | 17.8 | 163,005 | 16.5 | 61,294 | 7.3 |
| Hungary | 167,715 | 143,125 | 150,885 | 1.5 | 71,414 | 513,649 | 5.2 | 53,618 | 5.5 | 4,315 | 2.9 |
| **Total EU 28** | 28,608,016 | 32,295,335 | 38,599,485 | 7.5 | 21,583,107 | 57,273,932 | 11.2 | 4,282,894 | 8.4 | 994,800 | 2.6 |

*NOTE: (A)Net immigration rate per 1,000 inhabitants. (B) Naturalization rate per 100 resident foreigners. Na: not available*

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of Eurostat data (data as on 1 January)*

**ITALY. Resident foreign citizens by gender, continent and top sixteen nationalities, absolute values, percentage values and variation vs. 2016 (2017)**

| *Continental area/country* | *a.v.* | *Distribution %* | *Of which women* | *% women* | *% variation on 2016* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| European Union | 1,562,147 | 30.5 | 927,087 | 59.3 | 1.6 |
| *of which Romania* | *1,190,091* | *23.2* | *684,130* | *57.5* | *1.8* |
| *Poland* | *95,727* | *1.9* | *70,487* | *73.6* | *-1.4* |
| *Bulgaria* | *59,254* | *1.2* | *37,359* | *63.0* | *1.1* |
| Central and Eastern European countries | 1,047,614 | 21.0 | 616,347 | 58.8 | -1.2 |
| *of which Albania* | *440,465* | *8.9* | *215,362* | *48.9* | *-1.8* |
| *Ukraine* | *237,047* | *4.6* | *184,780* | *78.0* | *1.1* |
| *Moldova* | *131,814* | *2.7* | *87,505* | *66.4* | *-2.8* |
| *Macedonia* | *65,347* | *1.3* | *31,403* | *48.1* | *-3.9* |
| Other European countries | 10,496 | 0.2 | 5,961 | 56.8 | 0.4 |
| **Europe** | **2,620,257** | **51.7** | **1,549,395** | **59.1** | **0.5** |
| Northern African Countries | 654,585 | 12.9 | 278,102 | 42.5 | 0.3 |
| *of which Morocco* | *416,531* | *8.7* | *194,599* | *46.7* | *-1.0* |
| *Egypt* | *119,513* | *2.2* | *39,119* | *32.7* | *6.0* |
| *Tunisia* | *93,795* | *1.9* | *35,497* | *37.8* | *-0.3* |
| Western African Countries | 376,756 | 6.6 | 112,950 | 30.0 | 13.5 |
| *of which Senegal* | *105,937* | *1.9* | *27,400* | *25.9* | *4.7* |
| *Nigeria* | *106,069* | *1.5* | *43,419* | *40.9* | *19.8* |
| Eastern African Countries | 40,163 | 0.8 | 19,742 | 49.2 | 1.9 |
| Central-Southern African Countries | 24,585 | 0.5 | 11,722 | 47.7 | 5.1 |
| **Africa** | **1,096,089** | **20.7** | **422,516** | **38.5** | **4.7** |
| Western Asia | 47,952 | 0.9 | 25,789 | 53.8 | 8.1 |
| Central-Southern Asia | 523,777 | 10.0 | 187,910 | 35.9 | 3.9 |
| *of which India* | *151,791* | *3.0* | *62,042* | *40.9* | *0.2* |
| *Bangladesh* | *131,967* | *2.4* | *35,543* | *26.9* | *7.8* |
| *Pakistan* | *114,198* | *2.0* | *34,705* | *30.4* | *5.5* |
| *Sri Lanka* | *107,967* | *2.0* | *50,444* | *46.7* | *2.9* |
| Eastern Asia | 482,109 | 9.3 | 256,908 | 53.3 | 2.3 |
| *of which China* | *290,681* | *5.4* | *144,231* | *49.6* | *3.1* |
| *Philippines* | *167,859* | *3.3* | *95,260* | *56.8* | *0.8* |
| **Asia** | **1,053,838** | **20.2** | **470,607** | **44.7** | **3.3** |
| Western America | 17,157 | 0.3 | 9,775 | 57.0 | 2.5 |
| Central-Southern America | 354,197 | 7.0 | 218,791 | 61.8 | 0.4 |
| *of which Peru* | *97,379* | *2.0* | *56,667* | *58.2* | *-1.7* |
| *Ecuador* | *80,377* | *1.7* | *45,887* | *57.1* | *-3.3* |
| **America** | **371,354** | **7.3** | **228,566** | **61.5** | **0.5** |
| **Oceania** | **2,170** | 0.0 | **1,279** | 58.9 | 2.3 |
| **Stateless persons** | **732** | 0.0 | **355** | 48.5 | 2.4 |
| **Total** | **5,144,440** | **100.0** | **2,672,718** | **52.0** | **1.9** |

*SOURCE: Istat - ISTAT survey of movements and calculation of the resident foreign population and structure by nationality*

**ITALY. Foreign citizens holding a residence permit and persons registered on the permit of the holder, by nationality, gender, typology of permit and reason: absolute and percentage values. Classification (2017).**

