Lessons of European Integration / Werner Kamppeter. - April 2000</ti= tle>  </head> <body lang=3D"DE" style=3D"tab-interval:35.4pt"> <div class=3D"Section1"> Analyseeinheit Internationale Politik<= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso= -ansi-language: EN-GB"><o:p></o:p> International Policy Analysis Unit<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> Werner K= amppeter <o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:18.0pt;margin-ri= ght:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:70.9pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:right= ; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly">Lessons = of European Integration<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>= <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right= :0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:99.25pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:righ= t; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly"> <o:p></o:p> Apri= l 2000<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> European history is an almost incessant stream of blood, misery and destruc=ADtion = =96 within Europe itself and elsewhere in the world. We Europeans were always p= rone to generate ever new situations of conflict and to solve them by violent me= ans. <o:p></o:p> Unbelievable as it may seem against this background, we now have enjoyed half a century = of unprecedented peace and prosperity. We can be certain, at least in Western Europe, that all conflicts are resolved peacefully, that is without recours= e to mili=ADtary force and to the menace of military force. In fact, we have dev= eloped a new culture of conflict management: we follow accepted procedures that le= ad to negotiated solu=ADtions. <o:p></o:p> The process of European integration was central to the formation of the Europea= n peace community. Because this process can be credited with converting the belligerent Euro=ADpe of the past into a non-aggressive and stable peace community, many of the institutio=ADnal, democratic and economic deficienci= es of the EU necessarily appear in a much milder light. On the other hand, it wou= ld be very worth while to find out whether other regions in the world could le= arn any lessons from this experience.<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp;<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp;<o:p></o:p> </div> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Frutiger 45 Light";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman= ";mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section2">  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p> Dr. Werner Kamppeter<o:p></o:p><= /span> International Policy Analysis Un= it<o:p></o:p> Friedrich Ebert Foundation <o:p>= </o:p> D-53175 Bonn, Germany<o:p></o:p>= Fax: (xx49)(0)228.883-625<o:p></= o:p> e-mail: Werner.Kamppeter@fes.de<= o:p></o:p> <span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Swiss= ; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:&q= uot;Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:DE;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Analyseeinheit Internationale Politik<o:p></o:p> International Policy Analysis Unit<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> Werner K= amppeter <o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:18.0pt;margin-ri= ght:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:70.9pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:right= ; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly">Lessons = of European Integration<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>= <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right= :0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:99.25pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:righ= t; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly"> <o:p></o:p> Apri= l 2000<o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p> Contents<o:p></o:p></spa= n>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel1"> 1. European integration Why it happened and how it happened </a> </= span><o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel11"> The First Europe: The Cold War, the German Problem and Supra-nationalism </a> _____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fullt= ext/id/00730.htm#capitel111">The Limits of Hegemonic Power</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel112"> Alliances Agains= t Germany: Counterproductive</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel1113">Jean M= onnet: Supra-national Integration of Equal Partners</a> ____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel114">The Dec= line of Supra-nationalism</a> _ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel115">NATO, t= he Anglo-Saxon =91special relationship=92 and the German-French Axis</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel12">The Seco= nd Europe: The Common Market</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel13">Lessons = to be learnt?</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel2">2. Benefi= ts of Integration</a> _______ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel21">Politica= l Objectives and Market Efficiency</a> _____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel22">Economic= Benefits: Economies of Scale?</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel23">Better C= hances for Economic Development?</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel24"> Comparative Economic Performance of the EEC/EC</a> _____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel25">The EU a= s a Policy Maker</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel26">Advantag= es and Disadvantages of Size</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel27">Lessons = to be learnt?</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel3">3. Instit= utionalised Dialogue and other Roads to Peace</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel4">Reference= s</a> _____ <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></= o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p></spa= n>  <o:p></o:p></spa= n>  <o:p></o:p></spa= n> </div> <span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Swiss= ; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:&q= uot;Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:DE;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section3">  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p> [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 1] If there is a constant in European history, it is war. Our political systems and the people at the to= p of them were somehow prone to generate ever new situations of conflict and to solve them by violent means. European history is an almost incessant stream= of blood, misery and destruc=ADtion =96 within Europe itself and elsewhere in = the world. Furthermore, the width and depth of this stream increased with the s= ize and the strength of centrally organised states and with the development of military technology. Against this historical background Wes= tern Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe have enjoyed half a century of unprecedented peace and prosperity. Almost two generations have not been involved in a war nor have they experienced the misery it causes. The absen= ce of war is in itself an amazing and precious achievement. Yet, an even great= er achievement is, what might be called, a new culture of conflict management: Of course there are still conflicts and plenty of conflicting interests, but we follow accepted procedures that lea= d to negotiated solu=ADtions. We can be certain that all conflicts a= re resolved peacefully, that is without recourse to mili=ADtary force and to the menace= of military force. Military force has simply ceased to be part of the tactical= and strategic games that are played within the European Union (EU). In this sen= se we can say that the EU has become a peace community: It is characterised not only by the ab=ADsence of war, but b= y the absence of the possibility of war among its members.<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn1" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn1" name=3D"_= ftnref1" title=3D"">[1]</a> Small wonder that the neighbouring countries of the EU have, apart from the= eco=ADnomic benefits they expect, such a strong interest in joining the club.</p= > If you ask people in the EU, a vast ma= jority will agree that a war among the member states has ceased to be a possibility. If= you ask them how this was achieved, most of them will cite European integration= as being the most important factor. Even if you ask those who are highly criti= cal of the ways and means of European integration, most of them would probably agree that the danger of an intra-EU war has practically vanished =96 and s= till many of them might give credit to the European integration process for it. = Yet Europe has not only stopped to cau= se havoc within itself, but also to other countries. After centuries of conquest and subjugation of the world, Europe seems to have lost its impe=ADrialist driv= es. With very few exceptions the European colonies were relinquished. Neither t= he European Community nor its member countries initiated any military conflict= s outside Europe. Of course some countries gave military support to the US du= ring the Vietnam War, yet the price they paid in terms of the legitimacy of thei= r political regimes was a high one. [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 2] From the perspective of past European = behaviour this is quite astonishing, because the havoc caused inside and outside Euro= pe increased with the size of its centrally organised states and with the development of military technology. For both reasons one could have expecte= d an aggressive and destructive Europe on an unprecedented scale. That it was no= t the case can be explained by the Cold War and the difficulties that the EC member governments had in agree=ADing to common foreign policies. As the Co= ld War came to an end and as the EU is trying to establish a unitary policy framew= ork for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) there are some fears that Europe might return to its former behaviour and impose its will on others b= y military intervention and threats. If the process of European integration= can be credited with converting the belligerent Euro=ADpe of the past into a non-aggressive and stable peace community, then many of the institutio=ADna= l, democratic and economic deficiencies of the EU necessarily appear in a much milder light. On the other hand, it would be very worth while to find out whether other regions in the world could learn any lessons from this proces= s of integration. "To learn from history" is an old and controversial issue. Historic circumstances are never interpreted in the sa= me way. If one wants to draw any lessons from them, one has to abstract from t= he concrete events as such or to generalise. Depending on one=92s preferences = and cogniti=ADve biases, which can never be entirely subdued or avoided, one me= ntally derives these abstrac=ADtions and generalisations. There is always the dang= er of teleological constructions: Because Europe after half a decade of integrati= on has become a peace community (itself a mental con=ADstruction), one looks f= or all the elements in history which contributed to this end, that is, re=ADinterp= reting them in the light of the final outcome =96 and excluding or overlooking man= y other elements which in their time were of much greater importance than is admitted within such a perspective. It is, for instance, commonly assumed = that the basis of European integration was economic integration (as will be shown a largely exaggerated and even false claim). As European integra=ADtion was a success in pacifying formerly belligerent nations, it is then argued that o= ther regions should integrate economically too. Such inferences about European integra= tion are not warranted and even false: European in=ADtegration was from the very beginni= ng an essentially political integration. Economic integration was at times instrumentalised to that end, but its overall contribution to the pacificat= ion of the European continent was and remains limited. <a name=3D"_Toc463111929"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889877"><sp= an style=3D"mso-bookmark:_Toc463111929">In order to av= oid easy generalisations and possibly unfounded lessons derived from them, we will l= ook first with some detail at the historic events and constellations that surrounded the initial efforts of European integration during the early post-World-War-II years and the 1950s =96and try to draw some lessons from = this experience. Then we will change the focus and ask what benefits can be expe= cted from integration. In the final section, at a primarily conceptual level, different routes to integration will be briefly discussed.