The united Germany in the post-bipolar world / Eckhard L=FCbkemeier. - Bonn, 1993 (Studie der Abteilung Au=DFenpolitikforschung im Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung ; 56).

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The united Germany in the post-bipolar world / Eckhard L=FCbkemeier. - [Electronic ed.]. - Bonn, 1993. - 41 S. =3D 100 = Kb, Text . - (Studie der Abteilung Au=DFenpolitikforschung im Forschungsinstitut der= Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung ; 56). - ISBN 3-86077-111-6
Electronic ed.: Bonn: EDV-Stelle der FES, 1997

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Just as many other states, united Germany is seeking its proper place in th= e fluid environment of the post-bipolar world. Two factors unique to German= y are complicating this quest: the challenge of unification and - similar t= o the Japanese case - the combination of the country's past and (geographic= ) position with its newly-gained power. Against this background, the paper = identifies and discusses Germany's interests and responsibility on the West= ern and European layer as well as the global layer.

I. Introduction

The single most important determinant of (West) German foreign policy duri= ng the Cold War was the division of Germany and the resulting frontline sta= tus of its two political parts. Next to ensuring the survival and well-bein= g of its citizens, West Germany's ultimate foreign policy objective was ove= rcoming the division, thereby reuniting the country and restoring its full = sovereignty. The frontline status determined the manner in which this objec= tive had to be pursued. The iron curtain severing Germany in two was akin t= o a tripwire: had one side tried to lift it against the will of the other s= ide, it would have risked triggering an East-West war. Preventing such a wa= r from escalating into a nuclear conflagration would have been very difficu= lt, given the political interests at stake and the inherent escalatory dyna= mics; indeed, the prospect of a military confrontation quickly getting out = of control served as an inescapable=0B(self-)deterrent. Yet even if the att= empt to arrest the escalatory process would have been successful, Germany a= s the inevitable battleground would likely have already suffered an intoler= able level of destruction. This precarious geopolitical situation had two consequences for West Germa= n unification policy. First, the policy required a solid Western anchor, bo= th to safeguard the country's security in view of the Communist threat and = to secure Western support for its unification policy. Second, unification c= ould only be pursued by peaceful means; this required the interim step of r= ecognizing the status quo of two German states and accepting the need to co= operate with the Communist regimes. Not that West German governments had a unification master plan, cleverly d= esigned and consistently implemented. Indeed, the "interim step" of NATO's = 1967 Harmel concept of deterrent and detente policy was based on Germany's = and Europe's division, and the longer it lasted, the more that policy lost = its interim character. The post-war status quo had come to be seen as the "= natural" state of affairs, and while many in the West accepted it grudgingl= y, others could see substantial benefits deriving from it. In any case, bot= h groups were taken by complete surprise when the Wall did fall in November= 1989. Nevertheless, unification remained a prime objective of West German policy= throughout the post-war period. It could not have been otherwise given Ger= many's division and its frontline position. The former implied that as long= as Germans continued to see themselves as a single nation, obtaining the r= ight to self-determination for all Germans would be tantamount to opening t= he door to national re-unification. The same was true of West German securi= ty policy. It had to aim at removing the Soviet military threat to Germany'= s very existence. Ultimately, that amounted to lifting the Iron Curtain, be= cause the military threat was tied to the Communist nature of the Soviet Un= ion and its European satellites. The Communist regimes have disappeared, the Cold War is over and Germany i= s a united country. Together, these events mark a turning point in global a= nd, particularly, in European history. Undoubtedly, Germany has been one of= the countries most affected by these fundamental changes.=20 Thus, this paper reviews the implications of these changes for Germany's i= nternational role. It consists of three main parts. Chapter one discusses t= he international setting, including key features of the post-bipolar world = as well as enduring and novel aspects of Germany's position within the inte= rnational system. Chapter two is concerned with the domestic setting, i.e.,= internal determinants of German foreign policy. The description of the int= ernational and the domestic settings form the framework for chapter three, = which analyses German national interests.

II. The International Setting

1. From "Postwar Order" to "New World Disorder?"

In 1990, the end of the East-West conflict was widely seen as heralding a = peaceful and prosperous future. In the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe,"= the member states of the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe= " (CSCE) proclaimed "a new era of democracy, peace and unity". Encouraged b= y the opening of the inner-German Wall, an unprecedented cooperation with S= oviet President Gorbachev and the victory in the Gulf War, U.S. President B= ush delivered a series of speeches on a "new world order", "an order charac= terized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the cooperative= settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and bloodshed; and an unstinti= ng belief in human rights."=05 This euphoric rhetoric signalled high hopes that were soon shattered. In E= urope, the Cold War gave way to the outbreak of fierce fighting driven by e= thnic and nationalistic hostilities and exposing the unwillingness or impot= ence of the West to halt it. In the post-Communist countries, the transitio= n from dictatorship to democracy and from a central economy to a market eco= nomy has resulted in sharp reductions in living standards that are undermin= ing political stability. And while the end of the American-Soviet rivalry r= emoved a major source of regional tensions in the Third World, the resort t= o arms continues to be a common form of dispute settlement.=05=20 In view of this, one could say that the pendulum has swung back, with the = term "new world disorder" replacing earlier optimistic descriptions of the = post-Cold War world.=05 The notion of a post-Cold War "disorder" is mislead= ing, however, as it suggests an unjustified nostalgia for the seemingly ord= erly character of the Cold War era. Certainly, the dictate of the nuclear s= word of Damocles forced the superpowers to avoid another world war, and the= East-West cleavage provided both clear ideological demarcation lines and t= he cement for the Western alliance. In that sense the bipolar world was ord= erly and stable. Yet its long duration, together with a dramatic rise in the standard of li= ving, blinded many in the West to the pseudo-stability of the Eastern pole.= The "order" in the Communist bloc was maintained by the threat or use of f= orce (East Germany 1953, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968), because the re= gimes were politically illegitimate and, compared with the West, economical= ly inefficient. Thus, the speed with which they collapsed was, with hindsig= ht, less astonishing than was their durability.=05 Moreover, post-Cold War tragedies and turmoil should not induce one to for= get the costs and risks of the bipolar confrontation. The gravest risk was = associated with one of its pillars, namely the nuclear East-West stand-off.= Risk is the product of two elements: "the chance of something happening an= d the amount of damage caused by such an occurrence."=05 Thus, even if the = danger of a nuclear war may have been almost nil, the risk remained immense= because of the potential damage had it occurred. The greatest costs were b= orn by those suffering from oppressive Communist regimes and by the victims= of Third World wars fuelled by the superpower rivalry. Even the violent ou= tbreak of ethnic and national conflicts in Europe is partly attributable to= the old "order" because the Communist systems were the opposite of a polit= ical culture that fosters tolerance and solidarity. Had there been no Commu= nist systems, there would not now be the need for a painful transformation. This is not to belittle the relative stability of the bipolar world. For a= ll its costs and risks, the "long peace" of the post-World War II internati= onal system was a remarkable achievement, given the intensity of the East-W= est antagonism.=05 Yet it is perhaps somewhat self-centered, even cynical t= o speak of a period characterized by numerous Third World wars, many fought= with the direct or indirect participation of the superpowers, as the "long= peace."=20 Thus, while hopes of a "new world order" were short-lived, it is equally m= isplaced now to deplore a "new world disorder." For today's "disorder" is n= ot altogether new and, indeed, it is to a significant extent a consequence = of the old "order".=20