| *Nationality* | *No.* | *% W* | *% Long-term resid..* | *% term permits* | REASONS PROVIDED | | | *Nationality* | *No.* | *% W* | *% Long-term resid..* | *% term permits* | REASONS PROVIDED | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | *work* | *family* | *asylum/human.* | | | | | | *work* | *family* | *asylum/human.* |
| Morocco | 443,147 | 45.8 | 73.5 | 26.5 | 37.2 | 60.4 | 1.2 | Belarus | 8,854 | 81.6 | 75.5 | 24.5 | 43.5 | 36.1 | 2.4 |
| Albania | 430,340 | 48.8 | 73.6 | 26.4 | 28.5 | 66 | 0.8 | Ethiopia | 8,583 | 60.5 | 59.7 | 40.3 | 17.5 | 29.6 | 40.8 |
| China | 309,110 | 49.8 | 56.5 | 43.5 | 60.6 | 30.3 | 0.6 | Argentina | 8,528 | 58.6 | 66.3 | 33.7 | 20.3 | 51.2 | 0.3 |
| Ukraine | 235,245 | 78.8 | 75.4 | 24.6 | 56.1 | 32.2 | 9.1 | Japan | 8,337 | 71.2 | 64.4 | 35.6 | 34.8 | 33.7 | 0 |
| Philippines | 161,609 | 57.3 | 62.9 | 37.1 | 53.6 | 41.4 | 0.1 | Venezuela | 7,736 | 67.3 | 60.2 | 39.8 | 15.9 | 50.1 | 12.7 |
| India | 157,320 | 40.3 | 59.8 | 40.2 | 43.7 | 44.3 | 0.8 | Syria | 6,755 | 40.8 | 39.5 | 60.5 | 7 | 28.8 | 58.8 |
| Egypt | 140,651 | 31.7 | 65.9 | 34.1 | 46.7 | 45.6 | 3.1 | Thailand | 6,506 | 90.3 | 80.1 | 19.9 | 26.4 | 54.6 | 0.2 |
| Bangladesh | 139,409 | 27.3 | 55.3 | 44.7 | 45.2 | 30.3 | 23.2 | Mauritius | 6,138 | 56.9 | 68.4 | 31.6 | 46.1 | 50.1 | 1.3 |
| Moldova | 127,632 | 66.8 | 78.5 | 21.5 | 53.1 | 45.3 | 0.3 | Iraq | 5,677 | 18.9 | 12 | 88 | 1.1 | 11.6 | 83.3 |
| Pakistan | 125,218 | 28.3 | 50.8 | 49.2 | 25.2 | 29.5 | 43.3 | Togo | 5,620 | 33.9 | 46.4 | 53.6 | 8.6 | 21.5 | 56.6 |
| Tunisia | 108,225 | 38 | 75.9 | 24.1 | 43.2 | 52.1 | 1.4 | Mexico | 5,302 | 65.9 | 42.7 | 57.3 | 11.1 | 18.6 | 0.2 |
| Senegal | 105,240 | 25.6 | 62.4 | 37.6 | 33.3 | 30.2 | 34.8 | Congo Rep. | 4,785 | 49.8 | 42.2 | 57.8 | 6.4 | 24.4 | 28 |
| Sri Lanka | 104,937 | 46.8 | 64.3 | 35.7 | 49.7 | 47.5 | 1.7 | Lebanon | 4,676 | 37.9 | 53.1 | 46.9 | 17 | 29.9 | 9.6 |
| Nigeria | 103,985 | 41.7 | 37.8 | 62.2 | 10.7 | 18.7 | 67.1 | Cape Verde | 4,444 | 68.3 | 75.1 | 24.9 | 48.4 | 44.9 | 0.6 |
| Peru | 91,969 | 58.8 | 69.6 | 30.4 | 49.6 | 46.9 | 0.5 | Republic of Korea | 4,116 | 61.4 | 39.7 | 60.3 | 20.1 | 23 | 0 |
| Ecuador | 77,059 | 57.5 | 76.8 | 23.2 | 45.4 | 51.5 | 0.2 | Chile | 3,275 | 59.7 | 64 | 36 | 21.5 | 46.2 | 1.9 |
| Macedonian Rep. | 69,742 | 47.4 | 80.6 | 19.4 | 27.1 | 69.6 | 1.1 | Serbia-Mont. Kosovo pop. | 2,979 | 44.5 | 97 | 3 | 4.5 | 38.2 | 57.3 |
| Ghana | 51,523 | 35.4 | 59.5 | 40.5 | 23.9 | 28 | 44.7 | Indonesia | 2,974 | 79.2 | 35.5 | 64.5 | 5.9 | 9.1 | 0.1 |
| Kosovo | 47,149 | 43.9 | 71.6 | 28.4 | 23.9 | 63.1 | 9.3 | Congo | 2,893 | 47.4 | 57.9 | 42.1 | 10.8 | 25.5 | 40.8 |
| Brazil | 43,229 | 73.6 | 68.1 | 31.9 | 25.6 | 48.5 | 1 | Benin | 2,717 | 37.5 | 61.4 | 38.6 | 13.9 | 25.4 | 39 |
| Russia | 40,030 | 81.6 | 70.3 | 29.7 | 33.9 | 40.5 | 1.8 | Sudan | 2,687 | 18.2 | 22.6 | 77.4 | 1.2 | 13.2 | 80.5 |
| United States of America | 37,285 | 61 | 22.4 | 77.6 | 6.7 | 45.3 | 0 | Kenya | 2,591 | 62.4 | 55.6 | 44.4 | 20.1 | 25.5 | 9.7 |
| Serbia | 34,318 | 50.5 | 77.3 | 22.7 | 28.3 | 54.4 | 9.1 | Canada | 2,351 | 62.1 | 47.1 | 52.9 | 12.2 | 29.6 | 0.1 |
| Ivory Coast | 31,369 | 34 | 47 | 53 | 10 | 16.7 | 69.6 | Jordan | 2,331 | 40 | 71.6 | 28.4 | 18.9 | 48.9 | 3.9 |
| Dominican Rep. | 28,355 | 63.5 | 72.1 | 27.9 | 35 | 62.4 | 0.2 | Libya | 2,217 | 34.2 | 28.1 | 71.9 | 10 | 37.6 | 43.7 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 25,082 | 45.2 | 77.5 | 22.5 | 28.4 | 59.1 | 6.9 | Israel | 2,109 | 45.1 | 45.4 | 54.6 | 13 | 20.5 | 1.2 |
| Algeria | 23,931 | 37.2 | 80.8 | 19.2 | 38.9 | 54 | 3.1 | Guinea-Bissau | 2,022 | 8.8 | 13 | 87 | 3.4 | 3 | 91.5 |
| Cuba | 23,573 | 74.2 | 77 | 23 | 20.9 | 73.1 | 3.5 | Sierra Leone | 2,020 | 26.3 | 28 | 72 | 3.6 | 11.3 | 81.3 |
| Turkey | 21,940 | 43.2 | 56.5 | 43.5 | 21.6 | 39.2 | 20.3 | Honduras | 1,976 | 70.6 | 41.8 | 58.2 | 40.7 | 42.6 | 8.6 |

