MICHAEL DAUDERSTÄDT/ARNE SCHILDBERG (eds.):

Dead Ends of Transition: Rentier Economies and Protectorates

Heft 2/2007

Frankfurt 2006

Campus Verlag, 249 pp.

Dead Ends of Transition is a collection of papers presented at two international
expert seminars on »Transforming Authoritarian Rentier Economies and Protectorates
« in September and October 2005. The edited volume brings together a
range of scholars and practitioners who analyze the difficulties of transitions to
economic market orders and democracy in various authoritarian states and in international
protectorates (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). The central aim of
the book is to show that international protectorates are comparable in nature to
authoritarian rentier economies in their reliance on rents – in the case of rentier
economies on rents from natural resources, and in the case of protectorates on
rents derived from foreign development aid – and that therefore similar lessons
on how to bring about transitions to democracy and national reconstruction can
be learnt by practitioners.

The book is a welcome and timely contribution to the academic discussion in
three related areas. The first contribution concerns the comparability of rentier
states and international protectorates. In his opening contribution Michael Dauderstädt
lays out the rentier character of protectorates. He stresses their external
dependence on revenues, the authoritarian nature of their politics, and their vulnerabilities
in times of fiscal crises. The rentier character of protectorates is confirmed
by Barnett R. Rubin, who also highlights a number of specific characteristics
of protectorates, such as the way aid is distributed and the existence of dual
sovereignty (local government and international administrators) and hence two
public sectors.

The second contribution relates to debates on the role of natural resources in
political developments. Here the various contributions engage in a debate about
whether oil wealth should be seen as conducive to political stability (that is, the
longevity of authoritarian rulers) or as contributing to instability (resource curse).
Among those arguing for the longevity of authoritarian rule are Oliver Schlumberger and Benjamin Smith. Supporting the resource curse perspective is Richard
Auty, who links prolonged fiscal crises and delay in structural reform to the emergence
of predatory states (p. 41); Indra de Soysa, who stresses the indirect effects
of resource wealth on corruption, openness of trade, and investment (p. 50); and
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who claim a direct link between resource wealth
and the likelihood and duration of civil war. Given that this last and crude version
of the resource curse might be empirically called into question by the fact that
most authoritarian states do not descend into civil war, the need for nuanced
analyses of individual case studies, and especially of their societal and institutional
history, becomes clear. The contribution by Ricardo Soares de Oliveira on the states
in the Gulf of Guinea, in which he stresses the disadvantageous oil context (p. 72)
and the importance of prolonged fiscal crises – an observation that resonates with
an earlier point made by Richard Auty – best exemplifies such historically sensitive
analysis. Other authors add to this the need to analyze the kind of institutions
created in the period of state-formation and the policies implemented thereafter.

The third area, of particular importance to practitioners, is prospects for reform.
Here the contributors engage in a debate about whether reform prospects
should emanate from the international side – stressing demands for transparency,
the responsibilities of multinational corporations, and policy tools such as oil
funds and verification schemes – or whether reform efforts are better applied at
the domestic level. Generally, the authors see more likelihood of change in domestic
reform efforts. These range from reducing broad-based wealth creation
(Richard Auty), through fostering economic diversification and creating effective
tax administrations (Thorvaldur Gylfason), to increasing productivity outside the
oil sector. In view of the political logic of economic reforms in many states, the
key challenge for transition consists ultimately in breaking vested political interests
and fully implementing structural adjustment programs in order to create
better revenue management, transparency, and accountability.

Dead Ends to Transition is a very useful contribution to current debates in
world politics. A plausible case is made that protectorates share many common
features with rentier economies. A few critical points may nevertheless be made:
at times it is hard to discern a common thread, and the authors’ differing uses of
concepts and attempts to explain different things (lack of democracy, lack of economic
growth, difficult reconstruction efforts in post-conflict situations) sometimes
make it hard to read. This in itself is not, of course, a valid critique of a collective
volume. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning here in order to highlight
desiderata for future research and the way ahead, namely how to link the issue of Srentierism and the resource curse to the question of statehood. Rentier economies
are naturally part of rentier states and we must hence pose the question of how to
view such states. How can they be reformed? How are they to be maintained?
And, in the rare cases of post-conflict peace building, how are they to be reconstructed
or rebuilt?

One way forward seems to be a focus on the core functions of states and to measure
statehood and governance against fulfillment of the following: internal and
external security, welfare and wealth, and a level of representation. Using such an
approach, scholars can analyze functional state failure, civil wars (and the often
accompanying institutional state collapse), lack of reform in rentier states, and
even conceive of policy responses to humanitarian interventions (when to intervene?)
and international efforts at post-conflict peacebuilding (what to rebuild?).
This promising approach seems implicit in the structure of Dead Ends of Transition
(the first section on war and peace, the second section on economic aspects of the
resource curse and welfare issues, and the third section on societal aspects and
representation). What would have been desirable from our point of view, however,
is explicit reference to the core functions of states and the division of the
various contributions into the fields of security, welfare, and representation.

Despite the few critical points raised above, the fact remains that Dead Ends of
Transition is an important publication, and its editors and authors should be
thanked for their contribution to what is most certainly a subject of acute interest
to the international community.

Rolf S. Schwarz,

Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

<< zurück
Rezensionen/ Übersicht

© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Redaktion/net edition: Gerda Axer-Dämmer | 4/2007

Top