2. Contours of the Post-Bipolar World

Keeping this perspective in mind is important when one attempts to delinea= te the future international system, because a major determinant of the syst= em is how its actors think the system will and should develop. If they hold= an overly pessimistic assessment of the present, partially generated by a = unduly benign re-interpretation of the past, there is a danger that they wi= ll underestimate today's opportunities and cling to antiquated policies. In this way, then, the future is shaped by retrospective analysis. This is= , of course, a truism, but recalling it is particularly relevant in periods= of fundamental change. By definition, in such periods a stable set of new = co-ordinates has not yet been established. From the point of view of the in= dividual actor, the resultant uncertainty makes it more difficult to devise= a coherent strategy and increases the risk of miscalculation; at the same = time, however, it can offer novel opportunities to influence the course of = events in a preferred direction. This is the central characteristic of the present situation. International= relations are in a state of flux. For more than forty years, they were dec= isively shaped by the East-West confrontation. Indeed, the dominance of thi= s factor was such that bipolarity came to be seen as the defining element o= f the international system. So far, nothing has emerged to take its place, = as is shown by the lack of a consensual positive characterization of today'= s international system. Instead, the most frequently used terms are post-Co= ld War, post-bipolar or post-Wall world, indicating that while we know what= has passed, we do not know yet what will replace it. This is unlikely to change soon, as the following discussion will demonstr= ate. It briefly analyzes three views that attempt to predict the nature of = the post-Cold War world. The first such view is the "polar" model. It comes in three variants, depe= nding on one's judgment of the sources of power and their relative signific= ance. The most popular is the multipolar variant. Its proponents assert tha= t, in contrast to the bipolar world of two military superpowers, additional= actors will rise to a status of preeminence. Usually, though not always, t= he underlying assumption is that the future stratification of the internati= onal system will chiefly be determined by economic, rather than military ca= pabilities. They thus expect the rise of economically powerful entities suc= h as Japan, the European Community (EC) and/or Germany, possibly China and = Russia and, on a regional level, India and Brazil, which together will form= a new multipolar world order.=05 With the 1991 Gulf war interpreted as a bad omen, "unipolarists" are conce= rned that the end of the Cold War's "long peace" could be followed by a hei= ghtened, rather than diminished threat of war for the civilized world in th= e wake of the proliferation of modern weapons technology. In the turbulent = times ahead, it falls primarily to the United States to deter and defend ag= ainst the dangers ahead. "American preeminence is based on the fact that it= is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic = assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the worl= d it chooses to involve itself."=05 In contrast, "transpolarists" argue that "military power seems to have bec= ome a residual, rather than central element in international politics." Ref= erring to the growing interdependence of states and the increasing power of= transnational actors such as firms and banks, they predict a decreasing ca= pability and motivation of states to exert power in the form of a zero-sum = game. Germany and Japan are said to be prototypes of such "civilian powers"= whose policies are founded on the necessity of cooperation and the rejecti= on of polarizing thinking.=05 All three variants of the polar model suffer from serious deficiencies, gr= eatest in the case of the unipolar thesis, whose advocates have an inflated= perception of the military threat the West is likely to face in the mid-te= rm future. The main reason is the Gulf War fallacy, i.e., the erroneous ass= umption that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was the harbinger of simil= ar confrontations between Third World "weapons states" and the "civilized r= est" under U.S. leadership. The unique circumstances of the Gulf War (such = as the exceptional importance of oil for the world economy, Hussein's blata= nt aggression and bid for regional hegemony as well as the U.S. strategic c= ommitment to Israel) are highly unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in a comp= arable fashion. More importantly, the U.S. has neither the will nor the cap= ability to sustain a worldwide Pax Americana. President Clinton was elected= on an "inward-oriented" mandate. i.e., to focus political energy and mater= ial resources on America's domestic problems. As it turned out, foreign cri= ses and conflicts, particularly those in the former Soviet Union, ex-Yugosl= avia and Somalia, absorbed most of his attention in his early presidency; y= et the Clinton administration has shown no inclination to become a world po= liceman. This reflects not only popular sentiment and a voluntary political= decision--"the day of American hegemony has gone" because the U.S. has bec= ome more dependent on others while they have become less dependent on Washi= ngton.=05 The multipolar thesis has three main weaknesses. First, some of its propon= ents tend to overrate the devaluation of military might as a determinant of= international stratification and influence. While the end of the East-West= arms competition undoubtedly has had such an effect, the almost universall= y accepted view that the United States is the only remaining superpower is = still based to a large extent on American military prowess. Moreover, as th= e many ongoing wars demonstrate, perpetual world peace still remains a loft= y ideal. Second, multipolarists disagree on which states or groups of states will f= orm the poles of the future international system. The only state always men= tioned is the United States. Normally, Japan is also said to qualify, but s= ome see it hampered by its continued security dependence on the United Stat= es, by an insular mentality and by the lack of trust by regional neighbors.= The European Community is seen as another contender, but it is unclear whe= ther it will acquire the requisite political unity to become a pole of its = own. If not the EC, then perhaps united Germany? Germany alone has neither = the capability nor the will; yet while it does hold a veto power in the Eur= opean Community, the EC will never be a Germany writ large because any atte= mpt in this direction would be a recipe for anti-German alliance building. = Russia remains in a military class of its own in Europe, but while it has t= he potential to become a multidimensional global power, it has hardly begun= to do so. China has been showing an unprecedented dynamism in recent years= , but it started from a very low base and has yet to enter a stable pattern= of development. Other poles sometimes mentioned are states such as India a= nd Brazil, but they will not play a global role in the foreseeable future. Third, by focusing on the formal structure of the international system, th= e multipolar model tends to underrate the disparate nature of relations bet= ween the various poles. Thus, form the point of view of the United States, = for example, its relationship with China is qualitatively different from th= at with its European allies. And US-Japanese relations have been broader an= d deeper than (West) European-Japanese relations. Transpolarists rightly stress the de-nationalization of economic power as = well as its increasing importance for determining international status in t= he post-Cold War world. Even transnational firms, however, operate in a glo= bal environment still dominated by nation-states whose fiscal, monetary, tr= ade and social policies decisively affect the shaping of corporate strategi= es. Furthermore, the world is likely to remain a place tainted by wars and = war-prone conflicts. Thus, military might will hardly be degraded to a negl= igible asset, as the pure "civilian power" model suggests. In sharp contrast to the transpolar school of thought, the second cluster = of views on the nature of the post-bipolar world predicts an increased like= lihood of major crises and war. Its neo-realist adherents frequently also s= ee the international system or segments of it as composed of multiple poles= . They differ from other multipolarists in their analysis of the forces sha= ping the international system and in their policy recommendations. Neo-realists assert that "structure affects outcome", i.e., that the struc= ture of the international system is more important than the nature of the i= ndividual states in determining inter-state relations. In a world of sovere= ign states, it is argued, this structure is characterized by anarchy in the= sense that states are forced to provide for their own security as there is= no higher body or sovereign to perform this for them. This anarchy breeds = insecurity and rivalry: insecurity because states can never be sure about t= he peaceful intentions of others, while the risk of miscalculation could ha= ve devastating consequences; rivalry because in their attempt to minimize t= his risk, states seek to maximize their power relative to other states.=20 Thus, in neo-realist analysis, even if states are defensively motivated, t= he anarchic and self-help nature of the international system places them in= to a competitive situation that militates against establishing and preservi= ng a lasting international peace. Bipolarity in conjunction with nuclear de= terrence largely suspended this problem because a stable balance of power i= s easier to reach when there are only two opponents instead of a multitude = of real or potential rivals, and because their destructive capabilities mak= e nuclear weapons a potent deterrent. Moreover, bipolarity and its epipheno= mena of a common Soviet threat and American hegemony smothered the emergenc= e of an intra-Western competition for security. Consequently, neo-realists = expect that the multipolar system that has replaced the U.S.-Soviet bipolar= ity will be more prone to instability and violence, and that this tendency = could even endanger the peace among nations of the former Western camp.=05 Neo-realists correctly point to anarchy as a structural impediment to inte= r-state confidence building. Yet while structure undoubtedly affects outcom= e, they underrate the influence of the nature of states and the nature of t= he relationship between states. It makes a great difference whether states = are democracies or dictatorships. As to their interdependence, the degree t= o which it is asymmetrical or symmetrical regarding the bilateral distribut= ion of benefits and burdens is also decisive. Thus, after World War II a We= stern "peace community" was created within which the threat of war has for = all intents and purposes disappeared. Members still have conflicting intere= sts, but the threat or use of force is perceived as an illegitimate and cou= nterproductive means of dispute settlement. Consequently, the only justific= ation for their armed forces is to protect them (or others) from external t= hreats.=05 Even neo-realists normally do not question the existence of such a "zone o= f peace" (consisting of the highly developed democracies of Europe, North A= merica and Japan). For reasons presented above, however, they are deeply sk= eptical that it can survive and recommend a policy that aims at establishin= g a stable balance of power, fortified by military capabilities, among the = states or groups of states constituting a multipolar international system.= =20 Maintaining the Western peace community will be more difficult in the abse= nce of a unifying Soviet opponent and declining American dominance; yet nei= ther history nor neo-realist reasoning suggest its inescapable demise. The = combination of modern and prosperous democracies, tied together by common v= alues and mutually beneficial interdependencies, is a relatively recent his= torical phenomenon. As long as it lasts, the stability of peace communities= may well be assured.=20 In any case, assuming otherwise can trigger a self-fulfilling prophecy: wh= en renewed confrontation rather than continued cooperation is to be expecte= d, states will be inclined to pursue an uncooperative policy that reinforce= s their expectations because it offers insufficient incentives for other st= ates to act as partners rather than rivals. In this way, then, a vicious ci= rcle is initiated: it is precisely the application of dubious assumptions t= hat leads to consequences that were considered inevitable in the first plac= e. Yet the same mechanism may also support a virtuous circle: if it is assu= med that confidence in the peaceful intentions of other actors will continu= e to be rewarded and that a cooperative attitude is in one's own best inter= est, states will tend to resolve conflicts in a peaceful and mutually benef= icial manner. This is, of course, no recipe for perpetual peace. As the Cold War has dem= onstrated, in an antagonistic relationship detente is both necessary and li= mited, and a peace community is not immune to Murphy's law. Yet the asserti= on that the post-bipolar world will inescapably be more turbulent and war-p= rone is at least equally unjustified. States are, as neo-realists correctly= point out, constrained by the anarchic nature of the international system,= but this condition does not preclude the establishment of a lasting peace = order based on symmetrical interdependence and mutual trust instead of mutu= ally assured deterrence.=20 A similar critique can be levelled against the third perspective on the po= st-Cold War world. According to Samuel Huntington, "the fault lines between= civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of th= e Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed." In particular, he= sees the West pitted against the rest, of which the "Confucian-Islamic con= nection" is said to pose the most dangerous near-term challenge to Western = interests, value and power.=05 Even if one accepted Huntington's analysis, his policy prescriptions would= generally have counterproductive effects. For while he exhorts the West "t= o develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosop= hical assumptions underlying other civilizations," he favors a "Fortress We= st" approach based on military and economic strength that would deepen rath= er than bridge civilizational fault lines. More importantly, however, his hypotheses suffer from grave deficiencies. = In addition to civilizational differences rooted in cultural characteristic= s such as language, religion and Weltanschauung, there are more mundane pol= itical and economic sources of conflicts that are arguably more virulent an= d cut across civilizations or generate intra-civilizational struggles. Negl= ecting them leads Huntington to overestimate the coherence of civilizationa= l groupings (e.g., the Islamic world) and misinterpret recent events such a= s the 1991 Gulf War as a civilizational battle. Particularly disturbing is = his construction of a sinister "Confucian-Islamic connection", based as it = is on the shaky evidence of arms and relevant technology trade between Chin= a and North Korea on the one hand and some Islamic states on the other. Eve= n if they all shared, as Huntington assumes, an anti-Western bias, it is ha= rd to see that this alone could induce them to form a coalition aimed at mi= litarily challenging the West.

