International Conference on Whither Turkey? : Dimensions of future Turkish = domestic and foreign policy ; Berlin, June 4.-7., 1998 ; a brief summary / reporters: Wolfgang Aoydl and Mensur Akg=FCn. - [Electronic ed.]. - [Ist= anbul, 1998]. - 11 Bl. =3D 27 Kb, Text Electronic ed.: Bonn: FES Library, 1999 =A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung

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=C2?= =?utf-8?Q?=A9=20Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung?= Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 13:11:05 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----MultipartBoundary--McE2Bfsa1MRJR9PsiI9t6RpFOJr9SfslplRiUOHbVb----" ------MultipartBoundary--McE2Bfsa1MRJR9PsiI9t6RpFOJr9SfslplRiUOHbVb---- Content-Type: text/html Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/bueros/istanbul/00532.htm International Conference on Whither Turkey? : Dimensions of future Turkish = domestic and foreign policy ; Berlin, June 4.-7., 1998 ; a brief summary / reporters: Wolfgang Aoydl and Mensur Akg=FCn. - [Electronic ed.]. - [Ist= anbul, 1998]. - 11 Bl. =3D 27 Kb, Text Electronic ed.: Bonn: FES Library, 1999 =A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung

FES

International Conference on Whither Turkey? : Dimensions of future Turkish = domestic and foreign policy ; Berlin, June 4.-7., 1998 ; a brief summary / reporters: Wolfgang Aoydl and Mensur Akg=FCn. - [Electronic ed.]. - [Ist= anbul, 1998]. - 11 Bl. =3D 27 Kb, Text
Electronic ed.: Bonn: FES Library, 1999

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

=3D"CONTENTS"

Introduction

Some participants at Aspen Institute's and Friedrich Ebert Foundatio= n's Berlin conference on Turko-Western relations may have read the meeting'= s motto with mixed feelings: "Whither Turkey? Dimensions of Future Turkish = Domestic and Foreign Policy". After all, ten years ago nobody would have a= sked whether Turkey was moving anywhere. Turkey was taken always there, it = was almost for granted - a staunch ally, securely anchored in the Western a= lliance, a European neighbor tightly tethered to a post just outside the Eu= ropean Union's front door.=20

But 75 years after its founding by Mustafa Kemal Atat=FCrk and ten y= ears after the end of the Cold War, new prospects have opened up for Turkey= , both at home and abroad. The country does, indeed, have the potential to = sometime exert influence over a vast swath of territory stretching from the= Adriatic to the Great Wall of China; countries, incidentally, which are ri= ch in resources of natural oil and gas.

On the domestic front, the struggle between Atat=FCrk's secular and = etatist ideology on the one side and political Islam on the other, has not = yet been decided. Turkish society has still to make up its mind which road= it will choose. Or as one Turkish participant put it: "We are living in in= teresting times."

It was the conference's aim to evaluate potential new dangers and op= portunities arising from these circumstances, while taking into account Tur= key's long-standing relationship with the West. Soon it became clear, howe= ver, that West in this case does not equal West. In particular, there were= differences of perception and opinion between the US and the European Unio= n regarding Turkey's future role.

= =

Turkey, the United States, and Europe

Strong criticism was directed by both American and Turkish participa= nts against the European Union=92s decision at the Luxembourg summit meetin= g in December 1997 when Ankara was excluded from a shortlist of potential c= andidates for EU membership. One retired American official charged that "th= e Europeans have no strategic sense and vision" of Turkey's potential influ= ence.

A US government official even called Europe's Luxembourg decision "= not a rejection, but something worse - indifference". In consequence, Turke= y had become an irritant in relations between America and Europe. The US, h= owever, needed Turkey, just as it needed "allies all over the world, we can= 't shoulder the burden alone, anymore."

Turkish speakers also lambasted the European Union's Luxembourg deci= sion. A senior Turkish official charged that Europe had even failed "to ful= fill its own obligations" and had consequentially "lost most of its credibi= lity in Turkish eyes". A Turkish businessman put it slightly differently: "= The European Union put a bullet in its own foot", he said. "The EU is now l= imping, with an erratic Turkey on its threshold, a loose cannon on deck, wi= th a lot of gunpowder in it."