</a= > <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"f= ont-size: 16.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";ms= o-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> [Seit= e der Druckausg.: 3] <h2 style=3D"margin-top:0cm"><sp= an style=3D"mso-bookmark:_Toc463111929"><a name=3D"_Toc478798376"> </a><a name=3D"capitel1"></a> 1. European integration Why it happened and how it happened<o:p></o:p></h2> <h3 style=3D"margin-top:0cm"><a name=3D"_Toc463111930"></a><a name=3D"_Toc4= 70889878"></a><a name=3D"_Toc478798377"> </a><a name=3D"capitel11"></a>The First Europe: The Co= ld War, the German Problem and Supra-nationalism</h3> The most central historical condition = that set the stage for all the efforts to integrate Western Europe militarily, institutionally and politically was of course the Cold War. The anti-Hitler coalition of the USA and the USSR fell apart soon after the War was over. T= he ideologies and the economic and strategic interests of the two superpowers proved to be too conflicting.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn2" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn2" name=3D"_ftnref2" t= itle=3D"">[2]</a>= The economic and political collapse in western Europe could have made it easy prey for Stalin.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn3" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn3" name=3D"_ftnref3" t= itle=3D"">[3]</a>= The situation in 1946-47 seemed so tense that Washington felt that "the development of a strong European economy was the most urgent priority" and the Marshall Plan, "a massive design for European recovery, was launched accordingly, in June 1947. ... fortunately for them = (the Europeans, WK), the original American plan for a post-war world economy of = free trade, free convertibility and free markets, dominated by the US proved unrealistic".<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn4" href=3D"https://libra= ry.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn4" name=3D"_ftnref4" title=3D"">[4]</a>,<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:= ftn5" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn5" name=3D"_= ftnref5" title=3D"">[5]</a> [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 4] This economic and military reconfigura= tion of Western Europe as a part of the anti-Soviet alliance required some sort of = a union of those countries.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn6" href=3D"h= ttps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn6" name=3D"_ftnref6" title= =3D"">[6]</a>= But it also had realistically to rest on German economic strength and on the re-armament of Germany within Nato. As a result "from Marshall aid onwards, the United States began to see the economic recovery of German= y and later its military contribution to Western defence as vital to the Euro= pean, and by extension, world balance."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn7" h= ref=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn7" name=3D"_ftnref7= " title=3D"">[7]</a>= Such a policy had not only to reckon w= ith the opposition of the Soviet Union but also of both Britain and France. The Bri= tish still saw themselves as a world power, while the French saw themselves as t= he prime victims of German aggression and dreamed of a strong France and a wea= k and partitioned Germany. With them, as well as with most other Europeans, t= he idea of a rearmed and economically strong Germany naturally aroused feeling= s of fear and even horror. How could it be guaranteed that German economic and military prowess would not in the fu=ADture become a menace again for Franc= e and the other European countries? Such fears were not calmed when in Germany ho= pes to reverse the division of the country and to regain territories lost to Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were repeatedly voiced.<= a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn8" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id= /00730.htm#_ftn8" name=3D"_ftnref8" title=3D"">[8]</sup= ></a> The perceived strategic needs of the C= old War and the "German problem" became a major American dilemma. How could it be solved? Basically three options existed: a.= imposition of a solution through American hegemonic power; b. alliances against Germany; c. &n= bsp; reconciliation and co-operation among the Western European countries. [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 5] <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111931"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889879"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798378"> </a><a name=3D"capitel111"></a> The Limits of Hegemonic Power<o:p></o:p></h4> The United States was of course the= hegemonic power in Western Europe. However the exer=ADcise of this power in= volved serious limits. If it was not handled with great care, it could easily lead= to the escalation of conflicts among the European countries and therefore weak= en the alli=ADance. Besides the long-term consequences of American involvement= and its duration were dif=ADficult to predict.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-i= d:ftn9" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn9" name=3D= "_ftnref9" title=3D"">[9]</a>= The political, military and economic dependency on the US and the imposi=ADtion of Ame=ADrican policy aims by sheer power were bound to breed resentment against the US hegemon.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn10"= href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn10" name=3D"_ftnr= ef10" title=3D"">[10]</a> What about the possibility of a unified and neutral Germany =96 that eventually might remerge as a continental power?<a style=3D"mso-foot= note-id: ftn11" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn11" name=3D= "_ftnref11" title=3D"">[11]</su= p></a> Or what about a German-Soviet alignment = =96 which even the US policy makers considered to be a serious possibility up to the early 1950s.= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn12" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn12" name=3D"_ftnref12" title=3D"">[12]</su= p></a> Naturally, France's sense of vulnerabi= lity was shared by other countries in Europe, especially the smaller ones. As a resu= lt France wanted "guarantees to insure German demilitarization" and "extensive powers to control the production and distribution of Ruhr coal, coke, and steel in order to promote its economic self-interest and insure i= ts security."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn13" href=3D"https://library= .fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn13" name=3D"_ftnref13" title=3D"">[13]</a> Precisely these guaran=ADtees the US hegemon would not or could not offer without endangering its own objectives.<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn14" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn14" name=3D= "_ftnref14" title=3D"">[14]</su= p></a> Clearly, European complexities and ani= mosities could not be easily domesticated by hege=ADmonic power, even under Cold War conditions. [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 6] <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111932"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889880"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798379"> </a><a name=3D"capitel112"></a> Alliances Against Germany: Counterproductive<o:p></o:p></h4> European alliances against Germany wer= e also tried. The first one was established by the Trea=ADty of Dunkirk.<a = style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn15" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/= 00730.htm#_ftn15" name=3D"_ftnref15" title=3D"">[15]</su= p></a> It served as a model for the Brussels Tr= eaty, which was to become in 1954 the Western European Union (WEU). The five signatories (France, GB, Benelux) "pledged them=ADselves to mutual armed assistance against the Soviet Union and Germany."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn16" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn16" name=3D"_ftnref16" ti= tle=3D"">[16]</a> On the one hand US officials were delighted by Bevin's =96 the British foreign secretary =96 initiative to organise Western Europe into a = viable block.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn17" href=3D"https://library.fes= .de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn17" name=3D"_ftnref17" title=3D"">[17]<= /span></a> Yet, on the other hand, it was= quite clear that such a treaty could not be in the American strategic interest. As George Kennan put it in a let= ter to George Marshall: "The general adoption of a mutual assistance pact based squarely on defense against Germany is a poor way to prepare the grou= nd for the eventual entry of the Germans into the concept."<a style=3D"= mso-footnote-id:ftn18" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm= #_ftn18" name=3D"_ftnref18" title=3D"">[18]</su= p></a> Both thought that it was far more import= ant to design a security system that would co-opt German power against the Soviet Union, instead of = one that ostracised Germany and made a = rapprochement with the Soviet Union even more likely. <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111933"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889881"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798380"> </a><a name=3D"capitel113"></a> Jean Monnet: Supra-national Integration of Equal Partners<o:p></o:p></h4> The third approach to the German probl= em, that of reconciliation and co-operation among the western European countries, had b= een proposed early on by Churchill in his famous speech at the University of Z=FCrich. A peaceful Europe could not be based on feelings of hate and veng= e=ADance. Instead it required trust among the European peoples and a sort of United States of Europe. As a first step, a partnership between Germany and France ought to be formed.