Thus, neither the "polar" model nor the neo-realist approach, and even les= s so the "clash-of-civilization" thesis, can convincingly claim to identify= the future fulcrum of global politics. Indeed, it may well be that there w= ill not emerge a single principle or structural condition, which like bipol= arity will dominate the international system. As noted earlier, from the po= int of view of the individual actor, this situation poses a dual challenge:= while policy planning and implementation can be more error-prone in the ab= sence of a familiar set of co-ordinates, at least some actors may also find= increased opportunities to influence the course of history. =20 Nevertheless, the post-bipolar international system does not resemble a bl= ack box. Some of its salient features will probably be the following:

(a) A revival of the bipolar confrontation under American and Russian co-le= adership can be ruled out. In the optimistic scenario, post-Communist Russi= a will continue to be a generally cooperative global actor. But even if its= relations with the West should turn sour again or, in the most extreme cas= e, relapse into hostility, the loss of its Eastern European glacis conquere= d after World war II, debilitating economic and technological weaknesses an= d the ensuing unattractiveness as an alternative model to the Western econo= mic and political system all render it highly unlikely that Russia could on= ce again form the Eastern part of a bipolar world.=20 As mentioned earlier, in the West, too, the hegemony of a single state has= passed. Even in the Cold War era, the rise of Western Europe and Japan as = economic rivals increasingly undermined American hegemony. Russia cannot be= expected to again pose a threat of a magnitude that would reinstall Americ= an tutelage over its Western allies, and having relished their new freedom = of maneuver, Japan and West European nations are unlikely to relinquish it.= =20

(b) In the post-bipolar world, the importance of armed forces as a currency= of power and measure of international status will diminish. This trend, al= ready observable during the Cold War, will intensify in the wake of its dem= ise. It is far from being a universal phenomenon, as the many ongoing wars = and war-prone conflicts demonstrate; yet the status of great powers and the= ir bilateral relations will be much less dependent on their military might.

(c) At the same time, the end of the superpower rivalry has been accompanie= d by two contradictory tendencies: on the one hand, American-Soviet coopera= tion has made possible the moderation and settlement of regional conflicts;= on the other hand, wars have erupted in Europe and elsewhere that Moscow a= nd Washington would not have tolerated during the Cold War, because either = they would have endangered intra-bloc Soviet dominance or carried an unacce= ptable risk of a superpower clash of arms. Whether one of these tendencies will prevail, and if so, which of them, re= mains unclear. What can be expected is that the resort to force as a means = of fostering interests and ambitions will not disappear, and that the proli= feration of modern weapons and technology could render obsolete the notion = of "regional" conflicts. Still, another armed competition of the intensity = and global reach of the East-West antagonism appears unlikely. Thus, the mi= litary security of the Western nations has improved considerably.

(d) The diminished importance of its military might notwithstanding, the Un= ited States will continue to be the single most influential actor in the in= ternational arena. It alone has the requisite power, the political will to = bring it to bear and the attractiveness of a political, economic and cultur= al role model.=20 Yet America's future role in global affairs will be similar to Germany's r= ole in the European Community today: strong enough to occupy a veto positio= n, but not strong enough to be in command.=05 The European Community or par= ts of it such as the Franco-German axis, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Rus= sia and China can and will demand to be treated as equals in their dealings= with Washington.

(e) This realignment of power could intensify intra-Western conflicts, as W= ashington must grow accustomed to a greater self-assertiveness on the part = of its former European and Japanese junior partners, while the latter must = learn to make prudent use of their newly gained room for maneuver. This danger is further enhanced by a second dimension of the diffusion of = power in the post-bipolar world. While great power status will be distribut= ed more equally among nation-states, their absolute power has decreased due= to the increasing importance of transnational actors. These command econom= ic and financial resources that governments are unable or unwilling to cont= rol, although the workers and consumers they represent are crucially affect= ed by the way they are being used. Trade liberalization, the deregulation o= f financial markets and the communications revolution have greatly facilita= ted the ability to relocate these resources. As a consequence, attracting t= ransnational investments has become harder, which in turn increases the pot= ential for conflict among states or groups of states.

(f) Simultaneously, and partly as a result of this diffusion of power, the = necessity of international cooperation has grown in parallel with increased= interdependence. If a ruinous economic competition is to be avoided, state= s must agree on a minimum set of regulations that govern international trad= e and financial transactions. Weapons proliferation, environmental degradat= ion, migration and organized crime are transnational problems and risks tha= t cannot be dealt with alone. And in an age of television and instant commu= nication, the plight of the poor and the innocent victims of violence canno= t be ignored anymore.

(g) Greater objective and subjective interdependence, together with the end= of the Cold-War paralysis of the United Nations, have produced a situation= in which the sacrosanctity of basic principles of international law such a= s the territorial integrity of states and non-intervention in their interna= l affairs have come into question. This raises such serious problems as the= development of internationally agreed criteria for legitimate intervention= and their consistent application. Yet in an interdependent world, states h= ave to accept constraints on their sovereignty as the price for their commo= n survival and well-being.=20

(h) Indeed, the argument can even be carried a step further. By concentrati= ng minds and efforts on the military dimension of security policy, which co= ntinues to be a domain of state policy, the Cold War tended to divert atten= tion from the erosion of state sovereignty resulting from transnational cha= llenges and the emergence of powerful transnational actors. In the future, = regaining and preserving state sovereignty so as to maintain legitimate pol= itical control will require ever closer cooperation between states. Thus, w= hile pooling sovereignty may require states to accept constraints on their = freedom of action, it may also be the only means to regain sovereignty that= individually they have lost.

3. Novel Features of Germany's International Position

Germany has been a main beneficiary of the end of the Cold War. Most obvio= usly, the lifting of the Iron Curtain terminated a four-decade long divisio= n, symbolized and brutally reinforced for nearly thirty years by the Berlin= Wall and the "death strip" running along the inner-German border. In addition, unification was achieved in a peaceful manner. The "2+4 Accor= d" of September 12, 1990, has not been called such, but it amounts to a pea= ce treaty among Germany and the four major powers of the anti-Hitler coalit= ion. It ended the occupation regime and restored full sovereignty to the tw= o German signatory states that were soon to be unified. Germany was allowed= to stay within NATO and remain host to troops from NATO countries, while S= oviet troops would be withdrawn completely. United Germany concluded treati= es of cooperation and partnership with all of the East European member stat= es of the former Warsaw Pact, the treaty with Poland being especially impor= tant because it was preceded by the German-Polish treaty of November 1990 t= hat reconfirmed the Oder-Neisse-line as their inviolable common border. As a consequence, Germany's security has greatly improved. Germany no long= er has to fear that it will become the central battleground in an East-West= war and it is no longer host to the highest concentration of opposing mili= tary forces in the world; instead, the Federal Republic remains a member of= NATO and is now surrounded solely by friends and partners. Even though Germany is no longer a frontline state, for historical and geo= graphic reasons, it continues to be a particularly vulnerable country. As a= wealthy state located in the center of Europe, it would inevitably be affe= cted by the failure of reformist forces in neighboring post-Communist count= ries, which could bring mass migration, ecological degradation and politica= l turmoil. And as the country responsible for the eastward expansion of Sov= iet communism in World War II, Germany has a special obligation to support = post-Communist reform processes. In spite of this new vulnerability and responsibility, the end of the East= -West antagonism has enlarged Germany's maneuvering room in the internation= al arena. Its sovereignty is not limited anymore by the residual occupation= rights of the four victorious allied powers of World War II; its dependenc= e on military protection provided by others has been drastically reduced. G= ermany's status as a leading "civilian power," whose strength rests on econ= omic prowess and cooperative diplomacy, is enhanced by the devaluation of m= ilitary power in the post-bipolar world. This status could increase even mo= re if Germany succeeds in transforming its former Communist part into a vib= rant economy. These factors explain why Germany's international influence has grown in a= n objective sense,=05 a fact that is reflected in the subjective dimension = of international politics, i.e., how others perceive their German neighbor = and partner. When the Berlin Wall fell and German unification became a real= istic option, foreign commentators saw a "new superpower" on the rise=05 or= a "colossus" being formed in Europe.=05 Such exaggerations soon gave way t= o less nervous and more realistic assessments, particularly when it became = clear that the united Germany would continue on its pro-EC integration cour= se, remain a member of NATO and be subject to the constraints of reconstruc= ting its eastern part. Still, from the outside it looks bigger and more pow= erful, a politico-psychological fact that does make it bigger and more powe= rful.

4. International Expectations

Thus, the two principal novel features of Germany's international position= are that its security and influence have grown. This has led to definition= s of united Germany's status as a "great power with transregional influence= ", a "restored European great power," a "maturing upper-middle power" or as= "the preponderant European power."=20 With such characterizations have come increased expectations that the unfe= ttered German Gulliver assume a major role in coping with post-Cold War cha= llenges in Europe and beyond. Yet some of these foreign expectations are ex= cessive and inconsistent:

- Given its pivotal role in Europe, others have a marked interest in a stab= le and prosperous Germany. Such a Germany, however, is a strong Germany, nu= rturing fears that it might become too strong and self-assertive.

- The wealthy Germans, burdened by historical guilt, are expected to bear t= he brunt of support for their needy East European neighbors. Indeed, tradit= ional ties predating World War II, former Communist East Germany's close co= mmercial relations with the regions, geography and economic potential - all= make Germany the "natural" partner for, and inner-Western advocate of post= -Communist reform countries.=05 Thus, until mid-1992, of all the official a= id (G-24 countries, excluding multilateral organizations such as the World = Bank and the IMF) to the former Soviet Union and post-Communist Central and= East European countries, Germany had provided about 55 percent and 22 perc= ent, respectively.=05 At the end of 1992, the German share of foreign direc= t investments in East-Central Europe was 28 percent, compared to 22 percent= for the U.S., 9 per cent for France and 4 percent for Great Britain and It= aly.=05 And with a share of 25 percent of their total foreign trade, German= y in 1991 was by far their most important trading partner.=05 In some East European quarters, however, German assistance and engagement = may raise ambivalent feelings. On the one hand, support is being solicited = given the desperate need for infusion of Western cash and technology; on th= e other, such support touches upon sensitive historical nerves resulting fr= om lingering memories of war, and it provokes fears of German dominance.=05= And while some in the West may be concerned that, in the long run, heavy G= erman engagement in the East could loosen its Western moorings and establis= h an East European "D-Mark zone", they still call upon Germany to play a le= ading role in stabilizing the region, while demonstrating an insufficient i= nterest in this task themselves.

