中国家庭变迁和国际视野下的家庭公共政策研究

Family Changes in China and Comparative Research of Family Policies

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前言

家庭结构正处于一个持续变化的过程之中，并受到多方面因素的影响——教育水平、经济发展、技术进步以及社会价值观，文化传统与宗教信仰也对角色模式和家庭结构产生着影响。亚洲和西方世界的社会变迁有着迥异的起始状况，但是我们可以观察到，在这两个地区文化与宗教价值的影响力正在衰微。西方社会在过去一百五十年里伴随着工业化而经历过的变化——这种变化要归因于现代化——在亚洲各国是在近三十年的短时间里展现的。

在西方民主国家，主要是一个庞大的中产阶层的形成以及妇女运动推动的对平等权利的要求，持续地改变了家庭的结构。传统的大家庭迟至二战之后就成了过时的模式。典型的小家庭由父亲、母亲和两个孩子组成，它们成为西方世界理想的家庭模式。20 世纪 70 年代以来，社会变迁主要受到个体化的影响，这导致了社会日益差异化，人们可以观察到生活方式的多样化日益显现：单身家庭、组合家庭以及同性伙伴关系越来越多。至于何为家庭的构成要素，在当今也有了不同以往的答案。在德国，多数民众认为，“有孩子的地方，就是家庭所在的地方”，由此打破了由父母及其亲生子女构成家庭的传统家庭观。

在中国最近的发展过程中，对理想家庭的想象在很大程度上受到计划

生育政策的影响：父亲、母亲和一个孩子。但是，一般民众对家庭的理解超出了这一小家庭模式，往往把自己的父母和配偶的父母也包括进来。虽然儒家的伦理规范随着年轻一代日益解放而逐步瓦解，但是，在中国人们至今仍依照孔子的理想社会秩序观，称家庭是社会的基本单位。然而，中国向后现代社会过渡的进程也没有停步：通过三十多年前启动的改革与开放政策，生活方式的个体化和多样化在持续增加。此外，社会变迁在很大程度上受到大规模的工作移民的影响：约2.5亿流动农民工长期背井离乡地生活和工作，有的人甚至每年只能与家人团聚一次。家庭纽带的松弛，使得儒家的社会契约的约束力也因此松动了。

随着人口预期寿命的增加以及与此同时发生的出生率的下降，后现代社会在全世界范围均面临人口结构变化带来的挑战。在向社会保障体制缴费的在职职工人数日益减少的情况下，不可避免地会出现如何可持续地确保养老金以及向医疗或护理融资的问题。这是一个日益老龄化的社会所要面临的挑战，它不仅是工业化国家必须面对的，而且尤其是亚洲新兴国家要解决的一个核心挑战，因为它们“未富先老”。

在西方工业国家里，1968年的自主妇女运动冲击了固化的性别角色模式，开启了“走出厨房走上工作岗位”的道路。毛泽东曾说，“妇女能顶半边天”，女性应拥有与男性同样的权利与义务。但是，在世界各国，妇女普遍承担着更多的家务、子女照料和抚育工作以及对家庭成员的护理工作。这一事实令人清醒地看到，性别角色模式的持续变化是一个深刻的社会变革过程。这个过程虽然可能受到诸如经济富裕与教育水平以及政策措施的影响，但是，由于深深根植的价值和规范的羁绊，变革的过程注定是长期的。

究竟通过哪些政策可以更好地促进家庭变革，取决于其所依据的规范性目标和政策背后的价值理念。如果像西欧国家那样，其目标是在提高出生率的同时保障妇女的高就业率，那么就必须采取相应的激励措施，并建立相应的框架条件。在这一点上，幼儿照料设施的保障和妇女生育后能够顺利回归原先工作岗位同等重要。中国的家庭政策还处于起步阶段。考虑到目前社会保障体制的建设还不充分，家庭政策——国家促进家庭建设的政策——特别必要。这是因为目前有三代人相互依赖：子女一旦自己有了孩子，由于三岁以下儿童的幼托机会不足，就需要其父母的帮助；在将来，随着领取养老金的起始年龄提高，能够提供跨代照顾的祖父母越来越少。而当

这些子女退休时，他们又将依赖其子女的帮助，因为目前在中国，养老和护理设施的规模都还远远不够。

本书中的大部分文章收录自艾伯特基金会、南京师范大学、复旦大学和江苏省哲学社会科学界联合会于 2011 年 10 月 29—30 日在南京召开的“中国的家庭变迁和公共政策”研讨会。

最后，我谨以编者的名义并代表德国弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会，感谢各位作者和翻译人员为本论文集所做的出色工作。我们希望本论文集能对家庭政策的比较研究做出有价值的贡献。

史丽娜(Catrina Schläger)
德国弗里德里希·艾伯特基金会上海协调项目办公室主任

Foreword

Family structures are undergoing constant change, influenced by a host of factors. Cultural traditions and religious convictions shape family roles and structures, as do education, economic and technological progress and (socio-) political values. Societal change in Asia and in the Western world have very different points of departure, although in both regions cultural and religious values seem to be losing influence. The transformation owing to modernization experienced by Western societies in the past 150 years from the onset of industrialization has been experienced by Asian societies in accelerated fashion over the past 30 years or so.

In Western democratic countries in particular the development of a large middle class and the women's movement, with its demands for equal rights, have permanently changed family structures. Traditional large families were already on the way out as the continent started to rebuild after the WWⅡ. The typical small family consisting of a father, a mother and two children became the ideal family model in the Western world. Since the 1970s social change has been shaped primarily by individualization, leading to increasing social differentiation. A heightened pluralism with regard to lifestyles can be observed: there are more single-person households, patchwork families and same-sex partnerships. The question of what constitutes a family is answered more differently today than in the past. In Germany, a majority of people take the view that "wherever there are children there is also a family", thus breaking with the traditional model of the family as comprising parents and their natural children.

The ideal family model in recent Chinese history was largely shaped by the one-child policy: father, mother and child. However, the general conception of the family goes beyond this small family and includes the father's and mother's own parents and parents-in-law. Even though the Confucian social contract is beginning to crumble with the increasing emancipation of the younger generation, in China today the family is still talked of as the basic social unit corresponding to Confucius's notion of an ideal social order. However, transition to a (post-)modern society is not to be halted, even in China: the Reform and Opening-up policy that has been implemented over the past 30 years or so has steadily increased individualization and pluralization of lifestyles. Social change is also considerably influenced by the enormous labor migration: around 250 million migrant workers live and work far from their homes and in many cases see their families only once a year, thereby loosening family ties and compromising the Confucian contract between the generations.

With rising life expectancy, on one hand, and declining birth rates, on the other, (post-)modern societies worldwide face the challenge of coping with demographic change. The constantly declining number of active workers paying into social security systems inevitably gives rise to the problem of sustainably ensuring pensions and financing sickness and care benefits and services. The challenge of an ageing society faces not only the advanced industrialized countries but also—and especially—the emerging countries of Asia because "they are becoming old before they become rich".

In the Western industrialized countries the women's movement, in the spirit of 1968, broke with fossilized role models and prepared the "way from the hearth to the workplace". Mao promised "women can hold up half of heaven" and thus equal rights and duties with men. However, in all societies throughout the world women take on more household duties, including raising children and caring for relatives. This sobering state of affairs underlines that a sustainable transformation of roles is a far-reaching societal process that, although influenced by such factors as prosperity, education and policy measures, can be accomplished only slowly, due to deeply-rooted values and norms.

Which policies are best suited to promote families depends on the underlying normative goals and values. If, as in Western European countries, the aim is to increase the birth rate and, at the same time, to ensure a high employment rate among women, corresponding incentives must be implemented and a suitable framework established. The infrastructure for early childhood care is just as important in this respect as women's unhindered return to their previous occupation. China's family policy is still in its infancy, however. A family policy understood as state support for families is desperately needed, given the still inadequate development of social security systems. At present, three generations are dependent on one another: children need the support from their parents as soon as they bring their own children into the world because care provisions for the under-threes are inadequate. However, this form of early childhood care is possible for fewer and fewer grandparents due to the upcoming raising of the pensionable age. On retirement they are once more dependent on their children for support because care facilities and institutions for the elderly remain underdeveloped in China.

Most articles presented in this book were drawn from the joint conference of FES and Nanjing Normal University, Fudan University and Jiangsu Provincial Federation of Philosophy and Social Science Circles on the topic of "Family Changes and Public Policies in China", held on October 29 – 30, 2011, in Nanjing.

In the name of the editors and on behalf of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, I would like to thank all the authors and translators involved in this publication for their excellent work. We hope that this publication will be a valuable contribution to the comparative research on family policy.

Catrina Schläger

Resident Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Shanghai Office

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中国公共政策中的家庭定位及其未来走向*

一、中国转型社会正在遭遇的家庭变迁

中国转型社会正在遭遇的家庭变迁纷繁复杂，不过可以把它简单地分解为两个层面：一个是现象的层面，另一个是观念的层面。

（一）家庭变迁的现象层面

有关转型社会家庭变迁的现象层面，已有的研究主要从两个方面来描述：一方面，随着家庭规模的小型化，核心家庭成为占主导地位的家庭模式，家庭关系的主轴由纵向的亲子轴更多地转向横向的夫妻轴，同时传统的父系结构正在向夫妇双系结构转变，家庭成员的自主性与个体价值得到更充分的体现，家庭内部夫妻关系、亲子关系越来越走向平等（沈崇麟等主编，2009：2—127；马春华等，2011）；另一方面，社会结构的分化和人口流动的加剧，加上低生育率、老龄化社会和独生子女政策等因素，使得家庭本身变得越来越脆弱和充满风险。离婚率攀升、婚外情、啃老等社会问题日益凸显，家庭成员之间的凝聚力降低，家庭功能进一步弱化，家庭内部的代际关系向下倾斜，城乡家庭养老和照料问题陷入困境，等等（杨善华，2011；王跃生，2009）。由此，家庭在呈现它多样化的丰富类型和崭新形式的同时，似乎正在远离其作为温暖港湾的传统本色而日益成为一个风险来源地。

然而，家庭自身所要担负的责任却没有因为这种脆弱性而减少，反而越

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* 本文初稿刊载于《学术研究》2012 年第 9 期，题目是《公共政策中的家庭定位》，收入本书有删改。

来越重。处于转型社会和全球化风险当中的个体，面临着残酷的竞争压力和充满不确定性的生存环境，加上国内社会保障严重不足，迫使脆弱的个体唯有回到已经变得更脆弱的家庭寻找资源和安全感。因此家庭不得不承担起超出其自身能力范围的种种责任而常常显得自身难保，这些沉重的责任负担反过来加剧了家庭自身的脆弱性。因此中国转型社会的家庭变迁呈现出相互矛盾的不同方向：一方面离传统意义上的家庭越来越远，另一方面对于家庭本身的需求和依赖度却越来越高。这同时也反映了中国转型社会在家庭观念层面上的变迁。

（二）家庭变迁的观念层面

有关转型社会家庭变迁的观念层面，海内外学者基本达成共识的一点是，随着现代化进程的加速，中国传统的家本位文化正在淡化或衰落，被日益明显的个人本位倾向所取代；同时家庭内部出现了向女性/女系和子代倾斜的趋势（杨善华，2012；沈崇麟等，2009；阎云翔，2009：239—261）。也就是说，对个体性、情感和自主空间的强调，以及平等意识的增强，是中国转型社会家庭观念层面上变迁的两个主要基点。但是在不同的理论解释框架下，这种观念层面的变迁依循着不同的路径，如西方经典现代化理论框架中的个体主义模式、现代化框架中嵌入家本位元素后融合了传统和现代的多元化发展模式，以及依据贝克的“第二现代性”理论框架得出的个体化模式等。

个体主义模式作为西方经典家庭现代化理论的核心，其主要假设就是家庭的核心化与核心家庭的孤立化，包括传统扩大家庭的瓦解所导致的家庭规模的缩小和向夫妇式家庭制度的转变，家庭关系由亲子轴向夫妇轴的转移，传统亲属关系的衰落以及家庭内部个体价值的增长和家庭成员之间的日益平等（古德，1982；赫特尔，1988）。国内学者关于转型社会家庭变迁的研究大多采用的就是这一分析框架。李银河在20世纪末对北京一个大家庭的复杂关系进行个案分析后曾乐观地预言，伴随着家庭核心化的发展趋势，传统的中国家庭关系终将逝去，人们将从“仅仅看重家庭价值的观念模式向个人、家庭、社会三种价值并重的观念模式”转换，而到那时，“家庭主义将不再是中国文化的特色”，“中国的家庭与西方家庭之间的区别会变得越来越不明显，二者最终将趋于一致”（李银河、郑宏霞，2001：191—192）。

然而经典的家庭现代化理论由于一方面遵循的是从传统到现代的一元

进化论的静态线性思维模式，另一方面又以西方家庭模式作为判断现代与否的标准模板，因而本身具有很大的局限性（唐灿，2010），在20世纪70年代以后的西方社会已经遭到诸多质疑和批评。因此国内许多学者转而采纳经过修正的所谓“发展的家庭现代化理论”框架，将中国传统家本位文化的因素纳入其中，强调中国转型社会家庭变迁的复杂性和多元化路径，指出家庭变迁是传统与现代博弈的结果（马春华等，2011），二者之间并没有清晰的界限，也并非相互排斥或对立，而是可以兼容共存的。亲属网络作为“前现代模式的残余”，恰恰支持了个体或家庭对于社会变迁的适应过程（唐灿、陈午晴，2012）。

阎云翔等一批海外中国研究学者试图跳出传统与现代、东方与西方、家庭主义与个体主义的观念之争，参照乌尔里希·贝克的“第二现代性”理论框架，用个体化模式来解释中国社会包括家庭在内的种种观念变迁。按照这种理论，西方社会正在进入所谓“第二现代性”或者“自反性现代化”阶段，这一阶段的特点之一就是“个体化”。个体化意味着第一现代性过程中那些传统的概念和范畴都被抽离出来或者走向衰微，因此既定的“标准化人生”变成了风险性的“选择性人生”，这种个体化的文化催生了一种“为自己而活”的愿望，重塑了家庭成员之间的新型关系，家庭由一种“需要的共同体”正在变成一种“选择性关系”，变成一种“个体的联合”（贝克、贝克-格恩斯海姆，2011）。

阎云翔认为，中国社会和家庭的变迁呈现出许多个体化的特征。家庭规模和结构的变化本身并不能解释中国家庭现代化转型的最重要部分，因为当代家庭的现代性“一方面在于个体欲望、情感和能动性在家庭生活中的重要性上升，另一方面则是家庭关系中个体成为中心的趋势”，也就是说，“现在社会的个体不再愿意为了集体的利益和扩展家庭的绵延不绝而牺牲自己；相反，他们都通过家庭的运作来寻求自己的利益和快乐”（阎云翔，2012:4）。因此家庭从通过传统左右个体的选择，到不断变动以服务于个体的需求，已经丧失其绝对权威，成为正在崛起的个体可资利用的资源。

二、中国公共政策中的家庭定位

家庭问题作为世界性的社会问题，必须回放到全球化和社会结构变迁

的背景下来考察，它不仅仅是现代性带来的后果之一，也是国家应对现代性不力导致的结果，而中国现有公共政策的制度性缺陷正在使家庭陷入前所未有的困境当中。

（一）“家国同构”与公共政策中的家庭角色

在中国传统文化中，“家国同构”的理念深入人心。“家长制”被公认为家族、家庭以及国家统治的共同基础，它将忠孝二者整合起来，某种程度上奠定了中国传统社会无约束的专制权力的合法性，使得家族主义与国家主义的联袂成为中国社会治理的基本特色。

建国以后，中国传统的家族制度遭到毁灭性破坏，但是“家国同构”的理念依然在主流意识形态中作为传统保存下来，只不过集体主义取代家族主义成为社会和家庭治理的一个新规则。有学者将这种治理原则归纳为“家国一体”，即“在党的一元化领导和国家的统一计划下，公与私、社会与家庭、国家与社会高度一体化”(左际平、蒋永萍，2009：27)。然而这种治理模式的最大问题，就是作为同构一方的家，往往被国的一体化所吞没。在家国关系的链条中，国被放大为压倒一切的“大家”，家则被缩小为无足轻重的“小家”，在“舍小家、为大家”的理念倡导中，包含了国和家事实上的等级甚至排斥关系。因此“家国同构”的逻辑从根本上说是一种基于国家主义的治理逻辑，其中家庭和个体一样，充其量是为国家“时刻准备着”的候补角色，其自身的独立性和自主地位无法得到保障，家的利益只能被国家所代表，家庭作为私人领域的观念也没有生长的土壤。

有学者将改革开放后的家国关系描述为“家国分离”，指出这种“公私划界”的趋势在个人层面上导致了所谓“国家人”的淡出和“市场人”的出现，使得“一家两制”“男外女内”的家庭性别人角色得到了强化(左际平、蒋永萍，2009：75—109)。然而这只是变迁所呈现的表面现象，因为在市场转型时期，个体、家庭与国家之间的隶属关系并没有削弱。随着市场竞争的加剧、贫富差距的扩大，国家的责任在逐渐撤出，将转型的风险交给市场及家庭和个体自身来承担，而分配这些责任和权力的权限依旧掌握在国家手中，家庭只是它根据时机的需要有意放弃或把控的灵活地盘。

从这个意义上说，市场转型时期的家国关系并非“家国分离”，而是遵循着传统的“家国同构”的逻辑，沿袭着国家主义的治理基调，只不过在市场的

挤兑下，将更多的责任和负担甩给了家庭，而家庭自身的利益和诉求，则掩蔽在国家的需求和发展视野中。这决定了中国公共政策中的家庭角色不是无形的，就是模糊不清的，家庭在国家和市场的夹缝中艰难地生存。

（二）公共政策中的家庭定位问题

从中国现有公共政策中的家庭定位来看，或者是根本看不见家庭，或者是家庭的边界含混不清，或者是相关政策之间充满自相矛盾的价值取向。主要问题体现在以下三个方面：

1. 国家制度法规中的家庭缺位

这种缺位主要包含两层含义：首先，在国家的制度法规体系中，有关家庭的专门政策法规本身就非常有限。其次，政府在制定一般公共政策的过程中，考虑的宗旨往往偏重于社会稳定和国家发展的需要，以及不同部门和群体之间的利益分割等因素，而家庭作为一个基本的社会单元，却常常是缺位的，或者很少作为制度的受益对象加以考虑，因此导致制度实施的结果或者忽略了家庭的利益，或者客观上甚至对家庭本身造成损害。例如户籍制为人口管理和城乡及地区分治提供了方便，但却给家庭与个体的流动和发展造成了障碍；计划生育政策在考虑人口控制和经济发展的因素之外，并未将家庭的需求作为一个衡量准则，导致在相应的配套保障措施健全之前，“四二一”结构的独生子女家庭和空巢家庭养老陷入有史以来最大的风险和困境（徐俊、风笑天，2011）。

2. 国家制度背后家庭价值取向的摇摆不定

在出台的众多政策法规体系中，国家决策依据一向在基于家庭还是基于个体为基本单元的问题上摇摆不定，造成制度逻辑上的不一致，以及价值取向上徘徊在家庭主义与个体主义之间。比如同为身份管理制度，户籍制和身份证制分别以家庭和个体为基本单元，前者限制了个体的流动，后者提供了流动的通行证，二者之间在制度理念上是相悖的；农村土地承包制度和计划生育政策均以家庭为基本单元，而税收、就业、教育等制度则完全基于个体；与福利相关的住房、最低生活保障等制度均以家庭为单元，养老、医疗等保障制度则以个体为单元。这种决策依据和价值取向上的不一致，导致了制度之间的不相容和实施过程中的混乱，对家庭本身造成了彼此相悖的

矛盾性影响。

有学者对2001年新婚姻法出台后最高院的司法解释一至三即关于家庭财产分割的条文进行了逐一梳理和分析，指出这些司法解释背后的理念依循了由“同居共财”的家庭财产制传统到个人财产制的下行路线，其总体取向是用“个别财产制”逐步取代“家庭财产制”的思路，明晰家庭财产的个别归属（赵晓力，2011）。黄宗智也认为，2001年的新婚姻法以及此后的三次司法解释，“正在一步步走向更完全采纳西方个人主义的原则和实践”，而关于这些解释的争议所展示的正是“新兴个人主义化的市场经济中的社会现实，与长久以来的家庭主义实践两者间的张力”（黄宗智，2011）。

但实际上中国现有公共政策的问题不在于究竟应该采取家庭主义还是个体主义的立场，而在于其政策设计背后所依据的价值取向应该是清晰的、内在一致的。然而从上述罗列的公共政策清单来看，这些政策中的家庭定位和价值取向并未显示出清晰一致的内在逻辑，其采纳的基本上是功利性的国家主义立场，甚至没有考虑到在转型期特有的家庭主义与个体主义之间的平衡和过渡方面做出努力。这种政策取向上的矛盾和混乱不仅不利于家庭自身的健康发展，而且在很大程度上也损伤了社会公平。

3. 国家在公共政策的家庭界限问题上的暧昧态度

家庭本身是个私领域，但在计划经济时代没有私领域生存的空间，政府和社会可以自由地长驱直入；在市场化时代，家庭的私人性虽然受到了更好的保护和尊重，但是公私之间的界限依然由国家来限定和分野，并且政府在这个问题上的态度一直暧昧不清，更多采用的是功利主义的立场——就是依据国家治理的需要来界定家庭的公共性和私人性的边界，以此来干预和操纵家庭中的个体行为。

陈映芳的研究发现，在社会结构的转型过程中，家庭不只是经济实体或生活单位，它还可能是政府设置、调整国家—个人关系的一个重要的结构性因素（如福利单位），也可能是国家控制政治秩序的一个操作性因素（比如通过家庭成员的政治连坐等方式）。各级政府出于现实功利主义原则，将社会福利负担打包给家庭，同时也将国家—个人关系间的种种压力和矛盾转移给了家庭。而在社会团体自组织受到各种限制的社会关系中，家庭、亲属团体和家族网络等等，依然是个人—社会关系的主要结构形式，在广受关注的市民维权运动中，家庭扮演着重要的利益人和行动者的角色（陈映芳，2010）。因此家庭成为

现阶段国家维稳的基本单位，也成为政府保障责任和负担的无限制分担者。在政府“谁家的孩子谁抱走”的治理理念下，家庭被迫充当了国家与个人之间的组织中介，成为服务于社会管理的附属角色。

国家在公共政策的家庭界限问题上的暧昧态度，归根到底反映了一种国家主义的立场。这种出发点可能会走向两个极端：一是国家包罗万象、居高临下地对家庭事务实施过多干预和侵入，未能尊重其作为私领域的生存和发展空间；另一个是在家庭事务上的漠不关心和无所作为，将家庭问题全部推给市场，或者让家庭不幸成为容纳各种社会问题的垃圾桶，未能通过有效的制度激励和引导对家庭自身进行保护和扶植。这两种极端正好反映了计划经济和市场经济两个时期政府在家庭问题上的两种主要倾向。这种公共政策中家庭定位的不清晰，极大地损害了家庭自身的生存环境和利益，也制约了社会的有序发展。

三、走出家庭困境的两个方向

如前所述，中国转型社会的个体对于个人本位观念的强调和对家庭依赖性的增强，以及公共政策中有关家庭的制度性角色缺失，都可以用功利性选择来概括。在这样一种理念下，家庭成为国家与个体攫取资源，并与之分担责任和风险的场所，而家庭自身的独立地位和角色从未得到清晰的呈现和充分的保护和尊重，反而在国家与个体的博弈中受到不同程度的损伤。因此，转型社会走出家庭困境的关键一步，就是要对现有公共政策体系中的家庭进行重新定位，构建一个保护和扶持家庭的政策环境和体系，这是国家层面的应对方式；同时树立不同于以往的新的家庭观，这是个体层面的应对方式。

（一）确立公共政策的家庭视角

对现有公共政策体系中的家庭进行重新定位，首要的是增加家庭为必不可少的一个政策考量维度，考察和评估每一个制度法规的出台与实施对于家庭本身会造成哪些正面或负面的影响，使之成为政策调整和完善的重要依据。同时对现有的与家庭相关的政策体系进行梳理，协调不同法规政策之间的矛盾和冲突之处。为此有必要在政府部门成立专门负责家庭问题和相关事务的常设机构，来履行公共决策过程中尽量减少对家庭的伤害，并

扶持和保护家庭的监督职责;同时还可以建立一个以家庭为单位的全国性的综合数据信息库,作为公共政策制定和评估的数据参照系统。

确立公共政策的家庭视角,尤其需要明确政府与家庭之间的责任与权力边界,防止国家权力过界或者政府责任失灵这两个极端。在加大社会保障力度的过程中,逐步减轻家庭的责任负担,保护家庭的私人性和独立完整性。同时在国家治理方面不能一味采纳国家主义的功利立场,要平衡国家、家庭与个人之间不同的利益取向,为家庭自身的健康发展提供制度性支持,包括对有利于拓展家庭空间、解决现实家庭问题的相关市场行为及社会组织开绿灯,进行有效的引导和扶持,使得家庭不仅仅成为现有社会管理的中介或道具,而且成为个人福祉与社会和谐的源泉。

(二)在主流社会和媒体中倡导新的家庭观

关于家庭何去何从,有关解决之道一直饱含争议:一种倾向主张恢复传统的家庭价值和道德观念,捍卫传统的家庭形式,他们惊呼"家庭正在瓦解";另一种倾向主张"家庭并没有趋于瓦解,只是变得多样化而已",他们认为应该鼓励多种多样的家庭形式。如吉登斯所言,我们正处在这样一个十字路口,未来不可知,求助于过去不会解决任何问题,因为影响家庭变迁的那些因素已经不可逆转。唯一可做的是,必须努力"把我们大多数人在个人生活中予以看重的个人自由,与同他人建立稳定而持久的关系的需要相协调"(吉登斯,2009:201—202)。

这种取向与学者们关于东亚和中国正在进行中的家庭变迁的描述非常接近。例如阎云翔的研究指出,过去半个世纪中国社会在双重意义上实现了私人生活的转型,即家庭的私人化和家庭中个体成员重要性的增长(阎云翔,2009:241),这种趋势后来被纳入"个体化"的解释框架(阎云翔,2012:12—14),而在日本则被冠之以"个人化的家庭",与之相联系的另一个概念就是"多样化"。也就是说,在"以个人为单位的社会"到来的今天,家庭生活只是一种生活方式,是个人选择的结果(落合惠美子,2009:183—190)。这既是个体应对现代性的策略方式,也提供了公共政策制定的现实依据和价值取向。

在主流社会和媒体中倡导新的家庭观,就是一方面要充分尊重个体的自主权和选择空间,避免那种以家本位的名义将个体阈于传统标准模式的压制行为;另一方面要避免以个体自主的名义对家庭的无限攫取和伤害,让

家庭责任明晰化，做到“谁选择、谁负责”，使得家庭与个体成为应对转型社会风险和压力的共同体，以弥补国家现有制度和社会保障的不足，并将这种理念贯穿于公共政策的制定当中。因此这种新家庭观不应该是家本位文化的简单复苏，它已经从过去那种强调个体无原则服从于家庭的传统模式，转变成了家庭尽其所能服务于个体需求的模式，因此归根到底是基于个体自主性的、个人与家庭互利互惠的家庭理念。它的实现不是一个文化或伦理的转换问题，而要仰赖于社会变迁过程中的制度变革与实践。

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将性别平等纳入中国家庭政策的研究与制定*

改革开放三十多年来，我国的政治、经济、社会、文化体制以及人口政策发生了巨大的变化，对外开放、全球化、可持续发展议程、国际人权框架成为联合国各成员国必须遵循的普遍原则，国际国内大规模的人口流动、新型城乡社区关系的形成、新的科技资讯手段的广泛应用、人们对幸福生活的渴望和对物质利益的追求等等，都给中国的婚姻家庭关系和社会性别关系带来猛烈冲击，仅靠传统"家庭美德"和"男女平等"观念已难以维系。因此，亟须完善与整合家庭政策体系和性别平等机制，以满足多样化家庭和家庭成员的不同需求，建立和谐和睦的新型家庭，建构平等互助的社会性别关系。

中国政治体制的改革使得中国家庭不再是阶级斗争和无产阶级专政的组成部分，它不但将"公领域"和"私领域"做了区分，而且将私人空间归还给个人；主流意识形态默认了人们对"先公后私"革命秩序的改变，承认了个人对家庭"美好""幸福""富裕"生活向往的合理性，放弃了新中国逐渐建立起来的对利他精神、奉献精神、互助精神、责任意识等价值的追求；国家减少了对个人生活领域的干预，社会组织放松了对个人家庭生活行为的管制，公民学会了尊重个人隐私并宽容了超出婚姻关系的个人"越轨"行为，致使多元的、功利性的、不稳定的家庭层出不穷。

中国经济体制的改革使得市场成为调节基本公共服务包括家庭服务的指挥棒，旨在提高经济效益的"主辅分离"企业制度改革（即将企业承担的公共服务和社会福利全部转移到社会，以减轻企业负担、提高经济效益的改

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革），极大地瓦解了政府通过“单位制”给予每个“单位人”“从摇篮到坟墓”的公共服务与家庭福利，在政府和用人单位（含企业）的社会责任合理“退席”、企业追求效益和利益最大化合理“登场”的同时，就业、教育、医疗、住房、家庭服务等进行了全面市场化改革，这意味着家庭所需要的服务和福利要通过家庭能力向市场购买，家庭生活能否正常维持、家庭是否安康幸福彻头彻尾地成为每个家庭和家庭成员自己的责任（家庭私有化）。

中国社会（管理）体制的改革使得家庭承载了更多的经济、保障和照顾责任（功能），市场的分化作用和社会管理体制变化使得家庭之间的差别扩大，也使得家庭关系更为复杂和脆弱；城乡二元机制、下岗失业、分配不均、劳动关联型的社会保障体制，使得家庭成为个人生活保障的最后安全线，而在家庭中承担照顾角色的妇女包括上一代妇女（老年妇女，甚至老年男人）不堪重负；激烈竞争和生活的压力，既加大了人们对家庭的依赖，又增强了家庭婚姻关系的不稳定性；新的居住方式的改变和大量私人化住宅社区的兴建，瓦解了传统的城乡邻里关系，消解了传统的家庭支持体系；国家基本公共服务体系将家庭照顾（无论孩子、病人、残疾人、老人）排除在外①，加之就业歧视、收入偏低、提前退休、家庭服务市场昂贵等因素使然，既形成 1949 年建国后少有的城市家庭主妇阶层，又产生了史无前例的对家政工的需求和家政工（保姆）市场，使保姆甚至菲佣进入了家庭并分担着家庭照顾的功能；教育、就业、住房等政策的调控，随时可能将婚姻家庭置于聚散动荡之中，一旦政策有风吹草动，随即有家庭的真假解体②。上述变化，使得与家庭相关的社会问题层出不穷，例如虐待子女、儿童辍学、青少年犯罪、家庭暴力、虐待老人、精神疾病（含自杀）、离家出走等，家庭在教育、扶养、照顾、赡养、保健以及满足成员需求方面的能力有所下降。

计划生育政策的实施和人口发展模式的变迁也给家庭带来多方面的变化。妇女总和生育率的明显下降，在减轻妇女生育负担和家庭养育负担的

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① 国家基本公共服务体系“十二五”规划[N].光明日报，2012－07－20.

② 这里的“风吹草动”指的是政策变化。一旦与家庭有关的限制性政策出台时，就会出现“假离婚”现象，例如，有的地区新颁布的住房限购政策中规定，每个家庭只能购买一套住房，媒体报告，当地的婚姻登记部门排起了离婚的长队，甚至需要工作人员加班办理离婚手续。这样，一对“假离婚”的“夫妇”就可以买到两套住房。这种“假离婚”的家庭，有的在目的达到后复婚，有的则弄假成真，婚姻破裂。

同时，又使家庭可能面临失去子女的风险，致使失独家庭的出现；家庭规模的缩小、人的平均寿命增长，在降低家庭抚养比的同时，带来家庭抚养时间的延长和赡养压力的增大；人口出生率的急剧下降，加速了我国人口的老龄化，既撼动着中国长此以往的“养儿防老”观念和家庭养老传统，又带来家庭中老人照顾特别是高龄失能老人照顾的沉重负担；人口出生率的下降，独生子女的出现，造成儿童教育的困难和扭曲，在我国劳动力可能出现不足和就业竞争激烈的情况下，出现了青年人的不就业和家庭中的“啃老一族”；人口大规模流动、城乡二元机制和家庭流动成本偏高等，造成大量“留守家庭”、“留守妇女”、“留守儿童”、“留守老人”（空巢家庭）现象和家庭关系的不稳定；人口的迅速流动和企图通过婚姻获得个人利益和幸福的价值目标，使得离婚率迅速攀升，一方面单亲家庭比率因此上升，另一方面，未婚先育家庭、同居家庭也因此出现；养育成本的提高、社会环境的恶化、就业的压力、个人决策权的提高和新型生育技术的出现，使得晚育、不育、领养甚至代育代孕等现象在社会中频频出现，高龄少子家庭、丁克家庭、单身有子家庭、继子家庭、双重父母家庭（生理意义的父母和社会意义的父母）等家庭形态成为社会现实，其家庭成员的权利和福祉，常因其背离传统而难以得到相关政策的支持和关照；此外，市场化、工业化、城市化和改革开放带来的跨城乡、跨地域、跨国家的人口流动，使得跨阶层家庭、跨文化家庭、跨国家庭激增，其所面临的社会、文化和生活方式的冲突，可能成为影响家庭和谐的振荡器。

中国政治体制、经济体制、社会体制、人口政策的改革和家庭现状对社会性别关系和妇女权利保障产生重大影响。产生于革命时代和计划经济时期的马克思主义妇女观，在市场经济和多元文化的冲击下受到严峻挑战，衡量社会成员能力和地位的市场价值与经济效益标准，取代了男女平等和社会公平正义的标准，成为一个时期基本政策制定和执行的基础，从而使因革命从家庭中解放出来的妇女重新回归家庭。政府在公共服务和家庭福利上的退出，企业等用人单位社会责任的解脱，公共服务、家庭服务市场化所导致的家庭服务的缺乏与昂贵，妇女及其组织在顶层设计和公共政策制定中的缺位，人们对现代生活方式和生活质量的追求，以及对独生子女的高期望值和育儿观念的转变，都使得家庭照料的责任和对美好幸福的期待，更多地落到家庭中女性成员的身上，成为女性劳动者的双重责任和负担。而劳动力市场又以女性承担双重角色和负担为由，整体地拒绝她们平等地进入劳

动力市场，从而使她们成为在劳动力市场上最后找到工作和最先失去工作的人，抑或进一步造成她们在经济生活、政治生活、社会生活中的从属或边缘地位。可见，制定何种家庭政策对限制或促进男女平等地承担家庭责任和社会责任起着至关重要的作用。

中国社会的快速转型和大规模的社会变迁，呼唤着各种政治、经济和社会政策特别是家庭政策的完善和改革，引起了新一轮家庭研究和家庭政策研究的高潮，我们这次的研讨会的召开和这本论文集的出版就是其中的一个明证。据相关研究者统计，改革开放以来，涉及家庭的社会政策主要包括57 项，①涉及“儿童”或“未成年人”的家庭政策约 65 项，②且随着社会发展，与家庭相关的综合性政策、专项政策和单项政策的数量都在增长。

什么是家庭政策？一种狭义的理解，家庭政策即具有直接而明确的家庭目标，并以家庭或家庭中的个人为对象的政策；而广义的理解，家庭政策即不一定有明确的家庭目标但对家庭会产生影响的政策（陈卫民，2012；胡湛、彭希哲，2012）。但几乎所有的社会政策甚至经济政策都会对家庭有或多或少的影响。因此，我倾向于对家庭政策的研究首先集中在针对家庭中的个人或承担家庭角色的个人以及家庭为单位的整体目标上，同时其他相关社会经济政策的制定也应关照家庭福祉和个人从家庭支持中获得发展，从而形成“以人为本”和“关爱家庭”的家庭政策体系。

尽管对家庭政策的概念和内涵有不同的定义，但是有一点是研究者们达成共识的，即我国家庭政策的不完善和缺失。与发达国家相比，我国现有的家庭政策相对集中在计划生育、儿童抚育、老年赡养和贫困家庭扶助上，尚缺乏完善的专门以家庭为基本单位的家庭政策体系，对家庭的支持和服务范围非常有限，难以满足家庭发展的多方面需要，难以满足多样化家庭的需要，也难以系统全面支持不同生命历程的家庭发展（徐浙宁，2009；吴帆，

① 吴帆.第二次人口转变背景下的中国家庭变迁及政策思考[J].广东社会科学，2012(02).文章将家庭社会政策界定为国务院及各部委为单位制定并推行以家庭整体为目标对象的各项法律、法规条例及社会项目与行动的总和。

② 徐浙宁.我国关于儿童早期发展的家庭政策（1980—2008）——从“家庭支持”到“支持家庭”[J].青年研究，2009(04).文章采用了梁祖彬 2004 年对家庭政策的定义，指为实现扮演家庭中某一角色的个人目标和以家庭为单位的整体目标而设计的各种法律、规章制度、福利和方案。

2012;武新、李英,2012;陈卫民,2012)。研究者们普遍认为:现阶段中国家庭政策的制定和完善,应借鉴西方福利国家家庭政策和福利政策改革的经验和教训,更新家庭政策制定的价值和理念,顺应家庭与社会发展趋势,针对中国国情,建构中国发展型家庭政策体系(张秀兰、徐月宾,2003;陈卫民,2012;胡湛、彭希哲,2012;赵家鑫,2012;刘中一,2012 等)。

在这里,我特别呼吁在新一轮家庭政策研究中纳入社会性别视角。社会性别平等已经被联合国确定为促进男女平等的全球战略,两性平等地参与社会发展并平等地分享社会发展的成果已经成为全球性的追求,性别平等不只涉及政治、经济、社会、文化、教育层面,也涉及家庭中平等权利的获得。我遗憾地看到,即使一些杰出的女性学者,在探讨家庭和工作平衡的问题时,也习惯把解决这一问题的着眼点放在女性个人生活策略(个人和家庭资源的利用)而不是改革公共政策上。我也非常遗憾地看到,一些懂得社会性别知识并在公共政策研究领域很有见地的学者,在倡导建立平衡工作和家庭的政策时,把关注点仅仅放在对家庭中女性成员的支持上,而不是放在对所有有家庭责任的男女两性成员的支持上。在我国,怎样将民主、平等、公平、正义这些社会主义核心价值融入到我国各项公共政策的研究和改革中去,是对我们研究者智慧和能力的挑战与检验。

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上篇

中国家庭变迁研究

中国当代家庭模式变迁及其政策启示
——以江苏省为例

近三十年来，深刻的社会与经济变迁持续影响着中国人口发展态势，中国政府更通过人口和社会政策的制定与实施，直接参与了家庭活动，并形成中国家庭变迁的巨大推力。稳定的低生育水平、快速的人口老龄化、剧烈的人口迁移与流动、不断提升的人口城市化水平，无不冲击着社会的基本单元——家庭及户。在这样的背景下，厘清人口转变、家庭变迁及实际社会生活之间的关系，是研究中国家庭政策的重要前提。

本文以江苏省为例分析了2000—2010年间江苏省家庭户的变化及其功能变迁，并在此基础上讨论家庭政策体系应如何改革与完善。之所以选择江苏，是因为其地处中国经济与社会发展最为活跃的地区之一——长江三角洲，此地家庭变迁剧烈，兼具代表性与特殊性。

一、江苏省的家庭模式变迁

新世纪的第一个十年，江苏省人口发展态势及其家庭模式都在不断发生新的变化。由于数据来源所限，我们的讨论只能集中在“家庭户”而非社会学意义上的“家庭”，即以婚姻、血缘或收养关系为基础而且共同生活在一起的人所组成的户，它是家庭人口学研究的核心单位。本文所使用的数据除非特殊注明，均来自江苏省2010年的第六次人口普查(以下简称“六普”)。

(一) 家庭户户数增长速度明显高于人口增长速度

“六普”资料显示，2010年江苏省家庭户人口数为7 168.58万人，占江苏

省总人口数的 91.13%，家庭户户数为 2 438.18 万户，占江苏省总户数的 95.11%（集体户占 4.89%），比 2000 年增加了 300.18 万户，增长 14.04%，年均增长为 1.32%。而同期的家庭户人口年均增长则为 0.32%，年均户数增幅高于家庭户人口数增幅 1 个百分点。

（二）家庭规模持续缩减，逾五成家庭为二或三人户

2010 年江苏家庭户的平均人数为 2.94 人，比 2000 年减少 0.29 人，而 1982 年户均人口为 3.91 人，30 年间减幅达 25.0%。这一阶段的家庭户总户数的增幅则超过八成，远高于同期人口总量的增幅。分地市来看，家庭户规模低于 3 人的市主要集中在苏南、苏中地区，苏北地区家庭户规模则相对较大。

2010 年，江苏省家庭户以小户型为主。一人户、二人户、三人户占家庭户总数的 71.03%（一人户为 14.08%、二人户为 28.46%、三人户为 28.49%），成为家庭户的主要类型。自 1990 年以来，江苏省家庭户规模总的变动趋势则是一人户、二人户和三人户的比重持续上升（其中尤以二人户比重升幅最大），四人户、五人户和六人及以上户的比重持续下降，家庭户的规模进一步小型化。

（三）家庭结构趋于简化，一代和二代户是家庭户主体

家庭户规模的缩小，必然伴随着家庭代际关系的变化。“六普”资料显示，2010 年一代户、二代户和三代户占江苏省家庭户总数的比重分别为 37.64%、42.07%和 19.22%，其中一代户和二代户组成的家庭近八成。与 2000 年“五普”时相比，二代户、三代户比重下降（二代户下降 11.39 个百分点、三代户下降 0.76 个百分点），而一代户则上升了 12.24 个百分点。

家庭户由大变小的转变进程一直在持续，经济的迅速发展和文化的快速变迁进一步加强了人们独立生活的偏好，不均衡的城乡发展下的人口城市化加强了家庭成员的流动性。然而，家庭结构变动带来的“丁克家庭”、“独老家庭”、“空巢家庭”和“留守儿童”等社会现象亦将长久伴随我国的经济发展和社会发展过程。

（四）单人家庭户的比例持续增长

近二十年来，江苏省单人家庭户占全部家庭户的比例持续增长，其中

2000 年至 2010 年更有大幅增长(2000 年为 8.67%、2010 年为 14.08%),除了人口平均初婚年龄不断提高和离婚率攀升之外,寿命延长致使丧偶老年人比例扩大也是其增长因素之一。

此外还须指出,尽管江苏省单人户的数量和比例都在快速增长,但它占全部家庭户的比例仍然远低于西方发达国家。以美国为例,其同期的单人户比例是江苏省的近 3 倍。这种差距的形成原因可能主要来自于两个方面,一是江苏省的终身未婚者相对较少,二是江苏省老年人(尤其是丧偶老人)独居的比例远低于西方发达国家。尽管目前老年夫妇核心家庭的比例在持续增长,却远不如西方发达国家普遍。

(五) 扩展(大)家庭户(extended family)仍占较大比重,保持了典型的亚洲特征

“六普”资料显示,江苏省 2010 年三代及以上扩展家庭户的比例为 20.3%,这意味着超过五分之一的家庭户人口居住在扩展家庭户中。2010 年的三代及以上扩展家庭户比例相较 2000 年下降了 0.84 个百分点。三代及以上扩展家庭户的比例下降与独生子女较多,且独生子女工作结婚后离开父母有关。同时也是由于近年来,江苏省城市化进程加快,不少年轻人离开父母来到城市工作,并落户安家,使得江苏省三代及以上扩展家庭户的比重呈现下降趋势。

(六) 家庭老龄化的趋势日益显著

随着中国人口老龄化进程的推进,家庭户人口中老年人口的比重不断上升,有老年人的家庭户数量不断增多。2010 年,江苏省有 65 岁及以上老年人口的家庭户户数为 614.75 万户,占家庭户总数的 25.21%。其中,有 1 个老年人的家庭户占有老年人的家庭户比重为 63.25%,有多个老年人的家庭户增长趋势明显快于有 1 个老年人的家庭户。值得注意的是,有 3 个及以上老年人的家庭户虽然仅占有老年人口家庭户的 0.57%,但与 2000 年相比,其户数增长了 4.06 万户,增幅达到 56.50%。这表明随着中国人口老龄化程度的加深,家庭中有多个老年人、高龄低龄老年人共存、老年空巢等现象将日趋显著,这无疑会给传统的家庭养老格局带来更多挑战,也对社会养老保障体系提出了更高的要求。

需要特别关注的一种家庭形式是“纯老家庭”（家庭成员全部为老年人），尤其是三人及以上纯老家庭户和二代纯老家庭户（高龄老年父母与低龄老年子女户）的规模的增长。在中国人口、家庭和社会多重变迁的过程中，传统的家庭养老模式正以新的形式延续和发展。当生育资源所转化出的家庭养老资源日渐稀释，而社会保障又还不完善时，老年人与同龄兄弟姐妹或者低龄老年人和自己的高龄父母选择生活在一起，相互扶持，从而为家庭成员提供保障和照料并帮助其抵御风险。在低生育水平持续、人口老龄化加速、人口迁移流动加剧的背景下，这样的纯老家庭很可能会越来越多，成为一种脆弱的家庭居住模式，并越来越难以应对中国转型过程中所产生的各种结构性冲击，未来的家庭政策无疑需要对此予以特别关注。

（七）婚姻状况相对稳定，低生育率继续维持

“六普”资料显示，2010 年江苏省婚龄人口（男 22 岁及以上，女 20 岁及以上）的基本状况为：未婚人口占 19.08％，比 2000 年上升 2.8 个百分点；有配偶人口占73.92％，下降 2.8 个百分点；离婚人口占 1.12％，上升 0.4 个百分点；丧偶人口占 5.87％，下降 0.3 个百分点。江苏人口的基本婚姻状况相对保持稳定，女性大龄未婚现象有所增加，青年人有配偶比例下降明显，尤其在 25—29 岁年龄段，与 2000 年相比，男女分别下降 9.72％和 11.17％；中年段离婚比例明显提高，尤其在 35—49 岁年龄段，其离婚人口占全部离婚人口的比例过半。

此外，与“五普”相比，2010 年江苏省育龄妇女的总和生育率下降 1.3％左右，远低于更替水平，维持着极低的生育率。尽管计划生育政策仍是维持低生育水平的主要因素，但随着经济社会的发展，尤其在城镇地区，生育文化已由传统的多子多福、早婚早育转变为少生优生和晚婚晚育，女性的职业、文化程度等因素更对其生育水平带来越来越大的影响。

二、家庭模式变迁的政策启示

对“六普”数据的分析以及与以往普查数据的比较表明，江苏家庭正经历着剧烈的变迁，并与人口和社会的变迁相互作用。

家庭在中国不只是生产与再生产的经济单元，而且还是秩序单元、教化

单元和福利单元，并负有社会化和保护其成员的责任。而在人口与社会双转型的过程中，家庭规模、结构以及家庭关系和功能都发生了显著的变化，却缺乏有效的政策支持家庭自身的发展。尽管“家本位”“家国同构”等传统文化使中国家庭在制度不健全的情况下仍以这样或那样的方式竭力为家庭成员提供保障并帮助其抵御风险、适应变迁，但却远远不足以应对人口、家庭、社会多重变迁所带来的结构性冲击。随着中国社会经济的进一步发展，人口态势与社会形态的变化、家庭模式与人们生存状态的改变必将对社会的稳定以及维系社会正常运作的各项社会政策带来更大的挑战，家庭政策的完善与改革势必成为关系到江苏乃至中国经济社会可持续发展的一件大事。

在中国社会经济变迁的大背景下，考虑到江苏乃至中国人口发展的态势和家庭变迁的走向及规律，本文认为以下六个方面是家庭政策体系改革与完善的过程中不可回避的重要主题。

（一）创建专司家庭事务的职能机构

早在 1978 年，Kamerman 和 Kahn 便在其经典著作《家庭政策：十四个国家的政府与家庭》中将家庭政策分为三类：明确且广泛的家庭政策（如法国、瑞典）、明确但针对性强的家庭政策（如德国、奥地利）、含蓄的家庭政策（如美国、英国等），由此便产生了“明确型（explicit）”与“含蓄型（implicit）”家庭政策的分野。实施明确型家庭政策的国家一般设有专门负责规划与实施家庭政策的部门，如德国的家庭事务部、瑞典的家庭委员会、印度的家庭福利部等，它们的家庭政策明确以家庭为政策客体或福利单元。实施含蓄型家庭政策的国家则一般未设立专司家庭事务的部门，而是将其家庭政策融入福利、税收、就业等政策体系之中，并由不同政府部门分别管理或联合管理。

我国当前还没有明确的家庭政策体系，或者说可归入“含蓄型家庭政策”一类。而与此同时，中国家庭面临自身能力不断衰减而功能需求不断增大的困境。它在中国社会转型的过程中为社会成员提供了最重要的社会保护责任，但却很少得到政府和社会的支持，在整个社会政策领域中，家庭甚至是一个少被提及的概念。在这样的背景下，中国政府和社会不仅要重视和关注家庭，更要帮助家庭提高能力以承担更大的责任。

因此，家庭政策的完善与改革应首先寻求在行政管理体制上的突破，以实现由“含蓄型”向“明确型”的转变。这就需要建立一个专门的制定和实施

家庭政策的机构，从体制上强势整合人口计生、民政、税收、人保、卫生、妇联等部门的相关职能和资源，才能有效推进中国家庭政策体系的构建。目前，已有地方政府意识到家庭政策在人口与社会发展中的重要性，并试图进行体制创新，例如：广东省人口计生委便在“十二五”规划中向省委省政府明确提议，将计生委更名为“广东省人口与家庭委员会”。

（二）将家庭完善政策与人口政策调整协调起来

人们经常有一种误解，即中国的人口政策中已经蕴含了家庭政策。事实上，尽管人口政策与家庭政策经常在某些领域中同时发生，但它们之间更多体现为一种互补的关系。人口政策的本质是通过对家庭进行生育调节来达到有效控制人口规模的目的，但它却同时催生了大量独生子女家庭，极大地增加了中国家庭的脆弱性。政府有必要通过家庭政策对此进行功能矫正，即弥补受损于这一人口政策的社会群体。虽然政府一直有一些针对孕产保健、优生优育等方面的政策与项目，却仍未从更高的层次上去考虑独生子女家庭的负担与风险。例如对于独生子女家庭的养老问题，中国家庭的很多养老资源是通过生育资源转化的，而独生子女的唯一性使得这些家庭的养老远比非独生子女家庭更具风险，这一风险甚至还会随着时间的推进而进一步放大，因而亟须制定新的家庭政策以规避更大的人口及社会风险。

必须指出，目前计划生育政策的继续实施对人口年龄结构、家庭模式等方面的负面影响正在不断集聚，亟须根据现有人口发展态势适时调整并加以完善。在传统文化作用下的中国以及许多东亚国家和地区，赡养老人并不只是政府的责任，更是家庭的基本功能，但“独子化”和“少子化”又使得这些家庭不堪重负。

此外，家庭政策还应当和人口政策一起在保障人们的生育选择权（人们当然也有权利去选择不生孩子或者只生一个孩子）的同时，也保证社会保障体系对不同人群的良好支持，并且尽量做到公平合理，而我们现有的政策体系却很难实现这些目标。尽管政府一直尝试改革甚至重构社会保障体系（尤其是养老金体系），但如果生育率一直过低的话，那么任何社会保障体系都很难具有持续性，这将成为未来老龄社会的社会保障制度能否成功的一个关键。

（三）推行以家庭为单位的社会福利政策

单位制解体后，福利供给的责任下沉到家庭，家庭不得不承担起大部分

原先单位所提供的福利功能。但在我国市场经济发展、社会转型和人口转变的复杂背景下，中国家庭的规模与结构发生了很大变化，削弱了中国家庭抵抗传统风险的能力；婚姻和家庭稳定性的下降，又损害了妇女儿童当前和长远的福利资源；独生子女家庭、单亲家庭、丁克家庭、流动人口家庭、留守家庭、空巢家庭的持续增加，更带来了不同程度与层面的人口、社会与经济风险。家庭的福利需求与供应之间出现了严重的失衡。而与此同时，我国社会保障和社会福利制度的建设不仅明显滞后，而且又大多将个人作为基本的政策客体或福利对象，并未将不同类型家庭的福利需求考虑在内。

家庭是最基本的社会单元，它不仅是各种社会政策最终发生作用的地方，也是社会政策促进社会整体功能有效发挥的焦点。家庭应当成为社会政策中最基本的政策客体或福利对象之一。只有强调家庭作为福利对象的整体性，才能真正支持和强化家庭在福利供给中的功能与责任，激活家庭的潜力并延续重视家庭的优秀传统。在“找回家庭”的呼声中，很多发达国家的家庭政策已经明确地以家庭作为政策对象而制定专门计划或实施特定服务，如针对不同类型家庭的税收优惠和现金补助计划。

考虑到江苏的实际情况和目前已涌现的家庭发展困境，推行以家庭整体为福利对象的社会政策可优先考虑如下三个切入点：(1) 尝试以家庭为单位的税收政策以及税收优惠措施，尤其要将有养老需求的家庭的经济成本考虑在内；(2) 尝试以家庭为单位的社会保险及医疗保险制度，允许保险在家庭成员(主要是配偶)之间转移，并向老年夫妇倾斜；(3) 探讨将家庭成员所承担的某些长期家庭服务(如老年人的长期护理等)纳入社会保险范畴的可行性。

(四) 为承担养老责任的家庭提供直接援助

为不同类型的家庭提供直接经济援助是发展型家庭政策的重要组成部分。尤其在人口老龄化的背景下，对于那些正承担着养老责任的家庭来说，为缺少经济来源或不能自立的老年家庭成员提供支持是一件需要动用很多资源的事情，这些资源的短缺是影响家庭发挥功能的重要因素。政府应当通过家庭政策扩大对家庭的财政支持，除了保障大众的基本需求外，还要试图消除现行福利体制固有的不平等(如实现高收入家庭和低收入家庭之间、有老人的家庭和没有老人的家庭之间的收入再分配等)，提高对最有需求的家庭的支持力度(如纯老家庭、老年人多的家庭、空巢家庭、贫困及残疾老年人家庭、有养老

责任的独生子女家庭等),并消除妨碍有养老责任的夫妇就业的不利因素。

(五) 以发展家庭能力为目标进行社会投资

一般而言,家庭的稳定与功能健全不仅对儿童及青少年的学业表现和教育效果有着深远影响,而且极大地关系到成年人生活的稳定性。政府通过家庭政策及其相关的社会政策将社会资源用于改善家庭环境、满足儿童的成长需要,为社会成员提供形成和发展人力资本、优化人口素质结构的良好环境,实际上是对经济发展的积极支持与持续投资。这也是发展型家庭政策的应有之意。

(六) 推进家庭政策的适度普惠性

"适度普惠"应当成为中国家庭政策体系完善与改革的目标之一,尤其要为独生子女家庭、残疾人家庭和有抚幼或养老责任的中低收入家庭提供普惠型的社会福利。

为这一群体实施普惠型家庭政策有以下优点:(1) 独生子女家庭、残疾人家庭和有抚幼或养老责任的中低收入家庭面临极大脆弱性,且总量较大,如果这一群体均能得到一定资助,则需要救助的家庭数量可能会大幅下降;(2) 避免制度的内在不平等导致中低收入家庭无法从再分配系统中公平获利,这也是社会贫困现象的根源之一;(3) 避免将放弃家庭责任的青壮年人口大量纳入政策范围,这不仅有助于解决承担家庭责任的人与放弃家庭责任的人之间的分配问题,也可避免社会争议;(4) 大量独生子女家庭在人口老龄化、城市化的进程中遭遇不同程度的风险,他们都为响应计划生育国策的号召而尽到了义务,政府理应为这一群体提供普惠型支持,同时还可消除更多的伦理诟病;(5) 普惠型福利政策操作简单,可避免选择性政策需对贫困家庭进行"家计调查"的困扰以及"政策瞄偏"的情况。

不能回避的是,推进家庭政策的适度普惠性必然需要增加政府的财政支出,但这并不一定意味着过高的经济负担。我国改革开放以来的持续经济高速增长已为此创造了较好的物质条件,尤其是在江苏这一经济发展水平较高的地区,对社会福利的投入已经不再是一个经济问题,而是对发展序列的优先排序问题。不仅如此,普惠型社会福利还具有发展型或预防型社会政策的很多特征。

联合国早在1948年便于《世界人权宣言》中明确指出,“家庭是社会组成的最基本和最自然的单元,各国政府都要保护家庭”;2004年,联合国在“国际家庭年”10周年之际提出“健康稳定的家庭架构是人类福祉的基础”,并呼吁“各国政府应把帮助解决家庭问题和让家庭发挥作用纳入国家发展大纲”;2008年,联合国在第59/111决议中决定于2014年举办“国际家庭年”20周年活动,借此机会“进一步推进各国家庭政策的制定”。家庭一直是中国社会最为宝贵的财富,但在人口转变和社会经济变迁的背景下,当代中国家庭发生了巨大的变迁,它已经到了最需要支持的时刻,中国的家庭政策理应对此做出积极的回应。

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社会转型期中国城市家庭变迁与家庭凝聚力

一、背景:社会转型

中国当代的家庭变迁是与20世纪70年代末中共十一届三中全会后实行“改革开放”导致中国社会的转型分不开的。在中国城市,改革开放最初是从在公有制经济内部实行“放权让利,扩大企业经营自主权从而调动企业的生产积极性、提高效益搞活经济”开始的。到了20世纪90年代,城市的改革开始走向深入,中国经济出现了多种成分并存的新格局,社会也开始由原来的计划经济向社会主义市场经济转型。转型对社会而言,意味着资源的重组和再分配及市场竞争机制的建立;对个人而言,这意味着城镇的老百姓将永远告别“铁饭碗”的时代,浮沉于市场经济的大海,面对由此带来的一切风险,同时也面对比以前更多的机会。与相当多的国有企业不景气同时并存的则是民营企业、合资和外资企业的进一步发展。可以说,这是城市社会进一步分化的一个前提。从此以后,城市居民发现他们自己正在日益远离稳定和可预期的生活,生活似乎开始变得捉摸不定和无法预期。在一部分人富裕起来的同时,也有一部分人发现他们与别人比正变得日益贫困。而对于愿意且有机会致富的人来说,他们发现享受更好的生活的同时也意味着更多的付出,所以他们在品尝生活的丰富的同时也必然要体会生活的艰辛。总体上说,将20世纪90年代初期中国社会的现实概括起来就是变动和分化。

而到了20世纪90年代中期之后,中国城乡的经济体制改革进入了一个关键时期。这个时期的一个显著特征是,由于向社会主义市场经济体制转

型导致原有体制的一些结构性痼疾的充分暴露,从而引发了一些深层次的矛盾。这些矛盾,既有经济体制和经济结构方面的,也有社会分层和行政区域方面的。对中国的经济体制改革来说,它们都是我们必须面对和必须解决的问题。这些问题的表现形式可能多种多样,但归根结底都是资源如何更合理有效地配置和如何根据社会公平的原则去调整已有的利益格局的问题。正因为如此,经济体制改革才会在这样广的范围之中涉及那么多人的切身利益。对于中国城市的普通老百姓来说,他们发现他们将面对一个具有越来越高的不确定性的社会。

与此同时,区域和群体的分化也影响到在区域和群体中生活的个人。个人之间(亦包括家庭之间)也出现了明显的分化。贫富的差距不仅体现在区域与区域和群体与群体之间,同时也体现在生活于不同区域和群体之中的个人之间,包括生活于同一区域和群体中的个人之间。这样一种分化是在城乡社会中生活的每一个人都能感觉到的。在城市中,人们看到这样的分化首先体现在体制内外的不同个人之间,即在国有制和非国有制的企业、在新兴产业(如计算机与网络)和传统产业中工作的个人之间。其次分化也体现在同一体制内的不同部门工作的个人之间。

而进入21世纪,我们可以看到上述趋势依然存在,导致了在城乡家庭收入普遍增加的前提下收入分化和贫富差距的进一步加大。与此同时,类似高收入人群与低收入人群这样的社会群体,随着其内部认同和外部边界的日益清晰,出现了群体固定化的现象,若用社会学的概念来解释,我们可以理解为新形成的社会分层正在固化。与此同时,由于市场经济的影响日益增大,人们对风险和不确定性的心理承受能力也相对增强,这也导致了社会的价值观越来越多地受到功利主义文化的影响。一种中国特有的由“官本位”和“金钱本位”共同主导的评价机制正在社会机体中日益蔓延。

二、变迁

如上所述,中国社会现在面临的问题在很大程度上是与城市家庭这样的变迁分不开的。

(一) 家庭收入的性别倾斜和代际倾斜趋势

首先,在20世纪90年代早期,家庭收入格局和夫妻收入结构的改变已

经导致了家庭收入出现性别倾斜和代际倾斜这样的趋势。这在 1993 年的《七城市家庭研究》中就可以看出(表 1)。

表 1　北京、上海、成都三地夫妻月平均收入　　单位:元/人

年代	1983		1992	
	均值	标准差	均值	标准差
北京:				
丈夫	107.36(N=569)	82.97	326.60(N=728)	217.18
妻子	75.78(N=551)	61.33	233.55(N=757)	130.59
上海:				
丈夫	99.99(N=550)	50.51	405.19(N=739)	460.35
妻子	71.47(N=577)	38.71	279.72(N=794)	167.09
成都:				
丈夫	93.43(N=587)	73.74	239.50(N=753)	341.42
妻子	61.39(N=631)	51.39	156.73(N=820)	128.74

* 资料来源:沈崇麟、杨善华主编《当代中国城市家庭研究》第 331—332 页,中国社会科学出版社 1995 年

注:N 表示个数

表 1 揭示了两点:(1) 改革之后的 1992 年,在收入普遍提高的基础上,城市夫妻之间的收入差距都已经拉开,丈夫的平均月收入要明显高于妻子。(2) 标准差则表明,到了 1992 年,丈夫内部和妻子内部的收入分化也变大了,这点在上海最为明显,上海的丈夫不仅在三个城市中平均月收入是最高的,而且丈夫之间收入的分化也是最大的。

表 2　北京、上海、成都不同结婚年代的夫妻平均月收入　　单位:元/人

结婚年代	1959—1965①				1984—1993			
调查年代	1983		1992		结婚时		1992	
	均值	标准差	均值	标准差	均值	标准差	均值	标准差
北京:								
丈夫	101.77	88.31	335.39	137.22	185.91	205.58	327.23	196.36
妻子	65.88	31.27	229.37	123.21	125.02	86.88	268.51	135.24

① 之所以要选择在 1959—1965 结婚的被调查者与 1984—1993 结婚的被调查者来做对比,是因为于这一段时间结婚的被调查者与她们的丈夫中的大部分人在调查时的 1992 年仍在业,所以这样的代际比较是有意义的。

（续表）

结婚年代	1959—1965				1984—1993			
调查年代	1983		1992		结婚时		1992	
	均值	标准差	均值	标准差	均值	标准差	均值	标准差
上海：								
丈夫	105.07	44.16	418.74	231.37	174.44	117.44	497.42	879.42
妻子	81.35	35.60	253.00	113.16	141.59	90.87	302.67	149.40
成都：								
丈夫	98.16	40.59	223.91	110.21	228.56	723.39	356.35	757.15
妻子	79.02	39.78	181.88	102.47	119.52	95.28	188.91	143.29

* 资料来源：沈崇麟、杨善华主编《当代中国城市家庭研究》第 51 页，中国社会科学出版社 1995 年

表 2 则揭示了夫妻平均月收入出现的代际倾斜。除了北京 1984 年后结婚的丈夫平均月收入没有超过 1959—1965 结婚的丈夫之外（但差距甚小，均值只差了约 8 元），北京的妻子以及上海、成都的年轻夫妻其平均月收入都超过了上一代的妻子或夫妻。而且在上海和成都，年轻丈夫的平均月收入与老一代丈夫比，差距十分显著。这意味着计划经济时代城市职工以资历为标准来分配生活资源①的做法已经被改变了。

1998 年的调查显示，至少在上海和成都，夫妻收入的差距仍在维持。若是按照（平均）月收入来统计，那么与 1992 年比，夫妻之间的收入差距在进一步扩大（表 3）。

表 3　上海、成都 1998 年有收入的夫妻年总收入比较　　单位：元/人

	丈夫			妻子		
	均值	标准差	个案数	均值	标准差	个案数
上海	15 813.25	13 552.48	737	11 970.74	12 107.26	737
成都	8 328.12	10 704.83	648	6 528.73	7 362.42	648

* 资料来源：沈崇麟、杨善华主编《世纪之交的城乡家庭》第 80 页，中国社会科学出版社 1999 年

生活资源分配出现的性别倾斜和代际倾斜的趋势，对家庭关系有不可

① 之所以用“生活资源”是因为进入分配的除了金钱（收入）之外，还有像住房、食品这样的物质生活资料。

忽视的影响。在夫妻关系方面，它有助于增加丈夫的话语权，也有助于巩固和提升丈夫在家庭中的地位，从而加大丈夫的优势。在代际关系方面，如前面所述，年轻一代由于其在职业竞争中的优势地位，可以在家庭中确保代际平等关系的实现，并在涉及自身生活的各种问题上取得更多的话语权，从而为自己争得更大的生存和选择的空间。其结果意味着年轻一代的独立倾向的增大，一旦住房条件许可，他们可能会在结婚后首先选择小家庭独居，由此进一步强化"家庭小型化"的趋势。

由于城市家庭收入的普遍增加，我们可以从恩格尔系数的变化中看出家庭消费功能从"满足温饱"到追求生活质量的提升这样一个改变。

表 4 城镇居民的恩格尔系数

年代	1990	2000	2007	2008
恩格尔系数	54.2	39.4	36.3	37.9

*资料来源：中国国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴》2009 年卷第 317 页，中国统计出版社 2009 年

表 4 表明，从 1990 年到 2000 年，中国城镇居民的恩格尔系数有大幅度的下降（差不多 15 个百分点）。从 2000 年到 2007 年，继续下降了约 3 个百分点，到 2008 年则又上升了约 1.5 个百分点。这说明在进入 21 世纪之后，中国城镇居民的恩格尔系数稳定在一个与以往比相对较低的水平上，从而也使家庭的消费呈现出一种多元化的取向。虽然因为子女教育、买房和社会保障方面的原因，储蓄和理财仍是城市家庭经济经营方面不可忽略的部分，但是为提高生活质量而进行的各种消费（比如购车、买房、旅游）已经成为城市家庭消费中一道亮丽的风景线。

（二）家庭小型化的趋势

这里分析的是由于亲代和子代有了各自独立生活的可能后出现的家庭小型化的趋势。

所谓家庭"小型化"包含两层意思：(1) 家庭结构简单化，即核心家庭、夫妻家庭及单亲家庭所占比例日益增长，在联合家庭趋于消失的前提下，主干家庭（三代家庭）的比例逐渐下降。(2) 在每种家庭结构中，其家庭人口容量都向组成这种家庭结构所需的最低限度的人口接近（比如组织一个核心家庭最少需三口人——夫妻加一个子女，这就是核心家庭所需的最低限度的

人口)。在中国,之所以主干家庭还可以成为一种基本的家庭结构长期存在并保持一定的比例,除了与传统的小农的生产方式有适应的一面之外,在城市中更多的是因为中国独特的家庭生命周期。与美国人典型的家庭生命周期强调子女到 18 岁必须离家不同,中国的家庭生命周期在单个家庭诞生之后几乎其生命过程中的每一阶段——孩子出生,孩子结婚,配偶死亡,一直面临两种选择:与(父母)子女同住或分住。这不仅使主干家庭得以存在,而且还一直可以保持一个相当的比例(虽然这样的主干家庭在亲子两代维持一种平等关系的前提下随时有分的可能)。

表 5 和表 6 可以清楚地显示这种趋势。

表 5　全国人口普查关于家庭户规模的统计　　单位:人

年代	1953	1964	1982	1990	2000
家庭户规模	4.33	4.43	4.41	3.96	3.44

*资料来源:中国人口和计划生育年鉴社编《中国人口和计划生育年鉴》2009 年卷第 473 页,中国人口和计划生育年鉴社 2009 年

表 6　中国人口变动情况抽样调查关于家庭户规模的统计　　单位:人

年代	1998	2002	2007	2008
全国	3.63	3.39	3.17	3.16
北京	3.03	2.87	2.65	2.58
上海	3.06	2.89	2.65	2.61
天津	3.36	3.07	3.00	3.02
重庆	3.35	3.35	2.91	2.88

*资料来源:综合《中国计划生育年鉴》、《中国人口和计划生育年鉴》的相关资料编辑而成

在城市一对夫妻基本只生育一个孩子的前提下,家庭规模的不断变小也意味着家庭结构在向三种家庭类型靠拢:夫妻家庭(包括已婚未生育和空巢)、核心家庭和主干家庭(单亲家庭由于比例很低,因此可以不考虑)。而当家庭平均人口降到 3 人以下的时候(比如北京的 2.58 人),这就意味着主干家庭的比例还在进一步减少,而一对夫妻加一个孩子的核心家庭、夫妻家庭则占据了主导地位。无疑,在这样的趋势下,由独生子女政策导致的“四二一”模式在城市居民预期寿命越来越长的时候会导致养老方面的问题,虽然其影响如何还有待于观察。另外值得注意的是,家庭小型化导致了母家

庭与子家庭的分离，而这也可能导致家庭成员之间的关系的淡化。

（三）关于家庭稳定和离婚率

最后还有一点值得讨论：向社会主义市场经济转型对城市家庭稳定产生的影响是什么，或者说是否导致了离婚率的上升？

笔者认为，中国国内目前用来测算离婚率的几个指标，不能完全准确地反映目前中国离婚率的真实情况。比如常用的将一年中有多少对夫妻离婚作为分子，一年中有多少对夫妻结婚作为分母，这样的方法计算的结果必定是数值偏大。若按离婚率的定义，应该将一年中现存的夫妻对数作为分母，而将一年中离婚的夫妻对数作为分子才是最准确的。但是这种方法在中国国内却最缺乏操作的现实可能性。国内目前常用的是一种被称作“粗离婚率”的指标，它的计算方法是（中国）当年领证人数（人）/当地（中国）人口数×1 000‰。这虽然夸大了分母的基数（至少应是步入婚龄的总人数），使最后得到的数据不够准确（比实际离婚率要小）。但是若每年口径一致，倒也具有可比性，也能看出一个变动趋势。表 7 就是 1999—2010 年中国离婚情况的统计。

表 7　1999—2010 年中国的离婚情况*

年份	离婚率(‰)	年份	离婚率(‰)
1999	0.96	2005	1.37
2000	0.96	2006	1.46
2001	0.98	2007	1.59
2002	0.90	2008	1.71
2003	1.05	2009	1.85
2004	1.28	2010	2.00

* 离婚率计算公式：离婚夫妻对数/当期人口平均数×1 000‰。

资料来源：民政部编《中国民政统计年鉴》第 36 页，中国统计出版社 2011 年

由表 7 可知，虽然由于多种原因（功利主义文化的影响、社会流动的加剧、维系婚姻的责任、伦理和经济纽带的相对松弛、第三者插足等），但中国的离婚率在前五年显现的依然是稳中有升的状态，后七年有缓慢的增长。这从一个侧面表明，中国的家庭和婚姻总的来说还是相当稳定的（当然，这里要指出的是婚姻稳定和婚姻质量是两个不同的概念）。

三、简单的结论

由以上对中国城市家庭所遭遇到的“挑战”的分析，我们可以看到，中国城市社会在转型期所发生的社会变迁确实给城市家庭带来了若干离散的因素，而这些因素也有可能导致城市家庭出现因凝聚力不如以往而形成的不稳定。因此，对城市家庭挑战的实质是对中国家庭以往所具有的凝聚力的挑战，也即是对中国家庭能否成其为家庭(重视血缘亲情，重视共同生活，强调家庭成员彼此之间的义务以及个人对家庭的责任)的挑战。因为如果家庭已经不成其为我们一向以为的家庭了，那么讨论家庭结构、家庭功能和家庭关系的变迁也就失去了意义。在这个层面讨论中国城市家庭所面对的挑战，那么我们就可以看到基本上只是两种因素或者说两种社会力量在影响着中国城市家庭的凝聚力。一种是中国传统的“家本位文化”及其主导的价值观，另一种是功利主义文化以及与此相连的个人本位的价值观。

与父系父权的家庭制度相联系的中国传统的“家本位文化”有以下几个特点：(1) 在家庭成员与作为整体的家庭的关系方面，强调家庭高于个人，个人利益应该服从家庭利益(当然，反过来家庭也必须考虑满足家庭成员的个人利益，但这是后一步的事)。(2) 强调每个家庭成员对家庭所负有的责任，并且认为这种责任应该伴随家庭成员生命的始终。(3) “家本位”既包含了“家庭本位”，也包含了“家族本位”，即所有的家庭成员都负有对自己家庭所归属的家族的责任与义务，“光宗耀祖”为此做出了一个最好的注释。

与“家本位文化”相联系的是一种父母对子孙负责的、在代际关系上向下倾斜的责任伦理。

这种“责任伦理”首先表现在老年人在与子女相处时责己严、待人宽的态度。对自己，他们永远是高标准。年轻时，他们抚养子女是不计回报地付出；到老了，只要自己有能力，他们还是不计回报地付出。等到自己丧失了付出能力的时候，他们则把不要子女的付出或尽量减少子女的付出作为自己的付出。这样，“责任伦理”就自老一代有孩子时起，一直贯彻到他们离开这个世界。对每一代人来说都是这样。其次，在城市家庭的养老方面，这种“责任伦理”表现为大多数老年人都是依靠自己的力量来解决自己生存所必需的经济来源的提供和日常生活照料这两件大事。即使在改革之后由于社

会保障体系处在改革和完善之中，给老年人的生活带来了一些困难，他们还是采取量入为出、降低自己生活标准来实现自给。并且，对于城市家庭赡养必须具备的精神慰藉的问题，他们虽有这方面的需求，但是当子女不能完全满足的时候，他们也采取了一种理解和宽容的态度，不会因此责备子女不孝顺，而只是希望子女提供一个家庭养老所必需的亲情环境。

因此，虽然随着中国社会向市场经济转型的日益深入，功利主义文化和个人本位的价值观也在拓展其影响，应该说，这种影响在以“80后”“90后”为代表的年轻一代身上尤为明显，由此产生的两代人之间在价值与文化方面的代沟也有可能导致他们对“母家庭”的疏离，但是，随着他们步入婚龄并生儿育女，社会会教育他们，让他们理解父母并感受到父母对他们的亲情，从而促使他们向家本位传统的回归——因为人对亲情的需求是任何物质的东西都无法替代的。

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变迁中的家庭价值观特征新探

以往不少家庭价值观的研究或评论普遍认为，在物质主义和消费主义横行、西方个人主义思潮汹涌入侵的当今，人们已不再相信忠贞爱情、终身婚姻，乃至极端个人主义泛滥、性观念过于开放、家庭责任感淡漠、子女的孝道观衰退。传统道德已失去原有的存在基础，而现代的家庭伦理规范尚未建立起来，导致家庭功能衰退和婚姻不稳定等严重的社会问题。①

先前的研究虽大致描述了家庭价值观随着社会的变迁而发生变化的基本现状，但也存在不少缺憾，除了对当前的家庭伦理持负面评价的较多外，不少研究在对价值观现状和变迁特征做判断时，通常以传统或现代、正确或错误、家族主义或个人主义的二分法做区分，由此出现两种偏颇：一是褒传统贬现代，认为随着现代性来临，以及与之相应的以功利为本位的伦理思想的蔓延与浸染，传统家庭伦理受到严重的冲击，出现了前所未有的伦理危机，父子反目、兄弟成仇、夫妻背叛等现象屡见不鲜；二是对家庭价值观的变迁只关注“变”，而极少关注那些不随历史变迁而变化的家庭价值观。

本研究认为，对家庭价值观变迁特征的判断不能简单地采用传统或现代、正确或错误的二分法，传统家庭价值观中有精华、有糟粕，比如，将“孝道”笼统地称之为优秀的家庭伦理传统加以承继就失之偏颇，传统孝道中的敬亲、奉养、侍疾、善终等具有不受时代演进而改变的积极内涵，但也有将孝行泛化为政治和社会生活领域的最高价值，以及长幼有序、父为子纲等威权主义的消极面。一些传统价值观本身既非精华也非糟粕，只是在当时的社

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① 张冬玲.论我国农村新型家庭伦理的构建[J].山东社会科学，2011(09)；石琪.中国当代家庭的伦理困境与儒家伦理思想的当代价值[J].中国城市经济，2011(23)；孟宪范.家庭：百年来的三次冲击及我们的选择[J].清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2008(03)；李桂梅.中国传统家庭伦理的现代转向及其启示[J].哲学研究，2011(04).

会历史环境下才具有合理性，比如在生产力低下、人均期望寿命短和抵御风险能力差的传统农业社会，多子多福、儿孙绕膝成为众多人的理想，而在现代社会，期待多子女或不想要孩子，也无可厚非。

我们将家庭价值观区分为核心价值观和一般价值观，家庭价值观体系中最基础、最本质的，具有主导作用并支撑和决定一般价值判断的是核心价值观。核心价值观是家庭价值体系的集中体现和根本追求，通常具有普世性，是文明社会不同历史、文化阶段的基本准则，为所在社会或地区的法律、惯习所倡导，并获得大多数人的普遍认同。

本研究主要以上海和兰州城乡 4 个社区抽样调查的资料来对家庭价值观的变迁做分析。调查样本按分层多阶段概率抽样方法从上海 9 个区/县 22 个街道/镇 43 个居/村委会、兰州 4 个区/县 10 个街道/镇 33 个居/村委会中选取家庭，并以家庭中 20—65 岁成员的生日离 7 月 1 日最近者为访问对象，由经过培训的访问员入户进行问卷访谈。共获得 2200 个样本资料，其中女性占 49.3％，男性为 50.7％；市区样本为 65.5％，郊县样本为 34.5％。①

经验资料分析结果显示，中国经济、社会转型期的家庭价值观确实发生了不少变化，但并未支持传统家庭价值全面衰落的推断。尤其是一些主导性的核心家庭价值观并未随历史的变迁和经济社会结构的转型而改变。

一、核心价值观仍获得普遍认同

核心价值观凝聚了传统家庭价值观的精华，即使在经济社会发生巨大变迁的今天，仍为大多数人所认同和遵循，这主要体现在：

（一）和谐团结是家庭幸福的首要因素

什么样的家庭才是幸福、美满的？这个反映人们对幸福含义基本态度的问题能折射出家庭的核心价值观。被访者在回答我们的开放式提问“什么样的家庭才是幸福、美满的”时，认同“和谐团结”是家庭幸福要素的高达 53％，遥遥领先于其他表述。67％的被访者对与经济有关的职业、住房和收入等只字

① 以下凡是未注明出处的调查数据均为该研究的结果。

不提，即使提及经济基础，大多也并非将金钱作为幸福的唯一要素，而是将家庭和睦、健康平安、彼此同甘共苦和相互分担视作同样重要甚至更为重要，只有 3%的被访者将金钱作为家庭幸福的象征而未强调其他非经济因素。

对质化资料的话语分析结果还显示，尽管也有个别人将“家庭富裕”“钱越多越好”当作幸福的象征，但更多的表述为“有一定的经济基础”、“工作稳定”或“住房宽敞些”，甚至仅限于不要“穷得要饭”，只要“吃饱喝好”、“收成上多一些”或“有房住”，而不是山珍海味、汽车别墅或大富大贵。也就是说，大多数人仅把经济视作家庭幸福的基础之一而不是唯一要素，幸福观为物欲主义所主宰的推断未获支持。其他一些抽样调查结果也显示，家庭温暖、夫妻恩爱、家人关系和谐、平安健康被认同为人生幸福或家庭幸福的主要因素，而经济富裕、住房宽敞的排序普遍靠后。①

（二）敬老爱幼、相互扶助为应尽义务

本研究的调查结果所报告的人们养亲和侍亲观的代际差异，不仅未显示随年代的推移而衰落，反而出现年轻人更赞成对老年人的赡养和照顾：从养亲观看，94%的被访者首肯“子女应尽自己的力量赡养父母，使他们的生活更为舒适”，其中“非常赞同”的为 55%，而 35 岁以下者持非常认同态度的显著多于 50 岁以上者；从侍亲观看，前者非常赞同“当父母年老生活难以自理时，子女应和他们一起住”的比重也显著高于后者（见表 1）。

表 1　不同年龄被访者的养亲观和侍亲观差异 单位：%

	子女应尽自己的力量赡养父母，使他们的生活更为舒适			当父母年老生活难以自理时，子女应和他们一起住		
	20—35 岁	36—50 岁	51—64 岁	20—35 岁	36—50 岁	51—64 岁
非常不赞同	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.6	1.2	2.8
不大赞同	1.7	2.3	2.5	4.6	7.6	12.3

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① 肖玲. 深圳特区大学生幸福观的调查与分析[J]. 青年研究，2005(05)；李志强. 对成都地区青年农民工幸福观调查[J]. 重庆科技学院学报，2008(09)；李志，张旭东. 城市独生子女大学生幸福观的调查研究[J]. 重庆大学学报，2001(02)；沈汉. 家庭幸福的重要因素探析[J]. 学海，1994(05)；姜捷. 中学教师的“幸福家庭”态度研究分析[J]. 中国校医，2003(05)；黄盈盈. 从数据看青年的价值观取向——20 世纪 90 年代价值观调查研究文献分析[J]. 青年研究，2001(10).

（续表）

	子女应尽自己的力量赡养父母，使他们的生活更为舒适			当父母年老生活难以自理时，子女应和他们一起住		
	20—35 岁	36—50 岁	51—64 岁	20—35 岁	36—50 岁	51—64 岁
讲不清/无所谓	2.3	2.8	4.2	7.4	6.4	9.2
比较赞同	34.5	40.5	41.8	42.5	47.3	43.5
非常赞同	61.1	53.6	51.5	44.9	37.6	32.2
合计	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
平均值	4.54	4.44	4.42	4.26	4.13	3.90
标准差	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.83	0.91	1.07
F 检验	5.414*			24.22***		

年轻人认同养亲和侍亲观的比重更多也为其他经验研究所支持，①而中老年人非常赞同养亲和侍亲观的比重更少，除了反映出他们独立意识的增强、较少指望子女对自己的奉养外，或许也折射出父母不求子女回报的利他主义。此外，这一研究显示，只有 1%的有成年子女的被访者经常为子女“啃老”而烦恼，2%偶尔为此烦恼。也就是说，“啃老”现象虽存在，但令父母难以承受、烦恼不已的家庭只是个别。

同时期其他概率抽样的定量研究结果也和本研究类似。2006 年全国综合社会调查(CGSS)同样题项、同样刻度的相关统计结果，与我们的研究结论如出一辙，即 93%的被访者认同“赡养父母使他们生活更为舒适”的养亲观。此外，年轻人更认同已婚女性应给自己或配偶父母生活费以及“无论父母对您如何不好，仍然善待他们”。

对北京城区 1 275 位 60 岁以上老年人的调查结果也显示，80%以上的被访者首肯子女孝顺或比较孝顺，认为子女不孝顺或不大孝顺的不到 2%，尽管其中一些人出于尽量个人自立和减轻子女负担的责任伦理，从而降低了标准，减少了需求。②

① Whyte, M. K. The Fate of Filial Obligations in Urban China[J]. The China Journal, 1997(38):1－31；韦克难，许传新. 家庭养老观：削弱抑或强化——来自四川省的实证调查[J]. 学习与实践，2011(11)；杨慧，吕静. 基于认知层面的代际关系分析——重阳节调查报告[J]. 河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2008(03).

② 杨善华，贺常梅. 责任伦理与城市居民的家庭养老——以“北京市老年人需求调查”为例[J]. 北京大学学报，2004(01).

（三）终身婚姻仍为大多数人的理想和践行

中国的离婚率30多年来的持续攀升被不少人误读为白头偕老的婚姻观已成为过去，然而，调查结果却显示几乎所有的人都认同美好婚姻的重要性。99％的被访者认同“一个好的/幸福的婚姻对自己的人生非常重要”；婚姻的神圣性和终身性也获得广泛的认同，82％的被访者对“婚姻是神圣的，结了婚就要白头到老”的传统价值持肯定态度；只有24％的被访者认同“如果父母经常吵架，离婚或分居对孩子更好”，其中非常认同的只占3％，而有六成男女持反对意见。在控制了性别、教育程度、收入、地区、婚姻状况等人口特征变量后，年龄因素对终身婚姻态度的影响作用可忽略不计，所谓的“80后”被访者与“70后”“60后”“50后”相比，对终身婚姻的态度无显著差异。

终身婚姻的基本原则是专一性和排他性，在对“男女有婚外性行为是否总是错误的”做判断时，只有11％的被访者首肯“没错/正常”，对于“一夜情/露水夫妻只是偶尔消遣、刺激一下而已”的说法，赞同者只占8％，而持反对态度的高达87％，且性别、年龄、地域和阶层差异几乎可忽略不计。其他一些抽样调查结果也显示，被访者对婚外性行为持反对态度的均在90％左右，[①]坦陈自己在婚后与他人有过性行为的只占3.7％。[②]

白头偕老不仅是大多数被访者的理想，也是人们的生活践行。研究表明，被访者在对夫妻“相互尊重/平等相处”“相互交流/沟通”“相互理解/包容”“关爱/体贴”“承担家务的公平、合理”“对方的忠贞不贰/感情专一”“双方性生活”的满意度打分时，选择4—5分的都在八到九成；87％的已婚被访者明确表示“自己会尽力维持与配偶之间的关系”，93％的被访者在过去一年中从无与伴侣分手的念头。

① 李银河，王小波．婚外恋现象研究［J］．社会学与社会调查，1991(03)；靳小怡，任峰，悦中山．农民工对婚前和婚外性行为的态度：基于社会网络的研究［J］．人口研究，2008(05)．

② 李银河，王小波．婚外恋现象研究［J］．社会学与社会调查，1991(03)．

二、一般价值观的刻板定式趋向多元化

除了起主导作用的被大多数社会所一致认同的核心价值观外，一些在传统社会备受推崇甚至被定型化的一般价值观，大多随年代的变迁发生分化并日渐多元化。

（一）性别观不再刻板化

本研究的调查结果显示，在对“即使妻子有工作，主要的养家/经济责任仍应由丈夫承担，主要的家庭照料责任应由妻子承担”做判断时，持否定态度的占 42%，肯定者为 46%。2010 年第三期上海妇女社会地位调查结果也显示，67.0%的被访者不认同“挣钱养家主要是男人的事情”，54.3%的被访者不赞成“丈夫的发展比妻子的发展更重要”，90.7%的被访者对“男人也应该主动承担家务劳动”持支持态度。① 其中女性的性别角色观更少刻板化。尽管从年代变迁看，性别意识定型化未出现显著改善的倾向，但一些人可以选择在家养育孩子而不工作，或在孩子大些后再就业。

（二）婚育观趋向多元化

结婚、生育自古以来似乎是两性毋庸置疑的家庭义务，尽管本研究仍有 69.1%的市区被访者和 81.2%的郊县被访者首肯“不管怎么样，人总是要结婚的”，但也有不少人已不再认同结婚是唯一的选择。对上海 2600 名 20—65 岁男女的问卷调查结果也显示，郊县被访者非常认同“结婚是个人自由，所以结婚不结婚都可以”的为 8.0%，比较认同的占 24.2%，市区被访者分别为 17.5%和 37.0%，其中市区 20—30 岁青年男女的认同率已达 63.1%。②

在生育观上，无论是本研究还是 2006 年全国综合社会调查(CGSS)结果均显示，“只生一个好”的生育意愿已退居第二位，两个孩子成为多数被访者的理想孩子数，少数人选择生育三个以上。而向往“丁克”生活的远比传媒所渲染的要少得多，本研究的统计结果显示，无论是赞成理想子女数为零或

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① 根据 2010 年第三期上海妇女社会地位调查数据库的资料计算。

② 根据 2010 年第三期上海妇女社会地位调查数据库的资料计算。

者首肯“结婚后不要孩子”的被访者均不到3%。与此同时，人们对无子女家庭的接受度也在递增，全国综合社会调查（CGSS）结果表明，四分之一的被访者赞成“结婚后不一定要有孩子”的多元价值观。

（三）性观念更具包容性

随着禁欲主义性文化的退隐，性知识的广泛传播以及避孕技术进步带来的性与生育的相对分离，性观念日趋宽容已为不少研究①所证实。本研究结果首先表现在性在婚姻中的价值日益重要，快乐主义的性观念已为多数人所接受，近六成被访者首肯“在夫妻性生活中得到快乐、满足的婚姻才美满幸福”，且无性别、教育、城乡和年龄差异。其次表现在公众对婚前性行为日渐宽容，只有26.9%的被访者认为男女婚前发生性行为“绝对错误”，而35岁及以下青年人仅为13.5%；在判断“单身成年人如果非常相爱而发生性关系有错吗”时，仅有18.3%首肯“绝对错误”，而35岁及以下青年人仅为8.5%；人们对单身中老年人非婚同居的接受度相对较高，42.2%的被访者赞同“单身的中老年人同居可相互照顾并减少不必要麻烦”的说法。再次表现在对待同性恋态度的多元化，被访者对同性恋的宽容度甚至高于婚前性行为，23.3%的被访者对“同性恋是应得到尊重的个人自由的性取向/做法”持肯定态度，18.9%首肯“同性恋者组成家庭应该得到社会的承认”，另外，分别有22.1%和22.0%的被访者对上述观点取中立态度，非常反对的分别为28.5%和32.5%。其中年轻的、城市的和教育程度更高的被访者的刻板化倾向已大为减少。

三、家庭集体主义价值观仍为主流

中国当前的家庭价值观是否如一些研究所认为的更倾向于个人主义，尤其是家庭成员过于强调个人利益，自我中心式个人主义在家庭肆意发展，由此造成“无公德个人”的崛起、亲情冷漠和家庭功能弱化，核心家庭本位的

① 徐安琪.世纪之交中国人的爱情和婚姻[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社，1997；潘绥铭，白维廉，王爱丽，劳曼.当代中国人的性行为与性关系[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004.

观念开始为个体本位的观念所取代?

毫无疑问,个人本位的家庭价值观正在为越来越多的人所认同,但我们的经验研究结果未支持中国社会已转向个体本位的价值推断。事实上,转型期/现代社会的价值观正从传统社会的家族主义,转向家庭集体主义,而与欧美现代/后现代社会的个体主义仍有不小的距离。这主要表现在:

(一)家庭成员的相互依存多于个体的独立自主

个体的自主、独立和权利意识是个人本位价值观的核心内涵,西方式典型核心家庭的特征是孤立型、原子化。正如帕森斯所说,与父母分开生活,彼此经济独立,同时也独立于任何特殊主义的亲属关系群体,没有与扩大的亲属关系的利益瓜葛,因此,从功能上能够满足其成员的情感需求和个性需要。[①] 由中国社会科学院社会学所等单位于1983年对北京、上海、天津等五城市,1993年对北京、上海、成都等七城市以及2008年对广州、杭州等五城市开展的家庭专题调查结果都发现,中国城市的核心家庭并没有散落成为一个个独立的原子,而是通过血缘、姻缘、地缘等关系结成了一个个密切的网络。在这个网络中不仅流动着感情,还流动着各种经济的非经济的、物质的非物质的资源。父母对子女婚嫁时的经济资助不仅没有随年代推移而减少,反而大幅增加;[②]一些研究也显示,城市家庭养老除了依靠制度性保障如养老金和社会救济外,主要由子女、亲属负担,农村更是主要依赖子女、亲属的经济支持;而生活照料在城乡都极少获得外部支持而主要由家人承担;[③]当家里经济拮据或需要调剂、老弱病残生活照顾困难,或下岗、待业想找工作时,求助和获得父母、兄弟姐妹、儿女等亲属支持的比重和频率为最高。[④]

本研究的调查结果也显示,四分之三的被访者认同“家长应承担子女大学期间的一切费用”,其中50岁以上父母和农村被访者的认同率更高些;尽

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① Parsons, T. The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States[J]. American Anthropologist, 1943,45(1):22-38.

② 马春华,石金群,李银河,王震宇,唐灿.中国城市家庭变迁的趋势和最新发现[J].社会学研究,2011(02).

③ 张友琴.老年社会支持网的城乡比较研究[J].社会学研究,2001(04).

④ 徐安琪,张亮,刘汶蓉,包蕾萍.风险社会的家庭压力和社会支持[M].上海:上海社会科学院出版社,2007.

管有近五成被访者不赞成“父母应为女儿准备婚房”，但反对“父母应为儿子准备婚房”的只占三分之一；在城市有三分之二的被访者不赞成“照料孙子女是祖辈义不容辞的责任”（农村只有36.8%持反对态度）。尤其在社会竞争激烈、生活节奏加快以及社会保障体系尚不完善的今天，家庭对其成员的经济保障和生活扶助作用在众多家庭尤其在一些市场竞争居于劣势地位的家庭显著增强，乃至成为抵御各种生活风险的可靠保障，家庭成员间的相互依存关系依旧。

（二）家庭的整体利益仍高于个人利益

把家庭的整体利益居于个人利益之上，强调为家人尽义务而不看重个人权利，是家庭本位或是个人本位价值观的主要分界。本研究的经验资料也未支持个体利益高于家庭整体利益的判断。

首先，孩子是家庭的未来，也是父母自我重生的机会。本研究有57.8%的被访者认同“只要为了孩子好，父母可以牺牲一切”；不少父母为了孩子放弃追求自己的幸福而宁愿被困在围城中，六成被访者不认同“如果父母经常吵架，离婚或分居对孩子更好”，只有24%表示支持，其中非常认同的只占3%。

其次，赡养父母是子女的终身义务，顺亲荣亲是子女的职责。83.1%的被访者赞成“当父母年老生活难以自理时，子女应和他们一起住”的做法（美国为53.5%），①其中非常赞成者为38.3%（美国仅4%）。不少人至今仍赞成为满足父母的需要而抑己顺亲，2006年全国综合社会调查结果表明，被访者认同“放弃个人的志向，达成父母的心愿”占57.8%，首肯“无论如何，父亲在家中的地位都应该受到尊重”的高达83.1%。此外，“光宗耀祖”至今仍被多数人视作孝敬父母、荣耀家庭的行为，86.1%的被访者首肯“子女要力争有出息，以使父母/家庭引以为荣/自豪”；全国综合社会调查的结果也显示有89.0%的被访者对“子女应该做些让父母有光彩的事”持肯定态度。

再次，更看重家庭的整体利益和家庭义务的宽泛延伸。78.9%的被访者对“为使家中每个人都生活得好，觉得自己责任很重大”持肯定态度。全国综合社会调查（CGSS）结果还显示，84.1%的人赞成“应该以家庭为重，不

① 美国资料来源于2001—2003年美国家庭与户调查（NSFH）数据库，下同。

应把自己看得更重要”的观点，66.6％首肯“家庭的幸福应该优先于个人的利益”。而且，年轻人没有显示出和中老年人不同的看法，教育程度低的被访者也和中、高学历者的态度雷同。

（三）家庭价值更重于个人发展价值

公共领域的工作成就对于追求自我价值的个体而言，无疑更为看重。然而，尽管面临频繁的社会流动和市场竞争压力的冲击，大多数人仍未将个人的发展价值居于家庭价值之上，只有三成被访者认同“对于个人幸福而言，工作成就比家庭更重要”，赞成“为了多挣钱/争取更好前程，夫妻即使分居两地也没有关系”的也只占三成。而且，年轻的、城市的、高学历、高收入被访者的认同率更低些。这或许是因为工作压力和事业发展在给年轻的、城市的、高学历和高收入者带来更多金钱和更高生活质量的同时，也会对个人健康和家庭生活带来负面影响，于是他们也更期待多些时间陪伴家人，多享受天伦之乐。

综上所述，社会转型期的家庭价值观虽呈示了多元化和个体自主选择的趋向，但现阶段尚未完成个人本位的转向。遵循集体主义价值的家庭虽不再受宗族、长老的威权控制，其轴心也以核心小家庭的夫妇为主，但本质上与西方个人本位家庭以满足亲密情感和个性发展需求为目的的模式仍有较大的不同。主干家庭不仅仍具有旺盛的生命力（尽管在不同生命周期具有变动性），核心家庭也仍和亲/子代和姻亲网络保持紧密联系，它们之间的工具性和情感性的支持在全球化背景下的风险社会不减反增，扶老携幼、为家奋斗、相互负责、荣辱与共仍是中国式集体主义家庭价值的主要特质。

但我们同时认为，被访者把父母、子女看得比自己更重要，为家人尽职重于追求个人权利和幸福，更多的是因为长期以来个人主义在中国是个负面的贬义词，被误认为与自私自利、损人利己、缺乏家庭责任感和道德失范同义，而其中的正面价值却被忽视或屏蔽。我们的孩子从懂事起就被扼杀了自由快乐的天性，正如费孝通教授所说：“他的个体刚长到可以活动时，他的周围已经布满了干涉他活动的天罗地网……一个孩子在一小时中所

受到的干涉，一定超过成年人一年中所受社会指责的次数。”[①]他们的个人兴趣、交友、升学、工作和结婚对象的选择都逃不出父母的控制。因此，或许我们更应该为个人主义价值观正名，在私人生活领域更关注个人的自主选择、权利平等、人格独立以及个人隐私的维护，使家庭成员在人人自力更生、个个自我负责的基础上增强家庭的凝聚力和社会适应能力，以有效地迎接风险社会的各种挑战。

本研究将家庭价值观作“核心”和“一般”之区分，改变了以往价值观变迁研究以传统和现代的阶段之分，并对家庭价值作出衰退、失范还是趋强、延续的判断，以及对家庭价值观作优或劣的伦理评判。“核心”和“一般”的分类参照社会意识形态价值观的分类，但又有别于意识形态价值体系的分类，因为我们所界定的核心价值观不仅在家庭价值体系中起主导与支撑作用，同时具有超越时间和空间的普世性，不分社会主义还是资本主义、封建主义，不分国界和地域。尽管在不同历史阶段、不同地域有不同的“顶层设计”和民间实践，但基本特质离不开和谐、关爱、责任和包容。正如联合国以右边开口的屋顶盖心的图案作为“国际家庭年”的标志，显示了多元社会中家庭的变动与开放，以及永不改变的企求温暖、关怀、安全、容忍、接纳和同在一起的心愿。但这样的分类界定是否合适，有待进一步的讨论。

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① 费孝通. 生育制度[M]. 北京：商务印书馆，1999.

从家庭主义到个体家庭

——个体化视角下的城市家庭认同变迁和女性崛起

导语

2007年8月的一个晚上，我和六个“妈妈朋友”家庭一起吃饭，所谓的妈妈朋友就是那些因为我女儿而认识的朋友，彼此的名字都以孩子名加妈妈爸爸来称呼。[①] 七个家庭的居住模式都不相同，有的和父母住在一起，有的独立居住，当我问大家：如果问你，你的“屋里厢人”（家里人），是指哪些人？妈妈们快速、理直气壮、与传统不同的回答吸引了我。

> 雷雷妈妈、子路妈妈和凡凡妈妈非常快地并且很确定地说，屋里厢人指自己的爸爸妈妈和自己小家的三个人。
>
> 雷雷爸爸说：“你们这些女人，就只包括自己的父母……”
>
> 问一直在外面和孩子一起玩而没有参加讨论的奕辰妈妈，她说：“我的父母、老公和孩子。”
>
> 于是女同胞们说：“这是很正常的吧，就是这样啊。”
>
> 凡凡妈妈说：“我的回答是第一感觉，如果再想想可能就会包括公婆。比如说，大家庭可能会包括公婆。”
>
> 雷雷妈妈说：“我一年也见不到我公婆一两次，我的第一反应

① “从儿称”作为一种习惯用法，原来是建立在亲属关系和亲属称谓之上的，是对那些不好称呼的亲属使用的委婉的称呼方式（冯汉骥. 中国亲属称谓指南[M]. 徐志成，译. 上海：上海文艺出版社，1989）。而现在在城市中，对于这种没有亲属关系，因为孩子而认识的人采用从儿称是一件很常见的事情。

肯定是不包括的,再想想么……可能理性告诉我应该要包括,可是感情上,真是觉得没什么关系。”

“家庭”对社会来说,是一种客观存在;但是对个体来说,“家庭”更是存在于个体意识中的一种认同。上野千鹤子把使家庭成立的意识称作为家庭自我认同意识 Family Identity (简称 FI),它是指把什么等同于家庭的一种“界定范围的定义”。她认为,在研究中人们把具有血缘关系或者居住在一起就看作是一个家庭,“但是只要当事人本人没有意识到,这个‘家庭’的实体是不存在的”①。上野千鹤子在日本的研究发现,不同的家庭成员对居住在同一屋檐下的“家庭”认同是不同的。

长期以来,对家庭研究常常重视结构的研究,而忽视家庭成员的主观认同,实际上,很多的家庭变迁和家庭问题都和家庭认同有关。本文从家庭认同出发,以个体化理论为视角,探讨中国城市家庭的变迁。2006—2009 年期间,我在上海深度访谈了 46 个家庭(以中产阶层家庭为主),询问了各种与家庭有关的问题,并参与观察了部分家庭的家庭生活。本文正是在此基础上分析而得。

理论视角:个体化

本文的理论视角是个体化理论。当代学者中,个体化理论的主要代表者是鲍曼、吉登斯和贝克,②这三位对有关个体化的阐述有共性的地方,也有差异。对鲍曼来说,“个体化”指的是人们身份从“承受者”到“责任者”的转型,使行动者承担完成任务的责任,并对他们行为的后果(也就是说副作用)负责。③ 吉登斯所讲的个体化在我看来更像是一种可以灵活变动的结构,吉登斯反复提到了解放政治(Emancipatory politics)与生活政治(Life politics),他认为个体化的进程与生活政治紧密联系在一起,选择、自我实现

① [日]上野千鹤子. 近代家庭的形成和终结[M]. 北京:商务印书馆,2004:4—5.

② Howard, Cosmo. Contested Individualization: Debates about Contemporary Personhood [M]. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

③ [英]齐格蒙特·鲍曼. 流动的现代性[M]. 欧阳景根,译. 上海:上海三联书店,2002:49.

是个体化的核心内容。① 贝克认为个体化本身就是一种结构，就是第二波现代性的特点，个体化是“制度性的个人主义”（Institutionalized Individualism），个体在历史上第一次成为社会再生产的基本单位，没有确定的集体身份，如阶级等可以“自然地”“不加思考”地嵌入，而是必须通过选择和决定来体现出某一身份，“过自己的生活”。简言之，个体化正在成为第二波现代性社会自身的一个社会架构。②

阎云翔总结出个体化命题中有三个主要观点值得我们特别关注：第一个是吉登斯说的“去传统化”（detraditionalization），或贝克所指的脱嵌（disembedment）。个体日益从外在的社会约束中脱离出来，这些约束包括整体的文化传统和其中包含的一些特殊范畴，例如家庭、血缘关系和阶级地位。第二个是鲍曼所指的“强迫的和义务的自主”这种自相矛盾的现象（Bauman，2000：32）。③ 即现代社会结构强迫人们成为积极主动和自己做主的个体，对自己的问题负全责，发展一种自反性的自我（参见 Giddens，1991）④。第三个是“通过从众来创造自己的生活”（Beck and Beck-Gernsheim，2002：151），意思是倡导选择、自由和个性并不必然会使个体变得与众不同。相反，对社会制度的依赖决定了当代的个体不能自由地寻求并构建独特的自我，男男女女必须根据某些指南和规则来设计自己的生命轨迹，因此他们最终得到的反而是相当一致的生活。（阎云翔，2012：328—329）⑤

把个体化理论应用到家庭研究中去，阎云翔的《私人生活的变革》是一个很好的范本。阎云翔研究中国家庭模式时强调在社会变迁的过程中，“首先，过去在许多社会里仅仅作为一种生产与再生产的社会制度的家庭，如今逐渐演变为私人生活的中心以及个人的避风港。其次，在家庭成为私人圣地的同时，家庭内部的个体成员也开始了自己独立的私人生活，因此，

① Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age[M]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

② Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences [M]. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001.

③ Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Modernity[M]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

④ Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age[M]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

⑤ ［美］阎云翔. 中国社会的个体化[M]. 陆洋等，译. 上海：上海译文出版社，2012.

私人生活一词便具有了家庭与个人的双重含义”①。在这样一种理论指导下,阎云翔在考察中国家庭与私人生活过程中采取用个人中心的民族志方法,得出了两个非常重要的主题:(1)作为独立主体的个人的出现与发展;(2)国家在私人生活的转型以及个人主体性形成中所起到的重要作用。②这两个主题对研究性别与家庭的变迁是非常重要的,我们首先要看到个体,尤其是女性个体的存在,其次是在整个个体化进程中宏观背景与微观生活之间的互动。

在家庭研究中,把“人”作为个体的研究单位独立出来,给予家庭研究新的视角。这个个体不是抽象的,除了性格等不同,其性别、年龄和所处的辈分与阶层都赋予了这一家庭成员作为个体的独特性,其独特性会影响到整个家庭的运作,所以,需要把家庭分解为不同成员的组合体,看到不同成员的情况。在分析家庭认同的时候,我会把夫、妻、父母区分开来描述;在讨论代际关系的时候,把自己父母与配偶父母分开来讨论;在谈论家庭权力的时候,结合个体的年龄、辈分和性别的纬度来看。本文在讨论家庭认同的时候,就根据家庭角色对不同个体的家庭认同作了归纳和梳理。

此外,个体化还提供了一个与传统比较的视角,即脱嵌—再嵌入的过程,脱嵌并不意味着原来的价值理念不再被使用,而是原来的价值理念不再是一种结构性的力量,而是成为了个体可以选择的一种资源,因此,个体的主体性是非常重要的。

本文最后得出的结论“个体家庭”正是基于此视角发展而来,这一概念利用目前还是一款软件的名词:iFamily 作为总结目前家庭模式的一个词汇,我把它翻译为“个体家庭”③,这里的 i=I,也=individualization(个体化),强调目前上海家庭的动态性,以个体为中心,在个体化的进程中,通过个体之间以及各自家庭之间的博弈最后形成家庭结构、家庭认同和内部关

① [美]阎云翔. 私人生活的变革. 一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系1949—1999[M]. 龚小夏,译. 上海:上海书店出版社,2006:11.

② [美]阎云翔. 私人生活的变革. 一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系1949—1999[M]. 龚小夏,译. 上海:上海书店出版社,2006:19—20.

③ 确切的翻译似乎应该是“自我家庭”,因为 iChina 被翻译为“自我中国”,但是,在这里,个人觉得自我家庭很难理解,在中国文化还没有足够重视个体的情况下,先强调个体家庭,以后再强调自我家庭可能更好。

系运作模式的过程。本文详细阐述在家庭认同方面的变化。

传统的家庭认同："家族主义"

家族主义(Familism)这个词在英文词典中是没有的，是葛学溥(Daniel. H. Kulp)在研究中国华南的乡村生活之后创造的一个新词。他认为，家族主义是一种社会制度，所有的行为、标准、思想、观念都产生于或围绕着基于血缘聚居团体利益的社会制度。家族是所有价值判断的基础和标准，一切有利于家族的事务、行为，都会采纳、推行，而反之，就会被视为禁忌，加以修正和限制。①

后来的很多学者在对比中西方家庭体系和家庭制度不同时，都注意到了家族主义这样一种机制的存在。贝克(Baker)认为，在西方，家庭作为一个组织其存在主要是为了个体能被抚养长大和成为一个社会成员进入世界创造良好的环境。在传统中国环境中，与其说家庭能够存在是为了支持个人，还不如说个人存在是为了延续家庭②。伊斯曼(Eastman)认为中西方抚育孩子的目的是不同的。在西方，父母抚育孩子是为了使孩子成为一个独立的、自我实现的成人……在中国，儿童作为个体被珍视并不是因为他们的命运会展示他们独一无二的潜能，而是他们，尤其是儿子，将会有助于田地工作的价值。儿子将会延续家庭的姓、给父母养老、操办后事。所以，家族主义"familism"对中国人说是非常重要的，它是一种评价所有的观念和行为是否有利于家庭福利的体系。③ 桑顿认为(在中国)家庭被看作最基本的社会单位，个体的利益被放在大家庭的利益之后。老人得到充分的尊重，他们

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① ［美］丹尼尔·哈里森·葛学溥. 华南的乡村生活——广东凤凰村的家族主义社会学研究[M]. 周大鸣，译. 北京：知识产权出版社，2006. 此处直接引自周大鸣对《华南乡村生活》的译者序。

② Baker, Hugh D. R. Chinese Family and Kinship [M]. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979:26.

③ Eastman, Lloyd E. Family, Fields, and Ancestors: Constancy and Change in China's Social and Economic History, 1550－1949 [M]. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988:16.

的权威凌驾于年轻的家庭成员之上。①

这种家族至上的价值观念就是家族主义，它型塑了传统社会中人们的家庭认同。所谓家族至上，就是家族利益高于其他利益，重于其他利益，亲族联系重于其他一切联系。以家族至上作为导引家族成员思想、感情和行为的最高准则，作为最高的价值尺度，就是家族至上的价值观。② 这一系列文章都说明，一般认为中国的家庭利益高于个体利益，当两者相冲突的时候，以家庭利益为重。而这一原则之所以能够在中国执行，是因为中国盛行“家族主义”，而不是个人主义，家族主义是中国人的中心价值。③ 在西方体系下，人们不会将家庭看作是一个终身可以依靠的组织；而对中国人来说，家庭是一个世代延续的形式。④

中西方对家庭的界定是不同的。费孝通先生在20世纪30年代就指出：在不同的文化语境中，家庭的概念是不同的，英文中的“家”即family的概念不同于中文中“家”的概念。英文中的family表示的是由夫妇和未婚子女所构成的集团；而中国的“家”往往包括了已婚成年子女，其他亲属，有时甚至还包括仆佣等。为了表示这种差别，他特别提出用英文的Expanded Family作为中文“家”的翻译。⑤ 不仅如此，家的大小还依事业的大小而定：如果事业小，夫妇两人合作已够应付，这个家可以小的仅有子女、父母在内的核心家庭；如果事业大，超过了夫妇所能负担的程度的时候，家庭的集合就大了。⑥ 因此，家总是变现为一个能放能收、能伸缩的社会范围，可以“穷在闹市无人问，富在深山有远亲”。

虽然家庭概念具有伸缩性，但无论如何变化，在家族主义价值观体系

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① Thornton, Arland, Hui-Sheng Lin. Social Change And The Family in Chinese Taiwan [M]. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994:2.

② 杨知勇. 家族主义与中国文化[M]. 昆明：云南大学出版社，2000.

③ 刘创楚，杨庆堃. 中国社会从不变到巨变[M]. 香港：香港中文大学出版社，1989：179.

④ 刘创楚，杨庆堃. 中国社会从不变到巨变[M]. 香港：香港中文大学出版社，1989：46.

⑤ Fei. Hsiao-tung. Peasant life in China [M]. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1933.

⑥ 费孝通. 乡土中国·生育制度[M]. 北京：北京大学出版社，1998.

中，这个被认同的“家庭”，指的都是“父系、父居、父权”的家。在父系体系中，谁是“家里人”相对来说是比较好归属的，父系和居住的确定性使得家人的概念比较清晰，无论丈夫还是妻子所认同或只能认同的家庭就是父系家庭，并且这个家庭的利益置于个体利益之上。确认这个家庭是一个父系家庭，并且家庭利益高于个人利益，就使得一个家庭的家庭认同相对统一，个体的差异和分歧没有合法化的地位。

但是在现代化的进程中，尤其是居住的流动性成为了常态，家庭成员的认同就没有那么清晰简单了。本研究发现居住在同一家户中的人，甚至是夫妻之间对“谁是家人”的回答也是不同的，似乎印证了贝纳德所说的，当夫妻双方在谈他们的婚姻时，他们其实谈的是两个婚姻：妻子的婚姻和丈夫的婚姻。①

当代家庭认同模式：个体家庭

过去的研究把家庭看作一个整体，把家庭某成员的认同视为整个家庭的认同，但从个体化的视角出发，我在研究中发现妻子、丈夫以及老人的不同观点描述了同一家庭中不同成员的不同家庭认同，我把这种认同模式称为个体家庭模式（iFamily）。

在访谈许立萍家庭时，我询问了他们居住在一起的五个人：许立萍的爸爸妈妈、许立萍、她的丈夫严昊云和女儿。许立萍的女儿还小，许立萍的父亲耳背，没有参与讨论。

> 我：谁是你的家庭成员？
>
> 许立萍（妻子）马上问：那是小家还是大家？
>
> 我：小家怎么说，大家怎么说？
>
> 许立萍：如果小家的话，就是我们夫妻带着孩子。大家的话，就是我们三口加上我的父母和哥哥弟弟（许立萍没有把严昊云的母亲和兄弟算进去）。

① Bernard, Jessie. The Future of Marriage [M]. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

严昊云(丈夫):说到我们家的话,就是我们夫妻带着孩子加上父母亲。

我:就是你的母亲没有住过来,你认为也是这个家不可或缺的一部分对么?

严昊云:当然是。

我:那如果这个家的定义再大一点呢?

严昊云:那就是除了这些家庭成员,还有她的兄弟,加我的兄弟这样的。这样的家庭。

我们又把许立萍妈妈叫过来询问她的家庭概念。

许妈妈马上回答:我的家就是十六个人的家(没有任何计算过程)。我的四个子女,十四口人(其中两个子女生一个孩子,两个子女生了两个孩子)加上我们老两口一共十六个人。这些人总是在脑海里,一直在的。

我:那您的家在哪里呢?

许妈妈:我现在已经没有家了,到这里就为这个小家服务,到那里就为那个小家服务,现在我就是为一个个小家服务。

——个案24

这一家三个人的回答都非常具有代表性:首先,他们会很明确地区分大家庭小家庭的界限;其次,妻子、丈夫和父母对于谁是家人的回答是不同的,小家庭常常不包含配偶的父母;最后,小家庭的地位高于大家庭,所以,老人一旦没有自己的居住地或者没有实体的家庭,就认为自己没有家了,是在为其子女的小家服务。

在我其他的46个访谈个案中,这种回答比较普遍。个体家庭在认同方面的特征是以自己为中心,强调定位家庭(夫妇家庭)和自己的源生家庭(出

生所在家庭)①,并不一定把配偶的父母包含进来,这既和父系体系下的男性家庭认同不同,也和沃尔夫提出的“子宫家庭”(Margery Wolf, 1972)的概念不同,“子宫家庭”不包括自己的父亲。不同的家庭成员对家庭认同也是不同的。

对老人而言,**大伞下都是家里人**。大部分老人回答的共性是,自己的子女无论结婚与否都是自己的家人,因而老人的家庭显得特别的大。比如许立萍的妈妈,算也不算就直接告诉我他们家有16口人。对于父母来说,除非和媳妇或女婿的关系已经到了水火不容的地步,否则,在家庭成员中是不可能不包括子女家庭以及第三代的。对父母来说,尤其是对独生子女的父母来说,家里人是不可能把子女排除在外的,无论他们结婚与否。

我访谈的时候,正值蔡青青对她母亲不满,所以,她的家庭很清楚,就是三口之家的小家庭。而蔡青青父母对女儿也有抱怨,对女婿更是不满,但是,当我询问家里人时,蔡青青妈妈依然坚定地告诉我:他们三个,我们两个,五口人。

我:你们有没有觉得你们两个人是一个小家庭?呵呵,把他们三个人排除?

蔡青青爸爸:不可能的。

蔡青青妈妈:那不会的。独生子女啊。孩子总是一家人!不可能排除的。

——个案7

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① 在功能主义社会学家塔克特·帕森斯(1943)看来,家庭关系就像一个洋葱,可以被看作具有一系列的层。每一个层都是逐次的离位于中心位置的人越来越远的。不断增加的社会距离是以位于“洋葱”结构中心个体与外人之间的关系纽带逐渐弱化来表示的。例如,人们之间的接触越少,那么彼此之间的给予也就越少(Ched,1996)。在“洋葱”以外是更大的社会,在这里既不允许也不鼓励私人关系。根据帕森斯的理论,“洋葱”结构的中心是由两个家庭群体组成的。第一个是由个人加上他的父母以及兄弟姐妹既组成的群体,也就是个人的起源家庭。第二个群体对于大部分人来说是占据了他们生命的某些阶段的,它是由个人加上其配偶或许还有他们的儿子和女儿所组成的,也就是个人的定位家庭。对于大部分美国人来说虽然这两个群体都是极为重要的,帕森斯认为定位家庭在人们的成年时期具有最高的优先权。

对年轻的妻子来说，她有一个清晰的小家庭概念。女性的家庭认同很多时候和居住模式无关，血缘和亲密关系的影响更大，同时小家庭的概念也更突出。

崔浠是独生女，结婚后住在上海，崔浠的父母从来没有在崔浠家长住过，反倒是她婆婆在我访谈之前一直住在崔浠家，但是对崔浠来说，父母毫无疑问是家庭成员，婆婆当然不是。

> 我：你家人包含哪些人？
>
> 崔浠：我们家就我们三个，还要包含我的父母。一定要包含父母的。我们当时买房子的时候，就考虑给我父母一个常住的房间。因为我是独生女，我父母将来肯定是跟着我的。现在就是我儿子一个房间，我们俩一个房间，然后还有我父母一个房间的。
>
> 我：那你现在婆婆过来怎么住？
>
> 崔浠：她就住我父母的房间，对她来说，那是客房，不是她的房间，是我父母的房间。
>
> ——个案 14

年轻一代，尤其是女性，对小家庭的界定一般有两种：一种是只包含配偶和孩子；一种是包含自己的父母＋配偶＋孩子。而大家庭的概念相对灵活和广泛。

对男性而言，他的家庭认同更具包容性。对男性来说，家庭的概念似乎要比女性大很多，无论是所谓的小家庭还是大家庭。我的一个突出的印象是，当我询问谁是你的家里人时，大部分女性会问我：小家庭还是大家庭？或者就直接按照小家庭的概念回答，在我进一步询问后，再阐述大家庭的观念。而当问男性参与者这个问题时，他们第一个念头跑出来的就是大家庭。比如韩心的家庭概念显然是一个大家庭的概念。

> 我：如果你姐姐遇到困难的时候，你会？
>
> 韩心：她就是我的一家人，我会竭尽全力帮助她，她需要钱我就给她钱，她需要别的我就给她别的；包括我的外甥女，她以后读书啊，找工作啊什么的，我都会尽我所能帮助她。

韩心几次在访谈中谈到家人,他的家人的概念是非常广泛的:

> 韩心:现在我首先要帮到我的家人,就是我的父母、我爱人的父母、我的姐姐,还有我的外婆等,都需要我帮助,希望以后能够帮到更多的人。
>
> ——个案 4

家庭成员对谁是家里人的不同界定,提醒我们过去以父系家庭作为所有家庭成员的家庭认同单位,并且这个家庭具有整体的家庭利益的家庭主义已经逐渐过时了,取而代之的是我称之为“个体家庭”的认同模式。

个体家庭模式既不是从父系出发,也不是从核心家庭出发,而是以自己——无论是妻子和丈夫以及老人——为中心来构建家庭概念。妻子和丈夫的不同在于,妻子的家庭范围似乎比丈夫的小,而老人和年轻一代的不同在于是否把兄弟姐妹算作自己的家里人。这些差异体现了传统已经不再是结构,而成为了一种可取可舍的资源,个体根据自己的需求和与他人的关系来确定家庭成员。



但是在多元的认同中,我们还是可以看到个体家庭的一个重要趋势,即沿着自己的血缘关系展开的,同时包含了配偶,但是很可能排除配偶那边的家人,即血缘重于姻亲,正好形成了一个心形图案。

这一心形图案(见右)中,心形的左半部分是丈夫的源生家庭,右半部分是妻子的源生家庭,而中间重合的菱形部分是夫妻双方的定位家庭。这种模式并不意味着姻亲变得更重要,或者女方的家庭变得更重要,实际上无论对男女性来说,都是以自己为中心所认同的那个家庭更重要,而以自己为中心的家庭常常把血缘关系放在婚姻关系之上。

个体家庭是一种随时可以变动的形态,具有不确定性。在不同的层次上,个体家庭的内涵和外延是不同的:当冲突是在代际之间发生时,个体会强调三口之家的个体家庭;当个体与配偶有矛盾时,包含自己父母的个体家

庭就会占据上风;而当面对其他亲属的时候,包含双方父母的家庭会成为一种认同。这样的情况也同样发生在需求中。因此,讨论个体家庭模式的认同就像讨论一盆水的形状,器具决定了它的形状。而这个器具就是家庭内的个体,以及个体之间的力量博弈。

性别视野下的个体家庭认同

个体家庭模式一个非常重要的特征就是妻子一方的家庭成为了与丈夫的家庭体系同等重要的一个部分。孔迈隆认为在传统中国的语境中,后代的男性体系被高度的个体化,因为男性最大的责任就是确保家庭最大化的扩大……①而个体化的过程,强迫女性也要成为个体,用贝克的话来说,女性是"从为他人而活"到"为自己的生活"②。由于女性过去在家庭中受到压迫最深,因而反抗的弹力也更足。正是因为女性在家庭中的崛起,导致原来父系的家庭结构变成了心形的个体家庭系统。

但这种变化是从何时开始的,还有待于进一步的研究。早在20世纪70年代,沃尔夫就对这种父系视野下的家庭结构和认同的研究提出了质疑。沃尔夫发现,对男人来说,大家庭似乎只包含他们的直系祖先(父亲、祖父等)和他们自己的后代。而对女性来说,这个大家庭并不是自然而然的,需要人为的努力和联结:女性只有通过产生自己的后代,才能把自己和一个父系体系联系起来,否则她在家庭中是没有重要位置的。所以,沃尔夫提出一个问题:"女性如何定义她的家庭呢?"③

当沃尔夫在田野中重点关注女性的家庭认同时,她发现了子宫家庭。在女性还是一个孩子的时候,她的家庭就是她的母亲,有时候扩展到她的祖母。她和自己出生的家庭的父系体系的关系是暂时的,一旦她出嫁,她

① Cohen, Myron. L. House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Chinese Taiwan[M]. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976:27.

② Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences [M]. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001.

③ Wolf, Margery. Women and the Family in Rural Chinese Taiwan [M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972:31.

和父亲的家族关系就中断了，所以对她来说，意义最重大的是子宫家庭：她的母亲和她母亲的孩子们，但是把父亲排斥在外。一旦女性自己结婚生育后，就开始建立以其自身为中心的子宫家庭。她从来没有完全把“家庭”界定为父亲的家庭或者丈夫的家庭。当她结婚后，对她嫁入的家庭来说，她是一个外来者，而对中国人来说，外来者总是被怀疑的对象。她的丈夫和她的公公并不把她看作家庭成员，而是传宗接代的必要条件。所以，女性必须要通过生孩子来建立她自己的子宫家庭，并据此来紧密联系自己和夫家的关系。①

沃尔夫总结道：从男性的视角来看中国家庭是一条家系脉络（a line of descent），包含这个男性家户的所有成员并通过他的后代扩展开去。而从一个女性的视角来看，中国人的家庭并不是一个联系过去和未来的连续家系，而是一个当下的团体，是一个女性从其需要出发的团结体。②

沃尔夫暗示要重新检视以前所有的关于中国家庭的文献，这些研究从男性视角来看是如此，但是如果从女性视角来看，则可能完全不同。子宫家庭的利益常常和男性主导的家庭体系的利益相冲突。但是，沃尔夫的这一“洞察”在后来的研究中却鲜有延续。大部分关于家庭的文章依然是把家庭作为一个整体来讨论，实际上是把男性的家庭观作为一个范本来讨论，对于女性的家庭观以及这种家庭观的变迁却很少有详细描述的。

个体化中的明显变化是女系和男系处于同等的重要地位。过去研究差序格局是把在这个“自我”理解为男性，因此，在父权体系中，对男性来说，以自我为中心的往外的涟漪是比较清楚的，因为他日常生活接触和主观认同的体系和父系是相吻合的。但是对于女性来说，这个往外的涟漪中，自己家庭这边的亲属关系和丈夫那边的亲属关系究竟是如何排列的，这一点，我们非常不清楚。除了玛格瑞特仔细了解和询问过女性的家庭观，从而总结出了女性的“子宫家庭”概念外，我们对于传统中国中女性的家庭认同和亲属关系的认同情况知之甚少。

从心形的个体家庭认同模式来看，正是由于女性强调自己的代际关系，

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① Wolf, Margery. Women and the Family in Rural Chinese Taiwan[M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972: 34 - 35.

② Wolf, Margery. Women and the Family in Rural Chinese Taiwan [M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972: 37.

尤其是对父母的认同，导致家庭认同的模式发生了全面的变化，从过去连绵的三角形变成了一个一般只包含三代的家庭认同体系，同时，与子宫家庭有关的小家庭的概念被凸现出来。

女性那一方的家庭如果在经济实力、地域上和男方处于同等层次上的话，那么女性这一方的家庭脉络格局完全可以和男性这一方平起平坐，处于势均力敌的地位，而不再像过去那样，被隐在身后。而这正是心形个体家庭模式特点之一。同时，女性对于家族的认同相对来讲缺乏家族或宗族的概念，因而仅仅强调直系之间的关系，这种特点也影响到男性的家庭认同和家庭行为。家庭认同的模式已经发生了和过去完全不同的变化。

从性别角度而言，女性相比男性有更强的个体化动力。在传统社会中，等级依靠“角色轮流”来维持稳定，而男女尊卑却一直是存在冲突的，因此，随着西方思想的进入，这一方面首先得到了冲击，①被压迫的一方总是比压迫一方更有斗争的动力。

个体家庭的出现实际上是女性个体意识觉醒的结果，女性把自身的血缘和婚姻脉络加入到了家庭中，从而形成了一个家庭内两条家系的状况，这两条家系在一个家庭内的表现就是家庭成员不同的家庭认同，两条家系的斗争和妥协形成了多元而流动的家庭结构。

总之，个体家庭的认同模式在特征上显现出妻子这一方家庭脉络的兴起，但是，这一兴起不能简单地归纳为姻亲更重要，兴起的背后是个体化进程对家庭的影响。从个体化的角度来审视今天的家庭变迁，家庭的变迁并不是走向核心化，而是出现了多元灵活的个体家庭模式。

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① 刘创楚，杨庆堃．中国社会从不变到巨变[M]．香港：香港中文大学出版社，1989：51.

受流动影响的农民家庭研究

本文“受流动影响的农民家庭”所指既包括正在流动中的农民家庭，也包括因部分家庭成员外出而受到流动影响的农民家庭。

一、离土离乡和离家

农民大规模离土离乡的流动大潮在中国已经持续了三十年之久，且流动规模仍在持续扩大中。据国家统计局提供的数据，2011 年全国农民工总量已达 2.53 亿，其中外出农民工 1.59 亿，①中国农民的迁移潮规模之大、持续时间之长可谓史无前例、举世无双。

（一）农民家庭的“拆分式”流动

20 世纪 70 年代末 80 年代初中国沿海地区凭借乡村工业兴起，农民洗脚上田，以离土不离乡的方式完成职业身份的转变。而大规模跨地区的流动是从农村劳动力离乡开始的。

离乡，往往是个体流动迁移的起点。早在二十世纪八九十年代，农民家庭成员的迁移方式还主要是以个体、分散外出的方式进行。离乡也意味着离家，离家的农民成为原子化的劳动者。根据第四次人口普查资料显示，1990 年户主和配偶均为流动人口的比例仅占 7.44％，因此，那时人口学家认为农民家庭化迁移少到可以忽略不计（蔡昉，1997）。社会学研究者也指出，那时农民工的家庭关系是以分居家庭为主，并认为在未来几十年中，分居家

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① 国家统计局. 2011 年我国农民工调查监测报告［R/OL］.［2012 - 04 - 27］. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm.

庭仍是中国农民工家庭的主要模式(李强,1996)。

这种迁移模式把生产和人口的再生产拆分在城市和家乡两地进行(金一虹,2010),即使不断有家庭成员流动外出,也是有先后次序的。

(二) 进城农民:未曾完成的市民化

进入21世纪之后,迁移模式发生了变化,农民从农村向都市的迁移逐渐从个体化流动向家庭化流动转变。据国家统计局数据,在2008年时,举家外出的农民工2 859万,而2011年时举家外出的已达3 279万,所占比例也从20.36%提高到20.67%。①

有研究者利用2006年北京市1%流动人口调查数据分析得出,59.8%流动人口以家庭形式在京居住(侯佳伟,2009);但另有研究者利用同样的数据却得出,北京市已婚流动人口中,至少有70%仍然和他们的核心家庭成员处于分离状态的结论(张文娟,2009)。如何解释利用同一数据会得出差距如此之大的结论?有分析认为,是因对流动人口家庭化的概念不统一和科学测量家庭化问题未得解决之故(张航空、李双全,2010)。

但笔者认为有一个重要解释因素不容忽略:即使夫妇和他们的成年子女同为流动人口,也可能分布在不同地区;即使一家人在同一个城市,由于工作和居住条件等限制,也可能是同城分居。因此,如洪小良所言,"举家外出"并不是一个关于家庭迁移的好的指标变量,而以"家庭化迁移"概念更为准确(洪小良,2007)。

"家庭化迁移"所指的"家庭"是核心家庭,家庭化迁移是一个核心家庭成员以家庭在迁入地共居为目标的陆续迁移过程。家庭化流动在今天已成趋势是毫无疑问的,但这一趋势并未改变多数受流动影响的农民家庭被拆分的事实。

根据前述国家统计局农民工统计监测数据显示,尽管家庭化迁移逐渐增加,但是起码有70%—80%的流动农民家庭仍处在分离状态。流动者在流入地生活十年八年,甚至更长,至今在流入地还属于"外来人口"。即使实现"举家迁移",也仍然没有获得"户"的合法建制。人们经常把流动入城农

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① 国家统计局. 2011年我国农民工调查监测报告[R/OL]. [2012-04-27]. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm.

民难以市民化的障碍归结为户籍制，但是，户籍只是流动进城农民难以市民化的诸多壁垒之一，附着在户籍之上的还有市民所应享的就业、子女教育、住房、医疗、社会救助等等福利的壁垒。

移入城市者迟迟不能市民化，重要原因之一是市场对农民家庭的排斥——市场需要的是原子化的、没有“家庭负担”的廉价劳动力，而不是“拖家带口”的从业人员；从资本的利益出发，年轻劳动力的循环流动是最为有利的。

市民化的进程也与一个地区城市化的战略选择紧密相关。固然城市的扩张能力受限于城市的福利容量，但从局部、狭隘的既得利益出发，城市化需要扩张的是空间、是不断圈入农村土地；它愿意接受容纳的是新鲜的劳动力，却不希望把这些劳动力需要抚养、赡养的非劳动人口的家庭成员包揽进来。

由是，我们看到，一方面进城农民顽强地坚持举家迁入城市的目标，把家庭成员分批带入流入地，特别是新生代农民工，他们不再把回乡作为退路，①而是在流入地成家生儿育女；②但另一方面城市的管理体系仍然对已经安营扎寨的“流动家庭”视而不见，甚至选择性排斥。③ 因此，中国农民流动具有从农业向非农产业转移、从农村向城市转移的“离土离乡”意义，但农民和他们的家庭却始终处于流动之中，不能顺利落户完成市民化过程。

对流动进城农民既不愿退回农村，又难以在城市立足的困境，王春光以“半城市化”概括之。“半城市化”是相对于“城市化”而言的，是从整合理论角度出发，描述流动农民一种介于回归农村与彻底城市化之间的状态（王春

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① 根据深圳市总工会 2010 年对 5 000 名新生代农民工调查，99%的人不愿将来再回乡务农。43.8%的人明确表示要长期留下来。（张玮．深圳新生代农民工状况调查：99%不愿回乡务农[N]．南方日报，2010－07－15）

② 据中国人民大学人口与发展研究中心 2009 年组织的“中国流动人口问题研究”提供的数据，在家庭流动的流动人口中，大约有 1/3 的流动人口家庭是在流入地生育孩子组成的；另有国家人口计生委流动人口服务管理司数据，2007 年全国流出人口在外地生育子女总数达到 102.4 万（当前流动人口计划生育的总体状况[R/OL]．[2010－07－07]．江西省人口和计划生育委员会网站）。以上数据仅为说明流动人口在外生育子女的趋势，并非直接引自官方数据，仅作参考。

③ 深圳、北京、上海都曾有限制流动人口之举或官员提案。（周昌和，孙天明．深圳官员称应设置生存环境壁垒，让外地人无地可住主动离开[N]．南方都市报，2012－01－10）

光,2006)。

本文从城乡居民身份转化角度谈市民化。所谓市民化,不仅仅指获得市民户籍身份,还包括享有附着于户籍之上的城市居民的权利和福利。从这个意义上说,中国农民流动尚处于未曾完成的市民化的阶段。

在社会福利和人口统计方面(包括第六次人口普查),流动家庭至今未在城市获得“家庭户”的法定地位,其家庭成员只能以“流动”和“暂住”劳动者的个体身份存在,这在一个以家庭作为重要福利单位的国家,是一个颇为扭曲的社会现象。

(三)“非常态家庭”的常态化

农民进入了城市,但城市又不能使家庭成员实现空间聚合,流动家庭大多处于成员离散、家庭结构功能缺损、家庭维系受到挑战的状态(金一虹,2009)。在各种离散中,又以夫妻被迫分居和未成年儿童被迫与父母分离造成的后果最为严重。

有一份对安徽、河南、湖南、江西和四川五省十个行政村留守妇女的调查显示:7.5%留守妇女的丈夫结婚当年就外出务工,37.1%留守时间在三年以下,13.4%留守四至五年,留守六至九年的达12.1%,而留守十年以上的,高达37.4%(叶敬忠、吴惠芳,2009)。

流动家庭夫妇处于长期分离状态、孩子在低幼年龄处于或父母一方缺席或双亲缺席的家庭环境,可以说是家庭的非常态存在。这里所说的“非常态”是指夫妻、亲子的被迫分离。严重的还在于这种“非常态化”常常被社会忽略或仅轻描淡写地处理。

长期的分居将对婚姻和社会的稳定带来什么样的影响?几乎所有相关研究报告都承认农民家庭这种非常态化有负面影响,但是,这些报告又倾向强调分离对婚姻关系和家庭成员的负面影响有限(许传新,2009),起码“没有证据说明流动破坏了婚姻的稳定性”(魏翠妮,2006),甚至有认为因两地分居会增进感情,夫妻关系变得更加和谐(叶敬忠、吴惠芳,2009)。

但是杜凤莲利用中国居民健康和营养调查(CHNS)数据比较分析了有流动劳动力人口家庭和无流动劳动力人口家庭后证实:在其他条件不变的情况下,劳动力流动显著提高离婚率达60%以上(杜凤莲,2010),这意味着流动不仅对流动家庭存在负面影响,而且这种负面影响不容小觑。

以农民家庭为主、村集体部分提供的传统福利供给模式遭到破坏(农民历来别无选择地依赖着这种供给模式),但城市又不能供给进城农民以市民现代福利方式。一亿多留守儿童、留守妇女、留守老人,[①]受到流动影响,他们原应从家庭中享有的权益(抚育、赡养、照顾和情感满足)实际被忽略。农民大规模流动在经济意义以外的效应,即"对数千年来相对稳定的小农家庭造成剧烈的冲击,从基础结构层面颠覆着乡村社会,导致乡土中国走向解体"(张玉林,2006)。

二、家庭的"非常态化"何以能长存?

人们难免要质疑:受流动影响的农民家庭长期处于功能缺损、家庭成员间互助和情感需求包括性的需求不能得到满足的非常态状态,它是如何被接受的并维系下来的?

(一) 家庭选择策略、利他主义和对婚姻的低期待?

对此理论界通常解释为:家庭选择策略说、中国家庭基于家庭本位的利他主义传统说以及中国农民对婚姻的低期待等。

基于移民理论中家庭选择策略说认为,农民选择部分成员分散外出是一种寻求家庭经济利益最大化、风险最小化的家庭策略。由此获得的经济收益能对家庭情感缺失形成补偿作用。(Yuen-fong Wong,1993;罗小峰,2010)

此间形成的物质(丈夫赚取经济收入)与责任(妻子照顾家庭)的交换使双方能很好维系夫妻关系,这是在现有资源条件下做出的最佳选择。(叶敬忠、吴惠芳,2009)

这些分析报告大多会引用费孝通先生的话,在家庭情感功能和经济功

① 据各种研究报告测算,中国农村有留守妇女在 4 700 万—8 500 万之间、留守儿童 5 861 万、留守老人 4 000 万[数据来自张原. 中国农村留守妇女的劳动供给模式及其家庭福利效应[J]. 农业经济问题,2011(05);全国妇联. 全国农村留守儿童状况研究报告[R/OL]. [2008 - 03 - 05]. 中国妇女网 http://www.women.org.cn/allnews/02/1985.html;中国老年学学会常务副会长赵宝华. 农村人口老龄化高于城市 农村留守老人达 4 000 万[N]. 京华时报,2011 - 10 - 05]。如前所述,所引数据仅作显示这一"三留守"群体的庞大存在之用,本文并未对可能相互矛盾的数据进行辨析。

能两方面，如果偏重经济事业上的合作，是可以“把感情方面的要求撇开一下”。但是，恰恰是费孝通先生指出，这是“夫妇关系的片面化”（费孝通，1998：146），而不是一种常态，因此是不能持久维持的。

另一种解释即中国文化传统是基于家庭本位而不是个人本位的。如李强通过对中国外出农民工汇款比例高于其他国家这一事实的研究提出，中国农民工家庭成员之间存在“天然利他主义”（altruism），农民工个人在外节衣缩食、高比例汇款回家是基于对“家庭共同体”的基本认知，是注重家庭整体利益的正常体现（李强，2001）。

这些解释掩盖了遭受现有福利制度排斥的农民家庭做出拆分式迁移决策背后的无奈，而家庭总体经济收益的提高，也掩盖了部分家庭成员为此付出更大牺牲的事实。一些留守老人挑起经营农田和隔代抚育的重担，是因为老一辈对资源的掌控能力和权威的衰微，已丧失了与子代讨价还价的能力，这是强迫性“利他”，绝非“天然”；同样，农村妇女因在劳动力市场处于更不利的位置以及受“男主外、女主内”的性别分工模式支配，不得不选择“支持”丈夫外出，自己留守家园的分工模式。

有观点认为，妻子留守使女性为家庭创造的价值显性化，因而在某种程度上可提高妇女的家庭地位（李小云，2006）；留守妇女的劳动负担虽然增加了，但是由于丈夫的“缺席”，她们的家庭决策权反而增加了（Matthews & Nee，2000）。

但事实是，男性缺席下留守妇女的决策权并未增加，丈夫仍然是“管理者”“指挥者”，而留守妻子只是“生产者”、是辅助性的“配合者”，她们的地位并没有得到根本改变（郑真真等，2001；孙琼如，2006）。因农业和非农就业比较收益差导致了“谁拥有了外出务工的机会，谁在家庭事务中就有更大的发言权”（郑真真、解振明，2004），使得妇女对家庭的贡献被大大低估，尽管她们承担了主要的田间劳动和照顾性劳动。这直接影响到她们的家庭地位（金一虹，2010）。

而留守妇女重新分配时间资源的结果，对老人最为不利——留守妇女花费在照顾老人方面的时间显著减少，特别是对婆婆的照料大约只占到非留守妇女花费时间的 1/7，照顾公公的时间减少一半（张原，2011）。

当然，最没有协商权、自我选择权的是那些留守儿童。他们只能由父母做主，在不断变换监护人的情况下度过自己不稳定的童年。概言之，没有天

然的利他，只有在一定社会制度规制下的“利他”，而被迫利他将损害最脆弱的家庭成员的利益。

有研究证明农民对婚姻期待值低，特别是留守妇女保有婚姻期待的传统取向，即把子女作为婚姻的第一维系因素，而把情感置于不重要的位置（许传新，2009）。这些研究认为，流动农民既无力支付一家团聚的资本，也没有经受家庭解体的资本，因此流动家庭得以取得某种平衡。但是从权利角度看，对婚姻幸福的期待和正常情感满足的需求城乡居民是共同的，也是应该给予尊重的。忽略对这些正常需求权利的剥夺不仅是非人化的，也是最终导致流动家庭乃至社会不稳定的原因。

研究也表明，流动家庭的非常态化的负面影响有累积效应，如杜凤莲的研究表明，对婚龄而言，五年是一个时点，高于五年后，有流动人口家庭的离婚率一直高于无流动人口家庭（杜凤莲，2010）。另一项关于留守儿童的测试也发现，五年是一个拐点，留守时间五年以上儿童的心理失衡得分显著高于留守时间五年以下的儿童（胡心怡等，2007）。

（二）流动的家庭化，流动家庭的自救

有关流动家庭的研究有意无意地忽略了拆分式流动对受流动影响的农民问题的严重性。但是试想一下，如果63%的流动家庭夫妻分离在四年以上，将近四成分离在十年以上，我们还能平静地分析，流动家庭的这样一种非常态存在能否继续维持吗？

在上述解释性研究中还忽略了一个重要因素，即流动农民的代际变化。当新生代逐渐成为城市流动者的主力之时，“新生代”农民工个体主义的觉醒对作为家庭正常赋予个人权益的诉求，将使其对被迫拆分、长期分居分离变得不可忍受。他们正在用自己的方式表达权利的诉求。有研究指出，根据“生存策略”，农民要单独、分散外出；但根据“生活策略”，他们又要设法和配偶生活在一起，进一步，有留城意向的会将子女带入城市生活（王毅杰，2005）。

农民流动家庭化的动力并不仅仅是生活策略，也是生存策略的一部分。流动的家庭化，就是流动农民在制度环境没有彻底改变的情况下，自我改善生存状况的努力之一。比如，他们在城郊结合部见缝插针、在简陋租住房内建起“自己的家”、在小区路边游击式创业、在流动中同居生育等。据统计，近三分之一的流动家庭是在流入地生育孩子组成的，在广东东莞这一比例

甚至超过半数(张航空、李双全,2010)。

有研究分析了农民流动家庭化的特点,即家中最年轻的劳动力外出,然后是已经成家的主要劳动力,再其次是配偶和已成年的子女,最后把需要抚养的人口带到城市(王微,2005),但是极少有农民家庭把需要赡养的人口带入城市的。也就是说,家庭化流动仍然是养小不养老的。换言之,只要继续对进城农民设置市民化堡垒,只要城市的福利和社会保障制度不能覆盖到流动农民和他们的家庭,那么进城农民顽强扎根城市的行动,一方面将使都市贫民窟和与此相关的种种社会问题成为城市化令人生畏的伴生物和痼疾,也使农村的“三留守”带来的农村社会问题继续延续甚至矛盾加深。

三、流动农民市民化障碍分析

从长远看,中国的现代化、城市化必然经历进城农民市民化的过程,而实现农民的市民化又必须以实现家庭化移民为前提,也就是说,只有当都市接纳农民以家庭户(一个重要的福利单位)进入其中,才是真正的市民化。

《人民日报》刊文提出:基于农民工已经成为城市产业工人的主体、农民工是城市新增人口的主要来源以及国家目前已具备一定财政能力,“加快农民工市民化进程的基本条件已经具备”(迟福林,2010)。

但是农民工市民化至今仍然是只闻声响不见进展,其主要障碍何在?一个普遍的看法是户籍制是阻碍农民市民化的最主要的壁垒。户籍制确实是阻碍进城农民实现市民化的最大障碍,中央政府早在2009年中央经济工作会议上就提出“把符合条件的农业转移人口逐步在城镇就业和落户作为推进城镇化的重要任务,放宽中小城市和城镇户籍限制”①。但即使户籍实现城乡统一并不等于解决了一切。重要的是进城农民能否平等享有附着在户籍上的诸多城市居民福利。这种应享是实质性的而不是口头的。

有对策研究如全国总工会的报告提出,优先解决新生代农民工的户籍问题——每年给400万个指标以使新生代农民工落户,该报告一方面要求使他们“享有与当地市民平等的待遇”,一面又建议“要逐步剥离附加在户口上

① 中央经济会议举行,胡锦涛温家宝作重要讲话[N/OL]. http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-12/07/content_1481724.htm.

的社保、住房、子女教育、交通、就业等公共服务和社会福利，还原其人口登记管理的本来面目，引导人口自由而有序地迁徙流动和就业”①。该政策建议之所以向“新生代农民工”倾斜，是因为“一亿新生代农民工，正在成为市场主力”，仍然是基于通过将年轻进城农民个体化、原子化以及与社会福利相剥离以保持劳动的年轻廉价的“优质性”的市场逻辑，而不是出于对农民、农民家庭长远利益的考虑。

另有研究报告提出“大都市农民工第三地市民化”，认为进入上海的农民工收入使之生活无法持续达到上海“市民”生活水平，因此不适宜在上海就地市民化，应该采用第三地账户的社会保障来解决这个矛盾。实际这一建议是原有的把农民“在城市生产，在农村养老养小”的生产/人口再生产模式变成“大都市生产，小县城养老”的模式。② 虽然流动农民家庭福利有可能得到改进，但仍是为了保障大都市通过保持生产和人口再生产两种生产间的差等而获利的考量。

此外，还有让农民将其农村房产作价换取“房屋券”到城市购房等建议③，立足点是“盘活农村资产”……凡此种种，都是城市中心、以维护城市既得利益集团利益出发，这才是城乡二元分割结构迟迟不能打破、进城农民市民化壁垒重重、流动农民长期处于家庭成员离散、家园难归又无法在城市长久立足的半市民化胶着状态的根源。

因此，制定城市化和推进进城农民市民化政策，必须立足于使农村、农民、农民家庭在现代化、城市化过程中平等分享利益的原则(至少不损害他们的利益)，以“就业”和“落户”并行的“家庭化移民”方式，完成流动农民市民化这一伟大的转变。

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① 李泽民. 全总报告建议：每年解决 400 万新生代农民工进城落户[N]. 每日经济新闻，2011-02-22.

② 该建议见林建永：《“海归模式”应成为大都市农民工市民化的现实选择》。该文系 2007 结项长三角三地社科规划办联合课题“长三角 16 城市农民工现状调查”部分成果(未公开发表)。

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［30］ 张航空，李双全.流动人口家庭化状况分析［J］.南方人口，2010(06).

［31］ 张文娟.流动人口的家庭结构——以北京市为例［J］.北京行政学院学报，2009(06).

［32］ 张玉林."离土"时代的农村家庭——"民工潮"如何解构乡土中国［M］//吴敬琏，江平.洪范评论(第3卷第2辑).北京：中国政法大学出版社，2006.

［33］ 张原.中国农村留守妇女的劳动供给模式及其家庭福利效应［J］.农业经济问题，2011(05).

［34］ 郑真真，周云，郑立新，杨元，赵东霞，楼超华，赵双玲.城市外来未婚青年女工的性行为、避孕知识和实践——来自5个城市的调查［J］.中国人口科学，2001(02).

［35］ 郑真真，解振明.人口流动与农村妇女发展［M］.北京：社会科学文献出版社，2004.

［36］ 周宗奎，孙晓军，刘亚，周东明.农村留守儿童心理发展与教育问题［J］.北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)，2005(01).

［37］ Matthews, Rebecca & Victor Nee. Gender Inequality and Economic Growth in Rural China［J］. Social Science Research, 2000(29).

［38］ Yuen-fong Wong. Circulatory Mobility in Post-Mao China: Temporary Migrants in Kaiping County, Pearl River Delta Region［J］. International Migration Review, 1993(27):578-604.

农村留守儿童

——缺失的不仅是亲情

一、研究目的和方法

近期关于“新生代农民工”(或80后、90后农民工)的讨论越来越吸引社会关注的目光,而作为农民工子女的进城流动儿童和在乡留守儿童,正是新生代农民工的巨大后备军。这个庞大群体的生存和成长状况,对于今后几十年中国的社会、政治、经济状况,有着直接和深远的影响。从儿童权利角度看,这个群体无论是进城的还是在乡的,都处于多种不利的结构之中,面临着教育、心理、健康等诸多问题。相较于流动儿童,在乡的留守儿童由于父母(或其中一方)不在身边,可能遇到的问题更多。

应该说,政府、研究者和媒体给予了农民工子女较多的关注,各种调查逐渐揭示了这个群体各个层面的问题。但现有的研究也存在不少缺陷,①特别是早期一些对留守儿童的调查,有某种夸大留守儿童自身问题,并且将这些不良问题归咎于父母责任的倾向。由此可能造成对留守儿童在认识上的误导,影响各种干预行动和有关政策的思路。

本研究致力于寻找、辨析留守儿童存在的真实问题。文章分两条线索:

一是对已有研究的再研究,主要是通过中国知网“中国学术期刊网络出版总库”,使用了“留守儿童”“留守孩”“留守子女”“留守少年”四个关键词对期刊论文进行搜索,时间从最早的1994年至2010年5月底,共查阅到1 452篇文章,再筛选出影响较大、方法比较规范的文献170篇左右,对其做重点解

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① 请参照下文。

读，从中提炼出现有研究中能够反映留守儿童真实问题的主要结论。此外，还参考了有关流动儿童的论文、影响较大的报道，以及各种政策文件等。

二是笔者参与的有关研究的资料分析。主要的课题是：中国社科院社会学所“中国农村贫困定性研究”课题①（以下简称“贫困课题”），该课题在2006年对6个省的12个村做了深入调查，其中涉及外出打工和留守问题；还有中国社科院妇女/性别研究中心“农民工流动对儿童的影响”课题②（以下简称“留守课题”），该课题在2006—2007年对四川T县外出集中的一个村以及“T”县打工者集中的广东衡镇作了访谈，并在3个城市、3个乡镇分别做了流动父母、流动儿童和在村儿童的问卷调查。在此基础上，结合其他相关文献，对农村留守儿童问题进行延伸的分析。最终勾勒出农民工子女问题被认识、被问题化的背景和脉络，并从结构和资源的角度，提出留守儿童的边缘化，是由农民工“拆分式再生产”的模式，农村社会的解体，二元分割的教育体制等诸种不利的制度结构交织而成，家庭结构的不完整只是其中一个因素，它加剧了其他不利结构造成的问题。

二、问题的提出

常识告诉我们，农村留守儿童应当是与农民工同时出现的群体，比流动儿童出现更早，人数更多。1995年我们在湖南5个县调查了266名已婚的外出打工者，带子女（流动儿童）外出的仅12人，夫妻一方外出一方在家带子女的有196人，夫妻双方外出将子女托付给祖辈的有52人，后面的两类即后来所说的“留守儿童”。当时的调查已经涉及与后来差不多的留守孩子的学习和心理问题。③ “386199部队”④作为现在每个人耳熟能详的戏称，至少在

① 研究得到世界银行和英国国际发展署的支持。课题负责人王晓毅，并由核心课题组和地方七个课题组组成。成果主要有：《中国12村贫困调查》理论卷、江西—云南卷、四川—江苏卷、甘肃—内蒙古卷（共四本），社会科学文献出版社2009年出版。

② 研究得到中国社会科学院支持，课题负责人谭深，主要成员包括：罗琳、吴小英、杨宜音、唐有财、许平、庄明等。成果见中国社科院妇女/性别研究中心：《“农民工流动对儿童的影响”课题成果》，印刷本，未公开发表。

③ 邓微. 婚姻关系与家庭关系[M]//中国社会科学院社会学研究所“农村外出务工女性”课题组. 农民流动与性别. 郑州：中原农民出版社，2000.

④ “38”指留守妇女，“61”指留守儿童，“99”指留守老人。

90 年代早期即已出现。

但在那个时期，人们的注意力还是放在农民工进城给城市等流入地带来的影响，以及进城农民工和流动子女的权益上。而在流出地，由于外出打工给农村家庭带来了一定收入，给地方带回一些资金，还洋溢着“外出一人，脱贫一户”“返乡创业”的乐观气氛，外出的收益一定程度上遮蔽了农村正在出现的问题。虽然许多调查已经涉及农村的负面问题，比如城乡收入差距持续扩大和农村贫困问题，公共服务匮乏问题，“三留守”问题，农村儿童辍学和新的“读书无用论”，等等，但总体来讲，对这些问题的关心还主要局限在“农口”和“教育口”等政府部门和研究者，没有进入高层和全社会的视野。

直到 2000 年，原湖北省监利县棋盘乡党委书记李昌平上书国务院，提出“农民真苦、农村真穷、农业真危险”，引起高层重视，国务院两次批示“要求重视问题的严重性”；同时引爆了社会对三农问题的大讨论。这个讨论出现在即将提出“全面建设小康社会”战略目标的中共中央十六大之前，对于这届党的大会和新一届领导层有着不同寻常的意义。为了达到“小康”的目标，增加农民收入成为重点问题，而外出打工是增加收入的重要途径，由此将农村问题与进城农民工问题联系起来。在十六大报告中，则第一次将改变城乡二元经济结构、统筹城乡经济社会发展、解决三农问题作为“全面建设小康社会的重大任务”。

在“三农”问题中，农村义务教育的问题尤为突出。一是农村少年儿童失学现象趋于严重，导致学生辍学的原因主要与经济因素和不断滋长的厌学情绪有关；二是在当时的财政体制下，教育投入成为乡镇财政和农民的沉重负担。这两个问题都与教育资源和财政资源在城乡间的分配不合理直接相关。对于城乡间流动的农民工子女，他们进城难以分享城市的义务教育资源，父母往往只能将其留在农村，成了城乡二元结构背景下特定的“留守儿童”群体。在讨论农村儿童教育问题的同时，留守儿童作为一个“新”的群体也浮出水面。

2004 年 5 月底，教育部基础教育司召开了“中国农村留守儿童问题研究”研讨会，这次研讨会标志着留守儿童问题正式进入政府的工作日程，成为留守儿童问题的报道、研究和干预“升温”的重要推力。会议指出，流动、留守儿童是三农问题的副产品，而长期以来我国的城乡二元结构体制是“三农”问题的最大障碍，农村留守儿童教育问题也受制于此。此番话点出了对

留守儿童关注“升温”的背景。这次会议前后，教育部基础教育司委托了几家研究机构和高校组成课题组，分别在各地调研留守儿童情况，这些调研报告成为最早并被频繁引用的一批留守儿童研究的文献。在此之后，农村留守儿童研究数量迅猛增长，研究的问题范围从在校教育发展到家庭教育和其他社会教育，从学习问题到心理、行为、安全、监护类型，以及留守儿童的群体特征和人口特征等等；媒体的文章更是犹如井喷，其带有悲情色彩的报道特别牵动人心。经过 20 年的沉默，农村留守儿童成为最受关注的群体之一。

三、主要的结论

（一）“留守”是一个阶段性的生存状态而不是长久属性

不可否认，农村留守儿童是一个规模巨大的群体。但是直到现在，并没有一个准确的数据。被引用最广泛的一个说法是：农村留守儿童的规模是 5 861万。[①] 但是按照同一研究者同一口径的数据，从 2000—2005 年，5 年时间，留守儿童数量增长了 3 418 万，一倍还多。加上流动儿童，农民工子女的数量增加了 3 800 多万；然而按国家统计局公布的同时期数据，整个流动人口才增加 296 万人（这个数据也被广泛使用）。这里显然有一个常识性错误，被研究者和引用者忽略了。

总体规模难以确定的原因，与现实中判定谁是“留守”是一个困难的问题有关。与“独生子女”是某些个体终身的属性不同，事实上，无论是父母还是孩子，都可能在外出与回乡的状态下转换。我们的调查显示，在乡的儿童中，有 1/4 曾经随父母外出过一次或更多，就是说他们曾经“流动”过（包括调查时父母在身边的“非留守儿童”）；城市的流动儿童中，除了有少量出生在城市且从来没有在农村较长居住过以外，其余的有一半在老家与城市间往返 2 次以上，他们也会有留守的经历。吕绍清对留守儿童调查时发现，近一半人曾随父母进城生活和学习。因此，“留守”不能作为一种身份或标签。

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① 段成荣，杨舸. 我国农村留守儿童状况研究[J]. 人口研究，2008(03).

（二）农村留守儿童整体上是“问题儿童”的判断依据不足

由于对留守儿童群体知之甚少，最初的研究集中在各种调查上。鉴于“三农”背景下，留守儿童问题从一开始就是作为“社会问题”提出的，多数的调查倾向于了解留守儿童群体的负面问题。其间媒体报道的极端案例和局部调查揭示的问题令人触目。如新华社一篇影响很大的报道援引心理咨询专家的评价认为，目前农村“留守孩”中已经出现了较严重的心理危机；①而另一些认为留守儿童整体上存在很大问题的专业论文，②大多对调查的方法交代不清，论证过程不具体，而且没有同样环境下的“非留守儿童”作为参照群体，轻易将留守儿童的不良问题简单归咎于父母的外出。这些文章和结论相互征引，成为一时“留守儿童是问题儿童”的刻板印象，引发出对留守儿童父母如潮的批评，比如父母“赚了票子，丢了孩子”等。

而那些方法比较规范的文献显示，调查时父母不在身边的留守儿童与调查时父母没有外出的儿童之间，在教育和心理方面没有显著的区别。父母外出与否对孩子的学习成绩、学习兴趣并没有显著影响。③ 从数据上看，留守儿童的接受义务教育状况好于农村非留守儿童（可能与外出打工家庭经济状况相对好有关）④；心理方面，父母的外出虽然可能使儿童出现一些不良情绪，但是不一定导致儿童的心理问题。⑤

（三）不利因素的相互作用造成留守儿童的心理问题

研究显示，留守儿童心理问题的出现和程度至少与以下几个因素相关：

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① 周伟.三成“留守孩”直言恨自己父母　江西盘古山镇的这项调查揭示了解决“留守孩”问题的紧迫性[N].新华每日电讯，2005－03－29.

② 林宏.福建省“留守孩”教育现状的调查[J].福建师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2003(03)；王玉琼，马新丽，王田合.留守儿童　问题儿童？——农村留守儿童抽查[J].中国统计，2005(01).

③ 朱科蓉，李春景，周淑琴.农村“留守子女”学习状况分析与建议[J].教育科学，2002(04)；课题组（吴霓）.农村留守儿童问题调研报告[J].教育研究，2004(10).

④ 段成荣，周福林.我国留守儿童状况研究[J].人口研究，2005(01)；段成荣，杨舸.我国农村留守儿童状况研究[J].人口研究，2008(03).

⑤ 周宗奎，孙晓军，刘亚，周东明.农村留守儿童心理发展与教育问题[J].北京师范大学学报（社会科学版），2005(01).

其一是留守的模式

关键在于母亲是否在身边。有几项对小学和初中学生的测试发现，无论是单亲外出、双亲外出的留守儿童还是非留守儿童，均呈现出对母亲的依恋质量最强，对朋友依恋质量次之，对父亲的依恋质量最低的趋势。① 因此，单亲留守的如果是母亲，对于儿童心理没有太大影响。

另有对儿童健康的调查数据显示，父母均外出的留守儿童健康状况最佳，次为与母亲一起留守的儿童，最差的是仅母亲外出的留守儿童，其患病风险最高、就诊率最低，处于最为不利的境地。② 对于这样一个复杂的结果，研究者分析认为，这反映了留守儿童在卫生服务利用方面的困境，即只能依靠经济支持来弥补在健康人力支持方面的不足；而劳动力市场和家庭内部传统的性别角色定位，又决定了母亲的角色是提供照料服务，在劳动力市场上是没有优势的。双亲外出打工的家庭，经济条件相对比较好，故而在儿童健康方面可能有更多投入；母亲留守，儿童可能得到更多的健康照料；但是女性外出务工，其经济状况低于夫妇双方外出打工或男性外出打工的家庭，同时也显著降低了儿童日常照料的可得性。因此，与男性相比，女性外出会给留守儿童的健康以及卫生服务利用带来更少的收入效应，以及更大的负面作用。

其二是父母离开时儿童的年龄

全国妇联2008年的研究报告按年龄分层，清晰地梳理了幼儿、义务教育阶段儿童和大龄儿童各自生活的境况、面临的问题和需求。如留守幼儿面临的突出问题是得不到足够时间的母乳喂养；缺少父母亲情呵护和亲子交流，对幼儿认知、情感、社会性发展都会有深刻而持久的影响；接受正规学前教育的机会少，在家庭教育上的不足得不到正规学前教育的补偿。义务教育阶段农村留守儿童面临的突出问题是安全和青春期教育缺乏；寄宿制教育需加强和规范；进城生活面临困难。大龄留守儿童面临的突出问题是父母流动对学业完成具有一定影响，多数农村大龄留守儿童就业层次较低、缺

① 刘霞，武岳，申继亮，邢淑芬.小学留守儿童社会支持的特点及其与孤独感的关系[J].中国健康心理学杂志，2007，15(04)；范丽恒，赵文德，牛晶晶.农村留守儿童心理依恋特点[J].河南大学学报(社会科学版)，2009(06).

② 宋月萍，张耀光.农村留守儿童的健康以及卫生服务利用状况的影响因素分析[J].人口研究，2009(06).

乏社会保障,大龄留守女童的性侵害问题值得关注等。其他研究也揭示父母、特别是母亲如果在儿童早期就离开,亲子关系的缺失会使儿童产生分离焦虑。

其三是与父母分离的时间

一项测试发现,父母一方外出打工半年是一个关键时期。留守3个月的儿童仅仅只在自尊和情绪控制维度上与普通儿童有显著性差异,而留守半年的儿童则在诸多方面与普通儿童存在着显著差异。随着留守时间的增加,留守儿童在各方面的表现有进一步下滑的趋势。另一项测试发现5年是一个拐点,留守时间5年以上儿童的心理失衡得分显著高于留守时间为1—2年、3—4年的儿童,而后两者之间无显著性差异。① 总之,与父母分离时间过长,会影响儿童的心理健康水平,如果这种长期分离始于幼儿期,可能进一步影响儿童人格的形成。

其四是留守儿童的消极心理还来源于被"污名化"产生的歧视知觉

北师大的一个研究团队指出,一个时期以来,学校的管理者、教师、生活在留守儿童身边的人们以及一些研究者大量的负面描述夸大了留守的消极作用,留守儿童被"污名化"的倾向比较明显,进而使被"污名化"的儿童产生了歧视知觉。以往的研究也表明,歧视知觉能够使个体意识到自身处于弱势群体的地位,从而对个体的心理健康发展产生消极的影响。调查发现,留守儿童的歧视知觉显著高于非留守儿童,并且不存在年级、性别和留守时间上的差异,说明这种歧视知觉在留守儿童中是普遍存在的。而双亲在外打工更容易被看作"没有父母要"的儿童,他们可能对外界的歧视更加敏感。

其五是儿童和家庭的积极应对能够缓解父母外出产生的压力

北师大的研究发现,留守儿童的总体生活压力事件水平显著高于非留守儿童,但是在各项心理健康指标的得分上无显著差异。研究认为,其间存在着其他的因素起保护作用。这种保护作用可能包括:经济条件,来自父母、学校、同伴和其他方面的社会支持,留守儿童自身的积极应对方式。比如,留守儿童普遍比同龄儿童具有更强的生活自理能力,一部分留守儿童还

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① 郝振,崔丽娟.留守儿童界定标准探讨[J].中国青年研究,2007(10);胡心怡,刘霞,申继亮,范兴华.生活压力事件、应对方式对留守儿童心理健康的影响[J].中国临床心理学杂志,2007,15(05).

表现出一定的亲社会行为，通过这些亲社会行为，扩展了他们的社会关系网络。这些积极行为实际上是一种保护性因素，这些因素在一定程度上缓解了父母外出对留守儿童心理健康的不利影响。

一项对湖南一个村的研究指出，留守导致的家庭成员在时—空上的隔离虽然给儿童造成心理上、情感上的一些负面影响，但是并没有影响家庭的完整性和家庭成员（包括儿童）的认同感。其原因就在于农村固有的亲属网络提供了他们可资利用的社会资本。围绕“抚育孩子”这个中心，人们按照“由近及远”“由亲及疏”的差序来选择代为养育孩子的亲属。这些血缘性、亲缘性的社会性抚育可以在一定程度上缓解亲子关系因为“时—空”分离而造成的情感缺失。

事实上，真正造成儿童心理问题的，往往是几种不利因素的叠加或相互作用。比如母亲单独外出或者父母长期不能与孩子相聚往往与经济状况不良有关系，而贫穷又与歧视和歧视知觉连在一起。事实上，这样的儿童才是当下农村中真正的弱势。

四、延伸的分析

以上主要从留守儿童群体和他们的家庭影响角度的分析。“非问题化”的目的，是为了扭转将留守儿童反映的所有不足归咎于父母外出和父母责任这样的简单判断。

但是对于留守在家的农民工子女来讲，他们确实面临种种问题。这些问题不仅仅是家庭策略能够解决的，这就是他们和大部分农村儿童一样，处于各种不利的结构之中。有许多的研究提出了城乡分离的户籍、教育等问题，本文从与留守儿童密切相关的三个方面：家庭、社区和教育来分析留守儿童的不利结构，更为关心的是，有哪些社会资源可以帮助他们。

（一）拆分型家庭模式

研究者在分析农民工问题时，提出农民工并非形成于单项的户口制度，而是一整套的制度设计和安排。

农民工不得不选择一个家分成两部分，固然，户口制度和城乡二元分割的制度是这一模式形成的关键因素，但是各种针对农民工和子女的有利政

策不断出台，拆分模式依然延续至今，又不能简单说是原有制度的惯性。作为低技术的劳动力，他们只能得到低廉的报酬，其收入需精打细算，才能勉强维持自身在城市的基本生活和补贴农村家用，难以积累下整个家庭在城市长期生活的高额费用；作为外来人口，他们也得不到本地市民所拥有的包括住房、教育、医疗等方面的福利。结果只能以分居的形式维持着家庭的生活。近些年来，城市政府在“经营城市”的理念下致力发展房地产业，吸引高端产业和高端人才，必然导致对农民工及其家庭的排斥。城市政府“经营城市”的发展理念，都在挤压着进城农民工的生存空间，推动着“拆分型家庭模式”的延续。

为了维持不得不分离的家庭，农民工能够动用的还是家庭和乡土的网络。正是由于这样的传统资源还存在，还可用，才维持了留守儿童大致的正常生活和成长。所谓“祖辈监护”曾受到不少的批评。但是所有的调查都显示，这种模式所占比例甚高，在双亲外出情况下占到大多数。但是对于留守儿童来说，祖辈是除了父母之外，他们最熟悉的亲人。在农民工外出打工不可避免的情况下，他们使儿童得到基本的照护。然而，这样宝贵的传统资源，正在随着工业化和城市化的迅猛进展和人们价值观念的变化而日渐减少。可以试想一下，当现在的“80后”打工者进入祖辈的年龄后，他们还能够给孙辈提供如同他们的父母和祖辈那样的服务吗？

（二）农村社会的解体

严海蓉提出的由于大量外出导致“农村的虚空化”成为被广泛使用的沉重话语。

近些年，国家各项政策向农村倾斜，城乡统筹（2003年）、取消农业税（2006年）、新农村建设（2006年）、义务教育免费（2008年），等等。从经济层面看，农民的负担减轻了，农村的环境和设施得到不同程度的改善；从社会服务来看，新型农村合作医疗、最低生活保障、特困户救助制度等，使农民家庭提高了抵御风险的能力。而对于留守儿童来说，社区的社会环境影响更大。那些内部关系紧密、村民互助精神完好的村庄，即使父母不在身边，留守儿童也能生活得“健康快乐”。

主要的人力资源分散外出，导致彼此间联系松散确实是一个重要原因，但不是唯一的原因。因为即使生活在村里，人们之间的联系也比过去要少。

外出打工和农村市场化的结果使村里的分层日渐清晰，一些因外出而致富的家庭早已把重心移到村庄之外，留在村里的家庭其经济收入、生活水平成为分层最重要的标准。一些贫困家庭或打工失败的家庭被边缘化，孩子们也由此受到影响。政府的惠农政策提供了最低安全保障，但并不能增加农村的社会资源。比如新型农村合作医疗在许多地方并没有达到“互助共济”的目标，这种“缴费—受益”的方式没有促进村庄内部的团结。近年，各地都出现乡镇村合并重组、撤并教学点的潮流。在政府依然掌握主要社会资源的情况下，新的民间资源难以出现，那些失去了行政中心地位的地方立即衰落，农村家庭特别是留守家庭办事、求助更加困难。

（三）集中办学：农村教育的新问题

教育是留守儿童调查最重要的题目之一。前面谈到，留守儿童与农村普通儿童在接受义务教育方面没有什么区别。这只能说明，还有比父母的作用更重要的因素在影响着包括留守和非留守在内的所有儿童的教育。

教育问题、特别是农村教育问题，早已成为社会焦点和改革呼声最高的领域之一。近年来，在义务教育投入体制转换（免除教育附加费、教育集资和义务教育学杂费），而财政投入的费用又不足的窘境下，各地纷纷掀起撤并校点、集中办学的热潮。比如我们调查的四川两个镇，2006 年时，一个镇 11 所村小只剩 2 所，另一镇 14 所村小还剩 5 所。直接的结果就是上学的路途远了，有的要走三四公里，有的要更远。公办学校又没有校车，许多必经的公路上车辆飞驰，低年级的儿童来往很不安全，父母或祖父母只好每天接送，有的老人不会骑自行车，只好推“鸡公车（手推车）”接送，成为村民、特别是劳动力缺乏的留守儿童家庭新的负担。

与撤并校点对应的另一项措施，也是为了回应留守儿童问题和解决上学不便的问题，教育部门采取了推广寄宿制学校的办法，由于有国家的投资和可以开展的建设工程项目，各地政府对此都比较积极。大部分地区初中都要寄宿，有的地方小学也要寄宿。人为造成孩子与父母新的分离。由于需要负担住宿、伙食、交通等费用，农村家庭的负担反而增加了，抵消了减轻

农民负担政策（“两免一补”①）的作用。更大的问题在于，寄宿学校的模式重于封闭管理，基本没有顾及学生的心理需求，再加上生活条件较差，进一步加剧了学生厌学和辍学的问题。

还有更多的没有涉及的问题，如功利主义价值观对整个社会包括儿童的侵蚀，如精神健康恶化、自杀、犯罪等儿童青少年社会问题的加剧，这些不良后果的承担者往往是那些边缘人群。

（四）留守儿童的支持模式和赋权

目前的各种支持项目②给留守儿童提供了新的资源，一些项目模式有一个假设，即“留守儿童最缺的是亲情”，项目希望通过外部的力量，给留守儿童以家庭的温暖。但是如前所述，作为农村儿童的一部分，他/她们与非留守儿童、与流动儿童一样，缺乏公平的受教育机会，缺乏良好的社区环境，也缺乏被成人、城市人和处于上层人士的尊重，等等。其次，亲子关系是很难替代的。人与人之间的亲密关系是要依靠长期的共同生活才能建立，临时的代理如何能还原“原生态家庭”？

再次，现有的成功经验大多有强大的资源的投入，比如专家的技术支持和各方资金的支持，这就不是所有留守儿童所能分享的。更为重要的是，在提供支持时将项目的受益者——留守儿童和他们的父母的感受放在何种位置上，他们只是项目的实施对象还是有独立意愿的主体。这里面有两层含义：一是在制度和项目的设计时是否征求了受益者的意见，不是所有留守儿童都希望得到特别的关照，也不是所有的父母都对政府推行的寄宿制感兴趣；二是项目施行过程中，是否注意到对儿童和父母尊严的保护，而不是在“支持”的同时加之以二次伤害。

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① 指2001年开始实施的对农村义务教育阶段贫困家庭学生“免杂费、免书本费、逐步补助寄宿生生活费”的政策。其中中央财政负责提供免费教科书，地方财政负责免杂费和补助寄宿生生活费。

② 国务院妇女儿童工作委员会和各地妇联、共青团、少先队，联合国驻华组织和国际组织，国内民间组织等，都有这类项目。其中知名的如安徽省肥东县谭海美的“留守小队”；四川省青神县“三位一体”教育保护网络等。卜卫曾经分析了100多个留守儿童支持行动[卜卫.关于农村留守儿童的研究和支持行动模式的分析报告[J].中国青年研究，2008(06)]。

五、总结:缺失的不仅是亲情

农村留守儿童的不利不仅是由于家庭结构不完整所带来的亲情缺失，从而导致一定的心理、教育、健康、安全的问题，更在于各种不利结构的交织和可利用资源的匮乏。家庭的不完整，只是加剧了留守儿童的不利，而同样，这些不利因素的交织，使得家庭不完整问题更为突出。

留守儿童问题不单纯是“留守”所带来的问题，而是与更广泛、更深层的社会问题关联在一起，不可能通过一揽子行政措施和零散的项目解决。它是一个既紧迫又持久的问题。

谭　深
中国社会科学院社会学研究所编审

女儿赡养的伦理与公平

——浙东农村家庭代际关系的性别考察

在众多关于中国家族和农村家庭的研究中,女儿始终是个被忽略或研究不足的角色。其原因大概有两个:一是女儿身份和归属的模糊性和不确定性。费孝通先生说过,女儿一生有两个时期,一是从父时期,二是从夫时期。因为"女儿是替别家养的",是"泼出去的水",所以女儿在出嫁前身份总是处于暂时性质(费孝通,1998:198)。另有学者指出,女儿在父系家族中没有任何必然的权利,婚前她们是父系家族的"依赖人口"或"家之附从成员",暂时被娘家养着,婚后成为其丈夫家族的正式成员(滋贺秀三,2003:353;陈其南,1990:169;Cohen,2005:83)。二是女儿对于娘家缺乏工具性意义。由于未婚女子不是家之主体成员,没有宗祧和家产的继承权利,也因之被免掉对家的一应责任,女儿因此被认为缺乏工具性,只是男性继嗣制度"附带的受益者"(滋贺秀三,2003:353—375)。

但随着当前中国农村社会的结构性变动,女儿对于父亲家庭不断提升的工具性意义开始被研究者发现和关注。许多研究证明,娘家与女儿的联系趋于紧密,在支持娘家的日常生活和重大支出方面,在分担兄弟上学、结婚和赡养父母等实践性活动方面,女儿的重要性愈发显现。**作为父亲家庭的非正式成员,同时亦没有赡养父母和承担家计责任与义务的女儿,如今越来越多地在娘家的经济、资源和家庭福利等方面扮演重要角色,这便是女儿问题提出的缘由。**本文的发现和立论依据主要来自于笔者和同事在2007—2009年间,对浙东农村家庭代际关系和养老问题的多次实地调查。

一、顾娘家多于婆家的媳妇与村落赡养行为的性别差异

浙东A村的媳妇招弟告诉我们，现在的女人都是顾娘家多于婆家。她娘家弟妹端午节给了公公婆婆2斤肉2斤年糕，却给了自己娘家爸妈200元钱；过年时给公婆500元，给爸妈1 100元。她说，“现在随便哪家都是女儿出得多，儿子少”。其实招弟对娘家父母也好过婆家。她给我们算了一下，自己平时给娘家父母买吃穿用的花费和给的钱，加在一起其实跟家中独子——弟弟给的基本相当。招弟说，“我（对娘家）这样做，只是为良心！对婆家，是责任。我弟弟对父母也是责任”。浙东B村的陈老伯跟招弟的看法差不多，他说，“女儿养父母是情分，儿子养父母是名分”。在招弟所在的浙东农村，女儿参与娘家事务，特别是赡养父母的行为已经普遍化，虽然许多村民在道理上依然认为养老还是以儿子为主，但是细算下来基本承认，女儿在以货币和实物赡养父母方面，和儿子已经多半不相上下，还有许多甚至超过儿子。女儿在出力和体贴方面普遍优于儿子当然更有公论。

我们发现，在村落社会实际的赡养活动中，儿子和女儿的行为，以及村民对儿子和女儿行为的定义和期待，呈现出有趣的性别差异：其一，儿子的行为目标一般是提供父母基本温饱，并以此合理化；女儿的赡养活动则多是提供温饱之上的其他物质和精神内容。其二，儿子的赡养行为多半具有较强的交换色彩，女儿的赡养一般是没有回报的。村民们常说，女儿是能吃亏的，儿子不能吃亏。儿子在父母的付出和自己可能提供的赡养之间做斤斤计较式的讨价还价，这在村落里是常有发生的事情。其三，儿子的赡养行为被称之为“养”，女儿的被称之为“孝”。虽然在中国传统的孝文化中，孝至少包含“孝亲”和“赡养”两个部分，也就是说“养”是“孝”的题中应有之义，但是在村民的看法中，“养”和“孝”似乎是分离的，有区别的。其四，儿子的赡养行为是规定的、正式的，女儿的行为被认为是自愿的、非正式的。

二、父系家族的代际传承规则

脱离儿子和女儿不同赡养行为的制度伦理基础，将道德标签性别化的做法显然有失简单和偏激。我们从父系家族的代际传承规则和组织亲属关

系的不同伦理两方面入手，试图理解和解释儿子和女儿各自的赡养逻辑。

“夫继承云者，不惟承接其产业，实即继续其宗祧”(《大清民律草案》，引自滋贺秀三，2003：102)。在传统家族制度中，代际间所下传上承之事，一是宗祧，二是财产。宗祧传承将家族延续、传宗接代和祖先祭祀连在一起，通过宗祧传承，祖先和子孙形成世代连续体。在男性血统承继胜过一切的传统社会，亲属关系是以父系为中心来组织的，承继者的资格也因此而被规定。所谓承继，只能发生在父子间，哪怕儿子不孝不义。女儿不是承继父亲的人，因为女儿不是嗣(滋贺秀三，2003：100)。所以，男性嗣续这是代际传承的首要规则。

财产传承是祖先与子孙人格连续体的实物形式。所谓承继，既包括父亲或前辈的财产，也包括他们的权利和义务。其伦理依据是所谓的“父子一体”(father-son identification)，即父亲和祖辈的积蓄可由作为其生命之继续的子孙承继，因此，父辈也有理由享受子孙成年后带来的福利。这些福利在老了之后是赡养，死了之后就是丧葬和祭祀(许烺光，1949，转引自滋贺秀三，2003：104—117)。传统社会的一般规定是，继承权的取得必须以履行相应的义务，即“孝养”为前提(程维荣，2006：259)。事实上我们的观察和许多研究也都表明，赡养义务的明确往往与分家析产活动同时进行，这其实是个相互约定、计算和直接交换的过程。对等交换，这是代际传承的另一个主要规则。

在代际传承的规则中，承祧、祭祀、赡养和财产继承就是这样彼此不可分割地联系在一起。女儿因为不是嗣，因此被排除在这一系列的权利和义务关系之外。女人在家庭中的继承和赡养资格只能通过她的另一种角色——媳妇这一附属于丈夫的身份，在婆家得以实现。

从对代际传承规则的上述分析中我们大致可归纳出中国浙东地区传统农村家族正式赡养关系的几个主要特点：(1) 赡养关系是以男性血统为中心的家族等级制度的产物，女儿是被排除在正式的赡养关系之外的；(2) 赡养义务同时意味着一种资格一种身份，对应的是家族等级制度中的地位、名分和权利，包括财产权利，而不是单纯和自然的生身及抚育之惠；(3) 赡养关系因其身份化和功利化而具有很强的实用理性和交换色彩，无论抚育还是赡养活动都主要出于一种把外延放大到“家”的范围的利己主义，而不是利他主义(李银河，2003：124)。情感交换或亲情互惠不是家族正式赡养关系的

主要逻辑。

在招弟和其他村民的言谈中，我们已经了解到，儿子与女儿的赡养动力被认为是有差别的：前者被用“责任”“名分”“养”等词汇加以概括；后者则被表述为“良心”、“情分”和“孝”等等。由此看来，支撑代际赡养的至少应该有两套系统，一套是以规范，即责任、身份等为基础的系统；另一套是以情感，包括亲情、情分、恩情等为基础的系统。虽然在儿子的赡养活动中，肯定包含着源自血缘的亲情动力，但是协商和交换式的赡养规则决定了平等交易和讨价还价是构成儿子赡养行为的主要逻辑。女儿被排除在父系代际传承制度之外，同时也被排除在带有协商和交换性质的代际关系模式之外。交换和公平通常不是女儿组织代际联系的主要原则，如果有交换或互惠，交换和互惠的也只是基于养育之恩的亲情。所以，女儿的赡养行为更多的是单向的、无偿的和给予性的，是利他主义的。说明儿子代际与女儿代际之间不同的日常生活伦理，有助于理解在农村实践性的赡养活动中儿子与女儿赡养行为的差别。

三、女儿赡养的伦理建构

女儿非正式的赡养行为是否如一些村民所说，完全依靠女儿的自愿自发？来自女儿的回答中 90%左右都是否定的。女儿们和部分村民证实，女儿如果不赡养父母也会面临压力，会被说成是“不孝”，是“没有恩情”，会让父母感到“没面子”。由此可见，在实践性的赡养关系中，女儿不仅越来越多地担负实际的赡养责任和义务，而且同样面临伦理约束。那么，未被规定赡养责任的女儿为什么会被报以赡养期待，女儿赡养的伦理又是在什么样的情况下，如何被建构出来的呢？

女儿赡养的新风俗是在 1980 年代农村土地承包后出现的。分析下来，可能一是与农村家庭的迫切需要有关；二是与女儿在家庭中权力的增长有关，也与女儿生活改善、可控资源不断增加有关。这种家庭需求同女儿支持机会和能力的同步增长，反映在农村家庭赡养关系中儿子和女儿工具性意义的变化中。

儿子的工具性意义在下降、在减弱。表现在：第一，权力重心随着家庭结构的改变开始向女性向儿媳妇转移，使得父母对儿子的养老依赖变得逐

渐困难。第二，经历过集体化、缺乏个人积累和家庭财富的老人，缺乏与儿子交换赡养的资源。与此同时，随着商品经济向农村渗透，个人利己主义、消费主义和享乐主义文化开始泛滥，依靠“孝”文化代替代际间的物质交换变得很不现实。第三，儿子在家庭生产中不可替代的帮手作用，由于机械化生产而逐渐下降，家庭小型化和户均耕地的减少也降低了父母在农业生产中对儿子的依赖。第四，儿子多数外出打工，老人对儿子的照料和情感需求难以实现。儿子工具性意义的下降使得主要依赖儿子赡养的农村家庭养老制度面临困境，特别是经历了集体化的这代老人缺乏养老资源的问题已经非常尖锐。

女儿的工具性意义在上升。第一，妇女外出打工的比例低于男子。在A村，18—50岁成年男性留在村里未外出打工的比例不足30%，而成年女性留守村中的比例超过50%。以往外嫁女与父母走动相对不便的地理劣势转化为优势，加重了老年人对女儿照料的实际依赖感，也增加了女儿与娘家父母的互动机会。第二，家庭权力向女性转移，加之农村家庭收入逐渐增加，直接的受益者是与资源掌控者关系最密切的亲属，所以娘家父母和姻亲关系是农村家庭权力关系改变的获益者。第三，在儿子的赡养普遍被定义为给老人“吃饱”时，更多的赡养过程和老人在温饱之上的生活内容也只能依靠遵循非交换逻辑的女儿提供。女儿赡养的风俗实际是在家庭养老资源匮乏的情况下，农村家庭进行适应性调整、开发新资源的一种家庭策略行为。

由此我们看到，支撑赡养的两套动力系统同时也成为两种伦理压力系统，对儿子是“名分”和“责任”压力，对女儿则是“情分”和“良心”压力。“名分”是正式身份，是刚性的，儿子是继嗣人，是拿了父母财产的人，所以老人可以因此而理直气壮地向儿子讨要“赡养”——尽管在现实中大多并非如此；“情分”和“良心”是一种软约束，因为其在家族制度层面是一种非制度化的存在。但是在儿子赡养体制中晚景凄凉的老人对女儿“情分”的依赖和期待这些年愈加被发展起来，这种期待随时间流逝逐步转化为女儿赡养行为的规范和对女儿的伦理压力。来自“名分”和“情分”的不同压力似乎表明，在农村家庭赡养方面，儿子有正式的和约定性的责任或义务，而女儿则有非正式和非约定性的、模糊的责任或义务；儿子受“显规则”钳制，女儿则受“潜规则”约束，二者同样面临伦理压力。女儿在赡养关系中的责任和义务的规

定，就以这种非正式和模糊的方式被建构出来。

四、非正式身份和女儿权利义务的三重结构

从前面的分析可以看到，实践性赡养关系实际赋予了女儿同儿子几乎相似的赡养责任或义务，但是父系家族的代际传承规则和秩序并没有因此而改变，女儿无论出钱还是出力都不被认为是正式赡养，因此也没有对等的财产权利。对于儿子来说，其“正式”和“约定”的赡养义务和资格则是通过他们在父系家族制度中的身份和名分，即传宗接代的继嗣人，是拿“牌位”的，被加以天然合法化的；而女儿的“非正式”“非约定”责任或义务则被看作自发自愿的行为。

不同性质的责任或义务对应着不同的权利。儿子作为“约定义务”的承担者，对其“正式”名分的认可可以直接转化为一种权利——对父辈财产理所当然的继承和占有权利，而女儿这种缺乏名分的义务和贡献则不产生任何一种权利和利益。

学者们普遍认为，在中国的传统家庭关系中，代际交换无论是“延时交换”还是“即时交换”，总体而言都遵循公平原则。关于公平，笔者认为在家庭范畴内，首先是人格意义上的公平，包括年龄平等和性别平等，等等；其次是在法理意义上的权利和义务的对等。以此观察农村家族的赡养规则和实践性的赡养关系，女儿代际间的公平问题随之凸显。在农村，女儿与父母的代际关系中实际存在着多种规则，或显或潜，分别将女儿置于不同的权利义务关系和不同的社会地位中。具体说来，女儿处于这样三种权利和义务关系之中：

第一，在法律层面，无论是早在 1928 年民国时期的民法，还是现在中华人民共和国的《民法》《婚姻法》等，都已废除了父系家长制度而代之以强调平权的亲属关系，也都规定了女儿和儿子享有平等的家庭财产的继承资格，以及同等的“扶养”或“赡养”义务。所以在法律在国家制度层面，女儿不仅与儿子享有平等的社会地位，而且对其权利和义务的规定也是公平对等的。但是对农村妇女而言，这种法律层面的公平，从 1928 年至今 80 余年的时间，始终未能进入她们的视野，改变她们的命运。

第二，在家族制度和乡规民约层面，单系嗣续原则之下的家族等级制度规定了儿子和女儿不平等的家庭地位和社会地位。但是在代际交换关系

上，无论儿子还是女儿，在权利和义务方面还是保持了一致性：儿子既负有赡养义务也拥有当然的财产继承权利；而女儿，虽然被剥夺了财产继承权，但同时也免除了她们赡养父母的责任和义务。对儿子和女儿在不平等的家庭和社会地位基础之上实现的权利和义务关系的对等，我们姑且称前者为“积极对等”，后者为“消极对等”。

第三，实践性的赡养关系对女儿而言，权利和义务间的对等也被打破，两种公平都不存在。一方面，父系家族继嗣制度没有变化，女儿依旧处在与儿子有差别的地位和身份中，不能获得财产继承权，而且这种制度规则也被女性自己高度内化和认同；另一方面，在农村家庭变迁，传统的家庭赡养方式处于困境的背景下，女儿面临实际的赡养要求和压力，在现实生活中共同参与了赡养老人的家庭行动。

五、结论：家庭的变迁与家族的延续

家庭和家族，这是两个经常被混淆的概念。在中国历史上，很少用“家庭”这个概念。在研究中，一些西方学者将“夫妇式家庭”（conjugal family）与“房”的概念等同，将其作为中国家庭的基本模式。陈其南认为这是错误的，“房与家庭的差别：一是是否包含未婚女儿，二是男嗣原则，三是从属性质（有房的地位）”。在他看来，无论是“夫妇式家庭”还是“主干家庭”“联合家庭”等任何类型的家庭模式都因不包含父系原则而与家族这种功能性团体“大异其趣”（陈其南，1990：145—147）。

古德在他关于家庭变迁的经典著作《家庭》中指出，随着社会的现代化变迁，家庭将经历从扩大的血亲家庭制度向夫妇式家庭制度的转变，夫妇式家庭将最大限度地鼓励和满足个人主义和平等主义的价值观，个体服从家庭整体利益的传统的家庭关系被瓦解，个人与扩大亲属制度相联系的义务关系同时被削弱（古德，1982）。虽然后来对古德的家庭现代化理论假设有许多不同观点出现，但古德关于小家庭相对而言的自主性，以及小家庭内部的平等和民主化趋向被许多非西方国家，包括中国的发展经验所证明。正是因为这种家庭关系的变迁，才会有前述案例中所呈现出来的那些妇女在家庭中的地位变化，其中包括妇女在小家庭内的权利平等，以及妇女得以摆脱婆家的束缚，自主选择优先发展的亲属关系等等。

但是小家庭的自主性及其内部的平等化趋向，并不意味着家族文化结构的解体。虽然传统的、包括许多功能的大家庭或家族形式已经基本不存在了，但是家族的核心制度如父系继嗣，财产继承规则等并未随着家族形式和父辈权威的衰落而消失，它们依然保持着“文化韧性”，依然在分配人们的社会身份和财产继承权利方面继续其强制性地位。所以，正如弗里德曼所指出的，家庭和更高的亲属单位是有重要区别的，虽然妇女在小家庭中的活动和功能显得与男人一样重要，但是一旦超出家庭单位来看，她们的正规角色就消失了（弗里德曼，2000：30—40）。也就是说，妇女虽然在家庭范围内获得了较高地位，但是在家庭之外还缺乏平等的社会地位。

以父子血缘关系为中心的家族文化及制度的废存，看来并不像一些社会学家所设想的那样，是个主要依靠家庭结构从大变小而引致的自发过程——在浙东农村，小家庭式样在最近30年中已经成为主导型的家庭模式。西方社会发展史表明，那些源于血缘和亲属制度的优先权和义务的相互形式，最终是被人与人之间的纽带逐步取代的，而这个纽带不是别的，正是契约。因此，从男性嗣续的身份社会到个体平等的契约社会需要经历将家庭所具有的权力、特权和责任移交给法律，将建立在身份之上的社会关系转变为契约关系的过程（梅因，2006）。但是在浙东农村，法权对家族特权和乡规民约的替代在很多方面没有真正发生。虽然有学者认为，国家力量对乡村社会的进入和替代是农村传统价值观念失落和老人赡养问题化的重要原因（郭于华，2001），但是在家族制度的一些核心部分，我们看到的是传统的延续而不是国家责任和力量的替代。如养老问题，再如我们一再提到的男女平等的继承制度，虽早有法律设定，但是法律上的平权关系能否成为普遍的社会现实，仅靠契约关系的有无看来还是不够的。孔麦隆是这样评论的，传统因素延续下来的首要原因是，虽然国家大力推动经济社会变化，但是在没有可行的替代方案时，国家会一直接受和容忍家庭中的传统习俗，并不愿意干预家庭的安排。在中国农村这种条件不确定的情况下，人们也不打算抛弃这种安排（Cohen，2005：80）。

中国农村家庭的变迁并不像现代化理论预设的那样，是个非此即彼、从传统到现代的转折过程，而是两种家的结构同时存在——一方面是小家庭的普遍性和家庭范围内的平等化和自主性；另一方面是父系家族文化结构和继替规则在更大范围（社区共同体和乡规民约）中的延续。有意思的是，

两种结构并不完全冲突，而是混合在一起，甚至在许多方面表现出新老元素互补，女儿赡养就是农民利用家庭的“现代”资源补充传统体制缺失的生动例证。农民在日常生活中兼有“传统性”和“现代性”，但是他们并不感到冲突，家庭行为的这种复杂组合或许就是在两种结构间形成的一种张力。

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生育二胎

——城市“双独夫妇”的意愿及相关因素分析*

一、问题与背景

进入21世纪初，当第一批独生子女开始逐渐进入婚育年龄后，“双独夫妇”(即夫妻双方均为独生子女的夫妇)开始出现，其二胎生育的问题逐渐显露出来，并且很快成为学术界特别是人口学者关注的问题。

现行的计划生育政策实行之初，各地政府就规定“双独夫妇”可以生育第二胎。这种二胎生育政策的制定似乎具有一定程度的补偿含义：由于父母这一辈只能生育一个孩子，到了子女这一辈时，父母受到生育限制的两个独生子女结婚，就可以享受到生育两个孩子的政策优惠。实际上，这种带有补偿含义的政策优惠同时还意味着这样一种潜在的前提：当独生子女父母这一代人的生育受到限制后，等到他们的孩子，即独生子女这一代人进入婚育年龄、结婚成家时，社会中的人们(包括独生子女本人以及他们的父母)都普遍愿意并且普遍都希望生育第二胎。

人口学者的讨论也往往基于这样的前提，他们关注的是二胎生育对整个社会的生育率变动所具有的影响，因而往往是从整个社会的生育率变动

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* 本文为国家教育部2006年度哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“中国独生子女问题研究”的主要成果之一，项目批准号：06JZD0027。笔者感谢负责五个城市问卷调查的合作者。他们是：中国人民大学国际政治系孙龙副教授、华东师范大学社会学系徐连明副教授、华中科技大学社会学系郝玉章副教授、中南财经政法大学社会保障系乐章副教授、南京大学社会学院方长春副教授、成都理工大学社会学系许传新教授、西南交通大学管理系方纲副教授。笔者也感谢各地接受调查的1 200多位青年朋友。

的角度来关注和探讨这一问题的。“随着独生子女进入婚育期，是否会影响我国既定人口发展战略目标的实现?”①“独生子女在同龄人中的比例越大，政策生育率越高，未来生育水平升高，可能会导致生育水平反弹的情况。”②甚至也可能会形成新的生育小高峰。

然而，值得注意的是，这些可以享受二胎生育政策的当事者们(即“双独夫妇”们)真的都愿意，并且都希望生育第二胎吗？他们的生育意愿与那些不能享受这一优惠政策的非双独夫妇之间存在着明显的差别吗？又有哪些因素与“双独夫妇”们生育或者不生育二胎的意愿有关？这些正是本研究希望探讨和回答的主要问题。

二、文献回顾

目前有关二胎生育问题的文献主要集中在农村，几乎没有城市二胎生育方面的研究。只是进入 21 世纪后，随着第一代独生子女逐渐进入婚育年龄，城市社会中开始出现了“双独夫妇”，他们的二胎生育问题才进入到学者的视野中。经文献搜索，目前通过经验调查来专门探讨“双独夫妇”(主要是城市双独夫妇)二胎生育问题的研究仅有马小红、侯亚非等人分别依据对北京“双独夫妇”生育意愿的同一项调查所发表的三项结果。③

该研究结果表明，“双独”政策适用群体没有显示明显的二孩生育意愿。与“2002 年调查”统计比较，城市“双独”家庭虽然“理想二孩”和“愿意生育二孩”的统计比例明显高于“2002 年调查”的统计水平，但调查还显示，“双独”家庭特别是已生育的家庭，愿意生育二孩的比例从 26.9%下降到 24%，与本次调查全部独生子女样本这一比例 25%比较，未显示明显的普遍计划生育

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① 杨书章，郭震威.中国独生子女现状及其对未来人口发展的影响[J].市场与人口分析，2000(04).关于“政策生育率”，指的是符合国家计划生育政策条件的生育率，因为国家计划生育政策规定双独夫妻可以生育第二胎，这样就有可能带来生育率的上升。

② 姜玉，田丰，周欣欣.第一代独生子女婚姻生育选择及对未来人口和家庭结构的影响——兼与庄渝霞商榷生育政策调整的可行性[J].青年研究，2009(02).

③ 马小红，侯亚非.北京市独生子女及“双独”家庭生育意愿及变化[J].人口与经济，2008(01)；侯亚非，马小红.北京城市独生子女生育意愿研究[J].北京社会科学，2008(01)；侯亚非，马小红，黄匡时.北京城市女性独生子女生育意愿和生育行为研究[J].人口与发展，2008(01).

二孩的愿望，与“2002 年调查”统计结果基本一致，即明确表示愿意生育二孩的“双独”家庭约占 1/4。

该研究所描述的“双独夫妇”二胎生育意愿的状况为我们了解和分析这一问题提供了较好帮助。但该研究结果也还存在着一些局限性，比如该研究仅调查了比较特殊的北京，可能相对缺乏代表性；又如，该研究没有同时调查同一城市、同一年龄段的非双独夫妇，这样，无法对“双独夫妇”与其他青年夫妇的生育意愿进行比较；再如，该调查未能就与“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿有关系的问题进行探讨。因此，要更好地分析和探讨城市“双独夫妇”二胎生育的现状、相关因素以及可能趋势，还需要开展进一步的研究。

三、研究设计

本研究 2008 年在全国五大城市对 1 200 多名已婚青年进行了一项抽样调查。调查设计首先考虑到目前第一代独生子女结婚的比例在中心大城市中相对较高，因而选取了北京、上海、南京、武汉、成都五大中心城市作为调查地点。其次，兼顾到第一代独生子女的出生年代，将调查对象界定在“夫妻双方至少一方是在 1975 年及其以后出生”的青年夫妇。第三，样本抽取采用多段分层抽样的方法：在每一城市中简单随机抽取两个城区；每个城区中简单随机抽取一个街道；每个街道中再简单随机抽取两个社区；每个社区中根据社区和计生部门的相关登记资料，按照青年夫妻双方身份，分成“双独夫妇”、“男独女非夫妇”、“男非女独夫妇”以及“双非夫妇”四类，分别从各类对象中随机抽取 20 个个案(每类实际调查 15 个，多抽取 5 个作为备用)。这样，每个城市抽取了 320 个个案，五个城市总计抽取1 600个个案。

调查采用自填问卷的方式进行。在每对抽中的青年夫妇中，调查员采用轮换抽取丈夫和妻子的方法进行调查对象的抽取，即若前一对夫妻中调查的是丈夫的话，下一对夫妻中尽量调查妻子。调查实际成功完成已婚青年的有效问卷 1216 份，有效回答率为 76％。调查样本的基本情况见表 1。

表 1　五大城市已婚青年调查样本基本情况　［n(人)＝1 216］

变量	类别	人数	百分比(%)
性别	男	557	45.8
	女	659	54.2
身份	独生子女	697	57.3
	非独生子女	519	42.7
出生年代	1979 年以前	731	60.2
	1980 年以后	484	39.8
文化程度	高中及以下	419	34.7
	大专	401	33.2
	本科及以上	388	32.1
婚姻类型	双独夫妇	326	26.8
	男独女非夫妇	278	22.9
	男非女独夫妇	303	24.9
	双非夫妇	309	25.4

生育意愿的概念通常包括三个方面的内涵，即生育的数量、时间和性别。[①] 其中，“意愿生育数量”(理想子女数目)是最为重要的生育意愿测量指标。根据研究目的，本文的探讨也主要集中在“双独夫妇”以及同龄的其他青年夫妇的意愿生育数量、特别是“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿方面，而不涉及生育意愿概念的其他方面内涵。在实际的调查中，我们一方面按照传统的方式询问被调查对象目前的意愿生育数量，问卷中所用的具体测量问题是：“如果完全按照个人的意愿，你希望生几个孩子?”另一方面，我们又有针对性地直接询问“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿，问卷中所用的具体测量问题是：“国家规定，两个独生子女结婚可以生两个孩子。如果你们符合条件，你们会生两个孩子吗?”

此外，在分析思路上，本研究特别关注了“双独夫妇”与同一社区、相同年龄的其他非双独夫妇(包括单独夫妇和双非夫妇)的生育意愿比较，以及结合与二胎生育意愿可能相关的若干个人背景变量进行分析，以加深对“双独夫妇”二胎生育意愿影响因素的理解。

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① 顾宝昌.论生育与生育转变:数量、时间和性别[J].人口研究,1992(06).

四、结果与分析

(一)“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿及与其他类型夫妇的比较

表 2 双独夫妇与其他青年夫妇意愿生育数量的比较及统计检验 (%)

意愿生育数量	双独夫妇	单独夫妇	双非夫妇
不生	2.5	1.9	2.3
生一个	60.9	61.1	58.1
生两个	36.0	36.1	37.6
生三个	0.6	0.9	2.0
平均数(个)	(1.35)	(1.36)	(1.39)
(N)	(325)	(579)	(303)
卡方检验	Chi-square=4.021 df=6 p=.674		

表 2 的结果表明,目前“双独夫妇”的生育意愿状况是:60%左右的人希望只生一个,接近 40%的人则希望生育两个,希望生育三个以及希望一个都不生的比例都非常小。与“单独夫妇”以及“双非夫妇”比较来看,他们之间在各种不同意愿生育数量上的比例分布都非常接近,总体平均的意愿生育个数也几乎完全相同。统计显著性检验的结果表明,三者之间不存在明显的差异。因此,我们可以说,目前城市“双独夫妇”及其同龄的其他青年夫妇具有几乎完全一样的生育意愿。而生育两个孩子,只是他们中间三到四成人的意愿和选择。

(二)“双独夫妇”的生育意愿与北京调查结果的比较

表 3 “双独夫妇”以及双独已育夫妇意愿生育数量的比较 (%)

调查样本分类	样本规模	0 个	1 个	2 个	3 个+	平均数(个)
北京“双独”样本	642	15.9	49.5	34.1	0.5	1.19
五大城市“双独”样本	325	2.5	60.9	36.0	0.6	1.35
北京“双独”已育样本	192	0	60.8	36.6	0	1.34
五大城市“双独”已育样本	164	0.6	58.5	39.6	1.2	1.41

* 表中北京数据部分百分比之和不足 100%,原文如此,特此注明。

表 3 的结果表明,本次调查的结果与北京调查的结果大体上比较接近。

“双独夫妇”整体样本中，除了北京“双独”样本中不希望生育孩子（即生育意愿为0个）的比例明显高出五城市调查的结果、希望生一个的比例明显低于五城市调查的结果外，其他的百分比分布都不存在大的差别。与五城市“双独夫妇”整体样本的平均生育个数1.35有较明显差别的是，北京“双独夫妇”整体样本的平均生育个数仅为1.2左右，这实际上也主要是由其中不希望生育孩子的比例相对较大所导致。而在“双独”已育样本中，两项调查之间在各项百分比上的差别更小。两次调查样本的平均生育个数也基本上处于1.3—1.4之间。特别是在本文最为关注的二胎生育意愿上，两项调查的四个样本结果之间差异都非常小。无论是在“双独夫妇”整体样本之间比较，还是在“双独”已育夫妇之间比较，两项调查结果之间的差别都仅在3%以内。

为了进一步考察“双独夫妇”二胎生育的可能性，我们又将两项调查中被调查对象对于是否准备生育第二胎的回答情况进行了统计和比较，结果见表4。

表4 “双独夫妇”二孩生育意愿的比较 （%）

调查样本分类	样本规模	愿意生二胎	不愿意生二胎	没想好（不一致）
北京“双独”样本	642	26.9	42.9	26.9
五城市“双独”样本	314	27.1	62.1	10.8
北京“双独”已育样本	192	24.0	43.8	32.3
五城市“双独”已育样本	156	28.2	59.6	12.2

* 表中北京数据部分百分比之和不足100%，原文如此，特此注明。

表4的结果表明，在四个不同的样本中，虽然由于不同调查列出的第三个具体答案的表述方式不同，①导致总体百分比的分布不尽相同。但本研究所特别关注的“愿意生育第二胎”的比例却非常接近。即各种样本的对象中，都有接近30%的人明确表示愿意生育第二胎。

① 北京调查中采用的第三个答案是“没想好”，笔者进行的五城市调查中则采用的则是“丈夫愿意妻子不愿意”和“丈夫不愿意妻子愿意”两个答案，故在上表中用“不一致”来表示。表中这一栏的百分比是将这两项答案的百分比合并后得到的结果。相对来说，“没想好”可能更符合一部分调查对象的实际情况，而笔者的答案由于十分明确具体，可能会在一定程度上形成强迫回答的现象。当然，也还有另一种可能，就是“没想好”的答案在一定程度上可以掩饰被调查者的真实想法，因而对于有些不太愿意把自己真实想法告诉陌生人的被调查者来说，他们就选择了“没想好”，导致这一回答的比例提高。

如果将表 4 中“愿意生育第二胎”的结果与前面表 3 中“希望生育两个孩子”的百分比结果相比较，发现表 4 中的这一比例普遍略低于上一问题中“希望生育两个孩子”的比例。北京的调查也有同样结果。那么，哪一个百分比更有可能接近现实呢？笔者分析，对于“理想子女个数”的提问来说，被调查者考虑的可能更多是其好的方面、有利的方面；而对于“政策条件下”的生育意愿提问来说，被调查者的考虑可能更为现实，还会考虑到不好的、不利的方面。因此，后者的回答更有可能接近现实生活中被调查者的真实意愿和将来的行为。所以相对来说，接近 30％的“双独夫妇”愿意生育第二胎的结果更为可靠，因而也更为重要。

（三）“双独夫妇”二胎生育意愿的相关因素分析

表 5 “双独夫妇”个人背景变量与其二胎生育意愿的交互分析 （％）

相关变量	类别	二胎生育意愿			差异显著性检验
		只生一个	会生两个	意见不一致	
性别	男	63.7	28.8	7.5	p=.208
	女	60.7	25.6	13.7	
文化程度	高中及以下	65.2	27.3	7.6	p=.216
	大专	67.0	25.7	7.3	
	本科及以上	56.6	27.9	15.4	
出生年代	1979 年及以前	63.6	27.3	9.1	p=.731
	1980 年及以后	61.1	26.9	11.9	
生育状况	已生育一孩	59.6	28.2	12.2	p=.613
	尚未生育	64.6	25.9	9.5	
所在城市	北京	80.7	17.5	1.8	p=.035
	上海	60.5	26.3	13.2	
	南京	55.9	25.4	18.6	
	武汉	53.2	35.5	11.3	
	成都	61.7	30.0	8.3	

对“双独夫妇”的若干个体背景变量与他们的二胎生育意愿的交互分析结果表明，第一代“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿与他们自身的性别、年龄（1979 年前出生或 1980 年后出生）、目前有无孩子以及自身文化程度等因素

都没有关系，但与他们目前所生活的城市有一定关系。中西部的武汉、成都两市的“双独夫妇”比上海、南京等东部城市的“双独夫妇”有更高的二胎生育意愿，北京的“双独夫妇”则具有相对最低的二胎生育意愿。

五、小结与讨论

（一）研究结论

本文采用全国五大城市1200位已婚青年的调查数据，以相同城市、相同年龄段的非双独夫妇作为参照，对目前城市第一代“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿进行了描述和比较，并对“双独夫妇”的若干个人背景变量与其二胎生育意愿之间的关系进行了交互统计分析。研究结果表明，超过60％的“双独夫妇”依旧只希望生育一个孩子，希望生育二胎的“双独夫妇”比例大约在30％—40％之间，并且实际生育二胎的比例更有可能是在30％左右。同时，“双独夫妇”的生育意愿与同龄的非双独夫妇的生育意愿之间不存在明显差别。这一结果与现有文献中北京同类调查的结果相差也不大。通过将样本中“双独夫妇”的若干个体背景变量与他们的二胎生育意愿进行交互分析，发现除了不同城市之间的结果有所不同外，“双独夫妇”的性别、出生年代、文化程度、有无孩子等因素均与其二胎生育意愿没有明显相关关系。

（二）若干问题的讨论

首先，本研究结果对生育率变化趋势的分析和预测所具有的意义。本文导言部分指出，在现行政策条件下，符合二胎生育条件的“双独夫妇”的规模以及他们所具有的二胎生育意愿，是影响我国生育率水平变化的两个重要因素。目前，对于“双独夫妇”的规模，学者们可以利用全国人口普查数据以及人口抽样调查数据去进行计算和预测；但对于“双独夫妇”生育意愿、特别是二胎生育意愿究竟如何的问题，则鲜有经验调查结果。由此，在有关未来生育率变动问题的探讨中，学者们通常都是先对符合政策条件的“双独夫妇”的二胎生育意愿采用某种假定，然后利用现有统计数据来进行模拟和计算。比如，有的学者是在假定“双独夫妇”普遍生育二孩的前提下（即按政策

生育率)来进行统计模拟的;①有的是在假定“双独夫妇”中有 53%(中方案)和 88%(高方案)的比例生育第二胎的前提下来进行计算和预测的。② 但如果这些假定不成立,所有的生育率推算和模拟结果就会与现实情况产生巨大的偏差。因此,本研究的结果以及同类的北京调查的结果所得出的“双独夫妇”二胎生育意愿大约只在 30%—40%之间的结论,为学者们进行未来生育率变动状况的计算和结果的预测,无疑提供了新的、同时也可能是更为符合客观现实情况的参考依据。

其次,关于“一代人”整体的生育意愿问题。本研究结果表明,第一代城市“双独夫妇”们所具有的生育意愿与同龄的其他类型夫妇所具有的生育意愿几乎完全相同。这一结果启示我们,这种十分相近的生育意愿,更多的是作为出生在 20 世纪 70 年代中期至 80 年代中期的城市已婚青年这“一代人”的整体特征,而非仅仅是“双独夫妇”这“一类人”的特征。笔者以往对城市在职青年(包括未婚和已婚)的研究曾表明,“独生子女与非独生子女两类青年共同作为伴随着我国改革开放成长起来的一代新人,具有基本相同的生育意愿”③。本研究结果再次说明,目前城市中那些具有政策优惠条件而不受二胎生育限制的“双独夫妇”,与同龄的其他类型已婚青年夫妇在二胎生育的意愿上也同样不存在明显的差别,他们同样更多的是作为同一代人而具有类似的生育意愿。因此,在具体分析和看待与他们相关的生育问题以及其他类似问题时,应该特别注意到这种由共同的生活经历、共同的社会背景的影响所形成的共同特征所具有的作用。

第三,“双独夫妇”的个人背景因素与其二胎生育意愿的关系问题。个人的各种背景因素常常是我们分析人们具有不同态度和行为的解释变量。但本研究结果却表明,除了不同城市之间的结果有所不同外,“双独夫妇”的性别、出生年代、文化程度、有无孩子等因素均与其二胎生育意愿没有明显相关关系。为什么会如此呢?笔者认为,这同样可以用上述“一代人”与“一

① 尹文耀.中国独生子女家庭与二孩家庭生育模式百年模拟与选择[J].人口学刊,2001(03).