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn19" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn19" name=3D"_ftnref19" title=3D"= ">[19]</a> The reconciliation of these two countries was a necessary condition for a united and internally peaceful Western Europe. But how could both be achieved? This approach was tried with varying s= uccess in various cases, among them the Organisa=ADtion for European Economic Co-oper= ation (OEEC), the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)= , the European Defence Community and its political twin the European Politica= l Community, Euratom, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the</p= > [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 7] European Community. The spiritus r= ector behind the creation of these institutions was Jean Monnet, 'Mr Europe', as he came= to be called in the 1950s.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn20" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn20" name=3D"_ftnref20" title= =3D"">[20]</a> The first case was that of the OEEC, t= hat is the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:f= tn21" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn21" name=3D"= _ftnref21" title=3D"">[21]</a> Its main task was to distribute the funds of the Marshall Plan. The Americans insisted that the West Europeans should agree among themselves on= the amount of their collective request for aid and present a long-term plan to = the US Congress. This raised for the first time the question of integration ver= sus sovereignty. France assumed the initiative. Jean Monnet, who enjoyed ample confidence among the American leadership and officials<a style=3D"ms= o-footnote-id:ftn22" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_= ftn22" name=3D"_ftnref22" title=3D""><= sup>[22]</su= p></a>, heavily influen=ADced the French propos= al for the OEEC. It contained the "functionalist" institutions typical of Monnet's projects: a small and independent executive committee with real decision-making power composed of distinguish= ed Europeans with no official governmental connecti=ADons; an executive body h= eaded by a Director General; and an assembly of government repre=ADsentatives dec= iding, in this case, under the unanimity rule. The Americans wanted to go further limiting national vetoes in the assembly. Yet, most of the European countries, l= ed by Britain, wanted neither planning nor limits on sovereignty nor middlemen meddling in their relations with the United States. The OEEC that emerged w= as predictably inter-governmental. And because of its inter-governmental chara= cter Monnet lost all interest in it: In his thinking it was not an institution a= t the service of European integration. "The co-operation among nations, as important as it may be, does not solve any= =ADthing."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn23" href=3D"https://lib= rary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn23" name=3D"_ftnref23" title=3D""><sp= an class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[23]</su= p></a> National sovereignties remained unaffec= =ADted, decisions which one did not like could be ignored, discipline was too lax, while the common interest was too imprecise.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn24" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn24" name=3D"_ftnref24"= title=3D"">[24]</a> The failure to build a strong system led to unrestrained competition for as large a part of the share as pos=ADsible.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn25" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn25" name=3D"_ftnref25" title=3D"">[25]</su= p></a> For him strong system was one which sought the fusion of the interests of the Euro=ADpean peoples a= nd not simply the racking up of som= e balance of these interests.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn26" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn26" name=3D"_ftnref26" title=3D= "">[26]</a> [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 8] A second, somewhat more successful cas= e was the Schuman Plan. Jean Monnet was its ar=ADchitect. It led to the establishment= of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). = 1. The strategic situation at = the time was the following: The US had decided that German coal, steel and its industrial capacity were needed in the defences of Western Europe. The three Western occupational powers were united and the Federal Republic was formed. German= y was clearly on the way to become a sovereign nation again. French policy to= ward Germany was in a shambles and the anxieties were correspondingly large. Eve= n though the US did not talk openly yet of German rearmament, the issue was o= n everybody's mind. Acheson had asked Schuman, the French foreign minister, t= o propose a new German policy for the three allies (for the Foreign Minister'= s meeting in London in May 1950). = Another big= problem was the Saar. France had annexed it to shift the balance of power in coal and steel in its favou= r. To the German government the Saar was German. If the French succeeded, the = case for reunification with East Germany would be undermined. Because of the Saa= r the first official visit of Schuman to Bonn in January 1950 "was a disaster". "The reciprocating engine of hostility could spring to life again any time."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn27" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn27" name=3D"_ftnref27" title= =3D"">[27]</a> = 2. Against this background it = was necessary to develop a strategy based on sound concepts. Schuman had no idea what to pro= pose to Acheson and Bevin in London, although he had pondered deeply and consult= ed many people."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn28" href=3D"https://libr= ary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn28" name=3D"_ftnref28" title=3D""><spa= n class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[28]</a> How to deal with the contradictory need, on the one hand, to inte=ADgrate Germany as an equal partner within the logic of the Cold War and, on the ot= her hand, to control the resurgent heavy industry of the Ruhr, the potential ba= se for a new German military might? The Ruhr Authority, which had been created= for the second purpose, was humiliating for Germany and therefore an unstable arrangement. Ger=ADmany could be expected to get rid of it sooner or later.= The Saar problem was even more delicate. = Monnet had = pondered these problems for about a decade.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn29" href=3D"https://li= brary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn29" name=3D"_ftnref29" title=3D""><s= pan class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[29]</a> The discrimination of Germany had to end.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-= id:ftn30" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn30" name= =3D"_ftnref30" title=3D"">[30]</su= p></a> "Peace can only be based on equality."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn31" href=3D"https://= library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn31" name=3D"_ftnref31" title=3D""> [31]<= /a> Under this assumption he proposed to place the coal a= nd steel industries of France and Germany under a supra-national autho=AD [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 9] rity. The rule of law of the common authority would reign. France and Germany would limit sovereignty in favour of that authority. <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn32" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn32" name=3D"_ftnref32" title=3D""> [32] </a> Other countries could join if they so desired. Coal a= nd steel would stop being German and French coal and steel, there would be only Euro=ADpea= n coal and steel, and both would be enmeshed like cogwheels ('engrenage' was the vogue word for this process, much favoured b= y Monnet). One could expect that the High Authority, as it was to be called, would not tolerate unilateral rearmament efforts of Ger=ADmany. If the Fren= ch and German coal and metallurgical industries were fully integrated, Germany wou= ld not be able to wage a war against France or other countries.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn33" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn33" name=3D"_ftnref33" title=3D"">[33]</su= p></a> A French take-over of the Saar's economi= c resources would stop making sense under such an arran=ADgement. A harmonious settlement would be= come possible (as it did). = 3. The setting out of sound co= ncepts and principles in the Schuman Plan, which were greeted with enthusiasm by Adena= uer<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn34" href=3D"https://library.fes.de= /fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn34" name=3D"_ftnref34" title=3D"">[34]</su= p></a>, was an important political first step.<= /span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn35" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn35" name=3D= "_ftnref35" title=3D"">[35]</su= p></a> As a next step the institutional framewo= rk and the tasks to be assigned to it had to be laid down. The tasks had to be more or less 'technical', such as the promotion of a common market in coal and steel, th= e encouragement of competition, joint modernisation and export programs, the standardi=ADsation of freight rates and the harmonisation of working and li= ving conditions etc. = In contrast= the institutions were eminently political. The High Authority w= as given extensive powers including the right to levy taxes, to influence investment decisions, and also to im=ADpose minimum prices and production q= uotas in times of 'crisis'. For Monnet, who became its first president, the High Authority was endowed with real authority and he wanted to exer=ADcise it w= ithout reference to national governments. This was of course not easy, and relatio= ns with the inter-governmental Council= of Ministers were complex and not always smooth. Relations with the Consultative Committee, which had onl= y advisory capacity and was do=ADminated by industry, were awkward too. In contrast, the High Authority and the Common Assembly became natural allies, as the latter viewed itself as a supra-national European institution. Finally there was the Court of Justice whose decisions were generally respec=ADted.</= span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn36" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/full= text/id/00730.htm#_ftn36" name=3D"_ftnref36" title=3D"">[36]</su= p></a> Clearly the ECSC was an institution with= strong supra-national traits.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn37" href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn37" name=3D"_ftnref37" title=3D"">[37]= </a>,<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:= ftn38" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn38" name=3D= "_ftnref38" title=3D"">[38]</a>= [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 10] = 4. The tasks and the instituti= onal framework, that is 'function' and 'form' in functionalist theo=ADries, were only loose= ly related.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn39" href=3D"https://library.f= es.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn39" name=3D"_ftnref39" title=3D"">[39]</span= ></a> That was no accident, since = the integration of the two sectors was only partially an end in itself.