America's "strictly strategic view" of Turkey was summarized by an A= merican academic. He pointed out that Washington saw the Turkish republic = as a long-time, close NATO ally, as a "democratic and secular state in a re= gion where they are rare" and as a major emerging market. It was also in th= e United States' interest to continue to have access to the airforce base a= t Incirlik and - possibly - other facilities on Turkish soil, if and when t= he need arose. Furthermore, America perceived Turkey as a factor with whos= e help it could wield influence in areas as disparate as the Balkans, Centr= al Asia and the Caspian basin. Lastly, Turkey's budding relationship with I= srael was viewed very positively by the US administration: "These new ties = are seen as an absolute good."

A rather more skeptical opinion of Turkey's ability to make its weig= ht felt in both the Caucasus and Central Asia was put forward by a Russian = participant. He first expressed his surprise that Russia did not figure at= all in official Turkish deliberations about her own geostrategical role. T= hen he went on to say that "Moscow needn't worry about Turkish influence in= Central Asia, because she hasn't got the clout to enforce and guarantee a = Pax Osmanica."=20

The American academic, however, acknowledged Europe=92s domestic dim= ension of the Turkish problem. With more than two million Turks living in G= ermany alone, every decision concerning Turkey would have an immediate impa= ct on the domestic scene. Additionally, a German politician pointed out, e= very EU member state's internal affairs sooner or later become European dom= estic policy. This, he said, helped to explain why Greece does have a built= -in advantage over Turkey.

He also drew attention so some basic misconceptions which have gover= ned relations between Turkey and the European Union over many years. "The = Customs Union between Turkey and the EU was seen in Turkey as a first step = to full membership; the Europeans however did not view it as a necessarily = binding element for eventual membership". Europe, as a matter of fact, had = always evaded the central question: Do they want Turkey inside their club o= r not.=20

His views were partially shared by a German academic. "We have decei= ved Turkey for years, we even withheld money which is due to her, and she s= till wants to be a member - isn't that a good sign?" That being said, there= was, however, the problem of relinquishing sovereignty to Brussels and con= sequentially the question, how, when, under which circumstances and conditi= ons and - indeed - if Turkey wanted to join the European Union, at all. A G= erman official stressed that both NATO and the then European Economic Commu= nity had always viewed Turkey as a European state. "But now, I am waiting f= or a clear indication from Turkey's, how and where she sees her own role an= d her geopolitical environment."

A Turkish official maintained that his country "is willing to be par= t of the Western system, but at the same time, has to safeguard its individ= ual rights". "There is a historical delay of 140 years", he said, "Turkey i= s still fighting for its nation-state process to be established." However, = another Turkish official=20

demanded that "Turkey does not want further delays for its membershi= p nor can she wait behind other candidates, most of which cannot compete wi= th Turkey". Another senior government representative from Ankara stressed t= hat the Custom Union agreement showed that Turkey is prepared to relinquish= "some" sovereign rights to European political institutions.

A German participant, however, reminded the conference, that Turkey = throughout its history always selectively chose what she wanted from the We= st. "For the first time ever, Turkey has to decide whether or not she reall= y, totally and wholly wants to be part of Europe. She has to face the unwho= lesome question, whether or not she will eat all of the cake, and not just = pick out the raisins." There had never been an open and serious discussion= about European membership in Turkey. "Unfortunately, the Europeans have al= ways facilitated the Turks in evading this discussion."

There remained, however, a rather bland and banal problem for the Eu= ropean Union to swallow, as a British speaker pointed out: "Turkey is simpl= y too big, it's a fact of life. She is more difficult to absorb for the Eur= opean Union than a small country like the Czech republic."