*continue*

**ITALY. Foreign citizens holding a residence permit and persons registered on the permit of the holder, by nationality, gender, typology of permit and reason: absolute and percentage values. Classification (2017).**

| *Nationality* | *No.* | *% W* | *% Long-term resid..* | *% term permits* | REASONS PROVIDED | | | *Nationality* | *No.* | *% W* | *% long-term resid.* | *% term permits* | REASONS PROVIDED | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | *work* | *family* | *asylum/human.* | | | | | | *work* | *family* | *asylum/human.* |
| Mali | 20,467 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 94.6 | 1 | 1.9 | 95.1 | Kazakhstan | 1,958 | 82.3 | 67.3 | 32.7 | 27.3 | 38.1 | 2.2 |
| Gambia | 19,326 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 97.2 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 93.4 | Montenegro | 1,875 | 52.3 | 58.8 | 41.2 | 17.2 | 46.1 | 7.4 |
| Colombia | 18,544 | 62.4 | 68.2 | 31.8 | 23.7 | 41.2 | 7.9 | Australia | 1,828 | 63.5 | 47.6 | 52.4 | 12.9 | 33.5 | 0 |
| Afghanistan | 16,487 | 5.5 | 12.1 | 87.9 | 0.7 | 4.8 | 93.9 | Nepal | 1,789 | 40.1 | 50.3 | 49.7 | 37 | 41.6 | 14.2 |
| Cameroon | 15,161 | 47.1 | 52.3 | 47.7 | 15.9 | 23.2 | 34.3 | Paraguay | 1,677 | 71.4 | 57.7 | 42.3 | 45.1 | 33.9 | 0.8 |
| Burkina F. | 14,753 | 33.5 | 66.8 | 33.2 | 29.2 | 26.6 | 39.2 | Vietnam | 1,655 | 65.6 | 34.6 | 65.4 | 8.7 | 13.3 | 5.8 |
| Georgia | 14,065 | 82.1 | 47.3 | 52.7 | 62.5 | 27.7 | 6.8 | Niger | 1,471 | 22.8 | 24.9 | 75.1 | 4.7 | 10.9 | 75.7 |
| Serbia-Mont. | 13,853 | 48.2 | 90 | 10 | 36.9 | 45.8 | 5.7 | Palestine | 1,438 | 28.2 | 23.8 | 76.2 | 4.7 | 16.9 | 66.8 |
| El Salvador | 13,375 | 60.6 | 42.6 | 57.4 | 38.6 | 37.7 | 19.7 | Madagascar | 1,429 | 69.3 | 44.2 | 55.8 | 12.4 | 13.5 | 2.3 |
| Bolivia | 12,465 | 62.3 | 63 | 37 | 52.7 | 42.4 | 0.3 | Liberia | 1,327 | 15.6 | 25.5 | 74.5 | 4.8 | 8.3 | 85.1 |
| Iran | 12,178 | 48.4 | 37.1 | 62.9 | 18.4 | 17.9 | 19.7 | Angola | 1,321 | 48.2 | 54.8 | 45.2 | 10.4 | 21.3 | 12.4 |
| Guinea | 12,125 | 13.9 | 20.5 | 79.5 | 2.8 | 7.2 | 84.9 | Uzbekistan | 1,321 | 74.9 | 78.8 | 21.2 | 18.9 | 43.9 | 5.7 |
| Somalia | 11,913 | 30.4 | 16.6 | 83.4 | 2 | 6.5 | 90.8 | Kyrgyzstan | 1,316 | 80.1 | 51.9 | 48.1 | 49 | 37.6 | 6.8 |
| Eritrea | 11,179 | 43.9 | 36.9 | 63.1 | 3.1 | 10.4 | 83.1 | Uruguay | 1,220 | 62.3 | 68.7 | 31.3 | 19.1 | 69.6 | 1 |
| Tanzania | 1,168 | 51.5 | 42.2 | 57.8 | 9.3 | 13.8 | 3.9 | Djibouti | 32 | 43.8 | 31.3 | 68.8 | 31.8 | 22.7 | 0 |
| Armenia | 1,154 | 64.5 | 43.2 | 56.8 | 12.5 | 30.8 | 41.5 | Oman | 32 | 18.8 | 9.4 | 90.6 | 62.1 | 10.3 | 6.9 |
| Mauritania | 1,037 | 26.4 | 48.2 | 51.8 | 6 | 11.7 | 79.9 | São Tome and Principe | 31 | 54.8 | 80.6 | 19.4 | 0 | 50 | 0 |
| Taiwan | 982 | 71 | 44.5 | 55.5 | 26.6 | 23.9 | 0 | Qatar | 26 | 19.2 | 7.7 | 92.3 | 0 | 8.3 | 0 |
| Guatemala | 855 | 68.4 | 47.3 | 52.7 | 23.3 | 21.5 | 2.4 | Fiji | 25 | 68 | 36 | 64 | 12.5 | 37.5 | 0 |
| Azerbaijan | 820 | 45.2 | 23.3 | 76.7 | 6.8 | 11.3 | 11.9 | Swaziland | 24 | 62.5 | 4.2 | 95.8 | 0 | 4.3 | 39.1 |
| South Africa | 702 | 59.3 | 55.1 | 44.9 | 19.4 | 36.2 | 1.6 | Papua New Guinea | 24 | 62.5 | 12.5 | 87.5 | 0 | 14.3 | 0 |
| Dominica | 700 | 68.9 | 78.7 | 21.3 | 14.1 | 80.5 | 0 | Turkey, Kurdish population | 22 | 13.6 | 63.6 | 36.4 | 0 | 12.5 | 37.5 |
| Nicaragua | 660 | 67.1 | 55.2 | 44.8 | 36.5 | 32.8 | 3 | Barbados | 22 | 63.6 | 50 | 50 | 27.3 | 27.3 | 9.1 |
| Uganda | 619 | 51.2 | 38.3 | 61.7 | 10.7 | 11.8 | 19.6 | Bahamas | 21 | 42.9 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 0 | 14.3 | 28.6 |
| Burundi | 553 | 57.7 | 37.1 | 62.9 | 8.3 | 11.5 | 9.8 | Lesotho | 20 | 30 | 15 | 85 | 5.9 | 11.8 | 0 |
| Rwanda | 549 | 51 | 30.1 | 69.9 | 5.7 | 10.4 | 12.2 | United Arab Emirates | 20 | 40 | 30 | 70 | 7.1 | 14.3 | 7.1 |
| Costa Rica | 523 | 67.3 | 56 | 44 | 19.1 | 32.6 | 0.9 | Botswana | 19 | 52.6 | 21.1 | 78.9 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 20 |
| Malaysia | 468 | 59.8 | 49.1 | 50.9 | 31.5 | 34.9 | 0.4 | Maldives | 19 | 15.8 | 68.4 | 31.6 | 16.7 | 50 | 16.7 |
| Seychelles | 453 | 72.2 | 81.5 | 18.5 | 38.1 | 60.7 | 0 | Bahrain | 17 | 29.4 | 35.3 | 64.7 | 9.1 | 27.3 | 18.2 |