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn40" h= ref=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn40" name=3D"_ftnref= 40" title=3D"">[40]</a> Unsurprisingly, in strictly economic terms the ECSC could only be a partial success too, and it was a partial success only during the very earl= y years.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn41" href=3D"https://library.fes= .de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn41" name=3D"_ftnref41" title=3D"">[41]<= /span></a> It soon outlived its economic = purposes.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn42" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn42" name=3D= "_ftnref42" title=3D"">[42]</su= p></a> The main purposes of the ECSC was eminen= tly political. Economic integration= was instrumentalised for political reasons =96 and not the other way around. = 5. In terms of the underlying = political purposes the ECSC was rather successful, especially du=ADring the initial years. Fir= stly, the political emphasis on European integration=20 =20 made compro=ADmises possible that would not otherwise have been reached= . Secondly, the new system for=AD [Seite der Dr= uckausg.: 11] ced the member states into constant negotiations with one another. Therefore, interestingly, economic union in fa= ct increased rather than reduced the need for inter-governmental negotiation a= nd agreement!<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn43" href=3D"https://lib= rary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn43" name=3D"_ftnref43" title=3D""><sp= an class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[43]</a> Thirdly, the rule of law was firmly established. Rulings of the Court were never challenged or ignored. Fourthly, the problem of the Saar f= ell into place almost without effort because steel balances had stopped to be a yardstick of relations bet=ADween France and Germany. "(O)n balance, the new Community repre= sented a major shift in relations b= etween the mem=ADber states towards a confederal norm. It gradually lowered tension all roun= d, raised trust and in this sense laid the foundation of a new Europe."= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn44" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn44" name=3D"_ftnref44" title=3D"">[44]</su= p></a> In this sense the Schuman Plan was more = than an answer to an impasse of French foreign policy and more than a deal between France and Germany. On the other hand, even though it was the only truly supra-nationa= l institution, it was never as supra-national as it was intended to be or lik= ed to present itself. With its own loss of effectiveness in the economic field= , it was overshadowed more and more by the EEC, which had much less executive po= wer<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn45" href=3D"https://library.fes.de= /fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn45" name=3D"_ftnref45" title=3D"">[45]</su= p></a> and was much more subject to agreements = between govern=ADments, particularly after de Gaulle's return to power. Finally, in 1967, the institutions of the ECSC were integrated with those of the EEC. <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111934"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889882"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798381"> </a><a name=3D"capitel114"></a> The Decline of Supra-nationalism<o:p></o:p></h4> Another, less successful case of supra= -national integration was the European Defence Commu=ADnity (EDC). The pattern= of the creation of the ECSC was repeated. A perceived threat to French securit= y - after the Korean war had broken out, the US considered it indispensable to rearm Germany - led to a French proposal of a supra-national European army = along the lines of the Schuman Plan. Again Monnet worked in the background, altho= ugh less than with the Schu=ADman Plan. Again Britain stayed apart. The Pleven = Plan, as it was called, proposed a European Army under the Atlantic umbrella run = by a European Minister of Defence and a Council of Ministers, with a joint commander, common budget and common arms procurement. Yet, this Plan was clearly discriminatory against Germany: for Germany it was to be the army, for all the others an army; a German Defence Minister, a German General Staff and German full divisions were not foreseen. After difficult negotiations, in the course of which some of the more glaring discriminations were diluted, the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952.= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn46" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn46" name=3D"_ftnref46" title=3D"">[46]</su= p></a> Once it was signed, the European Po= litical Community came on the agenda.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn47" = href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn47" name=3D"_ftnre= f47" title=3D"">[47]</a> A constitutio=ADnal commission was formed in order to= draft a constitution for a European Union. The blue=AD [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 12] print contained a directly elected European Parliament, a Senate elected by parliaments of member states, an Executive Council of five members with a President to be elected by the Sen= ate, who was to be responsible to the two chambers; a Council of Ministers from member states to serve as a liaison between the European executive and memb= er governments; and a European Court of Justice. The EPC was to be the roof fo= r the ECSC and the EDC. The three would have formed the core<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn48" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn48" name=3D"_ftnref48" title=3D"">[48]</su= p></a> of a European state with a federal const= itution. It would have been the triumph of supra-national aspirations. Yet these aspirations received a deadl= y blow when the French parliament in August 1954 did not ratify the EDC.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn49" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn49" name=3D"_ftnref49" title=3D"">[49]</su= p></a> De Gaulle's influence had made itself fe= lt.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn50" href=3D"https://library.fes.de= /fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn50" name=3D"_ftnref50" title=3D"">[50]</su= p></a> The underlying reason was national sover= eignty.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn51" href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn51" name=3D"_ftnref51" title=3D"">[51]</su= p></a> For de Gaulle the proposal to integrate = the French and German armed forces was "plain idiocy".<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn52" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn52" name=3D"_ftnref52" ti= tle=3D"">[52]</a> The British government, characteristically, was all in favour of European integration and a European army, yet only as long as it did not include the Brit=ADish.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn53" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn53" name=3D"_ftnref53" title= =3D"">[53]</a> US officials, although not publicly, had "found the Pleven Plan totally unacceptable", because it made German rearmament contingent on the creation of a new set of European institutions. This made NATO total= ly inoperable, precluded US participation in a European defence force and dela= yed German rearmament for the indefinite future.<a style=3D"mso-footnote= -id: ftn54" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn54" name=3D= "_ftnref54" title=3D"">[54]</su= p></a> Unsurprisingly, the US had stayed on t= heir track of strengthening NATO. Once the EDC had failed, France found that it "had to swallow the very German national army inside NATO, which the EDC had bee= n intended to avoid."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn55" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn55" name=3D"_ftnref55" title=3D"= ">[55]</a> Germany, as a full Atlantic ally, was placed under a NATO integrated command headed by an American and it was placed under similar restrictions as the ones foreseen in the Pleven Plan.<a style=3D"mso= -footnote-id:ftn56" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_f= tn56" name=3D"_ftnref56" title=3D""><s= up>[56]</su= p></a> This 'double containment'<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn57" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn57" name=3D"_ftnref57" title=3D"">[57]</a> strategy was [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 13] bound to mollify French (and American) anxieties. Even though, it "was a curious paradox, that to create a credible NATO to defend Europe against the Russians to the East, both Britain and the US had= to commit their forces to the north German plain to reassure the French that a rearmed Germany would not turn its guns once more against its neighbour to = the West."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn58" href=3D"https://library.fes= .de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn58" name=3D"_ftnref58" title=3D"">[58]</a> Whatever the small print, after the fa= ilure of the EDC military defence and security were again under the firm control of the American hegemon. Bipolarity and the position of the hege=ADmon became even= more firmly established when the Warsaw Pact was created shortly after the acces= sion of Germany to NATO. This left the European integration in = an uncomfortable situation, because this "first Europe" of an already declining ECSC and a failed EDC "was in many ways a security Europe, n= ot an economic one. ... The shared characteristic both of the ECSC and the Europe= an Army was that they were primarily addressed to German power. Each had econo= mic aspects, but neither was economic in essence. ... the EDC proved that it wa= s dangerous, even impossible, to pursue further European union by direct secu= rity or political means."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn59" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn59" name=3D"_ftnref59" title=3D= "">[59]</a> Monnet had come precisely to this conc= lusion: the EDC crisis had proved that the sources of power lay in the nations, channel= led through the governments, not the Community in Lux=ADembourg.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn60" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn60" name=3D"_ftnref60" title=3D"">[60]</su= p></a> The demise of 'security Europe' not on= ly meant that the US and NATO assumed full leader=ADship in matters of military secu= rity, but also that supra-national concepts became less attractive. In fact, the watering down of the supra-national concepts of the Schuman Plan had alread= y begun during the negotiation of the EDC treaty and been accentuated during = the EPC talks.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn61" href=3D"https://library= .fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn61" name=3D"_ftnref61" title=3D"">[61]</a> The departure of Jean Monnet from the presidency of the High Authority - he was the High Aut= hority - in 1955 further undermined its supra-national character.