② 姜玉,田丰,周欣欣.第一代独生子女婚姻生育选择及对未来人口和家庭结构的影响——兼与庄渝霞商榷生育政策调整的可行性[J].青年研究,2009(02).

③ 风笑天.青年个体特征与生育意愿——全国 12 城市 1786 名在职青年的调查分析[J].江苏行政学院学报,2009(04).

类人”的观点来解释。这里的关键变量是年龄。本研究样本的对象基本上都出生在1975—1984年这10年中，基本上属于同一代人，属于在生活经历、思想观念等各方面都十分接近、同质性相对较高的年龄群体。而作为同质性相对较强的群体在共同的社会结构和社会文化的影响和制约下，具有相对一致的想法和意愿。这在一定程度上揭示出社会整体结构因素和个体因素与人们的行为、观念之间的关系问题。他们作为具有相同人生经历和生命历程的一代人，在改革开放以来我国社会结构转型和文化变迁的影响下，形成了相对一致的价值观念和行为方式。尽管他们在各种个体因素上依然有所差别，但这种个体因素的差别对其生育意愿的影响力已无法与他们作为一代人所具有的共同特征的影响力相比。

第四，本研究存在的局限性。本研究所反映的主要还是中心大城市“双独夫妇”的生育意愿状况，对于数量众多的中小城市的“双独夫妇”以及已婚青年来说，样本的代表性有所不足；“双独夫妇”之外的不同类型的青年夫妇的样本规模偏小，也会影响到研究结果的代表性程度；另外，本研究中只分析了与二胎生育意愿相关的“双独夫妇”的几个主要个体特征，对于其他一些可能与其二胎生育意愿有关系的变量，比如经济条件、父母的年龄、所在城市的规模（大中小），以及各种相关变量之间的交互作用等等，未能深入探讨。最后，本研究结果只是对第一代（更准确地说，是实行独生子女政策以来的第一批）城市“双独夫妇”二胎生育意愿的研究。他们所具有的生育意愿是他们所经历的社会和时代留下的烙印。对于此后的第二代、第三代独生子女来说，当他们进入婚育年龄后，一方面这种“双独夫妇”的比例或许会发生较大的变化，另一方面他们所经历的社会现实和面对的社会价值观念也会与前者不同。因而，他们的二胎生育意愿或许又有新的变化。这种变化的特点和趋势如何，将是今后独生子女研究领域以及人口和计划生育研究领域中的一个新的、重要的研究方向。

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论我国现阶段工作和家庭平衡问题

——基于性别与职业位置的比较*

一、问题的提出

工作和家庭的平衡(balance of work and family)是一个世界性问题,是每个人都会遇到并要做出选择的问题。在我国,有关工作和家庭的平衡,需要从三个方面加以研究:(1) 转型视角。计划经济体制下,我国形成了一整套以单位制为主的支持人们工作和家庭的制度,城镇中的双职工家庭是普遍的生活方式。但市场化给国人的工作和家庭带来了重要变化,需要研究当前人们平衡工作和家庭的状况。(2) 性别视角。工作和家庭平衡的问题有性别差异,因为"男性挣钱养家、女性照顾家庭"曾是传统社会家庭的生存模式,当女性也开始进入到"挣钱养家"的行列中,呈现出两性不同的行为策略。我们至少可以从三个方面来考察:一是在工作中,两性如何承担起有关加班、出差、异地工作等压力,如何处理内在的晋升需求和积极回应工作安排。二是人们要承担起家庭责任,必须要照顾年老的父母、生病的爱人、年幼的孩子以及一定要参加的家长会、生日聚会等,两性的家庭承诺与时间安排是怎样的? 三是人们要担当起因无法有效分配时间和情感而产生的压力、焦虑和无力感,要为处理自身的不良情绪做出积极的情感努力。(3) 从公共政策的角度,倡导组织机构和国家出台"家庭友好型工作场所和家庭友

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* 基金项目:2010 年教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"女性高层次人才成长规律及发展对策研究"(10JZD0045 - 1),2010 年国家社会科学基金重大项目"新时期中国妇女社会地位调查研究"(10@ZH020)。

好型公共政策”(family-friendly workplace and family-friendly policy)。平衡工作和家庭的任务应当通过个人、家庭、组织和国家的努力来共同承担。

回顾已有研究,国外社会学界对此已经形成了重要成果,[①]在文中亦将进行比较分析。人们越来越清楚地认识到,两性的平等发展和共同承担责任是解决问题的关键。一项以89个国家的数据为基础的研究表明:“当妇女地位与权力较高时,一国总的生活质量也较高;当她们的地位与权力较低时,所有人的生活质量也较低。”[②]

本文力求使用调查数据来分析我国城镇现阶段人们平衡工作和家庭关系的状况、时间分配等,回应如下问题:(1)分析现阶段城镇从业者的时间分配状况,其工作时间和家务时间是怎样的?(2)透过性别比较,分析传统的“男性以事业为主,女性以家庭为主”的性别分工模式发生了怎样的改变。(3)透过对城镇从业者与具有较高职业地位的高层人才的比较,理解高层人才在处理工作和家务劳动上的状况,特别是女性高层人才面临的工作和家庭的挑战及其应对策略。(4)分析人们在处理工作和家庭关系上具有的支持系统,并提出相关公共政策的建议。

研究使用2010年第三期中国妇女社会地位调查数据,调查标准时点为2010年12月1日。本调查由中华全国妇女联合会和国家统计局主持开展,自1990年开始每十年进行一次,以全国除港澳台以外居住在家庭户内的18至64周岁的中国男女公民作为个人问卷调查的对象,对各项反映经济和社会地位现状的资料进行了全面系统的搜集,个人问卷包括个人基本情况、受教育经历、工作和职业经历、婚姻家庭情况等部分。此外,本期调查第一次纳入高层人才附卷和专卷调查。前者是在随机抽样的入户调查中,请符合高层人才条件的调查对象在填写主问卷时也填写“高层人才附卷”,而后者是按定比抽取原则,在全国31个省市对党政人才、专业技术人才和管理人才三类人做专卷调查,三类人才以1∶1∶1的比例选取,每省126人,各部分为42人,其内部的性别比为1∶1。调查中,党政人才是指治国理政的行政人才,在权力等级位置上拥有副处级以上职位;专业技术人才是指专业技术能力的人才,拥有副高级以上专业技术职称;管理人才是指在企业组织中担任负责人和部门经理的高层管理人员。

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① 佟新.平衡工作和家庭的个人、家庭和国家策略[J].江苏社会科学,2012(02).

② [美]理安·艾斯勒.国家的真正财富——创建关怀经济学(原版2007年)[M].高铦,汐汐,译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.

研究所做的性别和职业位置的比较就是建立在全国个人主问卷与高层人才问卷(含附卷和专卷)基础上,将样本分类为城镇从业者(指调查时劳动适龄人口中正在工作的人,不含退休人员)和高层人才。为了清楚地分析工作和家庭的关系,我们从全国随机样本中挑选出城镇人口(本户常住,城市户口)中的"在业者"(不包括退休后继续工作)和"已婚者",是"城镇已婚从业者"。符合条件的城镇样本数为6 027人,其中男性3 337名,占55.4%,女性2 690名,占44.6%。对高层人才样本也进行了同样的选择,即"已婚高层人才",其样本数为3 871,其中男性2 120名,占54.8%,女性1 751名,占45.2%。

表1　样本基本情况①

		城镇从业者		高层人才	
		男	女	男	女
		平均数/比例	平均数/比例	平均数/比例	平均数/比例
地区分布②					
	东部	41.8	38.0	30.0	30.3
	中部	39.1	39.5	34.6	34.4
	西部	19.1	22.5	35.4	35.3
平均年龄		42.33	39.22	46.26	45.8
年龄分类					
	29岁及以下	17.5	10.1	0.6	1.00
	30—39岁	31.7	41.3	17.7	18.4
	40—49岁	37.9	41.8	49.8	51.9
	50—59岁	22.0	6.1	30.2	27.6
	60岁及以上	0.9	0.7	1.7	1.1
不包括成人教育,您总共上了几年学③		10.92	11	13.99	13.85

① 在实际分析时,对于不同变量而言,其具有缺失值(含不适用情况)的个案数并不相同。

② 参照第二期中国妇女社会地位调查的划分,东部地区包括北京、天津、上海、辽宁、山东、江苏、浙江、福建、广东;中部地区包括黑龙江、吉林、河北、河南、山西、安徽、江西、湖北、湖南、广西、海南;西部地区包括内蒙古、陕西、宁夏、甘肃、青海、新疆、重庆、四川、云南、贵州和西藏。

③ 上学年数指的是调查对象接受正规学校教育的年数,不包括成人教育和休学时间,但包括留级和复读年数。不足1年时按1年算。

(续表)

		城镇从业者		高层人才	
		男	女	男	女
		平均数/比例	平均数/比例	平均数/比例	平均数/比例
受教育程度					
	不识字或识字很少	0.6	1.3	0.0	0.0
	小学	4.2	4.6	0.0	0.1
	初中	25.8	23.1	0.5	0.4
	高中	23.6	20.8	2.2	1.6
	中专/中技	10.8	11.7	2.4	1.6
	大学专科	19.6	22.6	15.8	11.8
	大学本科	14.2	14.9	47.6	48.7
	研究生	1.2	1.0	31.5	35.8
人才类型					
	管理			25.0	21.7
	专业技术			38.3	42.0
	行政			36.7	36.3

二、城镇家庭的时间分配状况与特点

现代社会，随着工业化的发展，工作场所与家庭分离，形成了人们有关时间的规划和安排。时间规制表现为时间的标准化、规律性和协调性的高度结合，即在时空路径上人们被规定了要保持一致、有重复的程序并相互连接。① 现代社会，时间有了如下特性：第一，时间具有不可替代性，由此产生了时间成本问题。“时间成本”是指在同一时间内能完成的事是以该时间内不能完成的另一件事为代价。生育的代价是生育和养育时间内失去的学习或晋升的可能性。加班收益以减少休闲或陪伴家人为代价。第二，时间是有不同效率的，产生了“有效时间”(time availability 或 available time)的概念，即人们在单位时间内所做的事有效率或价格差异，如工作时

① Glennie, P. and Thrift, N. Reworking E. P. Thompson's "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism"[J]. Time and Society, 1996, 5(03): 275-299.

间是有价的、家务劳动时间是不值钱的、学习时间有利于未来。夫妻间的时间价格可能是不同的，配偶工资的潜在效率影响其做家务的时间安排。第三，时间是可安排和计划的。平衡工作和家庭的关系成为如何来分配时间的问题，现代社会，当工作时间和非工作时间产生竞争时，工作占据优先位置。

通过分析第三期妇女地位调查资料，发现在时间和家务劳动分配上有如下特点。

第一，城镇家庭出现了一些专职从事家务劳动的人，以女性为主

调查时，在已婚城镇民众中，有15.8%的人是未从事有收入工作的劳动人口（不包括已退休/内退人员），其中女性占74.8%。在这些15.8%的人中，有58.8%的人以料理家务为主，其中女性占94.8%。对所有因料理家务而未从事有收入劳动的人，问及“为什么没有工作的原因”，其中70.6%的人是因为家里有孩子需要照顾，27.4%的人是因为家里有老人/病人需要照顾。而在家里有孩子需要照顾的人中，有64.3%的人以前工作过；在家里有老人/病人需要照顾的人中，有62.7%的人以前工作过。对已婚女性而言，未从事有报酬劳动的主因是“因家务事而不得不离开工作”。

从调查问卷中的“从开始工作/务农到现在，是否有过半年及以上不工作也没有劳动收入的情况”一题发现，男性有18.8%的人表示有这种情况，平均最长中断工作的时间有25.73个月（2.14年），其工作中断的主要原因上，结婚生育/照顾孩子仅占2.3%，照顾老人/病人仅占2.7%。女性中断过工作的比例达30.8%，平均最长中断工作的时间有33.63个月（2.80年），在工作中断的主要原因上，结婚生育/照顾孩子占55.6%，照顾老人/病人占2.4%。在城镇从业者中，女性因生育而中断工作的比例为17%，这深刻地影响到她们的职业生涯，使其在职业流动中处于劣势地位。

第二，城镇家庭的家务劳动主要由妻子承担，夫妻合作模式也占有一定比例

表 2 分职业位置的家务劳动分工现状(%)

		城镇从业者(N=6 008)	高层人才(N=3 830)
谁承担的家务劳动更多			
	丈夫	8.6	7.6
	妻子	67.2	59.9
	差不多	24.2	32.5

从城镇已婚从业者来看,在 67.2%的家庭中,家务劳动主要承担者是妻子,伙伴式合作模式占了约四分之一,传统家务劳动的分工格局没有改变。从高层人才来看,情况有所改变,尽管仍有近 60%的家庭是女性更多地从事家务劳动,但夫妻合作模式有所增加,占到了三分之一。

表 3 分性别和分职业位置的家务劳动分工的现状

	昨天是工作/学习日还是休息日?	性别	城镇从业者	高层人才
			平均值(分钟)	平均值(分钟)
昨天用于家务劳动①的时间	工作/学习日	男	46.7	45.39
		女	107.18	85.35
	休息日	男	104.79	103.13
		女	177.67	176.72

(1) 从总量上看,女性家务劳动时间远多于男性,各职业位置、各类时间上,女性家务劳动时间远多于男性,所用时间大约是男性的 1—4 倍。传统的女性为主负责家务的情形没有改变,性别间的差异大于职业位置上的差异。(2) 男性正参与到家务劳动中,特别是在休息日,各职业位置的男性都积极参与到家务劳动中,其家务的时间虽然还是比女性少,但增加到工作日家务劳动时间的 2.3 倍左右。(3) 分性别和职业位置的比较发现,男性间家务劳动时间无职业位置之差;女性间存在职业位置之差。在工作日,女性高层人才家务劳动时间低于一般女性从业者;但在休息日,其家务劳动时间几乎一

① 根据第三期中国妇女社会地位调查调查员手册,家务劳动包括做饭、洗碗、家庭清扫、洗衣、照料家人、处理家庭其他事务等的所有家务劳动。其中照料孩子既包括对孩子的生活照料(为孩子穿衣、整理文具、喂饭、洗澡、喂药、医疗护理等),也包括教育孩子和辅导功课,同时也包括看护孩子和陪孩子外出活动等。照料老人既包括对老人的生活照料、医疗护理、陪老人去医院、户外,同时也包括陪老人聊天等。

致，接近3小时。在对女性高层人才的访谈中发现，几乎所有的受访者都强调自己平时工作比较忙，无暇顾及家庭，但是一旦有时间，她们就会亲自下厨为家人做饭，有些人是请了“阿姨”的，但仍喜欢亲自劳作，这时的劳动带有重要的情感色彩和对女性家庭角色的强调。美国社会学家霍克希尔德深入讨论了商品化过程中性别、工作、家庭和时间的复杂关系，提出了情感劳动和情感规则的概念。她认为，社会对情感有一整套规则，这些规则是一个系统，涉及一系列人们在私人生活与公共生活之间的交换关系。① 女性高层人才虽然在职场上拥有了较高的职业位置，但在家庭内，女性自觉实践着传统情感规则的要求。

第三，城镇劳动者工作时间较长

调查使用“前一天中，分别花费在有收入的工作/劳动/经营活动、学习（含专业培训和借助媒体的学习等）和工作/劳动/学习往返路途的时间”来了解人们的时间分配。

表4　分性别和分职业位置的工作时间分配状况

	昨天是工作/学习日还是休息日？	性别	城镇从业者	高层人才
			平均值（分钟）	平均值（分钟）
昨天用于有收入的工作/劳动/经营活动的时间	工作/学习日	男	491.93	464.22
		女	473.6	464.06
	休息日	男	51.23	85.78
		女	63.07	88.67
昨天用于学习（含专业培训和借助媒体的学习等）的时间	工作/学习日	男	22.04	76.06
		女	20.58	73.06
	休息日	男	23.55	75.78
		女	22.52	69.18

① Hochschild, A. R. Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure[J]. The American Journal of Sociology. 1979, Vol. 85(03):551-575.

（续表）

	昨天是工作/学习日还是休息日？	性别	城镇从业者	高层人才
			平均值（分钟）	平均值（分钟）
昨天用于工作/劳动/学习往返路途的时间	工作/学习日	男	48.00	68.04
		女	43.66	75.41
	休息日	男	10.26	37.05
		女	10.47	39.71

将工作时间、学习时间和路途时间视为与工作相关的时间，三项相加总体时间使用最多的排序为：女性高层人才、男性高层人才、城镇男性从业者和城镇女性从业者。女性高层人才用于与工作相关的时间最长，约合 10 小时 9 分钟，男性高层人才约为 10 小时 7 分钟，这说明高层人才在工作时间上没有性别差异。但城镇从业者的工作相关时间花费略有性别差异，男性所花时间略长，约合 9 小时 21 分钟；城镇女性从业者所花时间约合 9 小时。

在高层人才专卷中问及“在解决家务负担上帮助最大的人员或机构是什么”，发现两性间有明显差异。男性高层人才首先提到的是配偶，占到 74.2％，其次是母亲，占 8.2％，依靠社会服务机构的比例仅为 1.8％。高层女性首先提到的是配偶，有 43.3％，其次是母亲，占 23.6％，而社会服务机构仅占 7.1％，“没有”（主要是靠自己）的占到 10.5％。这表明，男性高层人才主要是透过妻子的帮助来解决家务压力的，而女性高层人才则难以有同样的比例（差三分之一）获得配偶在家务压力上的帮助。

总之，一名女性——一般从业者和女性高层人才，其工作日与工作相关的时间是 9—10 小时，家务时间是 2—1 小时，合计在 11 小时左右。一名男性——一般从业者和男性高层人才，其工作日与工作相关的时间是 9 个半小时—10 个小时，家务时间是不足 50 分钟，合计亦在 11 个小时左右。从业者们的休息和娱乐时间约为 13 小时。肯定地讲，在现当代，我国城镇从业者都感受到时间压力；现代工作的时间概念对人们的休息和娱乐产生规制。这样的时间规制是普遍的，无性别差异。但对女性来说，压力是双重的，传统家庭角色有一定改变，但家务劳动依然要求女性有更多的时间付出；在事业上，女性的时间付出并不逊于男性。比较发现，女性高层人才为工作和家务付出的总时间最多。

三、工作和家庭平衡的状况

工作和家庭的平衡是指职业人士在无法兼顾劳动力市场和家庭事务时所遭遇到的角色紧张，为了兼顾工作和家庭，人们要付出更多的情感和劳动。我们关注：在工作和家庭存在冲突时，人们的选择是什么，是以工作为主，还是以家庭为主。传统社会中，家庭与工作的平衡是通过性别分工来实现，形成了“男主外、女主内”的性别分工格局，那么在性别和职业位置间有怎样的状况呢？

第三期妇女地位调查问卷中，我们问了如下问题：“近年来，下列情况在您身上发生过吗？（1）因为工作太忙，很少管家里的事；（2）为了家庭而放弃个人的发展机会”（选项包括经常、有时、偶尔、从不），希望借此了解当工作和家庭相冲突时，人们作何选择。

表 5　分性别和职业位置的工作和家庭平衡的现状(%)

因为工作太忙，很少管家里的事		从不	偶尔	有时	经常
城镇从业者					
	男	25.3	32.7	21.5	20.5
	女	30.0	35.1	21.5	13.4
	小计	27.4	33.8	21.5	17.3
高层人才					
	男	12.5	32.2	27.9	27.4
	女	14.4	36.2	28.6	20.8
	小计	13.3	34.1	28.2	24.4
为了家庭而放弃个人的发展机会		从不	偶尔	有时	经常
城镇从业者					
	男	67.7	20.5	9.8	2.0
	女	59.0	22.5	13.6	4.9
	小计	63.8	21.4	11.5	3.3

（续表）

为了家庭而放弃个人的发展机会		从不	偶尔	有时	经常
高层人才					
	男	59.2	28.3	11.1	1.4
	女	49.9	30.8	16.5	2.8
	小计	55.0	29.4	13.5	2.1

从“因为工作太忙，很少管家里的事”的状况看，存在性别与职业位置间的差异。（1）从性别看，41.9%的城镇男性从业者因忙于工作而无暇顾及家庭，其比例高出女性7个百分点。[①]（2）从职业位置看，55.3%的男性高层人才会为工作而无暇顾及家庭，比城镇男性从业者高出13个百分点；而女性高层人才这一比例亦达49.4%，更高出城镇女性从业者约15个百分点。

从“为了家庭而放弃个人的发展机会”看，存在性别与职业位置上的差异。（1）职业位置的差异在于城镇从业者比高层人才有更高的比例“从不”为了家庭而放弃个人的工作发展，高8.8个百分点；在“偶尔”会“为了家庭而放弃个人的发展机会”的比例上，高层人才比城镇从业者高8个百分点，存在职业间的程度差异。（2）存在性别差异。在各类职业位置上，男性大约比女性多10个百分点的“从不”会“为了家庭而放弃个人的发展机会”，但也应当看到，各类职业位置上有一半以上的女性亦“从不”会“为了家庭而放弃个人的发展”。

在高层人才专卷中问及有关“最后一次更换工作单位的原因”，发现有22.2%的女性和14.3%的男性高层人才是因为“想更多地跟家人在一起”，女性比男性更可能为关照家庭而变动工作。

总之，现当代城镇从业者延续了社会主义中的夫妻共同参与公共劳动的情形，男性和高层人才更有可能因工作忙而顾不上家庭。

四、抚育孩子的分工和支持

从个人生命周期和家庭生命周期的角度看，生育和养育阶段，即孩

① 卡方检验 Pearson Chi-Square＝57.371，p＝0.000，说明性别间有显著差异。关系强度为 Cramer's V＝0.098。

子0—3岁是家务劳动量剧增的阶段。计划经济体制下，城镇以单位制的方式透过具有福利性质的托儿所、幼儿园来帮助双职工家庭实现养育的社会化。随着单位制的解体，养育责任更多地成为个人的事情。而生育和养育是最可能使母亲中断工作的原因，这种工作中断直接影响到女性的职业发展。英国的研究表明，一些女性管理者即使有能力雇用家庭佣人，她们也要比其男性伴侣承担更多的责任来对养育的事情进行安排和监督。①

在我国，城镇从业者家庭平均每家有1.13个孩子，高层人才家庭平均有1.06个孩子。

表6 分职业位置的孩子3岁前的照顾(%)

		城镇从业者	高层人才
最后一个/这个孩子3岁以前白天主要由谁照顾			
	本人	21.9	8.8
	配偶	21.5	13.6
	本人父母	27.6	30.1
	配偶父母	20.9	22.5
	其他亲戚	1.1	3.2
	保姆/家政工	3.2	12
	托儿所/幼儿园	3.4	9.4
	家人共同照顾	0.3	0.4
	其他	0.1	0.0
最后一个/这个孩子3岁以后上过幼儿园吗			
	没上过	8.7	2.6
	只上过学前班	2.4	2.3
	上过幼儿园	88.9	95.1

① Wajcman, Judy. Managing like a Man: Women and Men in Corporate Management[J]. Policy, 1998:152.

（续表）

		城镇从业者	高层人才
3 岁以后没上过幼儿园的主要是因为			
	不需要，家里有人照顾	53.0	25.5
	附近没有合适幼儿园	36.2	68.6
	负担不起费用	10.1	3.9
	服务质量差	0.7	2.0

在城镇从业者中，女性因生育而中断工作的比例为 17%。再从“孩子3 岁前主要由谁照顾”来看：(1) 代际间的抚育支持成为最主要的形式。城镇从业者家庭中，由夫妻一方的父母来照顾的比例达 48.5%，近一半；高层人才家庭中，由夫妻一方的父母来照顾的比例达 52.6%。同时，来自父母的支持亦打破了父系家庭网络，双系父母支持变得格外重要。(2) 存在职业位置的差异。城镇从业者，主要由丈夫照顾的比例占 4.47%，由妻子负责照顾的比例为 38.89%，合计由夫妻一方面照顾的比例达 43.4%；高层人才家庭中，由夫妻一方面照顾的比例为 22.4%，比城镇从业者家庭少了 21%。(3) 高层人才家庭更多地依靠市场力量，借助保姆/家政工和托儿所/幼儿园的比例达 21.4%，比城镇从业者家庭高出 14.8%。

总之，在抚育问题上，无论怎样的职业地位都主要是在家庭内来解决，代际间的支持起到了非常重要的作用，而高层人才在更大的程度上依赖市场的支持。

五、结论——理论讨论和政策建议

(一) 结论

在现当代，各类职位的从业者都面对有关工作和家庭平衡的挑战。数据分析表明：第一，在时间分配上，城镇从业者都感受到时间压力；现代工作的时间概念对人们的休息和娱乐产生规制。这样的时间规制是普遍的，无性别差异。女性的双重压力依然存在，家务劳动依然是女性有更多的时间付出；但事业上，女性的时间付出几乎与男性相同；女性高层人才兼顾事业和家庭，是工作和家务时间付出最多的人。第二，在平衡工作和家庭的关系

上，现当代城镇从业者打破了传统的“男外女内”的分工格局，两性从业者都在职场打拼；高层人才更可能因工作忙而顾不上家庭。第三，在0—3岁孩子的抚育上，来自配偶双方的父母成为最重要的支持力量，是家庭内部的支持网络帮助有孩子的父母们继续工作，得以替代单位制解体后抚育福利的缺失。部分高层人才在抚育上依靠市场力量，雇用家政工来帮助抚育，但受到经济条件的制约在一般从业者中这一比例并不高。

从性别的角度看，在工作和家庭责任的分担上，依然呈现“延迟”状况，即女性与男性共同参与有报酬劳动，但男性并非以同样的比例参与到家务劳动中，不过情况有所改善。无疑，两性的变化是共同发生的事情，但变化的程度不同。除女性高层人才外，女性参加有酬劳动的时间总体上比男性少；丈夫承担家务劳动的时间总体上比妻子少。在这个双向变化的过程中，女性进入有酬劳动的变化快于男性进入家务劳动的变化。

（二）政策建议

由工作组织和政府制定的、有利于“工作和家庭的平衡”的政策被称为“家庭友好型工作场所和家庭友好型公共政策”（family-friendly workplace and family-friendly policy）。斯堪的纳维亚国家显示出低水平的工作与家庭冲突，而英国和美国则有最高的工作和家庭冲突，这种冲突是源于工作时间过长和以市场为主获得支持。① 瑞典的公共政策是促进全民就业、男女平等和全民社会保障。工会不仅代表高工资的产业工人的利益，还努力追求缩小工人间的收入差距，有效地平衡了工作和家庭的冲突。②

目前，为了平衡工作和家庭，人们需要在助老、托幼、子女教育指导和减轻家务负担方面得到政策支持。在问及目前最需要的帮助或支持时（按重要程度排序选三项），对于第一选择，城镇从业者回答“子女教育指导”的比例（4.5%）仅达高层人才的半数，而在“减轻家务负担”上，女性高层人才中的比例（2.2%）是城镇民众女性的7倍，在“助老服务”（2.9%）上达6倍之

① Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family. The Reconfiguration of Work and Family Life in Contemporary Societies[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

② Wallen, Jacqueline. Balancing Work and Family: The Role of the Workplace [M]. New York: Allen & Bacon, 2003.

巨,这充分反映出高层女性在工作-家庭冲突上的处置机动性不如城镇从业女性,她们迫切需要政府和组织给予社会性支持。在第二、第三选择上也有类似的情况,反映出城镇从业女性更关注的是生计问题。

综合而言,我们倡导:(1) 进一步加大宣传,使更多的男性加入到家务劳动中来,建立起合作式的家务劳动分享模式。(2) 组织应给予工作着的父母们,特别是 0—3 岁的父母们以婴幼儿福利支持。(3) 政府要加大力度建立公立托儿所和幼儿园,将幼儿园教育(3—6 岁教育)纳入国家公共教育的范畴。

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下篇

家庭政策：

国际与本土的视角

家庭政策和生育率

——欧洲国家的现象和挑战

欧洲人口变化的特点是：出生率下降、预期寿命延长，以及随之而来的老龄化和人口总量萎缩。这些变化在不同程度上影响着所有欧盟国家。因此，人们日益关注家庭政策和生育率之间的关系，也即家庭政策（例如家庭现金补贴和幼托机构）是否、如何影响生育行为，哪些改革会帮助夫妇们实现他们的生育偏好。总体来说，研究表明这一关系极其复杂，而且各项研究还得出了相互矛盾的结论。然而，有一点变得越来越明显，那就是，如果存在维护工作—生活平衡的政策，如现金补贴、优厚的育儿假和公立幼托机构，那么女性就业和生育率就呈正相关。在此背景下，本论文从人口变化的角度出发，集中研究并对比了四个存在极大差异的欧洲国家的家庭政策——瑞典、德国、意大利和捷克共和国。

一、人口变化下的家庭政策

虽然并非所有欧洲国家都建立了明确的“家庭政策”或专职的“家庭部”，但它们全都制定了家庭支持政策。各国采取的措施多种多样，有家庭津贴、公立幼托机构、父母育儿假、受抚养子女的税务减免等。家庭政策工具大致可以分为三类：现金补贴、服务和家庭税务减免，[①]（OECD 2011）。这些政策都有明确的动机，而各国的动机不尽相同，不同动机在不同时代的重

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① 根据经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的家庭数据显示，家庭税务减免只在少数国家（尤其是德国，以及法国或比利时）起决定性作用。另外，税务减免的数据无法从各国的国家统计部门获得，而是依靠一些税务机关的估计。因此，关于税务减免的内容没有被纳入本文第三部分的四个选定国家的国别比较中。

要性也不尽相同。主要动机包括制度动机、人口学动机、经济动机、社会政治动机、性别平等及对儿童福利的关注（Kaufmann，2000；Blum/Rille-Pfeiffer，2010）。

近年来，由于所有欧洲国家均面临程度不一的人口变化挑战，人口学动机在许多欧洲国家的家庭政策决策中的重要性日渐凸显。如图1所示，欧洲总生育率最高的是爱尔兰的2.07，最低的是拉脱维亚的1.17，而欧盟27个成员国的平均生育率是1.58。2010年没有一个国家的生育率达到每位妇女平均生育2.1个孩子的净生殖率水平。如果将图1显示的国家大致分类，就会发现，东欧国家（如拉脱维亚、匈牙利和罗马尼亚）、南欧国家（如葡萄牙、西班牙）及德语国家（德国、奥地利）的出生率特别低，而北欧国家（丹麦、芬兰、瑞典）、英国、法国和爱尔兰的出生率较高。



＊数据来源：欧盟统计局（比利时的数据为2009年）

图1　总生育率（2010）

出生率的下降同其他人口学行为的变化相关，如成家年龄推迟、无子女家庭占比增加等。工业化国家人口变化的第二个特点是平均预期寿命延长。例如，目前德国女性的平均预期寿命为82.59岁，男性平均预期寿命为

77.51岁。出生率下降和平均预期寿命的延长相结合，导致了人口老龄化。人口老龄化的症状包括劳动人口数量减少、退休人员增多等。鉴于老龄化给经济和社会保险体系造成的压力，许多欧洲国家的决策者和研究人员均对家庭政策和生育率之间的关系产生了浓厚的兴趣。

对比研究表明，多个欧洲国家国民“想要的”孩子数量同“实际的”孩子数量之间存在决定性差距。2006年“欧洲晴雨表”民意调查询问受访者：“您个人希望有几个孩子?”民调结果显示，在欧盟内部，“在每一个年龄段，无论男性还是女性受访者，理想家庭规模的均值都超过两个孩子”(Testa，2006：19)。一方面，德国的生育率低，德国民众想要的孩子数量也相应较少(25—29岁妇女想要2.11个孩子)；而另一方面，南欧国家民众想要的孩子数量远远高于实际的低出生率。原因之一是后类国家通过公共政策向家庭提供的支持较少。

然而，把想要的孩子数量同实际的孩子数量之间的差距视为公共政策的“机会窗口”会起到误导作用(Gauthier，2007：328)，因为许多导致该差距的原因同政策无关。2006年“欧洲晴雨表”民调显示，受访者在解释为何没有生够理想数量的孩子时，最常见的理由是配偶中一方有健康问题或者是找不到合适的配偶(Testa，2006：13)。与此同时，民调还显示，养育孩子的成本、是否有父母育儿假和儿童幼托机构——这些均可受公共政策影响——也影响到生育决策(Testa，2006)。这说明，事关家庭的公共政策可以影响人口行为，但两者之间的关系极为复杂，而且多数情况下只是间接相关。

正因为如此，已有的关于上述两者之间关系的研究结果相互矛盾。例如，一些研究发现家庭现金补贴对生育率有重大积极影响，而另一些研究则认为这种影响无足轻重，更有一些研究持模棱两可态度(Bujard，2011：5)。Castles(2003)对21个经合组织国家进行的多国研究证实，生育率和面向三岁以下儿童的正规幼托机构之间存在正相关性。父母育儿假对生育率的影响的研究结果尚无定论(Bujard，2011：5)，一些论文作者指出，父母育儿假过长可能对出生率有负面影响(D'Addio/D'Ercole，2005)。

在此背景下，有几个关于家庭政策和生育率之间关系的观点已经得到证实(亦参见Stock et al.，2012：260 ff.)。其中一个常被引用的观点是，在经合组织国家中，女性的劳动参与率和生育率之间存在正相关性，也就是

说，女性整体就业率高的国家出生率也高。有意思的是，这两者在20世纪70年代呈负相关。请见图2，左图显示1980年的情况，当时女性就业率和生育率之间仍有明显的负相关性：女性在劳动力市场占比最高的那些国家——丹麦、芬兰和瑞典——总生育率处于最低区间；与之相反，女性在劳动力市场占比最低的国家（如爱尔兰、希腊）总生育率处于最高区间。2009年的情况倒了过来，丹麦、芬兰和瑞典——还有许多其他国家——女性就业率和出生率呈现双高。



* 数据来源：亚太经合组织家庭数据库

图2 1980年和2009年女性就业率和生育率关系跨国研究

与此同时，两者关系在各国的表现不如1980年清晰：许多其他国家（如墨西哥、爱尔兰、意大利、匈牙利）并未同时出现低生育率和低女性就业率。许多作者援引女性就业率和生育率之间关系的翻转来证明公共政策影响生育率（Gauthier，2007：330）：尤其在北欧国家（如瑞典），公共政策，特别是旨在维护工作和家庭生活平衡的政策，如待遇优厚的父母育儿假和公立幼托机构，似乎已将女性就业对生育行为的负面影响成功扭转为正面影响。

二、欧洲各国的家庭政策

因为欧盟在社会和家庭政策领域不具备能力，所以这些政策由成员国各自负责制定和实施。在此背景下，欧洲各国的家庭政策不尽相同，而这种差异又被视为上节中讨论到的各国人口现状差异的决定性因素。图3是各国家庭政策的大致情况。欧盟各国的家庭功能性支出用占该国2010年

GDP 的百分比来表示。家庭政策支出最低的是波兰，只占 GDP 的 0.79%，最高的是丹麦，占 GDP 的 4.03%。27 个欧盟成员国的家庭政策支出在 GDP 中占比的平均值为 2.26%。德国 GDP 的 3.2%用于家庭，因此位列家庭政策支出最高的前三分之一国家。



＊数据来源：欧盟统计局（功能性支出占 GDP 的比例）

图 3　欧盟 27 国家庭支出（2010 年）

如果想从上述家庭支出中找出一个规律，不妨看地理区域：在低于欧盟平均值的 17 个国家中，14 个坐落于东欧或南欧。高于欧盟平均值的 10 个国家，除爱沙尼亚、匈牙利和爱尔兰之外，要么是欧洲大陆国家（法国、德国、奥地利、卢森堡），要么是北欧国家（芬兰、瑞典、丹麦）。

这一规律同传统的福利国家对比研究及家庭政策对比研究中为了进行系统比较而采用的国家分类相呼应。20 多年前，Gøsta Esping Andersen（1990）发表了著名论述，将福利资本主义划分为三大世界：自由主义国家（如英国）、保守主义国家（如德国）和社会民主主义国家（如瑞典）。Gauthier（2002）相应地在一项国别对比研究中将家庭政策分为四种模式。据此，社会民主主义国家（如丹麦、芬兰、瑞典）的特点是，国家对家庭提供普遍支持，并致力于社会性别平等。这些国家只向父母提供中等水平的现金补贴，但幼托机构质量很高，父母育儿假的待遇也很优厚。而保守主义国家（如德国、奥地利、爱尔兰）的特点则是提供更多的同就业挂钩的国家支持，社会性别观点更为传统。它们提供中到高级水平的现金支持（见图 3），但

幼托机构的数量有限。自由主义国家(如英国)的家庭政策只向父母提供低水平的、需求导向的支持,在幼托等方面极度依赖私营部门。最后,南欧国家(如意大利、葡萄牙、西班牙)的家庭政策特点是现金补贴和服务的支持水平低,既有普遍福利也有私人福利。东欧国家加入欧盟以后,福利国家对比研究一直在争论如何将它们归类:有的研究者认为它们的后社会主义福利体制自成一家,也有研究者认为它们均会演变为 Esping Andersen 的三大世界中的成员,更有一些研究者则对两者均予以否定(参见 Blum et al.,2010)。

这些传统分类法——无论是 Esping Andersen 的福利资本主义三大世界还是其他类似的经典家庭政策分类体系——近年来遭到越来越多的批评,原因之一是它们没法将某个国家归类,抑或是将某个国家归错了类。更重要的原因是,这些分类法描述的是 20 世纪 90 年代早期的情况,而欧洲福利国家在此之后发生了剧烈的变化,家庭政策亦是如此。其结果是,这些分类法所包含的只是一些理想类型。政策改革,或许还有福利国家趋同进程,导致实际国家情况同它们不完全相符,而且越来越不相符。与此同时,如图 3 所示,至少就支出水平而言,还存在一些按地理区域划分的国家规律:总体来说,南欧和东欧国家的家庭政策支出远远低于北欧和欧洲大陆国家。因此,本文下一章节将讨论分别来自这四个地区的四个国家:瑞典、德国、意大利和捷克共和国。之所以选择这些国家,是因为它们至少在传统上相当接近上述的家庭政策理想类型。它们中有两个代表较为成熟的福利国家(瑞典、德国),另两个代表家庭政策支出不太多的福利国家(意大利、捷克共和国)。因为论文篇幅有限,只能概括介绍每个国家的家庭政策,所以本文将只着眼于三项工具:家庭津贴、父母育儿假法规和公立幼托机构。本文可能忽视了一些同样重要的措施,但这三项最具相关性,而且能很好地勾勒家庭政策框架。

三、聚焦四国

瑞典

如图 1 所示,2010 年瑞典的出生率 1.98,为欧洲第四高。该国 2009 年

的平均预期寿命也大大高于欧洲平均值，女性为 83.5 岁，男性为 79.4 岁（欧洲委员会，2010）。考虑到该国吸引了大批移民，欧盟“2010 年人口报告”预计瑞典到 2050 年人口将增加 8%（同上：163）。25—49 岁间女性就业率在 2008 年时为 79.8%，而经合组织平均值为 71.9%（经合组织家庭数据库）。

如第二章所述，瑞典家庭政策属于社会民主主义类型，特点是强调工作—生活平衡、普遍的中等水平现金补贴和高水平服务。相应地，该国的子女/家庭津贴属于普遍性支付，领取时不需验证收入，第一名子女津贴每月只有约 115 欧元，[①]其后子女的津贴有相应增加（欧盟社会保障共同信息系统 MISSOC，2011）。

瑞典的父母育儿假被视为收入替代，而且鼓励父亲请育儿假：育儿假总长度为 480 天，其中 60 天为母亲专用，另 60 天为父亲专用，余下天数则供父母酌情选用（Moss，2012：260）。480 天中的 390 天领取原收入的 80%（收入上限为每年 49 305 欧元）；余下 90 天领取固定金额，约为每天 20 欧元。

遵循北欧国家的福利传统，瑞典幼托设施的数量和质量均明显高出平均水平（Plantenga/Remery，2009）：2008 年经合组织家庭数据库提供的数据表明，瑞典幼托机构能收纳全国 46.7%的三岁以下儿童和 91.1%的三岁至法定入学年龄的儿童。

总而言之，瑞典的家庭政策经过演变，已成为其他欧洲国家的楷模。如图 3 所示，这一政策的成本并不比其他欧洲国家高多少，如德国或奥地利，但却被认为在引导生育行为、降低儿童贫困率、维持工作—生活平衡等领域更为“成功”或“有效”。因此，下文还将进一步论述，德国等国的家庭政策改革效仿了瑞典。

德国

2010 年德国的出生率为 1.39，位居欧洲最低出生率国家之列（图 1）。另一方面，该国 2009 年出生时预期寿命高于欧盟平均值，女性为 82.8 岁，男性为 77.8 岁（欧洲委员会，2011）。尽管德国在最近几十年的外来移民率高企，但净移民人数已转为负数。因此，欧盟“2010 年人口报告”预计德国人口到 2050 年将减少近 10%（同上：121）。不过，受经济危机余波的影响，德国

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① 2012 年 12 月，1 欧元兑换 8.22 元人民币。

的外来移民数量已经大幅回升。2008 年,德国 25—49 岁女性就业率为 76.8%(经合组织家庭数据库)。

德国的家庭政策被认为是保守的。它支持相当传统的社会性别角色(如女性低就业水平),宁可向家庭发放高额现金补贴而不提供幼托机构等服务。

子女/家庭津贴属于普遍性支付,领取时不验证收入。金额随子女数量而非年龄变动:头两个孩子每月 184 欧元,第三个孩子每月 190 元,第四及后续子女每月 215 欧元(欧盟社会保障共同信息系统 MISSOC, 2011)。

2006 年以前德国的父母育儿假与其相当传统、保守的家庭政策相符:育儿假长达三年,其中两年领取较低的固定金额,为每月 307 欧元。因此,它不鼓励父亲们请育儿假,而是支持母亲们较长时间中断职业。2007 年,德国向瑞典学习,进行了父母育儿假改革:如今,德国只向父母中的一方支付 12 个月的育儿福利金,另外还有两个月被称为“伴侣月”,福利金向父母中的另一方支付(通常是父亲)。同瑞典一样,该政策被视为收入替代,是父母一方最近一次收入的 67%;但是,该政策还设定了 300 欧元的最低金额(主要针对之前不工作的伴侣),以及 1 800 欧元的最高金额(Moss, 2012: 130)。不过,德国还设想从 2013 年秋季开始引入所谓的“儿童保育津贴”:在家照看一至二岁子女而不送其入托的父母将可每月领取 100 欧元(2014 年甚至涨到 150 欧元)。

传统上,直至 2000 年,德国的三岁以下儿童入托率还很低,而几乎所有三岁以上的儿童都进幼儿园,直到上小学。然而,近年来,德国加大了儿童保育设施的建设力度,主要目的是改善工作和家庭生活之间的平衡。2008 年,德国 0—2 岁儿童入托率为 17.8%,三岁至法定入学年龄儿童的入园率为 92.7%(欧盟收入与生活状况 EU-SILC)。2011 年,三岁以下儿童入托率上升到 25.2%,不过存在巨大的地区差异,尤其在德国东西部之间(德国联邦统计局,2011)。

父母育儿假和儿童保育设施领域的改革表明,德国的家庭政策仍表露出“保守主义根源”,但已发生决定性变化,而且正向“北欧”模式靠近,注重维持工作和家庭生活平衡。

意大利

2010 年,意大利的出生率为 1.41,位列欧洲末端。同期意大利的出生时

预期寿命高于欧盟平均值，女性为 84.5 岁，男性为 79.1 岁（欧洲委员会，2011）。假设意大利的外来移民势头不变，欧盟“2010 年人口报告”预期该国人口数量相对稳定（同上：133）。2008 年，意大利 25—49 岁女性就业率为 61.1%，明显低于经合组织平均值 71.9%（经合组织家庭数据库）。

意大利的家庭政策一直以来只向家庭提供有限的现金补贴和服务，而且同就业挂钩，既有普遍性福利，也有私人福利。在此背景下，意大利的子女/家庭津贴的发放同就业挂钩，且领取时要进行收入验证。金额按子女数量而非子女年龄变动。福利金同家庭收入呈反比。例如，一个四口之家年收入为 26 500 欧元，属于中等水平，每月可领取 127.25 欧元的福利金（欧盟社会保障共同信息系统 MISSOC，2011）。

在意大利，母亲可请六个月的育儿假，父亲也可以请六个月的育儿假。如果父亲还请了陪产假，他们还有权再多请一个月的育儿假（Moss，2012：166）：不过，陪产假不是法定的，只有就业的父亲可享受，津贴为最近一次收入的 80%，而且只有在特殊情况下才能使用（如母亲去世或重病，孩子由父亲一人照顾）。父母育儿假津贴同就业挂钩，只有最近一次收入的 30%，而产假津贴——同陪产假一样——是末次收入的 80%。

意大利的家庭现金补贴和假期制度同之前描述的南欧福利国家模式大致吻合，但幼托机构的规模相对较大：根据经合组织家庭数据库 2008 年提供的数据，意大利三岁以下儿童有 29.2%可以入托。三岁至学龄儿童中有 97.4%使用了正式幼托服务。

捷克共和国

2010 年捷克共和国的出生率为 1.49（图 1），比德国和意大利高，但还是远远低于瑞典。与其他三国不同，捷克共和国的出生时预期寿命低于欧盟平均值，女性为 80.5 岁，男性为 74.2 岁（欧盟委员会，2011）。考虑到大量移民，欧盟“2010 年人口报告”预计该国人口到 2050 年只会轻度萎缩（同上：117）。2008 年，25—49 岁间女性就业率为 73.6%。

总体来说，东欧福利国家的情况高度多元化：虽然它们都有一个共同的后社会主义传承，但不同的国家朝着社会民主主义、保守主义、自由主义或其他方向等有不同的发展（Blum et al.，2010）。捷克共和国的家庭政策“是社会保守主义……和社会民主主义体系相混合的最好例证”（Ripka/Mareš， 2009：110）。

子女/家庭津贴属于普遍性支付，但在领取时须验证收入，而且金额按子女的年龄设一个固定值：6岁以下儿童每月支付21欧元；6—15岁儿童，每月支付25欧元；12—26岁子女，每月支付29欧元（欧盟社会保障共同信息系统MISSOC，2011）。

在捷克共和国，父母双方均可享受三年育儿假。育儿假津贴的总额为8 700欧元，父母可以按照不同的速度加以领取（Moss，2012：93）：最长的时限为48个月，最短的时限为24个月。如果父母双方同时请育儿假，那么他们中只能由一位按时在固定地点领取福利金（父母双方也可以按照自己的意愿轮流请育儿假并领取津贴）。总之，捷克的育儿假体系给父母更多选择，但它以较长的假期为基础，而且相比瑞典和德国，福利金较低且一刀切。

如经合组织家庭数据库所示，捷克共和国的公立幼托机构在欧洲属于最不发达之列：2008年，只有2.2%的零至二岁儿童和79.7%的三岁至学龄儿童使用正式幼托服务。

四、结论

本文开篇论及，随着人口变化给欧洲各国带来不同程度的影响，人们对家庭政策和生育率之间的关系越来越感兴趣。

如本文第一节所述，对家庭政策和生育率的研究——至少到目前为止——还远未得出明确结论。因此，对四个国家——瑞典、德国、意大利和捷克共和国——关于人口状况和家庭政策的描绘不足以对这两者之间的关系形成定论。然而，可以从对比研究达成的一致意见出发，得出一些初步结论：现金和实物福利对生育率的积极影响；如果有工作—生活平衡政策，则高水平的女性就业率和高出生率之间存在正相关性。瑞典案例证实了“北欧国家广泛可用的工作—生活协调设施支持生育决策”这一假设（Plantenga/Remery，2009：25－26）。

家庭政策是长期性政策，改革的效果不会马上显现。家庭政策对生育率的影响尤为如此。例如，Bujard（2011：36）指出，人们主要从媒体及亲属、朋友和邻居的经验中知晓家庭政策现状。因此，政策改革需要时间才能得

到认知或引导行为变化。

然而,许多国家的出生率从 2002 年开始回升(经合组织,2011：20)。例如,欧盟统计局数据表明,瑞典的出生率从 2001 年的 1.57 大幅上升至 2010 年的 1.98,同期德国的出生率从 1.35 小幅上升至 1.39,意大利的出生率从 1.25 上升到 1.41,捷克共和国的出生率从 1.14 决定性地升至 1.49。特别值得一提的是捷克共和国。该国的工作—生活平衡政策水平相对较低,成为高女性就业率和高生育率并存的反例。而高女性就业率和高生育率虽然在跨国比较中的相关性具有统计学意义,但不适用于所有国家。不但在捷克共和国,而且在几乎所有的后社会主义国家,出生率自 20 世纪 90 年代早期以来都出现了剧烈下降,然后在低位维持了一段时间,新千年的头十年又开始回升。①

德国在进行家庭政策改革时效仿了瑞典,以此促进父母们的工作—生活平衡,保障女性就业,有可能的话还希望能提高出生率。不过,家庭政策和生育率之间的关系极为复杂,且具有长期性,德国的生育行为尚未出现重大改变。正如第一章所述,所有国家都在想要孩子的数量和实际孩子数量之间存在差距。因此,协调工作和家庭生活平衡的政策虽然只是帮助人们实现生育偏好的众多因素之一,但却是决定性的因素。

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① 此外,总生育率(TFR)受出生时机的影响很大,例如,头胎育龄的推迟(对比经合组织,2011)。

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从性别平等看家庭政策

——欧洲比较研究

引言

本文旨在探讨并说明在受薪工作、无薪家庭工作和家庭看护的分工方面，性别平等的家庭政策起到了作用的证据。本文的理论框架改编自 Pascall and Lewis (2004)的政策影响五大维度：(i) 受薪工作，(ii) 无薪工作，(iii) 收入，(iv) 时间和(v) 发言权。其后，本章对欧洲各国的不同家庭政策措施及其对劳动力市场、无薪工作和看护方面的性别平等的影响的证据作简短总结。最后，对一般政策趋势和各国家群体的不足做了反思，还对未来政策和研究议题做出了概括性建议。

大多数欧洲国家已经采用了若干家庭友好型政策，旨在促进父母，尤其是女性在履行看护义务的同时参与劳动力市场。这些政策的初衷不尽相同，但一般是把性别平等当作实现其他目标的手段。这里的其他目标指：减少女性面临的工作—家庭冲突、降低儿童的贫困风险、在老龄化和低生育率的背景下支撑福利国家财政，等等。从历史上来看，只有北欧国家才明确地将性别平等作为政策目标(Pascall and Lewis，2004)。近年来，将性别平等本身作为政策目标也受到了其他国家的日益重视。更多国家出台了鼓励男性参与家庭工作的政策，如允许父亲休育婴假等(Ray，Gornick et al.，2010)。

欧洲受薪和无薪工作的性别分工

家庭学者（如 Crompton and Harris，1999；Gornick and Meyers，2003）根据工作和看护体制对各国进行了分类，来比较各国家庭男女分担谋生和看护责任的系统性相同点和不同之处。第一种体制，也即男性养家/女性看护的模式，是二十世纪五六十年代主要的家庭工作和看护分工模式。如今，在大多数欧洲国家里，只有少数家庭还实行这一模式。意大利、西班牙和希腊等南欧国家例外。在南欧国家，母亲的就业率不到60%。另有三种工作/看护体制出现。北欧国家最接近男女全职工作/国家提供看护服务的机制，母亲的就业率在80%左右。不过，在抚养孩子的阶段，瑞典和挪威（OECD 2011）也有许多母亲从事长时间的兼职工作，芬兰的母亲们则会脱离劳动力市场更长时间以便照顾孩子。相比其他欧洲国家，北欧国家也实现了男女之间无薪工作更为平等的分工（Eurostat，2004）。配偶双方均为全职工的现象在许多中东欧国家（CEE）也很常见。在某些中东欧国家，无薪工作方面的性别不平等导致女性的工作时间长于男性（Eurostat，2004）。20世纪90年代，儿童保育服务减少，保育假时间长但是收入低，所以越来越多的家庭在孩子年幼的时候由男性暂时承担谋生责任。与前两种机制相对的是大多数西欧国家出现的男女共同就业/ 女性兼职看护的家庭模式。例如，德国、英国和荷兰两性全职就业比例差距在30%—40%之间（OECD 2011）。这些国家促进了母亲的兼职就业，同时向三岁以下儿童提供较低水平或昂贵的正规日间保育服务，导致女性长期担任主要看护者的角色。

在女性进入劳动力市场的同时，欧洲男性并未相应增加他们对无薪工作和看护的贡献。这一事实被认为是个潜在的看护缺失（Himmelweit，2005；Lewis and Giullari，2005）或不完全变革（Esping-Andersen，2009）。鼓励男性参与家庭劳动、减少他们对谋生角色的认同被视为清除女性职业发展余留障碍、支持所有公民既从事受薪工作又从事无薪工作的关键。女性职业发展的余留障碍还包括就业歧视。家庭学者（如 Fraser，1994；Gornick and Meyers，2008）和一些国家政府，如瑞典和荷兰政府（Plantenga，Schippers et al.，1999；Plantenga，2002；Nyberg，2006）推广男女共同就业/共同看护的模式，认为它既可以促进劳动力市场上的性别平

等，又可以增进男女在无薪工作和家庭看护时间分配上的平等。然而，目前为止没有一个国家的实践接近理想状态。

一个性别平等政策的理论框架

性别平等政策可以在五个维度上加以概念化：(i) 受薪工作，(ii) 无薪工作和看护、(iii) 收入、(iv) 时间和(v) 发言权（见图 1)。前四个维度指出在生活的哪些领域——受薪或无薪工作——政策具有最直接的影响力，以及政策影响的目标究竟是收益流还是两性在这些任务上花费的时间。第五个维度，发言权，考虑的是两性的政治影响力，如通过比例代表制、配额或社会运动来施加影响力。中东欧国家社会主义时期的经验表明，发言权机制至关重要，发言权不应只掌握在政府或精英手中，而应该由公民社会共同拥有，这样才能实现全面的性别角色改变(Pascall and Lewis，2004)。以下讨论将呈现证据，以说明家庭政策通过影响收入或时间来影响性别平等，改变受薪和无薪工作的分工。讲到家庭看护，本文的重点是儿童看护，而非老年人看护，理由在于：为人父母是重大的抉择关头，此后性别差异将拉大，其后果将影响到整个余生（Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel，2007；Grunow，Schulz et al.，2012)。



* 数据来源：改编自 Pascall and Lewis (2004)

图 1　性别平等政策的理论框架

相关欧盟指令出台后，欧洲各国有关劳动力市场歧视、同工同酬、非典型工作安排中的平等待遇和工作时长限制方面的立法开始趋同(Walby，

2004)。大多数欧洲国家都征收个人所得税,以资鼓励女性参与劳动力市场。与此相对的是德国和法国至今还在采用的配偶共同收入所得税(Jaumotte, 2003)。至于其他多个工作/看护协调平衡政策,各国的差异相当大。英国和荷兰等国普遍提供的弹性工作时间安排,包括兼职工作,提高了母亲们参与劳动力市场的可能性。不过,兼职工作限制了女性的工作时间,因此也有可能妨碍性别平等(Fagan and Walthery, 2007)。赋予员工既能要求增加工作时间、又能要求减少工作时间的权利非常重要,它可以鼓励员工在孩子长大一点之后恢复相对较长的兼职工作时间。

在有利于性别平等的分娩后休假计划的"最佳实践"中,既有个性化的、父母皆有权享受的、可至数月之久的带薪假期,又有长度适中的、父母之一可享受的保育假(Ray, Gornick et al., 2010)。经验表明,推出个性化陪产假和父母均可享受的保育假以及相对较高的补偿金后,父亲中休假的人数多了(O'Brien 2009)。至于该政策对父亲们后续参与无薪工作和看护的较长时期影响,证据的指向不一(如 Ekberg, Eriksson et al., 2005; Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel, 2007; Haas and Hwang, 2008)。父母联合产假权利应当具有灵活性,允许父母同时从事兼职工作,而且补偿金足以抵补因放弃全职工作而损失的收入。如果没有合理的收入替代,大多数父亲不太可能享受陪产假和保育假。如果集体融资结构中包含家庭友好型的条款,那么对育龄妇女的歧视就会减少。

此外,父母在休完保育假后能否重返劳动力市场取决于社会上是否有充分的、高质量的、负担得起的日间看护服务。如果政府期望大幅度提高母亲的劳动力市场参与,由祖父母和受薪看护人提供的帮助还不够(Kremer, 2007)。如果儿童看护成本过高,例如日间看护服务主要由私营市场提供,那么就会导致受薪和无薪工作分工领域更严重的性别不平等,收入赚取潜力低的母亲尤其受害(Schober, 2011)。有几项研究结果强调,日间看护服务的开放时间应该更长,而不是只适应那些兼职工作时间较短的家长的需要;儿童看护服务的质量符合家长的预期也非常重要(Kremer, 2007; Lewis, Campbell et al., 2008)。日间看护质量对母亲们的工作—看护选择的影响目前还不是太清楚。用于儿童看护的现金福利有可能让人们更重视多由女性承担的无薪看护工作。在欧洲国家(如德国、奥地利、芬兰、挪威和瑞典),儿童看护现金福利还没有丰厚到能缩小两性收入差距的地步,因而

不利于女性回归劳动力市场(如 Sipilä and Korpinen, 1998; Schøne, 2004; Tunberger and Sigle-Rushton, 2011)。上述政策的细节因素很重要,而鼓励两性在家庭受薪和无薪工作方面更平等分工的一揽子政策也很重要。Kremer (2007) 认为,激励两性自行看护孩子或将无薪工作和看护时间外包给国家、市场或自愿看护者的一揽子政策会塑造看护模式的理想规范,而这种规范可能加强或限制经济刺激以外的其他政策的影响。

未来政策和研究议题

过去十年间,许多欧洲国家在性别平等方面取得了长足进展,如提供了更多兼职工作、父亲陪产假和日间看护服务。全职工作者,尤其是男性全职工作者,普遍存在的长工作时间文化依然阻碍着家务劳动和看护方面更平等的性别分工。日间看护服务仍有质量提升的空间。中东欧国家和南欧国家在提高性别平等和缓解工作/家庭矛盾方面还有很多工作要做。

迄今为止,没有哪一个国家毫无代价地就实施了性别平等一揽子家庭政策。虽然成本—效益估算表明了性别平等的长期回报(如 Esping-Andersen, 2009),但考虑到当前政府预算捉襟见肘,将来此类政策的成本效益必须更高。政府可能趋向采用市场化的看护选项,并对自愿和私营部门的看护提供者进行监管。这可能会提出国家对市场进行监管的新问题,有待进一步研究。目前,对工作时长的调控尚未广泛采用,但它有可能是一个成本较低的选择,也符合许多欧洲国家居民对略微减少工作时长的偏好。

相比政策对男女两性劳动力市场参与的影响的记录,政策对无薪工作和看护时间的影响记录还不够全面深入。我们需要进行更多的跨国纵向家庭比较研究,以鉴别并更好地理解政策对无薪工作和看护的影响。理想状态下,这样的研究还应该包括代际家庭关系数据,因为在许多欧洲国家,祖父母是重要的看护者。由于领取养老金年龄提高,再加上年长女性更多地从事全职工作,祖父母提供看护会变得越来越困难。既然性别平等日渐成为欧洲国家的显著政策,我们有必要了解性别平等政策对于其他家庭政策目标而言意味着何种权衡。现有证据表明,性别平等政策同适度生育率政策相容,但与反对职业性别隔离和不同群体女性间社会经济不平等政策之间存在权衡可能性。受薪工作和看护方面的性别平等政策同儿童成就政策

之间的相容性在很大程度上取决于特定的政策组合，特别是非家长看护的质量。

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美国的家庭政策

——“自由国土”上的精英文化价值观障碍

引言

撰写美国的家庭政策概览是个挑战,因为,一方面,需要解释的东西很少,而另一方面,需要解释的东西又太多。之所以说需要解释的东西很少,是因为美国没有全面的联邦家庭政策。美国联邦政府既不提供带薪产假,也不强制要求实行带薪产假制度,就连普遍认可的孕、产后至少康复六周再重新从事受薪工作等常态活动的制度都没有。有关幼儿看护的联邦项目少之又少,而且时常变更;它们的设计初衷从来就不是向父母需要上班的儿童提供广泛的、可负担的日托服务。由于美国经济中日益浓厚的新自由主义倾向,劳动者受到的保护减少,履行护理等家庭义务的难度加大——美国人工作时间更长、报酬更低这一势头还在持续。与此同时,人口构成出现变化,由一位上班养家的父亲和一位专心呵护家人的母亲组成的异性恋核心家庭几乎已遭淘汰,可雇主和政府对此反应迟缓,政策没有做出相应调整。

如果要了解美国都有哪些家庭政策,我们必须对50个州进行逐一研究。即便是一些旨在向低收入人口提供医疗保健和食品的国家级项目,如医疗补助计划和营养补充援助计划,在各州的执行也有所差别。其结果是,因为所在地的不同,收入水平或家庭状况相似的美国人享受同一个“联邦”项目保障的程度大相径庭。显然,本文对此无法进行充分讨论。

作为一名人类学家,我不禁纳闷,美国的家庭政策历史及现状能反映出哪些美国文化价值观?我将在下文指出,美国缺少全面的联邦家庭政策这一事实表明,我们对政府在家庭生活中该扮演何种角色比较恰当还没有形

成全国共识。不过，某些美国精英文化价值观已经凸显了出来，包括相信自由市场最符合企业的利益、蔑视受薪和无薪护理劳动，以及最为重要的，为了维持当代社会种族和阶级层次结构而必需的对结构性不平等的掩盖。正是这些价值观使得美国长期无法形成家庭政策方面的全国共识。

儿童保育：辩论和障碍

虽然美国联邦政府层面没有全面的家庭政策，但这并不意味着美国家庭及其需求从来都不是强烈的政治诉求或辩论主题。恰恰相反。事实上，“家庭”往往是一个充满政治内涵的概念。家庭存在什么问题、是什么威胁了家庭、如何解决家庭问题或保护家庭等话题常常引起关注。然而，正是因为这些辩论的政治意味太浓，所以符合当代家庭、当代经济社会现状和良治需求的、务实高效的家庭政策难以形成。

美国儿童护理立法史能很好地说明这一点（Cohen，1996）。20 世纪 70 年代，国会两党均表示支持全民日间看护补助，不料却被尼克松总统否决，这一历时多年的立法努力成了冷战政治的牺牲品。显然，尼克松在同中华人民共和国建交之后，怕招致国内保守势力的批评，批评他支持“不敬神祇的共产主义”。美国的工作家庭何其不幸！尼克松的批评者同样把提供全民儿童看护补贴视作共产主义者的阴谋，指责后者企图培养美国孩子反抗父母的权威和教导、强迫妈妈们加入受薪劳动力大军。

目前，联邦儿童看护支出的主要决定因素是收入水平，因此它受阶级结构的驱动，并且维持现有的阶级结构。1965 年，美国卫生与公众服务部启动了领先计划（Head Start Program），由联邦政府出资，地方各组织及机构（包括非营利机构和公立校区）落实，并于 1981 年扩大了该计划（领先计划办公室，2013）。由于较低收入家庭的学龄前儿童更有可能在上学后无法完成学业，领先计划专门为这些儿童提供了早教强化及其他服务，但一般只有半日的时间，因此也无法帮助低收入家庭的父母抽身从事全职工作，养家糊口。此外，由于“领先计划”仅限于低收入家庭的儿童参加，所以孩子们更早地接触到了公立学校系统中现有的社会阶层分隔。

与此同时，中产阶级家庭享受联邦所得税减免。这种减免视家庭中受抚养子女的人数而定。许多家庭还有机会用税前收入支付私营儿童看护费

用，这可以为他们节省约 30%的日托费用。的确，税收优惠向许多需要抚养幼儿的中低收入家庭提供了重大支持。但值得指出的是，这样的税法福利为中高收入家庭带来的好处不可避免地大于中低收入家庭，从而确保相对富裕人群能独占更昂贵、(通常)更高质量的儿童看护服务。

如上述尼克松总统在 1970 年代否决全民日间看护补助一例所示，美国政治和关于儿童的公共话语的关键症结在于，母亲找人代劳养育孩子这一想法老让人如骨鲠在喉。不过，这种对妈妈和孩子必须在一起的关注从来都不适用于非裔美国人家庭。数十年来，后者被向寡母或被遗弃母亲提供支持的计划排斥在外。而如今，黑人女性如果生育，往往被归类为贫困母亲、早育母亲和/或瘾君子母亲，备受公众质疑(Roberts，1998)。

对母亲亲自照料孩子的关注也从来没有真心实意地、连贯一致地适用于未婚母亲。常听到的论调是，纳税人不应支持婚外生育的女性的伤风败俗或目光短浅，好像有了丈夫，母亲和孩子就一定会有经济保障。指责未婚母亲全靠政府支持才能养活孩子的妖魔化宣传影响深远，导致大多数现今的美国人都不明白，其实许多单身母亲都曾经结过婚，而且虽然她们的工作时间比任何其他高收入国家的单亲妈妈都要长，她们还是很可能比后者贫穷(Casey and Maldonado，2012)。

这种散漫的对于边缘化母亲(贫穷、非白人、未婚等)的妖魔化有时候也会拓展到对为了参加受薪工作而让孩子日托的主流(中产/受过良好教育、白人、已婚)母亲的妖魔化。当下的保守者认为，女性如果不想亲自养育孩子就根本不应该做母亲；而在过去几十年中他们的论调是，职业母亲一方面忽视了孩子，另一方面抢走了养家男人的好工作(Douglas and Michaels，2005)。

美国联邦政府在很大程度上没有意识到大多数从事受薪工作的美国父母都需要随处可得的、负担得起的高质量儿童看护服务，更没有做出反应。与此同时，私营部门涌现了一大批儿童看护设施，并且受到各州不同程度的监管。私营日托有两个普遍特点，一是对父母来说很贵，二是提供日托服务的员工工资很低，导致他们的流失率高、技能低下(Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner，2006)。许多双职工家庭发现，他们负担得起一个孩子的日托费用，但如果生了第二个孩子，两人还继续工作，就会造成经济损失，因为请人看孩子的费用高过父母一方的工资(典型情况下是高过母亲的工资，虽然不

是每个家庭都如此)。从短期来看,坚持工作,即使因儿童看护费用昂贵而导致入不敷出影响不甚明显;但如果中断一个工薪人士的职业,却是一个连带长期成本的决策。后者会加大男女之间的工资不平等,导致退休女性因为储蓄少、企业和政府养老金支付少而更贫困(大多数情况下如此)。家庭——尤其是母亲——需要更好的选择,而地球上最富有的国家应该有经济实力来为他们创造更好的选择。

为了企业股东和自由市场的特权而牺牲儿童和家庭的当前和长期需要是一种精英文化价值观。要是说美国的富人也有家庭,那是企图避开此类议题涉及的阶级问题。富裕家庭有钱支付昂贵的儿童看护服务(或者,他们更有可能雇用住家保姆),或者让父母中的一方退出劳动力大军,专心抚育孩子。相比低收入家庭,富裕家庭从强劲的、不受限制的私营部门得到的好处更多。因为如果经济好,比起中产阶级和低收入家庭,他们的加薪幅度更大、附加福利更多、投资(与工资相对)的获利也更丰厚。

种族和阶级是美国文化和家庭政策的建构原则

在经典的法律和政策分析著作《消灭黑色人体:种族、生殖和自由的含义》中,Dorothy Roberts(1998)指出,通过影响非裔美国人——尤其是妇女——的生育来实现对非裔美国人的压迫非但不是美国法律和司法体系的一个被忽视的方面或偶发的副作用,反而是美国文化和社会对生殖问题进行框定时的固有特点。从奴隶制时代到现在,精英们一直认为黑人女性的生殖活动从本质上而言对社会构成威胁,而不是社会的组成要素(他们一般视白人女性的生殖活动为社会的组成要素)。

20世纪60年代声名狼藉的《莫伊尼汉报告》就是一个很好的例证。这份报告的巨大影响力持续到今天。它声称对历代非裔美国人难以摆脱贫困的原因进行了实地调查,把火力集中在了黑人母亲身上,认为后者是贫困的根源,而不是非裔社区历经数世纪压迫而不倒的关键。该报告视多元化为异常,置低结婚率、早育和母亲低工资就业等结构性原因于不顾,基本上把黑人家庭,尤其是黑人母亲,描述为病态(Feldstein,2000)。

近几十年来,这一议题在很大程度上同阶级优越论(把“非白人”等同于“贫穷”,认定贫困妇女的生殖本身就是问题所在)重叠。在黑人社区以外的

地方，很少有人把非裔美国女性看作备受珍重和尊敬的母亲。（作为第一位非裔美国第一夫人，米歇尔·奥巴马是一个引人注目的新近例外，而且她在履行第一夫人职责过程中表现出来的那种彻底的母性人格成了白人女权主义者和保守批评者的争议导火线。前者认为她应该更有事业心，后者似乎感到她毫不含糊地以“好母亲”自诩是在侵犯神圣的、默认为白人专属的领地。）

简言之，美国文化和社会给予非裔美国人家庭的待遇、法律权利和经济机会一直乏善可陈。同样的，任何对美国家庭政策的严肃检讨都不应该忽视种族主义和阶级优越论的影响。这种影响维持和强化了不平等及压迫，而没有起到缓解作用。总之，受累于美国家庭政策的不仅是性别平等或儿童保护。

揭示这一点的最好的近期例子是 20 世纪 90 年代克林顿总统领导的福利改革。具有讽刺意味的是，他以对非裔美国人和工人阶级友善著称。“工作福利制”的目标是让接受福利救济者及时找到受薪工作，脱离政府资助。显然这是一个值得称道的目标，但改革的具体细节表明，这一改革其实是为了取悦保守人士。后者认为，政府把钱花在社会支持上纯属浪费，倒让那些在上世纪 90 年代需要越来越多低薪工人的企业尝到了甜头（Peck，2001）。

“工作福利制”中同本论文最相关的问题是，它没有向那些必须参加职业培训课程、求职或长途通勤去从事政府补贴的、上班时间极长却支取最低工资的工作的人们提供儿童看护服务（Swarns，1998）。（这对非裔美国人和其他少数族裔的影响特别大，因为他们更可能住在市区，而这些工作场所一般坐落在很远的郊区。）让我说清楚：在“工作福利制”下，纳税人的钱必须转给沃尔玛这样的企业，让它们聘用接受福利救济者，但不资助接受福利救济者在上班期间寻求儿童看护服务。如果一个中产阶级家庭的年收入处在中位数，即四万美元，它也要筹划一番才付得起一个孩子的日托费，更不要说两个孩子了。以此类推，一个接受福利救济的单亲家长，领取最低工资收入，即每年一万五千美元，又怎么负担得起哪怕一个孩子的日托费用？

这种对贫困美国人的实际状况的公然忽视，尤其是对贫困儿童的需求的公然忽视，切中我的论点。那就是，精英文化价值观是阻碍全民达成有关全面家庭政策共识的主要因素。在上世纪 90 年代从福利制度向工作福利制转型的过程中，我们看到对自由市场的信任符合企业利益（付钱给企业，让

企业提供徘徊于贫困线的、毫无前途可言的工作岗位,而不是付足够的钱给穷人,让他们有房住、有东西吃、有安全保障),对接受福利救济的家长所从事的看护劳动的蔑视(否则如何解释法律要求他们工作,却不提供儿童看护服务?),以及最为重要的,为了维持当代社会种族和阶级层次结构而必需的对结构性不平等的掩盖(因为工作福利制正是基于这样一种假设:美国之所以存在贫困,不是因为缺少报酬优厚的工作,而是因为穷人没有工作的动力——而穷人中非白人的比例畸高)。

家庭和劳动力大军中的人口变化

美国的家庭政策,或者更准确地说,美国家庭政策的缺失,在很大程度上未能适应家庭和劳动力大军中出现的人口变化。20 世纪中叶工业和都市经济框架成型的时候,一个典型的正常家庭由一位挣钱养家的父亲、一位主妇母亲和受抚养的孩子组成,或许还有一位可以帮忙做家务和照看孩子、同时又需要他人护理的祖父/母。那时候的人结婚生子的年龄比较早,劳动者退休后存活的时间相对较短,去世时的年龄比现在要早得多(Han and Moen,2001)。

美国的家庭和劳动力大军经历了巨变。1950 年时,只有 12%的已婚母亲从事受薪工作。因此,中产阶级的工作同父亲上班、妻子做全职主妇的情况相适应;对这些父亲的期待是专心工作,因为家里有人照顾孩子、做家务、从事所有其他让家庭正常运转的再生产劳动。对资产阶级人士来说,这是职业发展的必要条件——因为家里有另一位不追求职业发展的成年人分担了你本该从事的家庭再生产劳动,还为你做饭洗衣等,所以你能随心所欲地把工作放在首要位置。这种“理想劳动者”和“职业”模型绝对是男性专有的,而在如今的美国,它差不多已经过时了(Han and Moen,2001)。

今天,女性几乎占到了美国受薪劳动力大军的一半,即使结婚生子她们也不大会退出劳动力市场很长一段时间。1995 年时,70%的抚养 18 岁以下孩子的母亲和 61%的抚养 3 岁以下儿童的母亲从事受薪工作。从那以后,这些比例无疑上升了。一个重要原因是单身母亲(从未结过婚的、离婚的或孀居的)越来越多,还有就是 2008 年经济危机引发的衰退导致男性失业比例畸高,更多抚养幼童的妇女不得不继续就业或重新就业。

这就意味着，当今的一般美国劳动者同以前那个有妻子在家从事无薪再生产劳动，因而后顾无忧，可以全身心投入职业发展的理想男性员工越来越不一样。然而，美国的工作场所适应新现实的举措少之又少。有些企业提供带薪家事假、弹性工作时间、健康保险、儿童看护补贴等，以便吸引和留住最吃香的员工，但这是企业自主决定的。不可避免的是，最需要家庭友善型工作场所的劳动者——濒临或沦于贫困的单亲家长，往往是单亲母亲——最难获得这些福利。抚养幼儿但获得儿童看护服务渠道有限的母亲们常常从事兼职工作，而这些工作报酬低、不提供福利或就业保障，因此，不得不工作以赚取收入的幼儿主要看护者和支持者被美国的工作场所视为类同于放学后或暑假打工挣零花钱的十几岁青少年。女性老年贫困的一个最强烈的预测指标是为人之母，而上述现象是一个主要原因。这也是为什么没有子女的女性和母亲之间的工资差距甚至大过男女之间工资差距的一个原因（相比之下，父亲们挣的钱比没有孩子的男性多）（Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner，2006）。

近几十年来美国家庭的另一个重大变化是情侣们同居但不结婚的越来越多，尤其是有孩子的同居情侣增加了。虽然各社会阶层的同居现象都有增加，但低收入家庭，特别是非白人低收入成人未婚同居增加得最多。简言之，中产阶级人士推迟结婚生子，而美国的工人阶级和穷人只推迟结婚。后者中同居生育的越来越多。这不是意外怀孕导致的，而是因为他们的理念出现了转变。他们不像以前那样把单亲母亲视为耻辱，不再把结婚看成是成人生活和为人父母的必要前提，而只是视其为拿对方（男方）的经济前景下赌注（Smock and Manning，2004）。

同居降低了家庭的稳定性，同居者分手率较高，即使是同居后结婚者的离婚率也高于未经同居直接结婚者。不稳定的、经常变动的家庭组成对儿童成长具有重大的负面影响。相比那些跟亲生父母（含父母未婚者）一起生活在稳定家庭中的同龄人，出身此类家庭的儿童退学、十几岁就有性经验、滥用酒精和毒品的概率更高。另外一个更直接的负面影响是，同居结束或离婚导致的家庭破裂，往往使出身此类家庭的儿童陷于经济困境，而贫困显然对孩子有极大的破坏性和危险性（Smock and Manning，2004）。

家庭政策制定者面临的问题是，如何在最大程度上缓解给孩子们带来社会和身体伤害的贫困和不稳定。一些保守人士呼吁，应通过税收优惠和

家庭教育计划等政策来敦促同居者走向婚姻殿堂。然而,如果缺乏经济保障是同居生子这一生殖策略的重要驱动因素,那么"仅仅推动同居家庭缔结婚姻将不会改善经济状况"(Smock and Manning,2004:102)。

对家庭政策中的异性恋主义提出的挑战

美国同性恋权利运动的兴起,尤其是争取同性婚姻平等权利的运动,使人们更加关注各级政府和私营部门目前施行的家庭政策中所体现的异性恋主义。对LGBT(女同性恋/男同性恋/双性恋/变性恋)家庭的同等尊重已经在很大程度上取代了对艾滋病患者的关注,成为同性恋运动的号召力焦点。这包括对如何在法律和文化上定义伴侣或配偶、亲生父母或养父母、寡妇或未亡人等的关注,而这些定义的改变所带来的影响包罗万象,如税法、医院探视政策和养老院等(Cahill et al.,2002)。

从家庭政策的角度来看,有关LGBT家庭平等的两大议题尤其突出。首先,稳定的家庭和有经济保障的家长显然对孩子们有利,而目前并没有可靠的研究证据支持LGBT家长对孩子有害的保守派主张。有鉴于此,美国的家庭政策不但应当保持开放心态,而且应当积极寻求涵盖LGBT家庭的举措,特别是收养法及相关政策,以及婚姻平等政策(因为我们从以上论述看到,婚姻促进家庭稳定,家庭稳定又能给儿童带来幸福),还有对于监护和探视的规定。(Cahill et al., 2002)

美国某些州在这一方面已经取得了进展,而美国联邦政府却是进步的阻碍者。1996年,美国国会通过了《婚姻保护法案》,克林顿总统签署了这一法令。该法令拒绝向同性婚姻配偶提供联邦福利,还允许各州拒绝认可其他州颁发的同性结婚证书的合法性(这是一个特殊的、蓄意的、有别于异性婚姻的差别)。2013年6月,美国最高法院取缔了1996年《婚姻保护法》中一条关键条款,合法的同性婚姻伴侣自此可享受与异性夫妇同等的联邦福利。但是,最高院并未保证在各州均能享受平等的婚姻权利,同性婚姻伴侣还需在各州争取自己的利益。

截至2013年,美国50个州中已有13个,加上哥伦比亚特区,实现了同性婚姻合法化;未合法化的州中,也有部分已允许民事结合或同居伴侣关系;部分州以下的行政区划,如市,也对同性长期伴侣关系的认定和认可作

了规定。虽然同性婚姻的反对者在州一级的对抗中多次获胜，例如修订州宪法禁止同性婚姻，但现在不论左派还是右派都有很多人相信婚姻平等日渐为世人所接受，最终必将在全国范围内成为事实。

另一个同家庭政策相关的 LGBT 家庭议题是，为何 LGBT 家庭平等运动风生水起，而许多其他受家庭政策影响的家庭类型却影响力式微，经济条件每况愈下。我认为，个中颇具讽刺意味的原因在于，从目前来看，主张同性恋权利比主张其他权利，如穷人的权利，同美国精英文化价值观更能相容、威胁更小。

产假和家事假

美国没有任何全国性的强制带薪产假，这在世界上几乎是个特例。其他无全国性强制带薪产假的国家都是贫困小国。如果美国有些劳动者享受到了带薪产假，这一般是雇主为了吸引到最好的员工而自主决定提供的福利（因此受益者多数是最不需要带薪假期的高薪员工），要么是州政府的强制要求。后一种情况导致的结果是，带薪产假体系毫无章法，能不能享受带薪产假完全取决于劳动者在哪一个州就业（Fass，2009）。

正是因为这样一个毫无章法的、加强特权的体系，所以很多美国人都不知道，许多上班妈妈没有足够的带薪产假。女性在生育后两到四周就迫于经济压力重返工作岗位的情况屡见不鲜，这就意味着她们的新生儿必须每天交由他人看护很长时间。其他母亲们可能把所有的假期和病假时间都用掉，拼凑出六到八周的假期，但重返工作岗位后，她们在同一个福利年度里就无法再享受这些福利。而在这一年里，她们难免要请假照顾生病的孩子或带孩子去看病（Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner，2006；Fass，2009）。

依据适用范围极为有限的 1993 年《家事与病假法案》，少数上班家长可以请最多不超过十二周的假期（Waldfogel，1999），但请假期间他们一点收入都没有，家庭收入可能滑落至贫困线以下，只好动用储蓄或举债，导致后续年份的经济脆弱性。《家事与病假法案》主要对一定范围的双职工家庭有用。在这样的家庭里，有一位家长继续赚取全年收入，另一位家长年收入缩水四分之一也还过得去。而在这一年里，这个家庭必须承担怀孕、生育和多养活一口人的费用。因此，《家事与病假法案》“导致了不应被容忍的性别和

收入差距”(Frank and Zigler,1996：130)。

美国没有全国性强制带薪产假(更不用说陪产假了)这一事实,是美国社会保障网有瑕疵和自相矛盾之处的最令人震惊的指标之一。在世界其他地方的大部分人看来,解释无他,只能说美国无视新妈妈和新生婴儿的康乐,有意否认政府在创立健康社会中的职责。1993年颁布的《家事与病假法案》虽然只规定了非常有限的、无薪的、而且往往是象征性的假期,但它也已经是在那个更有希望的时代中进步力量努力争取得来的胜利成果。这一点更凸显了美国在家庭政策方面所缺少的全国性共识。

这种共识的缺失,甚至在给新妈妈更多时间康复而不至于陷入贫困这一基本问题上都达不成共识,反映了强调独立的精英文化价值观。但这种价值观在此类场景下不合理,也不应当适用。新生儿从定义上来说就得依赖他人,而世界上任何的产妇都需要护理并免除其他职责。

在美国,带薪产假只是工资和地位都较高的工作岗位的附带福利,(暂时)最脆弱的社会成员的基本需求只能受资本主义社会竞争性劳动力市场的无情力量的摆布。有的家庭享有足够的带薪假期,而他们中的大多数本来就是富裕家庭。许多其他家庭则一点都享受不到,而这样的家庭又大多贫困。这种状况表明,精英文化价值观对自由市场的影响极大,精英政治文化巧妙地掩盖了这一议题中体现的美国阶级差异。

结论

本文对美国的家庭政策做了一个非常简略的、不完整的介绍。美国没有一个全面的家庭政策。这种缺失,加上联邦政府和某些州层面已有的一些零碎的、往往相互矛盾的计划和立法,本身就给我们带来很多启示。现有的儿童看护和保育假/家事假政策凸显了美国精英文化价值观对制定有效的、连贯一致的家庭政策的阻碍。看护劳动受到蔑视,而自由市场,特别是劳动力市场,得到优先对待。与此同时,应对家庭需求的政府计划也造成和维护了种族和阶级不平等,对阶级不平等的影响尤其大。

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家族主义的悖论

——东亚社会为何不能持续*

东亚，已是当今世界生育率最低的地区。中国台湾、中国香港、韩国、新加坡以及日本最新总和生育率（TFR）分别为 1.03（2009）、1.06（2008）、1.19（2008）、1.28（2008）和 1.37（2008）。1990 年代南欧各国和德语圈国家的生育率下降到 1.3 以下，被称为"最低水平的低生育率（lowest low fertility）"（Kohler et al.，2002）。但如今东亚却打破甚至低于这个水平，变成了"不能持续社会"的集合体。是什么原因造成这一状况？欧洲第二次人口转型理论（the second demographic transition theory）有这样一个假设：低生育率起因于个人主义（Lesthaeghe，1991；van de Kaa，1987），东亚的低生育率是否也源于同样的原因？

本文的第一个疑问：认为东亚与欧洲一样经历着第二次人口转型的观点是否合适？第二个疑问：东亚的低生育率是否源于个人主义？

为了回答这些问题，本文采取两种方法，第一，将生育率置于更广阔的社会框架中考察。第二次人口转型并不仅仅是生育问题，也包含婚姻变化等现象。本文通过关注婚姻形态的变化以明确东亚和欧洲之间的差别。另一个方法就是比较的方法，而这一比较并不仅限于东亚和欧洲地区间的比较，还包括东亚地区内的各国比较研究，从而探明现在东亚低生育率产生的原因。本文的关键词是"被压缩的现代性（compressed modernity）"（Chang，

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* 本文译自 Emiko Ochiai. Unsustainable Societies: The Failure of Familialism in East Asia's Compressed Modernity[J]. Historical Social Research, 2011, 36(03): 219－245. 感谢为本文的汉译作出贡献的南诚博士（长崎大学），侯杨方教授（复旦大学），韩・中・日比较文化研究所。编者略作文字修改。

1999)，这个概念是由韩国社会学者张景燮(Chang Kyung-Sup)[①]提出，被用来形容快速达成的现代化。本文依据此概念试图说明，由于时间性的压缩导致了东亚现代化过程的复杂性，这种复杂性反映在东亚各种社会政策决策上，而这些决策又对东亚现代社会状况的形成起到决定性作用。

一、东亚的超低·极低生育率

(一) 东亚内部的多样化

首先，依据人口学的观点概述一下东亚的各种社会。有关“东亚”所指的地理范围，最近有两种用法。第一种是指中国、韩国和日本这些国家的传统用法，其范围是较为限定的狭义用法。第二种是将“狭义上的东亚”和东南亚综合起来的用法。这个广阔地域与欧洲共同体的地域不同，虽然没有在政治和文化上形成过统一的历史背景，但是在呼吁形成“东亚共同体”的情况下，其所指则大多数是后者的广义用法。但就语言、宗教、亲属组织和其他因素来看，广义的东亚是一个极为多样化的地区。

观察今日的生育率也可以看出东亚的多样化。总和生育率(TFR)大体分布在1.0到4.0之间。仅总和生育率这一点，我们就可以将东亚分为四组(表1)。第一组首先包括在此地区最早在1960年代就经历了经济高度增长的日本，接着是在1980年代经历了高度增长的被称为“亚洲奇迹”的“四小龙”，也就是所谓的NIES的新加坡、韩国、中国台湾和香港。这些国家和地区的生育率都是超低的。第二组是生育率水平在1.5到2.0之间的泰国和中国。第三组是东南亚的一些国家加上蒙古和朝鲜，这些国家维持着2.0到3.0的较高生育率。第四组是尚未结束第一次生育率下降即生育率转型(fertility transition)的老挝和柬埔寨。

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① 本论文中的东亚人名，按东亚方式将姓置于最前面。

表 1　东亚及其他部分国家/地区总生育率

国家/地区	总生育率	年份
中国香港	0.98	2007
中国台湾	1.12	2006
韩国	1.13	2007
新加坡	1.25	2007
日本	1.32	2007
中国	1.7	2007
泰国	1.9	2007
朝鲜	2.0	2007
缅甸	2.2	2007
越南	2.2	2007
印度尼西亚	2.3	2007
蒙古	2.3	2007
文莱	2.4	2007
马来西亚	2.8	2007
菲律宾	3.0	2007
柬埔寨	3.9	2007
老挝	4.6	2007

* 数据来源：日本内务省（2007）

如果把第一组放到世界范围来探讨的话，可以再分出两小组。第一小组是新加坡和日本，它们显示了和后社会主义的东中欧诸国、南欧诸国以及德语圈诸国非常接近的生育率。第二个小组包括中国台湾、中国香港和韩国，这个地区和世界其他任何区域相比都是生育率最低的国家和地区。所以第二小组被称为“极低生育率地域(ultra low fertility)”(Straughan et al.，2008)。本文主要探讨这些超低和极低生育率的社会，但在必要时也会论及其他东亚社会。

(二) 低生育率的历史性发展

在此详细地阐述一下东亚的超低、极低生育率社会。图 1 显示了这些社会在 1970 年以后的生育率，除了日本，1970 年的各国总和生育率都在 3.0

以上。日本和新加坡在第二次世界大战之后(菅,2010:140),韩国和台湾地区从1960年代开始,将抑制人口增长作为国家政策(山地,2010:43),推动家庭计划项目而诱发了1960年代的生育率转型(fertility transition)。日本在1956年达到了生育替换水平(replacement level fertility),新加坡是在1975年,韩国和台湾地区则是在1984年达到了这个水平(铃木,2010:20)。中国香港达到生育替换水平是在1980年。



* 数据来源:日本内务省(2010)

图1　东亚5个国家/地区总生育率趋势

日本的生育率在达到生育替换水平后,大约在20年间都保持稳定在同一个水平上,但从1974年开始,逐渐低于生育替换水平。换句话说,日本仅仅比欧洲1970年以后第二次出现生育率下降稍迟一点时间,便达到了同一低水平。与此对比,在其他的四个社会中,却看不到生育率稳定在生育替换水平的时期。在我们比较欧洲和东亚的生育率下降状况时,这一点是尤其应当注意的核心差异。

在新加坡,限制分娩的政策,在生育率达到生育替换水平后仍然持续着,特别是在1970年代,更是导入了任何人只要提出要求,都可以接受堕胎和避孕手术等新型的限制生育率的政策(菅,2010:141)。限制生育的政策在韩国和中国台湾也没有得到快速调整。在1980年代,这四个社会的生育率在一段时期比日本还要低。

在日本的生育率持续下降的1990年代,新加坡、韩国和中国台湾却出现了生育率维持在1.6到1.8之间的稳定期。新加坡1984年以后,政府开始关心民众的生活质量,鼓励收入较高的女性生育,对收入水平低的女性则鼓励其接受避孕手术。1986年新加坡对已有的人口控制政策做出修订,取消

了新加坡“家庭计划和人口委员会”。1987年,“为了新加坡,制造两个孩子的家庭(Two-child families for Singapore)”的口号改换成“如果有宽裕,生三个或更多的孩子(Have three or more if you can afford it)”(菅,2010:142)。与对二战中“多多生育”的人口增加政策抱着根深蒂固的抵触情绪的日本相比较,新加坡迅速完成了促进人口增加的政策转型。另一方面,在这期间韩国和中国台湾对于生育率的下降几乎没有表示过任何担心。当时的“韩国的人口学者解释说,日本的低生育率与大多数的西洋国家一样,是先进工业资本主义的特征”(Chang,2010:35)。

新的倾向发生在1997—1998年亚洲金融危机之后,进入21世纪后变得更加明显。中国台湾、新加坡和韩国的生育率急剧下降,虽然2000年有短暂的回升,但在2001年再次急剧滑落。这一年,韩国的生育率降至1.3水平以下,2003年,日本和新加坡也出现了同样的态势。[①] 之后,韩国、中国台湾、新加坡的生育率比日本更低,在日本和新加坡可以看到一点点的改善政策和保持安定生育率的现象,而与此相比,韩国、中国台湾和中国香港却都降到1.1以下,创下世界最低的生育率。这些社会记录下各自的最低生育率分别为:韩国2008年1.05,台湾2009年1.03,中国香港2007年0.98。这一组被定义为极低生育率社会(ultra-low fertility societies),从这个时期开始,显示了独自的发展倾向。对此现象的解释,尚处于摸索阶段。铃木透将在韩国和中国台湾存在的强烈的儒教家族制度传统与南欧和日本的封建式家族制度的传统相对比,试图在传统型家族构造中找到引起差异的原因(铃木,2010)。我认为应当更加注重经济方面。之所以这样说,是因为可以看到1997—1998年的经济危机起到了改变趋势的关键性作用。

(三)“被压缩的现代性”和人口转型

我已经指出:在生育率下降的过程中,除了日本以外亚洲社会并不存在一个稳定保持生育替换水平的时期。在此,我想再详细论述一下这个论点。当我们将视野放到世界范围内,重新讨论各地区生育率长期下降的趋向,就可以得到解释东亚社会变动的理论观念。

图2显示了包括日本在内的东亚诸国的总和生育率以及欧洲、美国的总

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① 香港的出生率从1990年代开始变为1.3以下。

和生育率在较长时间内的变化趋势。我们首先应当注意到,至少在欧洲出现过两次生育率降低现象。它们分别与第一次人口转型和第二次人口转型相对应。



* 数据来源:联合国人口年鉴

图 2　欧洲和亚洲总生育率长期趋势

一个有趣的现象是,除了极少例外情况外,处于同一区域内的国家——无论是在欧洲还是亚洲,生育率下降的现象几乎同时存在。这两个地区除了欧洲的法国和亚洲的日本,第一次生育率下降出现的时期之间大约有半个世纪的间隔。大部分的欧洲社会的第一次生育率下降是在 1870—1880 年代至 1920—1930 年代之间,而大部分东亚社会则是在二十世纪七八十年代经历的。日本的生育率下降始于 1950 年代,刚好位于大部分欧洲国家和东亚诸国经历第一次生育率下降的中间。从生育率下降的时期来看,日本既不落在欧洲这一组,也不落在亚洲这一组。也就是说在这个时期,日本没有与任何其他社会——欧洲社会或亚洲社会——一样,遭遇同样的社会状况或政策问题。我认为其中的原因在于,日本社会时常经历政治决策的困难和外交上的孤立。

下面看一下第二次生育率下降开始的时期。欧洲和美国是从 1960 年代末开始的,日本则始于 1970 年代中期。如此看来,日本同大部分的欧洲国家之间,第一次的生育率下降相隔了四分之一个世纪,但第二次的生育率下降却仅相隔了几年而已。在较晚实现现代化的国家中,它们的现代化并不仅仅是起步时期较晚,而是如韩国社会学者张景燮所描述的,是“被压缩”而产生的(Chang,1999)。

那么,除了日本以外的东亚诸国,究竟是从何时开始出现第二次生育率下

降呢？带着这个问题查看图 2 会产生一些迷惑，亚洲各国的生育率下降是一种持续状态，我们完全找不到如欧洲、美国和日本那里所看到的第一次和第二次生育率下降之间的分界。在这种情况下，我们必须将第二次的生育率下降重新定义为“低于生育替换水平的生育率下降”。依此定义来看，新加坡的第二次生育率下降仅比日本迟了两三年，始于 1970 年代中期。韩国、泰国、中国的第二次生育率下降，则分别始于 1980 年代初期，1980 年代后期和 1990 年代。如果我们将两次生育率下降期间，生育率稳定在生育替换水平的时期称为“现代的黄金时期”的话，这个时期在欧洲和美国为 50 年，在日本为 20 年，在东亚其他的地区却几乎不存在。在日本以外的亚洲社会，并没有经历过稳定的现代化，而是突然地或者说一蹴而就跳入到后期或者第二次现代化①。

从人口学的角度出发，我们可以确认张景燮所指的现代化被压缩的观点。在日本以外的亚洲经历了这种“被压缩的现代化”。与此相比，日本所经历的可以说是“打了对折的被压缩的现代化”。这种解释有利于说明这些地区随后的变迁。所谓“被压缩的现代化”，张景燮将这个概念定义为 “指政治、社会、文化方面的变化是在时间和空间被非常凝缩的状态下产生的社会状态。在此种状态下，因为本来不相同的历史和社会的种种因素共同存在并互动，因而创造了极为复合的流动性社会秩序”(Chang，2010：24)。

二、东亚的婚姻悖论

(一) 离婚、晚婚、终生未婚

在欧洲的第二次人口转型过程中，不仅仅是生育率，连婚姻的相关指标也显示出巨大的变化——离婚率上升、已婚率下降、初婚年龄上升、终生未婚者比率上升、同居比例上升和婚外生子上升。东亚在生育率方面显示的

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① “第二次现代化”这个术语由 Ulrich Beck 提出，与之前的现代前期的社会相比，用来说明在若干方面明显不同的现代社会。这个“第二次现代化”意味着欧洲 1970 年之后的社会，Beck 称之前古典的近代性为“第一次现代化”。他并没有将这两个现代化与两次人口转换相关联来定义，我认为应当将两者进行关联考察。因此，我将第一次人口转换所形成的社会称为“第一次现代化”，把第二次人口转换形成的社会称为“第二次现代化”(Ochiai，2010a)。

前所未有的极度下降以及和婚姻相关的数值变化，看起来和欧洲类似，但实质上却不相同。



* 数据来源：日本，NIPSSR(2010)；韩国，Chang(2010a)和韩国统计局(2008)；中国台湾，Ito(2010)；中国香港，政府统计处(2002)(2007a)(2007c)；新加坡，新加坡政府统计局(2009)

图 3　亚洲五个国家/地区的粗离婚率趋势

正如图 3 所示，东亚的离婚率增长显著。1960 年代末，在欧洲离婚率开始上升时，这种上升的倾向在日本也可以看到，粗离婚率(crude divorce rate)在 1980 年代为 1.50，2002 年达到了历史最高的 2.30。如图 3 所示，这一水平和英国、德国、瑞典、法国的比率相似。中国台湾和韩国的离婚率从 1980 年代开始上升，在 1990 年代初追上了日本，亚洲金融危机之后超过了日本。韩国的离婚率在 2003 年达到 3.50，与美国的 3.60 相接近。

但是，在比较东亚与欧洲的离婚率时，我们不能忽略这样的事实，即婚姻在欧洲被视为生活方式的选项之一，因而结婚率本身是在萎缩，而东亚却不同，那里的结婚率并不低。如表 3 关于离婚和结婚之间的比值所示，南北美和欧洲国家的数值盘踞高位，东亚最高的中国台湾为 0.45，中国香港 0.39，韩国为 0.36。较低的有受基督教影响的意大利和穆斯林诸国。东亚地区内的差距也比较大，如越南和蒙古比意大利和伊朗还要低，在这些国家可以说完全没有离婚(至少在统计数字上可以这么说)。在东亚，婚姻也在渐渐地变化，但就目前而言，婚姻仍然相当普遍；而婚姻一旦缔结，与西北欧和南北美洲相比，离婚概率都较低。

表 2 部分国家/地区粗结婚率、粗离婚率和离婚率/结婚率之比(%)

国家/地区	年份	粗结婚率	粗离婚率	离婚率/结婚率
乌拉圭	2007	3.84	4.33	1.13
比利时	2007	4.29	2.83	0.66
西班牙	2007	4.49	2.80	0.62
匈牙利	2007	4.06	2.50	0.62
古巴	2007	5.05	3.08	0.61
奥地利	2007	4.33	2.47	0.57
捷克	2007	5.53	3.01	0.54
俄罗斯	2007	8.90	4.83	0.54
法国	2007	4.33	2.22	0.51
德国	2007	4.48	2.27	0.51
瑞士	2007	5.34	2.63	0.49
美国	2005	7.50	3.60	0.48
英国	2007	5.14	2.37	0.46
中国台湾	2007	5.80	2.60	0.45
荷兰	2007	4.42	1.95	0.44
瑞典	2007	5.24	2.26	0.43
中国香港	2007	—	—	* 0.39
韩国	2007	7.10	2.57	0.36
日本	2007	5.70	2.02	0.35
中国澳门	2007	3.90	1.30	0.33
新加坡	2007	5.22	1.48	0.28
波兰	2007	6.50	1.75	0.27
中国	2007	7.50	1.58	0.21
意大利	2007	4.21	0.84	0.20
伊朗	2007	11.80	1.40	0.12
蒙古	2007	15.70	0.67	0.04
越南	2007	5.70	0.20	0.04
东亚各国/地区				

* 根据结婚和离婚数据计算得出

* 数据来源:中国香港、中国澳门、越南;联合国统计署(2008);中国台湾,Ito(2010);其他,NIPSSR(2010)

初婚年龄和终生未婚率的上升，在东亚是非常显著的。图 4 显示了日本、韩国、中国台湾、中国香港和新加坡的初婚年龄的变化趋势。日本最先有上升趋势；在中国香港、中国台湾、韩国可以看到急速上升的曲线，就男性而言，在 1990 年代超过了日本。而女性到 2000 年的时候几乎看不到任何差距。在 2005—2006 年，这些社会中男性初婚年龄为 30—31 岁，女性为 27—28 岁，与西欧的水平相近。



* 数据来源：日本，NIPSSR（2010）；韩国，Chang（2010a）；中国台湾，Suzuki（2010）、Sun（2009）；中国台湾，“内务部”（2010）；中国香港，政府统计处（2001）（2007a）（2007b）；新加坡，新加坡政府统计局（2009）