=09 - The French debate preceding the referendum in September 1992 about the Ma= astricht treaty highlighted an ambivalence that is not limited to France, b= ut also partly explains the Danish rejection of the treaty in June 1992. Wh= ile some Maastricht proponents argued that deepening the EC integration wou= ld constrain German power and keep it firmly anchored to the West, some tre= aty opponents argued the opposite, i.e., that EC integration =85 la Maastri= cht would create a German Europe rather than a European Germany.

These attitudes and expectations suggest two conclusions. First, against t= he background of history, and because German power and maneuvering room is = seen to have increased markedly in the wake of the end of the Cold War and = German unification, inner-German developments and Germany's foreign policy = are watched closely, and sometimes suspiciously. Second, foreign expectatio= ns can be contradictory and excessive. Consequently, it will be difficult a= nd sometimes impossible for Germany to reconcile or fulfill them. While thi= s is not a uniquely German problem, it nevertheless poses a special challen= ge to a united Germany that from the outside may appear bigger and more pow= erful than Germans perceive it to be. III. The Domestic Setting

A country's domestic situation has a dual relevance to its foreign pol= icy. First, just as any other area of government policy, it depends on two = kinds of inputs: material resources and policymakers' attention. In general= , the two are interrelated: policymakers spend time and energy on foreign p= olicy issues to the extent that they think they affect their countries' int= erests, and the more this is so, the more resources they are normally willi= ng and able to devote to dealing with them. Yet the link can be quite weak.= Even when policymakers correctly perceive the importance of foreign develo= pments for their country, overriding domestic needs or lack of a popular ma= ndate can severely constrain their international room for maneuver.=05 A second way in which domestic politics influence foreign policy has to do= with foreign perceptions. The image others hold of a particular country is= significantly shaped by developments within its borders. These perceptions= are, in turn, part of the international environment in which that country = establishes and pursues its foreign policy objectives. In this dual sense, the following domestic factors constitute important de= terminants of Germany's international role and its foreign policy. First and foremost is the challenge posed by unification. Germany has been= unified politically, but the material and mental division between its west= ern and eastern parts still needs to be overcome. This will take much longe= r, and demand considerably more resources than foreseen by optimists such a= s Chancellor Kohl, who in his 1990 election campaign predicted "blooming la= ndscapes" in east Germany within 3-5 years.=20 A few figures illustrate the magnitude of the task. In 1991, total demand = in east Germany was almost double the gross domestic product (GDP), and the= relationship has not changed much since then. The differences have been ma= de up by transfers from west Germany which amounted to between 5 and 6 perc= ent of west German GDP.=05 The real unemployment level in east Germany (tak= ing into account retraining and job creation schemes as well as involuntari= ly part-time positions) is at least 35 percent, even though growth was 7 pe= rcent in 1992 and is expected to be about the same in 1993.=05 This growth = has mainly been a result of a construction boom, large-scale infrastructure= improvements as well as the expansion of services and small businesses. Th= e critical challenge is to remove the east German economy's dependence on g= overnment funding and to create self-sustained recovery. This will only be = achievable if the massive de-industrialization of east Germany can be halte= d and a competitive industrial sector established.=05 The task is made more difficult by its politico-psychological dimension. W= est and East Germans certainly feel themselves to be one people, and most e= ast Germans have seen their living standards rise since 1990.=05 Yet they a= re well aware that this is to a large extent a "borrowed" prosperity based = on massive West-East transfers they neither can rely on nor want to rely on= forever. There thus exists the danger of growing mutual recriminations fue= lled by East Germans feeling dependent on their "arrogant and rich big brot= her" and by West Germans accusing their eastern compatriots of being ungrat= eful.=05 Conflicts over the inner-German redistribution of wealth were to be expect= ed given the disparity in East-West productivity and living standards, the = shattered hopes of a rapid recovery in East Germany and the lingering reces= sion in the West. Indeed, when asked about their dominant attitude, most Ge= rmans in the West and in the East now respond that their concern about the = problems associated with unification outweighs their happiness about it.=05= Again, the problem is compounded by German history. Hyper-nationalism was = the driving force of German aggression in World War I and World War II. The= backlash came after 1945 when, reinforced by the Western allies and the di= vision of their country, West Germans gradually developed a kind of post-na= tional identity in the form of a "European" Germany. While this is an addit= ional barrier to the recurrence of nationalistic excesses, it also makes it= harder to accept the reconstruction of east Germany as a challenge requiri= ng and deserving a demonstration of patriotism and national solidarity. Part of the post-national "syndrome" is an inclination to downplay Germany= 's international importance. In 1990, 75 percent of Germans polled preferre= d that their country keep out of international conflicts and 69 percent ref= erred to Switzerland or Sweden as a role model.=05 Two years later, results= of a survey conducted in late 1992 showed a growing willingness to assume = a more active international role (62 percent in favor).=05 Yet the "culture= of reticence" still exists when it comes to German military involvement in= out-of-(NATO)-treaty operations.=05 A strong majority favors participation= in U.N. peacekeeping missions; support for participation in U.N. combat op= erations ("peace enforcement") stagnates around the 50-percent mark, while = more than 40 percent are against it. Initially, unification was a boon to the (West) German economy. After mone= tary union had been introduced on July 1, 1990, East Germans went on a shop= ping spree, fuelled by the overnight conversion of their former money into = D-Marks at favorable exchange rates. Thus, monetary union in effect amounte= d to a giant government spending program propelling German economic growth. The global economic recession, however, soon caught up with the German "ex= port machine". Just behind the U.S., Germany is the world's second biggest = exporter.=05 Every third job is export-related.=05 As measured by the per-c= apita value of exports and their percentage of gross domestic product, Germ= any has by far the most export-dependent economy of the major industrialize= d nations (G-7). Furthermore, about 85 percent of German exports go to OECD= countries.=05=20 Therefore, sluggish global growth was bound to negatively affect the Germa= n export economy. Yet the current recession and economic forecasts predicti= ng only moderate growth in 1994 are probably generated by more than a cycli= cal downswing.=05 Diagnoses of the causes differ, but there exists widespre= ad agreement in political and expert circles that Germany accumulated struc= tural deficiencies in the 1980s that are now taking their toll. German expo= rt performance still attests to the strength of its economy and its high le= vel of productivity; yet Germany appears to have lost its competitive edge = in some areas and has failed to catch up in others, particularly in high-te= chnology and its innovative transformation into new products and methods of= production.=05 To this triple economic challenge (reconstructing East Germany, regaining = sufficient growth and retaining competitiveness) must be added two challeng= es that are not uniquely German. The first is ecologically sustainable deve= lopment. The Western mode of production and consumption rests on the shaky = foundation of a "prosperity lie," because its present and long-term costs o= f excessive levels of energy and resource consumption are not adequately ac= counted for.=05 According to a report issued by an all-party commission of = the German parliament, a worldwide application of the Western model would e= ntail potentially disastrous climate changes.=05 Yet a small minority canno= t expect the majority to tolerate this imbalance forever; for this reason a= nd because ecological degradation affects the wealthy West directly at home= through, for example, water, soil and air pollution, the rich industrializ= ed nations must develop an ecologically sustainable economy. The other challenge is coping with "jobless growth": "even when output inc= reases, increase in employment lags way behind."=05 It is a particularly di= sturbing phenomenon in developing countries where high population growth co= mbines with mass poverty. Yet in the rich industrialized world with slow or= no population growth, unemployment also has become chronic. The number of = unemployed in OECD countries went down from 31.1 million in 1983 to 24.4 mi= llion in 1990; thereafter it rapidly increased and is estimated to reach 35= .7 million in 1994.=05 Thus, the decrease during the economic upturn in the= second half of the 1980s was insufficient to prevent levels of unemploymen= t to exceed those registered in the previous recession of the early eightie= s. Opinion polls reflect the political saliency of the issue. Most Germans ra= te unemployment highest on their list of concerns. Next are immigrants and = asylum seekers, inflation and economic growth, right-wing extremism and uni= fication problems among West Germans. Their eastern countrymen express simi= lar priorities except that crime is of much greater concern to them and acc= ordingly receives the second-highest rating.=20 This array of domestic challenges is made even formidable by popular frust= ration with the political system. There exists a widespread feeling that wh= ile the problems are accumulating, the political parties' ability to cope w= ith them is diminishing. Indications are low approval ratings for the Bonn = government, the inability of the major opposition party to convert this dis= enchantment into growing support for the Social Democratic party, the rise = of right-wing and center protest parties and the high number of people expr= essing an intention to refrain from voting for any party. Germany's domestic ailments are serious and unlikely to be remedied soon. = Yet they must be put into proper perspective. Germany is still a wealthy an= d productive country, and while structural deficiencies may hamper its comp= etitiveness, a national consensus is forming to correct them.=05 Reconstruc= ting east Germany is an immensely complicated and very costly task, but it = also offers an opportunity to revitalize the German economy as a whole. The= re are silver linings on the economic horizon, and the German "trading stat= e" can expect to greatly benefit once the world economy starts to expand ag= ain. Diminished popular confidence in the political establishment must be t= aken as seriously as its manifestations of xenophobia and right-wing extrem= ism; German society is not in disarray, however, and its democratic system = has shown remarkable resilience in a domestic and international environment= of fast and fundamental change. Thus, this section's focus on economic, political and socio-psychological = problems should not be misconstrued as a representative picture of Germany'= s domestic situation. The purpose of this focus is twofold: First, to stres= s that at the end of the bipolar era, perhaps even more so than in other We= stern countries, German policymakers are faced with formidable domestic cha= llenges, with the material and mental completion of unification standing ou= t as the most important one. Second, coping with these challenges will abso= rb resources and energies that will both severely constrain Germany's inter= national room for maneuver and shape its foreign policy agenda.