= =

The Cyprus Problem

A large part of the discussion was devoted to the Cyprus question, w= hich has bearings both on American strategic interests in the Eastern Medit= erranean cum Middle East and on the EU's enlargement process. It also becam= e apparent that Turkey's future relationship with Europe and the West is in= trinsically linked to developments on Cyprus. Or in the words of a German a= cademic: "The EU policy towards Turkey is in a mess also due to the EU's ap= proach towards the issue of Cyprus' accession. Turkey's EU policy is in a m= ess due to the self-inflicted 'all or nothing' approach towards the issue o= f EU membership."

He claimed that =84the March 1995 decision of the EU had become a ma= jor stumbling bloc in the way of a solution to the Cyprus problem". In his = opinion =84Ankara and Denktash had overestimated the deterrent effect of th= eir warning that they would start a process of closer integration of TRNC w= ith Turkey if the EU should start accession negotiations with Cyprus." And = the Turkish Government should realize that =84the Cyprus Factor did not off= er enough leverage to induce the EU to include Turkey in the split group of= those countries with which the Union had declared its readiness to open me= mbership negotiations."

The academic elaborated on a number of scenarios for Cyprus, none of= which turned out to be very positive. They ranged from armed conflict betw= een Greece and Turkey, in case Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles were ac= tually deployed on the island, to a permanent division of Cyprus with the C= ypriot republic joining the European Union and the Turkish occupied North b= eing left in a sort of Ankara-controlled limbo. In all cases, however, "Tur= key's entry into the EU would definitely become impossible".=20

The EU, the speaker maintained, had nobody to blame but themselves.= "The EU was mistaken in the assumption of being able to use the negotiatio= n perspective (of Cyprus with the European Union) as a catalytic element in= bringing about a solution of the Cyprus problem. Hence, today, EU-Turkey r= elations are at an all-time low and a solution to the Cyprus problem seems = to be farther away than ever. The security situation in the Eastern Mediter= ranean has considerably deteriorated and an outbreak of military violence b= etween Greece and Turkey cannot be foreclosed."

There was only one reassuringly positive picture the speaker painted= , but it depended on a great number of "ifs": If American intermediaries co= nvinced both Cypriot communities that their common future would be better o= ff if they agree to a formula for the solution of the Cyprus problem; if se= rious negotiation about a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation ensued, if limit= ed Greek-Cypriot repatriation became possible; if a balanced security regim= e with outside guarantors would lead to an entry of the whole island into t= he EU, and if - simultaneously Europe would accept Turkey as a candidate, w= hich in turn embarked upon a large-scale reform drive - only then could a n= egative outcome be averted. The speaker himself, however, conceded: "I fear= , that this is less of a scenario but more of wishful thinking."

The academic's views sparked off a very frank and lively exchange, i= n the course of which some markedly differing points of view from Turkish p= articipants were put forward. One of them, for instance, complained that th= ere has never been an open discussion about the substance of the Cyprus pro= blem in Turkey: "We are afraid of discussing it, because we think there are= people in Ankara who take these decisions. I know nothing about the proble= m, because nobody tells me what the alternatives are."

These opinions, however, were refuted by Turkish officials who stres= sed that the Cyprus question was the only question on which a national cons= ensus existed in Turkey. "There is no more room for flexibility" one Turkis= h participant claimed. He also pointed out that "you can't solve the Cyprus= question without Turkish cooperation. We warned you against wrong moves be= fore, we do it again. You will have to accept the consequences."

Another senior Turkish government representative even went as far as= to suggest that the whole problem of responding to S-300 missiles now rest= ed with the General Staff in Ankara and was not any longer dealt with the c= ivilian administration. He and yet another government representative also = pointed out that "all previous frameworks and parameters envisioned to solv= e the Cyprus problem have been eliminated" by the EU's decision to start me= mbership talks with the Greek-Cypriot government in Nicosia.

These remarks prompted an immediate response by a German politician = who reminded the participants of the link between the Cyprus problem and Tu= rkish aspirations to EU membership. "If it is true that there really is not= any more room for maneuver in Cyprus on the Turkish side, then we may very= well conclude all discussions about Turkey's EU membership right now", he = said. All countries except Turkey regarded the 1974 invasion as a contraven= tion to international law. "There is no way to simply gloss over this fact= ."