图 4　亚洲 5 个国家/地区初婚年龄趋势

关于一次也没有结过婚的人的比率即终生单身率，因为这一目标群体达到 50 岁才能被纳入计算范畴，因此在图 5 中仅显示最先发生变化的日本。由于战争原因造成合适的婚姻对象缺失，终生独身的女性比率在日本曾一度上升，这一上升趋势止于 1970 年代。此后男性和女性双方的终生独身比率都逐步增加，导致日本社会每 6 名男性中有 1 名，每 13 名女性中有 1 名终生不结婚，这两个数值都比瑞典的低，但比其他欧洲社会高。比较 35—39 岁未婚女性比率，日本、中国台湾、新加坡和韩国分别是 19％、16％、15％和 8％，这与“用早婚・皆婚等词来形容 20 世纪中期的亚洲的结婚模式”明显有巨大差异（铃木，2010：21）。



＊数据来源：NIPSSR(2010)

图 5　日本未婚人口比例趋势

（二）同居和婚外生子

在此还有一个应当注意的现象，在欧洲，结婚年龄的上升和终生独身者的比率上升是与同居和婚外生子的增加相伴出现的。换句话说，欧洲人即使结婚晚，他们仍然生活在没有婚姻形式但有性关系和同居状态，是一种变革的“亲密关系”(Giddens，1992)。

相比而言，在亚洲看不到同居和婚外生子增加的现象，这一点与欧洲的第二次人口转型有着巨大的背离。如果调查日本 18 岁至 50 岁的独身人士，回答“没有正在交往的异性”的比率，男性为 52.2％，女性为 44.7％，从 1990 年起甚至能看到微弱的增长（国立社会保障人口问题研究所，2005）。在日本，婚姻年龄和终生独身者比率的上升，并非由“亲密关系的变革”所导致，而是意味着“亲密关系的缺乏”。

的确，有报告显示最近两三年间同居人数有所增加。内阁府在 2009 年实施的调查中，比较了日本、韩国、新加坡各个年龄层中有同居经验者的比例(内阁府，2009)。调查结果如表 3 所列，为了比较研究，表中还列出了 2005 年(内阁府 2005)针对美国、法国和瑞典，涵盖同一主题的调查数据(小岛，2010a；小岛，2010b)。与同居较多的欧洲和北美，特别是瑞典相比，同居现象在东亚占少数。但是，同居现象也在不断增加，以日本为首，其次是新加坡，然后是韩国。在韩国回答有同居经验的男性和女性的数量差距较大，因此有推测认为女性回答者有意掩盖了她们的体验(小岛，2010a)。

表 3　有同居经历者比例

	日本 2009		韩国 2009		新加坡 2009	
年龄	男性	女性	男性	女性	男性	女性
20—29	19.4%	19.5%	10.1%	2.0%	12.7%	9.3%
30—39	33.0%	25.8%	11.1%	1.8%	12.6%	9.2%
40—49	20.8%	12.5%	3.4%	0.6%	8.9%	7.0%
	美国 2005		法国 2005		瑞典 2005	
20—29	48.1%	51.2%	39.1%	53.0%	54.8%	69.0%
30—39	62.0%	61.7%	61.0%	66.1%	80.8%	87.2%
40—49	66.1%	60.5%	51.4%	45.9%	80.8%	77.5%

* 数据来源：Kojima(2010)，表 2 根据内务省(2009)和(2005)得出

但是尽管有上述事实，婚外生子在东亚还是很罕见的。2005 年婚外生子的比率日本为 2.0%、韩国 1.5%、中国台湾 4.0%、新加坡 1.2%（铃木，2010）。在欧洲，婚外生子在西北欧占了全体出生数的一半以上，南欧也在迅速增长（意大利为 20.7%，西班牙 28.4%，葡萄牙 31.6%）。这些都与东亚形成了鲜明对照。但是在日本所谓的“奉子成婚”也有所增加。在日本以怀孕为理由结婚的案例从 1990 年代后半期开始增加。第一个孩子出生在结婚后 9 个月以内的情况在 1980 年为 10.6%，但是到了 1999 年则增至 20.9%，2005 年为 25.6%，2009 年为 25.3%（厚生劳动省，2010）。由此可以推论，婚前性行为的增加和对结婚的保守性想法之间的落差，促成了这种“奉子成婚”现象的增加。

同居是可以的，但是必须隐藏；结婚前的怀孕是可以的，但是婚姻外生子则必须避免。在东亚，婚姻和除此以外的血缘关系之间有着极厚的屏障。这与同居逐渐成为结婚的替代选项、作为制度的结婚逐渐弱化的欧洲不同，东亚婚姻制度虽然有所动摇但是仍然很坚固。我们从这一点也发现被压缩的现代性的征兆。

（三）跨国和跨境婚姻与高出生性别比

我们在讨论东亚最近的人口统计变化时，不能忽略跨国和跨境婚姻。① 小岛宏认为这种现象是促成“东亚方式的第二次人口转型”的众多因素之一（小岛，2010b）。跨国婚姻增加的情况首先也是日本先行于其他东亚诸国，

① 关于东亚的结婚移民问题，参照了 Palriwala and Uberoi (2008)。

可以回溯到1980年代。为了解决农村男性没有合适伴侣问题，一些地方政府提出了政府主导的相亲计划，奖励与菲律宾、斯里兰卡等其他亚洲各国的女性结婚。换言之，这并非是基于自由恋爱的婚姻，这种跨国婚姻的增加是传统的结婚——相亲结婚的延续。不久，民间婚姻中介也开始撮合跨国婚姻。进入2000年代后，在城市和工业地带的跨国婚姻也多了起来（Liew，Ochiai 和 Ishikawa，2010）。[①]

韩国和中国台湾的跨国婚姻比日本稍晚，从1990年代起逐渐增多，其急剧增长的数字远远超过了日本。跨国和跨境结婚，[②]在2008年日本为5.1％，韩国11.0％，中国台湾12.2％（国立社会保障人口问题研究所，2010；山地，2010；伊藤，2010）。虽然后来有所减少，但在中国台湾，2003年结婚的每三件中就有一件是跨境婚姻。[③]

在韩国和中国台湾产生这种现象的背景都是因为农村地区和低收入男性找不到配偶。在日本也是一样。但在日本看不到高度的出生性别比。狭义上的东亚和南亚从最初的生育率降低开始后至今的30年间，普遍存在着高性别比（男孩过剩）。在此期间，不存在强大父系亲族集团和男孩偏好的日本是个例外。[④] 小岛认为，东亚方式的第二次人口转型的另一个特征就是高出生性别比（小岛，2010b）。1990年的出生性别比在韩国为117，中国台湾为110（铃木，2010）。但具有讽刺意味的是，虽然这些地区的生育率降低起步较晚，但却使人们赶上了孕期使用鉴别胎儿性别的医疗技术，实施选择性堕胎的年头。这是“被压缩的现代性”的典型案例。

拥有外籍妻子的丈夫们举出国际婚姻的理由是，必须有继承家系的儿子，以照顾年老的双亲，以及供给农场以劳动力（落合，2007）。东亚的跨国和跨境婚姻之所以增加的原因，不是现代家庭而是为了维持传统家族而产生的。这一现象也可以说是“被压缩的现代性”的一个特征。

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① 定居的外国人和日本人之间的国际结婚案例，与政府和企业的斡旋无关，在不断地增加。

② 在台湾，跨境婚姻一词也包含台湾与大陆之间的婚姻。

③ 新娘中的28.0％不是台湾人。

④ 根据德川时代的关于日本的历史人口学研究，至少可以确认东北地方的高度出生性别比一直保持到19世纪初。应当是由性别选择的杀婴所造成。但是到了德川时代末期性别比开始保持平衡，1950年代出生率转换时期也没有出现性别比的偏差。

（四）东亚的婚姻和回避风险方式的个人化

离婚率、初婚年龄和终生独身比率依然在上升，但是婚姻这种制度却屹立不倒；跨国和跨境婚姻虽然兴盛，但这又是以极为传统的目的进行的。考察与这些现象相关的因素，可以推断，东亚的“结婚”与欧洲有着不同的意义。

东亚婚姻的独特性在性行为与结婚的关系中也可以看出。厚生劳动省的研究小组针对16岁到49岁的男性和女性的性态度和行为，每隔两年进行一次调查。2010年已婚男女40.8％在过去一个月内没有过性行为，与2004年的31.9％相比呈持续增长趋势（每日新闻，2011）。这个现象被媒体称为“无性夫妻”。没有性生活的夫妻在新加坡也同样成为问题，以此为主题的小说也相继问世（藤井，2010）。如果说性行为是亲密关系的核心，那么东亚的婚姻并不是为了维持亲密关系，而是为了其他的理由而存在。

表4显示的是EASS（East Asian Social Survey）在2006年对日本、韩国、中国大陆和台湾以家庭为焦点的调查所得的部分结果（岩井和保田，2009）。最先的五个问题有例如“相比自身的幸福，应当以家庭的幸福和利益为优先”这样将个人主义和家庭主义对立起来的设问。韩国、中国及台湾地区的回答者十人中有七八人对上述问题做出肯定的回答，可以看出非常强烈的家庭主义倾向。即使在肯定性回答人数最少的日本，也有半数以上的人做出了肯定回答。回答“结婚生活不能很好地维持时，离婚是最好的办法”的，除了日本以外虽然比例都不低，但是在韩国和中国大陆，做出“想要离婚的人应当等到孩子们长大以后”回答的比率却很高，可以看出由于家庭主义使得人们回避了个人主义的决定。就亲子间的义务而言，义务并不是特指父母对孩子的，还包括“孩子必须努力能够给双亲带来名誉”。在东亚，结婚并不是基于个人欲望，而是与义务和责任相关而生的。

表4 亚洲各社会家庭价值观

回答“非常同意”“一般同意”“有点同意”的受访者所占比例（％）

	日本	韩国	中国大陆	中国台湾
以家族的福祉和利益为先	50	79	68	83
如果无法维系婚姻，离婚通常是最好的解决方案	29	38	49	46
必须等到子女成人后才能离婚	36	55	43	33

（续表）

	日本	韩国	中国大陆	中国台湾
你认为你父母对你选择当前婚姻伴侣有多大的影响？	30	47	41	36
子女必须努力为父母争光	40	74	89	86
婚姻不一定要有子女	20	11	28	35
非婚同居没有问题	28	22	25	36

* 数据来源：Iwai and Yasuda（2009），根据东亚社会调查（EASS）2006 数据得出

对于“即使结婚也不需要孩子”，或者“虽然没有结婚的意思，但是男女之间也可以同居”的一些问题，做出否定回答的较多。对于这两个问题，“强烈反对”、“相当反对”和“有些反对”的回答率，合计在韩国最高，分别为 77％和 66％。在韩国，回答“想要离婚，也要等到孩子们长大”也是居首位。理想选择和超低生育率、高离婚率的现实之间的巨大落差，显示了韩国社会的深刻矛盾。

张景燮将这个落差解释为“回避风险的个人化”。他说“韩国人过着非常重视家庭的社会和个人生活，也可以称之为‘家庭主义被压缩的现代性（familist compressed modernity）’”（Chang，2010a：24；Chang，2010b）。这是因为资本主义的工业化、都市化、无产阶级化，对教育成就的极端追求以及对急速发展的近代化中个人财富的保护等，对于毫无防备的个人来说，唯一能够提供保护的社会性资源就是家庭的缘故。但是“家庭作为制度而衰弱，是将家庭关系从社会资源变成了风险”。你可能更有义务接济在这个竞争社会中遭到淘汰的家庭成员和亲戚，而不是从他们那里得到帮助。① 因此“所谓的回避风险的个人化，可以定义为将个人化的生活状态加以延伸，或者是回归个人化，从而使与家庭相关的、影响到现代生活的风险降到最低”（Chang，2010a：25）。这一点实际上在 1997—1998 年的亚洲金融危机袭来，当超低生育率的社会出现之时，已经初露端倪。人们决定推迟结婚、生子，或离婚，是为了规避这些可能给自己带来的风险。

关于此点，小岛对日本、韩国、新加坡同居现象的相关理由的研究可以作为参考（小岛，2010a）。他指出，这三个社会的共通点是学历的负相关效

① 日本的社会学者山田昌弘也提出了将家族作为风险来源的看法（山田，2001）。

应。也就是说,学历越低同居的倾向越高。从 1992 年至 2001 年的日本经济低迷期,在高校毕业后就业的人中,同居人数增加。在韩国,受所谓 IMF 危机(韩国以此称呼亚洲金融危机)影响,中等学历的男性同居较多。换言之,在东亚,同居增加的原因与其说是想将自己从婚姻制度中解放出来的个人主义,倒不如说是那些低学历或工作不稳定的人们遭受“社会的排除”而被迫同居,是由于经济性理由而增加的。[①]

张景燮论述的核心是:这个倾向“并不一定是个人化的结果,之所以这样说,是因为同居的增加是由于在韩国生活中的家庭关系和家庭价值的意义被不断强化的缘故”(Chang,2010a:24)。张认为,这个现象在日本和中国台湾也有,这种状况可以概括为“在资本主义的东亚中,没有个人主义的向个人化的收缩,而是被压缩的现代性和现代化的迟到者的第二次现代化的历史性结果”(Chang,2010a:35)。

三、家族主义的多样化及其失败

(一) 家族主义的原因

现在东亚发生的人口变化,表面上看似与欧洲和北美的第二次人口转型中的现象相同。但是,在欧洲作为制度的婚姻已然动摇,个人主义也在抬头。与此相对照,东亚虽然表面上与此类似,但作为制度的婚姻和家族主义仍然被维持着。如果作为义务和责任的婚姻制度的重要性没有动摇的话,生育率的极度降低和离婚、初婚年龄的上升则可以解释为为了避免家族的重荷,或者想从其中逃开的愿望而造成的现象。

那么,如果家族主义在东亚至今仍然占有优势的话,又究竟是何原因所致?首先可以想到的是从这个地域的传统文化中求索的文化论解释。但是,正如上文所示,东亚地域并不存在一个共通的单一文化。例如,从东南亚到日本的离婚率和再婚率在传统上就很高,离婚和再婚也并没有被贴上不名誉的标签(Reid,1993),婚外生子也很多,有些地域对私生子几乎没有任

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① 但是,小岛发现在日本,高学历的女性也选择同居,这是 2000 年以后出现的新倾向,这也可以解释是一种新型生活方式的发现(小岛,2010a)。

何歧视（Ochiai & Nakajima，2010；Ochiai，2011）①。另一方面，从中国北部到韩国，在强大的儒教影响下，婚姻外的孩子自然不必说，离婚和再婚也被视为厌恶的对象。濑地山认为东亚北部和东亚南部在男女关系上是截然相反的。在以男女社会空间隔离所致、以家庭父权为特征的北方和因女性在水稻生产上的贡献而带来的男女平等的南方之间形成鲜明的对照。因此，不能将东亚综合起来企图用单一的文化来解释（濑地山，1996）②。

埃斯平·安德森（Esping-Andersen）认为，“家族主义”是指对所得分配和护理分担两方面，家庭对其成员的福利应当负有最大限度的责任。他主张，在近代的福利国家的初期阶段，几乎所有国家都在以家族主义为前提。到 1970 年代以后，北欧诸国才实施脱离家族化的政策。他指出家族主义式的社会政策会导引出两个不受欢迎的剧本，那就是低生育率和贫困家庭的频出（Esping-Andersen，2009：81）。正如埃斯平·安德森所指，欧洲在 1970 年后的政策选择，被摸索出来有三个或四个不同的方向。欧洲的现状很大程度上依托于政策选择的结果。我们应当注意的是，东亚政府迄今为止是在“被压缩的现代性”之下发展的，这在今天仍在决定着政策选择。“被压缩的现代性”本身及在其之下的政策决定，使得东亚比欧洲发展了更加强大的家族主义，同时也创造了各种各样的家族主义（Ochiai，2010b）。

（二）日本家族主义的改革

在此，有必要了解日本在 1980 年代所推进的改革的重要意义。直到 1960 年代的经济高度成长为止，日本政府一直采取发展主义的政策方针。政策的核心是在通商产业省的指挥下促进经济发展，在某种意义上可以说是战前政策的延续。在社会政策领域方面，日本在 20 世纪前半期模仿俾斯麦式的社会保障制度，展开了社会福利政策。第二次大战后，日本制定了生活保护法，并导入除了非就业主妇以外的全体国民的年金（养老金）制度。从确立社会保障制度这一点上来看，可以说日本在亚洲范围内是领先的。

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① 九州东海沿岸地区的事例。

② 但是，如果将欧洲的社会福祉的发展连同基督教来考虑的话，从东亚地域历史中追求根据的说明也有其成立的余地。正如杰克·谷迪（Jack Goody）所描绘的（Goody，1983），如果说在东亚欠缺那种由教会代替家族对弱者和残疾者予以照顾的过程，那么东亚历史中的家族主义就依然被维持着，甚至是被强化着，理由也许可以从中得出。

但是,1960 年代社会保障制度停留在了辅助性作用上。其原因是发展被认为是改善人们生活状态的最好办法。我们可以称这个系统为“workfare”,也就是“勤劳性福利”,高就业率被认为能与福利发挥同等功效。

直到经济高度发展后的 1960 年代末到 1970 年代初,日本政府才认识到有必要修订现存的社会福利制度,以建设合宜的福利国家。1973 年被称为“福利元年”,其中包含日本将变为完美意义上的福利国家的含义。但是颇具讽刺的是,就在这一年日本遭受了石油危机,政府开始摇摆,强调“作为日本传统美德的‘自助和家族共同体中的相互扶助’”,推出“日本型福利社会”的政策目标。政府实质上想要推进的,并不是福利“国家”,而是“国家”退居背后的“福利社会”。1980 年代以后,由于在欧洲也盛行削减福利和福利多元主义,因此也有将日本作为其中一例的看法,但是不能忘记,日本和欧洲在削减前的福利水平是不同的。因为日本并没有大力发展那些必须削减的部分。反而是在 1970 年代以及其后,增加了对福利的社会支出额。是在“被压缩的现代性”条件下,在福利领域同时推进发展和削减。

让其可行的还有经济和人口方面的条件。使欧洲和北美受到了严重打击的石油危机过后,日本仍然保持着高度的成长率。日本的富裕时期比欧美多了 20 年。同时,虽然儿童数量已然减少,但是因为老龄人口尚未增多,1970 年代日本仍然享受着 “人口红利”带来的好处。在这一时期,日本工作年龄人口的比率为 69%(1970 年),比欧洲更高(欧洲如德国为 64%,瑞典为 65%),比亚洲其他国家也高(亚洲如韩国为 56%,新加坡 58%)(参照 Ochiai,2010a 图 12)。在这个良好条件下,日本 1980 年代后半期到 1990 年代前半期的经济增长率实现了年增长 5%左右(IMF204)。这就是那个“泡沫经济”的时期。傅高义(Ezra Vogel) 题为《日本第一》的著作在 1979 年出版后成了畅销书,以此为开端,介绍日本的经营和文化的书籍繁盛起来。日本社会将“勤劳性福利”又持续了 20 年。

1980 年代政府将“家庭”作为政策目标,力图创出“日本式福利社会”的基础。受到日本经济成长发源于日本文化的优越性解释的煽动,日本政府和学者们力图打出不模仿任何西洋政策的独立政策方针。他们做出这一决断的另一个刺激因素来源于统计数据提供的家庭变化指标,例如离婚率和结婚年龄的上升、生育率下降等。大平内阁的“充实家庭基础”政策,或称为“家庭白皮书”(“国民生活白皮书”特别号)等,就是源自对这种“家庭危机”

的担忧，以及保护日本家庭的强烈愿望，使作为日本民族认同基础的家庭免遭西方文化的侵蚀。换句话说，这些政策是针对欧洲以及北美开始的第二次人口转型做出的反应。1980 年代不断出台被形容为“保卫主妇之位”的法律，诸如 1980 年提升了妻子在法律上的继承上限额，1985 年免除了大企业职员妻子的年金保险费用，1986 年对需扶养配偶者出台的减轻税金的措施。

这个不合时宜的家族主义改革的影响是非常巨大的。女性的全日制正式雇用从 1950 年代开始增长，但这个增长由于受到石油危机的影响而停止。从 1970 年代后半期至今，女性就业的扩大也仅体现在非全日制就业上(Tanaka，1999；Ochiai，2010a：Figure 10)。这是由于大企业员工的妻子们，为了使收入所得限定在“被扶养者”范围以内，刻意缩短自己的劳动时间。这个被简 · 路易斯(Jane Lewis)称为“1.5 人就业模式”(Lewis，2001)的新型性别分工从经济低迷期开始，由法律将其固定化后持续了二三十年。1970 年，女性的劳动力参与率令人意外地超过了大部分欧洲国家(Ochiai，2010a：12)。但是，在之后的 30 年中，相比欧洲和北美后来的大幅度上升，在日本仅能观察到微弱的变化(如图 6)。女性各个年龄层的就业率在日本仍然一成不变地呈 M 形。大部分欧洲国家和北美各国，在第二次人口转型的同时发生了男女性别角色的变化，而日本由于 1980 年代的家族主义改革，这一变化并没有发生。



＊数据来源：NIPSSR (2010)

图 6 日本女性劳动力参与情况的变化(按年龄)

1990 年代，日本失去了 1980 年代所拥有的经济和人口方面的良好条件。1991—1992 年泡沫经济最终破产的时候，日本经济陷入了长时期的停滞，增长缓慢，人口学上的良好状态也未能持续下去。1990 年代老龄人口比

率急速上升，2008 年达到了 22.1％，成为世界最高水平（国立社会保障人口问题研究所，2010）（图 7）。



＊数据来源：NIPSSR（2010）

图 7 部分国家 65 岁以上人口比例趋势

虽然经济和人口条件发生了这样巨大的变化，但是在 1980 年代被制度化了的家族主义构造开始对抗这种变化，最终带来了“失去的二十年”的结果。政府从 1990 年代后半期开始导入新的政策，据称是以护理工作的社会化作为目标，但是这些政策仍然严重倚赖家族主义的理念。例如 2000 年导入的 LTCI（长期护理保险），被设计为促进以家庭为基础的护理形式，而不是对护理机构的扶持。家庭内的护理者，一天中可以雇请几个小时“家庭护士”，并从护理保险中得到补助，但是一天中剩下的时间他们仍然负有护理的义务，并且必须自行承担部分护理费用（费用分担），因此造成经济上的重负而感到痛苦（Ochiai et al.，2011）。

（三）其他东亚社会中的自由主义式家族主义

日本以外的东亚诸国有着与日本非常不同的体验。在这些国家，现代化被更加压缩着而发展，需要接受这样矛盾的课题：在建设福利国家的同时也必须对福利进行削减（Miyamoto，Peng，and Uzuhashi，2003：301）。例如，韩国的金大中总统（任期 1998—2003）在 IMF 危机后面对新自由主义和全球化的强制性适应，得出了将社会福利作为社会投资，换言之是以经济成长为基础来建设“生产性福利”的概念。从对六个东亚社会现实情况的实证研究出发，我们的研究小组为了比较儿童看护和老人护理的责任分担的类型提出了研究框架（Ochiai and Molony，2008；Ochiai，2009）。其中一个显著

的发现就是，在一些特定的社会中，市场部门发挥了核心性的作用，特别是在新加坡的儿童保育和老年护理，以及台湾的老年护理中，家庭雇用的外籍家务劳动者和护理劳动者发挥了不可或缺的作用。由于亚洲地区内部的高度多样性，使我们看到越来越多的家政工和护理劳动者的跨国流动。在劳动市场上购买照顾劳动的家庭，其解释也起源于家族主义理念：家庭应当把年老双亲留在家里照顾。但是，实际上担任这些照顾劳动的是外籍护理工。换言之，这些家庭将他们对父母的孝敬给外包了。[①] 我们称这种做法为“自由主义式家族主义”。

在欧洲和北美也有外籍家政工和护理工。但是，如果我们比较外籍家政和护理工在全部外籍工人中所占的比例，可以得出以下数据：中国香港57.5%，中国台湾26.6%，新加坡17.8%，西班牙16.4%，意大利10.4%，法国7.2%，美国2.0%，德国0.6%，英国0.5%（Asato，2010）。从这些数字可以看出东亚社会对外籍女性的家务劳动和护理劳动的依存度之高。在欧洲可以相比的社会唯有西班牙和意大利，它们属于南欧崇尚家庭主义的社会。雇佣外籍家政和护理工是家庭主义的一个补充。安里和晃将“经由雇用外籍家务劳动者来维持家庭作为供给福利的单位”的政策命名为“家庭化（familialization）政策”。他在这里看出政府的意图是“将福利外化到家庭”，并且“考虑到国际性经济竞争”（Asato，2010：88）。

比较新加坡或是中国台湾，必将惊异于日本在外籍劳动者雇用方面解决方案的缺欠。由于日本的入境管理政策不发给外国人非熟练劳动者签证，因此在日本国内几乎没有外籍家务劳动者和护理劳动者（Liew，Ochiai and Ishikawa，2010）。[②] 与家族制度的强化一样，日本维持着1960年代的体系，即使面对社会的彻底转型，也从各个方面抵抗变化。在日本，这种“折半的被压缩的现代性”勉强建立起类似于欧洲“第一次现代化”的构造。但是，却并没有足够的时间将其酝酿成熟，也没有构筑新的体系以应对变化。与

① 安里认为，外籍劳动者“通常被认为是家庭的‘另一个亲密成员’，将这一代理的家庭准成员内部化，以此维持家庭功能”。雇用不起外籍家政工的人，还可以选择跨境婚姻。“就提供家族内的福祉这一点来看，外籍家务劳动者和结婚移民是相似的。”（Asato，2010：98）

② 最近，日本与印度尼西亚和菲律宾政府之间达成协定，开始接收护理劳动者作为候补护士，但他们的数量非常少，而且该项目也存在很多问题（Asato，2009）。

日本相比,其他东亚社会是在更短的时间内和在更“被压缩的现代性”的条件下达到稳定。例如,在现代化初期,雇用家务劳动者是一个普遍的习惯。在那段群体性记忆还没有失去时,在日本以外的东亚已开始接受外籍家务劳动者。但是在日本,精心构筑的隐私却成了一道难以逾越的障碍。

亚洲的家族主义在现实中是多种多样的。但是,即使是从市场上购买护理服务的自由主义式家族主义,护理费用的负担责任也主要是由家庭来承担。[①] 这就是为什么自由主义式的家族主义仍被称为家族主义,而且这些社会的生育率还是很低的缘故。对经济上不宽裕的人来说,经济负担是极大的。1997—1998 年的经济危机带来的影响深远而严重,因为在自由主义式的家族主义社会中,本来经济就不宽裕的人们在面临经济压力时更加不堪一击。

四、结论

对于本文一开始提出的问题,即东亚是否在经历第二次人口转型,答案既肯定又否定。之所以这样说,是因为乍一看,东亚现在所发生的人口学上的变化同欧洲和北美类似,但在本质上却极为不同。韩国、中国台湾和中国香港的生育率为“超低生育率”,已经跌落到了世界最低水平。离婚率、初婚年龄、终生独身率在上升,同居则增加缓慢,且忌讳婚外生子。跨国婚姻增加和高出生性别比是东亚式第二次人口转型的特别现象。相比爱情,作为义务和责任的婚姻制度在东亚仍然没有被撼动。因此,在东亚经济危机来临时,家庭关系从社会资源转变为风险,于是产生了想要逃脱家庭负担,回避风险的个人化。由此,便得出了对于第二个问题的答案,东亚的人口转型和家庭变化并不是起因于个人主义,而是家族主义。

家族主义兴盛于东亚的原因,并不是文化因素,而是由于“被压缩的现代性”这种共同的社会条件。在拥有“折半的被压缩的现代性”的日本,1980 年代不合时宜的家族主义改革反而强化了 1960 年代的家族和性别构造,并妨碍了对 1990 年代的经济、人口变化的适应,造成了之后“失去的二十年”的

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① 由日本的长期护理保险(LTCI)而创出的市场也具有同样的构造(Ochiai et al.,2011)。

结果。与此相对照,经历了更加强烈的“被压缩的现代性”的东亚其他社会,以家庭之名利用国际市场,选择了自由主义式的家族主义路线。这样,由于现代性不同程度的压缩,产生了我们今日看到的东亚家族主义的多样化。

但是,不管是哪一种家族主义,对于建设可持续的社会系统来说,都是以失败告终。日本的纯粹家族主义扼杀了面对变化世界的柔韧性和适应能力,而东亚其他社会的自由主义式家族主义,则出现了对于经济不宽裕人士的毫不慈悲的排除结果。在不久的将来,东亚的其他社会像今日的日本一样面临老龄化的时候,如果不进行革命性的动态政策变革的话,东亚的社会再生产将面临比当今更加严重的局面。

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(因篇幅所限,本文的参考文献请参见本书英文版“Unsustainable Societies—The Failure of Familialism in East Asia's Compressed Modernity”)

人口、政策、政治*

——从历史的视野看中国的独生子女政策

20 世纪下半叶，许多国家都面临人口快速增长的挑战，但为什么只有中国采取了"一对夫妇只生一个孩子"这样极端的生育控制政策？而且，这样一个弊端众多的政策，为什么能够持续如此之久，甚至超过了当初制定时的预定期限？这是现代人口和社会史上必须要回答的两个问题。

当前全球人口的增长速度已经下降到其历史高峰的一半，世界近一半的人口生活在生育率低于更替水平的国度中。在这种新的人口形势下，人口学界开始回顾和反思政治在制定、实施、调整人口控制政策中所扮演的角色（Demeny & McNicoll，2006；Robinson and Ross，2007；Demeny，2011）。也正是在这样的背景下，考察中国政府的独生子女政策，将为我们理解政治在全球人口控制中的作用提供宝贵的借鉴。

在整个 20 世纪中，除了共产主义的兴衰，计划生育和绿色革命应该是对人类影响最为深远的两大社会实验。但两者的内容和做法却大相径庭。绿色革命以养活人口为目标，而计划生育则以遏制人口增长为宗旨。绿色革命以技术为手段，经济为导向，通贯全球；而计划生育以社会动员为基础，政府政策为导向，各国有别。

在控制人口增长的努力中，中国是世界上受到政治和政策影响最为突出的国家。"一对夫妇只生一个孩子"的政策在全球绝无仅有，可以说是历史上最为严厉的社会工程之一。本文以人口政策的全球变化为背景，通过

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* 本文的英文版已发表，见 Wang Feng, Yong Cai, Baochang Gu. Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China's One-Child Policy?[J]. John Wiley and Sons: Population and Development Review, 2013(02).

验证“少生了 4 亿人”的说法，探究实施这一政策的必要性，探讨这样一个弊端丛生的政策得以延续超过 30 年的原因。

源起：人口与政治

20 世纪下半叶，全球人口增速达到历史最高，其主要驱动因素是工业革命以来人类的预期寿命得到了前所未有的提高；到 20 世纪初，人口增长的势头已从欧洲和北美的工业化国家扩散至全球各地，尤其是全球大部分人口居住的亚洲和拉丁美洲（Reher，2011）。

人口快速增长给许多国家带来了各种前所未有的社会问题。控制生育的全球运动也应运而生。各国政府很快积极参与其中。这个运动可追溯至二战结束后不久的 20 世纪 50 年代初：印度率先制定了全国人口政策、国际计划生育联合会（IPPF）诞生、人口理事会在洛克菲勒基金会的支持下成立（Sinding，2007）。当时关于生育控制主要有两种观点：早期强调提供避孕工具，鼓励自愿避孕，独立于政府运作以避免介入个人的生育选择；而后期则认为为了控制人口增长，政府可以限制个人生育自由，提倡政府干预，使政府的干预合法化（同上）。

到 20 世纪 60 年代中期，人口控制运动进一步扩大。越来越多的国际组织开始认同人口增长阻碍经济发展，危及欠发达地区政治稳定的观点。发达国家政府和民间基金会都加大了对人口控制的资金投入。1969 年，联合国设立了人口活动基金会（后改名为联合国人口基金）。1974 年第一个由联合国组织的世界人口大会在布加勒斯特召开。[①] 尽管大会以争议告终，但这次大会标志着“向更好的国家解决方案，最终实现更美好的世界迈出了重要一步”（Demeny，1984：359）。

布加勒斯特大会反映了各方言词和行动不一的问题，其中中国很有代表性。中国代表团在大会上谴责西方控制人口的呼吁是为了实现帝国主义目的，认为人口不是国家经济发展和国民福祉的决定因素（Demeny，1985）。但实际上中国国内的生育控制努力早已在全国范围展开。在布加勒斯特大

① 1954 年和 1956 年曾分别召开过二次学术性的世界人口大会，但 1974 年的大会是第一次由联合国召开的、各国政府代表出席的以应对人口过快增长为主题的国际会议。

会召开 10 年前的 1964 年，中国就已经成立了国务院计划生育委员会，负责推进计划生育工作，其长期目标是到 2000 年实现人口增长率降到 1%（杨魁孚等，2001：34），而当时中国的人口增长率为 2.7%。1971 年在第四个五年计划中正式列入了到 1975 年使城市人口增长率降至 1%，农村人口增长率降至 1.5%的目标。1974 年布加勒斯特大会召开时，中国城市地区的生育率（1.98）已经低于更替水平。大会召开后一年，当时全国人口增长率为 1.57%，中国又重新设定了农村人口增速降至 1%，城市人口增速降至 0.6%的目标（梁中堂，2007：116）。

中国并非是言行相悖的唯一国家。布加勒斯特大会召开前八年，印度公共卫生部就改名为公共卫生与计划生育部，并在部里成立了一个负责计划生育的专门机构。但在布加勒斯特大会上，印度代表却提出了“发展是最好的避孕药”的名言。两年后，印度发布了国家人口政策声明，宣布大幅降低生育率是“全国工作的首要任务和重大决策”。印度在 1975—1976 年开展了强制绝育，实施了 800 多万例绝育手术，民间因此怨声载道，并直接导致了 1977 年 1 月英迪拉・甘地政府的倒台和新的生育控制措施的出台（Harkavy and Roy，2007；Visaria，2002）。1977 年，印度的计划生育政策更名为家庭福利政策，绝育指标也大幅降低。到 1990 年代中期，印度取消了所有与生育控制有关的指标（Harkavy and Roy，2007）。

面对人口迅猛增长，世界各国政府认识到人口生育率过高带来的挑战。在 1976—1996 年期间，认为本国人口增长过快的政府从 55 个增加到了 87 个（联合国，2010）。其他许多人口多、增长快的国家，如孟加拉和印度尼西亚，也都采取了较为温和的强制性措施（Sinding，2007：8）。

中国推行“一对夫妇只生一个孩子”的政策则使政府对人口出生的控制达到了前所未有的程度。是什么力量和政治背景推动了中国实行独生子女政策？为什么在印度，当生育控制的强制措施受到反弹后就导致政策快速逆转，而在中国的独生子女政策却延续至今？

中国之所以与众不同，可以从中国政治体制及相关决策流程的三个特点来解释：国家主义的政治传统和强大的政府体制；领导人把通过控制人口来保证经济发展置于其政治合法性的核心；政治精英主导决策过程，缺乏透明度和公众参与。综合考虑中国政治体系的上述三个特点，就不难理解为什么中国会制定独生子女政策并一直存续至今。

中国独生子女政策出台，正值中国领导人在1976年毛泽东逝世后需要重新建立其政治合法性之时。毛泽东及其同时代领导人的政治合法性来源于他们所领导的成功的武装革命和建立了中华人民共和国。毛泽东去世时，“文化大革命”的灾难性后果已经显而易见，中国共产党面临着近30年统治以来最严重的危机。毛泽东以后的新一代领导人选择了以发展经济为新使命，并以此为其政治合法性的基础。一个量化指标，人均GDP，成为衡量成功的关键指标。这样的使命和这样的重点，就使人口控制成为了其合法性的关键组成部分。1980年9月，中国以《人民日报》发表中央公开信的方式宣布推行“一对夫妇只生一个孩子”的政策。1982年9月，中共十二大报告中明文宣布：“在中国经济和社会的发展中，人口问题始终是极为重要的问题。实行计划生育是中国的一项基本国策。”①

独生子女政策制定，虽然整个过程涉及面广泛，头绪错综复杂，但决策者依循的是计划式思维，把人口简单地看作可以规划、调控的数字。毛泽东去世后不久，新人口政策出台的酝酿就开始了（孙沐寒，1987；White，2006；Greenhalgh and Winckler，2005；Scharping，2003；梁中堂，2007、2010；Greenhalgh，2008）。中国政府在1977年9月提出，为了实现现代化，要在3年内把年均人口增长率降至1%以下的目标，并把此目标纳入了1978年2月的政府工作报告（杨魁孚等，2001：62，但该目标实际上到1998年才实现）。实现这一目标的关键手段是控制生育。

早在独生子女政策正式出台前两年，即1978年，就有领导人提出通过推广独生子女家庭，实现快速降低出生率的设想。1978年6月，党中央提出了“鼓励夫妇只生一个孩子，最多两个”的政策措施，随后十多个省份于同年通过了具体落实措施，包括对只生一个孩子的家庭给予奖励，对超生父母进行处罚等措施（梁中堂，2007：119）。② 至1979年1月，《人民日报》和新华社等官方媒体均发表了报道和社论，明确号召一对夫妇只生一个孩子，“最多两个”。这些报道和社论也反映了已经在部分省份提出实施的措施，即对承诺只生一个孩子的家庭给予奖励，对超生父母进行处罚等。1979年6月，《人民日报》头版头

① 后来增加的其他五项基本国策为：环境保护（1990）、男女平等（1992）、节约资源（1997）、耕地保护（1998）和对外开放（2007），http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1025/10016373.html。

② 1978年中共中央79号文件。

条报道了国务院计划生育领导小组组长陈慕华的讲话:“把计划生育工作重点转移到生一个上来”,而最支持这一目标的恰恰正是负责经济规划的领导人。[①]

1980年2月,为了实现中国政府提出的经济发展目标,又提出了一系列的控制人口增长目标,其中包括到2000年人口总数控制在12亿,人口增长率为零,以及城市一孩家庭比例达95%,农村一孩家庭比例达90%等具体措施。虽然无法确认12亿的人口目标是如何计算出来的,但这一数字显然与邓小平提出的从1980年到2000年期间中国人均收入翻两番,增至1 000美元的目标是相吻合的。既然人均收入目标已经确定,而且经济增长率(即人均GDP的分子)可以预测,就不难推定分母即人口总数。

当追求GDP增长成了各级政府的首要目标,人口也就成了没有生命的数字,而不再是众多生命的集合。1979年11月,中共中央发布了《关于实行干部考核制度的意见的通知》,正式实行干部考核制度,进一步强化了对GDP的追求。该制度以人均GDP、人均政府税收等量化指标作为考核干部政绩的标准。人口因而成为计算人均指标,实现政绩的组成部分。人均指标的持续驱动也成为独生子女政策长期存在的理由。

在这种先明确总体政治目标,再计算为实现该目标所需人口总数的决策流程下,独生子女政策的制定和延续是必然的结果。既然人口政策对党的政治目标如此重要,该政策的制定也就掌握在最高层而不容置疑。即使有不同意见或保留态度,党内元老们仍然在该政策的制定和执行中拥有决定性的话语权。

理解了领导人的想法,专家和学者为新政策的制定和推广及时地提供了所需的“科学依据”。到1979年,中国将推出更为严厉生育政策的政治信号已经非常明确,当时的一些学者,其中有那些掌握了现代计算工具的学者,提供了更“精确”的计算,预测了不同的生育率条件下的人口增长,由此推动了独生子女政策的最终制定(Greenhalgh,2008)。然而,不论是政策制定的先后,还是政府决策的过程都清楚地显示,独生子女政策首先是党的领导人的想法,科学家们不过是提供了支持依据(梁中堂,2007)。[②] 但是,他们的预测的确迎合了

① 在众多支持者中,当时主管经济工作的两位党领导人陈云和李先念最为明显。陈云时任党中央副主席,在1979年6月1日和其他党内干部的谈话中,表示必须制定明确的法律法规,要求一对夫妇只生一个孩子(梁中堂,2010:5)。

② 在科学家中,对独生子女政策的支持主要来自宋健和他的同事,他们在1980年2月引起陈慕华的注意(梁中堂,2007:193;Greenhalgh,2008:269—270)。

领导者们的需求，即如果不采取极端措施，将危及中国的未来。此外，他们还提供了实现政策提出的人口目标所要达到的生育量化指标，为政府的政策制定提供了所需的“科学依据”(Greenhalgh，2008)。在科学家、学术界和官方媒体的频频鼓动下，对新马尔萨斯式危机的恐惧愈演愈烈(Lee & Wang，1999)。

但是，“一对夫妇只生一个孩子”政策本身，从未见于任何政府的正式文件，也没有明确写入中国法律，而是以致共产党员和共青团员的公开信的形式提出的，而且用的是“提倡”的语言。公开信中谈到了对独生子女政策后果的担忧，例如人口老化、养老保障缺乏、性别失衡、未来劳动力短缺等。当时也有人口学家们提出了可以通过其他途径同样可以实现到2000年把人口总量控制在12亿的目标(梁中堂，1983；Bongaarts & Greenhalgh，1985)。党内外的反对意见使得全国人民代表大会最终没有采纳为独生子女政策立法的建议。[①] 公开信也承认中国家庭将不得不为此作出的牺牲，并承诺到30年后就会调整政策。各省市自治区则承担了政策落实的艰巨任务，负责把政策细化为具体的要求，并详细规定了各自不同的特殊情况(Gu et al.，2007)。

影响：独生子女政策的作用

独生子女政策出台时，政策制定者已经预见到中国人口可能因此而加速老化，也承认该政策将对中国家庭的亲属结构会产生负面影响。但在政策实施过程中还出现了意料之外的恶果，例如大规模的强制措施(往往是暴力执法)、性别选择性人流等。近几年，生育率过低带来的风险可能导致的不可逆转的人口老龄化、劳动力短缺、经济放缓甚至停滞等问题日益显现(Wang，2011)。对批评者来说，独生子女政策最根本的问题是它粗暴地侵犯了基本人权以及个人和家庭的生育自由。

然而，独生子女政策的支持者和同情者，甚至包括部分反对者都相信该政策的实施有效地遏制了全球人口增长，缓减了世界难以承受的人口压力。一种常见的说法是，“独生子女政策的实施使中国少生了四亿人”。这种说

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① 经过了二十年，到2001年全国人民代表大会才通过了人口和计划生育法，但措辞仍为“提倡”，而非“要求”一对夫妇只生一个孩子。

法来自中国官方，声称独生子女政策为中国的经济奇迹作出了贡献，因为生育率的下降提供了有利于经济发展的人口年龄结构。他们甚至提出，中国的人口控制努力为全球应对气候变化的负面影响作出了重大贡献。然而，似乎没有人认真地去验证这种说法的正确性。

“少生 4 亿人”这种说法究竟源于何处？有多大可信度？1990 年代末，国家人口和计划生育委员会主持了一个关于计划生育效益与投入评估的项目（杨魁孚等，2000），少生人口的原始统计数据正是源于该项目。项目报告的作者使用了一种简单的外推方法，按照 1950 到 1970 年期间出生率下滑的轨迹，来估测到 1998 年时中国人口的粗出生率。他们得出的估测结果是：到 1990 年，中国粗出生率为 29.7‰，到 1998 年为 28.4‰。由于 1970 年后的实际出生率远低于上述水平，报告作者根据预测出生率和实际出生率之差计算得出了“少生”的人口数：1970—1998 年期间为 3.38 亿。在该数字发布的十年后，少生人口数字又被提高到了四亿。

独生子女政策的推行者声称该政策让中国少生了四亿人，首先就是错误解读了上述项目的原始研究结果。报告所研究的时间区间是从 1970 年而非 1980 年开始。而独生子女政策正式在全国推行是 1980 年。这个错误非常关键，因为中国的生育转型主要是在 1970 年代完成，也即在中国制定独生子女政策之前。到 1979 年，中国的总生育率已从 1970 年的 5.8 降至 2.8，10 年内降幅超过 50%。如果说真的有人口少生的话，应该主要归功于 1970 年代生育率的快速下降，而不是以后才出台的独生子女政策。

此外，即使是 3.38 亿的少生人口也只是过于夸张的假设结果，而并非事实。为了估算在没有独生子女政策下中国的出生率或生育率，我们采用了出生率与 1970 年中国出生率类似的一些国家的数据，比较了这些国家与中国的变化轨迹。1970 年时世界上人口超过 100 万、出生率介于 30‰—38‰之间的国家共有 16 个，其中 12 个国家在 1970 年时出生率高于中国同期水平（33.4‰）（见表 1），这 16 个国家出生率的平均水平为 35.6‰。在 1990—1998 年期间，这些国家的平均出生率从 26.6‰降到了 22.0‰，显著低于上述项目报告作者预测的水平。对比中国和这些国家的变化显示，没有实施独生子女政策的国家出生率也在下降，而且降到比预期的中国出生率更低的水平。

表 1　中国和可比 16 个国家的粗出生率的比较

国家	年出生率（单位：‰）		
	1970	1990	1998
韩国	31.2	15.4	13.8
哥斯达黎加	32.8	26.9	21.2
阿尔巴尼亚	32.9	24.3	18.6
黎巴嫩	33.0	25.7	21.9
牙买加	34.4	25.2	22.2
朝鲜	34.6	20.6	17.9
巴西	35.0	24.2	21.4
乌兹别克斯坦	36.5	33.7	23.4
马来西亚	36.6	30.4	24.3
泰国	37.0	19.7	16.3
委内瑞拉	37.1	28.6	23.9
土库曼斯坦	37.2	34.7	24.6
巴拉圭	37.4	33.5	29.0
巴拿马	37.5	26.1	23.9
哥伦比亚	37.6	27.2	23.8
南非	37.8	29.3	25.1
16 国实际水平平均	35.55	26.60	21.96
计划生育效益课题组期望	*32.91*	*29.71*	*28.43*
中国实际水平	33.43	21.06	15.64

* 数据来源：各国出生率，世界银行(2010)；中国的政府预测，杨魁孚等(2000)

我们还可以用反证的方法来进一步检验“中国要降低生育率就必须执行独生子女政策”这一说法：如果没有独生子女政策，中国的生育率会怎么样？我们以 Alkema 等人(2011)提出的贝叶斯模型对中国生育率进行了预测。联合国最近的人口预测也使用了该模型(联合国，2011)。贝叶斯模型预测中国未来生育率情况的假设为：(1) 独生子女政策出台前中国的生育趋势，(2) 所有其他国家的生育趋势。

假如以 1970 年代中国的生育率快速下降的趋势预示中国未来的生育轨迹，那么中国的生育率将继续下降。贝叶斯模型显示，1980 年后将继续延续这一下降趋势。按照这一趋势，到 2010 年，即使没有独生子女政策，中国的

生育率也会下降到当前的平均每个妇女生育 1.5 个孩子的水平。

不仅如此，中国在 1980 年代初的实际生育率略高于贝叶斯实证模型预测的结果。这似乎很反常，但政策不确定性所导致的焦虑可能是导致这一现象的原因。许多夫妇因为担忧政策反复而决定提前生育。1980 年代初婚年龄和初育年龄提早体现了这一进度效应。此外，独生子女政策过度强调短期目标（如到 1985 年实现人口增长率降至 5‰），而忽略了进度效应和代群效应对削弱人口增长势头的影响。梁中堂曾提议全面推行“二胎加间隔”的政策，并且显示，实施这一政策不仅可以实现中国的人口控制目标，而且有助于创造更有利的社会和人口环境（顾宝昌、王丰，2009）。我们用同样的贝叶斯实证模型预测当代中国的生育率变化，结果发现，取消独生子女政策并不会对人口规模产生重大影响。而其他国家的经验显示，提高生育率甚至比降低生育率更为困难（Frejka、Jones & Sardon，2010；Goldstein、Sobotka & Jasilioniene，2009）。

如果独生子女政策并没有实现大量减少出生的目的，那么这一政策为何会被广泛批评为造成中国各种短期、长期社会问题的根源呢？为何如此多的国内外各方人士都强烈呼吁取消这一政策呢？独生子女政策之所以遭到抨击的根本原因在于人们普遍认为这一政策构思不当，考虑欠妥，侵犯了个人和家庭的生育自由。独生子女政策强力地改变了许多中国人的家庭与血缘结构，造成出生人口的性别失衡，几代人都将深受其影响，其中被迫只有一孩的家庭的负担尤其沉重。换言之，一方面，独生子女政策对控制人口增长的人口效应被夸大了；另一方面，该政策对中国社会的长远影响却被低估了。

其中一个影响尤为深远的后果是中国出现了大量的一孩家庭。虽然随着生育率降低，即使没有政府的强制，一些家庭也会自愿地选择只生一胎，但是一孩家庭的比例不可能达到我们目前所看到的水平。为了量化独生子女政策的社会影响，我们估算了中国一孩家庭的比例。我们的计算仅限于 2005 年 35—44 岁的女性，原因有二：首先，这些女性的最佳生育期恰逢独生子女政策；其次，大部分 35 岁以上女性已经完成生育。[①]

① 我们根据中国 2005 年小普查人口数据计算得出只生一胎的女性的比例。计算中我们使用了 2005 年小普查中一个 20%的样本，相当于中国总人口的 2‰，共包括 220 747 名女性，再考虑样本比率可以得出该年龄段女性人数为 110 373 500，即 1.1 亿人左右。

符合这一条件的女性共约 1.1 亿人，出生于 1961—1970 年，现在都已 40 岁以上，其中许多人将以只有一个孩子结束生育。2005 年，全国 35—44 岁女性的一胎比例超过 40%，各省比例差异很大，上海、北京等大城市比例高达近 80%，而贵州、云南和西藏等西部省份则不到 20%。在全国 31 个省市自治区中的 11 个省份中，35—44 岁女性的一胎比例超过了 50%。假设每位已婚妇女代表一个一孩家庭，则在这一年龄段中，约有 5 000 万的家庭为一孩家庭。

由于城市地区实行独生子女政策更为严格，一孩家庭的比例也特别高(Gu et al.,2007)。非农业户口的夫妇如果违反独生子女政策不仅需要缴纳巨额罚款，还有可能丢掉工作，其子女也无法登记户口以享受医疗和教育福利。在我们所研究的女性样本中，约 18%为非农业户口，其中 86%为一孩家庭。共有 10 个省级区域的一孩家庭占非农业户口家庭的比例超过了 90%，在三个直辖市(北京、上海、天津)以及辽宁省，一孩家庭比例超过了 95%。而处于 1960 年代年龄段出生的城市家庭实际上全是一孩家庭，这些夫妇在今后不到十年中就将迈入六十花甲之年。

独生子女政策对减缓人口增长的作用微乎甚微，但其导致许多中国家庭无法生育第二胎而产生的社会影响却巨大深远。一个简单的计算就可说明：假设允许上述年龄段中 1 500 万户家庭生育第二胎，十年期间每年出生人口将增加 150 万，那么该年龄段的城市家庭中将不再有一孩家庭。[①] 如果允许全国 1 500 万户家庭生育第二胎，则该年龄段中全国范围内一孩家庭的比例将从 42%降到 28%。1 500 万相对于中国十年期间的总出生人口而言微不足道，但却将避免大量一孩家庭的出现。假设 2005 年年龄介于 35—44 岁的女性大部分于 1985—2000 年期间生育，当时年均出生人口约为 2 200 万，则新增 150 万人口等于人口出生率增幅仅为 6.8%。这个数字不论是对每年的出生数量而言，还是对人口增长而言都无关紧要，但对千千万万的中国家庭却至关重要。

独生子女政策所产生的长期社会后果将由中国独生子女以后的一代人及其父母未来的生活来评判。今天中国大约有 1.5 亿一孩家庭，即超过三分

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① 非农户口女性比例乘以该年龄群女性总数得出该数字。城市女性人数为 19 867 230。我们得出的数字为 1 500 万，占比 75.5%。

之一的家庭只有一个孩子。① 在独生子女以后的一代人的父母中，只有一个孩子的家庭的比例更高。在这样的人口结构下，中国社会将不得不直面人口快速老龄化的挑战。

退出：人民与人口

20世纪中下叶，许多国家都为前所未有的人口快速增长而忧心忡忡；然而不到50年，人们焦思苦虑的问题却变成了人口减少和老龄化。尽管在世界的一些地区，尤其是撒哈拉以南非洲，人口的快速增长仍然严重阻碍了贫困的消除和经济的繁荣，但越来越多的国家现在忧虑的是生育率的持续低迷及其带来的后果。1976年，只有16个国家的政府认为本国生育率过低，到2006年已增加至47个。2009年，共有48个国家的总和生育率低于1.8（每名妇女生育1.8个孩子），其中超过70%的国家认为本国生育率过低（联合国，2010）。欧洲和亚洲的许多国家都已经出台了激励政策，鼓励多生多育（Demeny，2003；Frejka，Jones & Sardon，2010；Demeny，2011）。最近推出此类政策的国家是伊朗。伊朗的总和生育率从1990年的4.8降到了2006年的1.9（Roudi，2012）。

今天的中国不论是在经济、社会还是人口方面都已与35年前开始正式施行独生子女政策时完全不同。1980年，邓小平首先提出了到2000年人均收入翻两番，从250美元提高至1 000美元的目标。当时这一目标看似过于宏伟，但真正实现这一目标却只花了计划的一半时间。现在，中国人均GDP已超过8 000美元，加入了中高收入国家之列。中国的经济总量在全球仅次于美国。未来的问题不是中国是否会，而是何时会成为全球最大经济体。在中国的经济增长远远超过了后毛泽东时代初期设定的目标的同时，即便实行了严厉的独生子女政策，中国却仍然没有实现总人口不超过12亿的目标。中国2000年的人口普查结果显示总人口为12.6亿。在经济增速远超人口增速的情况下，超出目标6 000万人并没有对中国的经济发展构成障碍。

虽然经济增长好于预期，而且生育率下降已经威胁到中国人口的长期

① 根据2010年人口普查结果，中国家庭总数为4.02亿户。

安全，但中国的决策者们却并没有因此修改原定的人口目标，放开生育限制。许多国家因为生育率降低而调整了甚至扭转了原有的人口政策，但在中国，虽然中国生育率已经连续二十年低于更替水平，面临低生育率陷阱，但对生育政策的反省和修订却显得异乎寻常地漫长和缓慢。三十五年前作为应对人口增长的一项紧急措施而推行的独生子女政策，在其诸多负面后果尽人皆知的情况下，在三十五年后仍在执行。

独生子女政策在当初提出时其科学依据就存在严重缺陷，公众中的不满情绪也越来越强烈，为什么在中国取消这一政策的进程仍然如此缓慢呢？独生子女政策之所以能存续至今，和前文所述中国政治体制和决策流程的三个特征有关。另外，为了执行独生子女政策而建立的庞大的控制生育的机构也成了阻碍政策变革的主要力量。这一机构编造和散播了诸如独生子女政策让中国少生四亿人之类的误导信息，而且粗暴的强制事件仍时有发生。①

中国现在的问题不在于是否要取消独生子女政策，而在于何时取消这一政策。政治上，中国领导人已经开始意识到，中国不能再沿用过去的发展模式，为实现短期效应而牺牲长期利益，经济发展至上而忽略个人权利和福祉。社会上，中国的年轻一代，尤其是在独生子女政策下出生的 80 后、90 后，已经成为中国人口构成中最重要的组成部分，不论是在经济、社会还是政治上都发挥着关键作用。他们是中国历史上受教育程度最高的一代，流动性强，通过社交媒体发表意见，施加其影响力。中国的独生子女一代不再接受由国家强加自己的命运。他们中的许多人自愿推迟结婚、推迟生育，成为当今中国生育率低于更替水平的主要驱动力，但他们越来越多地把是否及何时婚育视为个人权利，而不是政府可以强加给他们的决策。对于他们而言，人口不再是受支配者的集合总数，每个生命个体都应该得到尊重和珍惜。

中国社会的开放和人口研究作为一门学科的复兴也形成了一支面对政府压力的独立力量。十多年来学术界的研究得出了一致的结果：中国的生

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① 近期一个例子发生于 2012 年 7 月，来自陕西省的冯建梅因为是第二胎，怀孕七月被强行堕胎。该事件引起全国哗然，政府迅速作出公开道歉（参见维基百科关于冯建梅的页面：http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_abortion_of_Feng_Jianmei）。

育率远低于更替水平(Retherford 等,2005;Guo and Chen,2007;Cai,2008;Morgan,Guo and Hayford,2009);独生子女政策并不是中国低生育率的主要原因(Cai,2010;顾宝昌、王丰,2009;Zheng et al.,2009)。一些著名人口学家们集体呼吁调整生育政策(顾宝昌、李建新,2010;Zeng,2007)。一再地坚持独生子女政策就必然会越来越陷入被动。

中国的独生子女政策将作为当代国家干预生育的极端例子而载入史册。其功过是非,历史会作出评价。从现在看来,这个决策代价高昂,是以计划物质生产的方式来计划人口的经济体系的产物,是政治精英主宰决策,缺乏透明度、公众参与和反馈问责的政治体系的结果。整个社会都为之付出了极大的代价。

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老年失能风险、长期护理制度选择与社会性别

中国自上世纪90年代末跨入老龄社会，[①]老龄化持续发展，全国60岁以上老年人口从2000年的1.3亿，至2013年已突破两亿大关，[②]而据预测，延续这一增长势头，到2050年老年人口将增长到四亿以上。[③] 更为严峻的是，中国老龄人口中高龄和失能老人也呈持续增长之势，需要专业化护理的高龄老人在迅速增加。如何满足失能老人长期护理需求的制度安排，将成为政府制定积极老龄化战略中的不可缺少的内容。

由于高龄老年人口、现有老年保障体系中的资源配置以及长期护理的劳动分担都带有明显的性别化特征，因此我们需要从社会性别的角度，对老年护理需求以及服务体系的制度设计做进一步分析。

一、失能风险与护理需求的性别分析

(一) 老年失能风险与长期护理需求

第六次全国人口普查资料显示，2010年我国人口平均预期寿命达到

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① 根据2000年11月底第五次人口普查数据，中国60岁以上人口已占总人口10.2%，按联合国的统计标准衡量，中国已进入了人口老龄化社会。

② 吴玉韶.中国老龄事业发展报告(2013)[R].北京：社科文献出版社，2013.

③ 中国老龄工作委员会.中国人口老龄化发展趋势预测研究报告[R/OL].[2010-06-06].http://www.cncaprc.gov.cn/info/1408.html.

74.83岁，比10年前提高了3.43岁。[①] 随着预期寿命的不断提高，我国老年人口中高龄人口比例也将持续提高。2000年我国80岁及以上老人的比例是0.9%，而据人口学家预测，到2050年这一比例将提高到6.2%—7.1%。[②] 高龄老人指80岁以上的老人。老龄人口的高龄化预示着失能老人数量的增长和存在巨大的失能风险。据国家统计局数据显示，2007年我国老年人平均生活不能自理率为8.81%。[③] 而据《中国老龄事业发展报告(2013)》提供的数据，仅从2012年到2013年，中国的失能老年人口就从3 600万人增长到3 750万人。据全国老龄委副主任吴玉韶预计，到本世纪中叶，中国失能、半失能的老人将会上升至1亿人左右。[④] 失能风险只能靠提供老年长期护理服务来化解。可以预计，未来中国面临的护理服务压力将超出世界上任何国家。政府应该未雨绸缪，尽早做出建立长期护理体系的制度设计。

（二）高龄老年人口的女性化，被长寿掩盖的脆弱性

老龄社会普遍具有高龄老人女性化的特征。许多国家55岁以下女性和男性的比例是相同的，但是到了60岁以上，每增加10岁女性的比例就增加10个百分点。2010年我国男性人口平均预期寿命为72.38岁，女性为77.37岁，男女平均预期寿命之差由10年前的3.70岁扩大到4.99岁。由于妇女平均预期寿命普遍比男性长，因此高龄老人中80%以上是女性。女性长寿似乎是女性的优势，但这一表面的优势往往掩盖了老年女性实质上的脆弱性。

贫困、疾病和失能是老年和老年家庭的三大风险，这三大老年风险都具有性别化特点：老年女性比男性更容易陷入贫困。据“贫困老年人救助模式研究”报告显示，在中国城市，男性老年人中处于贫困状态下的仅占6.3%，

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① 数据来自国家统计局第六次人口普查，www.stats.gov.cn/zgrkpc/d... 2013-01-28。

② 石琤.老龄化背景下我国老年人护理保障研究综述[J].劳动保障世界，2012(05).

③ 张宪.养老公共资源应向困难群体倾斜[J/OL].法易网，[2007-04-19].

④ 车丽.2050年我国生活不能自理老人将过亿 老年护理压力巨大[J/OL].中国广播网，[2011-11-04].

而女性老年人的比例高达 23.4%。① 直接导致老年女性陷入贫困境地的原因是缺乏社会保障或社会保障不足。2006 年中国老龄科研中心的一项调查显示，城市老年养老金(退休金)保障覆盖率男性为 89.1%，女性为 64.6%。城镇男性老年人 72.9%的人享有医疗保险，而女性老年人享有比例仅 49.8%。② 男女两性保障差别不仅体现在养老保险的覆盖率方面，也表现在养老保险给付水平上。男性人均养老金的数额比女性高出 40%，农村这一差别更大，男性高出女性 52%。③ 男女老年社会保障的差别，是结构不平等累积的结果。女性在工作期无论就业机会、收入还是就业结构，都处于更为不利的位置，导致女性晚年保障更为匮乏，这使妇女到老年期极易成为经济依赖者。在这里我们要以日本为例，一方面日本是东亚地区最早进入老龄化的国家，老年问题发生发展对我们有一定的借鉴作用，另一方面日本有较完备的性别统计。日本领取“生活保护”(属“最后安全网”)的家庭中，老年家庭占 46.7%，而老年家庭中女性被保护者占 62.0%，“高龄女性贫困化严重”。④ 其次，女性平均寿命长不等于平均健康寿命长，事实上失能老人中女性比例更高。因此，男女两性的差异，也表现在对老年护理的不同需求方面。如日本 2004 年需要看护的人中，女性占到 67.3%。75 岁以上的女性高龄老人 81.5%需要看护，而男性高龄老人需要看护的比例则为 67.5%。⑤

概言之，以三大风险而论，老年女性都比男性处于更为脆弱的地位。因此，有学者提出：老年问题的核心或实质是女性老年问题。据此，有必要强调社会性别视角，以制定具有性别敏感和性别平等指向的老年政策(刘伯红，2007)。

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① 中国老龄科研中心.中国城乡老年人口状况追踪调查[R/OL].[2007-12-17]. http://www.china.com.cn.

② 佟吉清.老年妇女贫困问题亟待关注[N].中国妇女报，2006-10-18.

③ 蒋永萍.社会转型中的中国妇女社会地位[M].北京：中国妇女出版社，2006：183.

④ [日]独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆.日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R].全国妇联妇女研究所，译.北京：当代中国出版社，2007：126.

⑤ [日]独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆.日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R].全国妇联妇女研究所，译.北京：当代中国出版社，2007：134.

二、中国老年护理制度选择:从性别角度反思

养老问题的关键是谁来提供养老资源,谁来承担老龄化所带来的财政压力和保障风险?其次是谁来承担“养老职能”问题(穆光宗,2000)。老年护理的制度设计同样需要解决护理资源的提供、护理职责承担两大问题。在中国,这两大问题都还处于探索阶段。

(一)老年长期护理资源的来源

谁来提供老年护理的资源?政府、市场、家庭谁是责任主要承担者,以及彼此如何分担?

目前我国养老保险、医疗保险提供的仅仅是老年人生活、医疗的基本保障,不包括护理费用在内。至今我国还没有建立长期护理的保险制度,老年护理费用都要由本人积蓄和子女支付。因此,必须对我国的老年护理体制和未来的运行机制积极进行探索。

老年护理按照生活依赖程度分为完全护理依赖、大部分护理依赖和部分护理依赖三类。以全国3 000万生活不能完全自理老年人口计,即使按最低的部分护理依赖型年均护理费用5 000元的标准计算,护理费用也在1 500亿元以上。因此,目前阶段期望老年护理资金全部由政府承担是不现实的,但如果全部由家庭负担,对于绝大部分家庭也是不堪其重的。2012年修改颁布的中国《老年人权益保障法》首设了失能失智老人监护制度、失能老人护理补贴制度以及高龄津贴和计划生育家庭老年人扶助制度。这是老年保障制度的一个重大突破,表明老年护理需求已经进入了政策视野,而且有公共资源部分供给的制度规定,但就应对老年失能风险而言,这部分带有兜底性质的补贴和救济尚不足以保障老年长期护理之需。因此学界不断呼吁政府借鉴国际经验,建立长期护理保险制度,为老年护理提供稳定的资源来源(黎建飞、侯海军,2009;兰淑慧、鲁道夫·特劳普-梅茨、丁纯,2010;石琤,2012)。而西方老龄化国家的经验也显示,设立长期护理保险是大势所趋。

(二)老年护理服务的供给

谁来提供足够的服务以满足老年护理的需求?在不同的制度设计的背

后，是不同的价值理念。

中国于1996年颁布的《老年权益保障法》规定，“老年人养老主要依靠家庭”（第二章第十条）。显然，此间政府是选择将家庭作为养老的责任主体以应对老龄化浪潮的。

在很长一段历史时期，中国都是沿用依靠家庭为主来提供养老保障和老年照顾服务的。但是说今天家庭养老为主的制度是传统的延续是不准确的。因为在计划经济时代，中国已经建有城市以“单位”、农村以公社集体为“集体保护伞”加家庭的养老机制，尽管集体保障水平很低、覆盖面也有限。中国是在社会转型过程中，舍弃“集体保护伞”而再次选择家庭养老作为应对老龄化趋势的首选策略的（佟新，2008）。

但是问题在于今天的中国家庭能否还能担当起责任主体之责？中国家庭在近三十年间已经发生了巨大变化。据第六次全国人口普查数据显示，家庭户人口数已由2000年的3.44人，下降到2010年的3.10人，核心家庭成为最主要的家庭类型。[①] 其次是家庭居住方式趋于散居化。据统计，中国有75.2%的已婚成年子女不与父母同住。“空巢”家庭[②]占比升至13.2%，[③]特别是在农村地区，留守老年人与空巢、纯老家庭迅速增多。到2013年中国的空巢老年人口也将突破了1亿人大关。[④] 家庭的小型化和空巢化显然极大削弱了代际赡养功能。换言之，生活在传统农业社会的人是在大家庭中经历衰老过程，如今许多老年人是要在“空巢”状态下独自面对老病。此外，实行计划生育的人口政策三十余年，中国现有独生子女已高达2.18亿，独生子女作为唯一的养老责任主体，明显养老资源不足，养老负担沉重。卫生部的数据显示，我国目前每年新增的“失独”家庭有7.6万个[⑤]，而据人口学者估计，独生子女中会有1 009万人或将在25岁之前离世，未来的失独家庭将

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① 国家统计局.第六次全国人口普查主要数据[R/OL].[2011－04－28].www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011－04/28/content_1.

② 空巢家庭一般是指家庭中因子女外出工作学习老人独居的一种现象。来自百度百科“空巢家庭”词条。

③ 王东亮.《中国民生发展报告2012》发布[N].北京日报，2012－08－06.

④ 全国老龄工作委员会.中国老龄事业发展报告(2013)[R]//张斯路.中国空巢老人突破1亿　老年卫生服务资源严重不足.光明日报，2013－02－28.

⑤ 根据百度百科编辑词条，“失独家庭”即独生子女家庭因独生子女发生意外伤残、死亡，其父母不再生育和收养子女的家庭。

达到一千万,[①]这又意味着还有数量庞大的家庭将失去唯一的家庭养老资源而“孤独终老”。巨大的养老需求和家庭现实供给能力之间严重失衡,将在未来构成社会风险,因此,一个继续延续主要依赖家庭养老传统的制度设计,显然是制度滞后型的。

2012年12月28日颁布的《中华人民共和国老年权益保障法》,对1996年的《老年权益保障法》(以下分别以新老《老年法》简称之)应对变化做出了修改,如旧《老年法》仅有对城乡“三无”老人(无劳动能力、无生活来源、无赡养人和扶养人的)给予救济的条款,新《老年法》增加了“国家逐步开展长期护理保障工作,保障老年人的护理需求。对生活长期不能自理、经济困难的老年人,地方各级人民政府应当根据其失能程度等情况给予护理补贴”(第三十条)的内容,这说明老年长期护理的保障问题不仅进入了公共政策视野,也扩大了公共资源供给的范围。

旧《老年法》总则第四条规定,“国家保护老年人依法享有的权益”。新《老年法》则是“国家保障老年人依法享有的权益”(总则第三条)。“保障”与“保护”虽是一字之差,但明确了国家为老年人权益保障的责任主体身份。新《老年法》在强化国家责任义务同时还对家庭养老进行了重新定位。

旧《老年法》在家庭赡养与扶养章节中规定,“老年人养老主要依靠家庭”,而修改后的《老年法》,将之修改为“老年人养老以居家为基础”(第二章第十三条),尽管学界对何为以居家养老为基础提出质疑(陈友华、沈晖,2010),但仍可视为国家为适应家庭结构变迁的现实,对家庭养老的地位做出了调整。所强调的“国家建立和完善以居家为基础、社区为依托、机构为支撑的社会养老服务体系”是一种国家、社会、家庭“多元整合”政策建构,包含了从护理家庭化向护理社会化过渡的可能性,因此,对这一变化的积极意义应予肯定。但据民政部官员对以“居家为基础”的解读:“旨在通过制度激励和制度约束……进一步巩固新形势下家庭养老的基础性地位”(曲淑辉,2013),立足点仍然是强化家庭“基础性”地位。而某些地方政府相关试点可以说是在实践层面对家庭“基础性”地位做出了诠释。如上海

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① 车丽,周尧.我国失独家庭将达千万　失独老人将由政府供养[J/OL].人民网,2013-02-16.

2013年在六街镇启动的"9073"保障制度试点,[①]即高龄老人服务90%由家庭养老、7%居家养老、3%机构养老提供。[②] 显然,这一比例悬殊的格局,尽管增加了老年护理专项补贴等救助内容,仍然呈现了照顾家庭化的取向,也仍然不能与老年人口高龄化、与中国家庭代际赡养功能递减的大趋势相匹配。

(三)从性别角度反思老年护理制度设计中的"家庭主义"

目前,无论是面对护理资源来源还是护理服务的供给问题,仍然未跳出家庭主义的理念。不可否认,无论过去现在还是将来,家庭都是家庭成员步入老年阶段所需物质精神照顾的重要来源。但是一方面如前所述,在家庭代际赡养功能削弱、家庭养老资源锐减的当代,家庭能否独自承担起老年长期护理的重担?陈俊全运用台湾家庭照顾者关怀总会调查的数据分析指出,照顾一个失能的家人,其家庭要花费6—10.5年时间,每天至少花费12小时以上,[③]且一旦承担照顾责任,就很难中途"退出"。因此出现"一人失能,全家落跑"的现象。

其次,把个人福利和家庭福利等同起来的"实用性的家庭主义"正如女性主义批评指出的:一方面可能掩盖了政府的责任;另一方面,在家庭既有的性别分工和男性优势的资源分配的性别原则下,很可能使家庭护理职责落到女性家庭成员身上(佟新,2008)。因此,"实用性家庭主义"的制度设计,不仅不能满足中国高龄失能老年人口的长期护理之需,同时也有违性别公平的原则。

三、以社会性别的视角审视:老年护理服务提供的政策选择

(一)"照顾家庭化",导致照顾的女性化—国际经验

"照顾家庭化"的政策选择,最终会造成照顾劳动的女性化。照顾家庭

① 姚丽萍.上海六街镇今年试点老年护理保障计划[N].新民晚报,2013-01-04.

② 陈丹沛.关于上海建立老年护理制度的分析与探讨[J].中国卫生资源,2009(04).

③ 参见《台湾妇女新知基金会通讯》,2012年1—3月号、4—6月号(合刊)。

化的传统，不仅视家人照顾家人为天经地义，而且基于性别角色定型，也要求家庭中的女性无可逃遁地担起照顾者的重任。社会资源的不平等分配，将经济依赖者角色分配给了女性，妇女的“照顾者”角色贯穿她的一生。女性的照顾者角色亦被国家福利制度所建构和强化。在台湾地区，家庭长期照顾者78.91%为女性；[①]在日本家庭中，担当看护责任的74.9%是女性，而且超过半数是60岁以上的高龄看护人，出现女性高龄看护人看护高龄老人的现象。[②] 在欧洲，只有18%的老龄男性照顾他们虚弱的妻子，然而却有54%的老龄女性在照顾他们的丈夫（当然原因也部分归于他们各自不同的平均寿命）（Helma Lutz，2002）。无酬的家庭护理既被视为女性理所当然的职责，其劳动价值得不到肯定，对女性形成的压力和由此产生的社会不公平也是十分显著的。护理者将来谁护理？这将是一个十分现实且尖锐的问题。

通过市场化发展提供老年护理，是老年护理服务的另一个重要的来源。当今在许多工业化国家中，在普遍建立了老年护理保险（包括如德国、日本等实施强制性老年护理社会保险和美国等实行商业性护理保险），基本为老年护理提供相对稳定的资源来源，但这些国家面临最大的困境是老龄人口长期护理人员的供给“高度且持续增长的不足”，在某些地区甚至已经出现护理人员短缺的“紧急状况”（兰淑慧、鲁道夫·特劳普-梅茨，2010）。

长期护理劳动供给不足，与护理工作异常艰辛但待遇和社会声望偏低、社会保障不足有关。护理工作身心付出巨大，但从事长期照顾劳动的服务人员，多数只能得到半职的工作和薪水。[③] 日本在家庭以外的福利机构中，看护者女性化和福利机构女性低层化同时存在。机构照顾者中女性比例高达82.8%，但在机构的负责人、医生、生活指导员等较高等级的职业中女性比例却很低。女性多从事辛苦、收入低、非正规就业的照顾劳动。[④] 因此有

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① 数据来自台湾“内政部”《身心障碍者生活需求调查》，转引自《台湾妇女新知基金会通讯》，2012年1—3月号、4—6月号（合刊）。

② ［日］独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆. 日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R]. 全国妇联妇女研究所，译. 北京：当代中国出版社，2007：125—127、134.

③ 参见《台湾妇女新知基金会通讯》，2012年1—3月号、4—6月号（合刊）。

④ ［日］独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆. 日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R]. 全国妇联妇女研究所，译. 北京：当代中国出版社，2007：136.

学者称，“女人选择了照顾，就等于选择了贫穷”（吕宝静、陈景宁，2007），这使女性陷入从事老年护理工作越多，自己越少获得老年保障资源的恶性循环圈，特别是那些为了照顾家人而放弃工作及收入的家庭照顾者，在自己步入老年时，将没有足够的财力购买护理服务。

一些发达国家和地区通过雇用外籍看护者，以舒缓护理劳动供给紧缺的矛盾。如新加坡目前有大约20万名来自印尼、菲律宾和斯里兰卡的外籍家政工人，[①]台湾地区2012年在家庭工作的外籍劳工已超过20万（其中99%为女性），中东、欧洲和亚洲的新兴工业化国家对外籍家政工人已形成高度依赖，全球家政工人2010年已达到5 260万人，其中女性约占83%。但是，外籍劳工的输出国也将面临老龄化风险。如目前台湾外籍劳工中占76%的外劳来自印尼，而印尼政府已开始控制和逐渐减少劳力输出，预计到2017年将完全停止劳务输出。因此，女性主义团体批评，靠雇用低廉的外籍劳工解决护理人员供给不足而不是通过提高护理人员待遇，完善其权益保障的做法，是一种“不负责任的人力资源政策”[②]。

（二）长期护理制度设计中的性别盲点

长期护理保险虽然可以解决护理保障资源的来源问题，但不能自动解决代际公平和实现性别平等原则。长期护理保险有给现金和给服务的不同选择，美国学者Campbell批评，现金给付的做法将排挤长期照顾服务的发展空间。他对比发达国家采取不同的长期照顾政策后发现，那些有“现金给付”选项的国家，人们会偏好领钱而不是领“服务”，如长期护理保险覆盖面走在世界前列的德国，2008年符合资格者72%选择了领取现金，结果重度失能者中45%既没有从政府得到照顾，也没有得到家人的照顾。而挪威这一比例仅13%。在欧洲，使用家庭看护黑工（非法外劳）最严重的三个国家（德国、奥地利和意大利），都是有“现金给付”选项的国家（Campbell等，2010），护理保险采取现金给付存在较大的制度漏洞，也暴露出政策制定者的性别盲点。正如女性主义团体所指出的，现金照顾不会自动带来女性自决/自主、在家庭决策依

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① 暨佩娟.亚太地区家政工人待遇急待改善[N/OL].人民网·人民日报，2013-01-16.

② 参见《台湾妇女新知基金会通讯》，2012年1—3月号、4—6月号（合刊）。

然为男性所掌控的情况下，要求领现金自己安排家人照顾，最有可能的照顾者就是妻子、“媳妇”和女儿。同时现金给付也使女性陷入贫困的陷阱，迫使一部分女性中断职业生涯，到老年只能靠“国民年金”和向子女伸手，若遇离婚等变故，有可能中年就陷入贫困。所以，现金给付是“服务了男权，没改善妇女地位”。日本2000年在制定“长期照护保险法”时，也曾倾向于现金给付，但遭到妇女团体的反对，最终选择了“给服务，不给钱”的长期照护保险，使得每年有120万个家庭得到居家服务，160万家老人白天到日间照顾中心，30万个家庭使用短期托顾住宿的服务。① 当然，日本老年护理照顾女性化的问题也并没得到解决，但是起码推行这一“由全社会支撑老年人”政策，有利于妇女从沉重的照顾劳动中得到喘息。

（三）忽略照顾者利益的政策是不可持续的

女性主义对一些国家和地区的现有老年长期护理制度的第三个批评，是以“受照顾者”需求为核心，缺少对照顾者利益与需求的关注，如日本的“长期护理保险法”。

护理，是一项身心消耗巨大的劳动。不仅工作本身费时、繁琐、单调，而且被照顾者依赖、有被绑缚无法做想做的事、与社会疏离，工作无意义感以及对自身日后如何被照顾的担心，凡此种种心理压力比身体的劳累更难以忍受。台湾有调查显示，照顾者每日照顾时间长达14.05小时，全台72万家庭照顾者都陷入睡眠障碍，只有两成的照顾者能够持续睡眠超过4小时，87％罹患慢性精神衰弱，65％有抑郁倾向，家庭照顾者死亡率比非家庭照顾者高出60％，英国的调查也显示，74％的家庭照顾者已被照顾工作压得喘不过气，压力与抑郁情绪已快达临界点。② 照顾者的利益诉求不应被忽视。据台湾地区调查显示，60％以上的家庭照顾者希望“家人给予肯定和支持”，80％以上希望得到“放松与休息”，而这一喘息服务最少应达到一周一天的水平。③

对照顾者需求和权益的漠视，将使老年长期照顾计划难以持续。因此，

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① 参见《台湾妇女新知基金会通讯》，2012年1—3月号、4—6月号(合刊)。

② 覃玉蓉.台湾长期照顾政策精简大补帖[J].台湾妇女新知基金会通讯，2011(10—12)、(04—06).

③ 覃玉蓉.台湾长期照顾政策精简大补帖[J].台湾妇女新知基金会通讯，2011(10—12)、(04—06).

一项体现代际公平和性别正义的老年护理制度设计，不仅要通过建立长期护理保险以提供较为稳定的资源，而且需要在国家、社会和家庭三方分担的机制下，兼顾失能者、照顾工作者和家庭照顾者各方面的权益，以普及、平价、优质地提供老年长期照顾服务。具有积极意义的是，德国自1995年起对从事无酬家庭护理的家属或邻居，在养老保险体制中给予义务保险（君特·默克尔，2010），一方面它能有效激励居家护理，另一方面也提高了照顾者的保障水平，体现了公平原则。

四、简短结语

正如莫尼汉（Moynihan，1986）所说："一个民族的文明质量可以从这个民族照顾其老人的态度和方法中得到反映。"在老龄化高龄化的前提下，中国必须将建构和完善老年护理保障体系作为积极老龄化战略的重点来积极对待。

但是，在制度建设的考量中，1. 必须考虑到老年人口女性化以及高龄老人照顾需求的性别差异，以制定具有社会性别视角、性别公平取向的老年护理保障政策。

2. 正如女性学界所提出的，现代社会应该改变传统依靠家庭养老的观念，强化社会保障和政府责任，多方参与，共同承担对老年人的赡养责任（夏吟兰，2007）。老年长期护理制度设计应该体现国家为主要责任主体，政府、家庭、社会三方合理分担的原则，也要体现从照顾家庭化逐渐向社会化过渡的发展方向。

3. 在社会公平正义的原则下，不仅要通过建立长期护理保险以提供较为稳定的资源，而且需要兼顾失能者、照顾工作者和家庭照顾者各方面的利益。从事老年长期护理的工作的工人包括移民工，大都来自女性弱势群体，对她们的需求应该给予特别的关注，以保障长期护理工作者的权益。

4. 在目前家庭仍为老年长期护理的主要提供者阶段，建立具有实质性意义的家庭支持政策十分必要。新《老年法》强调了"国家建立健全家庭养老支持政策"（第二十七条），但是必须是在诸如鼓励不与父母同住的子代"经常看望和问候"之类倡导性条款之外，提供更多实质性支持。如对那些与老年人共同生活或者就近居住者提供政策性支持；对那些不仅要照顾自己和配偶，还要照顾父母的老年女性，除肯定她们的贡献外，也应在政策中

给予支持(杜鹏,2007)。再如参照国外遗属制度,建立遗属津贴和遗属保险制①,作为一种收入再分配手段,通过社会化途径解决家庭内部在劳动期由性别分工所导致的晚年经济不平等问题,有利于改善贫困老年妇女的脆弱地位和促进性别平等。

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[12] 夏吟兰、杜鹏等观点均见:《保障老年妇女权益 构建平等和谐社会——〈老年人权益保障法〉修改专家讨论会综述》,全国妇联妇女研究所:《信息简报》,2007年第

① 2006年10月17日清华大学召开的"老年保障与性别平等研讨会"上,时任劳动与社会保障部养老保险司司长焦凯平提出建立遗属保险制的设想(佟吉清.老年妇女贫困问题亟待关注[N].中国妇女报,2006-10-18)。

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男性护理假

——立法必要与可能

生育是人类共同的活动，在生育中如何保障两性平等享有生育的权利和义务，促进两性在生育事务中的平等合作，应成为相关立法的重要内容。但在中国现行的法律中还缺乏有关男性参与生育事务的相关规定，男性护理假还未能在国家层面上立法。为此，2009 年中央党校妇女研究中心成立了“男性护理假”课题组，对在中国设立男性护理假以促进性别平等的必要性和可能性进行了研究。

一、男性护理假的立法理念与选择

（一）国际的立法趋势

两性的生育合作更多是在特定的社会关系和文化规则中展开，既是一个自然过程，也是一个社会过程。传统文化以性别隔离为特征，形成了规范两性生育行为的生育文化，这种文化的本质是具有等级意义的性别分工。随着社会的变迁、文明的发展以及两性关系的调整，原有的生育规范成为对两性共同参与的障碍，人们越来越要求生育文化随之改变，并且以新的规范形式满足人们的社会需求。在国际社会，“为了实现男女充分的平等需要同时改变男子和妇女在社会上和家庭中的传统任务”[①]已经成为共识。国际劳工组织也要求成员国制定政策或采取措施，使男女工人更好地平衡职业和

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① 联合国.消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约[Z]，1979.

家庭责任。[①] 目前,国际社会在推动两性共同承担生育事务方面的一个重大举措是,用法律形式要求和鼓励男性参与生育护理工作,通过鼓励男性承担生育事务,改变两性刻板的性别分工,改变公私领域的分离和对立。在相关法律中规定男性护理假或父亲假,就是一个非常具体而明确的举措。目前世界上已经有超过40个国家和地区施行了不同程度的男性生育假。[②]

在不少国家,父亲可利用三种形式的育儿假来照顾年幼的孩子,它们分别是父亲假、父母假以及临时父母假。欧美国家的父母假自20世纪70年代由瑞典开始实施,1974年瑞典出台了"父母育儿假",在生育保险法中规定父母都可享受产假,最初为6个月,后来逐渐增加,2002年增加到16个月,其中父亲假2个月,并且不能由母亲代休。[③] 继瑞典之后一些欧盟国家也开始立法规定父亲假。如英国的男性最多可享受34周产假;德国的男性可休12个月带薪产假,3年不带薪育儿假;2011年挪威"奶爸"的育儿假从10周延长到12周。[④] 用法律形式规定男性生育护理假或父亲假的国家中,欧盟数量最多,包括了北欧国家和西欧国家,如英国、法国、卢森堡、奥地利、丹麦、芬兰、瑞典等。另外北美地区的加拿大,亚洲地区的菲律宾、日本等,也有类似的立法,如日本的《育婴及家庭照料休假法》就规定,有3岁以下孩子的男员工可以休较长时间的产假。

用法律形式规定"父亲假"或"育儿假"的国家,表现出假期延长、待遇提高以及由社保支付等趋势,在立法理念上则遵循和体现的是儿童照顾、父亲责任等,特别是要求和鼓励男性参与家庭工作,改变传统的性别分工,因而是推进性别平等的重要举措。从形式上来看,中国国内也有为男性设立的"护理假",但主要是对实行计划生育行为的一种奖励,实际上并没有儿童本位、父亲参与的含义。通过法律规定引导男性分担家庭工作和照顾责任,无论理念还是制度上仍然是缺席的。生育是社会事务的理念,只是表现为经

① 国际劳工组织.有家庭责任的工人公约(第156号)[Z],1981.

② 父亲节香港父亲向港府请愿,要求设立男士带薪产假[N/OL].[2008-06-15].http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/hongkong/200806/0615_1424_597997.shtm.

③ 徐安琪,张亮.父亲育儿假:国际经验的启示和借鉴[J].当代青年研究,2009(03).

④ 世界男性产假一览[Z/OL].[2012-01-16].http://www.china-insurance.com/news-center/newslist.asp? id=187806.

济负担的社会分担,[1]并不涉及生育的事务分担,两性合作共同分担生育事务,还不是生育保险制度所要追求的目标。

(二)国内相关法规提案和立法情况

根据国际社会的经验,在国家法律中设定男性护理假,把男性参与生育事务作为公民的法定权利和义务,对于拓宽法律调整两种生产的作用范围、打破公私领域界限、改造传统的性别文化、赋予公民更多的平等机会和自主选择,都具有不可低估的意义。其实,当我们承认生育是社会事务时,不仅需要男性分担生育的经济责任,也需要与他们分享生育的社会待遇。尽管男性的生育社会待遇不可能与女性一样,但在属于人类再生产的生育活动中,无论是在责任还是在待遇方面,男性都不应该继续隐身。

在中国国内男女平等是宪法和法律的一个基本原则,也是基本国策,但“生孩子是女人的事”被当作天然的性别分工,还在左右着人们的意识,在涉及生育事务时,这一观念仍然是立法的预设前提。如1951年的《中华人民共和国劳动保险条例》,生育作为一项重要内容作了较为详尽的规定,但所有待遇只是针对女职工的。1994年《企业职工生育社会保险试行办法》,则是“为了维护企业女职工的合法权益,保障她们在生育期间得到必要的经济补偿和医疗保健”。2010年10月颁布的《中华人民共和国社会保险法》,将以女职工为对象的现行生育保险制度的主要内容纳入了法律规定。生育社会保险主要是为妇女劳动者因生育而造成收入中断时,由国家和社会给予的物质帮助,这是生育保险的基本立法思想。《人民日报》的解释具有代表性:“生育保险是国家通过立法,对怀孕、分娩女职工给予生活保障和物质帮助的一项社会政策。其宗旨在于通过向职业妇女提供生育津贴、医疗服务和产假,帮助他们恢复劳动能力,重返工作岗位。生育保险提供的生活保障和物质帮助通常由现金补助和实物供给两部分组成。”[2]正因为如此,生育保险更多只是对女职工的保障性措施,男性在生育中的权利和义务很难得到体现。

根据国际社会的做法,运用法律和政策方法,强制改变传统规则和惯习,对于促进新的性别文化的形成,建立平等的性别规则,既是必要的,也是

① 根据规定,生育保险费由用人单位按男女职工工资总额的1%缴纳,个人不缴纳。

② 白天亮.4 537万人参加生育保险[N].人民日报,2005-07-04:010.

可行的。而这个过程首先需要立法者改变传统观念。2005 年经过修订的《妇女权益保障法》,男女平等基本国策成为法律规定,该法第二十九条具体规定:“国家推行生育保险制度,建立健全与生育相关的其他保障制度。”对于这一条款,全国人大常委会法工委的解释是:“与生育有关的社会保障除了生育保险外,还包括:生育休假、生育补助、独生子女生育假奖励、独生子女的父亲护理假、独生子女费等。根据本条规定,我国不仅要建立与生育有关的社会保障制度,还要健全这些保障制度。”①在这一解释中,“父亲护理假”属于需要健全的保障制度之列,无疑肯定了男性护理假应该具有法律地位。

在《社会保险法》立法征求意见阶段,中央党校妇女研究中心成立了“男性护理假”课题组,对北京、江苏、郑州、西安四地的企事业机关员工和其他劳动者(其中 81.5%处于生育年龄段,男性占 59%)发放近 840 份问卷进行有关男性护理假的舆情调查。调查显示:有 92.2%的人肯定了休产假也是男性的权利,有 89.5%的人表示赞成有关法律明确规定男性护理假的内容。②在这一基础上,中央党校妇女研究中心 2010 年 11 月向全国人大常委会、全国人大法制工作委员会提交将男职工“生育护理假”津贴纳入职工可以享受的生育津贴的范围之内的立法建议。2011 年在国务院法制工作委员会就《女职工劳动特殊保护条例》向社会公开征求意见时期,中央党校妇女研究中心、中华女子学院社会性别与法律团队等研究机构和一些专家学者,再次提出增设男性护理假的建议。但目前尚未给出相应的立法方案和时间表。

二、男性护理假的相关规定与实际执行

(一) 男性护理假的地方性规定

尽管国家层面还没有立法规定,但男性护理假作为一项地方政策,已经比较普遍。2001 年颁布的《人口与计划生育法》中规定:“夫妻双方在实行计

① 全国人大常委会法工委行政法室. 妇女权益保障法释义[M]. 北京:国家行政学院出版社,2005.

② 中央党校妇女研究中心. 社会性别与公共政策通讯(第三辑)[J]. 内部资料,2007(07).

划生育中负有共同的责任。”各地在出台贯彻该法的地方性政策时，大都对男性带薪护理假做出了明确规定，以体现夫妻双方共同责任这一理念。据不完全统计，已经有26个省市自治区都在地方性政策或法规中，规定了男性护理假（见表1）。

表1　已有男性护理假的地区及相关规定

省份	发布时间	名称	天数	条件	相关待遇
福建	2002-07-26	男方照顾假	7—10	晚育、领取独生子女证	工资照发，不影响晋升
安徽	2002-07-28	男方护理假	10，异地20	晚婚晚育并在产假期间申请领取独生子女证	享受其在职在岗的工资、奖金、福利待遇
江西	2002-07-29	男方护理假	10	晚婚晚育	假期工资和奖金照发，福利待遇不变
云南	2002-09-01	男方护理假	7	晚育	视同出勤
广西	2002-09-01	男方护理假	10	晚婚晚育	工资、奖金照发，不影响福利及评奖评优
广东	2002-09-01	男方看护假	10	晚婚晚育	照发工资，不影响福利待遇和全勤评奖
浙江	2002-09-03	男方护理假	7	晚婚晚育	工资、奖金和其他福利待遇照发
重庆	2002-09-25	男方护理假	7	晚育	视为工作时间
四川	2002-09-26	男方护理假	15	晚婚晚育	视为出勤，工资、奖金照发
吉林	2002-09-27	男方护理假	7	晚育，凭《生殖保健服务证》	按正常工作对待，工资、奖金照发，其他福利待遇不变
山西	2002-09-28	男方护理假	15	晚育	工资、奖金照发
山东	2002-09-28	男方护理假	7	晚婚晚育	视为出勤，工资、福利待遇不变
贵州	2002-09-29	男方护理假	7	晚婚晚育	
陕西	2002-09-29	男方护理假	10	晚婚晚育	按出勤对待，享受相应的工资、福利待遇

（续表）

省份	发布时间	名称	天数	条件	相关待遇
黑龙江	2002－10－18	男职工护理假	5—10	晚育	工资照发
湖南	2002－11－29	男方护理假	15	晚婚晚育并在产假期间领取《独生子女证》	视为出勤
江苏	2002－12－01	男方护理假	10	晚婚晚育	视为出勤，不影响工资、奖金及福利待遇
湖北	2002－12－01	配偶护理假	10	晚育	视同出勤，工资、奖金照发
内蒙古	2002－12－01	男方护理假	10	晚婚晚育	
河南	2003－01－01	男性护理假	一个月	晚婚晚育	视为出勤，享受一切工资和福利待遇
辽宁	2003－01－16	男方护理假	15	晚育并领取《独生子女证》	工资照发，福利待遇不变
新疆	2003－05－22	男方护理假	15	晚婚晚育	工资、奖金照发
河北	2003－07－18	男方护理假	10	晚婚晚育	享受正常婚、产假待遇
北京	2003－08－13	奖励假 30 天，可以由男方享受		晚育	休假期间不得降低其基本工资或者解除劳动合同
海南	2003－12－01	男方护理假	10	城镇居民领取《独生子女证》	工资照发，享受全勤待遇
上海	2003－12－31	配偶晚育护理假	3	晚婚晚育	晚育护理假期间享受产假同等待遇

＊表中资料由孙凤娟收集

上表中可以看出，我国大部分省份都对男性护理假作出明确的地方性政策规定，主要涉及这几个方面的内容：一是假期名称，大部分地区称为“男方护理假”，少数地区叫“配偶护理假”或其他名称。不管名称如何变化，突出的都是男性在妻子生育后承担护理事务的含义，这是对男性与女性共同承担生育责任的强调。二是规定了护理假的时间，这一规定各地的变化比较大，一般在 5—15 天之间，以 7 天和 10 天较多，最少的只有 3 天，是上海市，时间最长的是河南省，为期一个月。三是把计划生育作为享受

男方护理假的前提条件，主要有夫妻双方属于晚育，以及孩子为独生子女。四是男方护理假的待遇，各地虽然不完全一样，但都有相对明确的经济和职业保障，休男方护理假视为全勤，工资、奖金、福利待遇不变，不影响评奖和晋升等。

各地的男性带薪护理假主要是对实行计划生育的奖励性政策，这一点在享受男方护理假的条件规定上非常明确，只有执行生育计划的生育行为，才有可能享受男方护理假。各地男方护理假时间的长短不同，也从侧面反映了这一点，如假期时间最长的河南省，相对来说，人口压力比较大，对计划生育的奖励力度也比较大，男方护理假长达一个月。尽管男性带薪护理假目前还只是计划生育政策的配套性措施，但却是第一次以政策形式明确了男性参与生育的权利和义务，这一规定引起了热烈反响，得到了普遍的赞成和拥护。

（二）男性护理假的执行情况

由于男性护理假目前不具有法定性，只是地方性奖励措施，其执行情况主要由企业自己决定。男性护理假在企业的执行情况有三种类型：第一种类型企业能够比较正常地按规定执行，一些企业在内部文件中明确规定，男职工休产假“视为出勤”，不仅在工作上会做出安排，而且不会扣发工资奖金。这种情况只要在企业相关部门履行一定手续就可以休假，假期由企业规定固定时间。这类企业既有管理规范、福利较好的大中型国有企业，也有运行良好、管理有序的合资企业、外资企业和私营企业。第二种类型企业没有正式制度规定，但可以请假，一般也不扣工资，有些人可能会扣奖金等其他费用。休假时间根据情况而定，因为生孩子是人生大事，视为特殊情况给予照顾。第三种类型企业对男职工休产假控制较严，主要是一些外资和私营企业，对于男性护理假，它们的态度是：企业在承担了纳税义务之外，除了法律规定的，不再承担更多的社会义务，法律有规定的就执行，没有规定不理会。但面对具体情况，比如对于企业需要的特别人才，仍然会做出例外安排。“法律规定的就执行，没有规定不理会”，这一说法表明他们以法律是否有规定为理由，选择是否执行地方性政策。这也给了我们一个启示，在没有明确的法律规定的情况下，政府的好政策也有可能被有意忽略，那么，就需要把好政策用法律形式固定下来，让好政策真正发挥作用。

从个人方面看，男性请护理假造成的经济损失包括了工资、奖金和其他收入。在课题组问卷调查中，被调查对象中32.5％的人会因此扣奖金，31.1％的人会扣工资，26.8％的人会损失工资以外的很多收入。由于收入与工作业绩关系密切，请假在造成收入减少的同时，也造成工作业绩的减少，这就进一步影响到岗位竞争和晋升，[①]对此产生的顾虑已经超过了收入减少。在问及“男性主动放弃护理假的可能原因”时，排在第一位的原因是“工作太忙脱不开身”，占66.5％，“竞争激烈怕失去岗位”，占43％，“经济损失较大”排在了第三位，占36％。也就是说，由于正式制度不足以支持男性参与生育事务，男性休护理假仍然只是部分人的个人选择，即使在有护理假的地区，男性也不能普遍享受这一权利。

三、男性护理假的立法需求与多方考虑

（一）政府需要履行的承诺

根据公共政策的公平性原则审视目前各地有关男性护理假的地方性规定，应当指出存在歧视和有违公平的问题。首先，男性护理假不是法定权利，但男性职工却要承担法定的生育保险缴费义务，也就是说，在生育的权利和义务上，法律存在着对男性生育权利的歧视；其次，男性护理假的设计以计划生育为基础，不包括非计划生育行为，因此会形成对非计划生育行为的歧视；第三，男性护理假的有无以地方政府有无规定为条件，而且假期天数及待遇差异较大，形成实际的区域间公平性问题；第四，男性护理假只是对计划生育行为的奖励，因而也就有可能随着计生政策的调整而改变，这种政策捆绑式福利只是权力给予的优惠，不是对公民权利的保障，说到底是对权利的歧视性对待。因此，从权利保障的角度来看，应当通过国家法律的统一规定，以实现公民权利的平等保障。

从宏观角度说，中国政府已经承诺实行社会性别主流化战略，消除对妇女

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① 一般企业员工的工资根据出勤、完成任务等考核情况决定收入高低。考核具有累积效应，当月考核会影响到季度考核，乃至半年和全年考核。因此，如果考核不理想，不仅会减少当月收入，还会通过其他考核放大损失并影响职业升迁。

一切形式歧视，因此，对男性护理假立法也是中国政府履行国际承诺的具体措施之一。这就需要通过法律的手段，不仅支持女性进入公领域并保障她们平等的社会权利，也要鼓励男性进入私领域，分担一直由女性承担的生育事务和家务劳动的责任，改变传统的性别分工，改造具有等级意义的性别机制和文化规则。从性别平等的视角看，以计生奖励形式给予的男性护理假，单纯强调了对计划生育的激励，使男性护理假原本具有的促进两性平等的深刻意义被忽略。因此，应当把男性护理假从计划生育配套措施中独立出来，给予明确的法律地位。这一立法将作为中国第一个要求和鼓励男性与女性分担生育责任和家庭事务的具体法律规定，其蕴含的权利共享、机会共有、责任共担的平等理念，对于改变传统的性别分工、改造不平等的性别文化，有着非常积极而深远的意义。

（二）公众的立法需求

从中央党校妇女研究中心“男性护理假”课题组所做的问卷调查显示，男性护理假立法具有广泛的公众基础。840 个受访对象中 83.8％表示赞成男性护理假，不赞成的只有 2.3％。83.2％的人认为生育是夫妻双方共同的事情。68％的人认为孩子出生时，父亲应该“在产妇身边”（已育夫妇实际只有 21.7％丈夫陪伴在旁），还有 57.6％的男性表示愿意伺候产妇和新生儿，39.1％的男性表示尽管不太愿意但仍然会承担相关事务，两项相加能够承担生育事务的男性高达 96.7％，由此可见，实际生活中男性愿意并实际参与生育事务已经非常普遍，给男性参与生育事务以制度保障已经成为一种普遍要求。在没有法定休假的前提下，男职工往往通过请事假来短期解决对护理的迫切需求。调查显示，男性请事假护理产妇和新生儿的情况，随着年龄的降低而逐渐增加，越是年轻的职工，越重视回家护理，甚至表示扣工钱也要请假。

调查中，对于“休产假也是男性的权利”的观点，60.4％的人表示非常同意，31.8％的人表示基本同意，两项相加，有 92.2％的人对此表示了肯定态度。作为某种权利，人们更希望得到法律的明确保证，因此有 89.5％的人表示赞成或基本赞成有关法律明确规定男性护理的内容（见表 2）。

表 2 是否同意法律应该明文规定男性可休带薪护理假

性别	非常赞成/比例	基本赞成/比例	无所谓/比例	不太赞成/比例	根本不赞成/比例	总计/比例
男	274	116	40	5	3	438
	36.8%	15.6%	5.4%	0.7%	0.4%	58.9%
女	185	90	22	6	2	305
	24.9%	12.1%	3.0%	0.8%	0.3%	41.1%
总计	459	206	62	11	5	743
	61.8%	27.7%	8.3%	1.5%	0.7%	100.0%

2009 年 6 月，人民网、新华网、凤凰网三个网站也作了相关调查，调查显示：在总计达两万多人的调查对象中，高达九成以上的人对于立法设立男性护理假持支持态度，比课题组问卷调查还要高出 2—3 个百分点。[①] 这表示了现代人对于改变传统性别文化中两性的角色形象和身份定位持有积极的态度。

（三）企业的态度和顾虑

作为当下主要承担男性休护理假工资津贴和工时付出的雇用单位持什么态度呢？

男性护理假期间的工资津贴，以及因休假造成的停止工作的损失，由企业承担，这在理论上说是企业的一项负担。但这仅仅是理论上的考虑，根据一些已经规定了男性护理假并且执行情况较好的企业反映，这项支出是在正常的人员费用支出范围内，不需要企业另外拿出资金，不会因此增加成本。下面以课题组所调查的某石油勘探企业为例，该勘探企业是一家国有企业，其中男职工 12 787 人，占职工总数 66.4%，女职工 6 458 人，占职工总数 33.6%。据 2005 年的统计，男职工休护理假的一共 434 人，占职工总数的 2.26%，以 434 人均休满 10 天护理假计算，需要支付的工资总额为 364 536.22元，占企业支付全部工资的 0.06%，比例非常小，因此这一“负担完全可以忽略不计”。相反，如果企业不给男性护理假，这一“负担”并不会因此减少，仍然要作为正常人员费用支出。该企业男职工的比例较大，不少

① 增加男性护理假 加入条款正当其时[N]. 中国经济导报，2011－11－26：B03.