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn62" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn62" name=3D"_ftnref62" title=3D"">[62]</su= p></a> Besides, the political cli=ADmate in Fra= nce, and, partly as a reaction, elsewhere changed. Monnet did not escape unscathed from the wreck= of the EDC and became for the first time a publicly controversial figure. The = idea of a Europe in some sense above the nations was no longer stated in the ope= n. "The gov=ADernments rejected anything or anyone that threatened, like Monnet, openly to compete with their mono=ADpoly."<a style=3D"mso-fo= otnote-id:ftn63" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn6= 3" name=3D"_ftnref63" title=3D"">= [63]</su= p></a> National sovereignty had won a decisive = battle against supra-nationality. The future masters of Europe were the = governments of the member states. Nevertheless the supra-national institutions created under the leadership of Jean Monnet - the High Authority, the Consultative Committee, the Common Assembly and the Court of Justice - did not disap=AD [Seite der Dr= uckausg.: 14] pear. They became under new names the core institutions of the European Economic Commu=ADnity (EEC) and its successors, that is the European Community and t= he European Union. <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111935"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889883"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798382"> </a><a name=3D"capitel115"></a> NATO, the Anglo-Saxon =91special relationship=92 and the German-French Axis<o:p></o:p></h4> With the demise of 'security Europe' a= nd the reaffirmation of NATO American leadership in matters of military security w= as clearly established. NATO became a necessary condition for stable and peace= ful relations among the European nations. Yet it could not be a sufficient one because the demise of supra-nationality left the doors open again for rival= ry and conflict among the European nation-states; doors which could not be clo= sed easily by the American hegemon. Instead, unwillingly or not, the United Sta= tes contributed to the conflicts which came to afflict the alliance and the relations between France and Great Britain in particular. In the first place the United States c= ontinued to cultivate a special relationship with Great Britain in nuclear and strategi= c matters.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn64" href=3D"https://library.f= es.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn64" name=3D"_ftnref64" title=3D"">[64]</span= ></a> This intensified de Gaulle's= suspicion of the Anglo-Saxons. As a result, "(t)he closer Britain cleaved to America, the more de Gaulle leaned to Adenauer."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn65" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn65" name=3D"_ftnref65" title=3D= "">[65]</a> Second, America's behaviour towards it= s NATO partner France was at times humiliating and hard to bear. General Norstad refused to inform President de Gaulle, for instance, about the deployment o= f nuclear weapons in France! This difficult relationship culminated in France= 's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance and the request for all troops = to leave French soil, in 1966.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn66" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn66" name=3D"_ftnref66"= title=3D"">[66]</a> Third, the US humiliated both France a= nd Great Britain at Suez, a plot they had prepared secretly with Israel, yet without American knowledge. In the aftermath of this crisis Western European leader= s asked themselves "whether America would stick by them through thick and thin - particularly in the days before an American election" one of which was due then.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn67" href=3D"https://libr= ary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn67" name=3D"_ftnref67" title=3D""><spa= n class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[67]</a> Fourth, Kennan, Dulles and others had = suggested, even in public, to unify, demilitarise and neutralise Germany. This America= n fashion for theories of German neutralisation was a stun=ADning shock, not = only for Adenauer, and, unsurprisingly, inclined him towards France.<a st= yle=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn68" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn68" name=3D"_ftnref68" title=3D"">[68]</su= p></a> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 15] In other words: In the back of the NAT= O alliance an Anglo-Saxon special relationship and a German-French axis were nurtured. Franco-German unity was to become the core of further European integration = and of the domestication of the 'German problem', which, in the percep=ADtion especially of France, had become more acute.<a style=3D"mso-footnote= -id: ftn69" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn69" name=3D= "_ftnref69" title=3D"">[69]</su= p></a> Britain was consistently excluded= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn70" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn70" name=3D= "_ftnref70" title=3D"">[70]</su= p></a>, even though it had always had affinitie= s with the idea of liberalising trade. Finally, the evolving stra=ADtegic position of Europe a= lso contained the seeds of European opposition against the American hegemon, i.= e. of the notion of a European world power, which was to get stronger with "a growing gap between the overwhelming military, and therefore political domination of the alli=ADance by Washington, and the USA's gradually weaken= ing economic predominance.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn71" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn71" name=3D"_ftnref71" title= =3D"">[71]</a> <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111936"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889884"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798383"> </a><a name=3D"capitel12"></a> The Second Europe: The Common Market</h3> This was the background against which = the second 'economic' Europe evolved. Its central pieces were the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom. Again Monnet worked busily, yet eve= n more hidden, behind the scenes as with the earlier projects of European int= e=ADgration. Unlike other leaders, Adenauer for example felt embittered and depressed, Monnet could not be disheartened by the failure of EDC/EPC.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn72" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn72" name=3D"_ftnref72" title=3D"">[72]</su= p></a> Monnet, of course, would not abandon h= is overriding aim of supra-national institution buil=ADding. His intentions le= aned more and more towards a new Community in a new sector, civil nuclear power. Such a proposal had several advantages: First, nuclear power was believed t= o be the basis of a new industrial revolution, yet its development required amou= nts of investment beyond the means even of the larger western European nations. Second, just like the integra=ADtion of coal and steel had provided the mat= erial for the great symbolic burial of old feuds in Europe, nuclear power could provide the basis for Europe's great symbolic entry into the mod=ADern worl= d. Third, the French inferiority complex which had played havoc with the EDC o= ught to be irrelevant, because France's nuclear effort was larger than those of = all its Community partners put together. Fourth, joint regulation could also en= sure that Germany's nuclear devel=ADopment would remain strictly civilian.</span= ><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn73" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext= /id/00730.htm#_ftn73" name=3D"_ftnref73" title=3D"">[73]</su= p></a> Finally, no limits would be put by the n= ew organisation [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 16] on the efforts of French to develop nuclear weapons. Hence, it seemed that = the new Commu=ADnity would be based on a set of sound economic, symbolic, tactical = and strategic reasons. In terms of the institutions to be formed the approach w= as similar to the Schuman Plan. Eventually Spaak proposed Monnet's pro= gramme for the new Community for civil nuclear power (and for an extension of the ECSC= to all of energy and transport, including airlines). To Monnet's great surpris= e the German government was not interested in the new Community, while Erhard= , already credited with the German Wi= rtschaftswunder, was openly opposed to it. A meeting with German officials established the b= asic fact of the coming negotiations, namely that Germany would not swallow Eura= tom without a general common market= . Monnet in fact had pondered about the = creation of a common market and came to the con=ADclusion that time was not ripe for it= .<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn74" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/f= ulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn74" name=3D"_ftnref74" title=3D"">[74]</su= p></a> He had a substantial reason that is stil= l put forward now=ADadays: In his opinion it was not possible to dissociate a common market from federal social, monetary and conjuncture policies. If a common market was formed without this common framework, it "= would be so near free trade, lacking institutions as to undermine his political purposes." (emphasis added). In fact, right after the failure of th= e EDC pressure for a Free Trade Area in the OEEC was put forward by Britain, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia. Erhard too favoured such a solution. Mon= net and Spaak however ignored these pressures. Instead, they agreed that the priority was to integrate Germany and that only supra-national Communities could achieve this. A Free Trade Area with Britain clearly would have been = an inter-governmental affair (or even less), while France would have been a hyper-reluctant member of such a scheme. Hence it would have weakened integration.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn75" href=3D"https://libra= ry.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn75" name=3D"_ftnref75" title=3D""><span= class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[75]</a> Adenauer largely sided with Monnet and Spaak. Because of the prevailing contradictor= y attitudes - Adenauer against Erhard - Bonn offered an "amazing spectacle" in 1955-56. But in France the situation was even more complicated: to champion= a common market in public would have been political suicide; a Free Trade Are= a was unthinkable; supra-nationality was too controversial to be discussed; a= nd the Atomic Ener=ADgy Commissariat feared that Euratom could block France's = road to nuclear weapons. On top of that, Monnet had become practically a persona= non grata in Paris. Only the B= enelux countries presented a more coherent picture. They tried to force the issue = by presenting a memorandum in which they combined the 'sectoral' with the 'general', i.e. the common market approach. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 17] Expectations were extremely low when t= he foreign ministers' conference began in Messina in June 1955. Monnet did not attend because of a French veto<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn76" href=3D"h= ttps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn76" name=3D"_ftnref76" titl= e=3D"">[76]</a>, neither did Adenauer, for fear of failure. Nevertheless, after cumbersome negotiations<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn77" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn77" name=3D"_ftnref77" title= =3D"">[77]</a> a compromise was struck that was to lead directly to the Rome treaties of 1957: Germany agreed to something less than free trade, i.e. a common market with an institutional core shaped along the lines of the ECSC= ; Belgium swallowed certain supra-national traits and sacrificed its preferen= ces for British-style inter-gov=ADernmentalism; the nuclear-power community gav= e France a chance to stay in the process, while it was stripped of most aspec= ts that could have interfered with French sovereignty in nuclear matters. Monn= et, the personification of the supra-national principle was partially eclipsed.= The institutional core of his approach was confirmed at Messina, although it wa= s to be much more inter-governmental in character. At Messina the Community of the six wa= s reasserted. Other groupings might have seemed, in nuclear power especially,= to make more sense. Yet the main purpose was not to create 'func=ADtionalist' institutions which could solve in a pragmatic and efficient manner specific problems, but to navigate the endangered European ship through hazardous straights and into more pro=ADmising waters. In fact, Messina became a clas= sic case of "European packaging": Propositions, which are not viable, because there are contradicting nationa= l positions attached to them, can become viable once two or more propositions= are negotiated simultaneously.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn78" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn78" name=3D"_ftnref78" ti= tle=3D"">[78]</a> A larger and more diverse negotiable mass makes it easier to compromise in a process of give and take. Such packages from now on became = a common feature of the processes of European integra=ADtion. Yet packaging, = even though it helped to further integration, also reaffirmed the role of the nation-state as the interests that entered these packages were always "national" (whatever that meant in reality) interests. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111937"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889885"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798384"> </a><a name=3D"capitel13"></a> Lessons to be learnt?</h3> In order not to step into the trap of = deriving lessons from superficial generalisation, the process of integration of West= ern Europe until the foundation of the EEC has been looked at in detail. Lookin= g back, what were the most salient features of the period studied? </p= > <spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB">1. European i= ntegration began under very specific and rather complex geo-strategical, politi=ADcal and ec= onomic conditions after World War II. The Cold War created a favourable set=ADting= for integration. It may have been a necessary condition, but it was by no means= a suffi=ADcient one. = 2. The "German problem" was es= pecially delicate: The economic and military potential of Ger=ADmany had to be devel= oped again, yet this potential also had to be restrained. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 18] = 3. Integration was favoured by= the US hegemon. Yet the hegemon was not always clear and coherent, and could do rather litt= le when the Europeans either did not agree with it or did not agree among themselves. = 4. After two world wars, every= body dreamt of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. There was probably only one person =96 Jean Monnet =96 who had a clear vision (yet no grand design) of the future of Eu= rope and, more importantly, a recipe of how to go about it. Furthermore, he was fortunate to have gained the trust of the political establishment in the US= , Britain and France during the war years. = 5. A close look at the events = reveals that there was much muddling-through. Outcomes depen=ADded as much on contingencies as= on open or hidden political games. There were advances and setbacks. The proce= ss itself was path dependent. Outcomes therefore could not be pre=ADdicted. In= the end it was often just luck, when in spite of all difficulties some compromi= se was struck that took integration one step further ahead (at Messina for instance). = 6. At the time of the signing = of the Treaties of Rome (1957) the signatory countries (not to speak of Western Europe as a wh= ole) still had a long way to go to become a peace commu=ADnity =96 it was not ev= en clear that it could become one. It is obvious then that very specific = historical conditions and contingencies reigned at that time. No grand design and no grand, rational strategy towards integration existed, nor would it probably have had a chance to succeed. Jean Monnet, certainly a gift from heaven for Euro=ADpean integration, did not have a grand design but a method that well= fit the path dependency of integration =96 and he had the right connections. Wi= thout him European integration would not be where it is today, but even with him = it could have taken a different route. Things cannot be otherwise =96 unless o= ne believes that history is some sort of a teleological construction. <= /p> Hence, what could be learnt then from = the early years of integration in Europe? Historical conditions across time and place= do not tend to appear twice. Hence there is little to be learned from historic experience as such. What could be of interest however is, apart from his an= d other peoples=92 perseverance, Monnet=92s method of integration. Using his = own words, it can be summarised as follows: = All countries must be equal partners: "Peace can only be based on equality." = 1. "The fundamental principle = is the delegation of sovereignty in= a limited, but decisive area. ... The co-operation among nations, as important as it m= ay be, does not solve anything. What ought to be sought is a fusion of the interests ... and not simply the maintenance of the balance of these interests."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn79" href=3D"https://librar= y.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn79" name=3D"_ftnref79" title=3D"">[79]</a> = "This propo= sition has an essential political message: to drive a wedge into the bastions of national sovereign= ty that is small enough to be acceptable and deep enough to move the States towards the necessary unity for peace."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn80" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn80" name=3D= "_ftnref80" title=3D"">[80]</su= p></a> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 19] = 2. Creation of institutions: A= small and independent executive committee= with real decision-making power composed of distinguished personalities with no official governmental con=ADnections; an executive body headed by a Director General; and an assembly of government representatives. = 3. Such an institutional set, = a. creates transparency among member countries, b. is based on the principle of 'every= body controls everybody', c. forces the member states into constant negotiations with one another, and d. allows for compromises, which could otherwise not = be reached. Such institutions fulfil the criteria of a peace community.= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn81" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn81" name=3D"_ftnref81" title=3D"">[81]</su= p></a> Under Monnet=92s leadership there was = a strong emphasis on supra-nationalism. It had to be scaled down. The member states regained some sovereignty. The balance between supra-natio=ADnalism and inter-governmentalism has been shifting since then in one or the other direction. Nowadays we have for the whole of the = EU only one set of Monnet-type institutions (Euro=ADpean Commission, Council of Ministe= rs, European Parliament, European Court of Justice, ...) and not several sets a= s he had had in mind (ECSC, EDC, Euratom). Over the years the need for negotiati= on and agreement became ever larger. The Council of Ministers, the most power= =ADful organ of the EU, has become a very complex "consensus seeking machine"<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn82" href=3D"https://library.f= es.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn82" name=3D"_ftnref82" title=3D"">[82]</a>. The Europe=ADan Commission and the European Parliament are closely integrated into this machine. Initiati=ADves, consultations and decisions i= nvolve frequent and time-consuming to-ing and fro-ing among the Commission, the Parliament and its Committees, the Council and its working groups, the Core= per (Permanent Representatives Committee), the conciliation committees of the Parliament and the Council. Outside the EU there are a number of other institutions too, where the respective member governments are in permanent contact and dialogue (NATO, OSCE, OECD, ...), and there are many bilateral = fora as well. Thus, every week hun=ADdreds of institutionalised dialogues are ta= king place in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe. </spa= n>The secret of the success, in terms of the formation of a peace community, of this sor= t of in=ADstitutionalised, permanent, multi-level dialogue is that civilised for= ms of social intercourse have become deeply ingrained. Over many years government officials have been spending a lot of time in meetings, committees, negotiations, luncheons etc. with officials from other European countries a= nd of European institutions. This intensive social intercourse together with t= he insti=ADtutional and political need to permanently negotiate has given rise= to a new culture of conflict mana=ADgement in Europe, spoken of at the beginning= . Here is the essence of our peace commu= =ADnity. The ever increasing need for negotiati= ons has been due to several factors: 1.&nbs= p; The Treaties of the EC and the EU are vague and often lend themselves to extens= ive inter=ADpretations. 2.&nbs= p; Even though the EU possesses strong and exclusive competencies only in a few policy [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 20] areas, almost any political and governmental issue has a European dimension and therefore needs to be discussed at the European level. 3.&nbs= p; =91National interests=92 are usually at variance. 4.&nbs= p; Negotiations lead to compromises. Compromises always leave some degree of dissatisfac=AD= tion and therefore bear the seed of new negotiations. In case of packaging, dissatisfaction is particularly likely to remain high: several issues, whic= h do not lend themselves to a solution separately, are linked and an overall compromise is found in a complex process of give and take. 5.&nbs= p; Stepwise solutions and path dependency easily lead to incoherences with respect to s= olu=ADtions found in the past and in other policy fields. 6.&nbs= p; Circumstances change and make past compromises inadequate or obsolete. <a name=3D"_Toc463111938">Naturally, o= ne can have doubts as to the efficiency and the democratic legitimacy of such all-perva= ding institutionalised dialogues. In a sense they are the perfect means to produ= ce second-best and third-best solutions. On the other hand this kind of give a= nd take occurs at the national and sub-national level too. Our political syste= ms have long been transformed into systems where most outcomes are the result = of complex negotiations which involve, just like in Brussels, not only government institutions, but all sorts of organised interests as well.