*continue*

**ITALY. Foreign citizens holding a residence permit and persons registered on the permit of the holder, by nationality, gender, typology of permit and reason: absolute and percentage values. Classification (2017).**

| *Nationality* | *No.* | *% W* | *% Long-term resid..* | *% term permits* | REASONS PROVIDED *work* | *family* | *asylum/human.* | *Nationality* | *No.* | *% W* | *% Long-term resid..* | *% term permits* | REASONS PROVIDED *work* | *family* | *asylum/human.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chad | 444 | 21.8 | 19.6 | 80.4 | 1.4 | 9.5 | 78.2 | Bhutan | 17 | 41.2 | 35.3 | 64.7 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 27.3 |
| New Zealand | 387 | 54 | 49.4 | 50.6 | 16.3 | 31.6 | 0.5 | Guyana | 16 | 93.8 | 50 | 50 | 0 | 75 | 0 |
| Panama | 372 | 69.9 | 58.3 | 41.7 | 19.4 | 42.6 | 0.6 | Grenada | 14 | 50 | 42.9 | 57.1 | 12.5 | 62.5 | 0 |
| Mozambique | 360 | 60.8 | 53.1 | 46.9 | 8.9 | 31.4 | 0.6 | Belize | 13 | 15.4 | 61.5 | 38.5 | 0 | 60 | 0 |
| Haiti | 351 | 53.6 | 50.7 | 49.3 | 11.6 | 27.2 | 5.8 | Marshall Islands | 12 | 50 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 0 | 85.7 | 0 |
| Myanmar | 303 | 65.3 | 25.7 | 74.3 | 8 | 7.1 | 15.1 | Tonga | 12 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 41.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Gabon | 270 | 51.9 | 34.1 | 65.9 | 7.3 | 19.1 | 16.9 | Antigua and Barbuda | 11 | 54.5 | 63.6 | 36.4 | 50 | 25 | 0 |
| Yemen | 267 | 37.5 | 37.8 | 62.2 | 9 | 27.7 | 45.2 | Saint Lucia | 11 | 72.7 | 63.6 | 36.4 | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| Saudi Arabia | 244 | 31.6 | 17.2 | 82.8 | 8.9 | 31.7 | 3 | Suriname | 11 | 81.8 | 63.6 | 36.4 | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| Zambia | 241 | 50.6 | 39.4 | 60.6 | 8.2 | 13 | 0.7 | Comoros | 10 | 30 | 40 | 60 | 0 | 33.3 | 33.3 |
| Mongolia | 229 | 69.9 | 36.7 | 63.3 | 9.7 | 25.5 | 5.5 | Iraq, Kurdish population | 10 | 30 | 100 | - | - | - | - |
| Singapore | 229 | 76 | 61.6 | 38.4 | 11.4 | 26.1 | 0 | Saint Kitts and Nevis | 6 | 50 | 16.7 | 83.3 | 20 | 40 | 20 |
| Zimbabwe | 204 | 54.4 | 31.9 | 68.1 | 14.4 | 18.7 | 12.9 | Tuvalu | 6 | 83.3 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 50 | 50 | 0 |
| Central African Rep. | 202 | 33.7 | 25.2 | 74.8 | 2.6 | 12.6 | 58.3 | Palau | 5 | 40 | 20 | 80 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Cambodia | 184 | 73.9 | 66.3 | 33.7 | 19.4 | 37.1 | 22.6 | Brunei | 4 | 50 | 75 | 25 | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| Jamaica | 161 | 57.8 | 63.4 | 36.6 | 15.3 | 57.6 | 3.4 | Solomon Islands | 4 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kuwait | 101 | 13.9 | 11.9 | 88.1 | 13.5 | 6.7 | 2.2 | Kiribati | 3 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 98 | 54.1 | 57.1 | 42.9 | 7.1 | 40.5 | 9.5 | Vanuatu | 3 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Malawi | 84 | 42.9 | 36.9 | 63.1 | 7.5 | 11.3 | 11.3 | Micronesia | 2 | - | 50 | 50 | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| East Timor | 80 | 86.3 | 1.3 | 98.8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Iran, Kurdish population | 1 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - |
| Turkmenistan | 73 | 78.1 | 61.6 | 38.4 | 14.3 | 35.7 | 0 | Nauru | 1 | - | 100 | - | - | - | - |
| Laos | 68 | 76.5 | 69.1 | 30.9 | 4.8 | 28.6 | 47.6 | ***Europe*** | ***1,059,061*** | ***58.7*** | ***75*** | ***25*** | ***36.9*** | ***53.5*** | ***4.2*** |
| South Sudan | 65 | 30.8 | 20 | 80 | 7.7 | 13.5 | 30.8 | ***Africa*** | ***1,172,479*** | ***38.2*** | ***62.1*** | ***37.9*** | ***25.5*** | ***34.6*** | ***35.5*** |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 58 | 74.1 | 63.8 | 36.2 | 4.8 | 61.9 | 0 | ***Asia*** | ***1,098,735*** | ***44.1*** | ***56.5*** | ***43.5*** | ***44.8*** | ***33.5*** | ***14*** |
| Tajikistan | 56 | 51.8 | 46.4 | 53.6 | 16.7 | 26.7 | 33.3 | ***America*** | ***381,724*** | ***62.6*** | ***64.6*** | ***35.4*** | ***30.4*** | ***47.5*** | ***2.3*** |
| Samoa | 50 | 54 | 8 | 92 | 8.7 | 13 | 0 | ***Oceania*** | ***2,362*** | ***61.5*** | ***46.6*** | ***53.4*** | ***13*** | ***32.3*** | ***0.2*** |
| DPR Korea | 40 | 30 | 30 | 70 | 10.7 | 0 | 0 | Stateless person | 573 | 44.9 | 18.7 | 81.3 | 4.9 | 31.3 | 10.9 |
| Namibia | 34 | 64.7 | 50 | 50 | 5.9 | 35.3 | 17.6 | **Total** | **3,714,934** | **48.3** | **64.3** | **35.7** | **35.2** | **39.3** | **18.1** |