年轻职工从事野外作业，企业管理者对男性护理假持积极理解的态度，休假执行情况比较好，即使这样，企业因此承担的“负担”仍然可以“忽略不计”。那么，男性护理假的企业负担问题，实际上并没有想象的那么严重。

已经有男性护理假的国家中，一个立法趋势是，男性护理假在延长，休假期间的待遇由社会保险基金支付，这就不存在具体企业的负担问题。我国的生育保险已经实现社会统筹，企业按职工工资总额1%缴纳生育保险费，保险基金现收现付专款专用。2011年全国生育保险基金收入220亿元，支出139亿元，年末生育保险基金累计结存343亿元。① 多年来生育保险基金收多用少，结余较多，而男性护理假的待遇支付份额很小，将其纳入生育保险支付范围，应该没有太大困难。

调查中很少有企业管理者从经济负担的角度提出反对意见，比较直接的理由是一人一岗，休假没有人顶替，特别是一些规模较小的企业，比较强调岗位替代困难。更深层的还有性别文化观念，即男人的价值在工作中，女人的价值在家庭里，生孩子是女人的事，男人不应当因为女人生孩子而放弃工作。这种观念与追求效益的企业目标结合起来，就会把男性护理假视为与企业目标相背离的事情。但是，在劳动者权利保护的国际潮流中，工作与家庭兼顾已经得到高度认同，保障两性的平等权利也是企业应当承担的社会责任。调查中我们发现一家生产粉末冶金的日资企业，在这方面就有比较明确的意识。该企业的规模并不大，职工总数500多人，但管理比较严格，公司法律意识比较强，同时还考虑到职工的文化生活和福利待遇，在生育方面明确规定给予男职工护理假，假期按出勤处理。该企业这样做的原因是为了让员工建立对企业的认同感，形成企业的凝聚力。由此可见，如果企业能够考虑员工兼顾工作和家庭的需求，对男性参与生育事务给以一定程度的保证，这对企业本身也是有积极意义的。

（四）政策执行机构的意见

目前男性护理假是计划生育的配套措施，因此计生部门对此给予了充分肯定，态度比较积极。对计生部门的调查得知，男性护理假在操作上的难

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① 人力资源和社会保障部.2011年度人力资源和社会保障事业发展统计公报[R],2012-06-05.

度并不大，根据相关规定，只要符合计划生育的条件，就可以由单位安排男性休护理假，休假时间和相关待遇也是有明确规定的。同时，男性护理假作为政策，其执行成本也不高，甚至被认为“没有成本”，因为，第一，男性护理假只需要在计划生育政策宣传中增加这项内容，并不需要专门进行宣传，也不需要专门的宣传经费，而政策宣传本来就是部门工作，只需要纳入统一的政策宣传计划中就可以。第二，男性护理假不需要政府额外的资金投入，不需要为此设立专门的预算，没有进行政策成本核算的必要。第三，男性护理假的实际执行情形非常分散，不是一个集中休假，不会造成对企业生产和社会生活的冲击，但却能有效地改变社会观念，增加社会福利。

但这不等于说政策执行没有障碍，比较困难的有两点，一是如何让需要的人知道这个规定，二是如何让企业落实。在 2001 年颁布的《人口与计划生育法》中，男性护理假并不是明确的法律条款，是各地为了贯彻该法作出的地方性政策规定，只是对计划生育政策的一个配套措施，在整个政策体系中并不醒目，不大容易引人注意，尽管当时媒体进行了比较集中的报道，但很多人仍然不知道这个规定。问卷调查中，39.9％的人表示不知道有这个规定，47％的人表示听说过，但不知道具体内容，只有 13.1％的人明确表示知道。计生工作是属地管理，有一个向企业宣传沟通倡导的过程，如果宣传沟通不畅，倡导不力，企业和职工都可能不知道有护理假的规定。调查中一些企业管理者就表示，现在还不知道有男性护理假这个规定，自己也不会主动给这个假。但同时又表示，只要规定给男性护理假，企业一定会给的，只要是国家规定的，都会照着做。在计生部门接待的上访和咨询的人中，也有人想了解男性护理假的规定，但却不愿意计生部门找企业协商，因为害怕这样做会被老板炒鱿鱼。那么，在法律上明确规定男性护理假也就成为能够让企业执行的前提条件。

综合各方面的反映，我们认为在我国男性带薪护理假的立法条件已经成熟。男性护理假作为一项独立的公民权利和义务，应当在相关法律中加以明确规定，给予法律保障。

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市场改革中城市工作与家庭关系变化及其政策思考

一、工作与家庭的变化

改革后中国经济由计划安排走向市场调节，以求提高市场效益，无甚市场价值的家庭从家国一体的格局中被分离出来归入私域。这对长期在中央集权体制掌控下的家庭来说，可以说是一种松绑，使家庭及其成员有了更多的自由发展空间。然而，在新型的市场经济条件下，政府由社会家庭福利的提供者转为市场效益的助推器，使家庭虽然一方面摆脱了国家的控制，另一方面却又失去了原有的依托。随着经济重点转向提高市场效益和竞争力，城市职工的"铁饭碗"以及通过单位所可能享受的医疗、住房、托儿、子女教育等方面福利也随之消失了。笔者认为此阶段工作与家庭的矛盾，根本问题在于市场条件下工作与家庭利益的不兼容性。市场讲求工作单位的经济效益最大化，而家庭更注重家庭再生产利益最大化。在这种条件下，工作家庭的矛盾突出表现在：(1) 工作家庭顾此失彼（比如，为了个人事业或养家糊口必须将更多的精力投向工作，但养育子女会影响工作，反之亦如此）；(2) 家庭成员的双重负担加重（例如，又要养家又要持家）。由于城市中妇女历来就业率很高，家务又以妇女为主，工作与家庭的矛盾在妇女身上表现得更为突出。这不是说改革前就没有工作与家庭的矛盾，但不存在工作与家庭利益的根本性对立，当时的单位通过各种就业福利保障，满足了家庭在生计和养育后代的基本需求——尽管这些满足按今天的标准在物质上是低层次的。当然，改革前国家是按其需要来塑造家庭的，要求家庭成员舍小家顾大家为单位/国家服务，城镇妇女都要工作，同时忽视了家务需要，给妇女造

成了为国贡献、养家和持家的三重负担。[①] 然而,当时妇女工作家庭冲突和三重负担的主观感受似乎不如今日妇女强烈,或许与当时某些意识形态的内化有关。那时的口号是“大河不满小河干”,“锅里有了碗里也有了”,以此类推,为单位/国家付出也在一定程度上是间接为小家谋利益。

与市场转型同步出现的是妇女就业率的下降。全国妇联妇女研究所在1990年和2000年所做的两期中国妇女社会地位调查的数据显示,中国曾拥有居于世界前列的妇女就业率。到1990年,城镇15—60岁妇女的就业率仍达到72.4%,50岁以下的则更高些达76.3%。而到了2000年,城镇妇女的就业率已降至63.5%,高于男性就业率下降的幅度(90%至81.3%),与此同时,在职业分布上出现了职业层次越高,男性比例越高,而女性的比例却与之相反的现象。职业的性别隔离现象导致性别收入差异的持续。据统计,我国城镇在业的女职工一直是男性职工的70%左右。改革后,这种差异并未消除。[②] 笔者曾对两次妇女社会地位调查的数据进行比较,发现城镇妇女与其丈夫做家务的比例从1990年的1.7倍上涨到2.8倍。[③]

当然,这一切与改革前后对妇女就业的歧视以及传统的性别观念的影响密不可分,但还要看到改革后体制变化通过加剧工作与家庭的矛盾造成上述性别不平等的格局。2005—2006年期间,笔者和蒋永萍对城市已婚妇女做过一项质性研究,其中内容之一是了解城镇妇女(包括农村外来务工女性)在经济改革期间工作和家庭两个层面的生活发生了哪些变化。我们注意到城镇妇女在处理工作与家庭的关系上出现了多元化趋势:有的以工作/事业为主,有的以家庭为主,还有的兼顾二者,再有的干脆回到家中。有人认为这种多元化的趋势是新形势下妇女有了更多的自由选择的空间所致,这也确实是事实。在改革之前,妇女没有多少选择,都要就业或参加生产劳动。[④]

我们这次的调查显示,总体来讲,妇女们还是愿意工作的,以保持经济

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① 左际平.20世纪50年代的妇女解放和男女义务平等:中国城市夫妻的经历与感受[J].社会,2005(01).

② 蒋永萍.妇女的社会经济地位[M]//蒋永萍.中国转型中的妇女社会地位.北京:中国妇女出版社,2006:128—196.

③ Jipng Zuo. Understanding Urban Women's Domestic-Role Orientation in Post-Mao China[J/OL]. Critical Sociology, DOI: 10.1177/0896920512452021.

④ 谭深.社会转型与中国妇女就业[M]//杜芳琴.中国妇女与发展——地位 健康 就业.郑州:河南人民出版社,1993:337—385.

独立，丰富生活，与社会保持联系，全面实现自我，并为社会做贡献。即使那些因照顾年幼子女而回家的妇女，也在想办法找些家务以外的事情来做，比如筹备个体经营小生意，这样可以不受时间和工作地点约束，或加入居家传销的经营活动。只是由于种种外界因素的影响，她们不得不做出各种抉择。比如，北京有一位改革初期下海的工厂女工，曾经在服装营销方面做得很好，后因公婆上了年纪，无法继续接送她在上幼儿园的儿子，加上丈夫一再催促她辞工，于是她回到家中照料儿子，白天有些空闲就炒股。还有一位在上海某区机关担任办公室副主任的女公务员坚持要兼顾家庭和工作，但以家庭为主。她坚持以家庭为主是因为办公室工作压力太大，同时她还要监督儿子的功课；但她又必须工作，因为光靠丈夫的薪水养家是不够的。值得讨论的是，无论妇女处在工作或家庭的什么位置上，她们都面临着共同的挑战，即工作与家庭的矛盾。市场、家庭的公私划界和政府社会福利角色的全面削弱大大增加了家庭的扶养、养老、育儿的压力，而社会对家庭的支持系统（比如福利性的社区幼儿园、养老院）又没有建立起来。此外，市场与家庭的不兼容性——前者要求经济效益最大化，而后者则需满足家庭成员的各种需要①——使得广大城市就业妇女处于既要顾及就业又要顾及家庭的重重矛盾之中。

我们的研究发现，那些事业型妇女之所以能够以事业为主，要么是家里有老人帮助照料子女，要么丈夫不坐班，要么是有经济条件将子女送到寄宿制的私立学校，或是子女已到了能够自理的年龄。即便如此，市场与家庭对立的价值也往往使一些事业型妇女在事业成功与贤妻良母之间感到无所适从。在工作场所，她们往往被认为要承担家庭照料角色而受到歧视；而在家里，她们又会因为家务和照料中出现的问题而时常受到社会甚至家人的责备。对回到家中的妇女来说，她们仍然逃脱不了顾此失彼的困境。回到家中虽然能在一定程度上缓解工作为家庭带来的矛盾，但她们以传统的分工方式建构稳定和谐家庭的愿望却被市场价值观对家庭的冲击打得支离破碎。在市场条件下，家务劳动是贬值的。此外，妇女没有工作又意味着社会、经济地

① Johanna Brenner. Women and the Politics of Class[M]. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000; Sharon Hays. The mommy wars: Ambivalence, ideological work, and the cultural contradictions of motherhood[M]//Susan Ferguson. Shifting the Center. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2010: 305 - 323.

位的丧失和社交网络的缩小。这使得部分回到家中的妇女陷入新的苦恼。

二、对中国相关政策的反思

计划经济时期城市妇女就业权利较为充分的保障和实现，一方面得益于劳动就业领域法律政策的制定和执行。国家除了以宪法的形式对妇女与男性平等的劳动权利进行保障外，还通过《女职工劳动保护规定》等专门性法律法规对妇女的平等就业、同工同酬、特殊劳动保护等作出明确的规定。与此同时，国家还采取了一系列政策性规定和行政措施促进妇女就业。另一方面是一系列相关领域政策的支持和跟进。生育保险制度的建立，使女职工的生育医疗、带薪产假、产后复职等得到有力保障；公益性的托幼服务等社会福利事业的发展，减少了妇女就业的后顾之忧；以及通过意识形态的影响形成有利于妇女就业的社会舆论环境等等。尽管到目前为止，中国并未批准国际劳工组织的 156 号公约①，但可以毫不夸张地说，在计划经济体制下，中国政府提前履行了该公约相关条款的要求。②

改革后，劳动力市场就业体制的建立为众多城乡女性创造了自主择业、自我发展、获得事业成功和经济收益的机会及条件，一大批女企业家、女经理人、女专业技术人才脱颖而出，在获得自身价值的同时也获得了更高的社会认同。但是在"家国分离""公私划界"的新自由主义经济思想日趋影响政府治理理念的背景下，旧的平衡被打破，新的与市场经济相适应的促进妇女就业的配套措施和社会支持政策并没有得到有关部门的高度重视，甚至缺乏自觉的性别平等意识，因此尽管男女平等就业仍然是社会主义市场就业体制的基本原则，某些相关领域的体制改革未能实现良好的愿望，反而成为影响妇女就业的障碍性因素。

例如，生育保险制度的改革。其改革的初衷是，在企业成为自负盈亏的独立经济实体后，通过生育费用的社会统筹，均衡不同企业的生育负担，提

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① 国际劳工组织的 156 号公约，即《关于有家庭负担的男女工人的平等机会和平等待遇的公约》，于 1981 年 6 月 23 日在瑞士日内瓦举行的国际劳工组织大会上通过，1983 年 8 月 11 日开始实施。

② 刘伯红，张永英，李亚妮. 协调工作和家庭的矛盾：中国的问题和政策[R]. 未发表，2008.

高企业招用女性员工的积极性，减少女性就业障碍。[①] 但是统筹的费用仅限于医疗和产假期间的工资，产后育儿假，企业使用替补劳动力，女工产前、哺乳期的工时损失等有形无形的经济负担和对生产率的影响并未被考虑进去，致使很多企业使用女劳动力的积极性仍然不高。而那些男性比例较高的企业，也因只有付出没有获得，缺少缴纳生育保险统筹费用的积极性，以至生育保险统筹的缴费率在五大社会保险中是最低的，2004 年全国职工生育保险的覆盖率仅为 57.9%。较低的覆盖率、保险费用支付范围设计的缺陷、新旧两种制度的衔接不力等问题的存在，还直接影响到城镇职业女性对生育保险待遇的享有，未缴纳生育保险企业的女职工、下岗失业女工、未纳入生育保险范围、用人单位又不愿承担生育费用的某些事业单位女职工基本无缘享受国家法律明文规定的生育待遇。一些中小学校甚至要求生育女教师个人负担产假期间学校聘用代课教师的费用。[②]

另一项对妇女就业影响较大的是托幼管理体制的改革。经济改革初期，对企业办托幼的负面评价及企业对经济效益的考虑，使得多数由企业和机关事业单位举办的托幼园所在很短的时间内纷纷关闭停办或转卖。近几年教育部门又明确提出，幼儿教育属于非义务教育，要削减政府补贴、进行收费成本化改革、鼓励多渠道多形式办园的改革思路。在这种思路的引导下，托幼教育市场化更甚于其他阶段教育的市场化程度。风险大、利润低的面向三岁以下儿童的托儿所基本停办，幼儿园的收费近些年来则一路攀升，有的竟占到生育高峰年龄段城镇妇女月平均收入的 60%以上。与此同时，服务、支持妇女就业功能的淡化，使得很多托幼机构缩短了服务时间长度，很多家长还不得不面对孩子接送时间与工作时间冲突的窘境，请人接送孩子上幼儿园成为幼儿园和低龄小学儿童家长的另一项额外支出。在改革中，政府还将更多的解决基本公共服务的希望寄托于市场，鼓励公共服务部门用市场经营的方法开办医疗、教育、养老、家政服务等公共服务，鼓励私人部门提供公共服务，导致市场服务收费过高，质量令人担忧。在限制了中低收入家庭利用公共服务的机会、扩大妇女和家庭风险的同时，也加重了作为

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① 左际平，蒋永萍. 社会转型中城镇妇女的工作和家庭[M]. 北京：当代中国出版社，2009.

② 左际平，蒋永萍. 社会转型中城镇妇女的工作和家庭[M]. 北京：当代中国出版社，2009.

家庭主要照料者的妇女的负担。而家庭照顾负担的加重反过来进一步导致妇女就业、收入和就业关联性社会保障的损失。①

当工作与家庭的矛盾冲突得不到有效的社会支持时，妇女的身心向家庭倾斜就成为必然。相对于“退出劳动力市场，重操家庭主妇旧业”的选择而言，“心”的回归影响更为巨大，它在改变妇女的生活目标的同时，也在重塑国家和妇女、家庭的关系。

三、家庭政策思考

应该说自1949年以来，中国尚未有正式冠名的家庭政策。如前所述，对家庭的福利、生育、妇女权益、养老等有关规定都体现在国家宪法以及各种社会、经济政策之中。而这种家庭政策的“缺失”恰恰体现了改革前的社会主义时期“公私领域不分”“家国同构”的社会体制，曾在制度上保障了城镇家庭最基本的生活需要。在新形势下探讨家庭政策，首先要突破目前在国内影响较大的西方自由主义公私领域传统划分的理论影响。在市场条件下，公私领域的划分是以市场价值为界。家庭是创造生命、延续生命的场所，而不是生产利润的市场。因此，公私领域划界之日，即是家庭与市场根本利益对立之时。要靠市场自发维护妇女和家庭利益是不现实的。相反，公私领域的划分不仅使两性之间的劳动的分工及报酬的差异成为一个自然的事实并不断加以维护，而且造成工作与家庭的矛盾，使政府无法或不去干预包括家庭性别分工、养老、育幼等在内的家庭和私人的事务。30年改革的实践也证明，在建立市场经济体制的过程中，随着政府从计划经济活动组织中淡出，公与私、社会与家庭、国家与社会高度一体化的结构逐渐分化。捍卫私人领域的完整性，反对对私人领域作公共干预的自由主义倾向在扩大私人生活空间的同时，也减弱了政府政策的人文关怀色彩，其直接的后果之一就是对妇女社会参与和职业发展的负面影响。

然而，在中国不乏学者认为目前中国的各种不平等关系，包括性别不平等等问题不是政府保障民生功能的丧失，而是市场还不够完善。笔者认为

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① 刘伯红，张永英，李亚妮. 协调工作和家庭的矛盾：中国的问题和政策[R]. 未发表，2008.

这是错误的。也许我们应该认识到，改革后政府中出现的市场垄断及腐败等行为正是政府功能和政府权力市场化的反映，而不是市场化程度低的表现。其实20世纪著名的社会理论家卡尔·波兰尼早已指出，西方市场经济的出现，无一不是靠政府支持的。而由市场自发调节经济，只能导致人类社会关系灾难性的毁灭。[①] 以此推断，如果家庭利益也要靠市场调节，那家庭关系最终也将毁于一旦。美国家庭在20世纪出现的家庭原子化、离婚率的上升和伴之而来的婚姻率的下降就部分地说明了这一问题。

前述2005至2006年我和蒋永萍的质性调查中还发现，[②]那些工作与家庭矛盾表现不十分突出的妇女，有相当一部分正是因为她们的工作场所仍然隶属于传统的单位体制，比如国家机关、媒体、科研单位及高校等被包下来的一批体制内的人员。因此，我们强调超越公私领域的划分，以人为本，以人的发展和生活福祉作为社会发展的第一要义，将社会政策的触角重新延展到家庭和个人生活领域，将家庭政策纳入社会政策框架体系；同时以人的发展为中心，建立社会政策与经济政策之间的联系，实现社会政策与经济政策的相互支持和协调。笔者想再强调我们制定政策的基本原则应该是，重新建立政府对家庭和民生的保障作用。这种建立不是指政府通过行政手段对家庭事务的大包大揽，而是将有利于家庭利益的政策通过法律的形式固定下来，而辅助之有关部门的行政监督与执行。另外，政策要有助于工作场所和家庭利益的协调，有助于减少性别和阶级差异，有利于社会肌体的巩固和发展。

第一，在加强政府福利作用的同时，削减政府的市场功能，注重民生，防止市场恶性膨胀

近年财政支出在支持就业、社保、医保、教育和住房都有较大幅度的增长，据说是在各项支出中增长最快的，这有利于缓解工作与家庭的矛盾。也许有人认为民生考虑多了会影响经济效益，但本人以为，发展经济的目的，并不是为竞争中少数赢家获得更大的利润，而是为了提高大多数人民的生活质量。

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① ［匈］卡尔·波兰尼. 大转型：我们时代的政治与经济起源［M］. 冯钢，刘阳，译. 杭州：浙江人民出版社，2007.

② 左际平，蒋永萍. 社会转型中城镇妇女的工作和家庭［M］. 北京：当代中国出版社，2009.

第二,协调工作场所和家庭的利益

如前所述,在市场条件下,工作与家庭的利益基本是不一致的,前者是效益最大化,后者则要传承生命、保证家庭成员的生活。这是工作与家庭矛盾的根本所在。而政府则可以要求工作单位增设福利指标,不过分强调利润或效益指标。但政府要通过补贴等形式承担工作单位一部分或大部分的福利支出,比如妇女由于生育或因为照料子女缺勤而为工作单位带来的经济成本。如仅靠工作单位的自觉自愿,根据目前西方发达市场经济的经验,企业部门在所谓劳动力过剩的情况下是不会为员工提供福利的;即使在劳力短缺的时候,其福利也是对企业更有利。比如英美公司里实行的“灵活工作时间”,表面上是照顾员工,但实际上主动权仍掌握在公司手中,对孕妇和请事假员工的歧视也比比皆是。①

第三,减少性别差异

在法国和德国,国家为家庭提供了较好的家务劳动支持,但政策均是针对妇女制定的,因此没有起到让夫妻双方充分就业或均担家务的作用,所以仍然不能完全实现性别平等。比如法国有很好的生育和托幼服务,但主要针对妇女制定的。它虽减轻了从业妇女的家庭负担,但男人却认为没有必要再与妻子均担家务了。Crompton 的一项调查发现,与芬兰、挪威、英美德葡等六个工业国家相比,法国的家务分工是最传统的,与葡萄牙不相上下。②德国则实行男人养家的模式,政府以现金形式补贴妇女的家务劳动,从而也在一定程度上强化了家庭和就业中的性别不平等。英美在发达国家中是家庭福利提供最吝啬的国家,家庭中男女就业率都较高,而且男子分担家务的程度也高于法德等国家。但它们的问题是许多妇女为了生计被迫就业,而男子也因为配偶就业而被迫分担家务。③ 二者都处于家庭生计而迫不得已来均担扶养和家务负担,这似乎也不可取。

第四,遏制非正规就业扩大的倾向

中国自市场改革以来,个人和家庭的物质水平普遍有了大幅度的提高,

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① Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

② Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

③ Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

但贫富差距也在急剧扩大。这是不争的事实。其中一个原因是非正规就业呈普遍趋势。据统计,截至 2008 年,城镇从业人数已从 30 年前的 9 510 万上升到 2.935 亿,其中 2.25 亿是农民工。然而,国企职工人数却从原来的 78.3%下降到 21.9%。与此同时,从业人员中有 39%被驱入非正规就业部门。非正规就业指无签约、无社会保障和无福利不稳定的工作。① 这实际上加剧了劳动者工作和家庭的矛盾。② 在非正规就业部门,尽管男性总体比重略高于女性,但非正规就业的女性在同性中的比例要高于男性。③ 这些妇女往往既要养家、又要持家,工作和家庭的矛盾会更加突出。所以在政策制定过程中要考虑这部分利益受损的群体。

第五,在经济领域里扩大公共利益空间

中国市场化改革以来伴随着私有化的进程和竞争机制的使用,出现了严重的利益分割。而利益的分割导致不同利益集团的产生,如果社会没有一个完善的平衡机制,就有可能激化利益集团之间的矛盾,也会加剧阶级分化。此外,有些关于民生的第三产业是不应私有化或过度商品化的,如医疗、托幼、教育,甚至住房。它们是用来满足人民基本需要的,不应作为盈利的工具,否则也会扩大性别和阶级差异并激化工作与家庭矛盾。此外,有些服务行业技术含量较低,薪酬较少(比如托儿),而妇女居多,它会巩固职业按性别分工的格局。另外提供这方面服务的往往是下层劳动妇女,所以它也不利于消灭阶级差异。④ 根据中央电视台 2011 年 9 月 30 日早间的“新闻纵横”栏目报导,中国现在强调幼儿园的公益性和普惠性。教育部计划在年底出台对幼儿园实施价格管理,对私营幼儿园采取限定最高价。厦门政府已规定幼儿园收费最高额为 510 元,政府补贴 300 元。但如何应对名目繁多的收费还是个问题,另外能否实现价格管理还要看地方政府的态度。

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① Kuruvilla, Sarosh, Lee, Ching Kwan, & Gallagher, Mary, E. Introduction and arguments[M]//Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary E. Gallagher. From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011:1-14.

② Tavernise, Sabrina. Soring poverty casts spotlight on “Lost Decade”[N]. New York Times, 2011-09-13.

③ 全国妇联妇女研究所课题组.社会转型中的妇女社会地位[M].北京:中国妇女出版社,2006.

④ Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family[M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

当然，要想在全球资本主义化进程中既保障家庭利益、消灭阶级差别，又要保持国家在国际市场的竞争力是不容易的。但中国改革前的经验似乎证明，只要我们能通过政策等手段扩大公共利益空间，就能增加政府和经济实体的凝聚力，提高人民的劳动积极性，从而增强国家的经济实力。据统计，在 1950 年至 1976 年间，中国的经济增长率不亚于全球的平均值。而人均寿命、健康和教育等指标更是突飞猛进。[①] 而这一切又是中国人民在自力更生、艰苦奋斗的摸索中经历了种种挫折之后取得的，更是了不起。笔者这样说是与西方发达资本主义国家比，它们巨额财富的积累和发达的经济相当一部分是建筑在对殖民地掠夺和对外侵略的基础之上的。[②] 2008 年由美国掀起的金融风暴和引发的经济衰退更加表明，中国不能照搬西方的经济模式。中国既然有过一段城市家庭保障的尝试，为什么不能在汲取自己的教训和借鉴他国经验的基础上继续尝试有中国社会主义特色的家庭政策呢?

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① Li, Mingqi. The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy [M]. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008; Lin, Chun. The Transformation of Chinese Socialism[M]. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

② Li, Mingqi. The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy [M]. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008; Lin, Chun. The Transformation of Chinese Socialism[M]. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

Family Changes in China
and Comparative Research of Family Policies

The Positioning of "Family" in Chinese Public Policies and Its Future Evolution*

1. Changing Families in China's Transition

Many changes are under way in Chinese families as the country continues to undergo a transition. They can be broken down roughly into two kinds: changes on the surface and changes deep down.

1.1 Changes on the Surface

Previous research on the more observable changes in families in a transitional society focuses mainly on two aspects: (i) the prevalence of nuclear families in which husband-wife relations are given priority over parent-child relations, the traditional patriarchal structure is transitioning towards a dual structure paying equal respect to the paternal families of both spouses, family members enjoy more autonomy and individual values and there is greater equality between spouses and between parents and children (Shen et al., 2009:2-127; Ma et al., 2011); (ii) the increasingly vulnerable family is exposed to risks such as social stratification, mobility,

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low fertility rates, ageing and one-child-only policies. The divorce rate has gone up. More extramarital affairs are occurring. More young adults depend on parents' income instead of fending for themselves. Family members are less in touch with each other. The functions of families have been further weakened. The youngest generation in the family is better cared for than the elderly. Provision for the old age seems a challenge to both urban and rural families (Yang, 2011; Wang, 2009). As families take new and more diverse forms, they seem to have shed the image of a safe haven and gradually have become a source of risk.

However, although more vulnerable than before, families have to take on more responsibilities. Individuals living in this transitional society and this age of globalization are faced with grim competition, as well as many other uncertainties. In addition, the social safety net in China is underdeveloped. Consequently, vulnerable individuals resort to vulnerable families for resources and a sense of security. Families have to carry on despite being overloaded, which makes them even more vulnerable. A tension is thus created in transitional Chinese society: on one hand, traditional families are fading further and further away; on the other hand, the need for and dependence on families are growing. Such a tension is also embedded in changes in Chinese families deep down.

1.2 Changes Deep Down

There is a consensus among both Chinese and overseas scholars on conceptual changes in families in a transitional society; in other words, as modernization accelerates in China, the traditional family-centered culture is giving way to an individual-based culture. Meanwhile, within the family the wife's relatives and children are increasingly prioritized (Yang, 2012; Shen et al., 2009; Yan, 2009: 239 - 261). In other words, what underline conceptual changes in Chinese families are the emphasis on individuality, emotions and feelings, as well as personal space and a heightened sense of equality. However, such conceptual changes follow different paths in different theoretical frameworks, such as individualism in Western classical modernization theory, the diversified development model which embeds family-centered elements in modernization theory and individualization derived from Ulrich Beck's "second modernity".

The major assumption of individualism, which is core to the Western classical theory of family modernization, is the emergence and isolation of nuclear families. According to this model, the disintegration of the traditional extended family gave birth to smaller-size families in which the husband-wife relationship is the dominant relationship instead of the parent-child relationship. Traditional kinship gave way to respect for individuality and equality among family members (Goode, 1982; Hutter, 1988). Chinese scholars usually adopt this model when they study changing families in societal transition. Li Yinhe made an optimistic prediction at the end of a case study of an extended family in Beijing at the end of the twentieth century that, with the emergence of nuclear families, traditional Chinese family ties will bow out. "The family-centred mindset will be replaced with a new one that puts equal emphasis on individuals, family and society." By then, "familism will not be characteristic of Chinese culture", "Chinese families and Western families will be more and more alike until they eventually converge" (Li and Zheng, 2001: 191 - 192).

However, the classical theory of family modernization has been challenged in Western society since the 1970s, for two reasons: a static linear view of evolutionary monism and the assessment of the modernity of families by referencing Western families (Tang, 2010). Consequently, many other Chinese scholars turned to a revised framework of family modernization. Such a framework integrates China's family-centred heritage, stresses the complexity and diversity of changing families in China's transition and attributes the changes in families to the interaction between tradition and modernity (Ma et al., 2011). According to this framework, the boundary between tradition and modernity is blurred. Instead of being mutually exclusive, they are compatible with each other.

It is exactly the network of relatives, "remnant of the pre-modern model", that supports the adaption of an individual or a family to societal changes (Tang and Chen, 2012).

Yan Yunxiang and other overseas scholars attempt to break away from the dichotomy of tradition vs. modernity, West vs. East, familism vs. individualism. By referring to Ulrich Beck's theory of "second modernity", they interpret conceptual changes in families and other aspects of Chinese society with a model of individualization. According to this theory, the Western society is entering a stage of "second modernity" or "reflexive modernization" featuring "individualization"; in other words, the traditional concepts and categories of the first modernity have either disappeared or declined. As a result, the established "standardized life" becomes a risky "elective life". Individualization has created in people a wish to "live for oneself" and has reshaped relations between family members. Families have evolved from a "community of need" to an "elective relationship" or an "alliance of individuals" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2011).

According to Yan Yunxiang, individualization is apparent in China's societal and familial changes. Changes in family size and structure are not the most important part of Chinese families' modernization, because the modernity of contemporary families is reflected "in the ascendance of individual desire, feelings, emotions, and initiative in family life, on one hand, and the trend of individual-centered familial relations", on the other. In other words, "individuals in contemporary society are no longer willing to sacrifice themselves for collective interests or the continuity of the family; quite the opposite, they manipulate the family in pursuit of personal interests and happiness" (Yan, 2012: 4). Therefore, the family, which used to dominate individual's choices, has lost its absolute authority. It has to adapt to individual needs. It has become a lever for the rising individual.

2. The Positioning of the Family in Chinese Public Policies

Family issues are universal. They have to be studied against the backdrop of globalization and social structural changes. Family issues result not only from modernity, but also the state's inadequate efforts to respond to modernity. Institutional defects in Chinese public policies have put families in an unprecedented conundrum.

2.1 "Identical Family and State Structure" and the Role of the Family in Public Policies

"Identical family and state structure" is a deep-rooted concept in traditional Chinese culture. Patriarchy was generally acknowledged as the common foundation of the clan, the family and the state. By combining loyalty and filial piety, it established to some extent the legitimacy of unrestrained despotic power in traditional Chinese society. The integration of familism and statism was a fundamental feature of social governance in China.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 destroyed the traditional clan system, but the idea of "identical family and state structure" managed to survive in mainstream ideology, except that familism was replaced by collectivism. Some scholars call it "the integration of the family with the state", or "a high level of integration between the public and the private, between society and family, between the state and society under the centralized leadership of the Communist Party and centralized national planning" (Zuo and Jiang, 2009: 27). However, the biggest problem with such a governance model is that the family is often swallowed up by the state. The state is the overwhelming "big family" and the family is reduced to an insignificant second. The advocacy of such ideas as "giving up family interests for the sake of the state" in fact indicates that the state is higher up in the hierarchy than the family or even that the two are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the logic behind "identical family and state structure" is essentially a governance logic based on statism. Families, like individuals, have to be ready at all times for the state. They do not have any independence or autonomy. Their interests have to be expressed by the state. There is no room for treating the family as a concept in private space.

Some scholars describe the relationship between the family and the state since China's Reform and Opening-up as "the separation of the family from the state". They claim that such a division has caused the fading away of so-called "state-oriented individuals" and the emergence of "market-oriented individuals". Gender roles within the family, such as "two systems in one family" or "the man being the breadwinner and the wife being the home-maker" have been strengthened (Zuo and Jiang, 2009:75–109). However, those changes are superficial, because the hierarchy consisting, from the bottom up, of the individual, the family and the state remains unchanged. With fiercer competition in the market, widening income gap and the shedding of state obligations, risks have been passed along to the market, the family and the individual, while the state still controls the allocation of obligations and rights. Families are something that the state can abandon or manipulate at will.

In this sense, the relationship between the family and the state is not really "the separation of the family from the state". Instead, the traditional logic of "identical structure of family and state", or statism, remains, except that the state, squeezed by the market, has tossed off more responsibilities and burdens to the family, whereas the interests and needs of the family are obscured by national needs and development. As a result, the role of the family in Chinese public policies is either invisible or ambiguous. The family is pressed on both flanks by the state and the market.

2.2 The Positioning of the Family in Public Policies

In current Chinese public policies, the family is either invisible or ambiguous, suffering from self-contradictory values embedded in the relevant policies. There are three main problems:

2.2.1 The omission of the family in state institutions, laws and regulations

There are two main types of omission: firstly, there are very few family-specific policies, laws or regulations; secondly, when formulating new public policies, the government gives priority to social stability and national development. Then it considers the division of benefits among different sectors or groups. Family, as a fundamental unit in society, is often omitted or seldom regarded as a beneficiary. Therefore, the implementation of a new institution may neglect family interests or even inflict damage on the family. For example, the household registration system facilitates population management, separation of urban administration from rural administration and administration by geographical division, but it blocks the mobility and development of families and individuals. Family planning policies were aimed at population control and economic growth, failing to consider the needs of families. As a result, the unstable family structure of four grandparents, two parents and an only child has been created. There is also the issue of support for empty-nest elderly parents. With an underdeveloped social safety net, families are at higher risk than ever (Xu and Feng, 2011).

2.2.2 Wavering values underlying state institutions

When policies, laws and regulations are developed, decision-makers often waver between treating a family or an individual as an elementary unit. As a result, there is inconsistency in institutional logic and prevailing values hover between familism and individualism. For example, the household registration system is based on the family, while the Identity Card system is based on individuals, although both are designed for identity administration. The former limits individuals' mobility, whereas the latter is a requirement for mobility. Rural land contracts and family planning policies treat families as basic units, while taxation, employment, education and so on are individual-based. In the field of social welfare, housing and minimum wages are family-based, while the pension system and medical care are individual-based. Such inconsistencies have caused inter-institutional incompatibility and chaotic implementation. Families are therefore negatively impacted.

Some scholars, after an in-depth analysis of the three juristic interpretations by the Supreme Court in 2001 that act as guidelines for the enforcement of the revised *Marital Law*, especially for the division of family property, believe that these juristic interpretations follow the logic of "individually-owned property", which is a deviation from the traditional logic of "family-owned property" (Zhao, 2011). Huang Zongzhi agrees. He believes that the 2001 new *Marital Law* and the three subsequent juristic interpretations "are advancing step by step to a comprehensive adoption of Western individualistic principles and practices". Controversies over these juristic interpretations reflect "the tension between social reality in the emerging individual-oriented market economy and the long-upheld practices of familism" (Huang, 2011).

However, what matters most is not whether familism or individualism underlies current Chinese public policies, but that there should be inherent value consistency across all public policies. It can be seen from the previously cited public policies that the positioning of families is far from consistent. Those policies take a utilitarian position on statism. They even neglect to make efforts to facilitate the balance between statism and familism and the transition it is undergoing. Such policy inconsistencies are harmful not only to families, but also to social justice.

2.2.3 The state's ambiguous attitude towards the family in public policies

The family is part of private space. In the era of planned economy, however, officially there was no private space. The government and society were given free entry. In the era of the market economy, however, the privacy of families is better protected and respected, but it is still up to the state to draw the line between what is public and what is private. Additionally, the government's attitude remains ambiguous. In most cases a utilitarian approach is adopted—the boundary between the public and private sphere is drawn in accordance with the needs of state governance, so that the state can intervene or manipulate the behaviour of family members.

Chen Yingfang's research shows that, in social transition, the family is more than an economic entity or a unit of living; it can also be an important structural element used by the government to establish and regulate state-individual relations (for example, a unit of welfare), a way for the state to maintain political order (for example, punishing an entire family for the political blunder of one member). From realistic utilitarian concerns, governments at different levels shirk social welfare responsibilities by passing them on to families. In doing so, they also pass on various kinds of state-individual tensions and conflicts. Since self-organized social groups are restricted in China, one's family, kin and clan are the major representations of individual-society relations. In rights protection movements, the family is an important beneficiary and actor (Chen, 2010). Therefore, the family is an elementary unit in the state's current efforts to maintain social stability. At the same time, it has had to assume unlimited liability in sharing the government's welfare provision responsibilities and burden. Families have had to become the intermediary between the state and individuals. They also serve the purposes of social administration.

The state's ambiguous attitude toward the family in public policies reflects, at the end of the day, a statist view. Such an attitude can go to extremes: at one extreme, the omnipresent state interferes closely in family affairs, failing to respect its private space; at the other extreme, the state is indifferent to family affairs, letting the market resolve family problems and making the family literally a depositary for all unresolved social ills.

These two extremes are exactly the attitudes adopted by the government in the era of planned economy and market economy, respectively. The ambiguous position of the family in public policies has greatly damaged the environment and interests of families. It has also restricted the orderly development of Chinese society.

3. Two Ways Out of the Conundrum

As we have seen, during China's social transition, while it is convenient to stress individual interests and depend more heavily on the family, it is equally convenient for public policies to omit the institutional role of the family. "Utilitarianism" has turned the family into an arena in which the state and individuals compete for resources, and into an actor to share the state's responsibilities and risks. The independence of the family has never been clearly presented, protected or respected. Rather it is harmed during the game played out between the state and individuals. Therefore, a key step to be taken by the state in order to lift the family out of the conundrum is to reposition the family in public policies, and to develop a policy environment and system to protect and support the family. Meanwhile, individuals must establish a new view of the family.

3.1 Establishing a Family Perspective in Public Policies

In order to reposition the family in public policies, first and foremost, the family must become an indispensable dimension of policy assessment. That is to say, the positive and negative impact of a policy, law or regulation on the family must be assessed. Such an assessment can then serve as a starting point for adjusting and improving policies. Efforts must be made to reconcile inconsistencies and contradictions across all policies related to the family. Therefore, a permanent government agency should be set up to take charge of all family affairs, to minimize harm to the family in the public decision-making process and to support and protect the family. At the same time, a comprehensive nation-wide family-based database could be established to provide policy input.

Key to the establishment of a family perspective in public policies is the drawing of a clear boundary between the government and the family. Both extremes—abuse of power by the state and the government dysfunction in providing social welfare—must be prevented. As social welfare provision improves, families should be relieved of at least part of the burden. The privacy and integrity of the family must be protected. State governance should not blindly follow the utilitarian approach. Instead, it should balance the interests of the state, the family and individuals. There should be institutional support for the healthy development of the family, such as market behaviour conducive to the expansion of family space and the resolution of practical family issues, effective guidance and support for social groups, so that the family can go beyond the role of intermediary or tool in social administration to become a source of personal well being and social harmony.

3.2 Advocating a New View of the Family in Mainstream Society and Media

Which course should the family follow? This has always been a controversial question. Some argue for a restoration of traditional family values and morals. They want to defend the traditional form of the family, exclaiming: "The family is disintegrating!" Others don't think the family is disintegrating, "it is simply becoming diversified". They encourage a plurality of family structures. As Anthony Giddens claims, we are at the crossroads. The future is unpredictable, while drawing on the past won't solve any problems, because factors affecting family changes are irreversible. The only thing we can do is to strive to "coordinate personal freedom, which the majority of us value highly in our personal life, with the needs to establish stable enduring relationships with others" (Giddens, 2009: 201 – 202).

The second school of thought is very similar to scholars' discussions of changing families in East Asia and China. For example, Yan Yunxiang points out that in the past half century, Chinese society has realized the transition to private life in two dimensions: families have been relocated into private space and the importance of individual members within the family has increased (Yan, 2009: 241). He later included such a transition in "individualization" (Yan, 2012: 12 – 14). Meanwhile, Japanese scholars have come to label such a transition the "individualized family". A related concept is "diversity". That is to say, in "today's individual-based society", family life is just a lifestyle, a result of personal choice (Emiko, 2009: 183 – 190). This is not only a strategy adopted by individuals in answer to modernity, but also a realistic basis for public policy formulation.

When the new family view is advocated in mainstream society and media, two points must be stressed. On the one hand, individual autonomy and personal choices should be fully respected. The suppression of the individual in the name of the family should be avoided. On the other hand, individuals should be prevented from grabbing an unreasonable amount of resources from the family or harming the family in the name of autonomy. Responsibilities within families should be assigned in accordance with personal choices, so that the family and individuals become a community against social risks and stresses in the transitional period to make up for the inadequacies of existing institutions and social security. Such a philosophy should underlie all public policy formulations. Therefore, this new view of the family is not just a revival of family-centred culture. It represents an evolution from the traditional model, in which the individual had to abide by family wishes without any preconditions, to a new model in which the family does its best to meet individual needs. This new family view is ultimately a new philosophy based on individual autonomy and on reciprocity between the individual and the family. To put such a philosophy into practice, what is needed is not a shift of cultural or ethical paradigms, but institutional reforms and practices in social transition.

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The Inclusion of Gender Equality in Family Policy Analysis and Policy Formulation in China*

Great changes have taken place in China's political, economic, social and cultural systems, as well as population policy since the start of the Reform and Opening-up over 30 years ago. Opening up to the outside world, globalization, sustainable development and the international human rights framework have become universal principles for all UN members. Marriage, family and gender relations have been heavily impacted by large-scale migration in and out of China, the development of new urban/rural communities, the wide adoption of information technology and people's aspiration for both mental and material well-being. Traditional concepts such as "family virtues" and "equality between men and women" are no longer sufficient. There is an urgent need to improve and integrate our family policy system and gender equality mechanism. Only in this way can the diverse needs of families and family members be met, new types of harmonious families established and gender relations based on equality and mutual support developed.

Political reforms in China have separated the family from the class struggle and proletarian dictatorship. Families are now part of the private domain. The mainstream ideology has acquiesced to the change from

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"putting public interest before self interest" to giving priority to a happy and prosperous family life. Altruism, dedication, mutual assistance and sense of duty, all values stressed since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, are now de-emphasized. The state is less involved in private life. Social organizations have loosened their control over individual behaviour in family settings. Citizens have learned to respect privacy and even, to some extent, to tolerate extramarital affairs. As a result, families have become more diverse. Families formed for utilitarian purposes and unstable families have come into being.

Economic reforms in China have marketized family services and other public services. Enterprise restructuring, which aims at improving economic returns, has relieved enterprises of the burden of providing public services and social welfare. Consequently, people no longer expect their work units to provide public services or social welfare "from the cradle to the grave". Employment, education, health care, housing and family services are all regulated by the market. In other words, a family's resources determine how much services and welfare it can purchase from the market. Normal family life and well-being are left entirely in the hands of family members (privatization of the family).

Reforms of the Chinese social (administration) system have assigned more economic provision and care-giving duties (functions) to families. The gap among families is widening. Familial relations are more complex and fragile. The dual urban-rural structure, layoffs and unemployment, uneven distribution of wealth and employment-linked social security have made the family the last resort with regard to individual subsistence. Women, including elderly women (and even elderly men), who are caregivers in the family, are overwhelmed. Fierce competition plus the stress of day-to-day life have increased people's dependence on the family, on one hand, while adding instability to familial and marital relations, on the other. New patterns of living plus massive construction of private residences have disrupted traditional neighbourhood relations, while eliminating the traditional family support system. Basic public services exclude family care (care for children, sick people, disabled people and the elderly). ① Factors such as employment discrimination, low income, early retirement and expensive domestic workers have created an unprecedented demand for domestic workers among urban Chinese families, in which full-time housewives are rare. Even migrant workers from the Philippines are now employed by some Chinese families. Changes in education, employment and housing policies put marriages and families at great risk. Families may disintegrate for genuine reasons or just to take advantage of particular policies. ② Social issues crop up continually, such as dropouts, juvenile delinquency, domestic violence, child and elder abuse, mental illness (including suicides) and runaways. Families perform worse than before in providing education and care, including health care, for their members.

Family planning policy and demographic changes are leading to changes in families, too. The considerable drop in women's total fertility rate has reduced women's bearing and rearing costs, while exposing families to the risk of losing their only child. Smaller family size and longer life expectancy have decreased the family dependency ratio, while extending the duration and pressures of family provision. The plunging birth rate has accelerated demographic ageing in China. The tradition of "bringing up sons to provide for one's old age" is being challenged. Families are feeling more stress in caring for the elderly, especially the disabled elderly of advanced age. Since the lower birth rate and the one-child policy have made children even more precious to their parents and grandparents, childhood education is more difficult and distorted than ever. Despite the potential labour shortage, some young people prefer dependence on parents to finding jobs when faced

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① 国家基本公共服务体系"十二五"规划[N]. 光明日报,2012 - 07 - 20.

② When restrictive policies that impact families—for example, some local governments allow only one house for one family in their house purchase restrictions—"fake divorces" rise. It is reported that couples lined up in front of marriage registry offices to get divorced and office employees have to work overtime to help complete marriage procedures. Couples fake divorces in order to qualify to buy two houses. Some of them remarry after houses are bought, while others do not.

with fierce job market competition. As a result of massive migration, the dual urban-rural structure and the relatively high cost of migration of the entire family, there is now a huge number of "left-behind families", "left-behind wives", "left-behind children" and "left-behind elderly (empty nests)". Familial relations are increasingly unstable. Owing to people's greater mobility and their aspiration to pursue personal interests and happiness through marriage, the divorce rate is rising rapidly and more single-parent families are coming into existence. Meanwhile, there are more pregnancies and births prior to marriage. Cohabitation is more common. Parents—taking into consideration the higher cost of raising a child, the deterioration of the social environment, employment pressure, the need for autonomy and the emergence of new assisted reproductive techniques—may decide to delay or forgo reproduction. Instead they opt to adopt or find surrogate mothers. The rights and well-being of non-traditional families, such as families with older parents and fewer children, DINK (Double Income, No Kids) families, single-parent families, families with step children and families with dual parents (both biological and social) are not properly covered by relevant policies. Furthermore, migration from rural to urban areas and cross-regional or even cross-border migration are leading to more diversified family composition, which may in turn affect family harmony.

All the abovementioned factors, including reforms in China's political system, economic system, social system and population policy, as well as the current state of Chinese families, exert significant impact on gender relations and the protection of women's rights and interests. The Marxist view of women, born in the era of revolution and the planned economy, is under severe challenge from the market economy and cultural diversity. Instead of gender equality and social justice, market value and economic returns, which are used to measure the ability and social status of an individual, are becoming the basis on which basic policies are developed and implemented. Women, once liberated from the family by the revolution, are being forced to return to the family. Since the government no longer plays a key role in providing public services and family welfare, employers have shed their social responsibilities; the market is failing to provide sufficient reasonably-priced domestic service; women and their organizations are underrepresented in top-level design and public policy formulation; people expect better quality of life; single children enjoy heightened status at home; and women have to shoulder the dual responsibilities of work and family. However, alongside the dual responsibilities forced upon women, the labour market does not grant them equal access. Consequently, women are the last to find jobs and the first to lose them, which further marginalizes them in the economy, politics and society. Therefore, family policies play a critical role in limiting or promoting gender equality both in and out of the family.

The rapid transition of Chinese society and massive social change call for the improvement and reform of all kinds of political, economic and social policies (family policies in particular). Consequently, there has been a new wave of family studies and family policy research, to which the convening of our seminar and the publication of the conference proceedings attest. According to statistics, since China's Reform and Opening-up, 57 social policies covering the family have been adopted① and 65 family policies concerning children or juveniles have been promulgated②. The number of such policies is still growing as society moves on.

What is family policy? A narrow definition would be a policy that has

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① 吴帆.第二次人口转变背景下的中国家庭变迁及政策思考[J].广东社会科学，2012(02). This paper defines family and social policies as all laws, rules, regulations, social programmes and initiatives targeting the entire family that are developed and implemented by State Councils, ministries and commissions.

② 徐浙宁.我国关于儿童早期发展的家庭政策(1980—2008)——从“家庭支持”到“支持家庭”[J].青年研究，2009(04). This paper adopts Liang Zubing's (2004) definition of family policies: all laws, rules and regulations, welfare and programmes aimed at promoting the realisation of overall family objectives, as well as the individual goals of family members.

direct and explicit family objectives and that targets families or family members. A more general definition would be a policy that may not have explicit family objectives, but that will have an impact on families (Chen, 2012; Hu and Peng, 2012). Almost all social policies, even economic policies, have an impact on families. Therefore, family policy studies should first of all focus on individuals in the family and the overall objectives of the family. The development of other socio-economic policies should also be conducive to family well-being and family-supported individual development. A family policy system that puts people first and shows concern for the family can thus be established.

Although researchers define family policies in different ways, there is a consensus that China does not yet have a comprehensive system of family policies. Compared with developed countries, our existing family policies are concentrated on a few areas, such as family planning, provision for children and the elderly and assistance to poor families. The support and services available to families are too limited to meet the diverse needs of families or to support the different stages of family life (Xu, 2009; Wu, 2012; Wu and Li, 2012; Chen, 2012). It is generally held that China should refer to family policies and welfare policy reforms in Western welfare states when improving the Chinese family policy system, that values and philosophies embodied in our family policies should adapt to changes in and out of the family and that a developmental family policy system with Chinese characteristics should be established (Zhang and Xu, 2003; Chen, 2012; Hu and Peng, 2012; Zhao, 2012; Liu, 2012).

This author would like to make a special appeal to include the gender perspective in the new round of family policy research. Gender equality has been identified by the UN as a global strategy. Equal participation of both genders in social development and equal sharing of the benefits of social development have become a global aspiration. Gender equality covers equal rights inside the family, as well as equal rights in politics, economy, society and culture. It is a pity that even some distinguished women scholars tend to focus on women's strategies for personal life (the utilization of individual and family resources) instead of public policy reforms when they study work-and-family balance. It is also a pity that some scholars knowledgeable about gender issues and public policies focus on support for women in the family, not on support for men who should share family responsibilities. It is a challenge to researchers to come up with ways to integrate such socialist core values as democracy, equality, fairness and justice into public policy research and reforms.

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PART Ⅰ

Research of Family Changes in China

Changes in Contemporary Chinese Family Patterns and Their Policy Implications

— The Case of Jiangsu Province

The profound socio-economic changes in China over the past 30 years have affected the country's demographic development. The Chinese government intervenes in family affairs and directs changes in family life with population and social policies. A steadily low fertility rate, rapid demographic ageing, massive migration and mobility, and rising urbanization are all leaving their marks on the basic units of society: the family and the household. Identifying relations among demographic transition, family changes, and current social life is critical to the study of family policies in China.

This thesis studies changes in the structures and functions of households in Jiangsu Province, China, between 2000 and 2010. It then discusses reforms and improvements in the family-policy system. Jiangsu Province is used as a case study because it is situated in one of the most dynamic regions, socially and economically, in China: the Yangtze River Delta. The drastic changes in family life there are both typical and specific.

1. Changes in Family Patterns in Jiangsu Province

In the first ten years of the twenty-first century, both demographic trends and family patterns changed constantly. The lack of data limits our study to "family households" rather than "the family" in the sociological sense: the former refers to a core unit in family demography composed of people who live together because of marriage, blood relations, or adoption. Unless otherwise noted, the data in this chapter come from the Sixth Population Census in Jiangsu Province in 2010.

1.1 Growth in the Number of Family Households Outpaces Population Growth

According to the Sixth Population Census in 2010, in Jiangsu Province 71.69 million people, or 91.13 percent of the entire population, were living in family households and 24.28 million households, or 95.11 percent of all households (the other 4.89 percent were collective households). This represents an increase of 3 million or 14 percent over 2000, with average annual growth of 1.32 percent. During the same period, the number of people in family households grew by an annual percent of 0.32. In other words, growth in the number of family households outpaced population growth overall by 1 percent.

1.2 Household Size Shrinking Constantly

In 2010, the average Jiangsu family household had 2.94 people, 0.29 less than in 2000 (in 1982 the average was 3.91). In other words, there had been a decrease of 33 percent over 30 years. In the same period, the number of family households grew by over 80 percent, far exceeding the overall population growth rate. Regional comparison showed that family households with fewer than three people were concentrated in Southern and Central Jiangsu Province, and that family households in Northern Jiangsu Province were relatively large in size.

In 2010, small family households dominated in Jiangsu Province: 71 percent of family households had one, two, or three people (14 percent were single-person family households, 28.5 percent were two-person family households, and 28.5 percent were three-person family households). Since 1990, the proportion of single-person, two-person, and three-person households had been steadily rising (two-person family households grew most quickly), while the proportion of households with four, five, six or more people had been declining steadily. The size of family households had been shrinking.

1.3 Family Structures Are Simpler

The shrinking size of family households entails changes in intergenerational relations in families. According to the Sixth Population Census in 2010, one-generation, two-generation, and three-generation family households accounted for 37.64 percent, 42.07 percent, and 19.22 percent, respectively, of all family households in Jiangsu Province. Put together, one-generation and two-generation households accounted for approximately 80 percent of the total. Compared to data collected in the Fifth Population Census in 2000, there were fewer two or three-generation households (the number of two-generation households dropped by 11.39 percent, whereas three-generation households dropped by 0.76 percent), but there were more one-generation households (an increase of 12.24 percent).

Family households are still shrinking in size. Rapid economic growth and cultural changes are strengthening people's preference for an independent life. Imbalanced development in urban and rural areas attracts more rural population to cities, heightening the mobility of family members. However, social problems brought about by family structure changes, such as DINK (Double Income, No Kids) families, families consisting of one single elderly person, empty-nest families, and children left behind in home villages by their parents, will continue in China for a long time.

1.4 Proportion of Single-Person Family Households Growing Steadily

In the past 20 years, the proportion of single-person family households has been growing steadily in Jiangsu Province, with two spikes, in 2000 (8.67 percent) and 2010 (14.08 percent). Reasons include the rising age of people getting married for the first time, the climbing divorce rate, and higher life expectancy, which increases the likelihood of senior citizens becoming widows or widowers.

It is worth noting that, although single-person family households in Jiangsu Province have been growing rapidly in both numbers and proportion, they are still not on the same level as in Western developed countries. For example, during the same time period, the percentage of single-person family households in the United States was about three times that in Jiangsu Province. Two factors might account for such a difference. On the one hand, relatively fewer people remain single throughout their life in Jiangsu Province. On the other hand, the proportion of senior citizens (especially widows or widowers) who live alone in Jiangsu Province is far lower than that in Western countries. The percentage accounted of nuclear families composed of elderly couple is indeed growing, but it remains comparatively small.

1.5 Still a Relatively High Percentage of Extended Families

According to the Sixth Population Census, 20.3 percent of household families in Jiangsu Province consist of three or more generations, which means that over a fifth of the family household population lived in extended families. This percentage was 0.84 percent lower than that in 2000. The decrease is related to the rising number of one-child-only families, and to the fact that the only child usually leaves home after getting a job or marrying. Moreover, with the rapid urbanization in Jiangsu Province, many young people have left their parents to work and live in cities. Consequently, the proportion of family households consisting of three or more generations is decreasing.

1.6 Clear Ageing Trend in Families

As the Chinese population ages, there are more and more elderly people in family households and more family households with elderly people. In 2010, 6.15 million family households in Jiangsu Province—or 25.2 percent of all family households—had member(s) aged 65 or above. Among them, 63.3 percent had one elderly person. The growth of family households with more than one elderly person outpaced that of family households with one elderly person. It is worth noting that, although only 0.6 percent of family households had three or more elderly members, such families had grown by 40,600 since 2000. With more elderly people in one family household, with several generations of elderly people living under one roof, but with fewer able-bodied family members, the traditional model of families caring for elder members alongside the social security system will undoubtedly face more challenges.

What is particularly noteworthy is the rapid growth of family households composed entirely of elderly people, especially those with three or more elderly people and those with two generations of elderly people (in other words, elderly parents living with elderly children). As demographic changes continue to occur in Chinese families and society, the traditional model of families taking care of the old is evolving. Since fewer children are born and the social safety net is still underdeveloped, elderly people choose to live with siblings and the young elderly choose to live with their even more elderly parents. In this way, they can help each other and cushion risks. Against the background of a continuously low fertility rate, accelerating demographic ageing and greater mobility, the number of these families will probably increase even further. This model is vulnerable to the structural impact of the ongoing transition of Chinese society. Future family policies must give serious consideration to this.

1.7 Marriages Relatively Stable—Low Fertility Rate Remains

According to the Sixth Population Census in 2010, the distribution of people of marriageable age (20 years of age and above for women, and 22 and above for men) was as follows: 19.08 percent were single, an increase of 2.8 percent over 2000; 73.92 percent were married, a drop of 2.8 percent over 2000; 1.12 percent were divorced, a rise of 0.4 percent over 2000; and 5.87 percent were widowed, a 0.3 percent drop from 2000. The marital profile of the population in Jiangsu remained relatively stable. There were more single women above the average age of marriage than before. The proportions of married young men and women declined significantly, especially for those between 25 and 29 years of age, for whom the proportions dropped by 9.72 percent and 11.17 percent, respectively, from 2000. There were significantly more divorces among middle-aged people, especially among those between 35 and 49. The number of divorced people in this age range accounts for more than half of the total number of divorced people.

Furthermore, in contrast to data from the Fifth Population Census, in 2010, women of childbearing age in Jiangsu Province had a lower total fertility rate of around 1.3, which is far below the replacement level. Family-planning policy is still the primary cause. However, with socio-economic development, the mindset of people, especially people living in urban areas, has changed from "to have many sons is to have many blessings", early marriage, and early childbearing to "fewer and better births", later marriage, and later childbearing. Women's career choices and education are having a greater and greater impact on childbearing.

2. Policy Implications of Changes in Family Patterns

A comparative study of data collected in the Sixth Population Census and previous censuses reveals that families in Jiangsu Province are experiencing dramatic changes and that these changes are interacting with population and social changes.

A family in China is more than an economic unit of production and reproduction. It is also a unit of social order, moral education, and welfare provision. In addition, it is responsible for introducing its members to society while protecting them at the same time. However, in the process of population and social transition, significant changes have occurred to the size, structure, internal dynamics, and functions of the family. Despite this, effective policies are lacking to support family adaptation. Traditional values, such as family orientation and "the shared structure of family and state", have previously enabled Chinese families to somehow provide for members, help them to withstand risks, and adapt to changes despite institutional inadequacies. However, such values are hardly likely to survive the structural impact of multiple changes in population, family, and society. With the further development of Chinese society and economy, demographic trends as well as changes in society, family patterns and people's living conditions will certainly result in greater challenges to social policies, whose principal objectives are maintaining society's stability and smooth functioning. Improving and reforming family policies will inevitably become critical to the sustainable development of Jiangsu Province and of China as a whole.

There are six key issues related to reforming and improving family policies:

2.1 Establishing an Agency for Family Affairs

In 1978, Kamerman and Kahn divided family policies into three types in their classic *Family Policies: Government and Families in 14 countries*: (i) explicit and extensive family policies (for example, France and Sweden), (ii) explicit but targeted family policies (for example, Germany and Austria), and (iii) implicit family policies (for example, the United States and the United Kingdom). Countries with explicit family policies usually have departments responsible for developing and implementing them, such as the Ministry of Family Affairs in Germany, the Family Committee in Sweden, and the Ministry of Family Welfare in India. Family policies in these countries identify families as policy objects or welfare units. Countries with implicit family policies do not usually have a specific department in charge of family affairs. Instead, they integrate family policies into other policy regimes, such as welfare, taxation and employment, to be administered individually or jointly by various authorities.

China does not have a specific family-policy system. It could thus be said to implement "implicit family policies". At present, Chinese families are caught in a predicament. On the one hand, their capacities are being weakened; on the other hand, the demands on them are increasing. The Chinese family plays the important role of protecting members of society from societal transition, but it seldom receives any support from the government and society in general. The concept of family is rarely mentioned in social policies. Therefore, from now on, the Chinese government and Chinese society more broadly must not only pay attention to families, but also help them to build their capacities to take on greater responsibilities.

For that purpose, the first step towards improved and reformed family policies should be a breakthrough in the Chinese administrative system, so that family policies can change from being "implicit" to "explicit". An agency should be established with a mandate to formulate and implement family policies and to integrate the functions and resources of existing government agencies in charge of population and family planning, civil administration, taxation, public health, and women's protection. Only in this way can the construction of a family policy system in China be facilitated. Some local governments, having realized the importance of family policies in demographic and social development, have made attempts at institutional innovations. For example, the Guangdong Provincial Commission of Population and Family Planning proposed to the Provincial CPC Committee and Provincial Government in "the Twelfth Five-Year Plan" that it be renamed the Guangdong Provincial Committee of Population and Family.

2.2 Coordinating Family Policy Improvement with Population-Policy Adjustment

It is a common misunderstanding that family policy is already part of Chinese population policy. In fact, although population policy and family policy apply simultaneously in certain areas, they are often complementary. Population policy aims at regulating the size of population by family planning but it has created a huge number of one-child-only families in China, making Chinese families much more vulnerable. The government must adopt corrective family policies or compensate social groups for the negative impact of such a population policy. Although there are already government policies and programs on maternity care, prenatal and postnatal care and good childbearing, there has never been any high-level consideration of the burden and risks of one-child-only families. For example, how are parents of one-child-only families expected to obtain support when they get old? The Chinese family used to depend heavily on the younger generation for provision and support for the elderly, but with only one child the risk is much greater. The passage of time will only heighten it. Therefore, new family policies are urgently needed in order to avoid greater population and social problems.

It must be noted that the negative impacts of the continuation of the family planning policy on age structure, family patterns, and other areas are aggregating. It is time to adjust and improve policies in accordance with demographic changes. In China and other East Asian countries or regions heavily influenced by traditional culture, providing for the elderly is not only a task for the government, but also a fundamental function performed by the family. However, the one-child-only policy and the low fertility rate make it extremely hard for families to take good care of the elderly.

Besides, family policies should work together with population policies to guarantee people's right to make independent decisions on childbearing (people can certainly choose not to have any child or to have only one). At the same time, the two sets of policies should also ensure fair and reasonable social security coverage for different population segments. However, the current policy system can hardly attain those objectives. The government has made repeated attempts to reform or even restructure the social security system (especially the pension system). But if the low fertility rate continues, any social security system will buckle under the pressure. This is key to social security for an ageing society in the future.

2.3 Implementing Social Welfare Policies on the Basis of the Family

The responsibility for welfare provision used to rest with work units, but things have changed and most of such responsibilities have now been shifted to families. However, as the market economy develops in China and as Chinese society goes through transition and demographic changes occur, the ability of Chinese families to withstand conventional risks has been weakened by changes in family size and structure. Less stable marriages and families jeopardize the current and long-term welfare resources for women and children. The continuous growth of single-child families, single-parent families, DINK families, migrant families, split-up families, and empty-nest families creates even more demographic, social, and economic risks. There is a severe imbalance between family welfare demand and supply. Meanwhile, the underdeveloped social security and social welfare systems in China usually regard individuals, not families, as policy or welfare objects.

The family, as the most basic unit of society, is not only a place in which all social policies ultimately take effect, but also a focal point for social policies promoting the effective functioning of society as a whole. The family should become the fundamental social-policy or welfare object. Only when the family is regarded as a welfare object can its functions and responsibilities in welfare provision be supported and strengthened, its potential tapped, and its superior traditions continued. Family policies in many developed countries have responded to demands "to get back to families" by identifying families as policy objects in specific programs or services, such as tax breaks and cash subsidies for various family types.

In view of the realities in Jiangsu Province and the challenges already facing families, the promotion of family-oriented social policies could start with the following three areas: (i) family-oriented taxation policies and preferential taxation, which must take into consideration the economic cost of provision for the elderly family members; (ii) a family-oriented social insurance and medical insurance system, allowing transfer of benefits between family members (mainly between spouses) and in favor of elderly couples; (iii) a feasibility study of family members paying for long-term care within the family (for example, long-term nursing for the elderly) into the social insurance system.

2.4 Providing Direct Assistance to Families with Elderly Members

Providing direct economic assistance to various types of families is an important part of developmental family policy. In an ageing society, families with elderly members who do not have sufficient economic resources or who are not self-sufficient must mobilize a lot of resources to support the latter. The lack of such resources may constrain families' proper functioning. The government should expand fiscal support to families through family policies. In addition to meeting people's basic needs, it should also endeavor to eliminate the inherent inequality in the current welfare system (for example, by income redistribution between high-income and low-income families, between families with and without elderly people); to strengthen support for the most needy families (for example, families consisting entirely of elderly people, families in which elderly people are the majority, empty-nest families, poor families or families with handicapped elderly people, single-child families with elderly people to support); and to eliminate barriers to employment for couples with elderly people to care for at home.

2.5 Social Investment with a View of Building Family Capacity

In general, a stable and well-functioning family not only exerts profound influence on children's academic performance and learning outcomes, but also relates strongly to the stability of adult life. If the government, via family policies and other relevant social policies, puts social resources into the improvement of the family environment, meeting children's growth needs, creating a good environment for social members to develop human capital and optimize human capacities, it is investing in the sustainable growth of economy. That is what a developmental family policy is supposed to do.

2.6 Promotion of Moderate Universal Benefits in Family Policies

"Moderate universal benefits" should become a target for improving and reforming the Chinese family-policy system. The improved system should provide universal social welfare to single-child families, families with handicapped people, and medium-to-low-income families with children to raise or elderly persons to support.

Family policies providing universal benefits to the above-mentioned segments will have the following advantages: (i) Single-child families, families with handicapped people, and medium-to-low-income families with young or old people to care for are extremely vulnerable. There are many such families, and if they all receive subsidies, the number of needy families may decrease substantially; (ii) the inherent inequality in the current system, whereby medium-to-low-income families cannot benefit from income redistribution, which is a root cause of poverty, must be dealt with; (iii) it excludes young adults who abandon family responsibilities , thereby resolving distribution issues between those assuming family responsibilities and those who abandon them, as well as avoiding potential social disputes; (iv) many single-child families were created because of government policy, but now ageing and urbanization have put them at risk.

The government should support them with universal benefits; (v) it is easy to implement policies of universal benefits; by contrast, selective policies face challenges with regard to "family livelihood audits" or may miss "policy targets".

The promotion of family policies with moderate universal benefits will inevitably increase government expenditure, but the economic burden may not be exorbitant. The sustained high growth since China adopted Reform and Opening-up policies has created a relatively high level of wealth. For Jiangsu Province, which is economically well developed, investment in social welfare is no longer an economic issue, but an issue of prioritizing different development targets. Furthermore, universal social welfare shares many characteristics with developmental or preventive social policies.

The UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of 1984 states that "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State". In 2004, the *UN Proclamation upon the Tenth Anniversary of the International Year of the Family* deemed a "healthy and stable family structure as the foundation of human well-being". It also encouraged "the incorporation of effective family policies and programs into national development strategies". In 2008, UN Resolution 59/111 announced the holding of events in celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the International Year of the Family, hoping to take the opportunity to "further promote the formulation of family policies by countries". The family has always been the most precious treasure of Chinese society. However, demographic changes and socio-economic transitions have changed the Chinese family greatly. It is in great need of help, to which Chinese family policy should react. Located in the Yangtze River Delta, economically the most developed region in China, Jiangsu Province has every reason—and the ability—to set an example.

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Changes in Chinese Urban Families and Family Cohesion during Social Transition

1. Background: Social Transition

The changes currently being undergone by Chinese families are inseparable from the social transition triggered by the Reforms and Opening-up that started with the convening of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970s. In cities, the first round of this process took place in the state sector of the economy. Enterprises, given more autonomy, took the initiative to make a profit. By the 1990s, more profound reforms were carried out in cities. The Chinese economy saw the emergence of diverse business-ownership structures. The planned economy was gradually replaced by a socialist market economy. For society in general, this transition brought about the restructuring and re-allocation of resources while establishing competitive market mechanisms. For individuals, the transition put an end to the "iron rice bowl" of urban residents, who had to learn to cope with the market, facing more risks, but also more opportunities. While many state-owned enterprises struggled, a fairly large number of private businesses, joint ventures and foreign-invested enterprises boomed. This could be regarded as a condition of the further stratification of urban society. Urban residents found themselves further and further away from a stable and predictable life. The future seemed to be highly uncertain. As some people got rich, others found themselves becoming poorer. Those who seized the new opportunities and worked harder than others were eventually rewarded with a much more comfortable life. Two words best summarize Chinese society in the early 1990s: change and stratification.

The mid-1990s were critical to China's reform of the economic system. This period was characterized by a series of profound conflicts when some chronic structural problems in the old system were exposed. These conflicts were inherent in the economic system, economic structure, social stratification and administrative division. They had to be resolved for the reform to ultimately succeed. All conflicts come down to two issues: (i) how to allocate resources better and more effectively; (ii) how to distribute benefits in a more equitable manner. Consequently, the impact of economic restructuring was deep and extensive. Average urban Chinese residents were faced with a society characterized by growing uncertainty.

During this period, greater divergence arose between regions and social groups. Within one region or one social group, there was also greater divergence among individuals (and families). Such polarization has been felt by every urban and rural resident. In urban areas, polarization first appeared between people working for state-owned enterprises and those working in the private sector, between people working in traditional industries and those working in emerging industries. Gradually, polarization also occurred among individuals working in different parts of the same sector.

Polarization continues in the twenty-first century, causing the income gap to widen, even though average household income continues to rise. Social groups such as high-income and low-income groups have developed a stronger identity within their own groups and the boundaries between them have become sharper. From a sociological point of view, these newly emerged social groups, or social strata, are consolidating. Meanwhile, as the market economy gains ground, people are developing a higher level of tolerance for risk and uncertainty, while utilitarianism is infiltrating the value system more and more deeply. The value of a person is increasingly measured by their official rank and/or wealth.

2. Changes

As already mentioned, many problems currently confronting Chinese society are strongly related to changes in Chinese families.

2.1 Gender and Generation-Related Income Gap within the Family

First of all, changes in household income and spousal income distribution led to the emergence of a gender and generation-related income gap within the family as early as the beginning of the 1990s, as shown in the 1993 *A Study of Households in Seven Cities* (Table 1).

Table 1 Average monthly income of spouses in Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu (RMB/person) (N=Number)

Year	1983		1992	
	Mean	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Beijing:				
Husband	107.36(N=569)	82.97	326.60(N=728)	217.18
Wife	75.78(N=551)	61.33	233.55(N=757)	130.59
Shanghai:				
Husband	99.99(N=550)	50.51	405.19(N=739)	460.35
Wife	71.47(N=577)	38.71	279.72(N=794)	167.09
Chengdu:				
Husband	93.43(N=587)	73.74	239.50(N=753)	341.42
Wife	61.39(N=631)	51.39	156.73(N=820)	128.74

* Source: Shen, Conglin and Yang, Shanhua (eds), *Contemporary Chinese Urban Family Research*, pp. 331-332, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1995

Two items from Table 1 are revealing: (i) In 1992, a decade or so since the start of Reform and Opening-up, although average income went up, the income gap between spouses was already widening, with men's average monthly income significantly higher than women's. (ii) Judged by the range of Standard Deviation (SD), the income gap between all husbands and all wives had widened by 1992. Shanghai stands out in this respect. Shanghai husbands had not only the highest monthly income of all, but also the greatest income gap.

Table 2 Monthly income of couples married in different periods in Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu (RMB/person)

Year of marriage	1959 - 1965①				After 1984			
Year of survey	1983		1992		Upon marriage		1992	
	Mean	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Mean*	*SD*
Beijing:								
Husband	101.77	88.31	335.39	137.22	185.91	205.58	327.23	196.36
Wife	65.88	31.27	229.37	123.21	125.02	86.88	268.51	135.24
Shanghai:								
Husband	105.07	44.16	418.74	231.37	174.44	117.44	497.42	879.42
Wife	81.35	35.60	253.00	113.16	141.59	90.87	302.67	149.40
Chengdu:								
Husband	98.16	40.59	223.91	110.21	228.56	723.39	356.35	757.15
Wife	79.02	39.78	181.88	102.47	119.52	95.28	188.91	143.29

* Source: Shen, Conglin and Yang, Shanhua (eds), *Contemporary Chinese Urban Family Research*, p. 51, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1995

Table 2 shows the inter-generational income gap among couples. Except for Beijing husbands who married after 1984, whose average monthly income in 1992 was no higher than that of Beijing husbands married between 1959 and 1965 (a minor difference of about RMB 8), Beijing wives, young couples in Shanghai and Chengdu had higher monthly incomes than their counterparts in the previous generation. Moreover, the

① People married between 1959 and 1965 were chosen because most of them were still employed when the survey was conducted in 1992 and thus their monthly income comparable with that of couples married after 1984.

monthly income of younger husbands in Shanghai and Chengdu was significantly higher than that of older husbands. This indicates that urban workers were no longer paid on the basis of seniority,① which had been the practice in the era of the planned economy.

According to the 1998 survey, the income gap between couples was maintained, at least in Shanghai and Chengdu. Judged by (average) monthly income, the gap between husband and wife had widened further since 1992 (Table 3).

Table 3 Total income of employed spouses in Shanghai and Chengdu (RMB/person)

	Husband			Wife		
	Mean	*SD*	*Sample size*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Sample size*
Shanghai	15,813.25	13,552.48	737	11,970.74	12,107.26	737
Chengdu	8,328.12	10,704.83	648	6,528.73	7,362.42	648

* Source: Shen, Conglin and Yang, Shanhua (eds), *Urban and Rural Families at the Turn of the Century*, p. 80, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 1999

The impact of the income gap between spouses and across generations on family-member relationships cannot be ignored. Husbands have more decision-making power in their respective families. The younger generation, thanks to their competitive advantages in the job market, enjoys equality with the elderly and gains more influence on family decisions in which they are concerned. Consequently, the younger generation is more independent. If housing conditions allow, they prefer living away from their parents, leading to the creation of more nuclear families.

With rising overall household income, household consumption has shifted its focus from meeting basic needs to improving quality of life, as proven by changes in Engel coefficients.

① Here "income" includes both monetary income and means of subsistence, such as housing and food.

Table 4 Engel coefficients for urban residents

Year	1990	2000	2007	2008
Engel coefficient	54.2	39.4	36.3	37.9

* Source: National Statistical Bureau of China, *China Statistical Yearbook 2009*, p.317, China Statistical Publishing House, 2009

According to Table 4, the Engel coefficient for Chinese urban residents fell significantly from 1990 to 2000 (by about 15 percentage points). From 2000 to 2007, it went down a further 3 percentage points. However, it went up by about 1.5 percentage points in 2008. It is safe to conclude that in the twenty-first century, the Engel coefficient for Chinese urban residents has so far been maintained at a relatively low level, making room for diversified household consumption. Savings and money management are still important to urban families because they have to put money aside for children's education, housing and social security, but consumption to improve quality of life (such as buying a private car and vacationing) is increasing by leaps and bounds.

2.2 Smaller Family Size

It is becoming easier for parents and children to live under separate roofs. Smaller family size is reflected in two areas: (i) Family structure is simpler than before, in other words, the share of nuclear families, husband-and-wife-only families and single-parent families is on the rise. Extended families are on the verge of disappearance and the share of stem families (three generations living together) is declining. (ii) In each type of family structure, population capacity approximates the minimum (for example, if at least three people—spouses plus a child—comprise a nuclear family, three would be the minimum number of people for a nuclear family). In China, the stem family had been a major type of family structure for a long period because of two factors: its compatibility with the traditional small-farmer production model in rural areas and the distinctive lifecycle of Chinese families in urban areas. Unlike the typical American family, in which children tend to depart when they turn 18, the Chinese family is always faced with two alternatives at every stage of the lifecycle, from the birth of a child to the marriage of the child until the death of one spouse: two generations living together or separately. As a result, stem families not only survive, but also account for a considerable share (although such families could split up any time if there is equality between two generations).

Such a trend is clearly demonstrated in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5 Household family size according to national censuses (persons)

Year	1953	1964	1982	1990	2000
Household family size	4.33	4.43	4.41	3.96	3.44

* Source: *China Population and Family Planning Yearbook 2009*, p. 473, China Population and Family Planning Yearbook Publishing House, 2009

Table 6 Household family size according to sample surveys on population changes (persons)

	1998	2002	2007	2008
National	3.63	3.39	3.17	3.16
Beijing	3.03	2.87	2.65	2.58
Shanghai	3.06	2.89	2.65	2.61
Tianjin	3.36	3.07	3.00	3.02
Chongqing	3.35	3.35	2.91	2.88

* Source: Data taken from *China Family Planning Yearbook* and *China Population and Family Planning Yearbook*

Since most urban couples have only one child, shrinking family size has led to the concentration of three types of family structures: husband-and-wife-only families, nuclear families and stem families (single-parent families are still few in number in China, therefore negligible in this case). An average of fewer than three people in a household (for example, 2.58 in Beijing) indicates a further reduction of the share of stem families and the growing dominance of nuclear families and husband-and-wife-only families. There is no doubt that the pattern of four grandparents, two parents and one child will challenge the provision for the elderly as life expectancy in urban areas goes up. It remains to be seen how great the challenge will be, however. Besides, smaller family size may distance family members from each other.

2.3 Family Stability and Divorce Rate

The final issue to be discussed here is the extent to which the transition into a socialist market economy affects the stability of urban families; in other words, whether it is the cause of the rise in the divorce rate.

Popular indicators used in China to measure the divorce rate are inaccurate. For example, one common practice is to divide the number of couples getting divorced in a year by the number of couples getting married during that same year. The result is larger than reality, because a more accurate measurement would be to divide the number of couples getting divorced in one year by the number of couples staying in marriage in that same year. However, such accurate measurement is hardly practicable in China. The "gross divorce rate" is often quoted in China, calculated in accordance with the following formula: the number of people granted marriage licenses in a year/local population × 1,000‰. The denominator in the formula is exaggerated (the more proper denominator would be the population of marriageable age). Nevertheless, if such "gross divorce rates" are calculated consistently every year, they are still useful for spotting trends. Table 7 shows divorces in China from 1999 to 2010.

Table 7 Divorces in China, 1999 - 2010*

Year	Divorce rate(‰)	Year	Divorce rate(‰)
1999	0.96	2005	1.37
2000	0.96	2006	1.46
2001	0.98	2007	1.59
2002	0.90	2008	1.71
2003	**1.05**	2009	**1.85**
2004	1.28	2010	2.00

* Divorce rate formula: the number of divorced couples/average population during the same period×1,000‰.

* Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, *China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook*, p. 36, China Statistical Publishing House, 2011

As indicated in Table 7, despite the many stimuli (utilitarian culture, increased social mobility, loosening of the ties that hold a marriage together, such as a sense of responsibility, ethics and economic interdependence, extramarital affairs), the divorce rate was quite stable in the first five years in China, with a slight increase, and it then experienced a slow increase in the following 7 years. In general, families and marriages in China are quite stable (to be sure, there is a difference between stability of marriage and quality of marriage).

3. Conclusion

The previous sections present the challenges facing urban Chinese families during the social transition. These challenges may have led to the emergence of less stable families. By challenging traditional family cohesion, they also challenge the essence of Chinese families (the priority of kinship, family affection, communal life, mutual obligation and individual responsibility for the family). If the essence has gone, there is no point discussing family structure, family functions or changes in family relations. There are essentially two factors, or social forces, affecting the cohesion of Chinese families: the traditional family-first culture and related values; the utilitarian culture and individual-first values.

The traditional family-first culture in China, which is closely related to the patricentric family, has the following characteristics: (i) family interests precede individual interests (with this in place, the family will then consider meeting personal needs); (ii) all family members assume responsibilities to the family throughout their lives; (iii) "Family-first" demands that priority should be given not only to one's immediate family, but also the entire clan. In other words, one should strive to "bring glory to one's ancestors".

Following the family-first logic, parents are expected to take responsibility for their children and grandchildren. Parents are expected to be strict with themselves and generous towards children and grandchildren. When they are young, they do their best for their children without considering payoffs. When they are old, they try to be self-sufficient as long as possible. If they are too old to be independent, they try to minimize the inconvenience to their children or grandchildren. Such ethics are practiced throughout a person's life. Most urban senior citizens take care of themselves both financially and in daily life. Even though the reformed but still underdeveloped social security system may pose challenges to their lives, they would keep expenditures within the limits of their income instead of relying on children. They certainly would like to find company and consolation in children, but they would understand if children are otherwise engaged. They will not accuse their children of not showing filial piety, as long as there is enough affection and support for their old age.

As China's transition to a market economy deepens, utilitarian culture and individual-first values are gaining influence, especially with the younger generation born in the 1980s and 1990s. Differences in values and cultural perceptions are leading to generation gaps, which may distance young couples from their parents' families. However, once young couples become parents themselves, they may better appreciate what their parents have done for them. Consequently, they may gravitate back towards the family-first tradition: after all, there is no material substitute for affection among family members.

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Changing Family Values

—A New Way of Looking at the Issue

Many studies and discussions on family values argue that today's China is fraught with materialism, consumerism and Western-style individualism, resulting in a loss of faith in fidelity and lifelong marriage. Even worse, society is sliding into extreme individualism, sexual indiscretion and indifference to family responsibilities and filial duties. The foundations of traditional values are being eroded, but a modern family ethics has yet to be developed, leading to serious social issues such as family dysfunction and precarious marriages. ①

Although these studies provide an overall picture of change in family values over time, they are not without flaws. Most of these studies present a negative view of current family values in China because they judge the changes dichotomously: either traditional or modern, right or wrong, familism or individualism. Hence, their conclusions are often contentious. They commend the traditional, censure the modern, and believe that modernity and its accompanying utilitarian values are polluting traditional family values, turning father and son, husband and wife, and siblings against each other and creating an unprecedented ethical crisis. Also, they focus only on "changing" family values, with little attention to those that

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① 张冬玲.论我国农村新型家庭伦理的构建[J].山东社会科学,2011(09);石琪.中国当代家庭的伦理困境与儒家伦理思想的当代价值[J].中国城市经济,2011(23);孟宪范.家庭:百年来的三次冲击及我们的选择[J].清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(03);李桂梅.中国传统家庭伦理的现代转向及其启示[J].哲学研究,2011(04).

have persisted over time.

This study proposes that observations of changes in family values should not be made on a black-or-white basis, because there are both positive and negative things in the traditional family value system. For instance, "filial piety" should not be asserted as a good family value to be passed on in all respects. Respecting and supporting aged parents, attending them when they are ill, and taking care of their funerals are positive ideas not constrained by time. However, if filial piety is generalized as the highest value in political and social life, such authoritarian rules as "order between seniors and juniors" or "sons must submit to their fathers" are not conducive to development. There are also traditional values that are neither essence nor dross; they are created simply because they fit the needs of the time. In an agrarian society where productivity was low, life expectancy was short and risk aversion was poor, it was reasonable to want more children and grandchildren. In the modern world, wanting more children or no child at all has nothing to do with value judgments and is neither right nor wrong.

Family values are divided into core values and general values. Core values are fundamental and essential to any family value system as guidelines, supporting and determining general value judgments. They are the expression and aspiration of the whole system. They are universal and, as a moral benchmark through different historical and cultural stages, they are encouraged by laws and conventions and commonly recognized.

This study looks at the changes in family values based on sampled data from four communities in urban and rural areas of Shanghai and Lanzhou. In accordance with the multi-stage probability sampling methodology, families were sampled from 43 neighborhoods/villages out of 22 streets/towns in 9 districts/counties of Shanghai and 33 neighborhoods/villages out of 10 streets/towns in 4 districts/counties of Lanzhou. Those who were born on dates closest to July 1 and aged between 20 and 65 were chosen as interviewees. Trained interviewers visited their homes with questionnaires.

Altogether 2,200 samples were gathered, among which 49.3 percent were on women, 50.7 percent on men; 65.5 percent from urban areas and 34.5 percent from rural areas.①

Analysis of the data showed that many changes have indeed taken place in Chinese family values in the course of the country's economic and social transformation. However, there is insufficient evidence to support the view that all traditional family values have been corroded. In fact, despite the passage of time and economic and social restructuring, some dominant core family values have remained unchanged.

1. Core Values Remain Commonly Accepted

Core values are the essence of traditional family value systems and are commonly accepted and observed in China today, despite significant economic and social changes.

1.1 Harmony Is the Primary Element of Family Happiness

What makes a happy family? Answers to this question on definitions of happiness reflect core family values. To this open question, as many as 53 percent of the survey participants quoted "harmony" as the main factor, far more than other factors; 67 percent did not even mention financial indicators, such as job, housing and income. Among those who did talk about financial matters, most did not consider money to be the only element of happiness; harmony, health and well-being, the sharing of joy, hardships and responsibilities are equally or even more important. Only 3 percent put money as the symbol of happiness, ignoring other non-financial factors.

A qualitative discourse analysis shows that although a few survey participants claimed that "wealthy" and "the richer, the better" were

① Data not otherwise noted with sources are all results of this study.

indicators of happiness, most people were happy with "some financial security", "a secure job", "bigger apartments", or just being "not a beggar", "well-fed", having "a good harvest" or "a house to live in" instead of delicacies, luxury cars or villas. To most people, the financial factor is only one element in family happiness, thus refuting the claim that materialism is now the dominant conception of happiness. Other sample surveys also found that family amity, amiable domestic life, relationships with other members of the family, health and well-being are widely held to be the key determinants of life satisfaction and family happiness, with financial status and housing size ranking low on the list. ①

1.2 "Respecting the Old and Loving the Young" and "Helping Each Other" Are Obligations

According to this study, despite inter-generational differences concerning support for and attendance upon aged parents, more rather than fewer young people today are happy to provide for the aged. On supporting aged parents, 94 percent of those surveyed agreed (55 percent strongly agreed) that "children should make due efforts to provide a comfortable life for their parents", among whom the number of those below 35 years of age is significantly higher than that of those over 50 years of age. On attending on aged parents, more of the younger group than the older group agreed that "children should live with their parents who are too old to take care of themselves" (see Table 1).

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① 肖玲.深圳特区大学生幸福观的调查与分析[J].青年研究,2005(05);李志强.对成都地区青年农民工幸福观调查[J].重庆科技学院学报,2008(09);李志,张旭东.城市独生子女大学生幸福观的调查研究[J].重庆大学学报,2001(02);沈汉.家庭幸福的重要因素探析[J].学海,1994(05);姜捷.中学教师的"幸福家庭"态度研究分析[J].中国校医,2003(05);黄盈盈.从数据看青年的价值观取向——20世纪90年代价值观调查研究文献分析[J].青年研究,2001(10).

Table 1 Differences between age groups on the issue of supporting and attending on aged parents (%)

	Children should make due efforts to provide a comfortable life for their parents			Children should live with their parents who are too old to take care of themselves		
	20 - 35	36 - 50	51 - 64	20 - 35	36 - 50	51 - 64
Strongly disagree	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.6	1.2	2.8
Disagree	1.7	2.3	2.5	4.6	7.6	12.3
Neither agree nor disagree	2.3	2.8	4.2	7.4	6.4	9.2
Agree	34.5	40.5	41.8	42.5	47.3	43.5
Strongly agree	61.1	53.6	51.5	44.9	37.6	32.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean	4.54	4.44	4.42	4.26	4.13	3.90
Standard deviation	0.67	0.73	0.69	0.83	0.91	1.07
F-Test	5.414*			24.22***		

This result is supported by many other empirical studies.① Fewer aged people agreed with the statements, partly because they are more independent than before and have less expectations of their children; it also reflects their altruism, in other words, that they do not ask for something in return for their own efforts. Also, only 1 percent of elderly survey participants were troubled by their "boomerang children" and 2 percent was worried only occasionally. Although "boomerang children" are a real problem, few parents find them unbearable.

Probability sample studies of the same period showed similar results. The China General Society Survey (CGSS) of 2006 on the same subject and the same scale produced similar statistics to ours: 93 percent of the survey participants agreed that "children should make due efforts to provide a

① Whyte, M. K. The Fate of Filial Obligations in Urban China[J]. The China Journal, 1997(38): 1 - 31;韦克难,许传新. 家庭养老观:削弱抑或强化——来自四川省的实证调查[J]. 学习与实践,2011(11);杨慧,吕静. 基于认知层面的代际关系分析——重阳节调查报告[J]. 河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(03).

comfortable life for their parents". Moreover, more young people than aged people agreed that married women should subsidize their own or their partners' parents and that "no matter how your parents treat you, you should always take care of them".

According to a study on the over-60s in urban Beijing, 80 percent of those surveyed confirmed that their children were filial or fairly filial and less than 2 percent found their children less than dutiful, although some had lowered their expectations because they were more independent and wanted to reduce the burden on their children.①

1.3 Most People Still Desire and Practice Lifelong Marriage

Over the past three decades, the divorce rate in China has climbed year on year. It is widely interpreted as heralding the end of lifelong marriage. However, the results of our survey showed that this is a misreading: almost all of those surveyed agreed on the importance of a happy marriage, with 99 percent believing that "a good/happy marriage is very important in one's life"; 82 percent of the survey participants acknowledged that "marriage is sacred and a couple should stick with each other through thick and thin", affirming traditional values on marriage. Only 24 percent agreed that "divorce or separation is better for children if the parents have regular fights" (strongly agree 3 percent), while over 60 percent disagreed with the statement. After excluding demographic variables such as gender, education, income, geography and marital status, we found that age's role in deciding attitude toward lifelong marriage is negligible. The Y-generation's (born in the 1980s) position on lifelong marriage is not significantly different from those born in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s.

Loyalty and exclusivity are fundamental to a lifelong marriage. When asked whether "extramarital sex is always wrong", only 11 percent of the

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① 杨善华,贺常梅.责任伦理与城市居民的家庭养老——以"北京市老年人需求调查"为例[J].北京大学学报,2004(01).

survey participants answered that it is "not wrong/normal"; only 8 percent agreed that "a one-night stand is fun and only a diversion". As many as 87 percent were against the idea of one-night stands, with little difference based on gender, age, geography or social class. Other sample surveys also revealed that about 90 percent of the survey participants disapprove of extramarital sex① with only 3.7 percent admitting such behavior. ②

Most of the survey participants desire and practice lifelong marriage. When asked to score their satisfaction with "mutual respect/equality", "exchange of ideas/communication", "mutual understanding/tolerance", "consideration/thoughtfulness", "fair and reasonable allocation of household chores", "loyalty" and "sex life", 80 - 90 percent of the participants chose "4" or "5"; 87 percent of married people made it clear that they would "try all means possible to keep a marriage going" and the idea of splitting up with their partners had never occurred to 93 percent of the participants in the past year.

2. General Values Are Moving from Rigid Prescriptions toward Diversification

Besides the guiding core values that are commonly accepted in most societies, there are also general values that are traditionally hailed and prescribed. Over time, they are becoming increasingly diversified.

2.1 Flexibility on Gender Roles

In this survey, 42 percent of the participants disagreed and 46 percent agreed with the statement that "even though the wife has a job, it is still mainly the husband's responsibility to provide for the family; household

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② 李银河，王小波. 婚外恋现象研究[J]. 社会学与社会调查，1991(03).

duties lie with the wife". The third survey on the social status of women in Shanghai (2010) also found 67 percent of the survey participants against the idea that "it's a man's job to earn bread for the family", 54.3 percent disagreeing with the statement that "the husband's career is more important than that of the wife" and 90.7 percent supporting the view that "men should offer to share household duties".① People in China are becoming more flexible on women's roles. Although no significant progress has been made on de-gendering, women now have more choices, for example, being a full-time mom or going back to work only after the child is old enough.

2.2 Diverse Views on Marriage and Fertility

It has long been taken for granted that marriage and reproduction are family duties that both sexes must take responsibility for. In this study, 69.1 percent of the urban survey participants and 81.2 percent of the rural participants agreed that "one has to marry", but marriage is no longer the only choice for many. A questionnaire survey of 2,600 people aged between 20 and 65 in Shanghai found that in the suburban area, 24.2 percent of those surveyed agreed and 8.0 percent strongly agreed with the statement that "marriage is a personal choice, and it's OK not to get married", while 37 percent agreed and 17.5 percent strongly agreed in cities. The approval rate was 63.1 percent among 20 to 30-year-olds in cities.②

With regard to fertility, both this study and the 2006 CGSS found that most families now desire two children, with "one child only" dropping to second place among all choices and a few preferring three. The DINK (Double Income, No Kids) family model is far less popular than that pictured by the media. In this study, less than 3 percent of the participants

① Calculated on the basis of data from the third survey on the social status of women in Shanghai (2010).

② Calculated on the basis of data from the third survey on the social status of women in Shanghai (2010).

chose 0 children or approved of "a childless marriage". However, DINK families are more accepted than previously. In the CGSS, 25 percent of the participants sided with the view that "a child is not a must for marriage", proving the diversity of family values in China today.

2.3 Tolerance with regard to Sex

Studies① have shown that with the decline of asceticism, the expansion of sex education campaigns and the gradual separation of sex and fertilization thanks to the development of contraception, the Chinese are becoming more tolerant about sex. Based on this study, first, most people now see the importance of sex life quality in marriage and accept that sex is about pleasure. About 60 percent of those surveyed, male or female, well-educated or less-educated, urban or rural, old or young, agreed that "a happy sex life is key to a happy marriage". Second, premarital sex is being increasingly tolerated. Only 26.9 percent believed that it is "absolutely wrong" to have sex before getting married, among which only 13.5 percent are at or under 35 years old. When asked whether "it is wrong for two single adults deeply in love to have sex", only 18.3 percent chose "absolutely wrong", among whom those at or under 35 years of age accounted for only 8.5 percent. Cohabitation between single (middle) aged is also well accepted; 42.2 percent agreed that "cohabitation allows the single (middle) aged to take care of each other and mitigates unnecessary risks". Finally, on homosexuality, tolerance among those surveyed is even higher than on premarital sex, with 23.3 percent agreeing that "homosexuality should be respected as a personal choice" and 18.9 percent agreeing that "same-sex marriage should be allowed"; 22.1 percent and 22.0 percent, respectively, were neutral about the two statements; 28.5

① 徐安琪.世纪之交中国人的爱情和婚姻[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1997;潘绥铭,白维廉,王爱丽,劳曼.当代中国人的性行为与性关系[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.

percent and 32.5 percent, respectively, were strongly against these ideas. All in all, young better-educated urbanites showed much less rigidity in their attitudes toward sex than other groups.

3. Family-centered Collectivism Continues to Dominate

Is the family value system in today's China, as suggested by some studies, in the grip of individualism and even an egotism that overemphasizes individual interests, resulting in the rise of "amoral individuals", indifference between family members, weakening of family functions and, in the end, replacement of the nuclear family by the individual as the focus of people's actions?

Undoubtedly, individual-centered family values are being increasingly accepted, but this empirical study has found no solid evidence to support the view that Chinese society is turning towards an individual-oriented value system. The results show that transitional/modern China is moving from traditional familism to family-based collectivism, which is very different from Western modern/post-modern individualism.

3.1 Family-Member Relationships: More Interdependent than Independent

The individual's autonomy, independence and consciousness of rights are the core of individual-centered values. Typical Western nuclear families are isolated and atomized. As suggested by Talcott Parsons, the nuclear family is separated and financially independent from the parents and any particularistic relation to kinsmen; functionally, it can meet its members' emotional and individual needs.① Themed studies by the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on families in five

① Parsons, T. The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States [J]. American Anthropologist, 1943, 45(1): 22-38.

cities (including Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) in 1983, seven cities (including Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu) in 1993 and five cities (including Guangzhou and Hangzhou) in 2008 all found that nuclear families in China's cities are not isolated atoms, but closely knitted networks formed on the basis of consanguinity, affinity and geography. The networks are maintained by emotional attachments and are characterized by financial and non-financial, tangible as well as intangible resources. Parents today are increasing rather than decreasing their financial support for their children when they get married;① some studies also showed that, besides institutional safeguards such as pension funds and social relief, children and relatives are the main providers of financial support for the aged in cities and play an even bigger role in the countryside. They are almost the only providers of care for the aged both in cities and in villages;②during financial hardship, when it is difficult to take care of those in need, or when people laid-off need to find jobs, most people turn to their parents, siblings and children for help and they do provide most support.③

In this study, 75 percent of those surveyed agreed that "parents should pay for children's university, including everything", with the highest recognition rate among those above the age of 50 and rural residents. Although almost half of the participants disapproved of "parents buying property for their daughters to get married", only a third were against "parents buying property for their sons to get married". Although two-thirds of those surveyed in cities disagreed with the statement that "grandparents are obliged to take care of their grandchildren", only 36.8 percent opposed the view in rural areas. In today's China, where

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① 马春华,石金群,李银河,王震宇,唐灿.中国城市家庭变迁的趋势和最新发现[J].社会学研究,2011(02).

② 张友琴.老年社会支持网的城乡比较研究[J].社会学研究,2001(04).

③ 徐安琪,张亮,刘汶蓉,包蕾萍.风险社会的家庭压力和社会支持[M].上海:上海社会科学院出版社,2007.

competition is intensifying, the tempo of life is getting ever faster and social security is far from adequate, the family is playing a significant part in providing financial and life assistance to its members. For those families who are in a disadvantageous position in particular, the family is a reliable safeguard against various risks. Thus, family members are as interdependent as ever.

3.2 Family Interests Precede Individual Interests

A fundamental difference between family-centered values and individual-centered values is that the former put family interests above those of the individual and stresses obligations to the family instead of individual rights. Empirical evidence collected in this study does not support the argument that individual interests outrank those of the family.

First, children represent the future of the family, in whom the parents find themselves reborn: 57.8 percent of those surveyed agreed that "parents will sacrifice everything they have for their children". On whether "divorce or separation is better for the children if it is not a happy marriage", 60 percent disagreed with the suggestion, with 24 percent agreeing and only 3 percent strongly agreeing, proving that many parents are willing to stay in the besieged fortress of an unhappy marriage for the sake of children.

Second, it is still commonly believed that it is the lifelong obligation of children to support their parents and that children should always fulfill their filial duties: 83.1 percent of the participants agreed that "when parents are too old to take care of themselves, children should live with them" (53.5 percent in the United States[①]), of whom 38.3 percent strongly agreed with this practice (only 4 percent in the United States). Even today, quite a lot of people believe that individual interests should be

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① Source: The data about the USA is from National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) 2001 - 2003. The same below.

given up when in conflict with parents' needs. In the 2006 CGSS, 57.8 percent of the participants agreed that "one should forgo one's aspirations to fulfill parents' wishes". As many as 83.1 percent agreed that "the father should always be respected whatever the circumstances". What is more, "glorifying the family name" is still deemed an important filial duty, with 86.1 percent of those surveyed agreeing that "children should make something of themselves to bring honor to their parents/family"; 89.0 percent of the participants in the CGSS also agreed that "children should do something to honor their parents".

Finally, family interests are prioritized and family obligations are defined in a broad way: 78.9 percent of those surveyed agreed that one has an important duty to provide a good life for everyone in the family. In the CSSS study, 84.1 percent agreed that the family is more important than the individual and 66.6 percent approved of putting the happiness of the family above individual interests. In addition, no difference has been found between the young people and the (middle) aged, the less educated and the better educated.

3.3 The Family Outweighs Personal Development

To any individual who wants to find self-fulfillment, professional achievement is without doubt of the utmost importance. However, despite increasing social mobility and intensifying competition, most people still choose to put family above personal development. Only one-third of those surveyed agreed that "in terms of personal well-being, professional achievement is more important than family" and accepted that "the husband and the wife may live in two different places to make more money/build a better career". Moreover, compared with other groups, less young well-educated high-income urbanites agreed with these statements. One reason why this group wishes for more time with family and a happy family life could be that while they are better off financially, pressure at work also burdens them with personal health problems and family issues.

In conclusion, in transitional China, family values are becoming more diversified, with the individual allowed more independent choices. However, to date individualism is still far from being mainstream. The collectivist family is no longer ruled by the authoritarian clan or elders, but revolves around the axis of the nuclear family. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally different from the Western individualist family whose core is affectionate intimacy and personal development. The stem family is still a vital force (depending on different life cycles) and the nuclear family is closely tied with the parental/offspring generation as well as in-laws. Against the background of a globalized risk society, family members are increasing instrumental and emotional support for each other. The collectivist Chinese family value system still features respect for the old and loving the young, fighting for the family, mutual responsibility and sharing of weal and woe.

Nevertheless, in China, individualism has long been considered a condemnation, misunderstood as selfishness, gaining at others' expense, no sense of duty and moral anomie, with its positive values largely ignored or screened out. This perception is also a reason why most of the survey participants chose to put their parents/children before themselves and sacrifice their personal rights and happiness for those of the family. Young children in China have often been denied freedom and happiness. As detailed by Professor Fei Xiaotong: "when he is big enough to move around, an escape-proof net has been cast around him, restraining his activities ... a child is subject to more intervention in one hour than an adult is criticized in his lifetime".① Whether it be developing personal interests, making friends or finding schools, jobs or husband/wife, they cannot escape from the shadow of their parents. Maybe more efforts should be made to restore the honor due to individualism which in private life is

① 费孝通.生育制度[M].北京:商务印书馆,1999.

more about the right to choices, individual independence, equality and protection of privacy, and helps to prepare the individual for a risk society by building his/her self-reliance and accountability, thereby improving the family's cohesion and the individual's adaptability.

This study divides family values into core values and general values, providing an alternative to the conventional approach that segregates values based on timeline (traditional vs. modern, corrosion vs. growth, anomie vs. continuation) and moral judgment (good vs. bad). This division of core values and general values refers to the classification of ideological values but it is different in that core values not only guide and support the whole family value system, but are also universal, beyond the constraints of time, space (national and geographical boundaries), and ideology (socialism, capitalism or feudalism). "Top-down design" and real-life practices are unique to historical periods and regions, but harmony, caring, duty and inclusion are always the essence. As the insignia of the United Nations "International Year of the Family"—a heart sheltered by an open-line roof—indicates, in a diversified society, the family is changing and open, and should be a place in which one finds warmth, caring, security, togetherness, tolerance and acceptance. However, further studies are necessary to determine whether the classification is appropriate.

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From Familism to iFamily

—Family Identity Change and the Rise of Women in Urban China

1. Introduction

One evening in August 2007, I was having dinner with six "mom friends" and their families. "Mom friends" refers to friends I have made because of my daughter. We address each other as a particular kid's mom or dad.① The seven families have different household structures: some live with their parents and others on their own. When I asked them whom they would count as family, I was amazed by the confident, unhesitating, but unconventional answers.

> Leilei's mom, Zilu's mom and Fanfan's mom quickly and confidently answered that their families include their parents and the three members of the small family.
>
> Leilei's dad said: "You women only think of your own parents. . . "
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> When I asked Yicheng's mom, who had been playing with the children outside and didn't join the discussion, the same question, her answer was: "My

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① Teknonymy is a customary usage based on kinship and kinship terms; it is a tactful way of addressing relatives whose titles are difficult to name(冯汉骥. 中国亲属称谓指南[M]. 徐志成,译. 上海:上海文艺出版社,1989). Teknonymy is commonly used in urban China to refer to people who are not kin but known through children.

parents, my husband and my kid."