IV. Germany's Interests and Responsibility

The West has won the Cold War, but victory came at a price. First, there w= ere the economic opportunity costs of the East-West arms competition, parti= cularly so in the case of the United States which may have lost some of its= competitive edge as a result. Second, the triumph of the Western economic,= social and political system highlights its deficiencies because communism = as the inefficient and oppressive rival has disappeared. Third, the loss of= the common opponent strains Western unity and thus increases the potential= for inner-Western conflicts. Moreover, initial hopes for a much more benign world soon had to be abando= ned. As it turned out, in many places and in many ways, the post-Cold War w= orld is bloody, disorderly and laden with new or newly perceived conflicts = and threats. As argued above, this offers no reason for Cold-War nostalgia.= Yet it cannot be denied that bipolarity, once a formal and informal modus = vivendi between East and West had been established, showed a remarkable sta= bility. A similarly dominant and enduring parameter has not appeared and is= , as also noted earlier, unlikely to do so. In such unchartered waters as the post-Cold War world, state actors find i= t difficult to steer a safe and steady course. In the case of united German= y, the problem is aggravated by two interdependent processes. During the Co= ld-War period, Germany's past, its limited sovereignty, its frontline milit= ary position and its division made the country vulnerable and prevented it-= -or, as some saw it, relieved it--from fully bringing to bear its weight in= the international arena. For better or worse, those days are over. Germany= cannot and should not attempt to escape its past; the restrictions connect= ed to the Cold War, however, have ceased to exist. Germans have to learn to= accept this and the ensuing responsibility to make prudent use of their en= larged scope of action, while their foreign partners have to learn to adjus= t to a more assertive Germany that will be unable to meet excessive and dis= cordant international expectations.

If one looks for a compass that will guide German foreign policy, it is, o= f course, national interests. At the most abstract level, they can be summa= rized as peace, prosperity and freedom in a congenial international environ= ment.=20 For a meaningful discussion of German interests, these general and timeles= s values must be translated into specific objectives that have to be pursue= d in a concrete international context. In principle, such an analysis can b= e conducted in two different ways. In a predictive analysis, an attempt is = made to determine how present and future governments are likely to define t= heir nation's best interests. In a prescriptive analysis, it is the analyst= who defines what policy he or she considers to be in the nation's best int= erest. Both types of analyses frequently overlap, not the least because of an inc= lination to give added weight to an analysis by portraying one's desired co= urse as the most likely one. In what follows both the predictive and the pr= escriptive approach will be used, while an effort will be made explicitly t= o differentiate between the two.

What, then, are Germany's interests? In discussing them, it is useful to d= istinguish between two layers. One is the Western and European layer, the o= ther the global layer. For the geographic, economic and political reasons e= laborated earlier, the first layer should and will absorb most resources an= d political attention. Germany's importance in the international arena has = grown and global as well as transnational issues are of increasing importan= ce to Germany. The implications of these developments have not been fully u= nderstood and accepted in parts of the German populace and political elite.= This is regrettable, but it is unlikely to change substantially in the for= eseeable future.

1. The Western and European layer

Geographically, this layer encompasses the highly industrialized countries= (the "Western" or OECD nations, including primarily North America, Japan a= nd the EC) and the post-Communist European countries. With regard to these = two groups, Germany has four overriding interests, in a predictive as well = as prescriptive sense:

A. Allaying concerns about unification=20 Germany's unity was restored in agreement with its four major wartime oppo= nents. Yet only the Bush administration wholeheartedly supported it from th= e outset. In Paris and London, as in other West and East European quarters,= the sudden prospect of imminent German unification initially caused consid= erable irritations and even reservations.=05 Occasionally, fears of German = arrogance and potential dominance flare up again.=05 Dispelling such concer= ns by demonstrating the compatibility of German unity with the interests of= other nations thus continues to be a foremost objective of German foreign = policy.

B. Maintaining the Western "zone of peace" This objective directly leads to a second overriding national interest. As= argued earlier, Germany is a member of a Western peace community within wh= ich conflicts are settled without the use or threat of force, a constellati= on that greatly facilitated German unification. Its collapse could entail a= nti-German alliances and thus threaten German security. Yet German interest= in the preservation of the Western "zone of peace" is not merely motivated= by this worst and unlikely case. As the postwar development has shown, a c= ongenial environment is the best means of safeguarding and fostering extern= al security, internal stability and prosperity. In this regard, the single = market strengthens the European basis of German competitiveness by enabling= companies to make greater use of economies of scale in production.=05

C. Expanding the "zone of peace" This postwar experience as well as specific factors noted earlier (i.e., G= ermany's exposed location, the legacy of history and economic opportunities= ) induce it to be strongly interested in an eastward enlargement of the Wes= tern peace community. For these reasons, Germany has been a firm advocate o= f Western assistance to post-Communist countries.

D. Maintaining economic competitiveness To a greater extent than in many other countries of comparable size, Germa= n international status rests on its economic performance. Germany has an ex= port-oriented economy, and it is internationally respected largely for its = D-Mark and its economic efficiency. For internal reasons as well (in partic= ular, coping with the challenges of unemployment and rebuilding east German= y), securing prosperity is a prime national interest that requires maintain= ing and improving German competitiveness and attractiveness as a location f= or transnational investments.

These four overriding interests translate into three specific objectives in= the Western-European realm. The ruling conservative-liberal coalition and = the opposition Social Democratic party, as well as political forces within = each camp, may put different emphasis on each one of these objectives or as= pects of them; however, their overall importance is not in dispute. Nor sho= uld it be, as these objectives are derived from Germany's vital national in= terests.

a. Promoting EC integration From a German point of view, the EC constitutes the core of the Western pe= ace community. And within the EC, the Franco-German tandem has been the cen= tral axis. Hence Germany's interest in maintaining the Western "zone of pea= ce" applies a fortiori in the case of the EC in general, and the Franco-Ger= man partnership in particular.=20 Germany can thus be counted upon to continue to support EC integration. It= has become increasingly unclear, however, where this process can and shoul= d lead. This is so despite, or even because of the Maastricht treaty of Dec= ember 1991 and its plan for both an Economic and Monetary Union, as well as= a Political Union. The debate prior to Maastricht and, even more so, the p= ost-Maastricht developments have revealed a gap between popular attitudes a= nd elite ambitions, as evidenced by the French and Danish referenda and, fo= r example, the German public's unwillingness to exchange the D-Mark for a E= uropean currency.=05=20 Unless this gap can be closed, EC integration will stagnate and the Maastr= icht objectives will turn into a chimera. It is already unlikely that the M= aastricht timetable (Monetary Union no later than 1999) can be kept. Indeed= , what is instead essential is that the EC peace community be kept intact. = In democracies, this cannot be achieved without broad and consistent popula= r support. If governments cannot present persuasive rationales for ambitiou= s integration schemes, they must be scaled down so as not to sacrifice the = possible on the altar of the impossible.

b. Stabilizing post-Communist Europe This objective has a dual quality. First, it is a means to the end of enla= rging the Western peace community. Second, it is an end in itself, since an= y such enlargement can only be conceived of as a gradual and long-lasting p= rocess. Therefore, the near-term goal is to help stabilize the reform count= ries as the prerequisite for initiating and sustaining this process. As mentioned earlier, Germany has been the main provider of Western assist= ance to ex-Communist countries, including financial aid and the transfer of= managerial and technical know-how. Such assistance can only be in terms of= providing help so that these countries can help themselves. Moreover, in t= his regard the most effective support is a liberal EC trade policy. Some po= st-Communist countries could substantially increase their exports to EC mem= ber states,=05 but the EC continues to maintain significant trade restricti= ons in key areas such as coal, steel, textiles and farm products.=20 Yet economic assistance alone is insufficient. The post-Communist reform c= ountries are going through a painful dual transition from planned to market= economies and from dictatorship to democracy. These processes are interdep= endent as prosperity cannot be secured without political stability and vice= versa. Thus, support for establishing the building blocks of democracy (e.= g., party organizations, efficient bureaucracies, independent judiciary, fr= ee media) is also important. There is no stability without security. The outbreak of violence as well a= s severe intra- and inter-state tensions thus pose a direct threat to post-= Communist reform processes. To alleviate the problem, in principle, Western= countries have two options: they can encourage regional security regimes w= ithout their participation or promote regimes with direct Western involveme= nt, albeit to varying degrees.=20 While the pursuit of the first option should not be rejected rashly as esc= apism, autonomous regimes in Eastern Europe do not currently correspond wit= h the interests of most states in the region. Germany has been a champion o= f the second option inasmuch as it means strengthening the capability of th= e CSCE to prevent and manage intra- and inter-state crises.=20 Despite some progress in this direction, the CSCE has not been upgraded in= to an effective security organization. In terms of military security, NATO = remains the only organization trusted by its members to provide them mutual= protection. This explains why many post-Communist reform countries are eag= er to join it.=20 Their representatives and Western voices, such as that of German Defense M= inister R=FChe, are convinced that an eastward expansion of NATO would enha= nce political and military stability in all of Europe.=05 Indeed, in a mann= er similar to the EC, NATO would not fulfill its post-Cold War function as = an instrument of pan-European security if the accession of new members were= ruled out categorically. From a European perspective, however, an opening = of NATO poses more problems than a widening of the EC. The gravest problem = is Russia. It does not aspire to EC membership and is unlikely to interpret= an eastward enlargement of the EC as directed against it. Moscow may not w= ant to join NATO either; there exists, however, a real possibility that it = would interpret an eastward expansion of NATO as an unfriendly or even host= ile move if it occurred without Russian consent.=05=20 The desire of eastern reformers to join NATO would be much weaker if such = a Russian endorsement could be obtained. Yet German Foreign Minister Kinkel= is right that "it would be tragic if, in reassuring some countries, we ala= rmed others."=05 This does not mean giving Moscow a droit de regard concern= ing NATO membership. If, however, an eastward extension of NATO is designed= to enhance stability in all of Europe, care must be taken that it does not= antagonize Moscow. =20

c. Preserving transatlantic cohesion The disappearance of the common Soviet threat, a more integrated EC Europe= and the interrelated demise of American hegemony are straining transatlant= ic unity. Yet European-American ties based on common values and shared inte= rests remain strong, and post-Cold War challenges continue to demand transa= tlantic cooperation. Both sides stand to lose from a "war" between trading blocs, both benefit = from fair economic competition. As rich industrialized countries, they bear= a common responsibility for global and ecologically sustainable developmen= t and a special responsibility for assisting their former Cold-War opponent= s. The proliferation of modern weapons and technology affects them both, an= d if the United Nations is to assume a more effective role in promoting pea= ce and development, it will not be possible without their coordinated contr= ibutions. Thus, priorities of transatlantic cooperation will shift and they will hav= e to be extended to include new areas. Furthermore, transatlantic relations= will have to be re-shaped as a partnership of equals. Germany has an added= interest in a continued, albeit modernized partnership. To the extent that= there are lingering concerns about Germany's increased international statu= s, American engagement in European affairs can help to dispel them.