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the Ministry of the Interior*

**ITALY. Foreign students enrolled in Italian schools, by nationality, gender and level of schooling (acad. y. 2016/2017)**

| *Nationality* | *Total* | *of which F (%)* | *Preschool* | *Primary* | *Junior second* | *Senior second* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 398 | 47.7 | 78 | 114 | 67 | 139 |
| Belgium | 530 | 48.5 | 96 | 145 | 98 | 191 |
| Denmark | 124 | 55.6 | 25 | 39 | 20 | 40 |
| Finland | 105 | 55.2 | 16 | 28 | 14 | 47 |
| France | 1,726 | 49.3 | 360 | 578 | 328 | 460 |
| Germany | 2,831 | 49.0 | 323 | 642 | 641 | 1,225 |
| Greece | 751 | 48.5 | 94 | 246 | 159 | 252 |
| Ireland | 199 | 51.3 | 32 | 73 | 41 | 53 |
| Luxembourg | 32 | 62.5 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 11 |
| The Netherlands | 505 | 49.1 | 82 | 151 | 131 | 141 |
| Portugal | 498 | 48.2 | 77 | 157 | 112 | 152 |
| United Kingdom | 1,492 | 48.5 | 239 | 500 | 311 | 442 |
| Spain | 1,926 | 50.9 | 342 | 798 | 385 | 401 |
| Sweden | 160 | 49.4 | 32 | 50 | 29 | 49 |
| **EU - 15** | **11,277** | **49.4** | **1,800** | **3,526** | **2,348** | **3,603** |
| Bulgaria | 5,559 | 48.6 | 876 | 1,991 | 1,282 | 1,410 |
| Cyprus | 12 | 33.3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 |
| Croatia | 2,111 | 47.7 | 313 | 744 | 503 | 551 |
| Estonia | 135 | 50.4 | 17 | 46 | 26 | 46 |
| Latvia | 355 | 44.2 | 27 | 118 | 88 | 122 |
| Lithuania | 689 | 48.9 | 63 | 200 | 151 | 275 |
| Malta | 43 | 32.6 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 18 |
| Poland | 8,836 | 49.5 | 1,069 | 2,739 | 1,797 | 3,231 |
| Czech Rep. | 408 | 48.3 | 72 | 144 | 82 | 110 |
| Romania | 158,428 | 49.1 | 32,319 | 58,189 | 31,754 | 36,166 |
| Slovakia | 632 | 46.0 | 168 | 203 | 133 | 128 |
| Slovenia | 400 | 45.0 | 74 | 139 | 93 | 94 |
| Hungary | 892 | 47.8 | 160 | 308 | 180 | 244 |
| **EU - new 13** | **178,500** | **49.0** | **35,166** | **64,834** | **36,100** | **42,400** |
| Albania | 112,171 | 47.6 | 23,641 | 40,217 | 22,549 | 25,764 |
| Belarus | 1,305 | 48.7 | 136 | 309 | 202 | 658 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 5,682 | 48.0 | 785 | 2,337 | 1,463 | 1,097 |
| Kosovo | 9,863 | 46.8 | 1,947 | 3,960 | 1,965 | 1,991 |
| Moldova | 25,308 | 51.0 | 4,552 | 7,974 | 4,929 | 7,853 |
| Montenegro | 486 | 48.7 | 73 | 173 | 132 | 107 |
| Macedonian Rep. | 15,193 | 47.4 | 2,779 | 5,851 | 3,504 | 3,059 |
| Russia | 4,350 | 47.6 | 586 | 1,356 | 916 | 1,492 |
| Serbia | 7,201 | 49.0 | 1,197 | 2,638 | 1,799 | 1,568 |
| Turkey | 3,650 | 48.4 | 785 | 1,464 | 665 | 736 |
| Ukraine | 19,956 | 48.8 | 3,004 | 6,312 | 4,028 | 6,612 |
| **Central-Eastern Europe** | **205,165** | **48.1** | **39,485** | **72,591** | **42,152** | **50,937** |
| Andorra | 113 | 41.6 | 39 | 34 | 21 | 19 |
| Vatican City | 514 | 50.8 | 37 | 246 | 121 | 110 |
| Iceland | 21 | 47.6 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 10 |