All the women agreed: "That's it. Am I wrong?"

Fanfan's mom said: "I answered off the top of my head. If I think carefully, I may include my parents-in-law. If you mean the extended family, then parents-in-law may be included."

Leilei's mom added: "I see my parents-in-law once or twice a year at most. My immediate answer would never include them. If I think carefully . . . my brain may tell me that I should include them, but my heart doesn't really mind."

To society, "family" is an objective existence; to the individual, however, "family" is more about individual awareness of identity. Ueno Chizuko called the consciousness on which families are built "family identity", a "definition that defines the scope" of family. She noted that most studies regard people who have blood relationships or live together as one family, "but such 'family' doesn't really exist if the individual involved is not aware of it".① In her study of Japanese families, she found that members of the same "family" living under the same roof have different family identities.

Studies on family have long concerned family structure rather than family members' sense of identity. In fact, change of family structure and many family issues are linked with family identity. From 2006 to 2009, I interviewed 46 families in Shanghai (mostly middle-incomers) on different family-related issues and observed some of the families' changes over the years. Based on an analysis of the interview and observation results, this thesis attempts to explore the changes undergone by urban families in China from the perspective of family identity and the theory of individualization.

① ［日］上野千鹤子. 近代家庭的形成和终结[M]. 北京:商务印书馆,2004:4－5.

2. The Theory: Individualization

This section draws on the theory of individualization. Its interpretations by three well-known modern scholars—Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck①—have both similarities and differences. To Bauman, "individualization" is a transformation from "takers" to "actors" who take responsibility for their actions and their consequences (or side effects).② For Giddens, "individualization" is a flexible and changing structure; he talks about emancipatory politics and life politics and believes that the process of "individualization" is closely linked to life politics and that choice and self-realization are the core of individualization.③ Beck argues that "individualization" is a structural characteristic of the second wave of modernity. In individualization, or institutionalized individualism, the individual is becoming the basic unit in social reproduction for the first time in history; without such defined collective ties as class, which allow "natural" and "matter-of-fact" embedding, the individual shows his or her identity by making decisions and choices, "living one's own life". In short, individualization is becoming a social structure of the second modern society.④

In Yan Yunxiang's summary of discussions on individualization, there are three key views that deserve close attention. The first is Giddens' detraditionalization or, in Beck's words, "disembedment": the individual is

① Howard, Cosmo. Contested Individualization: Debates about Contemporary Personhood[M]. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

② [英] 齐格蒙特·鲍曼. 流动的现代性[M]. 欧阳景根,译. 上海:上海三联书店,2002:49.

③ Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age[M]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

④ Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences[M]. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001.

increasingly free from external social constraints that include social conventions in general and encompassing sub-categories such as family, blood relationship and class. The second is what Bauman refers to as the paradox of "compulsory and obligatory self-determination" (Bauman, 2000: 32).① The individual is forced by the modern social structure to be proactive in taking responsibilities and making decisions on his or her own, thus developing a reflexive self (Giddens, 1991).② The third is "building one's own life with conformity" (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 151), in other words, advocacy of choice, freedom and individuality does not necessarily make the individual different; on the contrary, his or her dependence on social institutions dictates that it's impossible for the modern individual to find and construct a unique self freely and man or woman, everyone has to follow set guidelines and rules in designing their life trajectory, thus leading to similar lives (Yan Yunxiang, 2012: 328 - 329).③

Yan Yunxiang's *Private Life under Socialism* is a good example of how the individualization theory can be applied in family studies. When studying family structure in China, Yan emphasized that with social changes,

> firstly, the family, which in many societies previously served only as a social institution of production and reproduction, gradually evolved to be a center of private life and a refuge for individuals. Secondly, as the family became a private haven, individual family members began to have personal lives within the domestic sphere, hence the double meaning of private life—that of the family and

① Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Modernity[M]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

② Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age[M]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

③ [美] 阎云翔. 中国社会的个体化[M]. 陆洋等，译. 上海：上海译文出版社，2012.

that of the individual. ①

Guided by the theory, Yan employed ethnography to observe family and private life changes in China and proposed two important research topics: (i) emergence and evolution of the individual as an independent actor; (ii) the important role played by the state in the transformation of private life and the formation of individual subjectivity. ② These topics provide keys to studies on gender and family change: firstly, the existence of the individual, especially the individual woman; secondly, interactions between the macro social background and the micro personal life in the evolution of the individual.

Separating "the individual" as a research subject gives family studies a new perspective. The individual is not abstract; rather, his or her personality, age, gender, seniority in the family, class and other things give him or her unique qualities which, in turn, have an impact on the whole family. It is therefore necessary to regard the family as an aggregate of its individual members and study the members separately. In analysing family identity, I will distinguish between the husband, the wife and the parents; in discussing inter-generational relationships, I will separate the parents from the parents-in-law; and on family power, three dimensions of the individual—age, seniority in the family and gender—will be examined. In short, this chapter discusses and summarizes individual members' family identity based on their family roles.

In addition, the individualization theory allows for comparison in relation to the traditional, in other words, the process of disembedment-to-reembedment. Disembedment does not mean that traditional values are completely abandoned; instead, they have changed from a structural force

① [美]阎云翔. 私人生活的变革. 一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系1949—1999[M]. 龚小夏,译. 上海:上海书店出版社,2006:11.

② [美]阎云翔. 私人生活的变革. 一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系1949—1999[M]. 龚小夏,译. 上海:上海书店出版社,2006:19-20.

to a resource subject to the individual's choices. The subjectivity of the individual is therefore a very important factor.

This section concludes by proposing the concept of "iFamily", developed from the individualization theory to sum up the family structure in today's urban China. iFamily (also a piece of software), in which I equals "I" and "individualization", highlights the dynamic and individual-centred nature of families in Shanghai. The interplay among the individual members and between their families decides the family structure, inter-member relationship and family identity. The change of family identity is the focus of this section.

3. Traditional Family Identity: "Familism"

The word "familism" cannot be found in any English dictionary. It was coined by Daniel H. Kulp when he was studying rural life in south China. He argued that familism is a form of social organization in which behaviors, standards, mindset and beliefs are built on or around the interests of the blood-related group. All values are judged based on how favorable they are to the family or clan: things or behaviours favourable to the family will be adopted and promoted; otherwise they will be forbidden, and must be corrected and restricted.①

Familism as an institution has been recognized by many scholars when they study the differences between the Western and Chinese family systems. Hugh Baker proposed that in the West, the family is an institution that exists in large part to provide an environment in which the individual can be raised and trained to go out into the world as a full member of society, while in the traditional Chinese situation, the family

① ［美］丹尼尔·哈里森·葛学溥. 华南的乡村生活——广东凤凰村的家族主义社会学研究［M］. 周大鸣，译. 北京：知识产权出版社，2006. Direct quotes from Translator's Preface by Zhou Daming.

does not exist to support the individual, but the individual exists to continue the family.① Lloyd Eastman argues that children are raised for different purposes in the West and in China. In the West, parents raise children to become an independent and self-actualizing adult, while in China, children are treasured as individuals not because they are destined to show their unique potential, but because they, particularly sons, are valuable in farms. The son continues the family name, provides for the aged parents and takes care of their funerals. Therefore, familism is very important to the Chinese as a system on which beliefs and behaviors are determined if they are to the family's benefit.② Arland Thornton holds that (in China) the family is seen as the basic social unit and the individual's interest is always put behind that of the family; seniors are well respected and have authority over the younger members.③

Familism with its stress on "family first" has shaped family identity in traditional China. "Family first" means that the interest of the family is above and always more important than any other interest and that kinship matters more than any other relationship. Family first is the highest standard and value benchmark that guides family members' minds, hearts and actions.④ The above-mentioned studies indicate that it is commonly believed that family interest is above that of the individual in China and the former prevails when there is a conflict. This principle is closely observed in China because familism, not individualism, rules as the core value of the

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① Baker, Hugh D. R. Chinese Family and Kinship[M]. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979: 26.

② Eastman, Lloyd E. Family, Fields, and Ancestors: Constancy and Change in China's Social and Economic History, 1550 - 1949[M]. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988:16.

③ Thornton, Arland and Hui-Sheng Lin. Social Change and the Family in Chinese Taiwan[M]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994:2.

④ 杨知勇. 家族主义与中国文化[M]. 昆明:云南大学出版社,2000.

Chinese.① In the Western system, the family is not seen as an organization which you can rely on throughout your whole life; but to the Chinese, it extends from generation to generation.②

"Family" is defined differently in the West from in China. Fei Hsiao-tung pointed out in the 1930s that family is given different meanings in different cultural contexts. Family in English has different connotation from in Chinese ("*jia*"). In English, family is a group composed of the husband, the wife and their unmarried children; but in China, "jia" (family) includes the married sons and daughters, as well as other relatives, sometimes even the servants. To mark the difference, he translated the Chinese "jia" as "extended family".③ Moreover, the size of the family is also decided by the family's enterprise. If the enterprise is small enough for the couple to cope with, the family can be as small as a nuclear family that includes only the husband, the wife and their children; if the enterprise is so big that it is beyond the couple's capabilities, the collective family can be very large.④ Hence, the family is a scalable social sphere in which "in times of prosperity, friends will be plenty; in times of adversity, not one amongst twenty".

Although the concept of family is scalable, whatever the changes, the "family" acknowledged in the value system of familism has always referred to a "paternal, patrilocal and patriarchal" family. In the paternal system, the clearly defined hierarchy and patrilocality make it relatively easy to specify who "family" includes. The paternal family is the only family that the husband and the wife identify with and can only identify with and its

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① 刘创楚,杨庆堃. 中国社会从不变到巨变[M]. 香港:香港中文大学出版社,1989:179.

② 刘创楚,杨庆堃. 中国社会从不变到巨变[M]. 香港:香港中文大学出版社,1989:46.

③ Fei, Hsiao-tung. Peasant Life in China[M]. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1933.

④ 费孝通. 乡土中国·生育制度[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1998.

interest is always above those of its individual members, thus unifying family identity and making individual differences illegitimate in the family.

However, in the process of modernization, in which residential mobility has become normal, family identity is becoming more complex and more difficult to establish. This study finds that members of the same family, even the husband and the wife, have different answers to the question "who are your family?", apparently confirming Jessie Bernard's suggestion that there are two marriages in every martial union, the husband's and the wife's.①

4. Modern Model of Family Identity: iFamily

Most studies have looked at the family in its entirety and have taken the identity of a family member as that of the whole family. However, in my observations from the individualization perspective, I find that the wife, the husband and the elder members of the family in fact have a different family identity. I call this new model of family identity the iFamily.

Xu Liping and her family (her parents, her husband Yan Haoyun and her young daughter) agreed to take part in my interview. As her daughter is young and her father is hard of hearing, they did not join in the discussion.

> When I asked: "Who are your family?" Xu Liping (wife) immediately asked: "you mean my small family or the larger family?"
>
> Author: What about the small family, and what about the larger family?
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> Xu: if you mean the small family, then it's me, my husband and our daughter; the larger family includes the three of us, plus my parents and my

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① Bernard, Jessie. The Future of Marriage[M]. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

brothers (She didn't include Yan Haoyun's mother and his brothers).

Yan Haoyun (husband): Our family includes me, my wife, our daughter and our parents.

Author: Although your mother doesn't live with you, you still think she is an indispensable member of the family, right?

Yan: Of course.

Author: What about the larger family?

Yan: Besides those I have mentioned, also her brothers and my brothers. That's the family.

I then asked the same question to Xu's mother.

She answered immediately: there are 16 people in my family (without counting). I have four children. With their children, 14 (two of her children have one child each, and the other two have two children each). Plus me and my husband, altogether 16 people. They are always on my mind, always.

Author: Where is your own family, then?

Xu's Mother: I have no family of my own. I serve this small family when I am here; I serve other small families when I am at theirs. I am serving all these small families now.

—Interview 24

The three answers are representative. Firstly, the small family and the larger family are well defined; secondly, the husband, the wife and the parents have different definitions of family and the small family usually does not include the partner's parents; finally, the small family precedes the larger family—the reason why, if they do not have their own house or physical family, the parents believe that they have no family of their own and are serving their children's small families.

Similar answers were given in the other 46 interviews. Identity-wise, it is typical of the iFamily to focus on itself and emphasize the family of procreation (the couple's family) and the family-of-origin (biological family).[①] The partner's parents are not necessarily included, which is different from the male-led family identity under the paternal system, or "uterine families" proposed by Margery Wolf (1972) that do not include the individual's father. Family members also differ in their family identity.

To most of the elder members, **every one under the big umbrella is family.** Their answers are similar in that married or not, their children are always family. This is why the family they describe is usually very large. For example, Xu Liping's mother answered without any hesitation that her family has 16 members. To them, unless their relationship with their daughters-in-law (or sons-in-law) is like that of cat and dog, it is unimaginable not to include their children's family and the third generation. To all parents, particularly parents with a single child, children, married or not, are always part of the family.

When I interviewed Cai Qingqing, she was unhappy with her mother, so her answer to the family question was her nuclear family of three. Her parents also had grudges against her and her husband, but when asked, Cai's mother answered firmly that there are five of them in the family: Cai, Cai's husband, the child, herself and her husband.

Author: Have you ever thought that the two of you are enough to make one

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① To Talcott Parsons (1943), a functionalist sociologist, family relationships are like onions with a series of layers and each layer further removed from the center. The growing social distance is reflected as the increasingly weakened ties between the individual at the centre of the onion and others. For instance, the less the contact between people, the less they give to each other (Ched, 1996). Beyond the "onion" is the larger society, in which private relationships are not allowed or encouraged. According to Parsons, the center of the "onion" is composed of two family groups. The first is one's family of origin, including the individual, his or her parents and siblings. To most people, the second group takes up much of their life. It comprises the individual, his or her partner and maybe their sons and daughters and is called the family of procreation. These two family groups are equally important to most Americans, but Parsons believes that the family of procreation is of the highest priority in the individual's adulthood.

small family? You know, excluding the three of them?

Cai's Father: That's impossible.

Cai's Mother: No, I can't do that. She's our single child. Children are always family! Can't be excluded.

—Interview 7

The young wife has very clear idea about who are in her small family. More often than not, a woman's family identity is not decided by residency, but by blood and bond. In addition, her priority is the nuclear family.

Cui Xi is the single child of her family. After she got married, she moved to Shanghai. Her parents have never stayed long with her and her husband, but her mother-in-law has been living with them. However, to her, her parents are unquestionably part of the family, but not her mother-in-law.

Author: Who are your family?

Cui: The three of us, and my parents. Must include my parents. When we bought the apartment, we decided that there must be a room for my parents. Because I am a single child, my parents have got to stay with me when they get old. Now, one room for my son, one for me and my husband and the last one for my parents.

Author: Where will your mother-in-law stay when she comes over?

Cui: My parents' room. That's the guestroom for her. But that's not her room. It's my parents' room.

—Interview 14

The younger generation, particularly women, usually defines family in the following two ways: one includes only the partner and the child; the other takes in their own parents, the partner and the child. The definition of the larger family is more flexible and inclusive.

Men, on the other hand, are more accommodating on family identity. Family seems to be larger to men than to women, be it the so-called small family or the large family. What struck me during the interviews is that when I asked "who are your family?", most women would ask me to clarify what type of family I was referring to: the small one or the large one, while some of them would simply presume that we were talking about the small family and would only expound on the large family after I pushed the question. Men, however, always immediately started to talk about the large family. Han Xin is a good case in point: in interviews, he always talked about his extended family.

> Author: When your sister has trouble, what would you do?
>
> Han: She is my family. I will try my best to help her, money or anything. My niece is in the family too. I will try my best to help her find schools and jobs.

His definition of "family" is very broad.

> Han: "First of all, I have to help my family, that is, my parents, my wife's parents, my sister, my grandma. They all need my help. I hope I can help as many people as I can."
>
> —Interview 4

It is clear that in today's urban China, the definition of family varies from member to member. Familism that allows for only one identity for all members of the patriarchal family and puts family interests above everything else is becoming obsolete. The iFamily, as the new family identity model, is taking its place.

The iFamily is not patriarchal; neither is it rooted in the nuclear family. It always revolves around oneself, be it the wife, the husband or the elders, except that the wife's family is smaller than that of the husband; and the elders usually include their siblings in the family's scope, while the younger generation does not. These differences also reflect the trend that traditions are no longer structural, but a resource that one can choose to adopt or not. The individual now defines his or her family based on his or her own needs and relationships with the others.

Nevertheless, as family identity is becoming diverse, an important pattern can be found in the iFamily model. As illustrated by the heart-shaped graph, the scope of family is extended along the bloodline, including the partner but more often than not excluding the partner's family; in other words, consanguinity is more important than affinity.



The left half of the heart indicates the husband's family of origin, the right half that of the wife. The overlapping diamond in the middle is the family of procreation. This pattern does not mean that relationship by marriage or the wife's family is becoming more important. In fact, both the husband and the wife put the most importance on the family that orbits around him- or herself and very often put consanguinity above affinity.

The iFamily is dynamic and changeable. Its connotation and denotation vary depending on who it is dealing with. When there is a conflict between generations, the individual goes with the three or so member small family; during fights with the partner, the iFamily comes to include the individual's parents; facing other relatives, parents of both sides are admitted into the iFamily identity. It can also change with needs. Therefore, the iFamily is like water in a vessel. It is shaped by the vessel which is the individual and the game of power between the individuals.

5. Identity of the iFamily from a Gender Perspective

A key feature of the iFamily is that the wife's family occupies an equally important position to that of the husband. Myron Cohen argued that "in a traditional Chinese context, male lines of descent are highly individualized, for it's a man's major responsibility to ensure to the greatest extent possible that he will have male posterity".① At the same time, in the process of individualization, women are forced to become individuals, and in Beck's words, "live for herself" rather than "for others".② In the traditional family structure, women were most oppressed, hence the strongest backlash is from them. It is women's rise in family that is changing the patriarchal family structure to that of the heart-shaped iFamily system.

However, further studies must be conducted to identify when this change started. Margery Wolf questioned the patriachal family structure and identity as early as in the 1970s. She found that to men, "the larger family seemed to include only their direct lineal ascendants (fathers, grandfathers, etc.) and their own descendants". But women were not natural members of the larger family; they had to work and provide the links to be accepted: a woman's link with the patriarhal system was the child that she gave birth to; otherwise, she had no important position in the family. Wolf raised the question: "How does a woman define her family?"③

Wolf discovered uterine families when she was studying women's family identity in the field. As a child, a woman's family is defined by her mother, and to some extent also by her grandmother. She is only a temporary member of her birth family and its paternal members. When she

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① Cohen, Myron. L. House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Chinese Taiwan[M]. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976:27.

② Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences[M]. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001.

③ Wolf, Margery. Women and the Family in Rural Chinese Taiwan [M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972:31.

marries, her ties with her father's family are cut. Therefore, to a woman, her uterine family—that is, her mother and her mother's other children, excluding her father—is of the most significance. Once a woman gets married and has her own children, she starts to build her own uterine family around herself. Family, to a woman, is never her father's or her husband's family. She is an outsider to the family she marries into, and to the Chinese, an outsider is always viewed with suspicion. Her husband and her father-in-law do not see her as a member of the family, but nevertheless as essential to carrying on the family line. She has to rely on her children to create her own uterine family, which helps consolidate her link with her husband's family.①

Wolf concluded that:

> with a male focus we see the Chinese family as a line of descent, bulging to encompass all the members of a man's household and spreading out through his descendants. With a female focus, however, we see the Chinese family not as a continuous line stretching between the vague horizons of past and future, but as a contemporary group that comes into existence out of one woman's need.②

Wolf also indicated the need to review all past research literature on the Chinese family, as it was written largely from a male perspective and a female focus might give totally different results. The interests of the uterine family often conflict with those of the male-dominated family system. Unfortunately, this insight of Wolf's has been seldom explored by the following generations of researchers. Most studies on family continue to look at the family as a whole, which in effect means discussions of male family values with little attention to those of women and changes in these

① Wolf, Margery. Women and the Family in Rural Chinese Taiwan [M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972:34 - 35.

② Wolf, Margery. Women and the Family in Rural Chinese Taiwan [M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972:37.

values over time.

An obvious change induced by individualization is the paternal-maternal equality of positions in the family. In the past, "ego" in studies on differential modes of association was male. In a patriarchal society, ripples that spread from the ego are well-defined for a man, because his life experience and his subjective identity are consistent with the paternal system he dominates. To a woman, however, it is not clear how her kinship and that of her husband are ordered in the spreading ripples. Except for the concept of "uterine family" put forward by Wolf in her in-depth exploration of women's family values, we still know very little about women's family identity and kinship identity in traditional China.

The heart-shaped iFamily identity model reveals that it is a woman's emphasis on her own inter-generational relationship, particularly her identification with her parents that has led to fundamental changes in family identity; that is, from a triangular continuum to one that usually only includes three generations, underlining the small family that is tied to the uterine family.

If the wife's family is of the same status as the husband's financially and geographically, it claims equality with the husband's instead of being ignored, as in the past. This is a characteristic of the heart-shaped iFamily. In addition, the wife's family identity stresses immediate relations rather than extended family or clan, which in turn has an impact on the husband's family identity and behavior. Family identity is now completely different from that in the past.

From a gender perspective, women have a stronger drive than men to individualize. Traditionally, hierarchy has been maintained by "role-rotating", but conflicts over the pecking order of men and women have never stopped. When Western ideas were introduced into China, androcentrism was the first to be hit.① The oppressed are always better motivated than the oppressor to fight for themselves.

The emergence of the iFamily is in fact the result of women's awakening self-awareness. Women are starting to include their bloodline in their marriages, resulting in two different family lines within the same family, expressed as different family identities for different members. Conflicts and compromises between the two family lines make up a diverse and liquid family structure.

In conclusion, the iFamily features the rise of the wife's family line; but it cannot be simply concluded that affinity is becoming more important, as this rise is largely powered by individualization. Observed from the individualization perspective, family today is moving towards a diversified and dynamic iFamily model instead of nuclearization.

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① 刘创楚,杨庆堃. 中国社会从不变到巨变[M]. 香港:香港中文大学出版社, 1989:51.

A Study of Rural Families Affected by Migration

In this thesis, by saying rural families affected by migration, we intend to include both entire rural families on the move and those some of whose members are on the move.

1. Away from the Home Village, Away from Home

The massive migration of rural Chinese families, which started 30 years ago, is still going on. According to the State Statistical Bureau, in 2011, there were 253 million migrant workers in Chinese cities, including 159 million living away from their hometown.① The migration of peasant farmers in China is unprecedented and unrivalled in terms of scale and span.

1.1 "Split-and-Move" Rural Families

Rural industry sprang up in China's coastal areas in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Consequently, some peasant farmers left farming for factory work. However, they still lived at home. Massive trans-regional migration did not start until peasant farmers bid farewell to their home village.

Individual members of rural families ventured out first. In the 1980s

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① 国家统计局. 2011 年我国农民工调查监测报告[R/OL]. [2012 - 04 - 27]. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm.

and 1990s, it was still rare for an entire peasant family to leave together for the city. Peasant farmers away from home were atomized laborers. According to the Fourth Population Census, in 1990, only 7.44 percent of rural families had both the head of the household and their spouse living away from the home village. Therefore, demographers deemed the migration of rural families insignificant (Cai, 1997). Sociologists also pointed out that, back then, most migrant workers were separated from their family, and that, in the subsequent years, such a pattern would continue to dominate (Li, 1996).

Such a pattern of migration put production in urban areas and demographic reproduction in the home village (Jin, 2010). Even if more than one family member ventured out into the city, there was an order of precedence.

1.2 Peasant Farmers in the City: Urban Residents in the Making

The migration pattern changed at the turn of the century. Instead of one family member or two, entire families now moved to the city. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, 28.6 million farmer workers migrated to the city with their family in 2008, but the figure rose to 32.8 million in 2011, thus rising from 20.36 percent to 20.67 percent.①

Some researchers claimed after crunching data gathered from 1 percent in the 2006 Transient Population Census in Beijing that 59.8 percent of the transient population in Beijing lived with their family (Hou, 2009). However, other researchers drew a different conclusion from the same data set. They believed that at least 70 percent of married migrant workers were separated from members of their nuclear family (Zhang, 2009). What are the explanations for such a wide difference in opinions? Some blamed it on

① 国家统计局. 2011 年我国农民工调查监测报告[R/OL]. [2012 - 04 - 27]. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm.

the inconsistent definition of migrant families or the lack of scientific measurement (Zhang and Li, 2010).

However, I believe there is another important factor, namely that even if a couple and their grown-up children are all working away from the home village, they may be in different areas of China; or even if they are in the same city, employment and living conditions may force them to live apart. Therefore, as Hong Xiaoliang has rightly stated, "migrant family" is not as accurate a term as "family migration" (Hong, 2007).

The "family" in "family migration" refers to the nuclear family. Family migration is a gradual process during which members of the same nuclear family migrate with a view to finally living together in the same city. That family migration has become a trend today is undeniable, but it cannot change the fact that most migrant rural families are split up.

According to the previously mentioned transient population census, despite the stronger trend of family migration, at least 70 - 80 percent of migrant peasant farmer families still lived apart from each other. Migrants may have lived eight, ten, or even more years where they work, but they are still regarded as "non-native population". Even if the whole nuclear family is living in the same city, it may not be granted the legal status of "urban household". The household registration system is often blamed for blocking the way for migrant workers to become urban residents; in fact it is only one of the road blocks. Another might be the denial of access to urban benefits such as employment, children's schooling, housing, medical care, social relief and aid.

Still another road block is the market discrimination against peasant farmer families: the market prefers atomized cheap labor without "family burdens" to those with "dependents". From an economic perspective, the circulation of young labour is the best.

The access to urban residential rights is also closely related to a given region's urbanization strategy. Indeed, how much a city can expand is restricted by the welfare provision it can afford. However, urbanization driven by vested interests would like to grab more farming land and new labour supply from villages but reject the dependents of the same labour pool.

Consequently, what we see now is that, on one hand, peasant farmers already working in cities go on striving for family reunion in the city. They—and the latest generation of migrant workers in particular—have no intention of returning to the home village eventually;① instead, they start a family in the city.② On the other hand, the urban administration system turns a blind eye to or even discriminates selectively against those "migrant families" that have already settled down in cities.③ In this sense, Chinese farmers are transitioning from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural sector, from rural areas to urban areas, but they and their families have not formally become urban residents.

Wang Chunguang came up with the term "quasi-urbanization" to describe the predicament facing migrant rural workers who do not wish to go back to the village but are yet to gain a foothold in urban areas. "Quasi-urbanization" is an intermediate stage between rural life and complete

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① According to a 2010 survey by the Shenzhen Trade Union Federation, among 5,000 latest-generation migrant workers, 99 percent did not wish to go back to farming in the future; 43.8 percent indicated explicitly that they were going to stay in the city permanently (张玮. 深圳新生代农民工状况调查:99%不愿回乡务农[N]. 南方日报, 2010-07-15).

② According to "A Study of Transient Population in China" conducted by the Population and Development Research Center of Renmin University in 2009, about one-third of migrant families had children only after coming into the city. According to another set of data provided by the Department of Transient Population Services Administration at the State Population and Family Planning Commission, by 2007, 1.024 million children had been born to migrant parents (当前流动人口计划生育的总体状况[R/OL]. [2010-07-07]. 江西省人口和计划生育委员会网站). The above numbers were quoted only to illustrate the trend of migrant workers starting families out of their home villages. They are not first-hand data from the authorities.

③ Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai had measures or proposals to limit the inflow of migrant workers (周昌和,孙天明. 深圳官员称应设置生存环境壁垒,让外地人无地可住主动离开[N]. 南方都市报,2012-01-10).

urbanization (Wang, 2006).

When one formally becomes an urban resident, one gets not only an urban household registration, but also the rights and benefits that it entails. From this perspective, Chinese rural migrant workers have yet to become formal urban residents.

Neither social welfare nor demographic statistics (including the Sixth Population Census) has granted migrant families the legal status of "household". Members of migrant families are merely counted as "mobile" and "transient" individual laborers. This is quite an inadequate social phenomenon for a country in which the family is such an important welfare unit.

1.3 The Normalization of "Abnormal Families"

With peasant farmers working in cities but separated from family members, family functions are damaged and the family itself is threatened (Jin, 2009). Among all types of separation, the separation of spouses and of under-age children from parents have the direst consequences.

According to a survey among wives who stayed behind to take care of things at home in ten administrative villages in the Provinces of Anhui, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Sichuan, 7.5 percent saw their husbands leave for work in cities in the first year of their marriage; 37.1 percent had been left behind for less than 3 years; 13.4 percent had been left behind for 4-5 years; 12.1 percent had been left behind for 6-9 years; and a high 37.4 percent had been left behind for over 10 years (Ye and Wu, 2009).

Families in which spouses live apart for a long term and/or in which underage children are separated from their parent(s) are abnormal families. To make matters worse, such "abnormality" is often ignored or taken lightly by society in general.

What impact will such long-term separation have on marriage and social stability? Almost all research reports acknowledge that there is a negative impact. However, those reports tend to emphasize at the same time that the negative impact on marital relations and family members is limited (Xu, 2009), or at least that "there is no conclusive evidence showing that migration undermines the stability of marriage" (Wei, 2006). Some have even claimed that separation strengthens the spousal bond (Ye and Wu, 2009).

However, Du Fenglian proved by citing China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data in her comparison of families with migrant workers and families without migrant workers that, with everything else constant, migration boosts the divorce rate by a significant 60 percent or more (Du, 2010). This implies that migration has far more than a limited negative impact on families.

Rural welfare used to be provided by families and supplemented by the village administration. However, such a model (the only model peasant farmers had) has been damaged and cities have failed to step in. Over 100 million children, wives, and elderly parents who were left behind in villages are affected by migration.① Their needs that should have been met by the family (parenting, material provision, care and emotional fulfillment) have in effect been ignored. Besides the economic impact, the massive migration of rural population "has shocked the small-farmer family that had remained relatively stable for thousands of years, disrupted the foundation of rural society and triggered the disintegration of rural China" (Zhang, 2006).

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① Estimates in various reports differ. Among those who are left behind in villages, there are 47 - 85 million wives, 58.61 million children and 40 million elderly people. [Sources: 张原. 中国农村留守妇女的劳动供给模式及其家庭福利效应[J]. 农业经济问题，2011(05)；全国妇联. 全国农村留守儿童状况研究报告[R/OL]. [2008 - 03 - 05]. 中国妇女网 http://www.women.org.cn/allnews/02/1985.html；中国老年学学会常务副会长赵宝华. 农村人口老龄化高于城市　农村留守老人达4 000 万[N]. 京华时报，2011 - 10 -05] As indicated in a previous footnote, these numbers were quoted to indicate the enormous size of the left-behind population in rural China. This chapter does not differentiate or analyse the potential inconsistency.

2. Why Have "Abnormal Families" Been Tolerated for So Long?

It seems that rural families affected by migration are malfunctioning. Mutual help among family members is lacking. Emotional and sexual needs are unfulfilled. How come such abnormality has been tolerated and maintained for so long?

2.1 Family Decision-making Strategy, Altruism and Low Expectations with regard to Marriage?

Three theories are common among scholars explaining the abovementioned phenomenon: the theory of family decision-making, the altruistic tradition of prioritizing family needs over individual needs and Chinese peasant farmers' low expectations of marriage.

The theory of family decision-making, which branches out from immigration theory, claims that it is a profit-maximizing and risk-minimizing family decision strategy for rural families to send out some members to seek employment elsewhere. Economic returns could offset the emotional deficits in the family (Wong, 1993; Luo, 2010).

The exchange of material gains (economic income of the husband) for responsibility (care-giving provided by the wife) helps the spousal relations. This is the best alternative for rural couples under current circumstances (Ye and Wu, 2009).

Such analyses often quoted Fei Xiaotong (or Fei Hsiao-Tung) who has stated that, out of the two family functions (emotional and economic), economic cooperation may "put emotional needs aside". However, those analyses failed to note that Mr. Fei also stated that such marital relations are "lopsided" and therefore cannot be maintained for long.

Another explanation suggests the traditional Chinese culture is family based, not individual based. For example, Li Qiang found out that Chinese migrant workers remitted more money home than their counterparts in other countries. He went on to claim that there was "natural altruism" among members of Chinese migrant families. Migrant peasant farmers economize on food and clothing in order to send more money home because they identify with the family and put family interests first (Li, 2001).

Such explanations mask the helplessness of rural families when they have to decide to separate because they are not covered by the current welfare system. Moreover, the growing household income might have concealed the greater sacrifice made by some family members. For example, some elderly peasant farmers have to go on farming as they raise their grandchildren because their declining control over family resources and authority makes it impossible for them to bargain with their children. Such "altruism" is forced rather than voluntary. Similarly, village women are forced to "support" their husbands' migration and stay behind to take care of family matters because, for one thing, they are at a greater disadvantage than village men in the labor market, and for another, villagers still hold the belief that "men [are] for the field and women for the hearth".

According to some researchers, wives staying behind in the village make the value they generate for the family more explicit, therefore possibly enhancing women's status in the family (Li, 2006). Others believe that although stay-at-home village women have to work harder, their decision-making power increases because of the absence of their husband (Matthews and Nee, 2000).

Nevertheless, women's decision-making power has not increased even if the husband is absent because the man is still the "manager" and "boss" of the house, while the wife is just a "producer" or a secondary "helper". Women's status has not changed fundamentally (Zheng et al., 2001; Sun, 2006). The income gap between agricultural and non-agricultural sector employment has resulted in the fact that "those who work away from the home village have more say in family affairs"(Zheng and Xie, 2004). As a result, women's contribution to the family has been greatly underestimated despite the fact that they undertake most farm work and care-giving. Their status in the family is still low (Jin, 2010).

Village women left behind by their husbands are forced to reallocate their time to the disadvantage of the elderly: stay-at-home village women spend significantly less time on caring for the elderly, especially for parents-in-law. Their time spent on mothers-in-law is only one-seventh of that spent by women in non-migrant families, and they have cut back on time caring for fathers-in-law by half (Zhang, 2011).

Left-behind children are undoubtedly the least capable of bargaining or making voluntary decisions. It is up to their parents how they spend their precarious childhood, with frequently varying guardians. In short, there is no natural altruism, but "altruism" prescribed by social institutions. Forced altruism hurts the interests of the most vulnerable family members.

Some researchers have found that peasant farmers have a low expectation of marriage. In particular, left-behind wives stuck to the tradition of regarding children, instead of emotional attachment, as key to the survival of their marriage (Xu, 2009). The same researchers believe that, since migrant peasant workers can afford neither family reunion nor family disintegration, migrant families were able to strike a balance of some sort. However, rural residents have the same right to marital happiness and fulfillment of ordinary emotional needs as their city counterparts. Such a right should be respected. It is inhumane to deprive migrant workers of such a right. Besides, the deprivation will eventually lead to instability of both migrant families and society as a whole.

Research also shows that the negative impact of migration on rural families may gradually reach a tipping point. For example, the divorce rate of families with migrant members is consistently higher than that of families without any migrant members after five years of marriage (Du, 2010). To take another example, children left behind for more than five years score much higher in terms of psychological imbalance than those left behind for fewer than five years (Hu et al, 2007).

2.2 Family Migration: The Self Rescue of Migrant Families

Research on migrant families so far has, intentionally or unintentionally, ignored the severity of the impact of split migration on migrant peasant farmers. It is time to reconsider. If 63 percent of migrant families have spouses separated from each other for four years or more and if about 40 percent of migrant families have lived apart for over ten years, how long can such abnormality continue?

The abovementioned explanatory studies failed to take into account another important factor, namely the intergenerational differences among migrant peasant workers. The youngest generation of migrant workers is waking up. They are demanding family rights. They are increasingly intolerant of split-up families and long-term separation. And they are coming up with their own solutions. For the sake of survival, peasant farmers have to disperse into different cities; however, for the sake of "living a life", they try very hard to move in together first with the spouse, and then to bring children into the city to live with them (Wang, 2005).

Needs for both life and survival are driving peasant farmers' family migration. For example, as they wait for institutions to catch up, migrant peasant farmers set up "house" in makeshift rental housing in city outskirts, start up "guerilla" businesses at the roadside, cohabit and have babies as they move on. According to statistics, about one-third of migrant families were started after the parents had moved into the city. In Dongguan, Guangdong Province, the ratio exceeds 50 percent (Zhang and Li, 2010).

According to some researchers, there is a pattern in the family migration of peasant farmers, namely that the youngest worker in the family ventures out first, followed by married main workers and then by spouses and grown-up children, and then finally by dependent children (Wang, 2005). However, few migrant peasant families would eventually bring the elderly into the city. In other words, family migration works to the advantage of underage children, but not of the elderly. If barriers to migrant workers' becoming urban residents continue to exist and if the urban safety net does not extend to cover migrant peasant workers and their families, staunch efforts by migrant workers to take root in cities will, on one hand, create slums and subsequent chronic social ills in urban areas and, on the other hand, aggravate social problems concerning those who are left behind in villages.

3. Barriers to Migrant Workers' Becoming Urban Residents

In the long run, the modernization and urbanization of China must include the process of turning migrant peasant workers into urban residents. For peasant farmers to become urban residents, one prerequisite is family migration. In other words, real urban residence is based on the acceptance of peasant households (an important unit of social welfare) by cities.

According to an article in *People's Daily*, since migrant peasant workers have to date made up the majority of urban industrial workers as well as the newly-added urban population and since the state has gained considerable fiscal capacity, "the general conditions for accelerating migrant workers' settlement in cities are in place" (Chi, 2010).

However, the process has not really kicked off yet. What are the major obstacles? The household registration system usually bears the brunt of criticisms. And indeed it is the number one obstacle. As early as 2009, the Central Economic Working Conference proposed to "give priority to granting urban residency to qualified rural population who have gained employment in cities, and to loosen restrictions on household registration in small-to-medium-size cities and townships".① Nevertheless, reform of

① 中央经济会议举行,胡锦涛温家宝作重要讲话[N/OL]. http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-12/07/content_1481724.htm.

the household registration system is not a cure-all. What is essential is to grant equal welfare to migrant workers, and rights that have been reserved to urban residents. Such rights should be real, not merely lip service.

There have been some policy recommendations. For example, a report by the All China Federation of Trade Unions proposed an annual quota of four million urban residency permits to the youngest generation of migrant workers so that they could be "treated equally compared to native residents". The same report also suggested "a gradual stripping of social security, housing, schooling, transportation, employment and other public services or benefits from household registration to ensure free, orderly migration and mobile employment".① This policy recommendation favours the youngest generation of migrant workers because "the youngest generation of migrant workers, with a population of 100 million, is becoming the main force in the market". This is still cheap-and-prime-quality-seeking market logic talking. Young migrant workers are nevertheless atomized and deprived of social benefits. Such logic fails to consider the long-term interests of farmers and farmer families.

Other reports suggest that "migrant workers in metropolitan cities should gain urban residency in a third place". The logic is that, since migrant peasant workers employed in Shanghai do not have an income high enough to reach the living standards of Shanghai "residents", they should not gain residency in Shanghai; instead, they could have social security accounts created in a third place. This suggestion hopes, in effect, to turn the old model of migrant workers "producing in cities, providing for the young and the old in villages" into a new model of "producing in the metropolis and retiring in small cities or townships".② Although this

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① 李泽民.全总报告建议:每年解决400万新生代农民工进城落户[N].每日经济新闻,2011-02-22.

② Lin Jianyong, "'Returning from Shanghai' should be a realistic choice for migrant workers in metropolis", part of the 2007 joint research project entitled *A Survey of Migrant Workers in 16 Cities in the Yangtze River Delta* (unpublished).

suggestion, if adopted, may benefit migrant families as far as welfare is concerned, it favors metropolitan cities by separating production and demographic reproduction.

Others suggest issuing "housing coupons" to peasant farmers in exchange for their properties in rural areas. With those coupons farmers could buy real estate in the city.① The argument is to "tap into idle assets in rural areas". All such suggestions put cities first and aim at protecting vested interests. This is exactly why the urban/rural dual structure cannot be broken down, why there are so many barriers to migrant workers' gaining urban residence, why migrant families remain separated for such a long time and why migrant workers are stuck between the home village and the city.

Therefore, a fair policy should be based on the principle of equal gains (or at least no harm done) for rural areas, farmers and farming families in the process of modernization and urbanization. Family migration guaranteed by "employment" and "household registration" is the way to go for migrants to become urban residents.

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Left-Behind Children in Rural Areas

—Missing More than Family Affection

1. Objective and Methodology

The new generation of migrant workers (or migrant workers born in the 1980s and 1990s) has been much discussed of lately. The children of migrant workers, who are either on the move with parents or left behind in their home village, will eventually join this huge force. The conditions in which they live and grow up now will have a direct and profound impact on Chinese society, politics and economy in the coming decades. Their rights to education and to psychological and physiological health have been neglected. Compared with children on the move with migrant-worker parents, left-behind children in rural areas are confronted with even more challenges owing to the absence of one or even both parents.

The government, the research community and the media are starting to pay more attention to the children of migrant workers. Investigations have been conducted to identify the relevant issues. However, the problem with existing research,[①] especially earlier studies on left-behind children in rural areas, is that they tend to exaggerate the inadequacies of left-behind children and then attribute those inadequacies to poor parenting. Such a bias may mislead public perception and affect intervention and policies.

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① See below.

This study attempts to identify real issues with left-behind children in rural areas. Two approaches were adopted.

The first approach is a meta-analysis of research findings. Four key terms—left-behind children, left-behind kids, left-behind boys and girls, and left-behind teenagers—were used in a search through China National Knowledge Infrastructure's (CNKI) China Academic Journals Full-Text Database. 1,452 papers published between 1994 and May 2010 were found. Out of the 1,452, 170 were selected for their high impact and rigorous methodology. Major conclusions on left-behind children in rural areas were extracted. In addition, papers on migrant children, influential media coverage on this issue and relevant policy documents were consulted.

The second approach is hands-on research by this author and his team. They are: A Qualitative Study of Poverty in Rural China (henceforth the "Poverty Project") commissioned by the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,① studying migrant workers and left-behind families in 12 villages in six provinces in 2006; The Impact of Migration for Employment on Rural Children (henceforth the "Left-behind Project") commissioned by the Center for Women/Gender Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,② which consists of interviews conducted in a village in "T" County of Sichuan Province, where a large number of villagers take up jobs elsewhere, and Shengzhen of Guangdong Province where a large number of

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① This research was supported by the World Bank and the UK Department for International Development. The principal investigator was Wang Xiaoyi. There were one core project team and seven local project teams. Major outcome: Volume I—Theories, Volume II—Jiangxi Province and Yunan Province, Volume III—Sichuan Province and Jiangsu Province, Volume IV—Gansu Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, *Poverty in 12 Chinese Villages*, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009.

② This research was supported by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The principal investigator was Tan Shen. Team members include: Luo Lin, Wu Xiaoying, Yang Yiyin, Tang Youcai, Xu Ping, Zhuang Ming, etc. Outcome: The Center for Women/Gender Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, *The Impact of Migration for Employment on Rural Children*, unpublished.

migrant workers live, plus questionnaires targeting migrant-worker parents, children on the move with their migrant-worker parents and children left behind in the home village in three cities and three townships. These two surveys, in combination with relevant literature, facilitate our understanding of the context in which issues with children of migrant workers were identified and then considered challenging. Our research reveals that the marginalization of left-behind children is a consequence of many institutional problems, including "split reproduction" of migrant workers, the disintegration of rural society and the dual urban-rural systems of education. The fragmentation of family structure is only one of the causes, but it exacerbates other problems.

2. Questions Raised

Common sense tells us that left-behind children in rural areas emerged at the same time with rural migrant workers, and that they emerged earlier and the number was more than that of children on the move with migrant-worker parents. In 1995, we surveyed 266 married rural migrant workers from five counties in Hunan Province. Only 12 of them brought children with them (children on the move with migrant-worker parents). 196 worked outside, while their spouse stayed in the home village to take care of children. 52 left children to grandparents as both spouses took up jobs elsewhere. The latter two categories of migrant workers were parents to leave behind children in rural areas. This survey obtained a glimpse of issues related to left-behind children's study and psychological health, a recurrent theme later on.[①] "Troops 386199",[②] a household nickname, caught on in the early 1990s.

However, back in 1995, people were much more concerned with the

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① 邓微.婚姻关系与家庭关系[M]//中国社会科学院社会学研究所"农村外出务工女性"课题组.农民流动与性别.郑州:中原农民出版社,2000.

② "38" refers to left-behind wives in rural areas; "61" refers to left-behind children in rural areas; "99" refers to left-behind elderly people in rural areas.

impact of rural migrant workers in urban areas, on the rights and interests of rural migrant workers as well as children on the move with them. On the other hand, since migrant workers remitted part of their income back to their left-behind family members or even started businesses in their home villages after working outside for a period of time, villagers were so optimistic about migration for employment that they tended to neglect subsequent problems. There were many studies that touched upon the dark side, such as the widening income gap between rural and urban areas, poverty in rural areas, lack of public services in rural areas, the sufferings of left-behind children/wives/elderly people, high school drop-out rate among rural children and the re-emergence of the idea that study is useless. However, the dark side was known only to government agencies and researchers focusing on the agricultural sector or education. Senior government leaders and the general public were to be alerted much later.

In 2000, Li Changping, former Party Secretary of Qipan Township, Jianli County, Hubei Province, submitted a report to the State Council on the hardship of peasant farmers, rural poverty and the high risks of farming. The report caught the attention of senior government leaders. The State Council made two written comments demanding "attention to the severity of problems". A public debate on rural China, agriculture and peasant farmers began. Since the debate took place right before the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which would put forward the national strategy of "building a well-off society in all aspects", it held unusual implications for the Party Congress and the new leadership. One major means of realizing a "well-off society" was to increase peasant farmers' income and an important way of doing that was for surplus rural labor to work in urban areas. As a result, rural problems were connected to rural migrant workers in cities. The report by the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China identified for the first time the removal of the dual rural-urban economic structure, coordinated socio-economic development in urban and rural areas, the solution of problems related to rural China, agriculture and peasant farmers as "major tasks in building a well-off society in all aspects".

Compulsory education in rural areas stood out among all the problems related to rural China, agriculture and peasant farmers. For one thing, more and more rural children dropped out of school because of financial difficulties and increasing weariness of study. For another, the fiscal system at that time made investment in education a heavy burden for village and township public finance as well as peasant farmers. Both issues were related to the unreasonable allocation of educational and fiscal resources between urban and rural areas. Since children on the move with their migrant-worker parents can hardly share compulsory educational resources with city kids, parents often decided to leave children behind in home villages. Left-behind children in rural areas cropped up as a "new" subject in education for rural children.

In late May 2004, the Department of Primary Education of the Ministry of Education convened a conference on left-behind children in rural China, signaling the official inclusion of children left behind in rural areas in the government agenda. This conference also gave a strong boost to media coverage, research and intervention in this area. It was pointed out at the conference that migration and left-behind children were the by-products of problems related to rural China, agriculture and peasant farmers and that the long-term dual urban-rural structure in China constituted the major obstacle to the solution of these problems. Such a conclusion reflected a context in which more attention was given to left-behind children. Before and after the conference, the Department of Primary Education of the Ministry of Education commissioned several research institutes and colleges to study left-behind children in different parts of rural China. These research projects generated the earliest and most cited literature on left-behind children in rural areas. Since then, there has been a rapid growth in the number of studies done in this area, the coverage of which ranges from school education to family education and then to other types of social education, from learning problems to psychology, behavior, safety and guardianship, from group characteristics to demographic features of left-behind children in rural areas. Media coverage exploded, moving hearts with stories of deprivation and sorrow. After 20 years in oblivion, left-behind children in rural areas became the one of the groups that attracted the most attention.

3. Major Conclusions

3.1 Being Left Behind Is Temporary, Not Permanent

It is undeniable that there is a sizeable population of left-behind children in rural China. However, to date there are no precise data on how large this group is. The most widely quoted figure is 58.61 million.① However, according to the same researchers using the same statistical method, the number of left-behind children more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, or 34.18 million. If the latter number is added to the total number of children on the move with their migrant-worker parents, the total number of children by migrant-worker parents grew by more than 38 million; whereas according to the National Bureau of Statistics, the entire migrant population grew by only 2.96 million in the same period (this figure is also widely quoted). Apparently, there is a commonsensical error ignored by researchers and those citing their results.

The reason why it was hard to get an idea of the number of left-behind children in rural China is related to the difficulty in telling those who are left-behind from those who are not. A child might be the only child to their parents, but they may alternately live in the home village or move with migrant-worker parents. Our investigation shows that one quarter of children staying in home villages was on the move with their migrant-

① 段成荣，杨舸. 我国农村留守儿童状况研究[J]. 人口研究，2008(03).

worker parents at least once. In other words, they used to be counted as children on the move with parents (it was true even for children living in home villages together with their parents when our investigation was conducted). Among migrant children living in urban areas, except for the few that were born and raised in cities, half of them have alternated their residence between urban and rural area at least twice. In other words, even if they are living in cities now, they may have been left behind in rural areas before. In Lv Shaoqing's study on left-behind children in rural areas, nearly half of the children once lived and studied in urban areas. Therefore, being left behind is not a permanent identity.

3.2 Insufficient Evidence that Left-behind Children in Rural Areas Are "Problem Children"

Since little was known about left-behind children in rural areas, initial research were mainly surveys. Because left-behind children were identified as a by-product of problems related to rural China, agriculture and peasant farmers, they were regarded as a "social problem" from the very beginning. Most surveys were biased towards the dark side. Extreme cases reported by the media and problems exposed by surveys among non-representative samples were shocking. For example, an influential Xinhua News Agency report quoted psychiatrists in claiming that left-behind children in rural areas had severe psychological problems.① Academic papers concluding that left-behind children in rural areas as a whole were problematic②, failed to state explicitly how the investigation had been done or how the conclusion had been drawn step by step. Without using "non-left-behind children" living in the same environment as left-behind children

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① 周伟.三成"留守孩"直言恨自己父母 江西盘古山镇的这项调查揭示了解决"留守孩"问题的紧迫性[N].新华每日电讯,2005-03-29.

② 林宏.福建省"留守孩"教育现状的调查[J].福建师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2003(03);王玉琼,马新丽,王田合.留守儿童 问题儿童?——农村留守儿童抽查[J].中国统计,2005(01).

as control groups, these papers simply attributed negative issues found among left-behind children to the absence of parents. Cross references among those media reports and academic papers created the perception that "left-behind children are problem children". Parents of left-behind children were bombarded with such criticisms as "making money first, children second".

By contrast, more rigorous studies show no significant differences in education and mental health between children who were not living with parents at the time of investigation and those who were living with parents in the same time period. Whether parents were absent or not had no significant impact on children's academic performance or interest in learning.① The percentage of left-behind children in rural areas receiving compulsory education was higher than that of non-left-behind children (probably because more migrant-worker parents could afford schooling for children).② The absence of parents may cause some unhealthy emotions, but not necessarily psychological problems among left-behind children.③

3.3 Interaction of Adverse Factors Causes Psychological Problems among Left-behind Children in Rural Areas

Research shows that the occurrence and severity of psychological problems among left-behind children are related at least to the following factors.

The first factor is who takes care of left-behind children. The key here is whether the mother stays behind with children in rural areas or not. Several tests among primary and secondary school students show that all

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① 朱科蓉,李春景,周淑琴.农村"留守子女"学习状况分析与建议[J].教育科学,2002(04);课题组(吴霓).农村留守儿童问题调研报告[J].教育研究,2004(10).

② 段成荣,周福林.我国留守儿童状况研究[J].人口研究,2005(01);段成荣,杨舸.我国农村留守儿童状况研究[J].人口研究,2008(03).

③ 周宗奎,孙晓军,刘亚,周东明.农村留守儿童心理发展与教育问题[J].北京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2005(01).

children, including those left-behind by both parents or one parent as well as non-left-behind children, are attached to their mother, friends and father in descending order of importance.① Therefore, if the mother stays behind, children will not develop serious psychological problems.

Furthermore, data on child health reveal that children left behind by both parents are the healthiest, children left behind with mother come second, while children left behind by the mother have the highest risk of disease exposure but most limited access to medical care.② How to explain such a confusing phenomenon? Some researchers believe that it reflects the obstacles to left-behind children's access to medical care. That is to say, insufficient care-giving could be compensated only by economic expenditure. The care-giving role in the family is traditionally played by the mother, while women are less competitive than men in the labour market. Households in which both parents are migrant workers are economically better off and can invest more in children's health. Households in which the mother stays behind with children provide more care to children. However, households in which only the mother works outside are economically worse off than the two types of households mentioned above. At the same time, there is less care available to children. Therefore, compared with fathers working away from home, mothers working away from home generate less income for the household while having a negative impact on the health and access to medical care of left-behind children.

The second factor is the age of children when their parents left for work in urban areas. A report by the All China Federation of Women in 2008 identified the living conditions, problems and needs of kindergarten-

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① 刘霞,武岳,申继亮,邢淑芬.小学留守儿童社会支持的特点及其与孤独感的关系[J].中国健康心理学杂志,2007,15(04);范丽恒,赵文德,牛晶晶.农村留守儿童心理依恋特点[J].河南大学学报(社会科学版),2009(06).

② 宋月萍,张耀光.农村留守儿童的健康以及卫生服务利用状况的影响因素分析[J].人口研究,2009(06).

age children, children of the age of compulsory education and older children. For example, outstanding problems with kindergarten-age left-behind children include insufficient breast-feeding time, inadequate parental care and inadequate parent-children communication, all of which have long-lasting profound impacts on younger children's cognition, affection and social development. To make matters worse, the lack of family education is not compensated by formal preschool education. Outstanding problems with left-behind children of the age of compulsory education include lack of education on safety and puberty, the shortcomings of boarding schools and the difficulties of living in urban areas. Outstanding problems with elder left-behind children include the negative impact of parents' mobility on children's finishing school, low employment rate once out of school, lack of social security and sexual abuse of older girls. Other studies reveal that children would develop separation anxiety if their parents, especially their mothers, left them when they were very young.

The third factor is the length of separation from parents. According to one test, six months' separation is the Great Divide. Children left behind for three months have significant differences from average children only in self-respect and emotional control, while children left behind for six months are significantly different from average kids in many more dimensions. As the length of separation increases, the performance of left-behind children deteriorates in all aspects. Another test found five years' separation to be an inflection point. Children left behind for five years or more have a significantly higher level of psychological imbalance than children left behind for one to two years, or children left behind for three to four years; whereas there is no significant difference between the latter two groups.① In short, extended separation from parents affects children's

① 郝振，崔丽娟. 留守儿童界定标准探讨[J]. 中国青年研究，2007(10)；胡心怡，刘霞，申继亮，范兴华. 生活压力事件、应对方式对留守儿童心理健康的影响[J]. 中国临床心理学杂志，2007，15(05).

mental health. If such separation starts in the preschool period, the development of children's personality may be affected.

The fourth factor is that the stigmatization of left-behind children creates an sense of discrimination among them. According to a research team from Beijing Normal University, negative remarks made by school administrators, teachers, people living with left-behind children as well as some researchers have exaggerated the negative aspects of left-behind children in rural areas. Left-behind children have been stigmatized, which heightens left-behind children's sense of discrimination. Previous research shows that such an awareness makes individuals conscious of their vulnerable position, thereby negatively affecting their psychological health. Research illustrates that left-behind children have much higher discrimination awareness than non-left-behind children and that such an awareness is independent of grade, gender and length of separation from parents. This means that discrimination awareness is common among left-behind children. Children whose parents are both working away from home are more likely to be ridiculed as "abandoned children" and therefore even more sensitive to discrimination.

The fifth factor is whether children and their families take proactive measures to relieve the pressure caused by the absence of parents. According to the study done by Beijing Normal University, left-behind children in rural areas have a significantly higher overall stress level than non-left-behind children, but they score similarly in various dimensions of psychological health. The conclusion is that protective factors such as economic conditions, support from parents, schools, peers, and other parts of society and positive responses of left-behind children themselves play a part. For example, left-behind children have a stronger ability to take care of themselves in daily life than their peers. Some left-behind children are engaged in prosocial behaviors, which helps to extend their social network. These proactive behaviors protect left-behind children from the negative psychological impact caused by parents' absence to a certain extent.

According to a study done in a village in Hunan Province, absence of family members may result in some negative impact on children's psychology and emotions, but it does not affect family integrity or the sense of identity shared by all family members (including children) because the network of relatives in rural areas is a frequently resorted-to social capital. Relatives are asked to take care of left-behind children on the basis of kinship and affinity, thereby making up to some extent for the absence of parent-children affection.

In fact, what causes psychological problems among left-behind children in rural areas is a combination of or interaction among several unfavorable factors. For example, usually it is the poorer families that see mothers away at work in cities on their own, or children separated from both parents for a long time. For another example, poverty, discrimination and discrimination awareness follow on the heels of each other. Children affected by multiple negative factors are among the most vulnerable groups in rural China.

4. An Extended Analysis

What has been written so far is an analysis of left-behind children in rural areas and the impact of their respective families. We want to correct the view that all left-behind children are problem children, because we do not think it is right to blame all inadequacies of left-behind children on the absence of parents or a lack of parenting.

However, left-behind children in rural areas are confronted with all kinds of challenges that cannot be tackled by family strategies alone, because they, like most rural children, are placed in various disadvantageous structures. Many studies point out structural shortcomings in the household registration system and education. This chapter focuses on structural shortcomings in family, community and education; it also seeks to identify resources available to help left-behind children.

4.1 The Split-up Family

Peasant farmers become migrant workers not only because of limitations imposed by the household registration system, but also because of institutional design.

Rural migrant workers are often forced to split up their family. True, the household registration system and the dual rural-urban structure are the key drivers. However, the split-up family model is sustained despite the adoption of a series of policies favourable to migrant workers and their children. There must be more at play than just institutional inertia. As low-skilled labor, migrant workers earn low wages. Only by strict budgeting can they subsist in the city while sending money home. It is extremely difficult to put aside enough money for the entire family to live together in an urban area. Since they are non-residents in the city, they cannot enjoy benefits such as housing, education and health care that are available to urban residents, which is another reason why migrant-worker families have to split up. In recent years, city officials have given priority to real estate development, as well as to attracting high-end industries and top talents, which entails the exclusion of rural migrant workers and their families, forcing the split-up family model to continue.

In order to maintain the split-up family, rural migrant workers resort to the network of relatives at their home village. It is because of such traditional resources that left-behind children still enjoy a relatively normal life and growth. "Guardianship by grandparents" used to be widely criticized, but all studies show that this model prevails, especially among families in which both parents are migrant workers. Besides parents, grandparents are the closest family members to left-behind children. They provide basic care to children when parents have to work away from home. However, such precious traditional resources are dwindling as a result of rapid industrialization, urbanization and the change in people's values. When migrant workers born in the 1980s become grandparents, will they care for their grandchildren the way their parents and grandparents cared for them?

4.2 The Disintegration of Rural Society

The "hollowing out of rural China" owing to massive migration of peasant farmers to urban areas, a solemn concept proposed by Yan Hairong, has become a catchphrase.

In recent years, the government has adopted more policies to promote rural development, including coordinated urban-rural development (2003), the removal of agricultural tax (2006), the construction of a new countryside (2006) and free compulsory education (2008). Farmers are subject to less economic pressure. Rural environment and facilities have been improved, to different degrees. Social services such as the new rural cooperative medical system, subsistence allowances and the relief system for the poorest households have enabled peasant families to better withstand risks. The community environment has a greater impact on left-behind children. In villages where there is cohesion and a strong sense of mutual assistance, left-behind children live a "healthy and happy life" despite the absence of their parents.

The scattering of villagers outside the village is one, but not the only reason why villagers are less connected than before. Even relations among villagers who still live in the village are less close than before. Migrant work and marketization have resulted in social stratification in villages. Families that have become better-off thanks to migrant work have moved to cities. Families that stay behind are stratified by income and standard of living. Some poor families and families whose economic conditions have not been improved despite migrant work have been marginalized; so have children from such families. Favorable government policies do provide minimum security, but they do not increase social resources in rural areas.

For example, the new rural cooperative medical system fails to attain the goal of "mutual assistance and mutual aid" in many localities. Such a "pay to benefit" system does not enhance solidarity among villagers. In recent years, many villages, townships and rural schools have been consolidated. Since the government still controls most social resources, while it takes time for private resources to emerge, localities that are no longer administrative centers go downhill rapidly, making it more difficult for rural families, especially left-behind families, to handle administration-related affairs or ask for help.

4.3 Centralized Schooling: A New Issue in Rural Education

Education is a key topic in studies on left-behind children in rural areas. As already discussed, when it comes to compulsory education, there is little difference between left-behind children and average rural kids. That is to say, there are factors more important than parenting influencing the education of all children.

Education—and especially education in rural areas—has already become a social focus and an area in which the calls for reform are the loudest. In recent years, funding for compulsory education has been restructured (additional education tax, fundraising for education, tuition and fees during compulsory education have been removed), but fiscal appropriation is far from sufficient. Consequently, many rural schools have been consolidated. For example, in two townships we studied in 2006, eleven village schools in one town were reduced to two, while fourteen village schools in another town were reduced to five. As a result, village kids have to travel longer distances to school. Some have to walk three to four kilometers, or even farther. Public schools do not provide school buses. Roaring traffic poses great danger to younger students. Parents or grandparents have to accompany them to and back from school. Some elderly people who do not have the skills to ride a bicycle resort to wheelbarrows. Dropping off and picking up school children have become a new burden to villagers, especially families with left-behind children.

In order to address issues arising from centralized schooling, education authorities have started to promote boarding schools. Since there is government investment and practical construction projects, local governments responded enthusiastically. Most rural junior high schools are boarding schools. In some places, even primary school students are accommodated by the school, creating unnatural separation of children from their parents. The economic burden on rural families goes up because of lodging, food and transportation costs, which offsets the positive impact of policies reducing farmers' burden ("two exemptions and one subsidy"①). To make matters worse, the enclosed management model of boarding schools fails to take into consideration students' psychological needs. Plus, living conditions at those boarding schools are less than satisfactory, causing more students to grow weary of study or even drop out.

Centralized schooling can cause other problems, such as the erosion of values due to utilitarianism, mental health deterioration, suicides and juvenile delinquency. Marginal groups are at the greatest risk.

4.4 Support for Left-behind Children and Empowerment

Currently, there are support programmes② for left-behind children in

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① The tuition and fee exemption and subsidies for compulsory-education-age students from poor rural families, which came into effect in 2001. Textbooks are paid for by the central government, whereas fees and subsidies are covered by local governments.

② The State Council's National Working Committee on Children and Women, local offices of the Women's Federation, the China Youth League and the Youth Pioneers, offices of the UN and other international organizations in China and domestic NGOs have all launched such programmes, for example, "Squad for Left-behind Children", organized by Tan Haimei of Feidong County, Anhui Province, "Trinity" education and protection network in Qingshen County, Sichuan Province. Bu Wei studied over 100 programmes that offer support for left-behind children. (卜卫. 关于农村留守儿童的研究和支持行动模式的分析报告[J]. 中国青年研究,2008(06))

rural areas. Some programmes are based on the assumption that "what left-behind children need the most is family affection". They hope to leverage external forces to provide family-like warmth to left-behind children. However, as having been discussed in previous sections, what left-behind children as well as non-left-behind children and children on the move with migrant-worker parents need the most is equal access to education, friendly community environment, respect from adults, urban residents and the upper class. Moreover, the parent-child relationship is hard to substitute. It takes a long time for people living together to grow close to each other. How can proxy families replace real families?

Furthermore, successful support programmes are often backed by strong input of resources, such as expert support and funding. They cannot benefit all left-behind children. Another issue to be considered is the feelings of beneficiaries—left-behind children and their parents. Are they treated as objects of implementation or subjects with free will? In other words, the first question to ask is whether prospective beneficiaries have been consulted during the programme design process. Not all left-behind children want special care, nor are all parents interested in sending their children to boarding schools. The second question to ask is whether the dignity of left-behind children and their parents is preserved or damaged a second time in the name of "support".

5. Conclusion: What Is Missing Is More than Family Affection

Problems with the psychology, education, health and safety of left-behind children in rural areas arise not only from the lack of affection in the split-up family, but also from a combination of multiple unfavorable factors plus a shortage of resources. The incomplete family only adds to the severity of the problems. The combination of multiple unfavorable factors makes the incompleteness of families stand out even more.

Problems with left-behind children in rural areas are not limited to those caused by the act of leaving behind. They are related to wider and deeper social problems. They cannot be addressed by a package of administrative measures and scattered projects. They are both pressing and lasting.

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Ethics and Equity in Daughters' Providing for Parents

—A Gender Study of Intergenerational Relationships in Rural Families in East Zhejiang Province

Daughters have always been ignored or under-studied in the abundant research on Chinese families, including those on rural families. One reason might be the ambiguity and uncertainty concerning daughters' identity and familial affiliation. According to Fei Xiaotong (Fei Hsiao-Tung), the life of a daughter is divided into two periods: one of being obedient to her father and one of being obedient to her husband. In the latter case, "the daughter is raised for another family" and "comparable to siphoned off water that cannot be retrieved" (Fei, 1998: 198). Other scholars note that a daughter has no inexorable rights in a patrilineal family. Prior to marriage, females are a "dependency population", or "adherents", who live temporarily in their first familial homes. After marriage, they become members of their husband's family (Shiga, 2003: 353; Chen, 1990: 169; Cohen, 2005: 83). The other reason is that a daughter does not have an instrumental function in her patrilineal family's home. Unmarried women are neither principal members of their family nor entitled to genealogical or property inheritance, so they are exempted from responsibilities to their family. Thus, they are "incidental beneficiaries" of the male descent system (Shiga, 2003: 353 – 375).

With the structural changes taking place in contemporary rural Chinese society, researchers have come to note the increasing instrumentality of daughters to their patrilineal family. A number of studies show that daughters today are developing closer ties with their family than did those from previous generations. They play a more significant role in paying for daily and major expenditures, the education and marriage of their brothers, and support for their parents. Although daughters are still not counted as full members of their family or expected to provide for parents, their status within the patrilineal family has been greatly elevated in regard to income, resources, and welfare. This field study looks at the issues of daughters in rural Chinese families with a focus on intergenerational relationships and care for the elderly among rural families in East Zhejiang Province from 2007 to 2009.

1. Parental Care and Gender Differences in Provision for the Elderly

According to Zhaodi, a woman married into Village A in East Zhejiang Province, women today care more about their parents' family than their husband's. For example, on the occasion of the Dragon Boat Festival, the wife of her brother gave one kilo of pork and one kilo of rice cake to her in-laws, but 200 yuan to her parents; for the Chinese New Year, she gave 500 yuan to her in-laws and 1,110 yuan to her parents. According to Zhaodi, "These days, whichever family you look into, you will find daughters contribute more than sons." In fact, Zhaodi herself is much more generous with her own parents. She calculated that with all the money she has spent buying things for her parents, plus gifts of cash, her contribution was on par with her brother's, the only son in the family. She said, "Giving to my own parents is a matter of conscience. Giving to my in-laws is a matter of obligation. My brother is obligated to our parents."

Uncle Chen from Village B in East Zhejiang holds a similar view. He observed, "Daughters support their parents out of affection. Sons do so out of duty." In East Zhejiang, it has become quite common for married daughters to have a say in their parents' household, especially in providing for their parents. Although many villagers, out of habit, still regard sons as the major source of provision for old age, they concede that daughters' contributions in cash and in kind are, more often than not, about the same as sons'. They would concede even more readily that daughters are superior to sons in exerting themselves for the sake of their parents and in their consideration of them.

This study found a number of interesting gender differences in villagers' behavior and perception of provision for the elderly. First, sons usually provide for the basic needs of their parents and regard such actions as necessary, whereas daughters provide for a higher level of material and spiritual needs. Second, sons usually expect something in return from their parents, but daughters do not. There is a saying among the villagers that daughters can suffer losses, but sons cannot. It is quite normal for sons to haggle with their parents over the details of their provision. Third, support by a son is viewed as a "provision", while support by a daughter is considered "filial piety". Although in Chinese tradition, filial piety consists of piety as well as provision, villagers seem to distinguish one from the other. Fourth, support by a son is compulsory and formal, but support by a daughter is voluntary and informal.

2. Patriarchal Rules of Intergenerational Inheritance

It would be overly simplistic and radical to attribute morality to gender without taking into account the ethical institutional bases underlying the different support behaviors of sons and daughters. Here understanding and interpreting the logic of provision by sons and daughters are examined from two perspectives: the rules of intergenerational inheritance and the ethics governing kinship.

"Inheritance concerns not only property, but also the family name" (Shinga, 2003: 102, citing the Draft Qing Dynasty Law). In the traditional Chinese family, the younger generation inherits not only property, but also the obligation of maintaining the ancestral shrine, thereby ensuring the continuity of the clan. In a traditional society where the male heir is paramount, kinship develops along a patrilineal line. Heirs must be sons, even if they are unfilial or dishonest. Daughters are not considered rightful heirs (Shiga, 2003: 100). Thus, male descent is the governing principle in intergenerational inheritance.

The transfer of property is the physical manifestation of a male's descent. He also inherits rights and obligations from his father or another member of an older generation. The ethical grounds for such logic is the so-called father-son identification—that is, since the savings of the father and forefathers are to be passed on to the sons and grandsons who perpetuate the lineage, elders are justified in receiving benefits from the younger generation when the latter comes of age. Such benefits include provision for old age, burial, and the offering of sacrifice (Shiga, 2003: 104 - 117). It is a general rule in traditional Chinese society that the right to inherit entails the obligation to provide and show respect for one's parents (Cheng, 2006: 259). Indeed, observations made during this study and many others indicate that acknowledgment of the provision obligation usually coincides with dividing up family property and living apart. This is actually a process of mutual agreement, calculation, and direct exchange. Thus reciprocity is another principle of intergenerational inheritance.

As noted, the rules of intergenerational inheritance combine carrying on the family name, worship at the ancestral shrine, provision for parents, and inheritance of property. Since daughters are not heirs, they are excluded from the entire range of rights and obligations toward their parents. A woman is qualified to inherit from, and provide for, the older generation only in her husband's family because of her affiliation with him.

From the above analysis one can easily identify the major characteristics of the formal provision relationship in a traditional rural family in East Zhejiang Province in China: (i) The provision relationship is a product of the male-centered family hierarchy and excludes daughters from such relationships; (ii) The obligation to provide for the elderly comes with a qualification or an identity. Through obligation one gains position, status, and rights in the family hierarchy, including the right to property; (iii) Such obligation is more than children giving back to parents for having raised them. The formal provision relationship is utilitarian, pragmatic, and exchange oriented. Both child-rearing and provision for the old are done for selfish purposes within "the family", not for anyone else (Li, 2003: 124). The primary logic underlying the formal provision relationship in the family does not involve emotional exchanges or affection among family members.

Remarks by Zhaodi and other villagers show that sons and daughters have different motivations for supporting their parents. Sons are driven by duty, identity and provision, whereas daughters are motivated by conscience, affection and filial piety. Thus, there are at least two systems at work in intergenerational provision—one based on the norms of duty and identity, the other based on affection and family ties. Sons certainly have affection for their parents, but rules of provision based on negotiation and exchange dictate that equal exchange and bargaining are the major rationale behind their support for their parents. Daughters are excluded from the male-dominated rules of intergenerational inheritance, and thus at the same time are excluded from the model of intergenerational relationships based on negotiation and exchange. Usually they are not particularly keen on exchange and equity in intergenerational relationships. Even if there is exchange or reciprocity, it is done to show their appreciation for parenting. Therefore, provision by daughters is more often one way and voluntary. The demarcation of everyday ethics guiding sons and daughters helps understand differences in provision behaviors in rural China.

3. Ethics Guiding Daughters' Obligation to Provide for Aging Parents

Is a daughter's informal provision for her parents entirely voluntary as suggested by some villagers? Approximately 90 percent of daughters surveyed responded in the negative. According to them, and some villagers, if daughters do not support their parents, they are pressured and stand to be accused of being unfilial, heartless, and a humiliation for their parents. Thus in reality, daughters are not only assuming more responsibilities for provision, but also being bound by ethics to do so. Why are daughters now expected to provide for their parents? How long have these guiding ethics existed?

The custom of daughters providing for their parents emerged after the land contract reform that took place during the 1980s, perhaps for two reasons: the urgent need of rural families and the increasing influence daughters exerted on the family because of their better lives, including more abundant, disposable resources. Familial needs have grown in sync with improvements in opportunities for daughters and thus their ability to provide for their parents. This has been reflected in a change in the instrumentality of children to their parents.

Sons are less instrumental to parents than before for a number of reasons. First, as family structures have changed, with power shifting toward women, including daughters-in-law, it has become more difficult, and less logical, for parents to depend solely on their sons. Second, the elderly grew up in the collective era, and as a consequence, they accumulated little personal or family wealth. This means that they may lack sufficient resources to exchange with their sons for provision. In addition, individualism, consumerism, and materialism have spread in rural China with the penetration of the market economy. It has, therefore, become unrealistic to substitute "filial" culture for material exchanges between generations. Third, because of mechanization in farming, sons are no longer considered indispensible. Smaller households and less arable land per household have also reduced parents' dependency on sons. Fourth, if possible, sons typically take jobs in urban areas, making it, physically and emotionally, impossible or difficult for them to look after their parents. The decline in sons' instrumentality poses a threat to the provision of the elderly in rural China, especially those who matured the greater part of their lives in the collective era.

Meanwhile, daughters are gaining in instrumentality. First, more men than women typically leave their village to take up jobs in urban areas. In Village A, fewer than 30 percent of males eighteen to fifty years of age had chosen to stay in the village instead of seeking jobs elsewhere. By contrast, more than 50 percent of adult females chose to remain in the village. Also, it was once a disadvantage for married daughters to live away from their parents, but now it is easier for them than for their brothers to travel to their home village. As a consequence, daughters have more frequent interaction with their parents, so the elderly are more likely to depend on them for care.

Second, power in the family has shifted toward women. Higher household incomes in rural areas benefit the relatives of those who control the family resources. Therefore, the parents and relatives of married women benefit from the changed power structure in rural families.

Third, with provision by sons generally defined as "enough food on the plate", any added provision would most likely come from daughters, who expect nothing in return. Provision by daughters is, in essence, a strategic adaptation by rural families to inadequate support by sons for the elderly.

It can be seen from the above analysis that the dynamics behind the two kinds of provision for the elderly exert different ethical pressure on children. For sons, there is the pressure of identity and duty, while for daughters they involve affection and conscience. Identity is inflexible. Since sons inherit the family name and property, parents make what are considered to be justifiable demands on them for provision. Affection and conscience are "soft" constraints, as they are not part of the traditional family institution. The lonely and poor elderly, however, now appeal increasingly to their daughters' affection when their sons fail to provide adequately. With the passage of time, provision by daughters has gradually become a norm, bringing with it ethical pressure. The different sources of pressure seem to suggest that in the provision for the elderly in rural China, sons have formal and contractual responsibilities or obligations, while those for daughters are informal, non-contractual and ambiguous. In other words, sons are bound by explicit rules, while daughters are bound by implicit rules.

4. Daughters' Informal Identity, Rights, and Obligations

The preceding analysis indicates that, in practice, daughters are assuming obligations for provision similar to those for sons, but the intergenerational descent and inheritance system, particularly within a patrilineal family structure, has not changed accordingly. There remain different rights corresponding to different responsibilities or obligations. For sons, their formal and "contractual" provision obligation derives from their identity in the patrilineal family, that is, their status as heirs and holders of the family's memorial tablets. The recognition of sons as performers of contractual obligations gives them the right to inherit and possess the property of the elderly generation. By contrast, since daughters are not entitled to property inheritance, the money and effort they spend on parents is not considered formal provision. Rather, this informal and non-contractual provision is regarded as voluntary. With their obligation and contribution unrecognized formally, daughters gain no right or benefit from offering provision.

Scholars generally agree that in a traditional Chinese family, intergenerational exchanges, be them deferred exchanges or immediate exchanges, follow a principle of equity. This study argues that there are two aspects of equity within a family. First is equality among people, including age and gender equality, and second is judicial equity in matching rights with obligations. The provision rules and practices in rural families do not grant equity to daughters. In rural China, there are many implicit or explicit rules governing the intergenerational relationship between daughters and parents. Daughters have social status and right-obligation mixes different from those of sons.

First, the 1928 civil law of the Republic of China as well as the civil law and marriage law of the People's Republic of China grants equal rights to all kin, theoretically putting an end to patriarchy by stipulating that daughters and sons are equally entitled to inherit family property and are equally obliged to support or provide. Therefore, from a legal perspective, daughters are equal to sons in social status, rights and obligations. Rural women, however, have not enjoyed such equality in the more than eighty years since 1928.

Second, family hierarchy following the rule of unilineal descent means that daughters and sons have unequal family and social status. On the other hand, there is consistency in rights and obligations for both sons and daughters in intergenerational exchanges: sons, obliged to provide for parents, are entitled to inherit family property; daughters, while deprived of the right to inherit family property, are exempted from provision obligations. The equity in rights and obligations between sons and daughters is based on inequality in family and social status. The former can be called passive equity and the latter active equity.

Third, provision practices today destroy both kinds of equity for daughters. On the one hand, the patrilineal inheritance system remains unchanged, and daughters are still treated differently from sons. Not only are they still denied inheritance, but also they themselves have come to accept this fact. On the other hand, as rural family structure changes and traditional provision comes under threat, daughters are expected to provide for their elderly parents, and they do.

5. Conclusion: Changes and Continuation of Family

Family is often mistaken for clan in China. The concept of family has rarely been applied throughout Chinese history. Some Western researchers equate the "conjugal family" with a "branch of a clan." Chen Qinan disagrees: "The differences between a branch of a clan and a family are to be made using the following criterion: first, if they include unmarried daughters; second, if only males are entitled to inherit; third, if it is subordinate in nature (the status of being a branch to something bigger)." In his opinion, the so-called conjugal family, stem family, and joint family contrast sharply with a clan because they do not adhere to the paternal line (Chen, 1990: 145 – 147).

Goode (1982) pointed out in *The Family*, his classic work on family evolution, that with modernization, consanguinity-based extended families will be replaced by conjugal families. The latter will encourage and realize individualistic and egalitarian values to the greatest extent. The traditional family relationship dictating the subordination of individual interests to the interests of the broader family will disintegrate, and individual obligations tied to the extended family system will be weakened. Despite many other theories differing from Goode's family modernization hypothesis, Goodes' views on the relative autonomy of nuclear families, equality, and democracy within the nuclear family have been proven by the experiences of many non-Western countries, China included. It is exactly because of such evolution in family relationships that women in the case study here have found a new position within the family, equal rights within their own homes, and the right to prioritize relationships independent of their husband's family.

Nevertheless, the autonomy enjoyed by the nuclear family and the inclination toward equality within nuclear families have not brought down the family cultural structure. Although traditional, multifunctional extended families, or clans, are basically extinct, core family institutions, such as patrilineal descent and property inheritance, have not dissolved with the decline of extended families and patriarchal power. They maintain their "cultural toughness," mandating people's social identity and inheritance rights. Therefore, Friedman (2000: 30 – 40) is right in stating that there are major differences between the family and higher-level units of relationship in a clan. Women may have come to assume equal power within the nuclear family, but beyond it, their formal role vanishes in the clan hierarchy. In other words, women now may enjoy a higher position inside the nuclear family, but they are still denied equality outside it.

The abolition of patrilineal familial culture and institutions does not seem to fit the model proposed by some sociologists in which their discontinuation results naturally from shrinking family size. The nuclear family has been dominant in villages in East Zhejiang Province for the past thirty years. The Western experience was that the mix of rights and obligations based on blood relations would gradually be replaced by another kind of human bond based on contracts. Therefore, for the transition from an identity society where males inherit everything to a contractual society where everyone can take part equally, the power, privileges and responsibilities of a family must be acknowledged by law and identity-based social relations replaced by contractual relations (Maine, 2006).

In East Zhejiang Province, however, rights have not been substituted for family privileges and village regulations or agreements. Indeed, some scholars blame the entry of state power into rural society for the loss of traditional rural values and the challenges confronting provision for the elderly there (Guo, 2001), but one sees a continuation of tradition rather than substitution of state power when it comes to the core of the family system. Provision for the aged and equal inheritance rights for women and men are good cases in point. Relevant laws exist, but the society-wide realization of equal rights in the legal sense seems hardly possible when it depends solely on contractual relations. According to Cohen (2005: 80), the primary reason for tradition to continue is that although the state may vigorously promote economic and social changes, it will accept and tolerate traditional family customs as long as there is no feasible alternative. The state is reluctant to intervene in family arrangements. As long as there are uncertainties in rural China, people will not abandon such arrangements.

Changes in rural Chinese families, unlike those presupposed by modernization theories, do not follow the either-tradition-or-modernization approach. Instead, two family structures coexist: on one hand, nuclear families and equality and autonomy within the nuclear family are common; on the other hand, the patrilineal family structure and descent rules are perpetuated on a broader scale (involving community and village regulations and agreements). Of interest, these two structures are not wholly at odds with each other. Rather, they mix with and complement each other. Daughters providing provision for elderly parents is a good example of how farmers utilize "modern" family resources to make up for the inadequacies of traditional institutions. Both tradition and modernity can be seen in farmers' daily lives, but they do not sense the conflict. The complicated mix of family behaviors may reflect the tension between the two structures.

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Having a Second Child

—Factor Analysis of Both-Only-Child Couples*

1. Issues and Background

At the turn of the twenty-first century, as the first batch of only children approached marriageable and childbearing age, "both-only-child" couples (that is, in which both husband and wife are the only child of their respective parents) emerged. The issue of their having a second child soon attracted the attention of scholars, especially in the field of demography.

Since the adoption of the one-child policy in China, local governments have always allowed both-only-child couples to have a second child. Such a

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policy seems like compensation to a certain extent: since the parents were allowed to have one child only, their child, when married to another only child, is entitled to have two children. In fact, there is an implicit assumption in this policy: when an only child starts a family, they are willing to have a second child. Their parents and others around them are also in favour.

The discussions of demographic scholars often start with the same assumption. They are concerned with the impact of having a second child on China's overall fertility rate. "As only children approach marriageable and childbearing age, how much will the fertility rate go up? Will it affect the attainment of China's established strategic target for population growth?"① "The larger the proportion of single children among their peers, the more the policy fertility rate increases. As fertility rate goes up in the future, rebound in population growth may occur."② Scholars even predict a new baby boom.

However, it is worth asking whether the subjects under discussion (both-only-child couples) are all willing to have a second child. Is there any difference in fertility desire between them and those couples who are not the only child to their respective parents? What factors are related to both-only-child couples' desire for a second child? These are the questions this study attempts to answer.

2. Literature Review

The available literature focuses mainly on peasant farmers having a second child. Little research has been done on urban couples having a second child. Researchers did not realize there was such an issue until the

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① 杨书章,郭震威.中国独生子女现状及其对未来人口发展的影响[J].市场与人口分析,2000(04).

② 姜玉,田丰,周欣欣.第一代独生子女婚姻生育选择及对未来人口和家庭结构的影响——兼与庄渝霞商榷生育政策调整的可行性[J].青年研究,2009(02).

arrival of the twenty-first century, when the first batch of only children approached marriageable and childbearing age, and when both-only-child couples emerged. Our literature search returned only three papers published by Ma Xiaohong and Hou Yafei based on the same survey of both-only-child couples in Beijing. ①

According to their findings, both-only-child couples did not have an explicit wish to have a second child. Compared with a previous survey conducted in 2002, urban both-only-child couples did have a higher preference for two children and were more willing to actually have a second child. However, among both-only-child couples who had already had their first child, only 24 percent were willing to have a second child, down from the 26.9 percent found in 2002. However, 25 percent of all both-only-child couples stated their willingness to have a second child, which was consistent with findings in the previous survey.

This research provides valuable insights into the willingness of both-only-child couples to have a second child. However, there are some limitations. For one thing, the sample was taken entirely in Beijing; as a result, it may not be representative of China as a whole. For another, this research did not survey non-both-only-child couples of similar age in Beijing, consequently failing to compare the desire for a second child between the two groups. Furthermore, this research did not analyse factors related to the willingness of both-only-child couples to have a second child. Therefore, further research on the current state, relevant factors and potential trends of urban both-only-child couples' having a second child seems necessary.

① 马小红,侯亚非.北京市独生子女及“双独”家庭生育意愿及变化[J].人口与经济,2008(01);侯亚非,马小红.北京城市独生子女生育意愿研究[J].北京社会科学,2008(01);侯亚非,马小红,黄匡时.北京城市女性独生子女生育意愿和生育行为研究[J].人口与发展,2008(01).

3. Research Design

We did a sample survey among over 1,200 married young people in five major Chinese cities in 2008. Firstly, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan and Chengdu were chosen because they had a relatively high percentage of the first generation of only children getting married. Secondly, after considering the years of birth of the first generation of only children, we identified our subjects as "young couples of whom at least one party was born in 1975 or later". Thirdly, stratified multi-stage sampling was used to randomly select two districts in each city, and then one neighbourhood in the selected district, and finally two communities in each selected neighbourhood. In each community we drew on data collected by the community administration and family planning department to categorize young married couples into "both-only-child couples", "only-child husband and non-only-child wife", "non-only-child husband and only-child wife" and "couples neither of whom is an only child". Twenty couples from each category in each community were randomly selected for inclusion in the survey (15 as survey subjects, five as standbys); 320 couples from each of the five cities made up the total sample of 1,600.

Couples in the sample were asked to fill in a questionnaire. Our investigators were instructed to rotate respondents by gender; in other words, if the man of the first couple surveyed responded, the wife of the second couple should be persuaded to respond. There were a total of 1,215 valid questionnaires, making the response rate 76 percent. The sample profile is presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Sample profile (N=1216)

Variable	Category	Number of people	Percentage(%)
Gender	Male	557	45.8
	Female	659	54.2
Identifier	Only child	697	57.3
	Non-only child	519	42.7
Year of birth	Before 1979	731	60.2
	After 1980	484	39.8
Education	High school or lower	419	34.7
	Junior college	401	33.2
	College or above	388	32.1
Couple type	both-only-child	326	26.8
	Only-child husband and non-only-child wife	278	22.9
	Non-only-child husband and only-child wife	303	24.9
	Couples neither of whom is an only child	309	25.4

The concept of fertility desire usually consists of three aspects: preferred number of children, preferred timing of childbirth and preferred gender of children.① Among the three, "preferred number of children" is the most important indicator of fertility desire. It is also consistent with the objective of this research. This chapter will focus on the preferred number of children of both-only-child couples and their peers. The other two aspects will not be discussed. In our questionnaire, we asked about all respondents' preference by asking, "If it was up to you to decide, how many children would you have?" For both-only-child couples, we designed a specific question: "According to state regulations, Both-only-Child couples can have two children. Are you willing to have two children?"

Particular attention was paid to the comparison of the fertility desire of

① 顾宝昌.论生育与生育转变:数量、时间和性别[J].人口研究,1992(06).

both-only-child couples and that of other couples (including couples with one party being an only child and couples neither of whom is an only child) of similar age in the same community. Variables related to personal background that may have affected the willingness to have a second child were analysed in order to achieve a better understanding.

4. Results and Data Analysis

4.1 Comparison of the Desire for a Second Child between Both-Only-Child Couples and Other Couples

Table 2 Comparison and statistical test (%)

Preferred number of children	both-only-child couples	Couples with one party being an only child	Couples neither of whom is an only child
Zero	2.5	1.9	2.3
One	60.9	61.1	58.1
Two	36.0	36.1	37.6
Three	0.6	0.9	2.0
Average	(1.35)	(1.36)	(1.39)
(N)	(325)	(579)	(303)
Chi-square test	Chi-square =4.021 df=6 p=.674		

Table 2 illustrates that 60 percent of both-only-child couples prefer one child only, about 40 percent would like to have two, while very few wish for no child or three children. The distribution is very similar to that of other couples and the average preferred number of children is very close to that of other couples, too. A test of statistical significance shows no significant difference. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that, at present, both-only-child couples have almost the same fertility desire as other peer couples. Only 30 - 40 percent would like to have two children.

4.2 Fertility Desire Comparison between this Survey and the Beijing-Only Survey

Table 3 Both-only-child couples and both-only-child couples with children (%)

Survey sample	Sample size	0 child	1 child	2 child	3+	Average
both-only-child couples in the Beijing-only survey	642	15.9	49.5	34.1	0.5	1.19
both-only-child couples in the five-city survey	325	2.5	60.9	36.0	0.6	1.35
both-only-child couples with children in the Beijing-only survey	192	0	60.8	36.6	0	1.34
both-only-child couples with children in the five-city survey	164	0.6	58.5	39.6	1.2	1.41

* The total percent in Beijing-only survey is less than 100% as it is in the original report

Table 3 shows approximately the same results from the Beijing-only survey and the five-city survey. If we look at all both-only-child couples, we will find the percentage of both-only-child couples wishing not to have children in the Beijing survey is much higher than the five-city survey and there is a much lower percentage of both-only-child couples wishing for one child in the Beijing survey than the five-city survey. The other percentages are quite similar. If we look at the average preferred number of children, we will find 1.2 for the overall Beijing-only sample and 1.35 for the overall five-city sample. This significant difference results, in fact, from the higher percentage of both-only-child couples not wishing to have a child in the Beijing-only survey. Percentages relevant to both-only-child couples with children in both surveys are even closer. The average preferred number of children ranges between 1.3 and 1.4 in both cases. The most striking similarity between the two surveys, which happens to be a focal point of this research, is the desire for a second child. The difference, be it between all both-only-child couples or both-only-child couples with children in the two surveys, is less than 3 percent.

In order to further study the possibility of both-only-child couples having a second child, we compared answers to relevant questions in both surveys. The results are as follows:

Table 4 The desire for a second child among both-only-child couples (%)

Survey sample	Sample size	Willing to have a second child	Unwilling to have a second child	Can't decide (husband-wife disagreement)
both-only-child couples in the Beijing-only survey	642	26.9	42.9	26.9
both-only-child couples in the five-city survey	314	27.1	62.1	10.8
both-only-child couples with children in the Beijing-only survey	192	24.0	43.8	32.3
both-only-child couples with children in the five-city survey	156	28.2	59.6	12.2

* The total percent in Beijing-only survey is less than 100% as it is in the original report

Because the Beijing-only survey phrased the third possible answer to this question differently from the five-city survey, the distribution of answer choices differs across the four samples.① However, in all four samples, about 30 percent of respondents indicate their willingness to have a second child (the focus of this research). The percentages of couples "willing to have a second child" in Table 4 are generally lower than the percentages of couples choosing "2 children" in Table 3. Which set of

① The third choice in the Beijing survey is "Can't decide", whereas our five-city survey gave two choices: "Husband yes, wife no" and "Husband no, wife yes". In Table 4 they are both put under "Husband-wife disagreement" in the far right column. "Can't decide" may describe some respondents better, while our survey may have forced respondents into either of the two choices. Of course, "Can't decide" may also have covered up the real thoughts of those respondents who were reluctant to share something very private with strangers, which led to a higher percentage of people choosing this alternative.

results reflects reality better? This author attributes the difference to question framing. When asked about "fertility desire", respondents tend to consider the positive aspects. However, when told that having a second child was allowed by regulations, respondents would have more realistic considerations or they would even think about the negative aspects. Consequently, the answers to the question framed in the second way reflect reality better. That is to say, around 30 percent is a more reliable figure to quote in answer to the question of how many both-only-child couples prefer two children.

4.3 Factor Analysis of Both-Only-Child Couples' Willingness to Have a Second Child

Table 5 Conjoint analysis: both-only-child Couples' personal information versus their desire for a second child (%)

Correlated variable	Category	Fertility desire			Significance test of difference
		One child only	Will have two children	Husband-wife disagreement	
Gender	Male	63.7	28.8	7.5	p=.208
	Female	60.7	25.6	13.7	
Education	High school or lower	65.2	27.3	7.6	p=.216
	Junior college	67.0	25.7	7.3	
	College or above	56.6	27.9	15.4	
Year of birth	1979 or before	63.6	27.3	9.1	p=.731
	1980 or after	61.1	26.9	11.9	
Fertility state	One child	59.6	28.2	12.2	p=.613
	No child	64.6	25.9	9.5	
City	Beijing	80.7	17.5	1.8	p=.035
	Shanghai	60.5	26.3	13.2	
	Nanjing	55.9	25.4	18.6	
	Wuhan	53.2	35.5	11.3	
	Chengdu	61.7	30.0	8.3	

According to Table 5, the desire for a second child of the first batch of one-child-only couples is not related to their respective gender, age (before 1979 or after 1980), education or whether they already have one child or not, but is somewhat related to the city they are living in. Both-only-child couples in Wuhan and Chengdu, two cities in Midwestern China, are more willing to have a second child than those in Shanghai and Nanjing. both-only-child couples in Beijing are the least willing to have a second child.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

5.1 Conclusion

Based on a survey among 1,200 married young people in five Chinese cities, this study compares the desire for a second child among the first generation of both-only-child in Chinese cities with that of non-both-only-child couples. It also conducts a conjoint analysis of both-only-child couples combining personal background variables with the desire for a second child. It is found that over 60 percent of both-only-child couples want one child only, while 30 - 40 percent of both-only-child couples would like to have two children. A more realistic estimate of couples who indeed give birth to two children would be around 30 percent. No significant difference is found in the fertility desire between both-only-child couples and their peers, which is consistent with the published previous survey in Beijing. Conjoint analysis shows that, except for location, personal background variables such as gender, age, education and whether there has already been one child or not are not significantly related to both-only-child couples' desire for a second child.

5.2 Discussion

Firstly, what is the significance of this research for the analysis and prediction of fertility trends? In the introduction we stated that, given current policies, the two important factors affecting China's fertility rate changes are the number of both-only-child couples and their desire for a second child. Scholars could draw on National Censuses and sample surveys of population to estimate the number of both-only-child couples. However, little research has been done on the fertility desire and the desire for a second child in particular, of both-only-child couples. Consequently, when predicting fertility trends, scholars usually base their simulations and calculations on assumptions about the fertility desire of both-only-child couples. One research study assumes that both-only-child couples will have a second child (that is, based on policy fertility rate).① In another research study there are two scenarios: 53 percent of both-only-child couples will have a second child; 88 percent of both-only-child couples will have a second child.② However, if these assumptions do not hold, fertility rate projections and simulation results will be wrong. This survey, together with a previous survey in Beijing, proves that only about 30 – 40 percent of both-only-child couples are willing to have a second child. This is a more objective reference for future fertility projections.

Secondly, what about the fertility desire of the entire first generation of only children? Our survey proves that the fertility desire of urban both-only-child couples is almost identical with that of their non-both-only-child peers. Thus what we have revealed is not the preference of both-only-child couples only, but the preference of all married urban young people born between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Previous research by this author on urban working young people—both single and married—states that "Non-only-children and only-children born in the first few years of China's

① 尹文耀. 中国独生子女家庭与二孩家庭生育模式百年模拟与选择[J]. 人口学刊,2001(03).

② 姜玉,田丰,周欣欣. 第一代独生子女婚姻生育选择及对未来人口和家庭结构的影响——兼与庄渝霞商榷生育政策调整的可行性[J]. 青年研究,2009(02).

Reform and Opening-up have similar fertility desire"①. This research proves once again that both-only-child couples, even though permitted to have a second child, do not have a significantly different fertility desire from their peers. In other words, this generation shares the same fertility desire. Such commonalities resulting from shared life experiences and social background are worth noting in analyses concerning their fertility or related issues.

Thirdly, what is the relationship between the personal background of both-only-child couples and their desire for a second child? Personal background is often an important explanatory variable in analyses of human attitude and behaviour, but in this research, gender, year of birth, education and whether there has already been a child or not are not significantly related to the desire for a second child. Location seems to be the only exception. Why so? This author believes age or generation to be the key variable here. Our sample population was born in the decade between 1975 and 1985, forming a quite homogenous generation of similar life experiences, values and views. This homogenous group would have relatively consistent thoughts and wishes if put within the same social structure and culture. Born in the same period of time, experiencing China's Reform and Opening-up, affected by social and cultural transition, they have developed similar values and behaviours. As individuals they are still distinct from one another, but the impact of such individual elements on fertility desire is dwarfed by the impact of generation-wide characteristics.

Fourthly, what are the limitations of this research? It focuses on the fertility desire of both-only-child couples in major cities. both-only-child couples in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities are under-represented. So are other types of young couples. Furthermore, this research analyses only a few personal

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① 风笑天. 青年个体特征与生育意愿——全国 12 城市 1786 名在职青年的调查分析[J]. 江苏行政学院学报, 2009(04).

features of both-only-child couples that are related to the willingness to have a second child, but not other relevant variables, such as economic conditions, age of their parents and the size of the city in which they live. Neither does this research study interactions among those variables. Finally, this research is limited to the first generation of urban both-only-child couples whose fertility desire is a function of the society and times they have experienced. What is true of them may not be true of later generations of both-only-child couples. We have to keep looking for new trends.

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On Work-Family Balance in China

—A Comparison Reflecting Gender and Occupational Positions*

1. Introduction

Having to juggle the demands of work and family is a universal problem. To obtain a clear picture of work-family balance in China, the following three perspectives must be taken into account:

(i) Transformation: under the planned economy, the work unit (or the employer) was the underlying mechanism supporting people's work and family, and double income families were common in urban areas. However, major changes have taken place since China began to emerge as a market economy, making it necessary to study work-family balance in China today.

(ii) Gender: men and women prioritize work and family differently, partly because of the traditional survival models of families in which "men earned the bread, women took care of the household duties". When women also become bread winners, they adopt a different approach toward work

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* *Studies on the Growth Pattern of Female Senior Personnel and Their Development Strategies* (a key philosophy and social sciences research project funded by the Ministry of Education, 2010) (10JZD0045 - 1). *A Study on Women's Social Status in China Today* (a major research project funded by the National Social Science Foundation, 2010) (10@ZH020).

and family. Three questions are proposed to understand gender differences: how are the demands of work handled, including overtime, business trips and working away from home, personal needs for promotion addressed and work arrangements positively responded to? How are family commitments—for example, taking care of aged parents, sick husband/wife and young children, attending parent-teacher conferences and birthday parties—scheduled and honoured? How are negative emotions dealt with, including stress, anxiety and frustration arising from inability to effectively allocate time and affection?

(iii) Public policies: namely family-friendly workplace and family-friendly policies put forward by organizations and the Chinese government. Individuals, families, organizations and the state are all responsible for achieving work-family balance.

This thesis will also review important academic work both in China and abroad.① It is becoming clear that gender equality and sharing of responsibilities are key to work-family balance. According to a survey of 89 countries, "when the status and power of women is higher, so is a nation's general quality of life; and when it's lower, so is the quality of life for all"②.

This thesis analyses work-family balance and time allocation in today's urban China based on survey data and attempts to answer the following questions: (i) How do the urban employed allocate time between work and family duties? (ii) How has the traditional gender-based division of labour—that is, men for work and women for family—evolved? (iii) What challenges do senior personnel, especially females, face at work and home, compared with general employees, and what strategies have they adopted to balance work and family? (iv) What supports are available to help balance work and family and what public policies should be proposed to

① 佟新.平衡工作和家庭的个人、家庭和国家策略[J].江苏社会科学,2012(02).

② [美]理安·艾斯勒.国家的真正财富——创建关怀经济学(原版 2007 年)[M].高铦,汐汐,译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2009.

help address this issue?

This study is based on data from the Third Survey on the Social Status of Women in China which was conducted on December 1, 2010. The decennial survey started in 1990 and is organized by the All-China Women's Federation and the National Bureau of Statistics. Targeting both male and female Chinese citizens (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) aged between 18 and 64, the survey is a comprehensive and systematic effort to collect data on women's socio-economic status from questionnaires that include questions on personal profile, education, employment, marriage and family. In addition, the Third Survey, for the first time in history, included an appendix in its regular questionnaire and a special questionnaire on senior personnel. The former was randomly given to those qualified as senior personnel during the main door-to-door survey. The latter used a proportional sampling approach: three groups of senior personnel—that is, party and government officials, skilled professionals and managers—were sampled in 31 provinces at a ratio of 1∶1∶1, with 126 participants from each province, 42 people in each group and a gender ratio of 1∶1. Specifically, party and government officials included only government decision-makers who were at deputy division director level or above; skilled professionals referred to those with above-middle-level professional certifications; managers were defined as senior managers of businesses, including department managers and other decision-makers.

Data collected from the regular questionnaire and the questionnaire on senior personnel (including both the appendix and the special edition) constitute the basis for the comparison between genders and across occupational positions. The samples were divided into urban employees (defined as working age population that is employed at the time of the survey, excluding the retired) and senior personnel. To analyze the relationship between work and family, "the employed" (excluding those re-employed after retirement) and "the married" who were randomly selected from the urban population (permanent residents with urban household registrations) were grouped as "married urban employees". Altogether, the qualified urban sample pool included 6,027 people, among which 3,337 were male (55.4%) and 2,690 were female (44.6%). "Married senior personnel" were also separated from the total sample of senior personnel and included 3, 871 people, among which 2,120 were male (54.8%) and 1,751 were female (45.2%).

Table 1 Sample profile①

		Urban Employees		Senior Personnel	
		Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
		Average /Percentage	**Average /Percentage**	**Average /Percentage**	**Average /Percentage**
Geographic Distribution②					
	East	41.8	38.0	30.0	30.3
	Middle Region	39.1	39.5	34.6	34.4
	West	19.1	22.5	35.4	35.3
Average Age		42.33	39.22	46.26	45.8
Age Groups					
	29 and below	17.5	10.1	0.6	1.0
	3 - 39	31.7	41.3	17.7	18.4
	4 - 49	37.9	41.8	49.8	51.9
	5 - 59	22.0	6.1	30.2	27.6
	60 and above	0.9	0.7	1.7	1.1

① In actual analysis, different variables have different number of missing values (including n/a).

② As per the geographic classification in the Second Survey on the Social Status of Women in China, the east includes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong; the middle region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Hainan; the west includes Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Tibet.

Continued

		Urban Employees		Senior Personnel	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
		Average /Percentage	Average /Percentage	Average /Percentage	Average /Percentage
Years of schooling, excluding adult education①		10.92	11	13.99	13.85
Education					
	Illiterate or almost illiterate	0.6	1.3	0.0	0.0
	Primary	4.2	4.6	0.0	0.1
	Junior Secondary	25.8	23.1	0.5	0.4
	Senior Secondary	23.6	20.8	2.2	1.6
	Occupational/Technical Secondary	10.8	11.7	2.4	1.6
	Junior College	19.6	22.6	15.8	11.8
	Undergraduate	14.2	14.9	47.6	48.7
	Postgraduate	1.2	1.0	31.5	35.8
Personnel					
	Managers			25.0	21.7
	Skilled Professionals			38.3	42.0
	Party & Government Officials			36.7	36.3

2. How Urban Families Allocate Time

In modern societies, industrialization has led to the separation of workplace and home, forming the basis of people's time schedules. Time

① Years of schooling refers of the number of years that the respondent has received formal education in schools, excluding adult education and off-school years, but including repeating years. Less than a year is counted as a full year.

discipline takes the form of highly integrated standardization, regularity and coordination of time; in other words, in their spatiotemporal paths, people are required to follow consistent and repeated routines and to connect with each other.① Time embraces new features in the modern world. Firstly, time is irreplaceable, thus the opportunity cost of time, that is, within the same period of time, one action is done at the cost of alternatives forgone. The cost of having a child is the loss of learning or promotion opportunities because of maternity leave. Overtime earnings are made at the expense of less time for leisure or family. Secondly, time is characterised by different levels of efficiency, thus giving rise to the concept of time availability or available time. In other words, there are efficiency or price differences in a unit of time; for example, working time is priced, time for domestic duties does not earn income and time spent on learning can generate revenue in the future. The husband's time may have a different price tag from that of the wife, and the potential efficiency of the spouse's wage impacts on the time schedule of domestic responsibilities. Thirdly, time can be planned and scheduled. Reaching a balance between work and family involves allocating time between the two. In modern times, work usually takes precedence.