2. The Global Layer

German policymakers are aware that their country's interests and responsib= ilities go beyond Europe and the "Western" part of the world. Nevertheless = global and transnational issues are unlikely to receive the resources and p= olitical attention they deserve. German history, the country's postwar vuln= erability and American tutelage left the country with a political horizon t= hat hardly transcended Europe and transatlanticism--except for economic iss= ues. It is thus no surprise that Germany's political class does not have an= internationalist outlook commensurate with Germany's international weight. Popular attitudes and public opinion are another constraint. This is by no= means confined to Germany's international military role. Moreover, it is n= ot a uniquely German phenomenon since, for example, the wealthy North as a = whole restricts access to its markets for "Southern" products.=20 Finally, there is the special burden of rebuilding eastern Germany. As not= ed repeatedly, it severely taxes government resources and absorbs policymak= ers' energy and attention. This is not to suggest that German international engagement will be curtai= led. As explained below, German interests point in the opposite direction. = In this case, however, the prescriptive dimension of what follows is strong= er than the predictive one.

a. Narrowing the North-South gap=20 From a purely economic perspective, German interests in the "Third World" = are limited. As shown above, German exports as well as foreign direct inves= tment are heavily concentrated on industrialized countries.=05 As a resourc= e-poor country, Germany depends on raw material imports from the "Third Wor= ld." Its vulnerability is significant in the case of oil; with regard to no= n-fuel minerals, vulnerabilities exist, but they concern only a handful of = minerals, in which South Africa plays a key role, and the value of this tra= de is infinitely smaller than that of oil.=05 If economic interests are limited, other considerations play a more import= ant role. They can be grouped into two categories.=20 First there are concerns regarding security in both its narrow and broader= sense. Militarily, weapons proliferation is a disturbing phenomenon.=05 It= can intensify intra-"Third World" conflicts, and it appears to be only a m= atter of time before it will pose a direct threat to Germany and its allies= .=05 The two implications of this are interrelated: wars, catastrophes and = weapons proliferation in the "Third World" can lead to outside intervention= which is made more dangerous by the spread of weapons of mass destruction = and of modern conventional arms. In a broader sense, "Third World" developments affect German ecological, s= ocial and political security. Environmental degradation can exacerbate or e= ven induce conflicts within and between developing countries with potential= ly serious repercussions for the security interests of the developed world.= =05 It can also threaten the North's ecological security directly by, for e= xample, adverse effects on the global climate or the reduction of biodivers= ity as a result of deforestation.=05 Environmental stress is one of the major "push factors" of migration in ad= dition to economic deprivation, wars, population growth and oppression. Mos= t migrant flows originate and remain in the "Third World." Yet the "pull" o= f Northern prosperity and stability is heightened by the spread of global c= ommunications media. Thus, migration pressures grow, and although migration= can be economically and socially beneficial, uncontrolled South-North migr= ation movements could endanger social and political stability in the North.= Germany may not be affected immediately because, in contrast to the East-W= est dimension, its location in the center of Europe does not make it a fron= tline state; yet southern European states are, and their EC membership impl= ies that, one way or another, Germany also will be affected.=05 Finally, there are state-sponsored terrorism and the traffic in illegal dr= ugs. Drug trafficking is a symptom rather than a cause of social problems i= n the North since without demand it would quickly disappear; yet Southern d= rug barons have their own motives to ensure that the demand be satisfied, a= nd huge sums of drug money fuel worldwide criminal operations. Moral considerations make up the second category. It is easy to dismiss th= em as insignificant or even hypocritical. Indeed, for a long time, the rich= part of the world has lived comfortably in the face of glaring North-South= inequalities. And it has done so because one of the purposes of official d= evelopment aid is to ease the donor's bad conscience. Yet without moral qua= lms, there would be no bad conscience in the first place. And in an age of = television, nobody can claim ignorance of other peoples' plight, in particu= lar if - as the citizens of Western democracies do - they pride themselves = on being a champion of universal human rights. The North-South gap can be narrowed in many ways. First and foremost, deve= loping countries must create the internal prerequisites for sustainable dev= elopment, such as a more equitable distribution of productive assets (in pa= rticular land), reduced military expenditures, and broad investments in mas= s education and public health.=05 In terms of external incentives, the Nort= h can give financial and technical assistance, it can relieve the South's d= ebt burden and provide direct investments. Most importantly, it can lower p= rotective barriers and stop subsidizing agricultural exports.=05 For reasons discussed earlier, Germany is unlikely to provide the kind and= extent of support called for by its "objective" interest in the "Third Wor= ld." Political leadership may reduce this type of gap, but a popular mandat= e to close it will not be forthcoming.=20

b. Preserving the natural environment=20 Measured as a percentage of GDP, German expenditures for environmental pro= tection are the second-highest of the major industrialized countries (inclu= ding the U.S., Japan, France and Great Britain).=05 An OECD report evaluati= ng German environmental policy noted the "outstanding results" of Germany's= efforts to reconcile economic growth with ecological objectives.=05 In the= field of technologies for environmental protection patent as well as expor= t statistics show that Germany occupies a leading role.=05 First of all, these efforts reflect the urgency of the problem. As a rich,= heavily industrialized and densely populated country, Germany has been a m= ajor polluter, and the costs of environmental degradation could no longer b= e ignored. Second, they are a manifestation of the German public's ecologic= al consciousness, which has grown and may well be higher than in many other= Western countries. Both factors translate into a strong German interest in global environment= al protection and internationally coordinated measures to that effect. Thus= , in this case the gap between German interests and policy is smaller than = on North-South issues. Yet it still exists, because for the foreseeable fut= ure no government is likely to receive a popular mandate for drastic, ecolo= gically-oriented changes in production and consumption patterns.

c. Strengthening international security=20 The U.N. Secretary-General has correctly argued that democracy, peace and = development are interlocked: democratization supports the cause of peace, p= eace is prerequisite to development, and without development there can be n= o democracy.=05 Building peace is thus a primarily civilian task directed a= t creating and sustaining the political, social and economic foundations of= democracy and development. Yet it also has a security component in the narrow, military sense. Democr= atization and development require political stability which cannot be achie= ved if conflicts are carried out in a violent manner. As the Cold War and W= orld War II demonstrated, preventing or ending wars can require the threat = or use of force. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has assumed a new role i= n this regard. Quantitatively, peace-keeping has attained a new magnitude.= =05 Qualitatively, peace-keeping has been given new civilian and military t= asks such as the protection of the delivery of humanitarian supplies. "In S= omalia new ground has been broken by giving a U.N. operation the authority = to enforce, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the decisions of the Security= Council."=05 And the 1991 Gulf War was the first multilateral military ope= ration authorized by the Security Council since the Korean War. The quantitative and, even more so, the qualitative evolution of U.N. peac= ekeeping reflect both an unprecedented degree of cooperation within the Sec= urity Council and an increased readiness of the international community to = assume greater responsibility for peace and development.=05 By the end of 1= 992, however, the mood had changed, and the evolution of the Somalia missio= n strongly reinforced "a growing sense of frustration and uncertainty."=05 President Clinton's U.N. speech, in which he laid out stringent criteria f= or new U.N. peace missions, confirms an earlier judgement that "it will be = little short of magic if U.N. members turn their club into a potent interve= ntionist organization."=05 Sobering experiences call for rethinking, but no= t for retracting U.N. peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts because th= ey remain an essential instrument of maintaining and restoring internationa= l security. This as well as international expectations and an enlarged scope for actio= n confront the united Germany with the need to formulate its own policy on = German participation in international military operations. As noted above, = public support for such engagements is rather weak. Moreover, prospects for= a compromise between the conservative-liberal government and the Social De= mocratic opposition remain slim.=05 While a "Germans-to-the-front" attitude= would mean courting disaster in view of lingering concerns abroad about un= ited Germany's power and policy, Germany, as an important member of the Uni= ted Nations, the EC and NATO, cannot stay on the sidelines forever.

V. Conclusion

Just as many other states, the united Germany is still seeking its proper = place in the fluid environment of the post-bipolar world. Hampered by its d= ivision, frontline status and limits on its sovereignty, (West) Germany use= d to be called an economic giant and a political dwarf. Those sometimes irk= some, but also comfortable days are over. Germany cannot but play a greater= role in the international arena.=20 Thus, the question is not whether the united Germany has become more power= ful; instead, the question is for what purposes it will use that power. In = this regard, the most reliable compass is national interests. While they ar= e subject to political change, this paper has tried to identify those inter= ests that are most important, and which any German government will find dif= ficult to ignore.=20 Inevitably, there are tensions between some of these interests as well as = between domestic and international priorities. Assistance to post-Communist= reform countries limits the resources available for narrowing the North-So= uth gap. Opening Western markets for products from eastern Europe and devel= oping countries conflicts with demands of domestic groups for protection ag= ainst foreign competitors. Preserving Franco-German partnership prevents Ge= rmany from putting ist full weight behind efforts to reach a GATT agreement= that would improve transatlantic relations and stimulate the world economy= . There are inherent tensions as well. On the one hand, the objective of st= abilizing post-Communist democracies calls for their integration into NATO;= on the other, more could be lost than gained if Moscow saw an eastward exp= ansion of NATO as a hostile move. Such conflicts are normal and not confined to German foreign policy makin= g. Two additional factors complicating the problem are, however, unique to = the united Germany. One is the challenge of unification, which will dominat= e the German political agenda for years to come. Similar to the Japanese ca= se, the other is the combination of Germany's past with the reality of its = newly-gained power. As a consequence, "Germany, rightly or wrongly, is stil= l often seen through a different optic and measured by a different standard= than other countries."=05 German policymakers have to take into account th= is political fact, and to the extent that they do so, they can expect their= foreign partners to accept the united and democratic Germany as a "normal"= state.