*continue*

*continued*

**ITALY. Foreign students enrolled in Italian schools, by nationality, gender and level of schooling (acad. y. 2016/2017)**

| *Nationality* | *Total* | *of which F (%)* | *Preschool* | *Primary* | *Junior second* | *Senior second* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liechtenstein | 48 | 35.4 | 3 | 23 | 11 | 11 |
| Princip. of Monaco | 30 | 50.0 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 10 |
| Norway | 68 | 50.0 | 14 | 23 | 11 | 20 |
| San Marino | 901 | 47.1 | 25 | 45 | 32 | 799 |
| Switzerland | 1,193 | 47.8 | 161 | 286 | 216 | 530 |
| **Other European countries** | **2,888** | **47.7** | **286** | **672** | **421** | **1,509** |
| ***Europe*** | ***397,830*** | ***48.6*** | ***76737*** | ***141623*** | ***81021*** | ***98,449*** |
| Algeria | 4,758 | 47.7 | 1,118 | 2,059 | 928 | 653 |
| Egypt | 19,925 | 42.2 | 4,443 | 7,929 | 4,008 | 3,545 |
| Libya | 537 | 44.9 | 135 | 224 | 94 | 84 |
| Morocco | 102,121 | 47.9 | 23,815 | 41,387 | 18,820 | 18,099 |
| Sudan | 234 | 45.7 | 64 | 82 | 47 | 41 |
| Tunisia | 18,613 | 46.4 | 3,781 | 6,941 | 4,009 | 3,882 |
| **Northern African Countries** | **146,188** | **46.9** | **33,356** | **58,622** | **27,906** | **26,304** |
| Benin | 507 | 45.8 | 101 | 192 | 97 | 117 |
| Burkina Faso | 3,093 | 47.9 | 713 | 1,180 | 597 | 603 |
| Cape Verde | 539 | 51.9 | 52 | 180 | 140 | 167 |
| Ivory Coast | 4,916 | 47.8 | 919 | 1,601 | 959 | 1,437 |
| Gambia | 627 | 15.3 | 37 | 86 | 152 | 352 |
| Ghana | 9,177 | 48.8 | 2,023 | 3,498 | 1,609 | 2,047 |
| Guinea | 903 | 39.5 | 144 | 277 | 220 | 262 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 127 | 49.6 | 22 | 42 | 27 | 36 |
| Liberia | 128 | 44.5 | 30 | 47 | 16 | 35 |
| Mali | 466 | 28.5 | 72 | 113 | 83 | 198 |
| Mauritania | 181 | 50.3 | 25 | 70 | 40 | 46 |
| Niger | 387 | 47.3 | 124 | 166 | 53 | 44 |
| Nigeria | 14,853 | 48.4 | 4,417 | 6,314 | 2,248 | 1,874 |
| Senegal | 14,620 | 45.1 | 3,063 | 5,623 | 2,928 | 3,006 |
| Sierra Leone | 199 | 48.7 | 40 | 89 | 40 | 30 |
| Togo | 883 | 45.9 | 205 | 309 | 140 | 229 |
| **Western African Countries** | **51,606** | **46.7** | **11,987** | **19,787** | **9,349** | **10,483** |
| Burundi | 133 | 46.6 | 26 | 59 | 23 | 25 |
| Comoros | 5 | 20.0 | - | - | 3 | 2 |
| Eritrea | 768 | 46.9 | 160 | 292 | 154 | 162 |
| Ethiopia | 1,208 | 44.1 | 255 | 423 | 278 | 252 |
| Djibouti | 4 | 50.0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kenya | 318 | 56.9 | 52 | 132 | 58 | 76 |
| Madagascar | 135 | 54.1 | 21 | 44 | 15 | 55 |
| Malawi | 9 | 44.4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | - |
| Mauritius | 1,225 | 48.9 | 134 | 336 | 327 | 428 |
| Mozambique | 41 | 58.5 | 2 | 8 | 10 | 21 |
| Rwanda | 61 | 41.0 | 12 | 17 | 15 | 17 |
| Seychelles | 50 | 40.0 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 22 |
| Somalia | 365 | 43.8 | 63 | 100 | 94 | 108 |

*continue*

*continued*

**ITALY. Foreign students enrolled in Italian schools, by nationality, gender and level of schooling (acad. y. 2016/2017)**

| *Nationality* | *Total* | *of which F (%)* | *Preschool* | *Primary* | *Junior second* | *Senior second* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tanzania | 107 | 52.3 | 16 | 40 | 21 | 30 |
| Uganda | 48 | 52.1 | 13 | 17 | 8 | 10 |
| Zambia | 15 | 80.0 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 5 |
| Zimbabwe | 55 | 50.9 | 5 | 29 | 13 | 8 |
| **Eastern African Countries** | **4,547** | **47.6** | **769** | **1,524** | **1,032** | **1,222** |
| Angola | 357 | 50.4 | 54 | 84 | 84 | 135 |
| Botswana | 7 | 57.1 | - | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Cameroon | 2,183 | 48.6 | 517 | 795 | 370 | 501 |
| Chad | 54 | 50.0 | 7 | 20 | 11 | 16 |
| Congo | 897 | 49.5 | 118 | 331 | 210 | 238 |
| Gabon | 37 | 54.1 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 14 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 37 | 67.6 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 10 |
| Lesotho | 9 | 22.2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Namibia | 12 | 41.7 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Central African Rep. | 41 | 48.8 | 5 | 14 | 11 | 11 |
| Dem. Rep. of the Congo (former Zaire) | 555 | 51.2 | 91 | 221 | 112 | 131 |
| São Tome and Principe | 6 | 66.7 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| South Africa | 120 | 45.0 | 15 | 29 | 29 | 47 |
| Swaziland | 3 | - | - | - | 3 | - |
| **Central-Southern African Countries** | **4,318** | **49.4** | **828** | **1,521** | **857** | **1,112** |
| ***Africa*** | ***206,659*** | ***46.9*** | ***46,940*** | ***81,454*** | ***39,144*** | ***39,121*** |
| Saudi Arabia | 35 | 42.9 | 7 | 9 | 2 | 17 |
| Armenia | 166 | 38.0 | 32 | 54 | 29 | 51 |
| Azerbaijan | 57 | 49.1 | 10 | 24 | 10 | 13 |
| Bahrain | 6 | 33.3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| United Arab Emirates | 31 | 45.2 | 7 | 10 | 3 | 11 |
| Georgia | 878 | 45.6 | 211 | 265 | 179 | 223 |
| Jordan | 460 | 49.8 | 84 | 164 | 104 | 108 |
| Iran | 606 | 44.1 | 78 | 193 | 133 | 202 |
| Iraq | 463 | 40.2 | 75 | 146 | 92 | 150 |
| Israel | 236 | 46.6 | 38 | 87 | 52 | 59 |
| Kuwait | 11 | 63.6 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Lebanon | 466 | 44.6 | 107 | 162 | 94 | 103 |
| Oman | 15 | 26.7 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Qatar | 6 | 83.3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Syria | 1,210 | 46.0 | 257 | 517 | 250 | 186 |
| Palestine | 86 | 43.0 | 24 | 28 | 18 | 16 |
| Yemen | 63 | 49.2 | 12 | 20 | 15 | 16 |
| ***Western Asia*** | ***4,795*** | ***45.1*** | ***952*** | ***1,693*** | ***987*** | ***1,163*** |
| Afghanistan | 1,556 | 44.3 | 440 | 539 | 304 | 273 |
| Bangladesh | 14,786 | 45.9 | 3,920 | 6,543 | 2,426 | 1,897 |
| Bhutan | 2 | 50.0 | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| India | 25,851 | 44.4 | 5,700 | 10,624 | 4,548 | 4,979 |
| Kazakhstan | 196 | 48.5 | 17 | 61 | 49 | 69 |