An analysis of data collected from the Third Survey on the Social Status of Women in China reveals the following features concerning allocation of time and household duties in Chinese families.

First, fulltime-caregivers, mostly women, have emerged in some urban families. During the survey, among all married urban participants, 15.8 percent were of working age, but not employed (excluding retirees/early retirees), among whom 74.8 percent were women. A total of 58.8 percent out of the 15.8 percent unemployed spent most of their time on domestic duties, with women accounting for 94.8 percent. When asked

① Glennie, P. and Thrift, N. Reworking E. P. Thompson's "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism"[J]. Time and Society, 1996, 5(03): 275 - 299.

"why have you not found a job?", 70.6 percent of those who stayed at home answered that there were children to take care of and 27.4 percent had to take care of the aged or chronically ill in the family. Furthermore, 64.3 percent of those who stayed at home because of childcare used to have a job; for those who had to take care of the aged or chronically ill, the percentage was 62.7 percent. The main reason why married women quit paid jobs was "domestic responsibilities".

When asked if they "had neither job nor labour income for over 6 months since they went into the job market/farming", 18.8 percent of the male participants answered "yes", the average longest interruption being 25.73 months (2.14 years); among all main reasons for job interruption, marriage and childbirth/childcare accounted for only 2.3 percent, care for the aged or chronically ill only 2.7 percent. A total of 30.8 percent of the female participants had job interruptions, the average longest period being 33.63 months (2.80 years), the main reasons being marriage and childbirth/childcare (55.6 percent), with care for the aged or chronically ill accounting for 2.4 percent. Finally, 17 percent of the female urban employees quit their jobs because of childbirth, which had a deep impact on their career development, putting them in a negative position with regard to professional mobility.

Second, in the urban family, it is usually the wife who takes charge of domestic duties, although there are cases where the husband shares the burden.

Table 2 Division of domestic duties by occupational position (%)

		Urban Employees (N=6008)	**Senior Personnel(N=3830)**
Who takes more domestic responsibilities			
	Husband	8.6	7.6
	Wife	67.2	59.9
	Almost the same	24.2	32.5

Among the married urban employees, the wives took on most of the home duties in 67.2 percent of families, with the sharing (partnership) model taking up about 25 percent. The traditional division of household duties is still dominant in Chinese society. The results for women senior personnel were more favourable. Although women still took more responsibilities for household chores in almost 60 percent of those surveyed, the partnership model now took up about 30 percent.

Table 3 Division of domestic duties by gender and occupational position

	Did you work/study or take a day off yesterday?	Gender	Urban Employees	Senior Personnel
			Mean(minutes)	Mean(minutes)
Time spent on domestic duties① yesterday	Work/study	Male	46.7	45.39
		Female	107.18	85.35
	Day off	Male	104.79	103.13
		Female	177.67	176.72

In terms of total time, women spend far more time on household duties than men (one to four times that of men), whatever the occupational position or time category. The tradition of "women for domestic duties" has not changed. The difference between the genders is more significant than that across occupational positions. Men of all occupational positions are starting to share household duties more proactively. Especially during days off, men spend 2.3 times more time on home duties than on working days, though still less than women. Comparisons based on gender and occupational position find that occupational position is not a differentiating

① According to the manual of the Third Survey on the Social Status of Women in China, domestic duties include cooking, dish-washing, cleaning, washing, taking care of family members and dealing with other home responsibilities. Child-care includes taking care of the child's daily needs (dressing, clearing up, feeding, bathing, giving medicine, health care), education and tutoring, as well as his/her safety and outdoor activities. Aged care includes taking care of older persons' daily needs, health care, hospital visits, outdoor activities and chatting.

factor with regard to time spent on home duties among men, but is so among women. On working days, women senior personnel spend less time on home duties than general women employees; on days off, however, the two categories of women spend almost the same amount of time (about three hours) on household chores. In interviews with women senior personnel, almost all of the interviewees emphasized that they were usually too busy to spend a lot of time with family, but once available, they would personally cook for the family, though some of them had "helpers" at home. This emphasis is highly emotional and highlights the traditional perception of women's role in the family. A. R. Hochschild, an American sociologist, put forward the concepts of "emotion work" and "feeling rules" in her study of the complex relationships between gender, work, family and time in the process of commoditization. She believes that there is a whole set of social rules of feeling, a system that involves a series of exchanges between private life and public life.① Despite their senior positions at work, women senior personnel voluntarily practice the traditional feeling rules at home.

Thirdly, urban employees spend long hours working. To understand how time is allocated, the question "yesterday, how much time did you spend on income-generating jobs/labour/operating activities, study (including professional training and media-based learning, etc.) and travelling to and from places of work/labour/study?" was asked in the survey.

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① Hochschild, A. R. Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure[J]. The American Journal of Sociology. 1979, Vol. 85(03):551-575.

Table 4 Working time allocation by gender and occupational position

	Did you work/study or take a day off yesterday?	Gender	Urban Employees	Senior Personnel
			Mean(minutes)	Mean(minutes)
Time spent on income-generating work /labour/operating activities yesterday	Work/study	Male	491.93	464.22
		Female	473.6	464.06
	Day off	Male	51.23	85.78
		Female	63.07	88.67
Time spent on learning (including professional training and media-based learning) yesterday	Work/study	Male	22.04	76.06
		Female	20.58	73.06
	Day off	Male	23.55	75.78
		Female	22.52	69.18
Time spent on travelling to and from work/labour/study yesterday	Work/study	Male	48.00	68.04
		Female	43.66	75.41
	Day off	Male	10.26	37.05
		Female	10.47	39.71

Time spent on working, studying and travelling is categorized as work-related time. In terms of total work-related time, female senior personnel ranked first, followed by male senior personnel, male urban employees and female urban employees. Work-related time for female senior personnel was about 10 hours and 9 minutes, while for male senior personnel, it was about 10 hours and 7 minutes, indicating no significant gender difference in the senior personnel category. Gender difference is more obvious among the general employees: about 9 hours and 21 minutes for male and about 9 hours for female.

In the special questionnaire for senior personnel, answers to the question "who or which organization is most helpful in relieving the burden of housework" showed significant gender differences. To male senior personnel, their wives were most helpful (74.2 percent), followed by their mothers (8.2 percent), with private service providers accounting for only 1.8 percent. Among female senior personnel, 43.3 percent ranked their husbands as most helpful, followed by their mothers (23.6 percent), while private service providers accounted for only 7.1 percent; 10.5 percent answered there was "no extra help beyond themselves". The results showed that in the senior personnel category, most men can rely on their wives to relieve housework pressure, but much fewer women (30 percent less) have similar access to support from their husbands.

In summary, a woman, whether a general employee or senior personnel, spends 9 – 10 hours on work-related agenda and 1 – 2 hours on housework (a total of 11 hours) on working days, while for a man, whether a general employee or senior personnel, it is 9.5 – 10 hours and less than 50 minutes (a total of 11 hours), respectively. All have about 13 hours for rest and leisure activities. Obviously, in modern China, time pressure affects every urban employee, senior or not, whose time for rest and leisure is limited by the time standards of modern jobs. Such time discipline is universal without regard to gender. However, women are under double pressure: on one hand, although the traditional family role of women is changing, they still have to put in more time on housework than men; on the other hand, they spend no less time at work than men. Gender-based comparisons show that among all categories, women senior personnel devote the most time to work and home.

3. Work-Family Balance

When work roles and family roles are in tension, people have to put in extra efforts to reconcile the two. In this study, we are interested in what is prioritized when there is conflict between work and family. Traditionally, a balance between work and family is achieved via sex-based division of labour, in other words, "men for work, women for home". What are the differences between genders and across occupational positions today?

In order to understand what choices people make when work conflicts with family life, the following question was asked in the questionnaire for the Third Survey on Social Status of Women in China: "Have the following situations befallen to you in recent years? (i) Too busy to mind domestic duties; (ii) Have to give up personal development opportunities for your family"(choices include "often", "sometimes", "occasionally", "never").

Table 5 Work-family balance by gender and occupational position (%)

Too busy at work to mind family duties		Never	Occasionally	Sometimes	Often
Urban Employees					
	Male	25.3	32.7	21.5	20.5
	Female	30.0	35.1	21.5	13.4
	Subtotal	27.4	33.8	21.5	17.3
Senior Personnel					
	Male	12.5	32.2	27.9	27.4
	Female	14.4	36.2	28.6	20.8
	Subtotal	13.3	34.1	28.2	24.4
Give up personal development opportunities for family		Never	Occasionally	Sometimes	Often
Urban Employees					
	Male	67.7	20.5	9.8	2.0
	Female	59.0	22.5	13.6	4.9
	Subtotal	63.8	21.4	11.5	3.3
Senior Personnel					
	Male	59.2	28.3	11.1	1.4
	Female	49.9	30.8	16.5	2.8
	Subtotal	55.0	29.4	13.5	2.1

With regard to "too busy to mind family duties", there are differences between men and women and across occupational positions: (i) 41.9 percent of male urban employees were too busy to take care of family responsibilities, 7 percent higher than their female counterparts.①(ii) 55.3 percent of male senior personnel were too busy to mind domestic duties, 13

① Chi-square test: Pearson Chi-Square = 57.371, p = 0.000, indicating significant gender differences. Strength of Association: Cramer's V = 0.098.

percent higher than male urban employees, while for female senior personnel, the percentage was 49.4 percent, 15 percent higher than women urban employees.

Differences are also found between the two sexes and across occupational positions on "giving up personal development opportunities for family": (i) 8.8 percent more urban employees than senior personnel chose "never", while 8 percent more senior personnel than urban employees chose "occasionally", indicating differences in degree across positions; (ii) in terms of gender, of all positions, about 10 percent more men than women had "never" "given up personal development opportunities for family", but it is worth noting that over half of all women across all positions had chosen "never".

On "reasons for last job change" in the special questionnaire for senior personnel, 22.2 percent of women and 14.3 percent of men senior personnel chose "more time with family", indicating that women are more likely than men to change their jobs for the benefits of their family.

To sum up, modern urban workers have inherited the socialist tradition of both husband and wife being bread winners; men and senior personnel are more likely to ignore family because of their busy work schedule.

4. Childcare and Support

In an individual's life cycle and that of a family, the period after a baby is born and before it is three years old usually sees a dramatic increase in the housework burden. Under the planned economy, the work units (employers) supported double-income families in their childcare needs through publicly funded nurseries and kindergartens. With the dissolution of the work unit system, childcare is falling on the individual and the family. Childbirth and childcare are the most frequently cited reasons for mothers to quit jobs, which directly impacts on women's career development. Studies in the United Kingdom show that, even though they can afford domestic helpers, women managers take more responsibilities than their male partners in arranging and supervising childcare.①

In China, the average number of children per family is 1.13 in the urban employee category and 1.06 for senior personnel.

Table 6 Care of Children below three years of age by occupational position (%)

		Urban employees	Senior personnel
Who takes care of the last/this child in the daytime before he/she is three			
	Me	21.9	8.8
	My spouse	21.5	13.6
	My parents	27.6	30.1
	My spouse's parents	20.9	22.5
	Other family members	1.1	3.2
	Nanny/domestic worker	3.2	12
	Nursery/kindergarten	3.4	9.4
	All family	0.3	0.4
	Others	0.1	0.0
Did the last child/this child go to kindergarten after three years of age?			
	No	8.7	2.6
	Only preschool kindergarten	2.4	2.3
	Yes	88.9	95.1
Reasons why he/she did not go to kindergarten after three years of age			
	No need, as someone in the family can take care of him/her	53.0	25.5
	No good kindergarten nearby	36.2	68.6
	Can't afford the expenses	10.1	3.9
	Poor service quality	0.7	2.0

① Wajcman, Judy. Managing like a Man: Women and Men in Corporate Management[J]. Policy, 1998:152.

Among urban employees, 17 percent of women quit jobs because of childbirth. Based on answers to the question "who was in charge of childcare before the child reach the age of three?", the following conclusions can be drawn: (i) Cross-generational partnership is the most common form of childcare support. For urban employees, 48.5 percent had either the husband's or the wife's parents to help with childcare; for senior personnel, the percentage was 52.6 percent. This model of parental support in childcare is breaking down the patriarchal family network, underscoring the importance of bilateral parental support. (ii) There are obvious differences across occupational positions. Among urban employees, husbands took care of the child in 4.47 percent of the families surveyed, and 38.89 percent of the families had wives in charge; in other words, 43.4 percent of the families had either the husband or the wife taking care of the child; but for senior personnel, the percentage was 22.4 percent, 21 percent less than the former category. (iii) Senior personnel rely more on private service providers: 21.4 percent relied on nannies/domestic workers and nurseries/kindergartens, 14.8 percent higher than urban employees.

In short, family members are the most important source of support for childcare, no matter what the occupational position, in which inter-generational support plays a key part. In addition, compared with urban employees, senior personnel solicit more extra support from the private sector.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Conclusion

In modern times, people of all positions face the challenge of balancing work and family. This study shows that, firstly, in terms of time allocation, the urban employed are all feeling the pressure of time; the time standard of modern employment restricts the allocation of time for rest and leisure. Such time discipline is universal and gender-neutral. Women are still under the double pressure of work and family and spend more time on housework than men, although they devote almost as much time to work as men; women senior personnel, among all categories, put in most time on work and household duties, as they have to cover both career and family. Secondly, in terms of work-family balance, modern urbanites have given up the traditional division of labour, which put "men at work and women at home", and have turned toward the double-income model. Senior personnel are more likely to fail to attend to their families due to a busy work schedule. Thirdly, parents of both sides offer the most support for care of 0 – 3 year-olds. It is this family support network that has filled the gap in childcare benefits left open after the disintegration of the work unit system and has enabled couples with children to continue working. Some senior personnel rely on the market—for example, hiring domestic workers—to meet their needs in childcare, but less so among financially constrained common employees.

On sharing of work and family duties, there is still a "gender lag", that is, women are participating in paid economic activities as much as men, but men are not sharing housework in an equal way, despite some improvements. Undoubtedly, both men and women are changing, but to different degrees. Except for female senior personnel, women in general spend less time on paid work than men; the husband spends less time on housework than his wife. In this bi-directional process of change, women are moving more quickly into the paid workforce than men are taking up housework.

5.2 Policy Suggestions

Organizations and governments have formulated policies to help achieve work-family balance, known as the family-friendly workplace and family-friendly policy. Scandinavian countries have low levels of work-family conflict, whereas the United Kingdom and the United States have reported the highest levels of conflict because of long working hours and private sector support mechanisms.① Sweden's public policies are designed to promote full employment, gender equality and universal social security coverage. Labour unions not only represent the interests of highly-paid industrial workers, but also seek to narrow the income gap, thus effectively mitigating work-family conflicts.②

To balance work and family, policy support is necessary to help with care of the aged, childcare and children's education and to relieve the pressure of household duties. When asked what help or support is most needed at the moment (choosing three in order of importance), 4.5 percent of urban employees chose "guidance on children's education" as the top one, only half that of senior personnel; 2.2 percent of women senior personnel chose "reducing the housework burden", seven times that of women urban employees, and on "aged care services", the difference was six times (2.9 percent for women senior personnel). These differences reveal that women senior personnel are less flexible than their less paid sisters in dealing with work-family conflicts and urgently need public support from governments and organizations. Similar results were found in the second and the third options, indicating that urban women are more concerned with livelihood issues.

In conclusion, we propose the following: (i) more investment in educational campaigns to encourage more men to share domestic duties and establish a partnership model for housework sharing; (ii) organizations should extend more childcare benefits to working parents, especially parents of young children (0 - 3 year-olds); (iii) governments should

① Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family—The Reconfiguration of Work and Family Life in Contemporary Societies[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

② Wallen, Jacqueline. Balancing Work and Family: The Role of the Workplace [M]. New York: Allen & Bacon, 2003.

increase investment in public nurseries and kindergartens and include preschool education (for 3 - 6 years old) in the national public education programme.

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PART Ⅱ

Family Policies: International and Domestic Perspectives

Family Policies and Fertility
—Evidence and Challenges for European Countries

Demographic changes in Europe include declining birth rates, increasing life expectancy and—as a consequence—ageing and shrinking populations. These developments affect all countries in the European Union, although to very different extents. Interest is therefore growing in the relationship between family policies and fertility, in other words, whether and how family policies—for example, cash benefits for families or childcare facilities—affect fertility behaviour and what reforms may help couples to realise their childbearing preferences. Overall, research shows that this relationship is very complex and there have been a number of contradictory findings. It became evident, however, that there can be a positive correlation between female employment and fertility if policies improving the work-life balance are implemented, such as cash benefits, well-paid parental leaves and public childcare facilities. Against this background, this paper focuses on family policies in four very different European countries—Sweden, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic—and compares them in the context of demographic developments.

1. Family Policies in the Context of Demographic Developments

While not all European countries have implemented specific "family policies" or designated "family ministries", all of them have developed policies to support families. Their measures are varied and include, for example, family allowances, public childcare facilities, parental leaves and tax exemptions for dependent children. Generally, one can distinguish among three types of family policy instruments: cash benefits, services and tax breaks① for families (OECD, 2011). These policies pursue distinct aims, which differ across countries and also in their importance over time. These aims are primarily institutional, demographic, economic, socio-political, gender equality-related and child welfare-related (Kaufmann, 2000; Blum and Rille-Pfeiffer, 2010).

In recent years, demographic concerns have gained importance within family policymaking in many European countries. This has taken place against the background of a number of demographic challenges all European countries facing, although to very different extents. As Figure 1 shows, total fertility rates in Europe range between 1.17 in Latvia and 2.07 in Ireland, while the average of the 27 member countries of the EU lies at 1.58. However, no country achieved the net reproduction rate of 2.1 for average children per woman in 2010. Searching for country clustering in Figure 1, it can be seen that Eastern European countries (for example, Latvia, Hungary, Romania), Southern European countries (for example, Portugal, Spain) and the German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria) show particularly low birth rates, while in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), the United Kingdom, France and Ireland the rates are fairly high.

① As data from the OECD family database show, tax exemptions only play a decisive role in a few countries (especially Germany, but also France and Belgium). Furthermore, data on tax exemptions cannot be derived from national statistics, but rest on estimates by tax authorities. Therefore, in Section 3, tax exemptions are not compared across the four selected countries.



* Source: Eurostat (data for Belgium from 2009)

Figure 1 Total fertility rates(2010)

The birth rate decline is related to other demographic changes, such as the postponement of family formation to a later age and an increased proportion of childlessness. Another feature of demographic change in industrialised countries is increased life expectancy, which in Germany, for example, currently stands at 82.59 years for women and 77.51 years for men. Together, decreased birth rates and increased life expectancy lead to ageing populations, which is reflected in a shrinking workforce and a growing number of retirees. As this is putting the economy and social insurance systems under pressure, policymakers and researchers in many European countries have intensified their interest in the relationship between family policy and fertility.

Comparative studies have shown a decisive gap between the desired and the actual number of children for many European countries. In a Eurobarometer public opinion survey of 2006, individuals were asked:

"And for you personally, what would be the ideal number of children you would like to have or would have liked to have had?" The results showed that within the EU the "mean ideal family size, either general or personal, is above 2 children in each broad age group, for men as for women" (Testa 2006: 19). While in Germany, for example, low fertility parallels a comparatively low desired number of children (that is, 2.11 for women aged 25 to 39), the Southern European countries in particular showed a large gap, between high desired numbers of children and low actual birth rates. This has been traced back, among other things, to the comparatively low public policy support for families in these countries.

However, it would be misleading to view the gap between desired and actual number of children as a "window of opportunity" for public policies (Gauthier, 2007: 328), since many reasons for this gap are not policy-related at all. The 2006 Eurobarometer showed that, most frequently, respondents stated that not having fulfilled their childbearing desires was related to health problems on the part of one of the partners or to the absence of the right partner (Testa, 2006: 13). At the same time, surveys show that the cost of children, the availability of parental leaves and childcare—which can very much be influenced by public policies—also play a role in decision-making on whether or not to have a child (Testa, 2006). This shows that public policies towards families can be relevant for their demographic behaviour. However, this relationship is very complex and mostly indirect.

Correspondingly, previous research into this relationship has yielded contradictory findings. For example, some studies identified a significant positive effect on fertility rates of cash benefits for families, while others found an insignificant positive effect and yet others were ambivalent (Bujard, 2011: 5). A cross-national study of 21 OECD countries conducted by Castles (2003) proved a significant positive correlation between fertility and formal childcare facilities for under-three year olds. Results for the effects of parental leave regulations on fertility are inconclusive (Bujard, 2011: 5), while some authors have shown that very long parental leaves may even have a negative impact on birth rates (D'Addio and D'Ercole, 2005).

Against that background, there are a few proven points with regard to the complex relationship between family policies and fertility (see also Stock et al., 2012: 260 ff.). One which has been frequently cited is the positive correlation between female labour force participation and fertility in OECD countries. In other words, countries characterised by high female employment rates overall also show high birth rates. Interestingly, this correlation has turned around since the 1970s, as illustrated in Figure 2. The situation in 1980, on the left side, still shows a clearly negative correlation between female employment and fertility. The countries with the highest percentage of women in the labour market—Denmark, Finland and Sweden—were in the lowest range of total fertility rates, and vice versa (for example, Ireland, Greece). In contrast, in 2009, Denmark, Finland and Sweden—like many other countries—combined high female employment rates with high birth rates.



* Source: OECD Family Database

Figure 2 Cross-country relations between female employment and fertility in 1980 and 2009

At the same time, the cross-country relationship is not as clear as in 1980: many other countries—for example, Mexico, Ireland, Italy and Hungary—do not combine both and exhibit low figures for total fertility rates or for women's employment rates. Many authors have cited this reversed overall relationship between female employment and fertility as evidence of public policy impact on fertility (Gauthier, 2007: 330): It seems that especially the Nordic countries—for example, Sweden—have managed to reverse the negative impact of female employment on childbearing behaviour into a positive one through family policies and particularly those directed at the reconciliation of work and family life, such as well-paid parental leaves and public childcare facilities.

2. Family Policies across Europe

Since the European Union has no direct competences with regard to social and family policies, responsibilities lie with the member states. Against this background, European countries have implemented very different family policies. This has also been proposed as a decisive explanatory factor as regarding their different demographic situations. Figure 3 gives a first impression of this family policy variety. It portrays EU countries' functional expenditure on families as a percentage of GDP in



* Source: Eurostat (functional expenditure as a percentage of GDP)

Figure 3 Expenditure on families in the EU – 27(2010)

2010. Family policy expenditure ranges from only 0.79 percent of GDP in Poland to 4.03 percent in Denmark. The average of the 27 EU countries lies at 2.26 percent of GDP. Germany spends 3.2 percent of GDP on families and thus ranges in the upper third.

In terms of possible patterns in expenditure on families, some geographical clusters can be identified. Of the 17 countries below the EU average, 14 are in either Eastern or Southern Europe. The ten countries above the EU average, except Estonia, Hungary and Ireland, are all either continental European (France, Germany, Austria, Luxembourg) or Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark).

This pattern corresponds to the traditional country typologies, which have been identified by comparative welfare state and family policy research in an effort to group countries and allow for systematic comparisons. About two decades ago, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) published his famous distinction of *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. These are: the liberal (for example, the United Kingdom), the conservative (for example, Germany) and the social democratic (for example, Sweden) types of welfare state. Correspondingly, Gauthier (2002), for example, in a country-comparative study identified four family policy regimes. According to this, the social democratic type—for example, Denmark, Finland and Sweden—is characterised by universal state support for families and a strong commitment to gender equality. It provides only medium-level cash benefits to parents, but a high level of childcare facilities plus well-paid parental leaves. The conservative type—for example Germany, Austria and Ireland—on the other hand, is characterised by employment-related state support and a more traditional approach to gender. It provides medium to high cash support (see Figure 3), but only limited childcare facilities. Family policies under the liberal regime—for example, the United Kingdom—provide only low-level, needs-oriented support for parents and rely strongly on the private sector, for example, for childcare. Finally, family policies in Southern European countries—for example, Italy, Portugal and Spain—are characterised by low-level support, in terms of both cash benefits and services, plus a high mix of universal and private benefits. Since the EU accession of the Eastern European countries, comparative welfare state research has debated how to deal with them in typological terms: some researchers see them as a distinct, post-socialist welfare regime of their own, others claim that they will each develop into one of Esping-Andersen's three worlds of welfare capitalism and others still declare that neither will be the case (see Blum et al., 2010).

These traditional typologies—be it Esping-Andersen's three worlds of welfare capitalism or the similar classical differentiation of family policy systems—have been subject to growing criticism in recent years, for example, because they do not include or, arguably, have wrongly categorised particular countries. Most importantly, however, they depict the situation in the early 1990s, while in the meantime European welfare states have changed dramatically, not least in terms of family policies. Therefore, these typologies contain ideal types to which actual country cases may never have fully corresponded and are certainly doing so less and less, due to policy reforms and perhaps processes of welfare state convergence. At the same time, as Figure 3 shows, there still are some geographical country patterns at least in terms of expenditure levels: the Southern and Eastern European countries overall spend decisively less on families than the Nordic and continental countries. Section 3, therefore, looks at four countries from these regions: Sweden, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic. These countries were chosen because they come, at least traditionally, fairly close to the family policy ideal types described above. They also represent more mature (Sweden, Germany) and less expenditure-intensive (Italy and the Czech Republic) welfare states. Since only a brief description of each country's family policy can be given, only three instruments are focused on: family allowances, parental leave regulations and public childcare facilities. While a number of also important measures may thereby be neglected, these three are the most important ones and provide a good picture of the family policy framework.

3. Focus on Four Countries

3.1 Sweden

As Figure 1 shows, Sweden had—with 1.98—the fourth highest birth rate in Europe in 2010. Life expectancy at birth in 2009 was also well above the European average, at 83.5 years for women and 79.4 years for men (European Commission, 2010). Combined with significant immigration, the EU's *Demography Report* 2010 therefore expects that Sweden will experience further population growth of almost 8 percent until 2050 (ibid: 163). The employment rate of women aged 25 – 49 stood at 79.8 percent in 2008, as compared to the OECD average of 71.9 (OECD Family Database).

As described in Section 2, Sweden's family policy has been characterised as social democratic, marked by its focus on work-life balance, universal medium-level cash benefits and a high level of services. Accordingly, the child/family allowance is paid universally and not means-tested, but only amounts to about 115 euros① per month for the first child plus increasing supplements for any further child (MISSOC, 2011).

In Sweden, parental leave is construed as an income replacement and provides strong incentives for fathers to take it up. It lasts 480 days, 60 days being reserved for the mother and 60 for the father, while the rest may be taken by either parent (Moss, 2012: 260). Out of this period, 390 days are paid at 80 percent of earnings (with an income limit of about 49,305 euros per year); the remaining 90 days are paid flat-rate at about 20 euros per day.

In line with the Nordic welfare tradition, Sweden offers clearly above

① In December 2012, 1 euro equalled 8.22 yuan.

average childcare provision, regarding both quantity and quality (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). According to 2008 data from the OECD Family Database, there are childcare places for 46.7 percent of under three year-olds and for 91.1 percent of children between the age of three and mandatory school age.

All in all, Swedish family policy has evolved into a role model for other European countries. As Figure 3 shows, it is not even significantly more costly than its counterparts, for example, in Germany or Austria, and at the same time, it is described as much more "successful" and "effective", for example, regarding fertility behaviour, child poverty rates and work-life balance. Therefore, as becomes evident in the next section, German family policy reforms—and those in other countries—have followed this example.

3.2 Germany

In 2010, Germany, with 1.39, registered one of the lowest birth rates across Europe (Figure 1). Life expectancy at birth, on the other hand, was above the EU average in 2009, at 82.8 years for women and 77.8 years for men (European Commission, 2011). While Germany has experienced high immigration rates during recent decades, net migration has now turned negative. The EU *Demography Report* 2010 therefore expects that Germany's population will shrink by almost 10 percent by 2050 (ibid: 121). In the aftermath of the economic crisis, however, immigration to Germany has again been increasing decisively. In 2008, the employment rate of women aged 25 to 49 was 76.8 percent (OECD Family Database).

German family policy has been described as conservative, supporting fairly traditional gender roles (for example, low female employment) and rather distributing high cash benefits to families than services such as childcare.

The child/family allowance is paid on a universal basis and not means-tested. It does not vary by age, but by the number of children: 184 euros per month are paid for the first and second children, 190 for the third and 215 for the fourth and subsequent children (MISSOC 2011).

Until 2006, parental leave in Germany was in line with its traditional, rather conservative family policy framework. It comprised a long leave of three years, two of them accompanied by a fairly low flat-rate payment of 307 euros per month. It thus gave fathers no incentive to take parental leave and supported long career breaks for mothers. The 2007 reform of this parental leave was inspired by the Swedish example: nowadays, parental benefit is paid for only twelve months to one parent, while two additional "partner months" are paid if the other parent goes on leave (usually the father). As in Sweden, it is also construed as an income replacement of 67 percent of the parent's last earnings; there is, however, a minimum of 300 euros (mainly for formerly non-employed parents) and also a maximum of 1,800 euros per month (Moss, 2012: 130). However, the introduction of a so-called childcare allowance is being envisaged from autumn 2013: an amount of 100 euros per month (and even 150 euros from 2014) paid to parents who care for their one- and two-year-old children at home and do not make use of institutional childcare facilities.

Traditionally and still around the year 2000, Germany offered very low childcare rates for children under the age of three, while almost all children above that age attended kindergarten until they entered school. In recent years, however, there have been huge efforts to increase childcare facilities, mainly with the aim of improving reconciliation between work and family life. In 2008, Germany offered childcare places for 17.8 percent of 0 – 2 year-olds and 92.7 percent of children between the age of three and mandatory school age (OECD Family Database). By 2011, the childcare rate for under three-year-olds had risen to 25.2 percent, although with major regional differences, especially between western and eastern Germany (Federal Statistical Office, 2011).

The reforms in parental leave and childcare facilities show that German family policies still have "conservative roots", but have changed decisively and are on the way towards a more "Nordic" type, focusing on the reconciliation of work and family life.

3.3 Italy

At 1.41 in 2010, Italy's birth rate is among the lowest in Europe. At the same time, life expectancy at birth is above the EU average, at 84.5 years for women and 79.1 years for men (European Commission, 2011). On the assumption that immigration to Italy remains significant, the EU *Demography Report* 2010 expects the population to remain more or less constant (ibid: 133). In 2008, the employment rate of 25- to 49-year-old women was, at 61.1 percent, clearly below the OECD average of 71.9 percent (OECD Family Database).

Italian family policies have been described as offering only limited support to families, in terms of both cash benefits and services, while designing this employment-related and with a mixture of universal and private benefits. Against this background, the child/family allowance in Italy is employment-related and means-tested. It varies by the number of children, but not by age. As the amount of benefit is in inverse relation to family income, for instance a family with four members and medium-range annual income of about 26,500 euros would receive a monthly benefit of 127.25 euros (MISSOC, 2011).

In Italy, six months of parental leave are available for mothers and the same for fathers. If fathers also take the available paternity leave, they are entitled to one month of additional parental leave (Moss, 2012: 166). This paternity leave is not statutory, however. It is available for employed fathers, paid at 80 percent of last earnings, but only under special circumstances (for example, death or severe illness of the mother and the child left being in sole care of the father). Parental leave is accompanied by an income-related payment of only 30 percent of last earnings, while maternity leave—like paternity leave—is paid at 80 percent of last earnings.

While Italy's family cash benefits and leave regulations largely correspond to the Southern European welfare state as described above, its childcare facilities are comparatively expansive. According to the OECD Family Database data for 2008, Italy offered childcare places to 29.2 percent of under threes. For the age group between three and school age, 97.4 percent of children were using formal childcare services.

3.4 Czech Republic

At 1.49 in 2010 (Figure 1), the birth rate in the Czech Republic was higher than those of Germany or Italy, but significantly lower than that of Sweden. In contrast to the three other countries, life expectancy at birth lies below the EU average, at 80.5 years for women and 74.2 years for men (European Commission, 2011). Combined with significant immigration, the EU *Demography Report* 2010 expects the population to shrink only slightly by 2050 (ibid: 117). The employment rate of women aged 25 to 49 stood at 73.6 percent in 2008.

All in all, the Eastern European welfare states are very diverse. Although they share a common, post-socialist heritage, individually they have developed in social democratic, conservative, liberal or other directions (Blum et al., 2010). Family policies in the Czech Republic "are a prime example of variations in the mixture of social conservative [...] and social democratic systems" (Ripka and Mareš, 2009: 110).

The child/family allowance is means-tested and set at a fixed amount by age: for children under the age of 6, 21 euros are paid per month, for children aged 6 to 15, the allowance amounts to 25 euros and for children aged 15 to 26, it amounts to 29 euros (MISSOC, 2011).

In the Czech Republic, both parents have an individual entitlement to three years of parental leave. There is a total parental leave payment of 8,700 euros, which parents can receive in different temporal variants (Moss, 2012: 93): from the longest variant of 48 months to the shortest option of 24 months. While both parents may go on leave parallel, only one of them can receive the benefit at one point in time (while they can alternate in receiving the benefit as often as they want). In conclusion, the Czech parental leave system leaves many choices to parents, but relies on fairly long leaves and—compared to Sweden and Germany—rather low flat-rate benefits.

As the data from OECD Family Database show, public childcare facilities in the Czech Republic are among the least developed in Europe: only 2.2 percent of 0 - 2 year-olds used formal childcare services in 2008, and 79.7 percent of children between the age of three and mandatory school age.

4. Conclusions

There is increasing interest in the relationship between family policies and fertility, against the background of demographic changes affecting all European countries, although to very different extents.

As discussed in Section 1, the research on family policy and fertility is—at least to date—far from conclusive. Therefore, the case studies of the demographic situations and family policies in the four countries—Sweden, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic—cannot provide any firm conclusion on the relationship between these two. However, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the general consensus within comparative research: the positive impact of cash and in-kind benefits on fertility, and the positive correlation between high female employment and high birth rates, if work-life balance policies are in place. The Swedish case offers an example of the assumption that the "wide availability of reconciliation facilities in the Nordic countries supports fertility decisions" (Plantenga and Remery, 2009: 25 - 26).

The effects of family policies become visible over the long term; effects of policy reform cannot be seen quickly. This applies in particular to their impact on fertility. For example, as Bujard (2011: 36) points out, people draw their knowledge of family policy conditions primarily from the media, as well as the experiences of relatives, friends and neighbours. Therefore, it is quite a while before policy changes are perceived or lead to changes in behaviour.

From 2002, however, birth rates in many countries have started to rise again (OECD, 2011: 20). For example, Eurostat data show that the birth rate in Sweden has risen significantly from 1.57 in 2001 to 1.98 in 2010, in Germany slightly from 1.35 to 1.39, in Italy from 1.25 to 1.41 and in the Czech Republic decisively from 1.14 to 1.49. The case of the Czech Republic in particular, where work-life balance policies are comparatively low, provides a counter-example to the joint appearance of high female employment and high fertility. There is a significant correlation in cross-national comparisons, but it does not apply to all countries. Birth rates not only in the Czech Republic, but also in virtually all post-socialist countries declined sharply in the early 1990s, then remained at a very low level for some time, before starting to rise again during the first decade of the new millennium.[①]

Germany has followed the Swedish example in its family policy reforms, wishing to improve work-life balance for parents, enable female employment and see if possible to increase birth rates. However, with such a complex and long-term relationship, fertility behaviour has not yet changed significantly. As discussed in Section 1, in all countries there is a gap between people's desired and actual number of children. Therefore, policies towards the reconciliation of work and family life are only one among many and yet a decisive determinant in enabling people to realise their individual childbearing preferences.

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① Furthermore, the total fertility rate (TFR) is fairly sensitive to the timing of births, for example, the postponement of first births to a later age (cf. OECD 2011).

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Family Policies from a Gender Equality Perspective

—A European Comparison

1. Introduction

This study considers the evidence on the effectiveness of family policies for moving towards greater gender equality in the division of paid work and unpaid household labour and family care. It draws on a theoretical framework adapted from Pascall and Lewis (2004) concerning how policies impact on five dimensions: (i) paid work, (ii) unpaid work and care, (iii) incomes, (iv) time and (v) voice. It then summarises briefly the evidence on different family policy measures in European countries and their impacts on gender equality in the labour market and in unpaid work and care. It concludes by reflecting on common policy trends and deficits in selected countries and outlines some policy and research issues for future consideration.

Most European countries have introduced a number of family-friendly policies aimed at facilitating parents'—and in particular women's—labour-force participation during periods of care obligations. Such policies have been implemented for a number of reasons, often aimed at gender equality only as a means to achieve other goals. The latter range from reducing work-family conflicts for women and the risk of child poverty to shoring up welfare state finances in times of population ageing and low fertility.

Historically, gender equality has been an explicit policy aim only in the Scandinavian countries (Pascall and Lewis, 2004). Recently, however, it has received greater attention also in other countries, as can be seen in the more widespread introduction of policies encouraging men's participation in family work, such as parental leave quotas for fathers (Ray and Gornick et al., 2010).

2. The Gender Division of Paid and Unpaid Work across Europe

Family scholars (for example, Crompton and Harris, 1999; Gornick and Meyers, 2003) have classified countries' work and care regimes in terms of systematic similarities and differences with regard to how families combine earning and caring responsibilities. The first regime type, the male breadwinner and female caregiver model, was the predominant family model for combining work and childcare in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, it is practiced by only a minority of families in most European countries. The exceptions are Southern European countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece, with maternal employment rates below 60 percent. Three other work/care regimes have emerged. The Nordic countries have come closest to a dual full-time earner and state caregiver model with maternal employment rates at around 80 percent. During childbearing years, however, long part-time hours among mothers are also common in Sweden and Norway (OECD, 2011), whereas some Finnish mothers take longer labour market interruptions to care for children. The Nordic countries have also achieved a somewhat more equal division of unpaid work between men and women than the other European countries (Eurostat, 2004). Couples with two full-time workers are also common in many Central and Eastern European countries (CEE). In some of these countries, the persistent gender inequality in unpaid work has resulted in longer total work hours for women compared to men (Eurostat, 2004). The reduction in childcare provision in the 1990s and the long but low-paid parental leave entitlements have led to an increase in male breadwinner families as temporary arrangements when children are young. By contrast, a third model of dual earner and female part-time carer families has emerged in most Western European countries—for example, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands—with large gender gaps in the full-time equivalent employment rate of 30 to 40 percent (OECD, 2011). These countries have promoted part-time employment of mothers in combination with low or expensive provision of formal day-care for children aged under three years, which has perpetuated women's role as the main caregivers.

The fact that across Europe men have not increased their contributions to unpaid work and care to the same extent as women entering the labour market has been described as a potential care deficit (Himmelweit, 2005; Lewis and Giullari, 2005) or an incomplete revolution (Esping-Andersen, 2009). Encouraging men's involvement in family work and reducing their identification with the breadwinner role is increasingly seen as key to reducing the remaining obstacles to women's careers, such as labour market discrimination, and enabling all citizens to combine paid and unpaid work. Family scholars (for example, Fraser, 1994; Gornick and Meyers, 2008) and some governments—for instance, in Sweden and the Netherlands (Plantenga and Schippers et al., 1999; Plantenga, 2002; Nyberg, 2006)—have promoted the dual earner and dual carer model as one possible model that would promote gender equality not only in the labour market but also in time spent on unpaid work and family care. Practices in none of the countries, however, have come anywhere near this ideal.

3. A Theoretical Framework for Gender Equality Policies

Policies on gender equality can be conceptualised on five theoretical dimensions: (i) paid work, (ii) unpaid work and care, (iii) incomes, (iv) time and (v) voice (see Figure 1). The first four dimensions indicate which area of life—paid or unpaid work—policies have the most direct impact on and whether they target income streams or the time men and women spend on these tasks. The fifth dimension, voice, concerns the political influence of women and men, for instance through proportional representation, quotas or social movements. The experience of CEE countries under socialism suggests that the voice mechanism is very important and needs to be owned by civil society rather than only governments or elites in order to achieve change in gender roles across all spheres (Pascall and Lewis, 2004). The following discussion will present evidence of family policy influences on gender equality in terms of the division of paid and unpaid work, by impacting either income or time in one of these spheres. With respect to family care, the focus will be on child care rather than elderly care, as parenthood has been a crucial crossroads from which gender differences widen, with long-term consequences over the life course (Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel, 2007; Grunow and Schulz et al., 2012).



* Source: Adapted from Pascall and Lewis (2004)

Figure 1 Theoretical framework for policies on gender equality

As a result of European Union directives, there has been convergence in legislation regarding labour market discrimination, equal pay and equal treatment of atypical work arrangements, as well as working-hour limits (Walby, 2004). Individual income taxation is the norm in most European countries and has been shown to encourage female labour market participation compared to joint income taxation for couples, which is still found in Germany and France (Jaumotte, 2003). Considerable cross-national variation remains in many other work/care reconciliation policies. Widespread provisions of flexible working arrangements, including part-time work, have improved the likelihood of mothers' labour market participation in countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Part-time work, however, may also hinder gender equality by limiting the number of hours women work (Fagan and Walthery, 2007). Giving employees the right to request a reduction as well as an increase in work hours is important to encourage a return to relatively long part-time hours when children grow older.

After childbirth, the "best practice" leave package for gender equality consists of individualised paid entitlements to a few months of leave for the mother and the father, respectively, plus parental leave of moderate length, which may be shared by mother and father (Ray and Gornick et al., 2010). Individualised entitlements to paternity leave and parental leave quotas reserved for each parent, in combination with relatively high compensation, have been shown to increase fathers' take-up of leave (O'Brien, 2009). Evidence regarding longer term effects on paternal involvement in unpaid work and care has been varied (for example, Ekberg and Eriksson et al. 2005; Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel 2007; Haas and Hwang 2008). The joint parental leave entitlement should be flexible to allow for simultaneous part-time work and it should be well-paid to compensate for forgone earnings. Without reasonable income replacement, most fathers are not likely to take up their leave entitlements. Collective financing structures for family-friendly provisions reduce the incentive for discrimination against women of childbearing age.

Furthermore, the possibility of parents to return to the labour market after parental leave depends on sufficient, high-quality and affordable day-care provision, especially when governments aim to raise maternal labour market participation beyond a certain level that can be achieved through informal care assistance from grandparents or paid carers (Kremer, 2007). Large child care costs—for instance, due to day-care being provided primarily by the private market—may lead to a more gendered division of paid and unpaid work, in particular for mothers with low earning potential (Schober, 2011). Several studies have stressed that opening hours should be compatible with more than short part-time hours and the importance of childcare quality matching parents' expectations (Kremer, 2007; Lewis and Campbell et al., 2008). Less is known yet about the importance of day-care quality for maternal work-care choices. Cash benefits for care have the potential to add value to the otherwise unpaid care work done mainly by women. In European countries (for example, Germany, Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden), they have not been large enough to help to narrow the gender income gap and provide disincentives for women's labour market return (for example, Sipilä and Korpinen, 1998; Schøne, 2004; Tunberger and Sigle-Rushton, 2011). The detailed elements of each of these policies matter, but so does the whole package of policies in terms of incentives for the gender division of paid and unpaid work in families. Kremer (2007) has argued that the combination of policies providing incentives for men and women to undertake care duties themselves or to outsource unpaid work and care time to the state, market or voluntary sector shape normative ideals of care that may promote or constrain policy effects in addition to any economic incentives.

4. Policy and Research Issues for Future Consideration

Many European countries have taken important steps towards policies for greater gender equality over the past decade, for example, the trend towards greater availability of part-time work, paternity leave and day-care provision. The widespread long-hours culture for full-time workers, especially men, still inhibits a more equal division of domestic work and care and there is still room for improvement in the quality of day-care.

Much remains to be done to increase gender equality and ease work-family conflict in CEE and Southern European countries.

So far no country has implemented such family policy packages for gender equality without considerable costs. Even though cost-benefit estimations suggest long-term returns (for example, Esping-Andersen, 2009), current constraints in government budgets will require greater cost effectiveness in the future. Governments may move more towards marketised care options and state regulation of voluntary and private sector care providers. This may raise new issues in terms of state regulation of markets, on which further research is needed. Regulations on working hours have not been used extensively yet, but may be one potentially less expensive option in line with people's preferences for slightly reduced working hours in many European countries.

Policy effects on the labour market involvement of men and women are better documented than influences on time in unpaid work and care. More cross-nationally comparable longitudinal data on the family sphere are needed to isolate and better understand policy effects on unpaid work and care. Ideally, this should also include data on intergenerational family ties, as grandparental care is an important source of care in most European countries. This will become more difficult with increasing pension ages and full-time employment of older women. As gender equality is becoming a more salient policy aim in European countries, we need to know more about the extent to which policies for gender equality imply trade-offs with other family policy objectives. Existing evidence suggests compatibility with moderate fertility rates but potential trade-offs with gender segregation in occupations or socio-economic inequalities between different groups of women. The compatibility of gender equality in paid work and care with child outcomes is likely to be strongly dependent on the specific policy mix, in particular the quality of non-parental care.

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Family Policy in the United States of America
—The Obstacle of Elite Cultural Values in the "Land of the Free"

1. Introduction

The challenge of writing an overview of family policy in the United States of America is that there is both too little and too much to explain. There is too little because the U. S. has no comprehensive federal family policy. The federal government does not offer or mandate any paid parental leave, not even the six weeks that is widely recognized as the minimum recommended time to recover physically from pregnancy and childbirth before returning to normal activities such as paid work. Federal programs related to the care of young children are piecemeal and change frequently; they have never been designed to be broadly effective in creating and providing affordable access to quality daycare for the children of working parents. The increasing neoliberalization of the American economy has left workers with fewer protections to help them also meet family obligations such as caregiving—Americans continue to work longer hours for lower pay. In the meantime, demographic shifts have made the nuclear heterosexual household with a breadwinning father and a caregiving mother all but obsolete, but employers and governments have been slow to respond to this reality with policy changes.

To understand what family policy does exist in the U. S., it would require a one-by-one study of all fifty states. Even some national programs like Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, designed to give lower-income people access to healthcare and food, respectively, are implemented differently in different states, so that people at the same income level or household situation in different parts of the country may have very different levels of access to the same "federal" program. Such a discussion is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

As an anthropologist, I am led to wonder what the history and current state of family policy in the U.S. reveals about American cultural values. I will argue that the absence of a comprehensive federal family policy in the U.S. indicates a lack of national consensus about the proper role of government in family life. However, certain American elite cultural values are also discernible and help to perpetuate this lack of consensus, including trust in the free market to the benefit of corporate interests, disdain for both paid and unpaid caregiving labor, and above all the desire to mask the structural inequalities that maintain race and class hierarchies in contemporary society.

2. Child Care: Debates and Obstacles

The lack of a comprehensive family policy in the U.S. federal government should not be interpreted as indicating that American families and their needs have never been politically salient or debated. Quite the opposite, in fact, "the family" has often been a politically-charged concept with much attention at times given to what is wrong with it, what threatens it, and how to fix or protect it. However, it is precisely the politically-charged nature of these debates that has hampered the development of a pragmatic, effective family policy suited to the needs of contemporary families, the contingencies of the contemporary economy and society, and the goals of good government.

A look at the history of childcare legislation in the U.S. will illustrate this point (Cohen, 1996). The United States actually came very close to achieving universal subsidized day care in the 1970s, but President Nixon vetoed the bill despite broadly bipartisan support in Congress. This effort, years in the making, fell victim to Cold War politics. Nixon had opened relations with the People's Republic of China, which apparently left him feeling vulnerable to domestic conservative criticism that he supported "godless communism". Unfortunately for America's working families, those same critics saw in universally-subsidized daycare a communist plot to raise America's children, subverting the authority and instruction of their parents, and forcing mothers into the paid workforce.

Federal spending on childcare now is determined primarily by income status, marking it as highly class-driven and class-maintaining. Begun in 1965 and expanded in 1981, the Head Start Program is funded at the federal level by the Department of Health and Human Services and administered at the local level by a range of organizations and agencies, including non-profits and public school districts (Office of Head Start, 2013). Head Start provides early academic enrichment and other services to lower-income preschool-aged children, whose income status will later make them more likely to fail in school. However, hours are typically limited to half the day, and so this program does not usually free poor parents to hold full-time jobs and earn a living wage for their families. Additionally, as Head Start is limited to lower-income children, it simply extends to an even younger age the existing pattern of segregation by social class in the public school system.

Middle-class families, meanwhile, receive deductions on their federal income tax, both for the numbers of dependent children in their household and also, at least in many families, through the opportunity to pay for private childcare with pre-taxed earnings, which may save them about 30% on daycare fees. While this provides an important support for many lower-middle-income families with young children, it is important to note that such tax-code benefits inevitably benefit higher-income families even more than lower-income families among the middle class, maintaining the relatively more wealthy population's exclusive access to more expensive and thus (usually) higher-quality childcare.

As seen in the 1970s story of President Nixon's veto, an overarching sticking point in American politics and public discourse on children has been a perpetual vocal discomfort with the idea of someone other than the mother raising her children. However, this concern for mother-child togetherness has never been extended to African-American families, who for decades were excluded from programs to support widowed or abandoned mothers and who now are so frequently lumped together with poor, young, and/or addicted mothers that to simply procreate as a black woman is rendered suspect and illegitimate in the public eye (Roberts, 1998).

Nor has concern for mother-care of young children been wholeheartedly and consistently applied to never-married mothers, with frequent repetition of the refrain that taxpayers shouldn't have to support the immorality or short-sightedness of women who give birth out of wedlock, as if the existence of a husband is a guarantee for economic support of both mother and young children. This demonization of unwed mothers dependent on government support to feed and house their children is so strong that the vast majority of Americans today are unaware that most single mothers have been married in the past and that they work more hours and still are more likely to be poor than single mothers in any other high-income nation (Casey and Maldonado, 2012.)

This discursive demonization of marginal (poor, non-white, unwed, etc.) mothers has at times been complemented by a commensurate demonization of mainstream (middle-class/educated, white, married) mothers who seek to place their children in daycare so that they can be employed for pay. The conservative refrain here is likely to be that the mother shouldn't have had children if she didn't want to raise them; in the past decades it was more along the lines that a working mother was both neglecting her children and taking a good job away from a man who needed it to support his family (Douglas and Michaels, 2005).

While the federal government has largely failed to act in recognition of the need for widespread affordable quality childcare for the now majority of American parents who are engaged in the paid workforce, a broad range of childcare facilities have emerged in the private sector, with varying degrees of state regulation. The two things that are broadly true of private daycare are that they are very expensive for parents and, at the same time, offer primarily low-paying jobs to staff, resulting in high turnover and often low skill among daycare workers (Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner, 2006). Many double-income families find that they can cover daycare for one child, but with the birth of a second child, it no longer makes economic sense for both parents to be employed, because the cost of childcare exceeds one parent's salary (typically but not always the mother's). To work at a loss because of expensive childcare makes no short-term sense, but interrupting one wage-earner's career is a decision with long-term costs, intensifying the male-female wage gap and impoverishing (mostly) women upon retirement due to lost savings and investiture in both company and government pension plans. Families—and especially mothers—need better choices, and the richest nation on the planet ought to be able to afford to create them.

Privileging corporate shareholders and the free market over the immediate and long-term needs of children and families is an elite cultural value. To say that the wealthy in America have families, too, is to dodge the class issue on these matters. Wealthy families can afford either to pay for expensive childcare (or, more likely, to hire in-home nannies) or to pull a parent out of the workforce to care for children. Wealthy families also benefit far more from a strong and unfettered private sector than lower-income families, because when the economy is doing well, they earn the most raises and fringe benefits and derive more of their income from investments (as opposed to wages) than middle-class and lower-income families do.

3. Race and Class as Structuring Principles of American Culture and Family Policy

In the classic legal and policy analysis *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty*, Dorothy Roberts (1998) argues that far from being a neglected facet or accidental side effect of America's legal and judicial system, the oppression of African-Americans through their—especially women's—reproductive lives is intrinsic to how American culture and society frames reproductive issues. From times of slavery until now, black women's reproductive activities have been seen from elite perspectives as fundamentally threatening to society, as opposed to constitutive of it (the perspective generally granted to white women.)

The infamous 1960s Moynihan Report is a case in point and continues to be hugely influential. Purporting to be a fact-finding document aimed at uncovering the root causes of the stubbornly generational poverty of African-Americans, it focused more on black mothers as the source of the problem rather than as the key to the community's survival through centuries of oppression. Framing diversity as deviance and ignoring the structural causes of low marriage rates, young childbearing, and maternal low-wage employment, it literally described black families and especially black mothers as pathological (Feldstein, 2000).

While in recent decades this issue has largely overlapped with classism (equating "non-white" with "poor" and framing poor women's reproduction as inherently problematic), the African-American woman as valued and esteemed mother is still a figure rarely evoked outside the black community. (Michelle Obama as the first African-American First Lady is a notable and very recent exception, and her thoroughly maternal persona in that role has been a flash point of controversy for white feminists—who want her to be more career-minded—and conservative critics—who seem to feel she is encroaching on sacred, default-white territory by claiming unequivocal "good mother" status.)

In short, American culture and society have a very poor track record of treatment of African-Americans in their family lives as well as in their legal rights and economic opportunities. Likewise, no serious analysis of U.S. family policy should neglect to consider the ways in which both racism and classism are woven into its fabric, such that it often functions to maintain and intensify rather than alleviate inequality and oppression. In short, there is much more at stake in U.S. family policy than gender equality or the protection of children.

The best recent example of this is found in the 1990s reform of welfare, under the leadership of President Clinton, ironically championed as a President notably friendly to African-Americans and the working class. "Workfare" aims to get welfare recipients into paying jobs and off the governmental rolls in a timely fashion. While that is clearly a worthy goal, the details of the reform make it clear that this was about pleasing conservatives who view money spent on social support as government waste and benefiting corporations which in the 1990s were increasingly in need of low-wage workers (Peck, 2001.)

The most relevant problem to this paper is workfare's general lack of provision for childcare as recipients attend required job training sessions, conduct required job searches, or commute long distances to work long hours at minimum-wage jobs that are subsidized by the government (Swarns, 1998). (This particularly affects African-Americans and other racial minorities, who are more likely to live in urban neighborhoods far from the typically suburban locations of such jobs.) Let me be clear: under workfare, taxpayer money may be given to companies like Walmart to pay them to hire welfare recipients, but it is not given to recipients to help them pay for childcare while they work. And if a middle-class family earning the median income of roughly \$40,000/year often struggles to pay for daycare for one, let alone two children, how might a workfare recipient who is the single parent of even one child pay for daycare with a minimum-wage income of $15,000/year?

This blatant disregard for the real conditions of poor Americans and above all the needs of poor children goes straight to the heart of my argument that elite cultural values are a major impediment to a national consensus about the need for a comprehensive family policy. In the story of welfare-to-workfare reform in the 1990s, we see trust in the free market to the benefit of corporate interests (paying companies to create poverty-level, dead-end jobs rather than paying poor people enough to keep them housed, fed, and safe), disdain for the unpaid caregiving labor of parents on welfare (how else to explain the lack of provision for childcare while working as required by law?), and above all the desire to mask the structural inequalities that maintain race and class hierarchies in contemporary society (because the very basis of workfare is the assumption that poverty in America is caused not by a lack of well-paying job but by a lack of motivation to work among poor people—people who are disproportionately non-white).

4. Demographic Shifts in Households and Workforce

Family policy in the U.S., or more precisely its lack, has also failed to a great degree to adapt to demographic changes in the household and the workforce. When the framework of the industrial, urban economy was established in the mid-twentieth century, the typical and normative family household included a breadwinning father, a stay-at-home mother, dependent children, and perhaps a grandparent who helped with domestic work and childrearing but also needed care as well. People married and had children relatively early in life, and workers had relatively short retirements, dying at a much younger age than they do now (Han and Moen, 2001).

Radical changes have unfolded in the shape of American households and the American workforce. In 1950, only 12% of married mothers also were employed for pay. Middle-class jobs could therefore be tailored to the wide availability of fathers married to stay-at-home wives; such workers were expected to be focused on their jobs because someone else at home was taking care of the kids, the housework, and all the other reproductive labor that makes a household function. Especially in middle-class terms, this was the prerequisite backdrop for having a career—the freedom to make work your highest priority, buffered by the privilege of having the support of a non-career-pursuing adult doing your share of the household's reproductive labor and even caring for you reproductively with meals, laundry, etc., provided. This "ideal worker" and "career" model is definitively male, and it is now nearly obsolete in America (Han and Moen, 2001).

Today, women are very nearly half the paid workforce in the U.S., and being married mothers no longer removes them in great numbers for any great length of time. In 1995, 70% of mothers of children under age 18 were employed for pay, as were 61% of mothers of children under age three. The rates have surely increased since 1995, especially since increasing numbers of mothers are single (never married, divorced, or widowed) and the recession triggered by the 2008 economic crisis disproportionately led to male unemployment, requiring more women to stay in or return to the workforce despite having young children.

What this means is that the average worker in the U.S. bears less and less resemblance to that ideal male employee who is supported by a wife at home doing the unpaid reproductive labor that frees him to pursue a career. However, the U.S. workplace has done remarkably little shifting to accommodate this reality. Paid family leave, flexible working hours, health insurance, childcare subsidies, etc. are benefits that some companies may offer to attract and retain the most highly-sought-after workers, but entirely at their own discretion. Inevitably, the workers who most need a family-friendly workplace—single parents, usually mothers, living close to or in poverty—have the least access to these benefits. The part-time work that mothers of young children with limited access to childcare often does in particular pays little and offers no benefits or job security; primary caregivers and supporters of young children who need to work for income are therefore treated by the American workplace as equivalent to teenagers working after-school or summer jobs to earn personal spending money. This is one major reason that the strongest predictor for women of poverty in old age is motherhood, and is another reason why the wage gap between childless women and mothers is even greater than the wage gap between men and women (Fathers, by comparison, earn more on average than childless men) (Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner, 2006).

Another major shift in the American household in recent decades is the rise in cohabitation instead of marriage among partnered couples, especially couples with children. While cohabitation has increased across all social classes, it has increased the most among lower-income households and most of all among non-white lower-income adults. In short, as educated middle-class people have begun to delay marriage and having children, working-class and poor people in the U. S. have begun to delay only marriage, increasingly having children while cohabiting. This is not due to unplanned pregnancies but rather to a shift in ideology that has somewhat destigmatized single motherhood and made marriage into a bet on one's (male) partner's economic prospects rather than a prerequisite for adult life and parenthood (Smock and Manning, 2004).

Cohabitation produces less stable households, with higher rates of break-up for couples who cohabitate, even if they marry after living together and then divorce, than for couples who do not cohabitate before marrying. Unstable, frequently-changing household formations are a key predictor of negative outcomes for the children of those households, who face a higher likelihood of dropping out of school, teenage sexual activity, and alcohol or drug abuse than do their peers living in stable households with both biological parents, regardless of whether those parents are married. Even more directly, household breakups, whether through dissolution of cohabitation or through divorce, very predictably lead to economic hardship for the children of those households, and poverty is clearly damaging and dangerous to children (Smock and Manning, 2004).

The question for family policy makers is how to best to alleviate the poverty and instability that put children in the path of social and physical harm. Some conservatives call for policies to promote marriage among cohabiting families, through such things as tax incentives and family education programs. However, if childbearing while cohabiting is primarily a reproductive strategy driven by the lack of economic security, as opposed to marriage itself being a path to economic security, then "simply shifting cohabiting families into marriage will not produce better economic circumstances" (Smock and Manning, 2004: 102).

5. Challenges to Heterosexism in Family Policy

The rise of a gay rights movement and in particular the movement for same-sex marriage equality in the U.S. has brought increased attention to the heterosexism of much family policy at all levels of government and in the private sector. Equal respect for LGBT (Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender or Transsexual) families has largely supplanted concern for the individual suffering from HIV/AIDS as the rallying point of the gay rights movement. This involves both legal and cultural attention to the definition of a partner or spouse, a biological or adoptive parent, a widow or survivor, etc., affecting everything from tax codes to visitation policies in hospitals and nursing homes (Cahill et al., 2002.)

From a family policy perspective, two issues around LGBT family equality stand out for the purposes of this paper. The first is that children clearly benefit from having stable homes and economically secure parents, and there is no reliable research evidence to support the conservative claim that children are harmed by having LGBT parents. In light of this fact, it makes sense for family policy in the U.S. to not only be open to but to actively seek ways to be inclusive of LGBT families, particularly in adoption law and policy, in marriage equality (because as we have seen above, marriage promotes household stability which promotes children's well-being), and in custody and visitation provisions (Cahill et al., 2002).

This is one issue in which some U.S. states have led progress while the federal government has impeded it. In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the *Defense of Marriage Act*, which denied federal benefits to same-sex married couples and allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states (a specific and deliberate difference from the privilege afforded to heterosexual marriages). In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a key provision of the 1996 *Defense of Marriage Act*, with the result that legally-married same-sex couples are now eligible to receive the same federal benefits as heterosexual couples. However, the Court stopped short of guaranteeing equal marriage rights in all states, leaving that battle to be fought state by state.

As of 2013, thirteen of the fifty U.S. states, plus the District of Columbia, have legalized same-sex marriage, while some others provide for civil unions or domestic partnerships; some lower-level entities such as cities have also made provisions to affirm and recognize same-sex committed partnerships. While it is true that opponents to gay marriage have won many battles at the state level, through amending state constitutions to specifically prohibit same-sex marriage, many people on both sides of the political spectrum now believe that marriage equality is gaining ground and will eventually be a national fact.

The second issue around LGBT family equality from a policy point of view that is relevant to my analysis is to explain why this movement is thriving while so many other constituencies affected by family policy are falling further down the ladder of national priorities and economic well-being. I suggest that, ironically, advancing gay rights is currently viewed as more compatible with and less threatening to American elite cultural values than, say, advancing the rights of the poor.

6. Maternity Leave and Family Leave

The absence of any nationally-mandated paid maternity leave is very nearly unique to the United States of America, and the only other countries in this category are very small and very poor. Where paid maternity leave is available to U. S. workers, it is typically either a benefit provided at the employer's discretion to compete for the best workers (and thus may benefit most the higher-paid employees, who need it the least), or it is mandated at the level of state government, which results in a piecemeal system in which one's benefits are determined by the state in which one happens to be employed (Fass, 2009).

Because of this piecemeal and privilege-reinforcing system, many Americans are unaware of the fact that many working mothers lack any amount of paid maternity leave. It is not uncommon for women to be forced by economic necessity to return to their jobs as soon as two to four weeks after giving birth, which usually means that their newborns must be left in someone else's care for many hours each day. Other mothers might cobble together six or eight weeks of leave by using all their vacation and medical leave time, which leaves them unable to access those benefits for the rest of the benefits year after their return to work, during which time they almost inevitably need time off to care for a sick baby or take their baby to the doctor (Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner, 2006; Fass, 2009).

The relative minority of working parents who qualify for unpaid leave under the very limited 1993 *Family and Medical Leave Act* may take as many as twelve weeks away from work (Waldfogel, 1999), but as they earn no income at all during that leave, their family income may fall below the poverty line, making them economically vulnerable for years afterward as they use up savings or accrue debt. The FMLA is useful primarily to dual-earner families in which one parent's income is large enough to make it tolerable to forego one-fourth of the other parent's annual income, during the very year that their family must shoulder the expenses of a pregnancy, birth, and the addition of another mouth to feed. This is one way in which the FMLA has "created a gender and income gap that should not be tolerated" (Frank and Zigler, 1996: 130).

The absence of nationally-mandated paid maternity (let alone paternity) leave in the U.S. is one of the most shocking indicators of the flawed and contradictory social safety net in America. In the eyes of most of the rest of the world, it is hard to interpret this as anything other than disregard for the well-being of new mothers and babies and a willful refusal to admit any role of government in creating a healthy society. The fact that the 1993 FMLA, with its very limited, unpaid, often just symbolic leave provisions was a hard-fought, hard-won victory of progressive forces during a more hopeful era only underscores the extent to which the U.S. lacks a national consensus on the general question of family policy.

The absence of such consensus even on the basic question of allowing new mothers to recover from childbirth without falling into poverty points to an elite cultural value that prizes independence even where none logically can or should exist. Newborns are by definition dependent beings, and newly-postpartum mothers the world over require care and rest from their other duties.

Instead, paid maternity leave in the U.S. is a fringe benefit of higher-paying, higher-status jobs. This leaves the basic needs of the (temporarily) most vulnerable members of society to the dispassionate force of the competitive labor market under capitalism, allowing some, mostly wealthy, families ample paid time off while many others, mostly poor, receive none. This state of affairs illustrates just how strong the elite cultural value on the free market is, as well as indicating just how skillfully elite political culture has masked America's class disparities on this matter.

7. Conclusion

This essay offers a very brief and incomplete introduction to the state of family policy in the United States of America. The U.S. does not have a comprehensive family policy, but this absence as well as the patchwork and often contradictory pattern of programs and legislation that does exist, at the federal level and in some states, is in itself revealing. Childcare and parental/family leave underscore the extent to which elite U.S. cultural values pose obstacles to the development of an effective and consistent family policy. Caregiving labor is viewed with disdain, while the free market, especially for labor, is given priority. Meanwhile, government programs to address the needs of families also structure and maintain racial and especially class inequality.

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Unsustainable Societies

—The Failure of Familialism in East Asia's Compressed Modernity

In today's world, East Asia is the region most associated with very low fertility. The latest total fertility rates (TFR) for Chinese Taiwan, Chinese Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Japan are 1.03 (2009), 1.06 (2008), 1.19 (2008), 1.28 (2008), 1.37 (2008) respectively. In the 1990s, Southern and German-speaking European countries recorded fertility levels below 1.3, which was described as the "lowest-low fertility" (Kohler et al., 2002), but contemporary Asia has broken through that level. In the second demographic transition theory, lowered fertility is hypothesized as being caused by individualism (Lesthaeghe, 1991; van de Kaa, 1987). The first question of this article is whether we can consider that East Asia is going through a second demographic transition, just like Europe. The second question is whether individualism is also the cause for the low fertility in East Asia.

In order to answer these questions, this paper uses two strategies. The first is to embed fertility in the wider social context. By focusing on changes in marriage we can clearly see the differences between East Asia and Europe. The other strategy is the comparison method, not only between regions, i.e., between East Asia and Europe, but also within regions. The key concept of this paper is "compressed modernity" (Chang, 1999), referring to the way modernization has happened in such a brief period. This article will show how the increased complexity of the modernization process due to chronological compression in East Asian modernity has led each society to respond that with its own policy directions, which have had crucial effects on materially constructing the current situation in East Asia.

1. Ultra-low and Lowest-low Fertility in East Asia

1.1 Diversity Within East Asia

First, let us take a demographic view at the current state of East Asian societies. The geographical tag "East Asia" has, in recent years, been used in two ways. The first is the traditional way of referring to the countries and regions of Chinese mainland and Chinese Taiwan, Korea, Japan, in a more restricted sense of the term. The second is a more encompassing use that takes in both East Asia in the narrow sense and also Southeast Asia. In the context of proposing the establishment of an East Asian community, the wider sense is the one most often used, although this region, unlike Europe where the EU has been created, has never historically been a politically or culturally unified whole. Language, religion, kinship organizations, and many other aspects demonstrate that East Asia, in the wider sense, is an extremely diverse region.

The diversity of East Asia is also shown in its current fertility levels. We see a range in the TFR from almost 1.0 to greater than 4.0. When we look at East Asia in terms of fertility, we can divide it into four blocks (Table 1). The first group contains Japan, the earliest country in this region to undergo rapid economic growth in the 1960s, and the "four tigers" (Singapore, Korea, Chinese Taiwan, Chinese Hong Kong, known as NIES) which underwent economic growth in the 1980s as the so-called "Asian Miracle", which make up the lowest-low fertility societies. The second group consists of Thailand and Chinese mainland which have fertility levels between 1.5 and 2.0. The third group is the bulk of

Southeast Asian nations, as well as Mongolia and North Korea, which are maintaining relatively high fertility rates of between 2.0 and 3.0. The fourth group is the countries of Laos and Cambodia, which have not yet completed their first fertility transition.

Table 1 Total fertility rates in East Asia and other selected societies

Area	TFR	Year
Chinese Hong Kong	0.98	(2007)
Chinese Taiwan	1.12	(2006)
S. Korea	1.13	(2007)
Singapore	1.25	(2007)
Japan	1.32	(2007)
Chinese Mainland	1.7	(2007)
Thailand	1.9	(2007)
N. Korea	2.0	(2007)
Myanmar	2.2	(2007)
Vietnam	2.2	(2007)
Indonesia	2.3	(2007)
Mongolia	2.3	(2007)
Brunei	2.4	(2007)
Malaysia	2.8	(2007)
The Philippines	3.0	(2007)
Cambodia	3.9	(2007)
Laos	4.6	(2007)

* Source: Japanese Cabinet Office (2007)

When examined from a global perspective, we can split Group 1 up further into two sub-groups. The first includes Singapore and Japan, nations with approximately the same lowest-low fertility as post-communist CEE countries, Southern Europe and German-speaking countries. The other consists of Chinese Taiwan, Chinese Hong Kong and South Korea, which have levels lower than anywhere else in the world. This second subgroup can be termed "ultra-low fertility" societies (Straughan et al., 2008). This article mainly deals with the ultra-low and lowest-low fertility societies, but it will discuss other East Asian societies as needed.

1.2 The Historical Development of Low Fertility

We shall now take a closer look at the five ultra-low and lowest-low fertility societies in East Asia. Figure 1 shows the TFRs from 1970 in these societies and demonstrates that all of them except Japan had TFRs above 3.0 in 1970. Governments started family planning programs as a national policy immediately following WWⅡ in Japan and Singapore (Suga, 2010: 140), and in the 1960s in Korea and Chinese Taiwan (Yamaji, 2010: 43), spurring the fertility transition. Replacement level fertility was reached in Japan in 1956, in Singapore in 1975, and in Korea and Chinese Taiwan in 1984 (Suzuki, 2010: 20). Chinese Hong Kong reached replacement level in 1980.



* Source: Japanese Cabinet Office (2010)

Figure 1 Trends in TFR in five East Asian societies

After reaching replacement level, Japan's fertility remained steady for about twenty years, and then in 1974 started dropping below replacement level. In other words, it immediately followed the second fertility decline that began in Europe around 1970. In contrast to this, there was no period in the other four societies where fertility remained steady around the replacement level. When we compare fertility declines in Europe and East

Asia, this is the key difference to note. In Singapore, birth control policies were followed even after replacement level was reached, and in the 1970s a new system of fertility control was even brought in, whereby anyone who wished was able to have an abortion or undergo sterilization (Suga, 2010: 141). Korea and Chinese Taiwan were also slow in making policy changes, and by the 1980s fertility levels in the four societies had temporarily dropped below that of Japan.

By the 1990s, while Japan's fertility continued to drop, that of Singapore, Korea, and Chinese Taiwan had steadied temporarily, holding at between 1.6 and 1.8. In Singapore, the quality of the populace started to be of governmental concern from 1984, with well-educated women from the upper income brackets being encouraged to give birth, and conversely with poorly-educated women from lower income brackets being encouraged to undergo sterilization. In 1986, existing population control policies started to be revised, and Singapore's Family Planning and Population Board was closed down. In 1987, the old "Two-child Families for Singapore" slogan was replaced with "Have three or more if you can afford it" (Suga, 2010: 142). In stark contrast to Japan, where there was an allergy to the pronatalist ideas of the "Give Birth and Procreate" policy of WWII, Singapore changed quite quickly to a birth promotion policy. On the other hand, during this time Korea and Chinese Taiwan had few fears regarding the decline of fertility, and "South Korean demographers used to interpret Japan's very low fertility as a social symptom of advanced industrial capitalism that was shared by most Western countries" (Chang, 2010: 35).

A new aspect started after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 - 1998, and became clearer once the 21st century started. The TFRs for Chinese Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea dropped sharply, and while they recovered briefly in 2000, started plummeting again in 2001. In that year, Korea fell below the 1.3 level, and in 2003 Japan, Korea, and Singapore followed suit.[①] Following that, fertility in Korea, Chinese Taiwan, and Singapore dropped below Japan, and while Japan and Singapore showed either a slight improvement or held steady, Korea and Chinese Taiwan continued dropping along with Chinese Hong Kong, going below 1.1 and recording a new global low level of fertility. The lowest levels each society reached were 1.05 in Korea in 2008, 1.03 in Chinese Taiwan in 2009, 0.98 in Chinese Hong Kong in 2007. This group, termed "ultra-low fertility societies", started showing its unique trends from this period. Explanations for this trend are only just beginning. Suzuki Toru, for example, has contrasted the strong Confucian family traditions of Korea and Chinese Taiwan and other nations with the feudal family traditions of Southern Europe and Japan, trying to find a causal factor in traditional family structures (Suzuki, 2010). I propose that we should pay more attention to the economic aspects, because the economic crisis in 1997 - 1998 seems to have played a critical role in altering the trends.

1.3 Compressed Modernity and Demographic Transitions

Earlier, I noted how we need to focus on the fact that, in the process of declining fertility, Asian societies outside Japan never had a period when fertility stayed at the replacement level, an argument I would like to develop further now. When we take another look at long-term trends in declining fertility in different regions of the globe from a macro perspective, we can gain a theoretical idea for considering social change in East Asia.

Figure 2 shows the long-term trends in TFR for a number of East Asian countries, including Japan, as well as those of Europe and the U.S. The first thing we should notice, at least in Europe, is that there were two declines, one as part of the first demographic transition and the other as part of the second.

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① Hong Kong has been at a level below 1.3 since the 1990s.



* Source: UN, Demographic Yearbook

Figure 2 Long-term trends in TFR in Europe and Asia

An interesting fact is that, with very few exceptions, societies within one region—i. e. Europe or Asia—experienced their fertility declines almost simultaneously. In those two regions—with the exceptions of France in Europe and Japan in Asia—there is a gap of about half a century in the timings of first fertility declines. The first fertility decline occurred in most European societies between the 1870s–1880s and 1920s–1930s, and in most East Asian societies in the 1970s–1980s. Japan experienced it in the 1950s, exactly halfway between the time of most European countries and that of most East Asian countries. In terms of timing, Japan does not fall into either the European group or the Asian group. For the same given period, it shares no social situation or policy issues with the societies of either region. I believe that this is connected with the difficulties of political decision-making and diplomatic isolation that Japanese society constantly experienced.

Next, when did the second fertility decline take place? In Europe and the U. S., it started at the end of the 1960s, and from the mid-1970s in Japan. Thus while there was a quarter-century gap between Japan and most countries in Europe for the first fertility decline, for the second fertility decline, the gap was only several years. Latecomers thus had their modernity not only delayed but "compressed", as the Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-Sup[①] has noted (Chang, 1999).

① East Asian names are given in the East Asian order of surname first.

When, then, did the second fertility decline take place in Asian countries other than Japan? Examining Figure 2 with this question in mind can lead to confusion. In Asian countries, the fertility decline is continuing; we cannot see any boundary between the first and second fertility declines as we could for Europe, the U.S., or Japan. We need to operationally define a decline below replacement levels as a second fertility decline, which means that in Singapore the second fertility decline started in the mid-1970s, only a few years after Japan. Meanwhile, the second declines in South Korea, Thailand, and Chinese mainland started, respectively at the beginning of the 1980s, in the second half of the 1980s, and in the 1990s.

If we think of the period between these two fertility declines—when fertility was stable and at around the replacement level—as the "golden age" of modernity, then the length of this period was about 50 years in Europe and America, 20 years in Japan, and almost nonexistent in the rest of East Asia. As the Asian societies other than Japan have not experienced a stable modernity, they have plunged headlong and directly into late or second modernity①.

From the demographic point of view, we can see very clearly the compression of modernity that Chang Kyung-Sup pointed out. Areas in Asia outside Japan have gone through this "compressed modernity," while Japan having a "semi-compressed modernity", and this provides an explanation for the experiences these regions would later undergo. Chang Kyung-Sup defined this concept as "Compressed modernity is a social situation in which economic, political, social and/or cultural changes occur

① The term "second modernity" was coined by Ulrich Beck to explain the fact that a modern society with distinctly different attributes to the previous modern society had arisen in Europe in the 1970s. The previous, classical modernity he termed "first modernity". Beck did not define these two maternities in relation to the two demographic transitions, but I believe they should be, so at times I shall refer to the society created by the first demographic transition as the "first modernity" and the society created by the second demographic transition as the "second modernity"(Ochiai, 2010a).

in an extremely condensed manner with respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system" (Chang, 2010: 24).

2. Paradox of Marriage in East Asia

2.1 Divorce, Late Marriage, Celibacy

In the second demographic transition in Europe, it was not just fertility, but marriage-related indicators that showed major changes. These indicators included an increase in divorce rates, a decrease in marriage rates, an increase in age at first marriage, an increase in the proportion never married, an increase in cohabitation rate, and an increase in births out of wedlock. In East Asia, which has plummeted to extreme levels of fertility never seen historically, changes related to marriage superficially appear to resemble Europe, but differ in essence.

Divorce rates in East Asia are also increasing notably (Figure 3).



* Source: Japan, NIPSSR (2010); Korea, Chang (2010a) and Statistics Korea (2008); Chinese Taiwan, Ito (2010); Chinese Hong Kong, Census & Statistics Department (2002) (2007a)(2007c); Singapore, Singapore Government, Department of Statistics (2009)

Figure 3 Trends in crude divorce rates in five East Asian societies

After the late 1960s, when the divorce rate in Europe started rising, an increasing trend was also seen in Japan, which by the 1980s spiked at a crude divorce rate of 1.50, and in 2002 recorded an all-time high of 2.30. This is the same level as European countries like the UK, Germany, Sweden, and France shown in Table 2. In Chinese Taiwan and Korea, divorce rates started rising from the 1980s. By the start of the 1990s they were closing in on Japan, passing it during the Asian Financial Crisis, with Korea's 2003 record level of 3.50 almost the same as the U.S.'s 3.60.

However, in a comparison of East Asian and European divorces, we must not overlook the fact that unlike Europe, where marriage has become an option in life and so the marriage rate itself is decreasing, in East Asia the marriage rate is not that much lower. So when we look at the ratio of marriage and divorce (Table 2), North and South American and European nations dominate, with East Asia's highest figures remaining at 0.45 for Chinese Taiwan, 0.39 for Chinese Hong Kong and 0.36 for Korea. At the lower end of the spectrum we can see Vietnam and Mongolia, which are lower than Italy or Iran. Marriage in East Asia is changing, but at the moment marriage is still relatively common, and once a couple is married, they are less likely to divorce than in Northwest Europe or North and South America.

Table 2 Crude marriage rate, crude divorce rate, the ratio of divorce and marriage in selected societies

Area	Year	CMR	CDR	div/mar
Uruguay	(2007)	3.84	4.33	1.13
Belgium	(2007)	4.29	2.83	0.66
Spain	(2007)	4.49	2.80	0.62
Hungary	(2007)	4.06	2.50	0.62
Cuba	(2007)	5.05	3.08	0.61
Austria	(2007)	4.33	2.47	0.57
Czech	(2007)	5.53	3.01	0.54

Continued

Area	Year	CMR	CDR	div/mar
Russia	(2007)	8.90	4.83	0.54
France	(2007)	4.33	2.22	0.51
Germany	(2007)	4.48	2.27	0.51
Switzerland	(2007)	5.34	2.63	0.49
USA	(2005)	7.50	3.60	0.48
UK	(2007)	5.14	2.37	0.46
Chinese Taiwan	(2007)	5.80	2.60	0.45
The Netherlands	(2007)	4.42	1.95	0.44
Sweden	(2007)	5.24	2.26	0.43
Chinese Hong Kong	(2007)	—	—	* 0.39
S. Korea	(2007)	7.10	2.57	0.36
Japan	(2007)	5.70	2.02	0.35
Chinese Macao	(2007)	3.90	1.30	0.33
Singapore	(2007)	5.22	1.48	0.28
Poland	(2007)	6.50	1.75	0.27
Chinese Mainland	(2007)	7.50	1.58	0.21
Italy	(2007)	4.21	0.84	0.20
Iran	(2007)	11.80	1.40	0.12
Mongolia	(2007)	15.70	0.67	0.04
Vietnam	(2007)	5.70	0.20	0.04
East Asian societies				

* Calculated from numbers of marriage and divorce

* Source: Chinese Hong Kong, Chinese Macao, Vietnam, United Nations Statistics Division (2008); Chinese Taiwan, Ito (2010); Other, NIPSSR (2010).

The increases in age at first marriage and in proportion never married are also clear in East Asia. Figure 4 shows the changes in age at first marriage in Japan, Korea, Chinese Taiwan, Chinese Hong Kong and Singapore. Japan was the first to show an increase, but Chinese Hong Kong, Chinese Taiwan and Korea show steep curves; and for men, outpaced Japan in the 1990s, while for women, showed almost no difference by the 2000s. The age at first marriage in these societies at the 2005 - 2006 point was 30 - 31 for men and about 27 - 28 for women, close to Western European levels.



* Source: Japan, NIPSSR (2010); Korea, Chang (2010a); Chinese Taiwan, Suzuki (2010), Sun (2009), Chinese Taiwan Ministry of Interior (2010); Chinese Hong Kong, Census & Statistics Department (2001) (2007a) (2007b); Singapore, Singapore Government, Department of Statistics (2009).

Figure 4 Trends in age at first marriage in five East Asian societies

The proportion never married cannot be calculated until the relevant cohorts are 50 years old, so Figure 5 only shows Japan, which was the first to show changes. Once the rise in the 1970s in women who never married (due to eligible men having died during the war) ended, the proportions of both men and women who never married at all increased, leading to a society in which one in six men and one in thirteen women would never experience marriage in their lifetime. These numbers are lower than Sweden for both sexes, but are higher than other European societies. When we look at the proportions of women aged 35 - 39 who are unmarried in Japan, Chinese Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea for comparison, the levels are 19%, 16%, 15% and 8% respectively, showing that there is a considerable gap from the "early marriage and universal marriage that marked the marriage patterns of mid-20th century Asia" (Suzuki, 2010: 21).



* Source: NIPSSR (2010)

Figure 5 Trends in proportion never married in Japan

2.2 Cohabitation and Births Out of Wedlock

There is another point we need to focus on here. In Europe, these phenomena—the increase in age at marriage and proportion never married—occur as a set with the increase in cohabitation and births out of wedlock. In other words, even if Europeans may marry later, they still have sexual liaisons and cohabit, causing a "transformation of intimacy" (Giddens, 1992).

In contrast to this, in Asia there is no such clear increase in either cohabitation or births out of wedlock, and this aspect has been termed the greatest difference from the European second demographic transition. According to a survey of unmarried people in Japan, the ratio of those aged between 18 to 50 who responded that "there is no one of the opposite sex I am involved with" was 52.2% for men and 44.7% for women, and there has been even a slight increase trend since the 1990s (NIPSSR, 2005). Japan's increase in age at marriage and proportion never married does not seem to be from "transformation of intimacy", but rather, represents a "lack of intimacy".

Indeed, in just the past few years there have been reports that the number of people cohabiting is increasing. A Cabinet Office survey carried out at the start of 2009 (Cabinet Office, 2009) compared the ratio of those who had experience cohabiting in each age group from the three countries of Japan, Korea, and Singapore. Those results are shown in Table 3 with the results from a 2005 survey (Cabinet Office, 2005) covering the same topic in the U. S., France, and Sweden for comparison (Kojima, 2010a; Kojima, 2010b). In contrast to Europe and North America, especially Sweden, where cohabitation is the majority, it remains a minority in East Asia, but is spreading, starting from Japan, then Singapore, then Korea. As there are large differences in the ratios of between men and women who have experienced cohabitation in Korea, it has been suggested that female respondents are concealing their experience (Kojima, 2010a).

Table 3 Proportions ever experienced cohabitation

	Japan 2009		**Korea 2009**		**Singapore 2009**	
Age	male	female	male	female	male	female
20-29	19.4%	19.5%	10.1%	2.0%	12.7%	9.3%
30-39	33.0%	25.8%	11.1%	1.8%	12.6%	9.2%
40-49	20.8%	12.5%	3.4%	0.6%	8.9%	7.0%
	USA 2005		**France 2005**		**Sweden 2005**	
Age	male	female	male	female	male	female
20-29	48.1%	51.2%	39.1%	53.0%	54.8%	69.0%
30-39	62.0%	61.7%	61.0%	66.1%	80.8%	87.2%
40-49	66.1%	60.5%	51.4%	45.9%	80.8%	77.5%

* Source: Kojima (2010) Table 2 based on Cabinet Office (2009) and (2005)

Despite this, however, births out of wedlock are still extremely rare in East Asia. The ratio of births out of wedlock in 2005 was 2.0% in Japan, 1.5% in Korea, 4.0% in Chinese Taiwan, and 1.3% in Singapore (Suzuki, 2010). In Europe, births out of wedlock count for more than half of all births in Northwestern Europe, and it rapidly increased even in Southern Europe (20.7% for Italy, 28.4% for Spain and 31.6% for Portugal), a great contrast with East Asia (Suzuki, 2010). Instead, what we find is an increasing number of so-called "shotgun marriages", or to be more faithful to the Japanese expression, "oops marriages"①. In Japan, the number of marriages due to pregnancy increased from the second half of the 1990s, and the proportion of cases in which the birth of the first child was less than nine months after the wedding was 10.6% in 1980, but had increased to 20.9% in 1999, 25.6% in 2005 and 25.3% in 2009 (MHLW, 2010). The gap between the frequency of premarital sex and the contrasting conservative standards has presumably been responsible for this increase in "oops marriages".

Cohabiting is possible, but must be concealed; pregnancy before marriage is possible, but birth out of wedlock must be avoided: there is still a very strong wall between marriage and other intimate relationships in East Asia. Unlike Europe, where cohabitation is replacing marriage and the institution of marriage has weakened, in East Asia the institution of marriage, while shaky, is nevertheless solid. We can see a sign of compressed modernity here.

2.3 International Marriages and High Sex Ratio at Birth

When we talk about recent demographic changes in East Asia, we cannot ignore international and cross-border marriages.② Kojima Hiroshi includes these phenomena in the elements that make up the "East-Asian style second demographic transition" (Kojima, 2010b). The increase in international marriages is once again led by Japan ahead of the other East Asian societies, starting back in the 1980s. In order to solve the problem of lack of eligible women for rural men to marry, a number of local authorities started government-led matchmaking projects, encouraging marriage with women from Asian countries including the Philippines, Sri Lanka, etc. In

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① This type of marriage is called "dekichatta kon" in Japanese, which can be translated loosely as "Oops, we've done it! marriage". It is important to note that these are not "forced marriages" in the sense of "shotgun marriages".

② Regarding marriage migration in East Asian, see Palriwala and Uberoi (2008).

other words, rather than natural love-based marriages, this growth in international marriage was driven by an extension of introduced marriages, the traditional marriage method. In short order, marriage brokers jumped on the international marriage promotion bandwagon. In the 2000s, international marriage moved to showing increase in urban areas and industrial regions (Liew, Ochiai and Ishikawa, 2010). ①

Korea and Chinese Taiwan started showing increased numbers of international marriages from the 1990s, a little later than Japan, but they rapidly increased in number, soon rising to far overtake Japan. The proportions of international or cross-border marriages② are 5.1% in Japan (2008), 11.0% in Korea (2008) and 12.2% in Chinese Taiwan (2008) (NIPSSR, 2010; Yamaji, 2010; Ito, 2010). While they declined later, in 2003 almost one marriage in three in Chinese Taiwan was a crossborder marriage. ③

In Korea and Chinese Taiwan too the factor behind this was the lack of eligible women in rural areas and for lower-income men, but another factor, one not found in Japan, was the high sex ratio at birth. A high sex ratio has been prevalent in East Asia (in the narrow sense of the term) and South Asia for the past 30 years, since the start of the first fertility decline, with the exception of Japan which does not have patrilineal kinship groups and strong son preference. Kojima considers a high sex ratio to be another formative factor in the East-Asian style second demographic transition (Kojima, 2010b). The sex ratio at birth in 1990 was 117 in Korea and 110 in Chinese Taiwan (Suzuki, 2010). Ironically, the late start of the fertility decline enabled the people of these societies to use the new technologies of checking sex and sex-selective abortions. This is a typical

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① With the rise in the resident foreigner population, it appears to be increasing without depending on the government or businesses (Liew, Ochiai and Ishikawa, 2010).

② The term "cross-border marriage" is used in Chinese Taiwan to include marriages with Chinese Mainland.

③ 28.0% of brides in 2003 were non-Taiwanese.

example of compressed modernity.

As for the reason why they chose international marriages, the husbands of foreign wives usually mention the need to have a son to inherit the family name, the need for people to care for elderly parents, and the need to ensure a labor supply for the farms (Ochiai, 2007). It means that the increase in international marriages and cross-border marriages in East Asia occurs to maintain the traditional family. This too can be seen as a sign of compressed modernity.

2.4 East Asian Marriage and Risk-Aversive Individualization

Divorce, the age at marriage, and the proportion of celibacy are all rising but the institution of marriage is intact. International and cross-border marriages flourish but for very traditional purposes. When we examine these related issues this way, it appears that "marriage" in East Asia may in fact have a different meaning to that in Europe.

We can see a striking character of the East Asian marriage in the relationship between sex and marriage. According to a MHLW research group which carried out surveys every two years of the attitudes and behaviors related to sex of men and women aged 16 - 49, in 2010, 40.8% of married people had not have sex for the past month, a continual increase from the 31.9% recorded in 2004 (Mainichi Newspaper, 2011). This phenomenon has been termed "sexless couples" by the media. Sexlessness is also becoming an issue in Singapore as well, and novels are also written about the theme (Fujii, 2010). If sex is at the center of intimacy, we can see that marriage in East Asia is not for the sake of intimacy itself, but is maintained for other reasons.

Table 4 shows selected results from the 2006 EASS (East Asian Social Survey) conducted in Japan, Korea, China, including China mainland and Chinese Taiwan, focusing on the issue of the family (Iwai and Yasuda, 2009). The first five questions, such as "One must put familial well-being and interest before one's own", ask about the balance between individualism and familialism. In Korea, Chinese mainland and Chinese Taiwan, 7 or 8 out of 10 respondents agreed with the above question, showing strong familialistic trends. Even in Japan, the lowest, more than half agreed. Agreement with the idea that "Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage" was not low in the three societies other than Japan, but in Korea and Chinese mainland, agreement with "People who want to divorce must wait until their children are grown up" was enough high to prevent people following individualistic decisions. Inter-generational duties are not just from the parents to the children, but also "Children must make efforts to do something that would bring honor to their parents". Marriage in East Asia is more about duty and responsibility than individual desire.

Table 4 Family values in Asian societies

The total proportions of people who answered "Strongly agree," "Fairly agree" and "Somewhat agree"

	Japan	Korea	Chinese Mainland	Chinese Taiwan
One must put familial well-being and interest before one's own.	50	79	68	83
Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage.	29	38	49	46
People who want to divorce must wait until children are grown up.	36	55	43	33
To what extent do you think your own parent (s) influenced your decision of the current marriage partner?	30	47	41	36
Children must make efforts to do something that would bring honor to their parents.	40	74	89	86
It is not necessary to have children in marriage.	20	11	28	35
It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married.	28	22	25	36

* Source: Iwai and Yasuda (2009) based on EASS 2006

There were many disagreements with the statements, "It is not necessary to have children in marriage" and "It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married". The total of "Strongly disagree", "Fairly disagree", and "Somewhat disagree" was highest for both in Korea, with 77% and 66%. Korea was also top in agreeing with "People who want to divorce must wait until their children are grown up". The huge gap between these strong normative ideas and the reality of ultra-low fertility and high divorce rates shows the depth of the inconsistency within Korean society.

Chang Kyung-Sup has explained this inconsistency under the concept of "risk-aversive individualization". He notes that "South Koreans... have led highly family-centered social and personal lives under what may be called *familist compressed modernity*" (Chang, 2010a: 24; Chang, 2010b). This is because the family is the only social resource that can support individuals exposed to capitalist industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, extreme tendencies in educational pursuit, and privatized welfare protection in rapid modernization. However, "the institutional weakening of families induced family relations to turn from social resources into risks". You might be obliged to help your family members and relatives who have become fallen behind in this competitive world, rather than receiving support from them.[①] So, "Riskaversive individualization is defined as a social tendency of individuals trying to minimize the family-associated risks of modern life by extending or returning to individualized states of life" (Chang, 2010a: 25). This is what actually happened after the 1997 - 1998 Asian Financial Crisis in ultra-low fertility societies. People decided to postpone marriage or children or divorce to avoid the risk these might create for them. Kojima's analysis of causes for cohabitation in Japan, Korea, and Singapore is suggestive

① The Japanese sociologist Yamada Masahiro also presented the idea of seeing the family as a source of risk (Yamada, 2001).

(Kojima, 2010a). He demonstrates that a common factor to all three societies is a lower educational background. The poor economy in Japan from 1992 to 2001 led to an increase in the number of people entering the workforce after high school who were cohabiting. In Korea, there was a large number of men with moderate education who assumed to have been affected by the IMF Crisis (what the Asian Financial Crisis is known as in Korea) and in cohabitation relationships. In other words, cohabitation, which has started increasing in East Asia, is promoted by the "social exclusion" of people with lower education and unstable employment, rather than by individualistic choices to free themselves from the institution of marriage.①

Chang's key point is that these tendencies are "not necessarily symptoms of individualization, because they seem to reflect the ever intensifying significance of family relations and values in South Korean life" (Chang, 2010a: 24). Chang also notes that these trends are not restricted to Korea, but are shared by Japan and Chinese Taiwan, summing the situation up as: "The apparent convergence of capitalist East Asia in individualization without individualism is a historical outcome of the condensed modernization and second modernization of the latecomers" (Chang, 2010a: 35).

3. Varieties of Familialism and Their Failure

3.1 Causes of Familialism

Demographic and family changes currently underway in East Asia have similar phenomena-based aspects to the second demographic

① However, Kojima also found a new tendency for highly-educated women in Japan to cohabit after 2000, which might be interpreted as the birth of a new lifestyle (Kojima, 2010a).

transition of Europe and North America, but in Europe while the institution of marriage is shaky and individualism has arisen, in East Asia in contrast the institution of marriage and familialism remain, showing superficially the same phenomenon. The extreme decline in fertility and the increase in divorces and in age at first marriage can be interpreted as desires to avoid the burden of a family, or to flee from them, since the importance of the institution of family in terms of duty and responsibility remains unchanged.

So what causes familialism to be prevalent in East Asia? The first thing that comes to mind is a cultural explanation rooted in the region's traditional culture, but, as noted above, there is no single shared culture common to all of the East Asian region. For example, the region from Southeast Asia to Japan has traditionally had high divorce rates and remarriage rates because there were no stigma attached (Reid, 1993). Also, it was not uncommon to have children out of wedlock, and there was little discrimination towards illegitimate children (Ochiai and Nakajima, 2010; Ochiai, 2011). In this region, divorce and illegitimacy rates declined as part of the modernization process (Ochiai, 2010: 8 - 9). On the other hand, the Northeastern area from North China to Korea, with its strong Confucian heritage, generally frowns on divorce and remarriage, not to mention children out-of-wedlock. Sechiyama contrasted the northern part and the southern part of East Asia in terms of gender relation: patriarchy with gender segregation of social space in the northern area and more gender equality with women's high contribution to rice production in the southern area. A simple cultural explanation cannot be applied (Sechiyama, 1996).①

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① However, there is still a room for the explanation based on the history of the area, if we relate the development of social welfare in Europe to Christianity. The lack of the process that the Christian church replaced the role of the family in taking care of their frail or disadvantaged members just as Jack Goody describes (Goody, 1983) might be the reason of remaining and even strengthened familialism in Asia in history.

According to Esping-Andersen, "familialism" is the idea that the family should have the greatest welfare responsibility towards its members, both in income distribution and care provision. He holds that, in its early stages, the modern welfare state was premised on familialism in virtually all nations. It was only from the 1970s onwards that the Scandinavian countries came to prioritize defamilialization. He insists that the consequence of familialistic social policy is two sub-optimal scenarios: low fertility or a high proportion of families in poverty (Esping-Andersen, 2009: 81). As Esping-Andersen notes, Europe has progressed in three or four different directions through its policy choices from the 1970s. We should pay more attention to the policy decisions East Asian governments have made and are making under the conditions of compressed modernity. With the combined effects of compressed modernity and the policy decisions in it, East Asia has developed a stronger familialism than Europe at the same time as creating varieties of familialism (Ochiai, 2010b).

3.2 Familialist Reform in Japan

For Japan, we should understand the importance of the policy reform made in the 1980s. Prior to that, until the High Growth period of the 1960s, the Japanese government was still following developmentalist policies. The policy focus was on economic growth under the strong leadership of MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry), and was, in a way, a continuation of the prewar system. In the realm of social policy, Japan started to develop social welfare, imitating Bismarkian social insurance schemes as early as in the first half of the twentieth century. After the WWⅡ, the Livelihood Protection Act was introduced and the universal pension system was established for all save for non-working housewives. We may grant that Japan was ahead, in the Asian context, in the construction of social security system. However, the role of social security still remained peripheral in the 1960s, because growth was considered to be the best way to improve people's well-being. We can call this system a sort of "workfare", where high rates of employment are assumed to perform the same function as welfare. It was only when substantial economic growth had been achieved in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the government recognized the need to revise the existing welfare system to construct a more appropriate welfare state. The year 1973 was named "Welfare Year 1", which referred to it as the starting point for transforming Japan into a welfare state in the fuller sense.

However, ironically, "Welfare Year 1" was hit by the Energy Crisis. The government became wary and set a new agenda called the "Japanese-style welfare society" that emphasized "traditional" Japanese virtues of "self-help and mutual support within the family and the community". What the government tried to promote was not actually a welfare "state" but a welfare "society". People might find an early example of welfare retrenchment and welfare pluralism in this idea but the important difference was the level prior to the change. Japan did not have much developed to retrench to. Rather, the size of social expenditure was increased in the 1970s and later. Under the conditions of compressed modernity, this development and retrenchment of welfare happened at the same time.

There were also economic and demographic conditions that made it possible. Growth rates remained high even after the Energy Crisis, which affected Europe and North America even more seriously. Compared to Europe and North America, affluence lasted 20 years longer in Japan. Also, with an already low number of children and a still low number of elderly people, Japan was still enjoying a "demographic dividend" in the 1970s. In this period, the proportion of working-age population in Japan was 69% (1970), higher than that in Europe (for example, 64% in Germany, 65% in Sweden) and other Asian countries (56% in Korea, 58% in Singapore) (see Figure 12 in Ochiai 2010a). Under these favorable conditions, growth rates even reached around 5 percent per annum from the late 1980s to the early 1990s (IMF 2004), a period known as the "asset bubble". A book entitled *Japan As Number One* by Ezra Vogel (Vogel 1979) became a best-seller in 1979, opening the way to the boom of books about Japanese management and culture. The Japanese society was able to continue "workfare" for two more decades.

In 1980s, the government made the "family" a policy issue to create the foundations of a "Japanese-style welfare society". Flattered by the cultural explanations of Japan's economic success, the government and their ideologues tried to create a unique policy direction, not imitating any policies in the West. They were also irritated by the changes in the family already becoming visible in the statistics, such as increasing divorce rates and age at marriage, and decreasing fertility. The Ohira Cabinet's policy agenda on "Enrichment of Family Foundations" (1979) as well the so-called "Whitepaper on the Family" (a special issue of the "Whitepaper on National Life") were produced from this fear of a "family crisis" and a strong desire to protect the Japanese family, the core of national identity, from contamination by western culture. In other words, these policies were a reaction to the second demographic transition that started from Europe and North America. Laws known as the "protection of the housewife's throne" were implemented in the 1980s, including an increase in the legal inheritance amount for the wife (1980), pension reform that waived premiums for the wives of employees of large companies (1985), and the creation of a special tax deduction for those with dependent spouses (1986).

The effect of this anachronistic familialist reform was enormous. Increase in the full-time employment of women since the 1950s ceased by the Energy Crisis and the only expansion in women's employment from the latter half of the 1970s to present was in part-time employment (Tanaka, 1999; Ochiai, 2010a: Figure 10). This was because the wives of large company employees restricted their working hours to adjust their income within the amount to be recognized as "dependent" on their husband. This new gender division of labor—what Jane Lewis calls a "one-and-a-half earner model" (Lewis, 2001)—was created in the recession, fixed by the law and remained entrenched for decades. In 1970, in contrast to expectations, the rate of female labor force participation was higher in Japan than in most European countries (Ochiai, 2010a: 12). However, in the three decades that followed, Europe and North America each saw big jumps, while little change has been observed in Japan (Figure 6). Women's participation rates by age still show an M-shape pattern in Japan. The gender role change occurred in most European and North American countries at the same time as the second demographic transition did not occur in Japan because of the familialist reforms of the 1980s.



* Source: NIPSSR (2010)

Figure 6 Changes in women's labour force participation by age in Japan

In the 1990s Japan lost the economic and demographic conditions it had in the 1980s. When the bubble economy finally burst in 1991 - 1992, the Japanese economy entered a long period of stagnation. Since then, Japan's growth has been modest, with some fluctuations. The favorable demographic state did not last either. The proportion of elderly population skyrocketed in the 1990s, reaching 22.1% in 2008 (NIPSSR, 2010), the highest rate in the world (Figure 7). In spite of these drastic changes in economic and demographic conditions, the familialistic structure consolidated in the 1980s resisted change, resulting in the "lost decades". The government introduced new policy measures from the late 1990s, allegedly aiming for the socialization of care, but those policies were still heavily reliant on familialistic ideas. For example, the LTCI (Long-term Care Insurance), which was introduced in 2000, is designed to promote homebased care, not institutional care. Family caregivers can hire "home helpers" for a number of hours a day with subsidies from this insurance, but they still suffer from responsibility for care for the rest of the day and from the economic burden of having to partially pay for this care (co-payment) (Ochiai et al., 2011).



* Source: NIPSSR (2010)

Figure 7 Trends is proportion over 65 in selected countries

3.3 Liberal Familialism in Other East Asian Societies

Other East Asian societies had very different experiences from Japan. Modernity was even more compressed in these other societies, forcing them to undertake the paradoxical task of constructing a welfare state and at the same time, retrenching welfare (Miyamoto, Peng, and Uzuhashi, 2003: 301). For example, Korean President Kim Dae-Jung (1998 - 2003) was faced with this despite the forced application of neo-liberalism and globalization after the IMF Crisis created a concept of "productive welfare" that would construct social welfare as a social investment, or in other words, the foundation of economic growth.

Based on field research in six East Asian societies, our research team has proposed a framework for comparing the patterns of childcare and elderly care provision (Ochiai and Molony, 2008; Ochiai, 2009). One significant finding was the key role the market sector played in certain societies, especially for childcare and elderly care in Singapore and for elderly care in Chinese Taiwan. This reflects the employment of foreign domestic workers and care workers in the home. The huge diversity within the Asian region means that we are seeing more and more transnational migration of domestic and care workers. Those families who hire care services from the market usually profess the familialistic idea that a family should take care of its elderly parents at home. Yet the reality is that it is migrant care workers who perform these care tasks. To put it another way, these families outsource their filial piety.① We may call this approach "liberal familialism".