A Turkish official, on the other hand, reminded that it was not the = Turks but the EU did in fact gloss over the facts. He referred to the Commi= ssion=92s opinion prepared in 1976 on the Greek request for membership and = read the actual text which said =84the examination of the Greek application= for membership will not affect relations between the Community and Turkey = nor the Turkish rights under the Association Agreement".

The discussion, however, led an American scholar to a rather surpris= ing suggestion: "Why should one have a Cyprus solution, at all? Is it reall= y the end of the world, to have the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus wit= h Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus with Greece?"

= =

Turkey's Domestic Scene

A major precondition for Turkey playing a significant regional or ev= en geostrategic role is, however, her internal situation. Therefore, a grea= t deal of attention was focused on the Turkish domestic scene. There was an= understanding on the Turkish side, that the 90=92s were in fact the "most = dried up period in domestic Turkish policies, ever" - as one politician put= it. "No political party has any visions, not party emanates any motivation= ", he said.

A scholar from Istanbul took stock of the situation and noted a "col= lapse of centrist policy" in Turkey over the last years. This in turn led t= o a fragmentation of parties and electorate alike which eventually enabled = the Islamist Refah Party to gain a majority of votes at the last general el= ection in December 1995, he contended. Refah, however, refused to play by t= he rules, "forced the political boundaries and went overboard". As the secu= lar parties failed to pull Refah back from the brink, the military had to s= tep into the vacuum which had been created by the political party leaders.

The academic partly blamed the European Union for this development, = saying that the Luxembourg decision exacerbated the negative points. He con= sidered it a "very disturbing trend that the military has started to shape = its own foreign policy which is seen exclusively through security prisms". = The military, however, was neither prepared nor equipped for a hazardous tr= ip into foreign affairs, since what lurked out there was "full of traps and= a swamp". By deposing the Refah government, the military "may have overste= pped an invisible line". Generally, the scholar said, one couldn't fail bu= t notice a "process of de-democratization, a continuing process of =84intro= vertedness", of nationalism bordering on xenophobia, a prevalence of the mi= litary". "We are going the opposite way", the academic reiterated, "unlike= Bulgaria or even Iran."

Both German and American participants basically concurred with his v= iew. One German scholar stressed that Turkey was "a potential regional powe= r only, once she solves her internal problems, especially, since the impact= of civil society on the country has almost been like nil, so far". An Amer= ican ex-official agreed: "Turkey's major foreign policy problem is its dome= stic situation, i.e. the war in the South East".

An American academic also noted "internal contradictions", challengi= ng the state authorities to define their version of "secularism": "American= belief in secularism is different from Turkeys. Here, secularism has quite= a different meaning, which is - at least partially - anti-religious." His = views were supported by a German scholar who suggested that a clear separat= ion of state and religion should at long last be executed in Turkey by abol= ishing the state appointed authority for religious affairs (Diyanet).

The divide between secular and religious forces was also highlighted= by a Turkish speaker who warned against the polarisation between these two= forces. "We must built bridges between them, maybe even to the extent that= we promote the liberal, tolerant ideology of the Turkish Alevis among them= ."

Generally, American participants advised Turkish politicians and off= icials to pay more attention to the Turkish electorate which had always pro= ved to be "very astute" in the past. Their cool-headed, sober behavior went= back to the first elections after the 1980 military coup, a US official sa= id, when it was thought one could buy them off with a choice between a "Yes= Party" and a "Yes, sir Party". They observed that Turkey, in the near futu= re might become a more difficult partner for the Western states.=20

= =

Pipelines and Economic Orientation

With respect to geopolitical importance of the oil-pipelines, which = are said to carry Caspian oil to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, = a Turkish scholar claimed that the strategic value of this highly politiciz= ed economic issue was exaggerated. He argued that nobody would allow Turkey= or any other country to use any pipeline as an instrument of foreign polic= y. If the pipelines are ever realized, Turkey will be bound by her commitme= nts in the special operation agreement, in addition to those in the Europea= n Energy Charter. He added =84despite the support extended by the American = administration, the pipelines can only be constructed when they are economi= cally feasible."