=20 Bush address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, 1991, U.S. Poli= cy Information & Texts (USPIT), No. 128, September 25, 1991, p. 12. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has registered 30 maj= or wars in 1992 (S=FCddeutsche Zeitung, June 16, 1993, p. 2). The term has become fashionable in conservative as well as liberal circles= . See, e.g., Michael St=FCrmer, Globale Aufgaben und Herausforderungen eine= r "neuen Weltordnung", in Forum f=FCr Deutschland, Eine neue Weltordnung - = Vor welchen Herausforderungen stehen Deutschland und die Atlantische Allian= z? Eine Dokumentation der Tageszeitung Die Welt, Bonn 1993, p. 132, and Ger= t Krell et al. (eds), Friedensgutachten 1993 (M=FCnster: Lit 1993), p. iii. German Defense Minister R=FChe has rightly spoken of the "apparent stabili= ty of the old bipolar order". (Bulletin of the Press and Information Office= of the German Government, March 3, 1993, p. 145). Daniel Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (Geneva: United Nations In= stitute for Disarmament Research, 1992), p. 222. For the term "long peace" and an analysis of the elements of its stability= , see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, in International Security, Vol. 10= , No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142. "Multipolarists" are, for example, Butros Butros-Ghali, Vereinte Nationen:= Werkzeug f=FCr den Frieden, in Der Spiegel, August 16, 1993, p. 122; Paul = Kennedy, interview in International Herald Tribune, July 10, 1990, p. 5; He= nry Kissinger, Clinton and the World, in Newsweek, February 1, 1993, p. 12,= and Theodore C. Sorensen, Rethinking National Security, in Foreign Affairs= , Vol. 69, No. 3 (Summer 1990), p. 7. Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.= 1 (America and the World 1990/91), p. 24. Hanns W. Maull, Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers, in Foreign Aff= airs, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 91-106 (the quote is on p. 103). The quote is from The Economist, June 22, 1991, p. 16; the same argument i= s made by Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Consequences of the End of the Cold War = for International Stability, in The International Institute for Strategic S= tudies, New Dimensions in International Security, Adelphi Papers 265, Winte= r 1991/92, p. 16; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., What New World Order?, in Foreign Aff= airs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 88, and Gebhard Schweigler, The Unit= ed States and the New World Order, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenh= ausen, June 1991, p. 56. Increased U.S. dependence, for example, is shown b= y the fact that as a proportion of gross domestic product, America's export= s were 12 1/2% in 1991, double what they were 20 years ago (The Economist, = September 28, 1991, p. 15). In addition, U.S. administrations increasingly = feel the constraints imposed by the power of non-state actors. They recogni= ze that transnational problems such as ozone depletion and potential change= s in the global climate can only be solved through multilateral cooperation= . Japan and the member states of the European Community are no longer junio= r partners of the U.S. They are now able to bring to bear their full econom= ic potential since in the post-Soviet world they are less dependent on U.S.= military protection. =20 For two such views see John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instabilit= y in Europe After the Cold War, in International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (= Summer 1990), pp. 5-56, and Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why G= reat Powers Will Rise, in International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 19= 93), pp. 5-51. For a brief exposition of the term "peace community" see Eckhard L=FCbkeme= ier, Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe, in Armand Clesse and Lotha= r R=FChl, eds., Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a New Securit= y Structure in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990), pp. 187-190, and L=FCbkem= eier, Konzeptionelle =FCberlegungen zur milit=E4rischen und politischen Sta= bilit=E4t in Europa, in Erhard Forndran and Hartmut Pohlman, eds., Europ=E4= ische Sicherheit nach dem Ende des Warschauer Paktes (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1= 993), pp. 130-138. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?," in Foreign Affairs, Vo= l. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49 (the quote is on p. 29). Ibid., pp. 48-49 (the quote is on p. 49).

For a critique of Huntington's essay see the contributions in Forei= gn Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 2-26. For this characterization of Germany's role within the EC, see Egon Bahr, = Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Souver=E4nit=E4t und Anpassung, in Gert Kre= ll, Friedens=1Fgut=1Fachten 1993, p. 25. For an opposing view, see Hanns W. Maull, Grossmacht Deutschland? Anmerkun= gen und Thesen, in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull, eds., Die Zukunft der de= utschen Aus=1Fsen=1Fpolitik, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft = f=FCr Ausw=E4rtige Politik (Bonn: Europa Union, 1992), pp. 59-60. The New Superpower, Newsweek, February 26, 1990, pp. 8-13.

Steven Greenhouse, A Colossus Is Formed In Europe, The New York Tim= es, reprinted in International Herald Tribune, July 2, 1990, pp. 1 and 5. Karl Kaiser, Verantwortung =FCbernehmen, die Welt mitge=1Fstalten, in Fran= kfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 1, 1993, p. 12. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Aussenpolitik ohne Konzept, in Rheinischer Merkur, Oct= ober 1, 1993, p. 3. Harald M=FCller, German Foreign Policy after Unification, in Paul B. Stare= s, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 19= 92), p. 162. Gebhard Schweigler, Conclusion: Problems and Prospects for Partners in Lea= dership, in Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler, eds., From Occupation to = Cooperation: The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order= (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 249. Analysing the American security elite's attitudes toward the united German= y, Asmus reports a "split between those who fear that Germany will be too s= trong and those who fear it will be too weak." (Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in= the Eyes of the American Security Elite (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporatio= n, 1993), p. 19). One could add that, at different times, the same person c= an hold either one of these ambivalent views. As one Hungarian economist put it: "No alternative economic partner is ava= ilable for the region." (Andr s Inotai, Economic Implications of Germa= n Unification for Central and Eastern Europe, in Stares, ed., The New Germa= ny, p. 294). See Die Zeit, March 26, 1993, p. 36, and Berthold Busch and Hans-Peter Fr= =F6hlich, Westliche Unterst=FCtzung der Reformprozesse, in IW-Trends, Vol. = 20., No. 1 (1993), pp. 53-54. This is, of course, partly explained by speci= al German interests such as financing the speedy withdrawal of Soviet troop= s from eastern Germany and must also be seen as a sign of German gratitude = for allowing and supporting German unification. Neue Z=FCrcher Zeitung, October 3-4, 1993, p. 1. (East-Central Europe usua= lly encompasses Poland, Hungary as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia)= . Tom Redburn, Germany Fuels East's Industrial Rebirth, in International Her= ald Tribune, March 5, 1993, p. 1. On East European ambivalence toward Germany, see Helmut Hubel, Das vereint= e Deutschland aus internationaler Sicht, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen G= esellschaft f=FCr Ausw=E4rtige Politik (Bonn: Europa Union, 1993), pp. 71-7= 8, 94. "However, the behavior of other West European countries toward Eastern Eur= ope has been inconsistent. A pronounced fear that Germany may dominate Cent= ral and Eastern Europe has not been accompanied by increased West European = interest in Central and Eastern Europe." (Inotai, Economic Implications, in= Stares, ed., The New Germany, p. 295). See Helmut Hubel, Das vereinte Deutschland, pp. 57-64, and Anne-Maire Le G= loannec, The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe, in Star= es, ed., The New Germany, p. 266. A blatant case in point is the French GATT policy. Although France stands = to gain more from a GATT agreement than it might lose through the so-called= "Blair House agreement" (which would reduce the volume of subsidized farm = exports from the EC by 21 percent), it continues to hold a GATT agreement h= ostage to domestic policy considerations (see The Economist, September 11, = 1993, pp. 19-20). See Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichte, Vol. 44, No. 3 (March 1992), p. 1= 5; Achim D=FCbel and Ulrich Pfeiffer, Eine gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklun= gsstrategie f=FCr die Neuen Bundesl=E4nder (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,= 1993), p. 10, and Judy Dempsey, A painstaking restoration, in Financial Ti= mes, October 1993, p. 13. Dempsey, Financial Times. The immense social and psychological strains Eas= t Germans are exposed to as they attempt to adopt and adapt to a fundamenta= lly different economic, social and political system, are exemplified by the= extraordinary fall in birth rates: compared with the previous year, the nu= mber of births declined by almost 40 percent in 1992 (S=FCddeutsche Zeitung= , October 5, 1993, p. 6). See Deutsches Institut f=FCr Wirtschaftsforschung, Gesamtwirtschaftlichle = und unternehmerische Anpassungsfortschritte in Ostdeutschland, Wochenberich= t 41/93 (October 14, 1993), pp. 566, 568. From 1989 to 1992, the number of = industrial workers per 1.000 inhabitants declinded from 195 to 63, about ha= lf the West German level (D=FCbel and Pfeiffer, Eine gesamtwirtschaftliche = Entwicklungsstrategie, p. 7). In real terms, the average household income increased by 50 percent betwee= n July 1990 and September 1993 (Richard Hilmer and Rita M=FCller-Hilmer, Es= w=E4chst zusammen, in Die Zeit, October 1, 1993, p. 17). For opinion polls demonstrating an increasing East-West estrangement, see = Der Spiegel, January 18, 1993, pp. 52-62, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Wir= d sich jetzt fremd, was zusammengeh=F6rt?, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitun= g, May 19, 1993, p. 5. See Der Spiegel, January 18, 1993, p. 52, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitu= ng, September 16, 1993, p. 5. See Heinrich August Winkler, Abschied von einem deutschen Sonderweg - Wide= r die postnationale Nostalgie, in Die Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte, = Vol. 40, No. 7 (1993), pp. 633-636. S=FCddeutsche Zeitung, Magazin, January 4, 1991, pp. 8-9. Ronald D. Asmus, Germany's Geopolitical Maturation, Rand Issue Paper, Sant= a Monica, February 1993, p. 3. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