*continue*

**ITALY. Foreign students enrolled in Italian schools, by nationality, gender and level of schooling (acad. y. 2016/2017)**

| *Nationality* | *Total* | *of which F (%)* | *Preschool* | *Primary* | *Junior second* | *Senior second* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kyrgyzstan | 147 | 52.4 | 17 | 44 | 29 | 57 |
| Maldives | 20 | 65.0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 13 |
| Nepal | 224 | 44.2 | 35 | 53 | 49 | 87 |
| Pakistan | 19,934 | 45.2 | 3,740 | 8,375 | 4,160 | 3,659 |
| Sri Lanka | 9,602 | 49.6 | 2,279 | 3,410 | 1,913 | 2,000 |
| Tajikistan | 6 | 33.3 | 4 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Turkmenistan | 10 | 60.0 | 4 | 1 | - | 5 |
| Uzbekistan | 105 | 54.3 | 14 | 27 | 11 | 53 |
| ***Central-Southern Asia*** | ***72,439*** | ***45.7*** | ***16,172*** | ***29,678*** | ***13,496*** | ***13,093*** |
| Brunei | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Cambodia | 140 | 36.4 | 7 | 51 | 48 | 34 |
| China | 49,514 | 47.7 | 9,330 | 18,900 | 12,143 | 9,141 |
| DPR Korea | 74 | 36.5 | 12 | 8 | 12 | 42 |
| Republic of Korea | 286 | 44.8 | 65 | 85 | 36 | 100 |
| Philippines | 26,962 | 48.6 | 4,051 | 8,608 | 6,416 | 7,887 |
| Japan | 392 | 53.3 | 103 | 112 | 65 | 112 |
| Indonesia | 179 | 58.1 | 22 | 50 | 23 | 84 |
| Laos | 8 | 100.0 | 3 | 4 | - | 1 |
| Malaysia | 32 | 40.6 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| Mongolia | 25 | 48.0 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 10 |
| Myanmar | 11 | 63.6 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Singapore | 12 | 66.7 | 2 | 7 | - | 3 |
| Taiwan | 588 | 51.0 | 107 | 249 | 164 | 68 |
| Thailand | 683 | 59.7 | 43 | 196 | 185 | 259 |
| East Timor | 4 | 25.0 | - | - | 2 | 2 |
| Vietnam | 377 | 53.3 | 71 | 193 | 48 | 65 |
| ***Eastern Asia*** | ***79,288*** | ***48.2*** | ***13,830*** | ***28,478*** | ***19,157*** | ***17,823*** |
| **Asia** | **156,522** | **46.9** | **30,954** | **59,849** | **33,640** | **32,079** |
| Canada | 183 | 53.0 | 41 | 47 | 24 | 71 |
| United States of America | 2,542 | 51.3 | 739 | 860 | 397 | 546 |
| ***Western America*** | ***2,725*** | ***51.4*** | ***780*** | ***907*** | ***421*** | ***617*** |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 7 | 57.1 | 2 | 2 | - | 3 |
| Argentina | 1,414 | 48.9 | 151 | 267 | 253 | 743 |
| Bahamas | 4 | 50.0 | - | 3 | - | 1 |
| Barbados | 1 | 100.0 | 1 | - | - | - |
| Belize | 4 | 25.0 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |
| Bolivia | 2,629 | 50.4 | 452 | 755 | 524 | 898 |
| Brazil | 6,625 | 51.2 | 624 | 1,617 | 1,670 | 2,714 |
| Chile | 634 | 52.5 | 54 | 232 | 144 | 204 |
| Colombia | 3,267 | 49.1 | 368 | 938 | 787 | 1,174 |
| Costa Rica | 142 | 47.9 | 13 | 40 | 32 | 57 |
| Cuba | 1,502 | 53.3 | 167 | 340 | 367 | 628 |
| Dominica | 802 | 53.9 | 185 | 177 | 165 | 275 |
| Ecuador | 16,153 | 49.0 | 2,760 | 5,038 | 3,105 | 5,250 |