According to the Turkish scholar the realization of Baku-Ceyhan pipe= line would neither make Turkey an indispensable part of the Western world n= or firmly connect her to the Caspian region. Turkey, he said, had not reall= y discussed the true dimensions of the project. Instead Ankara chose to con= front Russian which happens to be Turkey=92s second trading partner. A new = Straits regulation was promulgated by the Turkish Parliament on 11 January = 1994 and the passage of large oil tankers made prohibitively expensive. Des= pite the recent changes, Turkey still seems to consider Russian Federation = as her natural geopolitical competitor. The scholar argued that so far the = new energy policy and the special relations developed with the =84Turkic" w= orld did not affect the basic premises of the Turkish foreign policy.=20

Some Turkish participants did not agree with this view. For them Bak= u-Ceyhan was an extremly important project. Another academic from Turkey po= inted out the possibility of a future Russian-Turkish rapprochement and fur= ther reconciliation as the two countries excluded from the EU=92s enlargeme= nt process. However, a Russian participant did not take this as a serious a= lternative for both countries. An American scholar also supported the Russi= an assessment.

With respect to on Turkey=92s future economic orientation, a German = academic argued that all the links connecting Turkey to various regional se= ttings were complementary, =84not alternatives". He enumerated OECD, EU, Cu= stoms Union, Energy Charter Treaty, ECO, BSEC as some of those links and as= serted that the Western links would stay for the foreseeable future more in= tense than the others. But yet Turkey had to overcome some of her basic eco= nomic problems in order to be further integrated to the Western economic sp= here. The academic claimed that the inflation rate was certainly the major = problem because it deterred investors and despite the considerable amount o= f direct foreign investment in Turkey, the potentials were not exploited. H= e maintained that =84further international interdependence is the asset on = which the Turkish economy can count and from which it will benefit."

Suggestions and the Next Steps

Considering that the discussions during the conference were remarkab= ly and gratefully frank, there appeared to be a rather surprising general a= greement: Let things between Turkey and Europe cool off, put everything int= o perspective. There was a fairly provocative statement by a German academi= c who maintained that the European Union after their Luxembourg decision si= mply "got rid of the Turkish problem and can even be sure that Turkey remai= ns Western oriented and a member of NATO." Even if Turkey would not join th= e EU, "things would not become unmanageable" and "transatlantic relations w= ould never be seriously damaged because they are ruled by overriding intere= sts". He went on to suggest that Turkish EU membership should be taken off = the agenda "for a year or two" while at the same time both the customs uni= on and the association agreement should be broadened.

His view was largely echoed by an American official who pointed out = that Turkey still had no real alternative to the West. "Neither has there = been a change in Turkey's orientation, nor will there be. The assumption t= hat Turkey could be lost to the West was but a canard by (former Prime Mini= ster Tansu) Ciller. But this is not a God-given presumption."

A note of caution was also sounded by a Brussels based politician. I= n his opinion, the EU's enlargement process "is just not realistic, at all"= . The Union was incapable to digest new members, he said. Even in most fort= uitous circumstances one would have to reckon with 20 to 30 years for the f= irst two batches of candidates to join. "In this context, the debate about = Turkish membership becomes ridiculous. Instead, Europe should rather start = to think about alternatives for Turkey."

Time and patience was also of the essence in the Turkish businessman= 's remarks. "We knocked at the door of your tennis club and asked to take p= art in the tournament. True, I am the first to admit that we are not proper= ly dressed for a tennis match. But to turn away an enthusiastic sportsman f= rom entering the tournament is a shortsighted decision, especially if the a= pplicant is your very close neighbor next door. An intelligent decision wou= ld be to request from him to be patient, to change from jeans into tennis s= horts, from boots into rubber shoes, and eventually get his economy in orde= r so that he can afford to buy a tennis racket."

=A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | = technical support | net edition=20 fes-library | November 1999

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