There are foreign domestic and care workers in Europe and North America as well. However, when we compare the proportions of foreign domestic and care workers in terms of the total foreign labor force, the figures are: Chinese Hong Kong 57.5%, Chinese Taiwan 26.6%, Singapore 17.8%, Spain 16.4%, Italy 10.4%, France 7.2%, U.S.A. 2.0%, Germany 0.6% and UK 0.5% (Asato, 2010). These figures demonstrate the extent to which East Asian societies depend on the domestic and care labor of foreign women. The only comparable cases in Europe are Spain and Italy, which are Southern European societies known to be familialistic. The employment of foreign domestic and care workers is complementary to familialism. Asato Wako rather calls it "familialization policy" to "maintain family as a unit of welfare provision by incorporating foreign domestic workers". He sees the intention of the government for "externalization of welfare provision onto family", "considering international

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① According to Asato, foreign workers are "often referred to as an 'intimate other' to internalize surrogate quasi-family member in order to maintain family function". For the people who cannot afford hiring foreign domestic worker, an option is cross-border marriage. "Foreign household workers and marriage migrants are similar in that they both provide welfare within the family." (Asato, 2010: 98) economic competitiveness" (Asato, 2010: 88).

Compared with societies like Singapore or Chinese Taiwan, the complete lack of a solution that involves hiring foreign workers in Japan is striking. Japan's immigration policy does not provide visas for unskilled foreign workers, so there are almost no foreign domestic or care workers in the country (Liew, Ochiai and Ishikawa, 2010)①. Just as in the case of consolidation of the family, Japan sticks to its 1960s system and resists changes in numerous aspects in spite of the thorough transformation of the society. In its "semi-compressed modernity" Japan barely managed to build a structure resembling the first modernity. However, there was not enough time for it to mature and be reconstructed according to changing circumstances. In contrast, other East Asian societies had even less time in their much more "compressed modernity" to achieve stability, which functions as a positive factor to promote constant change. For example, the hiring of domestic workers was a normal habit in an earlier stage of modernity. Before losing their collective memory of hiring domestic help, other East Asian societies started accepting domestic workers with foreign nationalities, while the carefully-constructed privacy works as an obstacle in Japan's case.

Asian familialism is diverse in reality. However, even in the case of liberal familialism where the family receives care services from the market, the responsibility to finance the cost of care is usually borne by the family.② This is why liberal familialism is still called familialism, and why fertility in these societies is also low. The economic burden is particularly heavy for people of economically disadvantaged status. The impact of the economic crisis in and after 1997 – 1998 was severe, because in liberal

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① Japan has recently begun accepting care workers as candidates to become nurses based on agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines, but their numbers are still few and the program has a lot of problems (Asato, 2009).

② The regulated market created by Japan's LTCI has the same structure (Ochiai et al., 2011).

familialism societies, it is people with lower economic status who are more vulnerable to economic stress.

4. Conclusion

The answer to the first question whether East Asia is going through a second demographic transition is both yes and no, because, at first glance, the demographic changes currently underway in East Asia have similarities to those in Europe and North America, but there are considerable differences in essence. Fertility in Korea, Chinese Taiwan and Chinese Hong Kong has declined to a new global low level, which can be called "ultra-low fertility". Divorce, the age at marriage, and the proportion never married are increasing but the rise in cohabitation is slow and births out of wedlock are avoided. Increasing international marriages and the high sex ratio at birth are special elements of the East-Asian style second demographic transition. Marriage as an institution of duty and responsibility rather than intimacy is still intact in East Asia. Because of that, when family relationships changed from being social resources to being risks during the economic crisis, risk-aversive individualization occurred to avoid the burden of a family. The answer to the second question, therefore, is that it was not individualism but familialism that is causing the current demographic and family changes in East Asia.

The cause of the prevalence of familialism in East Asia is not primarily cultural factors, but compressed modernity. In the semi-compressed modernity in Japan, the anachronistic familialist reform of the 1980s consolidated the family and gender structure of the 1960s, which then resisted the economic and demographic changes in the 1990s, resulting in the "lost decades" since then. In contrast, other East Asian societies that experienced a much stronger compression of modernity took a course of liberal familialism that made use of the global market in the name of the family. Thus, different degrees of compression created the varieties of familialism we see in East Asia.

We may say that both types of familialism have failed in constructing a sustainable social system. The genuine familialism in Japan suppressed the flexibility and adaptability of the family in the changing world, while the liberal familialism in other East Asian societies resulted in the harsh exclusion of economically disadvantaged people. In the near future, when other societies are as aged as Japan is today, the social reproduction of East Asia will become an even harder challenge without radical and dynamic policy changes.

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(East Asian names are given in the East Asian order of surname first)

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Population, Policy, and Politics*

—How Will History Judge China's One-Child Policy?

One of the main puzzles of modern population and social history is why, among all countries confronting rapid population growth in the second half of the twentieth century, China chose to adopt an extreme measure of birth control known as the one-child policy. A related question is why such a policy, acknowledged to have many undesirable consequences, has been retained for so long, even beyond the period of time anticipated by its creators.

With the world's population growth rate now at half its historical peak level and with nearly half of the world's population living in countries with fertility below replacement level, we can look back at the role politics played in formulating, implementing, and reformulating policies aimed at slowing population growth (Demeny and McNicoll, 2006; Robinson and Ross, 2007; Demeny, 2011). In this context, an examination of China's unprecedented government intervention in reproduction offers valuable lessons in appreciating the role of politics in the global effort of birth control in the twentieth century.

Aside from the rise and fall of Communism, family planning programs along with the Green Revolution could be considered two of the most consequential social experiments of the twentieth century. These two experiments differ, however, in both content and approach. The Green

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Revolution was aimed at feeding the population, while family planning programs were designed to curtail its growth. The Green Revolution was technological, economic, and global, while family planning programs were social, political, and often country specific.

Nowhere in the world did politics and policies figure more prominently in the effort to control population growth than in China. The policy of allowing all couples to have only one child finds no equal in the world and it may be one of the most draconian examples of government social engineering ever seen. In this essay, we cast China's one-child policy in the changing global context of population policymaking, we revisit the supposed necessity of such a policy by examining the claim that the policy was responsible for preventing 400 million births, and we discuss the reasons why such a policy, with all its known negative consequences, has been allowed to stay in place for more than thirty years since its inception.

1. Entry: Population and Politics

The world in the second half of the twentieth century saw the fastest rate of population growth ever in human history. While the main driver of this growth, the unprecedented lengthening of human life expectancy, had its seeds in the previous centuries, the momentum of population growth by the early twentieth century was spreading from industrialized countries in Europe and North America to the rest of the world, especially Asia and Latin America, where the majority of the world's population resided (Reher, 2011).

Rapid population growth created challenges in many societies and led to a global movement of birth control, soon with the active involvement of national governments. This movement can be dated to the early 1950s, shortly after the end of WWII, with events such as adoption of the first national population policy in India, the establishment of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), and the founding of the Population

Council with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation (Sinding, 2007). Two views of birth control programs emerged: the earlier one focusing on providing contraceptives for voluntary use without joining forces with governments in order to avoid interfering with individual reproduction choice; the later one legitimating and promoting the role of government in restricting individual reproductive freedom for the sake of controlling population growth (ibid.).

By the mid-1960s, the population control movement had gained new allies, with more and more international organizations identifying population growth as a hindrance to economic growth and a potential risk to political stability in the world's less developed areas. Funding increased from both governments of the developed world and private foundations. The United Nations established its Fund for Population Activities (now the UN Population Fund) in 1969. The first UN-organized World Population Conference was held in 1974 in Bucharest.① Although the conference ended in some controversy, it represented a "great step toward better national solutions and ultimately toward a better world"(Demeny, 1984: 359).

China was an example of the contradiction between rhetoric and action evident in Bucharest conference. At the conference, the Chinese delegation denounced the call for population control from the West as part of an imperialist agenda and claimed that population was not a determinant of national economic growth and well-being (Demeny, 1985). At home, however, a nationwide birth control program was already well underway. Ten years before the Bucharest conference, China had established the Birth Planning Commission within the State Council to lead its birth control efforts, with a long-term goal of reducing the population growth rate to 1 percent by 2000 (Yang, Liang, and Zhang, 2001: 34). (The growth rate

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① There were two earlier World Population Conferences, in 1954 and 1965. Unlike its predecessors, the delegates to the 1974 meeting had the authority to commit their governments to decisions taken at the conference.

in 1962 was 2.7 percent.) In 1971, a Chinese State Council document made reducing the population growth rate to 1 percent in cities and 1.5 percent in rural areas by 1975 part of China's "fourth Five-Year Plan". By the time of the Bucharest conference, fertility in urban China, at 1.98, was already below replacement level. A year after the conference, another goal was set to reduce the rural population growth rate to 1 percent and the urban rate to 0.6 percent (Liang, 2007: 116). The national growth rate in 1975 was 1.57 percent.

China was not the only country where rhetoric did not match reality. Eight years before the Bucharest conference, India's Ministry of Public Health had been renamed the Ministry of Public Health and Family Planning, and a special department on family planning was formed within the ministry. Two years after the conference, at which an Indian delegate famously argued that "development is the best contraceptive", a National Population Policy statement proclaimed that sharply reducing fertility was a "top national priority and commitment". India's notorious forced sterilization campaign was carried out between 1975 and 1976, during which more than 8 million sterilizations were performed (Harkavy and Roy, 2007; Visaria, 2002). The campaign led to the collapse of Indira Gandhi's government in January 1977 and resulted in new approaches to birth control. In 1977, family planning in India was renamed family welfare, and sterilization targets were sharply reduced. By the mid-1990s, all targets related to birth control had been removed (Harkavy and Roy, 2007).

In a number of other countries with large populations and rapid growth rates, such as Bangladesh and Indonesia, coercive methods of a lesser degree were also used (Sinding, 2007: 8). All around the world, governments in countries experiencing rapid population growth recognized the challenges they faced and considered the level of fertility in their country too high. Between 1976 and 1996, the number of governments viewing their population growth rate as too high increased from 55 to 87 (UN, 2010).

By launching a nationwide policy of limiting each couple to only one child, China, of course, established an unprecedented level of government control of births. What forces and political contexts led China to adopt the one-child policy? Moreover, why did opposition to intrusive measures of birth control lead to a quick reversal in policy in India, while in China the one-child policy continues to the present? Three features of the Chinese political system and associated policymaking help explain the Chinese exception: a statist tradition and bureaucratic institutions that treat individual citizens as subjects of the state; a post-revolutionary regime that places birth control at the heart of its political legitimacy; and a policymaking process that is carried out among political elites shrouded with secrecy and lacking public scrutiny. Combined, these three features of the Chinese political system help explain not only the design but also the survival of the one-child policy.

The one-child policy was launched at a time when China's political leadership was reestablishing its political legitimacy following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. In contrast to Mao and his generation of leaders, who based their political legitimacy on armed revolutions that led to the founding of the People's Republic, the post-Mao leadership could no longer count on such a legacy. The devastating aftermath of "the Cultural Revolution" at the time of Mao's death presented the greatest crisis for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its nearly three-decade rule. The post-Mao leadership consequently made economic development the new mandate and the fundamental basis of its political legitimacy. The measure used to gauge its success in increasing living standards of the population was per capita GDP growth. With this new mandate and focus, controlling population growth became a critical component of this legitimacy. In 1982, birth control was announced as a "basic state policy" (*jiben guoce*). ①

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① The other 5 "basic state policies" added subsequently, are environmental protection (1990), gender equality (1992), resources saving (1997), farmland protection (1998), and opening to the outside world (2007). "http:// politics. people. com. cn/GB/ 1025/10016373. html".

Historical studies of the design of the one-child policy reveal a fluid, complex, and at times confused process involving many actors. The core calculation leading to the policy began soon after Mao's death (Sun, 1987; White, 2006; Greenhalgh and Winckler, 2005; Scharping, 2003; Liang, 2007, 2010; Greenhalgh, 2008). As part of the modernization drive, a goal was proposed in September 1977, of reducing China's annual population growth rate to below 1 percent within three years. The goal, formally stated in the government's Working Report in February 1978 (Yang, Liang, and Zhang, 2001: 62), was not achieved until 1998. The planning mentality, treating population simply as a number that can be planned and regulated, was clearly evident.

The idea of one-child families, as a means to achieve the goal of reducing the birth rate quickly, came from political leaders as early as 1978, two years before the policy was announced nationally. In June 1978, the policy measure of "encouraging couples to have one child, at most two" was formally stated in a CCP Central Committee document, to be followed by concrete measures adopted in over ten provinces in the same year. These measures included rewarding parents having only one child and punishing those with two or more (Liang, 2007: 119).[①] By January 1979, official Chinese news outlets, the *People's Daily* and Xinhua News Agency, reported and printed editorials that clearly called for one child per couple, with "at most two". They also reconfirmed the measures already proposed in some provinces, namely to reward couples pledging to have only one child and to punish those with two or more. In June 1979, the headline in the *People's Daily* report of a speech by Chen Muhua, then head of the National Family Planning Leading Group, read: "To move the focus of birth control work to having one child is the best approach." The leaders who lent the strongest support to this goal, not surprisingly, were those in

① CCP Central Committee document No. 79, 1978.

charge of economic planning.[1]

A coherent set of demographic goals emerged by February 1980 in support of the economic developmental goals advanced by the Chinese leadership. These goals included a total population of 1.2 billion by 2000 and a population growth rate of zero, supported by concrete measures of restricting 95 percent of urban couples and 90 percent of rural couples to having only one child. The 1.2 billion population size figure, while still unclear how calculated, clearly conformed to the overall goal set by Deng Xiaoping of quadrupling China's per capita income between 1980 and 2000, to $1,000. Given that a per capita income goal was already set and the growth of the total economy (the numerator for calculating the per capita GDP) could be projected at a certain rate, determining the denominator, namely the total population, should not be difficult.

A strategy of GDP growth has remained the chief goal at all levels of the Chinese political system, and population has been made a lifeless number, not an aggregation of individual lives, in this pursuit. Such a pursuit is further reinforced by the CCP's cadre performance evaluation system that measures government officials' performance with numeric indexes, such as GDP per capita or government revenue per capita.[2] This per capita metric, using population size simply as part of the political calculation for achieving political goals, has been a constant driving force to justify the continuation of the one-child policy.

With an overall political goal set and with population size entered into the calculation of achieving that goal, the policymaking process led directly

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① Two CCP leaders in charge of the economy, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, were the most vocal in their support. Chen Yun, then Vice Chairman of the CCP, made it clear in conversations with other party officials on 1 June 1979 that clear laws and regulations needed to be formulated to require only one child per couple (Liang, 2010: 5).

② In November 1979, the CCP released the "Notification on the Implementation of the Cadre Evaluation System", marking the formalization of government officials' performance evaluation.

to the promulgation and continued existence of the one-child policy. Here, an extremely important policy justified by the goal of maintaining Communist Party legitimacy was left in the hands of elite political leaders, whose decisions few could challenge. Dissent and reservations notwithstanding, Party elders were instrumental in implementing the policy. Seizing on these signals for an even stricter birth control policy than those implemented by other governments in the 1970s, Chinese scholars, especially those with updated knowledge and skills in the natural sciences, offered more definitive calculations and population projections under different fertility scenarios, and pushed for the formalization of the one-child policy (Greenhalgh, 2008). Both the temporal sequence of policy formulation and the prevailing style of decisionmaking of the CCP, however, suggest clearly that the idea of the one-child policy came from leaders within the Party, not from scientists who offered evidence to support it (Liang, 2007).[①] But the work of the scientists nevertheless provided what the leaders wanted: population numbers that suggested a doomed future for China if extreme measures were not taken. Moreover, these scientists provided fertility numbers to achieve the goal the planners wished, under a cloak of scientism that evinced authority, confidence, and elegance (Greenhalgh, 2008). The fears of neo-Malthusian crisis increased, fanned not only by the scientists but also by academia and the state-controlled media (Lee and Wang, 1999).

The one-child policy strangely was never issued as a government order nor written explicitly in Chinese law, but rather was announced in the form of an Open Letter to members of the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Youth League, in the language of "advocating" such a policy. Worries about the consequence of the one-child policy, such as population

① The work by Song Jian and his colleagues, who were the main scientists providing support to the one-child policy, was not brought to the attention of Chen Muhua until February 1980 (Liang, 2007: 193; Greenhalgh, 2008: 269 – 270).

aging and lack of old-age support, sex imbalance, and future labor shortages, were acknowledged in the Open Letter. Demographers argued that there were alternative ways of reaching the population target of 1.2 billion by 2000 (Liang, 1983; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh, 1985). Facing resistance both within and outside the CCP, China's legislative body, the National People's Congress, resisted suggestions for enacting a national law requiring one child per couple.① The Open Letter contained both recognition of the sacrifices that Chinese families would have to endure and a promise to change the policy in 25 - 30 years. As for the difficult task of enforcing the policy, it was left to each province to translate the policy into concrete requirements and to specify the exemptions allowed (Gu et al., 2007).

2. Legacies: What Contributions Has the One-Child Policy Made?

At the time the one-child policy was announced to the Chinese public, the designers of the policy anticipated a faster pace of population aging as a result and acknowledged the policy's deleterious effect on the kinship structure of Chinese families. Over the course of the policy, unanticipated consequences also emerged, such as physical, often violent abuses, sex-selective abortion, and, more recently, a risk of a depressed fertility level that could lead to irreversible population aging, labor shortage, and economic slowdown and stagnation (Wang, 2011). For its critics, the one-child policy is a blunt violation of basic human rights and an intrusion into individuals' and families' reproductive freedom.

Supporters and sympathizers, even some of the critics, however, have accepted the policy in the belief that it has played a positive role in

① It took two decades, until 2001, for China's National People's Congress to pass a family planning law, but still "advocating", not "requiring", each couple to have no more than one child.

containing global population growth and in saving the world from unbearable population pressure. A common claim is that the policy has prevented some 400 million Chinese births. This claim originated with the Chinese government, which credits the policy for undergirding China's economic miracle. In the Party's view, the fertility reduction helped create a population age structure favorable for economic growth. The government has even suggested that its population control effort was a major contribution to the global effort to address the negative consequences of climate change. No one, however, has seriously examined the validity of this claim.

Where did the claim of 400 million births prevented come from, and how credible is it? The original calculation of the number of the births prevented came from a project sponsored by China's National Population and Family Planning Commission, completed in the late 1990s, with a goal to evaluate the inputs and the benefits of China's birth control program (Yang, Chen, and Wei, 2000). The authors used a simplistic extrapolation method, projecting what the crude birth rate would have been by 1998 had China's birth rate followed the trajectory of decline between 1950 and 1970. Their projected crude birth rate for China was 29.7 per thousand by 1990 and 28.4 per thousand by 1998. Given that the observed birth rate after 1970 fell far below these rates, the authors calculated the number of births attributed to the difference between the predicted and the observed birth rates as the number of births "averted". For the period from 1970 to 1998, the number derived was 338 million. In the decade after the publication of this number, the number of births averted was raised to 400 million.

In stating that the one-child policy averted 400 million births, the promoters of the policy first misinterpreted the original results from the study mentioned above. The number of births averted was for the period since 1970, not from 1980, when the one-child policy was formally implemented nationwide. This mistake is crucial because most of China's fertility transition was completed during the decade of the 1970s—that is, before China's one-child policy was enacted. Within that decade, China's total fertility rate dropped by more than half, from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979. Most of the births averted, if any, were due to the rapid fertility decline of that decade, not to the one-child policy that came afterward.

Even the number of 338 million births averted appears to be a result of over-generous assumptions, not reality. To examine what China's birth rate or fertility would have been in the absence of the one-child policy, we use data from countries that had a birth rate similar to China's in 1970 to compare the trajectory of change in these countries with that of China. There were 16 countries in 1970 with a population of at least one million that had a birth rate between 30 and 38 per thousand, 12 of which had a level that was higher than China's at the time, 33.4 per thousand (Table 1). The average of these 16 countries was 35.6 per thousand. The average birth rate in this group of countries declined to 26.6 per thousand by 1990 and 22.0 by 1998, both significantly below the levels predicted by the authors who arrived at the "births averted" numbers. This comparison shows that in other countries without a one-child policy the birth rate also declined, and it declined below the level predicted for China.

Table 1 Assumptions and comparison of birth rates, China and 16 other countries, 1970, 1990, and 1998

Country	Births per 1,000 population		
	1970	1990	1998
South Korea	31.2	15.4	13.8
Costa Rica	32.8	27.0	21.2
Albania	33.0	24.3	18.6
Lebanon	33.0	25.7	21.9
Jamaica	34.4	25.2	22.2
North Korea	34.6	20.6	17.9
Brazil	35.0	24.2	21.4
Uzbekistan	36.5	33.7	23.4

Continued

Country	Births per 1,000 population		
	1970	1990	1998
Malaysia	36.6	30.4	24.3
Thailand	37.0	19.7	16.4
Venezuela	37.1	28.6	23.9
Turkmenistan	37.2	34.7	24.6
Paraguay	37.4	33.5	29.0
Panama	37.5	26.1	24.0
Colombia	37.6	27.2	23.8
South Africa	37.8	29.3	25.1
Average of 16 countries	35.6	26.6	22.0
Government projection for China	32.9	29.7	28.4
China observed	33.4	21.1	15.6

* Sources: Birth rate by country, World Bank, 2010; Government projection for China, Yang, Chen, and Wei, 2000.

To further examine the claim that China's one-child policy was necessary to lower fertility, we also explore a counterfactual: what would China's fertility be if there were no one-child policy? We use the Bayesian model developed by Alkema et al. (2011), the same used for the latest United Nations population projections (United Nations, 2011). The Bayesian model projects China's future fertility scenarios based on: (i) the fertility trend in China before launching the one-child policy and (ii) fertility trends in all other countries.

Fertility in China would have continued to decline if the country's rapid fertility decline in the 1970s offers any hint about the country's future fertility trajectory. According to the Bayesian model, the decline would have continued after 1980. By 2010, fertility would have fallen to its currently observed level of around 1.5 children per woman.

Moreover, the counterfactual scenario shows that the fertility level observed for the early 1980s was somewhat higher than what would be expected from the empirical Bayesian model. This seems to be counterintuitive, but it might be explained by the anxiety caused by policy uncertainty, which prompted many couples to have children earlier than they would have otherwise. This tempo effect is shown in the declines in ages at first marriage and first childbearing in the 1980s. In addition, the policy overemphasized meeting short-term (period) targets (e.g., reducing the population growth rate to 5 per thousand by 1985) and overlooked the tempo and cohort effects in reducing population momentum. Calculations of a universal two-child policy with spacing, as advocated by Liang Zhongtang, have demonstrated that such an approach would not only have achieved China's population control goal, but would also have produced more favorable social and demographic conditions (Gu and Wang, 2009). If we apply the same empirical Bayesian model to contemporary China, lifting the one-child policy is unlikely to have a major impact on population size. Experience from other countries shows that raising fertility is probably an even more challenging task than reducing it (Frejka, Jones and Sardon, 2010; Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene, 2009).

If the one-child policy did not achieve its goal of preventing hundreds of millions of births in China, the question then becomes why it is widely criticized as a cause for many of China's short- and long-term social problems, and why so many both in China and abroad have urged that it be phased out. The one-child policy is criticized not just because of the demographic uncertainty it has caused. More fundamentally, it is seen as an ill-conceived policy that has prevented Chinese individuals and families from having the number of children they desire. It is a policy that has forcefully altered family and kinship for many Chinese, has contributed to an unbalanced sex ratio at birth, and has produced effects that will be felt for generations, with its burden falling disproportionately on those many couples who were forced to have only one child. In other words, at the same time as the demographic effect of the one-child policy in controlling population growth has been exaggerated, its long-term impact on Chinese society has been underappreciated.

A particularly long-lasting consequence is the hundreds of millions of families with only one child. Although, with declining fertility, some families would opt for one child voluntarily even if the government had not imposed the draconian restriction, there is little reason to believe that the proportion of families with only one child in China would ever have reached the level we currently observe. To quantify the social effect of the one-child policy, we estimate the proportion of Chinese families with only one child. We restrict our calculation to women aged 35 to 44 in 2005. We focus on this group for two reasons: first, these women spent their prime reproductive years under the one-child policy; second, by age 35 and over, they have mostly completed their childbearing. ①

Among this group of women, numbering just over 110 million, who were born between 1961 and 1970 and by now are all aged over 40, a large proportion will complete their childbearing with no more than one child. In 2005, nationally, over 40 percent of them had only one child. The proportion of one-child women varies widely by province, from a high of nearly 80 percent in the urban centers of Shanghai and Beijing, to a low of less than 20 percent in the western provinces of Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet. In 11 of China's 31 mainland provincial-level administrative regions, over half of women aged 35 – 44 had only one child. If we treat each married woman as representing a single-couple family, then roughly 50 million families in this age group will have only one child.

The share of families with only one child is even more pronounced in China's cities, where the one-child policy is most strictly enforced (Gu et

① We use data from China's 2005 minicensus to calculate the proportion of women with only one child. The calculation was done using a 20 percent micro sample from the 2005 mini-census, equivalent to 2 per thousand of China's total population. The total number of women included in the calculation is 220,747. Inflating this number with the sampling ratio gives a number for the women in this age group of 110,373,500, or about 110 million.

al., 2007). Couples with non-agricultural household registration status *(hukou) not only face a stiff fine for violating the one-child rule, but also risk losing employment and being unable to register their children for health care and education. Among women in our sample, roughly* 18 percent have nonagricultural household status. Among these urban families, the proportion of one-child families is 86 percent. In ten Chinese provincial regions, this share exceeds 90 percent, and in the three provincial-level urban centers, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and in Liaoning province, the share is over 95 percent. Among urban Chinese families of the 1960s birth cohort, who will begin to reach age 60 in less than a decade from now, a virtually universal one-child family world is already a reality.

In contrast to the demographic effects of the one-child policy in reducing population growth, which can at best be very small, the policy's social effect in depriving a large proportion of Chinese families of a second child is enormous. A simple calculation illustrates the magnitude of this impact: allowing 15 million families in this age group to have a second child results in 1.5 million more births per year over a ten-year period and could virtually eliminate all one-child families in this age group of urban families.[①] Applying the figure of 15 million to the whole country, the share of one-child families nationwide in this age group would drop from 42 percent to 28 percent. The figure of 15 million is trivial in comparison to the total number of births over a ten-year period in China. Assuming most of the women aged 35 - 44 in 2005 had their children during the years 1985 to 2000, and given that the annual average number of births for this period was about 22 million, the additional 1.5 million births amounts to only 6.8 percent more births, a number that is inconsequential for total births for

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① This number is derived by multiplying the share of women with non-agricultural household registration status and the total number of women in this age group, which gives a number of women in cities of 19,867,230. Our figure of 15 million accounts for 75.5 percent of these women.

each year or for population growth, but extremely consequential for a large number of Chinese families.

The policy's long-lasting social consequences will be judged by the future lives of China's one-child generation and their parents. China today has about 150 million families with only one child, accounting for more than a third of all families.① Among the post-one-child generation of parents, the share is even higher. This is the population structure with which China will have to confront the challenge of rapid population aging at the societal level.

3. Exit: People Vs. Population

In less than half a century, the alarm that unprecedented population growth caused in many counties in the mid and late twentieth century has turned to concerns over population decline and aging. Moreover, the twentieth century saw not only population growth but also extraordinary growth in material wealth (Lam, 2011). While, in parts of the world, especially sub-Saharan Africa, rapid population growth still poses serious challenges to poverty reduction and economic prosperity, more and more countries are now concerned with sustained low fertility and its consequences. The number of countries where the government considered its fertility level too low had increased from 16 in 1976 to 47 in 2006. Among 48 countries with a total fertility rate below 1.8 children per woman in 2009, over 70 percent considered their fertility too low (United Nations, 2010). Countries in Europe and Asia have begun incentive programs to encourage couples to have more children (Demeny, 2003; Frejka, Jones, and Sardon, 2010; Demeny, 2011). The latest entry is Iran, where total fertility dropped from 4.8 in 1990 to 1.9 in 2006 (Roudi,

① The total number of Chinese households counted in the 2010 census was 402 million.

2012).

China today is also economically, demographically, and socially vastly different from 35 years ago, when the one-child policy was officially initiated. The goal of quadrupling per capita income from \$250 to \$1,000 by the year 2000, seemingly wildly ambitious when first set by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, was achieved in roughly half the time. Today, with per capita GDP at over \$8,000, China has joined the ranks of the high-middle-income countries. China's economy is second only to the United States in total size, and the question for the future is not whether but when China will become the world's largest economy. While China's economic growth exceeded the goal set at the start of the post-Mao era by a wide margin, the goal of not permitting the population to exceed 1.2 billion was not achieved, even with the draconian one-child policy. China's 2000 census reported a total population of 1.26 billion. However, in light of the much faster economic growth, the extra 60 million should be of little concern.

Even with the better-than-expected economic growth, however, Chinese policymakers have not revised their original population goals to allow couples to have more children. Unlike other governments around the world, under which declines in fertility level have led to revisions and reversals of their population policy, in China the process of policy review and revision has been surprisingly long and slow. Almost 35 years after it was ushered in as an emergency response to population growth, the one-child policy, with its many known deleterious consequences, is still in place.

Why has China been so slow in phasing out a policy that has become increasingly unpopular among the public—a policy that was initially defended by deeply flawed science? This policy was only able to survive because of the three features of the Chinese political system and policymaking process that we outlined earlier. Moreover, the huge birth planning apparatus that was created in the process of implementing the one-child policy has become a main force of resistance to policy change. Not only does it produce and disseminate misinformation such as that the one-child policy has averted 400 million births, but also it continues the practices of coercion and other heavyhanded tactics.

The question, however, is not whether, but when, the one-child policy will be phased out. Politically, the Chinese leadership has come to realize that the country can no longer continue the old development model that sacrifices long-term benefits for short-term gains, that ignores individual rights and welfare, and that elevates economic development above everything else. Socially, China's younger generations, especially those born under the one-child policy in the 1980s and 1990s, have become the most critical segment of the population not only economically but also socially and politically. These generations are the best educated in Chinese history, are highly mobile geographically, and exert their power and voice in the sphere of social media. China's single-child generations are no longer willing acceptors of the country's statist orientation. While many of them are voluntarily postponing marriage and childbearing, and hence form the driving force of today's below-replacement fertility, they also increasingly regard it as their right, not the government's, to decide whether and when to have children. To them, population is no longer a number of aggregated subjects, but individual lives that should be respected and cherished.①

The opening up of Chinese society and the revival of population studies as an academic discipline have also produced an independent force that can confront government pressure. A decade and more of research by scholars has shown consistently that fertility remains well below the replacement level (Retherford et al., 2005; Guo and Chen, 2007; Cai, 2008; Morgan, Guo and Hayford, 2009), and has revealed that the one-child policy is not a

① A recent example is the case of Feng Jianmei, a woman in Shaanxi province, who was forced, in July 2012, to abort a seven-month fetus because the child would have been her second. Her case caused national outrage and produced a quick government apology (see Wikipedia page on Feng Jianmei: "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced_abortion_of_Feng_Jianmei").

main driver of China's low fertility (Cai, 2010; Gu and Wang, 2009; Zheng et al., 2009). Leading demographers have formed a collective voice calling for phasing out the policy (Gu and Li, 2010; Zeng, 2007). Insistence on maintaining the policy has become increasingly a political liability.

History will remember China's one-child policy as the most extreme example of state intervention in human reproduction in the modern era. History will also possibly view this policy as a very costly blunder, born of the legacy of a political system that planned population numbers in the same way that it planned the production of goods. It showcases the impact of a policymaking process that, in the absence of public deliberations, transparency, debate, and accountability, can do permanent harm to the members of a society.

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Policy Options for Long-Term Care for the Elderly

—A Gender Perspective

Since the transformation into an ageing society began in China at the end of the 1990s,① the ageing process has accelerated rapidly. In 2000, there were 130 million Chinese aged above 60, whereas in 2013 there are already more than 200 million Chinese in this age group.② If the trend continues, estimates are that the elderly population will exceed 400 million by 2050.③ An even grimmer prospect is that the proportions of senior citizens and disabled elderly people are also on a steady rise. Furthermore, the number of senior citizens requiring professional care is increasing sharply, thus institutional choices to meet their long-term care needs will be an essential part of the government's proactive ageing strategy.

Gender is a significant factor not only in ageing, but also in the allocation of resources in the current social security system for the elderly, and in the division of labor in long-term care. Therefore, further analyses from the gender perspective on the need for elderly care and the

① According to the Fifth National Census conducted in late November 2000, Chinese people aged above 60 accounted for 10.2 percent of the total population, which, in line with UN standards, is an indication that China has become an ageing society.

② 吴玉韶.中国老龄事业发展报告(2013)[R].北京:社科文献出版社,2013.

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institutional design of the service system are imperative.

1. An Analysis of Disability Risk and Need for Care from the Gender Perspective

1.1 Disability Risk among the Elderly and the Need for Long-Term Care

According to the Sixth National Census, the life expectancy of Chinese citizens stood at 74.8 in 2000, 3.4 years longer than the life expectancy in 1990.[①] As the average life expectancy increases, so does the share of elderly population. In 2000, senior citizens aged 80 and above accounted for 0.9 percent of the total population. Demographers expect the figure to rise to between 6.2 percent and 7.1 percent by 2050.[②]

The elderly aged 80 and above are regarded as advanced-age people. With the increase of an advanced-age population comes the immense risk of disability. Data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics show that in 2007, 8.8 percent of senior citizens in China had lost self-care skills.[③] In addition, the number of disabled senior citizens has been growing steadily. According to the *2013 Development Report on the Cause for the Elderly Population in China*, the number of disabled elderly people in China increased from 36 million in 2012 to 37.5 million in 2013. Wu Yushao, Deputy Director of China National Working Commission on Ageing, predicted that by the mid-twenty-first century, there would be

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① National Bureau of Statistics. *The Sixth National Census*. www.stats.gov.cn/zgrkpc/d...2013-01-28.

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③ 张宪.养老公共资源应向困难群体倾斜[J/OL].法易网,[2007-04-19].

approximately 100 million elderly people with no or limited self-care skills.① Such a risk can only be mitigated by long-term elderly care. It is foreseeable that the care system in China will come under greater stress than its counterpart in any other county. Accordingly, it is critical that the Chinese government plan ahead.

1.2 Female Dominance in the Advanced-age Population: Vulnerability Masked by Longevity

Ageing societies generally consist of far more female senior citizens than male senior citizens. In many countries, men and women are about equal in number in the age brackets below 55. However, in age brackets above 60, women will gain 10 percent for every ten years of age. In 2010, the life expectancy for men in China was 72.4, while for women it was 77.3. The difference between the two had increased from 3.7 in 2000 to 4.9. Since women have a longer life expectancy than men, more than 80 percent of advanced-age senior citizens in China are women. Longevity seems to be a female privilege, yet it masks the actual vulnerability of elderly women.

Elderly people and elderly families are exposed to three major risks: poverty, disease, and disability. All three are more likely to befall elderly women. Firstly, elderly women are more vulnerable to poverty than elderly men. According to *A Study of Assistance Models to the Poor Elderly*, 6.3 percent of male senior citizens in urban China were living below the poverty line, while the figure stood at an astonishing 23.4 percent for female senior citizens.② A direct cause of the impoverishment of female senior citizens is the lack or inadequacy of social security. According to a 2006 survey conducted by the Research Center affiliated to the National Working

① 车丽. 2050年我国生活不能自理老人将过亿 老年护理压力巨大[J/OL]. 中国广播网,[2011-11-04].

② 中国老龄科研中心. 中国城乡老年人口状况追踪调查[R/OL]. [2007-12-17]. http://www.china.com.cn.

Commission on Ageing, old-age insurance is available 89.1 percent of urban male senior citizens, but only 64.6 percent of urban female senior citizens; medical insurance is available to 72.9 percent of urban male senior citizens, but only to 49.8 percent of female senior citizens.① A gender gap exists in the payment, as well as in the coverage of old-age insurance. On average, male pensioners are paid 40 percent more than female pensioners. The gap is even greater in rural areas, where male pensioners are paid 52 percent more.② Such gaps are an accumulative result of structural inequality. Working-age women are at a disadvantage when it comes to employment opportunities, income, and employment structure. Consequently, they have less protection in old age and are more likely to be economically dependent. If we consider Japan, which is the first Eastern Asian country to become an ageing society, its experience with elderly people can be useful for us. Research indicates that gender-specific statistics are relatively improved in Japan. For example, elderly families account for 46.7 percent of all Japanese families claiming "Daily Life Security" ("the last safety net"). Among these elderly families, elderly females accounted for 62 percent. "Female senior citizens in advanced age are severely impoverished."③ Moreover, longer life expectancy doesn't necessarily equal longer active life expectancy for women. In fact, disabled female senior citizens outnumber disabled male senior citizens. Hence, gender difference is also present in the need for elderly care. In 2004, for example, 67.3 percent of the Japanese who needed care were women, 81.5 percent of Japanese women aged above 75 needed care; in contrast, 67.5

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① 佟吉清.老年妇女贫困问题亟待关注[N].中国妇女报,2006－10－18.

② 蒋永萍.社会转型中的中国妇女社会地位[M].北京:中国妇女出版社,2006:183.

③ [日]独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆.日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R].全国妇联妇女研究所,译.北京:当代中国出版社,2007:126.

percent of Japanese men aged above 75 needed care.①

In summary, elderly females are more vulnerable than elderly males to the three major risks. As a result, some researchers argue that female ageing lies at the core of the ageing issue. The gender perspective should be highlighted in order to formulate ageing policies that are gender sensitive and equality oriented (Liu, 2007).

2. Institutional Choices of Long-Term Care for the Aged in China: Rethinking from the Gender Perspective

The key to the ageing issue is the provision of resources: who is to bear the fiscal pressure and social security risk caused by ageing; and, secondly, who is to take responsibility for providing care (Mu, 2000). The institutional design of the care for the aged must resolve both issues. What has been done so far in China is exploratory in nature.

2.1 Who is to Provide Resources for Elderly Long-Term Care?

Who is to provide resources needed in the care for the aged—the government, the market, or the family? Who is going to assume primary responsibility? How should the responsibility be shared?

At present, pension insurance and medical insurance in China provide only basic care. Caregiving costs are not covered. There is no insurance system for long-term care. Either the elderly people or their children have to pay for the care. Thus, proactive explorations of the care system for the aged and the future operation model are necessary.

There are three types of elderly care: total nursing dependence, major nursing dependence, and partial nursing dependence. Since there are 30 million elderly Chinese who have lost all or part of their self-care abilities,

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① ［日］独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆. 日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R]. 全国妇联妇女研究所，译. 北京：当代中国出版社，2007：134.

the total annual nursing cost would exceed 150 billion yuan, based on the assumption that all receive minimum care (partial nursing dependence) at an annual cost of 5,000 yuan. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect the government to pay for all the costs at this stage of national development. Yet, most Chinese families would also be challenged to bear all of the costs. *The Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly*, which was amended and promulgated in 2012, stipulated for the first time guardianship for elderly people with disabilities and/or dementia, nursing care allowance for disabled elderly people, old age allowance, and assistance to elderly people with a single child. Such institutional breakthroughs indicate that the need for elderly care has entered policymakers' agenda, and that public resources are available by law to protect senior citizens. However, such allowances and relief provide only minimum protection to elderly people and can hardly guarantee long-term care. Therefore, academics call repeatedly on the government to establish a long-term care insurance system to guarantee the stable provision of resources for old-age care, by referring to international experiences (Li and Hou, 2009; Langsdorf, Traub-Merz and Ding, 2010; Shi, 2012). Experiences from ageing societies in the West have also proven long-term care insurance to be an irresistible trend.

2.2 Who is to Provide Elderly Care Services?

Who is going to provide adequate elderly care services? Different values underlie different institutional designs.

The Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly from 1996 stipulated, "The elderly shall be provided for mainly by their families" (Article 10, Chapter II), meaning that in response to the rapid ageing of the Chinese society, the government held families responsible.

Chinese families used to be the primary providers of elderly care. However, the tradition was replaced by a combination of collective and family care system during the era of planned economy, when "work units" in urban areas and "communes" in rural areas provided a low level of collective security to the aged. In the recent round of social transition, collective protection was removed. Families again became the primary provider of elderly care (Tong, 2008).

However, are Chinese families today up to the task? Drastic changes have taken place in the past 30 years. According to the Sixth National Census, the average size of Chinese households shrank from 3.4 people in 2000 to 3.1 in 2010. Nuclear families became the prevailing family structure.① In addition, more and more family members are separated from each other. Statistics show that 75.2 percent of married children in China do not live with their parents. "Empty-nest"② families account for 13.2 percent of all families.③ This is particularly true in rural areas, where the number of left-behind elderly people, the number of empty-nest families, and the number of families consisting entirely of elderly people are climbing rapidly. By 2013, the number of empty-nest elderly people in China had exceeded 100 million.④ Smaller family sizes and emptier homes have certainly weakened families' ability to provide for the aged. In other words, people in traditional agricultural societies went through the ageing process surrounded by the extended family, whereas many elderly people today have to cope with ageing and disease all on their own. Moreover, with the family-planning policy in place for more than 30 years, China now has 218 million only children who have to single-handedly provide for their elderly parents when the time comes. Moreover, data from the Ministry of

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① 国家统计局.第六次全国人口普查主要数据[R/OL].[2011-04-28]. www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-04/28/content_1.

② According to http://www.baidu.com, "empty-nest" refers to those families in which the children are out for work or study, and the elderly are left behind and live alone.

③ 王东亮.《中国民生发展报告 2012》发布[N].北京日报,2012-08-06.

④ 全国老龄工作委员会.中国老龄事业发展报告(2013)[R]//张斯路.中国空巢老人突破1亿　老年卫生服务资源严重不足.光明日报,2013-02-28.

Health show that about 76,000 families lose their single child every year.[①] Demographers estimate that 10.09 million single children die before the age of 25, and that about 10 million families will have lost their single child in the future.[②] This means that a huge number of elderly people will have no one to provide for them. Such challenges will pose a great threat to society in the future. This being the case, the institutional design that continues to resort to families to care for the aged is sluggish in nature.

The Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly promulgated on December 28, 2012 made corresponding amendments to the 1996 version of the same law (henceforth "the new law" and "the old law"). For example, while the old law only stipulated assistance to the elderly who are unable to work and have no sources of income or supporters or whose supporters are truly unable to provide for or support them, the new law specifies that "the state shall promote long-term care step by step to safeguard care for the elderly. Local governments shall provide nursing care subsidies to permanently disabled elderly who are in economic difficulty based on the severity of disability" (Article 30). This amendment not only demonstrates that safeguarding long-term elderly care has been included into the public policy agenda, but also that more elderly people have access to public resources.

Article 4 of the General Provisions of the old law stipulated that, "the State protects the lawful rights and interests of the elderly". The new law stipulates that, "the State safeguards the lawful rights and interests of the elderly" (Article 3, General Provisions). By substituting the word "protects" with "safeguards", the new law identifies the State as subject of legal responsibility in the safeguarding the rights and interests of elderly

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① According to http://www.baidu.com, "losing the only one" families refer to those families in which the only child is disabled of dead by accident, and the parents do not bear or adopt another child.

② 车丽，周尧. 我国失独家庭将达千万　失独老人将由政府供养[J/OL]. 人民网，2013-02-16.

people. Moreover, the new law repositions family provision for the elderly.

The old law stipulated that, "the elderly shall be provided for mainly by their families", while the new law changed the wording to, "the care for the elderly shall be home-based" (Article 13, Chapter II). Although there are questions raised in the academic community concerning the meaning of home-based elderly care (Chen and Shen, 2010), such an amendment could still be interpreted as the State's response to changes in family structure. The new law stresses that, "the state shall establish and improve a social elder care system that is home based, supported by the community, and facilitated by institutions". This system integrates the efforts by the State, the community, and families—indicating a positive transition from domestic caregiving to social caregiving. According to officials at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, "home-based care" aims at "further consolidating the fundamental role played by families in caring for the elderly... through institutional incentives and constraints" (Qu, 2013). Some local pilot studies illustrate the "fundamental role played by families" on a practical level. For example, six communities in Shanghai started a pilot project in 2013 nicknamed Project 9073.① Of the advanced-age senior citizens participating in the project, 90 percent are cared for by family members, 7 percent receive home-based care, and 3 percent live in institutions for old-age care.② It goes without saying that, despite newly adopted care practices such as nursing care subsidies, old-age care is still provided predominantly within the family. Such a model is inconsistent with both ageing and the significantly reduced intergenerational care abilities in Chinese families.

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① 姚丽萍. 上海六街镇今年试点老年护理保障计划[N]. 新民晚报,2013 - 01 - 04.

② 陈丹沛. 关于上海建立老年护理制度的分析与探讨[J]. 中国卫生资源,2009 (04).

2.3 Rethinking "Familism" in the Institutional Design of Old-Age Care from the Gender Perspective

Family is still the major source of old-age care in present-day China. It is undeniable that families were, are, and will be essential in providing material and mental care for the elderly. However, as intergenerational care abilities weaken and family supporting resources dwindled, can families alone shoulder all of the burden of old-age care? Quoting data gathered by the Chinese Taiwan Association of Family Caregivers, Chen Junquan claims that it takes a family 6 – 10.5 years to care for a disabled member, spending at least 12 hours a day with him/her.① Moreover, it's almost impossible for one to "draw back" once he/she cares for family members. As a result, it's not uncommon for families with disabled members to struggle.

Secondly, as feminist criticism rightly points out, the so-called pragmatic familism that equates personal well-being with family well-being has the following shortcomings: it may blind people from what the government should be responsible for; and the division of labor between genders and priority given to men in resource allocation may force women to take up care work in the home (Tong, 2008). Therefore, institutional designs based on "pragmatic familism" can't meet the long-term care needs of the advanced-age and disabled Chinese. Neither are they in line with the principle of gender equality.

3. A Gender Perspective: Policy Choices for Old-Age Care

3.1 "Care Within the Family" is Almost Always Given by Women: International Experiences

The policy choice of "care within the family" will eventually make

① *Awakening Foundation Newsletter*, Issue 1 – 3 & 4 – 6 (Combined Issue), 2012.

women caregivers in the family. This traditional approach not only takes it for granted that family members care for each other, but also forces women to be caregivers because of gender stereotypes. Resources in society are allocated unequally, making women economic dependents and caregivers. Such roles are included in, and strengthened by, the national welfare system. In Chinese Taiwan, 78.9 percent of long-term caregivers within families are female①; in Japanese families, 74.9 percent of caregivers within the family are women, over half of whom are above 60 themselves. In other words, younger elderly women are taking care of older elderly people.② In Europe, only 18 percent of male senior citizens look after their infirm wives, while 54 percent of female senior citizens care for their husbands; granted, another reason for this is that women have a longer life expectancy (Lutz, 2002). Since family care is considered a natural duty of women that doesn't deserve pay, the pressure on women and the subsequent social inequality are significant. Who is going to care for the caregivers? This will be a poignantly realistic issue.

Another choice is to use the market to provide old-age care. Old-age care insurance has been widely established in industrialized nations (e.g., mandatory old-age care social insurance in Germany and Japan, or commercial care insurance in the US) to provide relatively stable resources for old-age care. However, the challenge facing these countries is the "high level of sustained shortage" of caregivers, which has reached a "tipping point" in some regions. (Langsdorf and Traub-Merz, 2010).

The chronic supply shortage in long-term care is a function of hard

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① Interior Ministry of Chinese Taiwan. "A survey of the needs of physically and mentally disabled people". *Awakening Foundation Newsletter*, Issue 1 - 3 & 4 - 6 (Combined Issue), 2012.

② ［日］独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆.日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R].全国妇联妇女研究所,译.北京:当代中国出版社,2007:125 - 127、134.

work, low pay, low social status, and inadequate social security for care workers.① In Japan, non-family care workers are predominantly female, so are lower-level employees in welfare institutions. In Japanese welfare institutions, 82.8 percent of care workers are women, but few of them make it to the top to become administrators, doctors, or life counselors. Most female care workers work hard, receive little pay, and are often informally employed.② Thus, some researchers claim that, "when women choose to care for others, they choose poverty" (Lv and Chen, 2007). Women are trapped in the vicious circle: the more they take care of the elderly, the less support they will receive when they are old themselves. This is especially true of those women who give up work and income outside the family to take care of family members.

In some developed countries and regions, foreign caregivers help mitigate the supple shortage. For example, about 200, 000 domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka are employed in Singapore,③ and over 200,000 foreign workers were employed by families in Chinese Taiwan (99 percent are women). There is a heavy dependence on foreign domestic workers in newly industrialized countries in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. In 2010, there were 52.6 million domestic workers in the world, of which 83 percent were women. However, labor-exporting countries will also be faced with ageing. For example, Indonesia—which at present supplies 76 percent of the foreign workers in Chinese Taiwan—has decided to control and reduce labor export until 2017 when the labor exporting is to be ceased. Therefore, feminist groups criticize the practice of hiring cheap foreign labor to address supply shortage—instead of

① *Awakening Foundation Newsletter*, Issue 1 - 3 & 4 - 6 (Combined Issue), 2012.

② [日]独立行政法人国立女性教育会馆.日本的女性与男性——男女平等统计·2006[R].全国妇联妇女研究所,译.北京:当代中国出版社,2007:136.

③ 暨佩娟.亚太地区家政工人待遇急待改善[N/OL].人民网·人民日报,2013-01-16.

improving the working conditions, compensation, and benefits of care workers—as an "irresponsible HR policy". ①

3.2 Gender Blind Spots in the Institutional Design of Long-term Care

Although long-term care insurance resolves the issue of who is to provide resources needed for caregiving, it can't automatically achieve intergenerational equity or gender equality. Long-term insurance offers two payment alternatives: cash or providing service. According to American researcher John Campbell, cash payments will stunt the growth of long-term care services. After a comparative study of long-term care policies in developed countries, he found that in countries where cash payments are available, people prefer cash to service. For example, in Germany, whose long-term care insurance coverage is ahead of other countries in the world, 72 percent of those eligible opted for cash in 2008. As a result, 45 percent of severely disabled people received no care from either the government or the family. In comparison, the ratio in Norway was only 13 percent. Cash payments are available in three European countries (Germany, Austria and Italy) with the largest problem with illegal foreign domestic workers (Campbell et al., 2010). The loophole in the cash payments system reflects the blind spots of policymakers. As feminist groups rightly put it, cash payments will not automatically bring self-determination and autonomy to women. If men continue to dominate family decisions, they will certainly claim cash while assigning care duty to a family member—most likely the wife, a daughter-in-law, or a daughter. Moreover, cash payments drag women into poverty, forcing them to terminate their career. When these women become old, they have to depend on "national annuity" and children. In case of divorce, they will be poverty-stricken when middle-aged. Therefore, the cash payment system "consolidates patriarchy instead

① *Awakening Foundation Newsletter*, Issue 1 - 3 & 4 - 6 (Combined Issue), 2012.

of improving the status of women". When the *Long-term Care Insurance Act was drafted in Japan in* 2000, cash payments were dropped due to opposition from women's groups. Eventually, the provision of service, rather than cash, was written into the law. Subsequently, every year, 1.2 million Japanese families enjoy residential care service, 1.6 million senior Japanese citizens receive care at day-care centers, and 300,000 families have access to short-term, accommodation-included care.① Although it is true that most care workers in Japan are still women, they do receive some relief.

3.3 Policies Neglecting the Interests of Caregivers Are Not Sustainable

The third problem feminists have with the current old-age care systems in some countries and regions is that they are too focused on the needs of the "cared for", while neglecting the interests or needs of the caregiver, such as the Japanese *Long-term Care Insurance Act*.

Caregiving is exhausting both physically and mentally. Caregivers work long hours, perform tedious tasks, and feel so bound to the people they look after that they have hardly any time left for themselves. They feel distanced from society, wonder whether their work is meaningful, and worry about their own old age. Such mental pressure is harder to bear than physical fatigue. A survey in Chinese Taiwan shows that caregivers work 14 hours every day. The 720,000 family caregivers in Chinese Taiwan suffer from sleep disorder. Only 20 percent of caregivers can sleep uninterrupted for more than four hours. Furthermore, 87 percent suffer from chronic athopia and 65 percent have developed depression symptoms. The mortality rate of family caregivers is 60 percent higher than that of non-family caregivers. A survey in the UK also finds that 74 percent of

① *Awakening Foundation Newsletter*, Issue 1 - 3 & 4 - 6 (Combined Issue), 2012.

caregivers are overwhelmed by care work, their stress and depression levels having reached a critical point.① Hence, the interests of caregivers should not be neglected. According to the survey in Chinese Taiwan, more than 60 percent of family caregivers wish for "recognition and support from family members", and 80 percent would like to have at least one day per week for "relaxation and rest".②

The disregard for the needs, rights, and interests of caregivers will make long-term care for the elderly unsustainable. A new institutional design of elderly care embodying the principles of intergenerational equity and gender justice must establish long-term care insurance to secure the stable inflow of resources on one hand, and on the other hand, give consideration to the rights and interests of disabled people, care workers and family caregivers by setting up a sharing mechanism among the state, the society and the family. Only in this way can long-term elderly care be accessible, reasonably priced, and of high quality. It is encouraging to see that the German endowment insurance regime granted liability insurance to relatives or neighbors engaged in unpaid family caregiving in 1995 (Merkel, 2010), because it provides incentives for family care, while improving the security provision of caregivers—a commendable reflection of the equity principle.

4. Conclusion

As Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, "one can infer how advanced a nation's civilization is from how it looks after the elderly" (1986). With ageing and an ever-growing population of advanced-age senior citizens, China must take proactive measures to develop and improve the old-age care

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① 覃玉蓉.台湾长期照顾政策精简大补帖[J].台湾妇女新知基金会通讯,2011(10-12)、(04-06).

② 覃玉蓉.台湾长期照顾政策精简大补帖[J].台湾妇女新知基金会通讯,2011(10-12)、(04-06).

system.

However, the following aspects must be considered in institution building:

(i) Since there are more elderly women than elderly men, and there is gender difference in senior citizens' need for care, old-age care policies should reflect the gender perspective and ensure gender equality.

(ii) As researchers engaged in women's studies rightly point out, modern society should change its mindset of family-based, old-age support and strengthen the role of social security and the government in the provision for the elderly (Xia, 2007). The government should assume primary responsibility. Both society and families contribute within reasonable means. There should be a gradual transition from family-based care to society-based care.

(iii) In line with the principles of social justice and equity, we should not only have long-term care insurance to provide stable inflow of resources for old-age care, but also take into account the rights and interests of disabled people, care workers, and family caregivers. People engaged in long-term care for the elderly, including migrant workers, are mostly female and vulnerable. Their needs and rights should be taken into consideration.

(iv) Given that families still provide most of the care to elderly people at present, the adoption of pragmatic family support policies is highly necessary. The new *Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly* does stress that, "the State shall develop and improve policies supporting family provision for the aged" (Article 27). However, in addition to suggestions that children living away from parents shall "visit their parents regularly", there should be more substantial support. For example, there should be policy support to children living with or close to parents. There should be special recognition of and support for elderly women who take care of their spouse, parents, as well as themselves (Du, 2007). For another example, surviving dependents' benefits and insurance, which already exist abroad, could be introduced into China① as a tool of income redistribution. This tool could help address economic inequality suffered by elderly women as a result of the division of labor during their working years, reduce the vulnerability of poverty-stricken elderly women, and promote gender equality.

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Paternity Leave
—Legislation Both Necessary and Possible

Reproduction involves both men and women. It is important to legislate on the equal reproductive rights and obligations of both sexes to facilitate an equal partnership between men and women with regard to reproduction. However, in China, men's reproductive rights and obligations, including paternity leave, are still absent from the law. For this reason, the Women's Studies Centre of the Central Party School initiated a research programme on paternity leave in 2009 to study whether it is necessary and possible to incorporate paternity leave into national law in order to improve gender equality.

1. Rationale for Legislating on Paternity Leave and Options

1.1 International Legislation

Male and female partnership with regard to reproduction is constrained by local social networks and cultural rules. However, reproduction is a natural as well as a social process. The traditional sex segregation gave birth to a culture of reproduction that is, in essence, a gender-based hierarchical division of labour. Over time, with social changes, the development of human civilization and the rebalancing of gender relations, the old norms of reproduction have become obstacles to co-participation of men and women in the process. The reproduction culture must adapt and new norms must be established to meet evolving social demands. The global community has reached a consensus that "a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality of men and women". ① The International Labour Organization also requires its members to formulate policies or adopt measures necessary to allow male and female workers to balance their work and family responsibilities. ② Many countries have taken major steps to facilitate the sharing of reproduction responsibilities between men and women, namely by setting out legal requirements to encourage men's participation in child care, thus changing the rigid gender-based division of labour and narrowing the public-private divide. Incorporating paternity leave into the law is a clear case in point. More than 40 countries and regions now mandate paternity leave to various degrees. ③

In many countries, fathers of young children are entitled to paternity leave, parental leave and temporary parental leave. In 1974, Sweden became the first country in the West to introduce parental leave. Swedish parents were now able to take up to six months of paid leave after the birth of a child under the country's parental leave insurance rules. Since 2002, the full amount of leave time has been increased to sixteen months; two months are reserved for fathers and cannot be transferred to mothers. ④ Some European Union countries followed Sweden and issued paternity leave stipulations. For example, the United Kingdom provides fathers with up to 34 weeks of family leave, while German fathers can enjoy 12 months of paid leave and three years of unpaid leave. In 2011, Norway extended the

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① 联合国.消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约[Z],1979.

② 国际劳工组织.有家庭责任的工人公约(第156号)[Z],1981.

③ 父亲节香港父亲向港府请愿,要求设立男士带薪产假[N/OL].[2008-06-15]. http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/hongkong/200806/0615_1424_597997.shtm.

④ 徐安琪,张亮.父亲育儿假:国际经验的启示和借鉴[J].当代青年研究,2009(03).

leave time for new fathers to 12 weeks (from 10 weeks). [1] The EU has the most countries with laws on paternity leave, including the United Kingdom, France, Luxemburg, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Canada in North America and the Philippines and Japan in Asia have similar legislation. Japan's Child-care and Family-care Leave Law provides that male employees with children under 3 years old may take long parental leaves.

Countries that have recognized paternity leave in law allow more days off, provide more benefits and pay for leave from social insurance funds. The underlying principles are that childcare is part of the father's parental obligations and that men should be encouraged to take up home duties, thereby changing the traditional gender-based division of labour and promoting gender equality. In China, however, paternity leave is provided as an incentive for family planning only; it is neither child-centred nor intended to encourage fathers' participation in household work. China has neither the concept nor the institutions to use law to guide men's sharing of childcare and other home duties. Although reproduction is regarded as a social affair, society only helps to share the financial burden[2] and does not cover parental duties. Encouraging the sharing of reproduction duties between men and women is not in the mandate of China's maternity insurance system.

1.2 Proposed Regulations and Legislation in China

Based on international experience, recognizing paternity leave in law—thus, men's participation in reproduction affairs as citizens' legal rights and obligations—holds great significance for adjusting the spheres of action of the two kinds of production (production of the means of existence and

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① 世界男性产假一览［Z/OL］.［2012 - 01 - 16］. http://www. china-insurance. com/news-center/newslist. asp? id=187806.

② Maternity insurance is paid by the employer as 1 percent of the total salary of both male and female employees; individuals do not contribute.

human reproduction) with more powerful laws, breaking down the barriers between public and private space, transforming traditional gender culture and granting equality and freedom of choice to citizens. When we accept reproduction as a social affair, we acknowledge that men must share both the financial obligations and social benefits of reproduction. Although social benefits granted to men will never be the same as those granted to women, men should no longer be invisible in human reproduction, in terms of both responsibilities or benefits.

In China, equality of men and women is a fundamental principle embodied in the Constitution and laws, as well as a basic national policy. However, it is still taken for granted that "having babies is women's job only". As a result, legislation on family care is still founded on the traditional gender-based division of labour. For instance, *the Labour Insurance Regulations of the People's Republic of China* of 1951 set out detailed childcare entitlements, but for women only. The 1994 *Interim Rules on Maternity Insurance for Enterprise Employees* is intended to "protect the legal rights and interest of women employees so that they receive necessary compensation and healthcare services when they are in maternity care". *The Social Insurance Law of the People's Republic of China* promulgated in October 2010 includes the main ideas in the current maternity insurance scheme, but again targets women only. The legal principle of the maternity insurance regulations is that such insurance is necessary to ensure that female employees receive financial assistance from the state and society when they cannot generate income themselves because of childbirth. The *People's Daily*'s interpretation of the law is illustrative:

> Maternity insurance is a social welfare policy legalized by the state to offer women employees in pregnancy and parturition protection and material assistance for their normal life. Its purpose is to help professional women recover their employability and return to their jobs by providing them with allowances, health care services and maternity leaves. Protection and material assistance offered in

maternity insurance programmes usually include cash subsidies and material help. ①

Thus, maternity insurance is rather for the protection of women. The reproductive rights and obligations of men are largely ignored.

International experience tells us that it is both necessary and feasible to force a change of traditional norms and customs with laws and policy rules, thereby helping to develop a new gender culture based on gender equality. To do this, lawmakers must abandon their conventional wisdom. Thanks to the revised *Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests* (2005), gender equality as a basic national policy has been written into law. Article 29 of the Law provides that "the state shall roll out a maternity insurance system, and create and improve other protections to supplement this system". The Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) interprets this Article as follows: "Maternity-related social security plans include maternity insurance, parental leave, family care allowance, and parental leave incentives, paternity leave and allowance for single-child families, etc. Under this provision, China must establish and improve social security plans for maternity care."② On this interpretation, paternity leave is included as one of the schemes that need to be improved, thus confirming the legal recognition that paternity leave deserves.

When the legislature was soliciting opinions on the proposed *Social Insurance Law*, the Women's Studies Centre set up a research team on paternity leave and surveyed public and private sector employees (81.5 percent were of reproductive age, 59 percent were male) in Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhengzhou and Xi'an. About 840 questionnaires on paternity leave

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① 白天亮. 4 537 万人参加生育保险[N]. 人民日报，2005－07－04：010.

② 全国人大常委会法工委行政法室. 妇女权益保障法释义[M]. 北京：国家行政学院出版社，2005.

were distributed. According to the survey results, 92.2 percent of those surveyed agree that men are also entitled to parental leave, and 89.5 percent agree with legislating on paternity leave.① Based on the findings, in November 2010 the Women's Studies Centre proposed to the Standing Committee of the NPC and its Legislative Affairs Commission that paternity leave allowance be included in the maternity care allowance package for all employees. In 2011, when the Legislative Affairs Commission of the State Council published the exposure draft of the *Female Workers' Labour Protection Regulations*, the Women's Studies Centre, together with research organizations such as the Gender and Laws research team of the China Women's University and some academics, proposed for a second time that paternity leave be included. However, so far, no specific programme or timetable for the legislation has been put forward.

2. Rules on Paternity Leave and Compliance

2.1 Local Rules on Paternity Leave

Although there is still no legislation on paternity leave at the national level, paternity leave is a common local policy. According to the *Law on Population and Family Planning* of 2001, "Husband and wife shall share the responsibilities of family planning". As a practical expression of this idea, most local policies introduced to implement the law include specific rules on paid paternity leave. According to statistics, 26 provinces and autonomous regions mandate paternity leave in their local policies or regulations (see Table 1).

① 中央党校妇女研究中心.社会性别与公共政策通讯(第三辑)[J].内部资料,2007(07).

Table 1 Provinces and regions with paternity leave and their rules

Province	Date of Publication	Name	Days	Preconditions	Entitlements
Fujian	26 July 2002	Paternity care leave	7 - 10	Late childbearing, with certificate of honour for single-child parents	Usual salary, no impact on promotion
Anhui	28 July 2002	Paternity leave	10; 20 if husband and wife are not living in the same place	Late marriage and childbearing, with certificate of honour for single-child parents obtained during parental leave	Salary, bonus and benefits as usual
Jiangxi	29 July 2002	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	Salary, bonus and benefits as usual
Yunnan	1 September 2002	Paternity leave	7	Late childbearing	Same as working full time
Guangxi	1 September 2002	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	Salary and bonus as usual, no impact on benefits and performance evaluation
Guangdong	1 September 2002	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	Salary as usual, no impact on benefits and full attendance bonus
Zhejiang	3 September 2002	Paternity leave	7	Late marriage and childbearing	Salary, bonus and benefits as usual
Chongqing	25 September 2002	Paternity leave	7	Late childbearing	Same as working full time

Continued

Province	Date of Publication	Name	Days	Preconditions	Entitlements
Sichuan	26 September 2002	Paternity leave	15	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as working full time with salary and bonus as usual
Jilin	27 September 2002	Paternity leave	7	Late childbearing, with reproduction health care service certificate	Same as working full time with salary, bonus and benefits as usual
Shanxi	28 September 2002	Paternity leave	15	Late childbearing	Salary and bonus as usual
Shandong	28 September 2002	Paternity leave	7	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as working full time with salary and benefits as usual
Guizhou	29 September 2002	Paternity leave	7	Late marriage and childbearing	
Shaanxi	29 September 2002	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as working full time with salary and benefits as usual
Heilongjiang	18 October 2002	Male employee paternity leave	5 – 10	Late childbearing	Salary as usual
Hunan	29 November 2002	Paternity leave	15	Late marriage and childbearing with certificate of honour for single-child parents obtained during parental leave	Same as working full time
Jiangsu	1 December 2002	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as working full time, no impact on salary, bonus and benefits
Hubei	1 December 2002	Partner leave	10	Late childbearing	Same as working full time with salary and bonus as usual

Continued

Province	Date of Publication	Name	Days	Preconditions	Entitlements
Inner Mongolia	1 December 2002	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	
Henan	1 January 2003	Paternity leave	One month	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as working full time with salary and benefits as usual
Liaoning	16 January 2003	Paternity leave	15	Late childbearing with certificate of honour for single-child parents	Salary and benefits as usual
Xinjiang	22 May 2003	Paternity leave	15	Late marriage and childbearing	Salary and bonus as usual
Hebei	18 July 2003	Paternity leave	10	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as those of marriage and maternity leaves
Beijing	13 August 2003	incentive leave, can be enjoyed by fathers	30	Late childbearing	The employer may not reduce the leave-taker's basic salary or terminate the labour contract
Hainan	1 December 2003	Paternity leave	10	Urban residents with certificate of honour for single-child parents	Same as working full time with salary as usual
Shanghai	31 December 2003	partner leave	3	Late marriage and childbearing	Same as those of maternity leave

* Source: Information collected by Sun Fengjuan

It is clear that most local governments have created specific policy rules on paternity leave. Such leave is known as "paternity leave" in most provinces and "partner leave" or something similar in others, and the name indicates that husbands are obliged to help with maternity care after their wives give birth to their children, underlining the sharing of responsibilities between men and women. However, leave time varies a lot from province to province. The general rule is between 5 and 15 days; most provinces provide for 7 days and 10 days of leave time. Fathers in Shanghai can enjoy only three days of leave, while those in Henan can take leaves as long as a month. In all provinces, observance of family planning policy (one-child rule), including late childbearing, is the precondition for paternity leave entitlements. Also, paternity leave entitlements are largely consistent across provinces, including clear guidelines on compensation and job security, for example, paternity leave is counted as working full time with salary, bonus and benefits unchanged and no impact on performance evaluation or promotion.

To a large degree, paternity leave in China is granted as an incentive for compliance with the family planning policy, as clearly indicated by the conditions attached. Only if the new parents observe the family planning policy are they allowed to enjoy paternity leave. The gap in leave time between provinces also hints at this. For instance, Henan, which is overburdened with a large population, tries harder than others to encourage compliance with the family planning policy by offering longer leave time (one month). Currently, paid paternity leave is provided only to support the implementation of the family planning policy, but the local policy rules have for the first time in history clearly defined the reproductive rights and obligations of men, with strong approval and support from the general public.

2.2 Compliance with Rules on Paternity Leave

As paternity leave benefits are local incentives only and not yet legal requirements, the degree of compliance depends on employers. Some employers have clear rules on paternity leave: paternity leave-takers should be treated as "working full time" and proper job arrangements should be made for them without deductions of their salaries or bonuses. Leave-takers only need to follow the necessary procedures and leave-time policies specified by the employer. Such employers are usually well-managed medium and large-size state-owned "welfare" companies or well-run joint ventures, foreign-invested companies and companies in private ownership. Other employers may not have formal policies on paternity leave, but employees can ask for it. Usually, they do not have their salaries cut, but may receive less bonuses and other benefits. Leave time is decided on a case-by-case basis, as the birth of a child is regarded as a major event in anyone's lifetime and hence should be treated as a special case. A third group of employers is much less generous. On paternity leave, some foreign-invested companies and privately owned companies believe that companies should not be asked to take up more social responsibilities than what is provided for by law; if there are no legal requirements, then there is no need to be compliant, although key employees are treated as exceptions. The claim that "only legal requirements must be acknowledged" shows that the absence of relevant laws has become an excuse for these employers not to comply with local policies. It is obvious that without specific laws well-intentioned government policies may be deliberately brushed aside. Therefore, it is essential that good policies are secured with laws so that they play their due roles.

Individual paternity leave-takers have suffered financial losses, including salaries, bonuses and other forms of income. In the questionnaire survey, 32.5 percent of the respondents had their bonuses cut, 31.1 percent had lost some of their salary and 26.8 percent had lost a large part of their income other than salary. Employees' income is closely linked to their job performance. Taking leave results not only in less income, but also worse performance evaluation results and thus in less opportunities to move to other positions and promotion.① The latter factor outranked income impact as the major concern for the respondents. Among all the

① Employees' salaries are determined based on their attendance records, performance at work and other indicators. Performance evaluation results are cumulative, that is, current month's results impact the quarter, half-year and even full-year results. Therefore, less than satisfactory results will not only reduce the current month's salary; the negative impact is exacerbated by other evaluations related to career development.

"possible reasons why men give up paternity leave", "too busy to take leave"is ranked first (66.5 percent), followed by "competition is so fierce that taking leave may result in loss of job"(43 percent) and "big financial loss" (36 percent). In other words, as the formal institution does not offer strong enough support for male participation in maternity care, paternity leave remains an individual choice; men cannot exercise this right even in places where it is offered.

3. Need to Legislate Paternity Leave and Concerns

3.1 A Government Commitment

If the local rules on paternity leave are examined in terms of the principle of equity for public policies, discrimination and inequity can be identified. Firstly, paternity leave is not a legally defined right, but men are obliged to pay for legally provided maternity insurance. In terms of reproductive rights and obligations, the current law discriminates against men's reproductive rights. Secondly, paternity leave is designed to support the family planning programme and does not apply to those who are not involved, thus discriminating against non-participants. Thirdly, not all local governments provide for paternity leave in their policies and those that do have gaps in terms of leave time and entitlements, resulting in de facto inequity across regions. Fourthly, paternity leave is bundled with family planning policy as an incentive and as a result can change with the adjustment of the family planning policy. Such policy-bundled benefits are favours bestowed by power but not by protection of civil rights; in the final analysis, this is a discriminatory treatment of rights. Therefore, it is necessary to formalize the right to paternity leave in law so as to ensure equality of civil rights.

At the macro level, the Chinese government is committed to gender mainstreaming as a strategy to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women; accordingly, legislation on paternity leave is a step that the Chinese government should take to deliver on its international commitment. Laws must be made and invoked to not only support women's participation in the public sphere and protect their equal social rights, but also to encourage men to go into the private domain and share with women responsibilities for maternity care and household duties, thereby transforming the traditional sex-based division of labour, gender caste and hierarchical cultural rules. From the perspective of gender equality, using paternity leave as an incentive for family planning puts the focus on the latter while ignoring the significance of the leave in facilitating sex equality. For this reason, paternity leave should be independent from the family planning programme and duly recognized in law. Such legislation, as the first legal provision in China to demand and encourage sharing of reproductive responsibilities and household duties between men and women, embodies equitable sharing of rights, opportunities and responsibilities. It will have positive and far reaching implications for the reform of the traditional sex-based division of labour and the remodelling of the unequal gender culture.

3.2 Public Demand for Legislation

According to the questionnaire survey the Paternity Leave Research Team of the Women's Studies Centre conducted in Beijing, Xi'an, Yangzhou and Zhengzhou, the public is very supportive of legislating paternity leave: 83.8 percent of the 840 respondents in favour of paternity leave, with only 2.3 percent against the idea. Most people (83.2 percent) believe that husband and wife should share reproductive responsibilities; 68 percent of the respondents believe that husbands should be "with wives" when babies are born (only 21.7 percent of the husbands surveyed did so); 57.6 percent of the men say they are happy to wait on their wives and babies, while 39.1 percent will take on some of the burden, although they are not very willing to do so. Altogether, as many as 96.7 percent of the men say they will share maternity care duties. It may be inferred that in real life, many men are willing to take up part of the duties and are indeed doing that. It is now a common demand to institutionalize the protection of male participation in maternity care. Without legal provisions on paternity leave, men often have to ask for leave of absence to address the urgent need for care. The survey also shows that the younger the father, the more willing he is to ask for leave to care for the mother and the baby, sometimes even at the cost of lower pay at his job.

With regard to the issue of "it is also men's right to have parental leave", 60.4 percent of those surveyed totally agree with this statement, while 31.8 percent agree with some reservations. All in all, 92.2 percent are in favour. It is commonly believed that rights need to be specified and protected by law: 89.5 percent of the respondents totally agree or generally agree that paternity leave should be laid down officially in law (see Table 2).

Table 2 Should paid paternity leave be laid down in law?

Gender	Totally Agree/%	Generally Agree/%	Indifferent /%	Generally Disagree/%	Totally Disagree/%	Total/%
Male	274	116	40	5	3	438
	36.8%	15.6%	5.4%	0.7%	0.4%	58.9%
Female	185	90	22	6	2	305
	24.9%	12.1%	3.0%	0.8%	0.3%	41.1%
Total	459	206	62	11	5	743
	61.8%	27.7%	8.3%	1.5%	0.7%	100.0%

In June 2009, websites such as people.com.cn, xinhuanet.com and ifeng.com conducted similar surveys. The results show that more than 90 percent of the over 20,000 people surveyed support legislating on paternity leave, 2 - 3 percent higher than in the Women's Studies Centre's survey.① This reveals that the public today has a positive attitude towards changing

① 增加男性护理假 加入条款正当其时[N].中国经济导报,2011 - 11 - 26:B03.

the traditional gender roles and identities.

3.3 Employers' Position and Concerns

What is the position of employers who are funding their employees' paternity leaves, including salaries, allowances and lost work hours?

Some may argue that salaries, allowances and lost work hours incurred because of paternity leave increase the financial burdens on employers. However, in reality, as explained by businesses whose formalized paternity leave policies are well implemented, such expenses are accounted for in the general staff costs, and employers do not need to set aside extra funds; hence there is no extra cost. Taking the example of an oil exploration company, a state-owned company with 12,787 male employees (66.4 percent of the total) and 6,548 female employees (33.6 percent), statistics in 2005 show that 434 men (2.26 percent of the total) took paternity leave that year. Assuming that all of them took 10 days off (the maximum allowed), the salaries paid for them were 364,536.22 yuan, a negligible 0.06 percent of total payroll. On the other hand, even if an employer decides not to allow paternity leave for its men, this "burden" is not reduced, as it still has to pay for the general staff costs. More than two-thirds of the oil exploration company's employees are men, among whom are many young people. The management sympathies with employees who need to take paternity leave and its leave policy has been well utilized. Even so, the "burden" on the company is negligible. The extra cost to businesses because of paternity leave is not grievous, as some have argued.

In countries where paternity leave is legislated on, leave time is getting longer and leave benefits are covered by social insurance schemes, so businesses do not have to shoulder the burden. In China, maternity insurance is paid on a pay-as-you-go basis from a common pool of earmarked funding. Employers contribute 1 percent of total payroll to the fund. In 2011, the maternity insurance fund had 22 billion yuan gross revenue and 13.9 billion yuan expenditure, with a year-end cumulative balance of 34.3 billion yuan.① Over the years, the fund has always been in surplus. As paternity leave benefits do not cost much, it should not be difficult to include them in maternity insurance coverage.

Very few of the surveyed managers complain about the financial burden, but they are concerned that it is difficult to find temporary replacements for leave-takers, particularly in smaller companies. At a deeper level there is also the traditional perception about the roles of the two sexes: the value of men lies in earning the bread for the family, while that of women is in taking care of the household duties; having babies is women's job and men should not give up their work for maternity care. This mindset and the pursuit of economic benefits give rise to the view that allowing paternity leave is out of line with attaining business targets. However, protection of labour rights is an international trend, which acknowledges the importance of family life-work balance and emphasizes that promoting gender equality is a social responsibility that employers should take. In the study, a Japanese powder metallurgy company stands out with its particular attention to its social role. It is not very big, with about 500 employees, but well-managed, mindful of legal compliance as well as its people's benefits and needs. It provides paternity leave and specifies that leave-takers be treated as working full-time. It believes that such measures help engage the employees and strengthen the cohesion of the company. It is indeed in the interest of the employer to heed the employees' need to balance family life and work and help protect men's reproductive rights.

3.4 Position of the Government

At present, paternity leave remains a supporting measure to the family planning programme. The regulator, namely the Family Planning

① 人力资源和社会保障部. 2011 年度人力资源和社会保障事业发展统计公报[R],2012-06-05.

Commission, is positive with regard to making paternity leave a legal requirement. Inquiries at the Commission find that it is not difficult to put paternity leave into practice. Based on governing regulations, an employee can ask for paternity leave from his employer if he meets the conditions set out in the family planning programme. Also, there are clear rules on leave time and entitlements. In addition, implementation of paternity leave as a policy does not incur high cost, or even "any cost", for three reasons. Firstly, there is no need for special public education campaigns, thus no extra cost, for paternity leave, because as a policy, it can be included in the Commission's current publicity plans. Secondly, paternity leave does not need additional funding from the government, hence there is no need for special budget or cost accounting. Thirdly, in practice, individuals take paternity leaves on different days; unlike a public holiday, it does not impact production or social life, but does effect the public mindset and improve social welfare.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the policy can be implemented easily. There are two main challenges: communicating the availability of this policy to those who need it, and compliance at the employer level. In the *Population and Family Planning Law* of 2001, paternity leave is not included as a provision; it is a policy rule formulated by local governments to implement the Law. As a measure to support the family planning programme, it is not impressive. Although there was intensive media coverage at the time, it has escaped many people's attention. In the questionnaire survey, 39.9 percent of the respondents have no knowledge of such a rule, 47 percent have heard about it but do not know the specifics; only 13.1 percent have a clear idea. The family planning programme is executed by the local governments who are responsible for educating and guiding the employers. Poorly done, the paternity leave policy can be missed by both the employers and the employees. Some of the managers surveyed admit that they do not know whether there is such a policy as paternity leave; neither will they take the leave themselves. But they also indicate that they will allow paternity leave if the government rules say so. People have also come forward to consult with the regulator on paternity leave rules, but they do not want the regulator to help negotiate with their employers for fear of losing their jobs. Legislating paternity leave is therefore necessary to improve compliance by employers.

In summary, it is now the right time to adopt laws on paternity leave. As an independent civil right and obligation, it deserves to be validated and protected by law.

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Changes in Urban Work-Family Dynamics during Market Reforms and Their Policy Implications

1. Work-Family Dynamics

Reforms in China have made the economy there more market oriented than previously. The family, which does not carry much market value, is no longer a concern of the state, having been relegated to the private sphere. This could be viewed as an emancipation of sorts for families long bound to a centralized state system, but once the market economy established itself, the government switched from being a provider of social and family welfare to a promoter of market efficiency. As a result, families, while free from state control, lost benefits the state had previously provided, among them the "iron rice bowl" (permanent employment) for urban workers, along with health care, housing, day care for young children, and schooling for older children. The current tension between work and family life is attributable to incompatibilities between work interests and family interests in the market economy.

The market wants profit maximization for a work unit, while the family wants what is optimal for reproduction and sustenance. The work-family tension is most apparent in two ways. First, on one hand, career ambition or the need to support the family may keep one away from the family, while on the other hand, child rearing may affect one's performance at work. In short, one can't have one's cake and eat it too. Second, the double burden on family members of bringing home the bacon while keeping house has been exacerbated. Employment has always been high among urban Chinese women, and since they do most of the housework, the work-family tension is felt most acutely by them. There is no denying that such tension existed before the market reform, but the either-or conflict between work and family is new.

In the past, the work unit met a family's basic needs—very basic needs when compared with those of today—providing for child rearing and everyday life through a variety of employment benefits. Admittedly, before the reform, the state dictated to the family, demanding that people give priority to the work unit/state, instead of the family, and that all urban women find employment. At the same time, the state neglected the necessity of housework. As a result, women fell under the triple burden of serving the country, supporting the family, and keeping house.① Women of that era, however, did not appear to feel as strongly about work-family tensions or bearing a triple burden as women do today. This might involve the internalization of a certain ideology in the past. A few slogans popular in previous decades—for example, "If the river is not filled, streams would run dry" and "If there is food in the wok, there will be food in the bowl"—implied that contribution to the work unit/state to some extent also represented an indirect contribution to the family.

Concurrent with China's transition to a market economy was a drop in women's employment rate. According to surveys conducted in 1990 and 2000 on Chinese women's social status by the Women's Studies Institute of China, which is affiliated with the All China Women's Federation, the employment rate for Chinese women during that period was the highest in the world. It stood at 72.4 percent for urban women aged 15 to 60 in 1990

① 左际平. 20 世纪 50 年代的妇女解放和男女义务平等:中国城市夫妻的经历与感受[J]. 社会,2005(01).

and 76.3 percent for women under 50. In 2000, however, the employment rate for urban women had dropped to 63.5 percent, a much steeper drop than men's employment rate, which fell from 90 percent to 81.3 percent. During these ten years, the percentage of women ascending career hierarchies decreased. Gender differences in career development sustains the income gap between men and women that reforms have in no way closed. Statistics show that the number of employed urban women remains at 70 percent of the figure for urban employed men.① A comparison of data collected in the women's federation surveys show that in 1990, urban women did 1.7 times more housework than their husbands, with that figure increasing to 2.8 times in 2000.②

Of course all the phenomena discussed above are closely related to long existing discrimination against women in the workforce as well as traditional concepts of gender. Post-reform structural changes, by exacerbating the work-family tension, further underscored gender inequality. One objective of a study carried out during 2005 and 2006 among urban wives was to find out what changes had occurred in urban women's lives and families, including migrant rural women working in cities, since the economic reform. One change discovered was an increasing diversity in urban women's approaches to the work-family tradeoff. Some focused on work and career and others on family; still others tried to balance the two, while some choose not to work at all.

There is a belief that such diversity is attributable to the greater number of alternatives available to women under the changed circumstances. True, before the reform, women had far fewer

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① 蒋永萍. 妇女的社会经济地位[M]//蒋永萍. 中国转型中的妇女社会地位. 北京:中国妇女出版社,2006:128-196.

② Jipng Zuo. Understanding Urban Women's Domestic-Role Orientation in Post-Mao China[J/OL]. Critical Sociology, DOI: 10.1177/0896920512452021.

alternatives. Employment or other participation in production was a must.①

The study on urban women, however, revealed that in general, women preferred work in order to maintain economic independence, enrich their lives, keep up with the times, fulfill themselves, and contribute to society. Even those women who stayed at home to take care of young children tried to find something other than housework to do. For example, some became self-employed, working whenever and wherever they could, or joined a pyramid sales scheme. After all, they only stayed at home because external factors forced them to do so.

In one instance, a worker in Beijing who had set up her own business at the beginning of the reform and economic opening had done quite well in the garment-selling trade. She, however, had to give it up and take care of her son at home because her in-laws were too old to transport the child to and from kindergarten. In addition, her husband repeatedly got after her to stop working. She was then only able to do a bit of stock work in her spare time. Another example involved a public servant working as vice director of an office at an authority in a district in Shanghai. She insisted on a work-family balance that gave priority to her family. It was because of the pressure of her office work on one hand and her obligation to help her son in his studies on the other hand that led to her decision to focus on the family. Yet she could not give up her work entirely, because her husband's salary alone was insufficient to support the family.

These examples demonstrate that regardless of women's roles at home or at work, they all faced a common challenge—a conflict between work and life. The market economy and reduced government support put tremendous pressure on families. The family unit still needed to be provided for, the elderly looked after, and children reared, but the social

① 谭深.社会转型与中国妇女就业[M]//杜芳琴.中国妇女与发展——地位 健康 就业.郑州:河南人民出版社,1993:337-385.

system supporting them had not developed accordingly with the market reform (e. g., more non-profit kindergartens and homes for senior citizens). The incompatibility between the market and family—the former seeking profit maximization and the latter hoping to meet the various needs of family members①—made urban working women feel torn between career development and family well-being.

Our research shows that women who had established themselves in their respective careers either had parents or in-laws who took care of the children, husbands who enjoyed flexible working hours, or kids attending private boarding schools or old enough to take care of themselves. Even these women were pained over the tradeoff between career achievements and family duty. At work, women were often discriminated against because they were expected to put more effort toward the family; at home, they were often reproached for not being good enough wives or mothers by society and even by family members. Full-time housewives found themselves stuck in a similar predicament. They might have cared for the family better by giving up work, but their effort to construct a harmonious family while staying at home was crushed by market values that disregarded housework. In addition, with no job came the loss of socioeconomic status and a smaller social network, creating even more problems for women who had stopped working.

2. Women and Work in China

Women's employment rights were better protected in urban areas during the planned economy era in China. Laws and policies governing their employment were developed as well as enforced. In addition, the Chinese

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① Johanna Brenner. Women and the Politics of Class[M]. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000; Sharon Hays. The mommy wars: Ambivalence, ideological work, and the cultural contradictions of motherhood[M]//Susan Ferguson. Shifting the Center. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2010:305 - 323.

constitution safeguarded equality between men and women in the workplace. Regulations on the Protection of Women Workers and other legal guidelines quite clearly stipulated women's rights to equal employment, equal pay, and gender-specific labor protection. There were also government policies promoting women's employment along with supporting policies in various other areas. For instance, women were covered by maternity insurance, had paid maternity leave, and were guaranteed post-maternity reinstatement at their jobs. Nonprofit nurseries and kindergartens reduced working mothers' worries about raising a family, and public opinion was shaped by media to be friendly toward working women. It is no exaggeration to say that although China had not ratified the International Labour Organization's Convention 156,① the Chinese government nonetheless fulfilled its requirements under the planned economy.②

Since the market reform, the liberalized labor market has offered greater opportunities for women in choosing career paths, personal fulfillment, and achieving career and economic successes. Many businesswomen and female executives and professionals have made names for themselves. They have not only realized their own value, but also won recognition from society. At the same time, however, the old societal balance was disrupted. Families had to learn to fend for themselves after the state's protection was taken away, as neoliberalism made increasingly deeper impressions on government administrative philosophy. In addition, authorities did not prioritize measures or social policies to facilitate women's employment in the new market-oriented environment. They were not even conscious of the importance of gender equality. As a consequence,

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① International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, Convention 156, adopted 23 June 1981, entered into force 11 August 1983.

② 刘伯红,张永英,李亚妮. 协调工作和家庭的矛盾:中国的问题和政策[R]. 未发表,2008.

although equal employment was still a fundamental principle in the socialist job market, some institutional changes, despite their good intentions, blocked women's participation in the labor market.

For example, maternity insurance reform was intended to reduce businesses' cost concerns about hiring female workers by setting up a unified fund, so more women could be employed.① The new fund, however, only covered medical bills and wages during maternity leave. Planners failed to take into account the tangible and intangible costs to a business, such as child care leave, the cost of a substitute when a female worker went on leave, and the loss of working hours before childbirth and during lactation. As a result, many businesses were still not motivated to hire female workers. Also, businesses with a predominantly male workforce were reluctant to contribute to the unified fund because they did not see a return. Thus, the unified fund for maternity insurance became the smallest among the five major social insurance funds.

In 2004, maternity insurance coverage among employed women in China stood at a low percentage of 57.9. The low rate of coverage, design defect, and hiccups in the transition from the old system to the new system directly affected urban working women's access to insurance. Female workers whose employers did not pay into the unified fund, laid off female workers, as well as female workers in some public institutions who are not covered by the fund and in addition, their employers refuse to pay for their maternity costs, were all excluded. Some primary and secondary schools even demanded that female teachers on maternity leave pay their substitute's salaries.②

The reform of nursery and kindergarten services also had a big impact on women's employment. As the economic reform kicked off, the majority

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① 左际平,蒋永萍.社会转型中城镇妇女的工作和家庭[M].北京:当代中国出版社,2009.

② 左际平,蒋永萍.社会转型中城镇妇女的工作和家庭[M].北京:当代中国出版社,2009.

of businesses and public institutions terminated their in-house day care services because of cost considerations and the desire to separate business initiatives from social services. In recent years, education authorities have stated explicitly that since preschool education is not part of compulsory education, government subsidies should be reduced, preschool service providers should charge according to costs, and private investment in preschool services should be encouraged. Thanks to such guidelines, preschool education is far more market-oriented than education for older children.

Nurseries for children under three, bearing high risks but low profits, basically disappeared. Fees charged by kindergartens climbed steadily, in some cases up to 60 percent of the average monthly income of women of prime childbearing age. Moreover, since serving and supporting women was no longer a priority for many nurseries and kindergartens, they shortened their hours. Parents with young kids were forced to arrive at work late or leave work early, otherwise they had to pay someone else to drop off the kids and pick them up. The government hoped the reform would introduce market practices to public services, such as health care, education, provision for the elderly, and domestic services. It also encouraged private players to provide public services. As a result, prices skyrocketed while quality remained uncertain. Low- and middle-income families now have limited access to public services, and women and families are exposed to greater risks. Women, as the primary caregivers in the household, have to deal with more tasks and problems than previously. Their having to stay at home full time also entails losses in employment opportunities, income, and employment-related social benefits.① When there is inadequate support for women torn between work and family, women tend inevitably to lean toward the family. This does not only

① 刘伯红，张永英，李亚妮. 协调工作和家庭的矛盾：中国的问题和政策[R]. 未发表，2008.

change their life goals, but also reshapes the relationships among the state, the family, and women.

3. Reflections on Family Policies

China has not had explicit family policies since 1949. Instead, rules and regulations governing family welfare, child bearing, women's rights and interests, provision for the elderly, and so on have been dispersed across various social or economic initiatives and the constitution. The absence of defined family policies highlights that in the pre-reform socialist era, the essential needs of urban families were met through a mixing of public and private spaces plus the state having a structure resembling that of a family.

Discussions on family policies after market reform should first of all break from the Western liberal theories prevalent at the moment in China. Such theories assume or advocate a clear demarcation between public and the private spaces. In a market economy, the demarcation is made on the basis of market value. Families, however, create and sustain lives rather than generate profits. Therefore, such a demarcation pits the family and the market on opposite sides. It is unrealistic to expect the market to protect the interests of women and families on its own initiative. Indeed, the reality is quite the opposite. The distinction between private and public spaces not only creates and maintains the gender gap in the division of labor and pay, but also causes conflicts between work and family.

The Chinese government is incapable of or refrains from intervening in such private family affairs as a gender-based division of labor, provision for the elderly, and child rearing. Experiences during thirty-odd years of reform also reveal that as the market economy developed and as the government loosened its control over the economy, boundaries were drawn between the public and private, society and family, state and society. The liberal protection of the private space from public intervention weakened the government's protection of and assistance to its people, negatively affecting women's social participation and career development. Quite a few Chinese scholars believe it is the imperfect market, not a government failure to safeguard people's livelihood, that is the cause of the current inequalities, including gender inequalities. Others, however, disagree.

The market monopoly and government corruption that emerged after reforms did so not because the market economy was yet to fully develop, but because government functions and power were valued on market terms. According to Karl Polanyi, the twentieth-century social philosopher, all Western market economies were developed on the strength of government support. If the market were given a truly free rein, human society would meet a disastrous end.① In a similar vein, if family interests are regulated by the market, the family relationship will be destroyed. In the United States in the twentieth century, family atomization, rising divorce rates, and the drop in the marriage rate might be partially explained by such dynamics.

The 2005 – 2006 qualitative survey also found that a considerable number of women did not feel an acute work-family tension because they were working for organizations—for example, government agencies, media, research institutes, colleges, and universities—that had not gone through restructuring.② Therefore, making a distinction between public and private space is not advised. Social policies should put people first because human development and well-being are critical to social development. Social policies should (once again) reach out to families and private lives, making family policies a part of social policies. At the same time, there should be consistency between social policies and economic policies in an effort to promote human development.

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① ［匈］卡尔·波兰尼. 大转型：我们时代的政治与经济起源［M］. 冯钢、刘阳，译. 杭州：浙江人民出版社，2007.

② 左际平，蒋永萍. 社会转型中城镇妇女的工作和家庭［M］. 北京：当代中国出版社，2009.

The guiding principle in policy development should be the reinstatement of the government's role in supporting families and securing livelihoods. It is not advocated here that the government take on all things related to the family through administrative measures, but that laws be adopted to ensure the continuity, supervision, and implementation of family-friendly policies. Moreover, such policies should help balance workplace and family interests, reduce gender and class differences, and strengthen and develop the social fabric.

First, the government's role in welfare provision must be strengthened while its market power is decreased. People's livelihood should be protected from the infringement of the market. In recent years, fiscal expenditures on employment support, social security, health insurance, education, and housing have grown substantially. Their rate of increase is the highest among all outlays. Protections could mitigate the conflict between work and family. Opponents may worry that too much concern about people's livelihood will reduce economic benefits. That said, shouldn't the goal of economic growth be about enhancing the quality of life for the majority of the people rather than the profits pocketed by a few.

Second, workplace interests and family interests should be reconciled. As discussed above, in the market economy, the root cause of the work-family conflict is the polarization of these two interests, with the workplace seeking profit maximization while the family strives to get through life and provide for family members. The government could demand that work units add welfare targets and deemphasize profit and efficiency targets. The government should subsidize part of, even a large part of, welfare expenses incurred by work units, such as economic losses resulting from childbirth or parental leave. Experiences in Western developed countries indicate that without government intervention, companies in the private sector would not voluntarily provide employee benefits when surplus labor exists. Even in the case of a labor shortage, employment benefits would still be in favor of companies. For example, "flexible" work hours in Western companies may sound employee friendly, but ultimately it is up to the company to decide whether and when to offer such an arrangement. Discrimination against pregnant workers and those asking for a leave of absence can be found everywhere. ①

Third, gender and class differences should be mitigated. In France and Germany, the state offers comparatively advanced support for housework, but the policies only target women. As a consequence, they fail to ensure full employment and an equal sharing of housework between husbands and wives. Thus, there is still some way to go before gender equality is achieved. Take France as an example. Excellent childbirth and day care services have decreased women's burdens in the workplace and at home, but men think they are somehow exempt from housework. According to a survey by Rosemary Crompton, comparing the industrialized countries of the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, Norway, Portugal, and the United States, the sharing of housework in France is the most traditional and roughly the same as in Portugal. ② In Germany, husbands are expected to work to support the entire family, while wives receive cash subsidies from the government for doing housework. Such a regime, Crompton argues, has strengthened gender inequality in both family and workplace.

Among all developed countries, the United Kingdom and the United States provide the least amount of family welfare. Both countries have high employment rates among men and women. Men in these countries do more housework than their counterparts in France and Germany, but the problem is that many women are forced to work because the family income would otherwise be insufficient. In short, men are forced to do more

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① Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

② Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

housework because their spouses have to work.① It is not desirable for both husband and wife to share family duties simply because of finances.

Fourth, the tendency toward the expansion of informal employment should be stemmed. Since the market-oriented reforms were introduced in China, the living standard for individuals as well as for families has generally improved substantially. However, the gap between the rich and the poor has greatly increased. This is indisputable. One reason for that lies in the development of informal employment. According to statistics, by 2008 the number of employees in cities and towns had increased from 91.5 million in 1978 to 293.5 million, among which 225 million were migrant workers from rural area. Meanwhile, employees in state-owned enterprises dropped from 78.3 percent to 21.9 percent. Thirty-nine percent of all state-paid employees were driven into the informal sector. Here, informal employment refers to working without a contract, social security, or stable work conditions.② This exacerbates the incompatibilities between work and family.③ Although more males than females work in the informal sector, the proportion of women among all working women is higher than that for male workers.④ These women are usually responsible for supporting the family as well as caring for it. The incompatibilities between work and family are especially stark for them. They should thus be taken into consideration in policy-making.

Fifth, the public interest should afford more room in the economy. As market reforms introduced privatization and competition into China,

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① Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

② Kuruvilla, Sarosh, Lee, Ching Kwan, & Gallagher, Mary, E. Introduction and arguments[M]//Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary E. Gallagher. From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011: 1 - 14.

③ Tavernise, Sabrina. Soring poverty casts spotlight on "Lost Decade" [N]. New York Times, 2011 - 09 - 13.

④ 全国妇联妇女研究所课题组.社会转型中的妇女社会地位[M].北京:中国妇女出版社,2006.

different interest groups emerged. Each interest group fended for itself. Without a balancing mechanism in a society, conflicts among interest groups can be aggravated, as class polarization can. Those sectors in the service industry closely related to people's livelihood, such as health care, day care, education, and housing, perhaps should not be privatized or excessively commercialized. They meet people's basic needs and thus should not become money-making tools. Otherwise gender inequality and class polarization might escalate and work-family conflicts be exacerbated. Moreover, some service jobs with low skill requirements and low pay (e.g., day care) are usually taken by women, cementing patterns of gender specificity in jobs. Furthermore, since the women providing these services are usually from the working class, such a practice is not conducive to the elimination of class differences.[①]

On 30 September 2011, CCTV Morning News reported that the Chinese government had decided that kindergartens should be non-profit and for all children. The Ministry of Health had plans to regulate kindergarten pricing by the end of the year, with a price cap on private kindergartens. The Xiamen municipal government already had such a policy in place, capping kindergarten prices at 510 yuan while providing a subsidy of 300 yuan. Kindergartens could, however, charge miscellaneous fees. The effectiveness of price regulation ultimately depended on the attitude of local governments.

It is undoubtedly a daunting task to protect family interests and eliminate class differences while maintaining China's competitiveness in the international market as capitalism continues to spread around the globe. Nevertheless, the experience with reforms in China so far seems to confirm that if policies and other measures are leveraged to expand the public interest, both the government and economic entities will garner a greater

① Crompton, Rosemary. Employment and the Family [M]. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

commitment from people to engage in production, and as a result strengthen the economic foundations of the country. According to statistics, China's growth rate between 1950 and 1976 was no lower than the world average, with its performance in life expectancy, health, and education improving by leaps and bounds during the same time period.[①] Such achievements are even more impressive when one considers that they were accomplished while China was isolated from a large part of the world. By contrast, development and wealth accumulation in Western capitalist countries depended to a large extent on colonization and invasion of other countries.[②] The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession that originated in the United States warn all the more against China blindly copying Western economic models. China once provided family welfare in urban areas. Why should it not further explore family policies with Chinese socialist characteristics on the basis of learning from its own past as well as other countries?

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① Li, Mingqi. The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy [M]. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008; Lin, Chun. The Transformation of Chinese Socialism[M]. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

② Li, Mingqi. The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy [M]. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008; Lin, Chun. The Transformation of Chinese Socialism[M]. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

编 后 语

这本论文集的出版，缘起于2011年10月的一次会议，一次由南京师范大学、上海复旦大学、德国艾伯特基金会和江苏省社会科学联合会共同举办的“中国家庭变迁和公共政策”国际研讨会。

人所共知，中国家庭正经历着剧烈而深刻的变迁，但是，这些变化是如何发生的，又如何影响着家庭和社会关系？在研讨中，与会者深深感到，我们需要重新研究和定位家庭。正如联合国在2004年“国际家庭年”10周年之际所指出的：“健康稳定的家庭架构是人类福祉的基础”“各国政府应把帮助解决家庭问题和让家庭发挥作用纳入国家发展大纲”——这一意义对转型中的中国尤为重要。中国的家庭一直在福利、在社会保障上扮演着西方社会所不能比拟的重要角色，家庭在当今需要越来越多地面对、承担社会的各种不确定性和风险，但是目前中国与家庭相关的法律政策除了生育政策和对部分特殊家庭的支持政策相对完整外，并没有一个既针对家庭特殊需求又能积极开发家庭功能的政策体系。在中国的社会政策框架中，迄今为止仍没有“保护家庭”“关爱家庭”的政策概念和内容。这种政策的缺失、不完善，是与支持家庭以满足家庭与社会发展的多方需要的社会建设目标不相适应的。因此，我们的研讨在中国家庭变迁之外，较多地转向家庭政策的探讨，并接受艾伯特基金会的建议，也引进较多的国际元素，以达到借鉴西

方国家家庭政策和福利政策改革的经验和教训、推动中国建立发展型家庭政策体系的目的。

尽管这一次会议对中国的家庭变迁和与家庭相关的公共政策建设的探讨而言，仅仅是一个开始，但这一议题已引起学界同仁的关注和进一步探讨的热情，大家迫切希望能把会议成果结集出版。在艾伯特基金会的大力支持下，我们开始了本书的编辑出版工作。

我们在原有会议论文的基础上做了较大的调整，经过精选使原有论述内容更加集中，同时也特约了部分新稿，增加了有关独生子女政策、男性护理假、老年护理等新的内容，特别是在欧盟研究增加了美国和东亚地区的家庭政策的研究分析、增强了本土与国际的比较视角，使之更具比较与借鉴的意义。

从 2011 年的会议到 2014 年出版，其间走过了很长的编辑之路，有关内容、研究视角的反复讨论，约稿海内外作者时的反复协商……在我参与过的图书编辑出版经历中，可以说本书是时间耗费和精力付出最多的一本。本书编委会的成员似乎不约而同有一个共同心愿，希望一是坚持我们的学术追求，二是保证书的质量，希望在若干年后，也许书里涉及的某些具体问题已经不再是问题，但这本书里的研究思想和所走过的探索路径仍然有其价值。

在本书即将面世之际，最要感谢的是本书各位作者，他/她们都是各自研究领域中的翘楚，他们在慷慨提供了最新研究成果之后，还要接受责任编辑们的多次“磨难”——一遍遍的讨论甚至争议以及一次次的修改。

在这里我还要感谢本书的主编史丽娜女士，作为艾伯特基金会上海办事处的主任，除了给本书的出版以财力、人力方面的支持外，作为主编也极为尽职，她仔细审阅了每一篇稿件并提出非常专业的修改意见。

我要感谢我们编委会的每个成员，对本书之倾心投入，犹如孕育我们共同的孩子。除了尽职尽责地完成自己那部分编审任务，编辑出版过程中遇到的每一个难题大家都乐于分担，使我们在一年多的工作中，在体验编务的细琐繁难之外，也收获了团队友好协同工作的快乐。在这里我还要特别感谢艾伯特基金会的王蓓敏女士，她同时也是本书的副主编，因为本书由中英文两种文字构成，作者海内外皆有，她为作者、译者、编辑、出版多方间的沟通和协调做了大量工作。

最后还要感谢出版本书的南师大出版社编辑部各位老师，她们高度认真负责的态度使我们增加了对本书质量的信心。

在本书即将面世之时，心中除了欣喜和期待也有些许忐忑，从最初的会议研讨到编辑成书出版，中国家庭和与家庭相关的政策也在不断变化和调整之中（例如对独生子女生育政策的调整），和长青之树的现实相比，研究结集出版永远要滞后一步。但希望这本书不仅能记录下我们探索的足迹，还能对今后新的研究有所启迪。

金一虹

2014年3月4日于南京

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