See S=FCddeutsche Zeitung, April 24-25, 1993, p. 12, and July 10-11, 1993,= p. 8. Opinion polls regularly reveal that East Germans are even more retic= ent in this regard than West Germans. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 29, 1993, p. 15. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, Chancen der Erneuerung in Politik, Wirtscha= ft und Gesellschaft, in Bulletin, February 24, 1993, p. 127. For pertinent figures, see Dieter Senghaas, Verflechtung und Integration, = in Kaiser and Maull, Die Zukunft der deutschen Aussenpolitik, pp. 38-39, an= d Klaus Kinkel, Verantwortung, Realismus, Zukunftssicherung, in Frankfurter= Allgemeine Zeitung, March 19, 1993, p. 8. Germany's GDP is projected to shrink in 1993 by 1.5 percent. Five of Germa= ny's six major economic research institutes predict a real growth of 1.5 pe= rcent in 1994, one is pessimistic and expects a further GDP reduction of 0.= 5 percent. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 25, 1993, p. 17, and S= =FCddeutsche Zeitung, October 25, 1993, p. 1). According to a McKinsey Global Institute's study on manufacturing producti= vity, German average productivity in certain key sectors is 79 percent and = Japan's 83 percent of the American average level. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Z= eitung, October 22, 1993, p. 13; see also ibid., June 8, 1993, p. 17; J=FCr= gen N=F6tzold, USA, Japan, Deutschland: Wirtschaftliches Leistungsverm=F6ge= n als Grundlage internationaler Stabilisierungsbeitr=E4ge, in Wolfgang Heyd= rich et al., eds., Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellationen, R= isiken, Instrumente (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 762-763; Der Spiegel, S= eptember 6, 1993, pp. 30-38). For the term "prosperity lie" and its explanation, see German Environmenta= l Minister Klaus T=F6pfer in Die Zeit, June 19, 1992, p. 25. See Enquete-Kommission "Schutz der Erdatmosph=E4re," Erster Bericht, Klima= =E4nderung gef=E4hrdet globale Entwicklung: Zukunft sichern - Jetzt handeln= , Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2400, March 31, 1992, pp. 17 and 98. For two attempts in this direction, see Lester R. Brown, Launching the Env= ironmental Revolution, in Brown et al., State of the World 1992 (New York a= nd London: Norton, 1992), pp. 174-190, and Christopher Flavin and John E. Y= oung, Shaping the Next Industrial Revolution, in Lester R. Brown et al., St= ate of the World 1993 (New York and London: Norton, 1993), pp. 180-199. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993 (New Y= ork and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 36; for worldwide exampl= es, see ibid., pp. 35-36. See S=FCddeutsche Zeitung, October 21, 1993, p. 25, and Newsweek, June 14,= 1993, pp. 10-12. For an account that this problem particularly affects EC = economies, see Der Spiegel, October 18, 1993, pp. 142-146. A particularly unsettling aspect has been the increase in chronic joblessn= ess, i.e., the number of those unemployed over 12 months. Long-term unemplo= yment as a proportion of total unemployment rose in ten out of 12 OECD coun= tries between 1979 and 1992 (The Economist, July 24, 1993, p. 95). See S=FCddeutsche Zeitung, October 16-17, 1993, p. 9.

For pertinent survey results, see Der Spiegel, March 1, 1993, pp. 24-29. I= n addition, see ibid., October 18, 1993, pp. 40-45. As The Economist put it: "The Germans have a habit of spurring themselves = into action just when it seems they might be falling into a self-satisfied = doze." (February 25, 1992, p. 26). For two long-term and astute observers of Germany who consider German demo= cracy to be stable, see Ralf Dahrendorf, interview in Die Zeit, August 27, = 1993, p. 3, and Alfred Grosser, Denk ich an Deutschland, in Frankfurter All= gemeine Zeitung, Magazin, No. 707 (September 17, 1993), p. 38. As she confirmed in her memoirs, then Prime Minister Margret Thatcher went= even further and opposed German unification, though she soon had to resign= herself to its inevitability. (See excerpts published in Der Spiegel, Octo= ber 11, 1993,pp. 162-169). Mitterand was less concerned than Thatcher, but = his meetings with Gorbachev in Kiev and with East German Prime Minister Mod= row in East Berlin in December 1989 (i.e., shortly after the fall of the Be= rlin Wall in November 1989) were widely interpreted as attempts to slow dow= n the pace of German unification. For examples see the section on "International Expectations". For this argument, see Norbert Walter, Patterns of Competition. Economic r= elationships: Germany, in Muller and Schweigler, From Occupation, p. 217. More than two-thirds of Germans consistently oppose a common EC currency. = (See S=FCddeutsche Zeitung, October 17-18, 1992, p. 10, and ibid., Septembe= r 25-26, 1993, p. 13). According to the latter source, only 17 percent of G= ermans believe that the EC offers them more advantages than disadvantages, = whereas 32 percent believe the oppossite to be true. Between 1989 and mid-1992 EC imports from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungar= y and Poland rose by 72.4, 62.0, 87.0 and 86.1 percent, respectively. (See = J=F6rg Beyfu=DF, Position der Reforml=E4nder in der internationalen Arbeits= teilung - Stand und Perspektiven, in IW-Trends, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1993), p. 3= 5). See Vaclav Havel (president of the Czech Republic), We Really Are Part of = the NATO Family, in International Herald Tribune, October 20, 1993, p. 4; f= or Volker R=FChe, see his speech "Gestaltung euro-atlantischer Politik - ei= ne 'Grand Strategy' f=FCr eine neue Zeit," delivered in London at the Inter= national Institute for Strategic Studies (Alastair Buchan Memorial 1993) on= March 26, 1993, in Bulletin, April 1, 1993, p. 232, and S=FCddeutsche Zeit= ung, May 22, 1993, p. 5. See President Yeltsin's letter to Western leaders in which he apparently w= arned them against an early eastward expansion of NATO. (Frankfurter Allgem= eine Zeitung, October 2, 1993, p. 1). Klaus Kinkel, NATO Requires a Bold but Balanced Response to the East, in I= nternational Herald Tribune, October 21, 1993, p. 9. For investments, see Die Zeit, October 1, 1993, p. 40. Germany is no excep= tion in this regard. In 1989 Western intra-trade (i.e., trade among Western= Europe, North America and Japan) amounted to nearly 78 percent of their to= tal trade. (See Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, ed., Globale Trends: Date= n zur Weltentwicklung 1991, Bonn/D=FCsseldorf 1991, p. 116). "And of global= flows of foreign investment, the developing countries have been getting a = steadily smaller share: from 31% in 1968 down to 17% in 1988-89." (United N= ations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1992 (New York and O= xford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 52). However, the share has begun= to rise again, reaching 25 percent in 1991. (See The Economist, A Survey o= f Multinationals, March 27, 1993, p. 25). See Hanns W. Maull, Energy and resources: the strategic dimensions, in Sur= vival, Vol. 31, No. 6 (November/December 1989), pp. 505-509; for the distin= ction between dependence and vulnerability, see ibid., p. 502. For an overview, see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, St= rategic Survey 1991-1992 (London: Brassey's, 1992),pp. 201-211. Indeed, the time has already arrived, as Iraqi Scud attacks in the Gulf Wa= r have shown. See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold: Environmental Change as Cause= s of Acute Conflict, in International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991),= pp. 76-116. See John C. Ryan, Conserving Biological Diversity, in Brown, State of the = World 1992, pp. 9-26. On the migration issue, see Peter J. Opitz, Migrations- und Fl=FCchtlingsb= ewegungen, in Dieter Nohlen and Franz Nuscheler, eds., Handbuch der Dritten= Welt, Band 1: Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien (Bonn: Dietz, 1992), pp.= 374-395, and United Nations Population Fund, The State of World Population= 1993, New York 1993. See UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, pp. 68-70.

According to World Bank estimates, protectionism of the industriali= zed countries cost the developing countries twice as much as the official d= evelopment assistance they received from them. (See German Minister Carl-Di= eter Spranger, Ordnungspolitische Weichenstellungen f=FCr eine freiheitlich= e Weltwirtschaftsordnung, in Bulletin, December 13, 1991, p. 1146). Only Austria's level of expenditure was higher. (See Deutsches Institut f= =FCr Wirtschaftsforschung, Umweltschutz und Standortqualit=E4t in der Bunde= srepublik Deutschland, Wochenbericht 16/93, April 22, 1993, p. 200). Bundesministerium f=FCr Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Umweltp= r=FCfbericht Deutschland: Bericht der OECD =FCber Umweltsituation und Umwel= tpolitik in Deutschland, Bonn, July 2, 1993, p. 6. See Deutsches Institut f=FCr Wirtschaftsforschung, Wochenbericht 16/93, pp= . 204-205. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, in Orbis, Vol.= 37, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 329. Between its founding year 1945 and the beginning of 1988, the U.N. carried= out 13 peacekeeping missions. In the following four years alone, 14 new mi= ssions were established. The personnel involved in all peacekeeping mission= s increased from 11,500 in January 1992 to more than 80,000 participants in= the Cambodia, ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia missions alone. (See Winrich K=FCh= ne, VN-Friedenssicehrung in einer turbulenten Welt, Stiftung Wissenschaft u= nd Politik, Ebenhausen 1993, p. 9). Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 327.

For a discussion of the implications of this development for key pr= inciples of international law such as state sovereignty and non-interventio= n in internal affairs, see The International Institute for Strategic Studie= s, Strategic Survey 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 24-31, and K= =FChne, VN-Friedenssicherung, pp. 16-33. Strategic Survey 1992-1993, p. 32; for additional skeptical accounts, see = The Economist, December 26, 1992-January 8, 1993, pp. 60-62, and Time, June= 28, 1993, pp. 26-28. The Economist, December 19, 1992, p. 11; for Clinton, see USPIT, No. 99, S= ptember 29, 1993, p. 6. For a discussion of the inner-German debate, see Oliver Thr=E4nert, Aspekt= e deutscher Sicherheitspolitik in den neunziger Jahren, Friedrich-Ebert-Sti= ftung, Bonn 1993, pp. 16-25. Asmus, Germany in the Eyes, p. 20; see also Maull, Grossmacht Deutschland?= , in Kaiser and Maull, Die Zukunft der deutschen Aussenpolitik, pp. 57-58.

=A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | te= chnical support | net edition=20 fes-library | M=E4rz 1998 =20

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