*continue*

**ITALY. Foreign students enrolled in Italian schools, by nationality, gender and level of schooling (acad. y. 2016/2017)**

| *Nationality* | *Total* | *of which F (%)* | *Preschool* | *Primary* | *Junior second* | *Senior second* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| El Salvador | 3,280 | 49.1 | 513 | 1,095 | 823 | 849 |
| Jamaica | 21 | 38.1 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 6 |
| Grenada | 5 | 80 | - | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Guatemala | 120 | 54.2 | 17 | 27 | 26 | 50 |
| Guyana | 16 | 68.8 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 |
| Haiti | 46 | 47.8 | 7 | 11 | 5 | 23 |
| Honduras | 440 | 53.2 | 61 | 131 | 100 | 148 |
| Mexico | 435 | 56.8 | 47 | 115 | 73 | 200 |
| Nicaragua | 97 | 43.3 | 9 | 24 | 29 | 35 |
| Panama | 43 | 44.2 | 3 | 15 | 10 | 15 |
| Paraguay | 251 | 50.2 | 25 | 63 | 61 | 102 |
| Peru | 18,018 | 49.2 | 3,032 | 5,440 | 3,506 | 6,040 |
| Dominican Rep. | 4,160 | 50.6 | 568 | 1,262 | 1,073 | 1,257 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 10 | 30 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Saint Lucia | 5 | 60 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Saint Vincent and Grenadine | 3 | 33.3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| Suriname | 8 | 37.5 | 2 | 4 | - | 2 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 6 | 50 | 2 | - | 1 | 3 |
| Uruguay | 199 | 52.3 | 30 | 31 | 47 | 91 |
| Venezuela | 1,356 | 48.9 | 190 | 389 | 299 | 478 |
| ***Central-Southern America*** | ***61,703*** | ***49.8*** | ***9,297*** | ***18,034*** | ***13,112*** | ***21,260*** |
| **America** | **64,428** | **49.8** | **10,077** | **18,941** | **13,533** | **21,877** |
| Australia | 219 | 56.2 | 30 | 52 | 37 | 100 |
| Fiji | 5 | 40 | - | 4 | - | 1 |
| Kiribati | 3 | 66.7 | - | 2 | - | 1 |
| Marshall Islands | 3 | 66.7 | 3 | - | - | - |
| Micronesia | 1 | - | - | 1 | - | - |
| Nauru | 2 | 100 | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| New Zealand | 32 | 43.8 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 15 |
| Palau | 2 | 50 | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| Papua New Guinea | 7 | 42.9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Solomon Islands | 4 | 50 | - | 2 | - | 2 |
| Tonga | 3 | 33.3 | 2 | - | - | 1 |
| Vanuatu | 2 | - | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| ***Oceania*** | ***283*** | ***53.7*** | ***41*** | ***75*** | ***40*** | ***127*** |
| Stateless person | 369 | 49.3 | 71 | 180 | 108 | 10 |
| **Total** | **826,091** | **47.9** | **164,820** | **302,122** | **167,486** | **191,663** |

*SOURCE: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS. Processing of data of the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research, Ufficio studi e programmazione*

**ITALY. Characteristics of jobs held by certain foreign nationalities: % breakdowns (2017)**

| *Features* | NATIONALITY | | | | | | | | | | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Romania* | *Albania* | *Ukraine* | *Morocco* | *Philippines* | *Moldova* | *Peru* | *China* | *India* | *Macedonia* | |
| **Post** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Employees | 92.4 | 82.9 | 96.6 | 74.5 | 98.1 | 96.0 | 93.5 | 50.9 | 90.9 | 92.3 | 86.9 |
| *Permanent* | *74.5* | *60.2* | *83.5* | *55.2* | *88.1* | *82.5* | *79.2* | *45.8* | *62.2* | *64.4* | *70.0* |
| *Temporary* | *17.9* | *22.7* | *13.0* | *19.3* | *10.0* | *13.5* | *14.3* | *5.1* | *28.7* | *27.9* | *16.9* |
| Self-employed | 7.6 | 17.1 | 3.4 | 25.5 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 6.5 | 49.1 | 9.1 | 7.7 | 13.1 |
| **Working times** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Full time | 73.5 | 75.9 | 66.6 | 75.5 | 61.5 | 68.4 | 61.7 | 79.3 | 83.7 | 79.1 | 72.9 |
| Part time | 26.5 | 24.1 | 33.4 | 24.5 | 38.5 | 31.6 | 38.3 | 20.7 | 16.3 | 20.9 | 27.1 |
| **Area of activity** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture | 7.2 | 9.2 | 2.6 | 8.8 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 30.8 | 9.6 | 6.1 |
| Industry | 30.8 | 47.5 | 10.8 | 29.8 | 7.1 | 17.9 | 16.5 | 20.5 | 28.1 | 48.1 | 26.5 |
| *Specifically industrial* | *16.3* | *18.3* | *6.6* | *20.0* | *6.7* | *11.5* | *13.3* | *20.0* | *25.1* | *28.5* | *16.8* |
| *Construction* | *14.5* | *29.2* | *4.2* | *9.8* | *0.4* | *6.4* | *3.2* | *0.5* | *3.0* | *19.6* | *9.7* |
| Services | 62.0 | 43.4 | 86.6 | 61.5 | 92.1 | 80.9 | 83.4 | 78.9 | 41.0 | 42.2 | 67.4 |
| *of which:* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Commerce* | *5.8* | *4.4* | *6.7* | *24.9* | *4.6* | *9.0* | *5.7* | *35.6* | *9.4* | *4.7* | *10.6* |
| *Hotels and catering* | *8.1* | *11.1* | *7.8* | *7.8* | *13.0* | *11.5* | *4.3* | *31.9* | *8.9* | *14.9* | *11.1* |
| *Services for families* | *25.7* | *8.7* | *52.6* | *8.5* | *54.7* | *38.0* | *33.5* | *0.4* | *9.2* | *3.3* | *22.2* |
| **Professions** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Qualified (directors, entrepreneurs, technical experts) | 3.9 | 5.0 | 2.6 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 5.3 | 8.2 | 6.7 | 3.8 | 2.9 | 7.2 |
| Office workers, sales staff, service providers | 30.0 | 18.1 | 50.4 | 17.5 | 24.5 | 43.3 | 35.2 | 67.1 | 18.0 | 15.7 | 30.0 |
| Labourers, artisans | 35.2 | 50.0 | 14.5 | 28.3 | 5.7 | 21.8 | 16.1 | 18.1 | 33.1 | 56.9 | 28.4 |
| Unqualified (manual, house cleaners etc.) | 30.9 | 26.9 | 32.3 | 50.9 | 68.3 | 29.6 | 40.6 | 8.1 | 45.1 | 24.5 | 34.4 |

*SOURCE: ISTAT Labour force survey*