</a><a st= yle=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn83" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn83" name=3D"_ftnref83" title=3D"">[83]</a> That is of course no excuse, because interest-group politics and dealings of governments=92 elit= es behind closed doors<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn84" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn84" name=3D"_ftnref84" ti= tle=3D"">[84]</su= p></a>,<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn85" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn85" name=3D"_ftnref85"= title=3D"">[85]</a> do not accord well wi= th democratic principles. Here, not only the EU, but also its member states su= ffer from a democratic deficit. There could well be a dilemma here. Immanuel Kant argued long ago that democracie= s do not fight wars against each other.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id= :ftn86" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn86" name= =3D"_ftnref86" title=3D"">[86]</su= p></a> The reason he gave is that the citizenry abhors the costs and miseries of war.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn87" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn87" name=3D"_ftnref87" title=3D"">[87]</a> The =91functionalist= =92 integration of government elites makes war structur=ADally impossible. Ther= efore it is an even better way to secure peace. Yet, the democratic con=ADtrols o= f these government elites are weak. If they were stronger, the mass media=92s pecul= iar perception of =91national interests=92, for example, would be propelled to = the negotiating tables. Tendencies of a re-nationali=ADsation of European polit= ics (which are becoming stronger in any case) would be reinforced and the integrationist force of institutionalised dialogues would be weakened. A pr= oper relationship between Monnet=92s eng= renage =96 the enmeshing of govern=AD [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 21] ments in Community institutions and the transfer of national sovereignty to them =96 and demo=ADcracy can not be established ea= sily. This difficulty is illustrated by Ralf Dahrendorf's lack of faith in Monnet: Political decisions ought not to be taken through functionalist tricks, but= in principle politically, that is by elected governments and parliaments.</spa= n><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn88" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/= fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn88" name=3D"_ftnref88" title=3D""><span= lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-text= -raise: 0pt">[88]</a> He would start, as he= has repeatedly expressed, with a Euro=ADpean Constitution, that clearly delinea= tes the competencies of a European government and of national governments and defines citizens=92 rights etc. It would be discussed extensively by the Eu= ropean publics and parliaments and thus would gain legitimacy and acceptance. It i= s clear, unfortunately, that this route would not have led anywhere in the ea= rly years of European inte=ADgration. This, of course, does not mean that it co= uld not be implemented elsewhere. One won=ADders however, under which historica= l circumstances the desire for such a grand scheme of inte=ADgration could be strong enough in the potential member countries of a union to initiate such= a dialogue and to take it to a happy conclusion. Furthermore, one wonders to = what extent the dangers of an institutionalised and hermetic dialogue could real= ly be avoided in such an under=ADtaking. <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> <h2> <a name=3D"_Toc470889886"></a><a= name=3D"_Toc478798385"> </a><a name=3D"capitel2"></a> 2. Benefits of Integration<o:p></o:p></h2> Economic growth and social justice are= the two most important positive sources of legitima=ADcy<a style=3D"mso-foot= note-id: ftn89" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn89" name=3D= "_ftnref89" title=3D"">[89]</su= p></a> =96 in contrast to the negative sources = of nationalism and of external or internal enemies. There is no doubt that during the "Golden Age" (1950-73) high rates of economic growth, re=ADductions in income inequalities and the expansion of social security systems all were importan= t sources of legitimacy for the governments of the EEC countries. During the Golden Age it was easy to find satisfaction in the idea that those economic benefits had something to do with European integration. Yet, when growth slowed, and unemployment and inflation accelerated after 1973 this sort of satisfaction, unfortunately, has become much more difficult to achieve. The European publics became less optimistic and more critical. Thus the costs t= o consumers and taxpayers of the Common Agricultural Policy has become a recurring topic in public deba=ADte. Equally, the deregulative measures car= ried out in the course of Delors=92 Inte= rnal-Market-1992 project were widely perceived as undercutting social and environmental standards and even as a contributive factor to unemployment. Therefore, the hitherto perceived basis of legi=ADtimacy of the EC =96 economic and social benefits for all =96 has been suffering.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:= ftn90" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn90" name=3D= "_ftnref90" title=3D"">[90]</a> The political record of the EEC/EC in = terms of creating a peace community is amazing. Its economic record is therefore ope= n to some doubt at least. What is the relationship between political and economi= c integration? Does political integration increase economic welfare in the [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 22] integrating countries? Or to be more precise: What economic or other benefi= ts can one expect from regional integration? Can such benefits be observed in = the case of European integration? <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111939"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889887"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798386"> </a><a name=3D"capitel21"></a> Political Objectives and Market Efficiency<span= lang=3D"EN-GB"> </h3> The economic benefits of integration h= ave, especially after the creation of the EEC, whose centrepiece is the Common Market, alwa= ys played an important role in public discourse and in the official presentati= ons of the EEC/EC and their member governments. It is worthwhile to remember however t= hat, in fact, the real purpose of the ECSC, Euratom and the integration of the Comm= on Market was not the improvement of economic conditions, but always political integration. After the failure of EDC and EPC it became clear that direct political integration was not possible. As a consequence, the development o= f common econo=ADmic institutions and economic integration were deemed to be = easier as intermediate steps toward political integration.<a style=3D"mso-f= ootnote-id: ftn91" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn91" name=3D= "_ftnref91" title=3D"">[91]</su= p></a> Therefore, even if the EEC economic po= licies did not produce the expected economic bene=ADfits, they could still make sense,= if they led in the end to higher levels of integration and co-operation among = the member countries. In other words, even if higher levels of integration and co-operation led to losses in economic performance and incomes, these losse= s could simply be the price that had to be paid for the creation of a more peaceful Europe. To put it more blunt=ADly: Why should one expect at all th= at economic-political integration leads to peace and econo=ADmic prospe= rity? Should we not undertake measures intended to improve peaceful co-operation because they are unlikely to produce economic benefits? =B7&= nbsp; The formation of the ECSC = is a case in point. Soon after it was established its steel and coal industries were tur= ned into protective cartels.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn92" href=3D"h= ttps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn92" name=3D"_ftnref92" titl= e=3D"">[92]</a> They received ever more subsidies =96 to the detriment of consumers and taxpayers.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn93" href=3D"https://lib= rary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn93" name=3D"_ftnref93" title=3D""><sp= an class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[93]</a> Nevertheless, without the ECSC the relations between France and Germany, and the EU as such, would not be what they are today. =B7&= nbsp; The same can be said of th= e infamous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Its blunders in terms of the principles o= f economic liberalism are well known. Yet, in terms of political inte=ADgrati= on, it was a central part of the development of the EEC and a cornerstone of Euro= =ADpean integration. In spite of its hideous costs (it still absorbs half of the EC budget and puts a heavy burden on taxpayers and consumers<a style=3D= "mso-footnote-id:ftn94" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.ht= m#_ftn94" name=3D"_ftnref94" title=3D"">[94]</su= p></a>), it continues to be an integrationist s= uccess: A=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 23] European cartel which has served the interests of its members more or less well (especially= the larger farmers and agro-industry), while generating a permanent need for negotiations and reforms =96 precisely because of its structural defects an= d its enormous costs. =B7&= nbsp; During the "Golden Age" (1950-73) it was popular to associate the then prevailing high growth rates= and the rising standard of living with European integration. This, of course, g= ave legitimacy to European integration. In fact, the economic performance of th= e EEC, even though it was quite remarkable in absolute terms, was not superio= r to that of other OECD countries. During the "crisis decades" (Hobsbawm) that followed, the relative per=ADformance of the Community declined notabl= y. It is safe to conclude that European i= ntegration involved costs to taxpayers and consumers and that it did not improve the economic performance of the member countries. To repeat, that is no argumen= t against integration, because the purposes of integration were political. In= the case of the ECSC and CAP, economic efficiency and political integration cou= ld not go hand in hand. Equally, the below-average economic performance of the= EU can probably be attributed to the logic of political integration and the si= ze of the EC/EU. By contrast, economic integration that= aims to improve economic efficiency can have nega=ADtive effects on political integration. CAP is a fully regulated policy area, which stabilises agri=AD= cultural markets, gives preference to EC producers (truly a "fortress Europe") and requires EU-wide solidarity. By comparison the Internal Market 1992 project is a "gigantic operation of deregulation", which tends to eliminate national regulatory power but does not establish a comparable regulatory power at the EU-level.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn95" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn95" name=3D"_ftnref95" title=3D"">[95]</su= p></a> This has led to, in the opinion of many = obser=ADvers and interest groups, a race to the bottom for social and environmental standards, consu= =ADmer protection etc. Such claims may be exaggerated. But one wonders all the sam= e how dere=ADgula=ADtion should be able to make a contribution to political integration. The main advantage of the market mechanism is precisely the independence and autonomy it gives to economic actors. The market does not create political or other kinds of communities. Hence, to perceive European integratio= n only in terms of market efficiency and the benefits derived therefrom, is short-sig= hted and even wrong. Pure and simple economic integration can undermine politica= l integration and its legitimacy. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111940"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889888"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798387"> </a><a name=3D"capitel22"></a> Economic Benefits: Economies of Scale?</h3> At a council meeting on 31 October 194= 9 of the Organisation for European Economic Devel=ADopment (OEEC), the body which implemented the Marshall Plan, Paul Hoff=ADman, the OEEC administrator, del= ivered a plan for "the integration of the Euro=ADpe=ADan economy", which circum=AD= scribed very clearly the purposes of the Common Market. He said: "The substance of such integration wou= ld be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictio= ns on the movement of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments, [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 24] and eventually all tariffs are permanently swept away. The fact that we ha= ve in the US a single market of 150 million consumers has been indispensable to the strength and efficiency of our economy. The creation of a permanent, freely trading area comprising 270 million consumers in Western Europe, would have= a multitude of helpful consequences. It would accelerate the devel=ADopment o= f large-scale, low-cost production industries. It would make the effective us= e of all resources easier, the stifling of healthy competition more difficult."<= /span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn96" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/ful= ltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn96" name=3D"_ftnref96" title=3D"">[96]</su= p></a> In view of American mass production te= chnologies and of the trade conditions at that time, the vision of Paul Hoffman made a= lot of sense. After all, as Adam Smith had recognised, the division of labour i= s limited by the size of the market. And after the war the national markets w= ere very small and trade protection was high. Therefore the benefits of the division of labour and of economies of scale could not be fully taken advan= tage of, and that hampered improve=ADments in productivity and incomes. The form= ation of a customs=92 union =96 elimination of all internal obstacles to trade, y= et maintenance of common tariffs and other trade regulations =96 could make mu= ch sense under these conditions. In fact, trade among the EEC-countries during that period increased somewhat faster than production.<a style=3D"ms= o-footnote-id:ftn97" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_= ftn97" name=3D"_ftnref97" title=3D""><= sup>[97]</su= p></a> Nevertheless, the Common Market for ma= ny years was a far cry from being truly liberalised. Roughly 30 years (!) after the Trea= ties of Rome Jacques Delors launched the program "Europe 1992" which aimed at the "completion of the internal market". It did not have too much effect on intra-EC trade, yet it helped to create, at least transitorily, expectations of optimism and growth (after a prolonged period of Euro-scepticism). Investment, especially intra-EU foreign direct investment= , increased - and made national oligopolies somewhat more European.<a = style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn98" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/= 00730.htm#_ftn98" name=3D"_ftnref98" title=3D"">[98]</su= p></a> For=ADeign direct investment from outsid= e the EU increased too, mainly driven by the (largely unjus=ADtified) fear of investors not to be admitted later into the "fortress Europe". Yet, one wonders if the vision of Paul= Hoffman has still much relevance nowadays =96 becau=ADse world trade is largely liberal= ised: In a world of GATT and WTO where free trade prevails, the size of the market cannot be really improved by regional integration =96 the biggest market si= mply is the world market. With it no regional formation could possibly compete i= n terms of the potentials of the division of labour and of large-scale production. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 25] This is corroborated by the fact that = some of the smallest countries are among the ten most prosperous ones: Singapore, the U= S, Switzerland, Hongkong, Norway, Japan, Denmark, Bel=ADgium, Austria and Cana= da. Seven of the first ten have less than 10 million inhabitants. They all are internationally open, market economies: The size of a country or of a union= of countries does not seem to be a necessary condition for prosperity.<= a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn99" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/i= d/00730.htm#_ftn99" name=3D"_ftnref99" title=3D"">[99]</su= p></a> Therefore we conclude that argu=ADments = about economies of scale and customs=92 unions have ceased to be relevant (if they ever were). </= p> <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111941"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889889"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798388"> </a><a name=3D"capitel23"></a> Better Chances for Economic Development?</h3> After the war Europe did not develop i= n an environment of a free-market economy. As has been mentioned in the first section (see especially footnote 4), initially the US wanted, in order to h= elp her own industry, to create a free-trade regime in Europe (but not in the U= S!). Only under the pressures of the Cold War did the hegemon changed its plans. Instead, a systematic effort was made to rebuilt and modernise the European economies =96 and to make them, against the promises of socialism in Easter= n Europe, socially a success too. All that involved huge efforts by the Europ= ean governments to create the necessary infrastructural and institutional conditions for a modern economy. Naturally, the European economies were all= owed to protect themselves against superior competitors from America in the area= s where they deemed that necessary and desirable. Otherwise, how could they develop= ? Hence, one can say that in Western Eur= ope comprehensive, national development strategies were developed, which allowe= d for the protection of industries against superior North Ameri=ADcan competi= tors, while the EEC provided a larger market in a world that was still segmented = by high tariff barriers. In this there could well be a lesson f= or other countries and regions. In fact, such strategies have been tried, particular= ly in Latin America (Andean Pact, Central American Economic Uni=ADon, Mercosur= , NAFTA). Unfortunately these efforts were not as successful as in the Euro= =ADpean case. Possibly there was too much emphasis on economic integration and free trade, and too little on political integration and on national and regional development strategies and institution building. However, easy generalisati= ons and critique should be avoided. They should be based on in-depth analyses o= f these experiences. <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font= -size:14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-farea= st-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 26] <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111942"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889890"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798389"> </a><a name=3D"capitel24"></a> Comparative Economic Performance of the EEC/EC</h3> Let us turn now to the economic "fundamentals" and see whether the historical evidence sup=ADports claims of a superior economic performance of the EEC/EC. Take first the "Golden Age" of post-wa= r economic growth (1950-73). During that period the performance of the EEC in terms of growth, inflation, investment and employment (Tables 1-6; see belo= w) was not superior to the other OECD countries =96 to the contrary it was usu= ally inferior. As Maddison and others have shown, the Golden Age corresponded to= a secular trend, which was largely shaped by institutions, technology, human capital formation and by the adoption of American Fordist, i.e. mass-production methods. The OECD countries were involved in a process of catching up with the more advanced United States a= nd Canada, where, correspondingly, growth and capital formation advanced at a somewhat slower pace. The tables 1-6 clearly indicate that t= he performance of the EEC countries during the Golden Age was not as brilliant= as that of the other catching-up countries of the OECD.<a style=3D"mso-= footnote-id: ftn100" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn100" name= =3D"_ftnref100" title=3D"">[100]</s= up></a> =B7&= nbsp; During the "crisis decades= " (Hobsbawm) that followed the Golden Age, the relative perfor=ADmance= of the EEC/EC did not improve at all. Instead it declined notably: Its GDP gro= wth was consistently lower and its rate of inflation higher than in most refere= nce countries and country groupings (Tables 1-2). =B7&= nbsp; The investment and employm= ent creation gap became notorious, while unemployment rose to record levels (Tables 3-4)= . Over the whole period from 1960 to 1994 employment growth was scandalously = low. Over two decades jobs were created almost exclusively in the public sector, very few in the private economy.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn101" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn101" name=3D"_ftnref101" = title=3D"">[101]</s= pan></a> In recent years job growth is somewhat higher, but still far below that in reference countries, while unemployment reached new record levels. The situation is particularly severe for the young and for persons above 45 as = well as for certain regions in the EU-member countries. <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn102" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fu= lltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn102" name=3D"_ftnref102" title=3D"">[102]</a> =B7&= nbsp; Finally, EC governments ac= cumulated public debt at a much faster pace than most other OECD countries. As a resu= lt the interest payments on public debt have become an ever larger burden (Tab= les 5-6). Hence, judging by the empirical eviden= ce, it is probably safe to conclude that the integration and the economic policies of= the EEC/EC did not generate additional economic benefits of any=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 27] significance that went beyond the ones of the Golden-Age period. It is ther= efore no accident that the EEC is entirely ignored in Maddison's discussion of the causes of growt= h (1991) as well as in other research on the Golden Age.<a style=3D"ms= o-footnote-id:ftn103" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#= _ftn103" name=3D"_ftnref103" title=3D"">[103]</s= up></a> On the other hand, in the struggle aga= inst the problems of the Crisis Decades that followed, the EEC/EC hardly proved more resourceful than the other non-integrated OECD countries. To the contrary, = it is difficult not to conclude that the EEC/EC=92s performance was deplorable= . It may be disheartening to hear that t= he performance of the EEC/EU has been relatively poor. In absolute term= s, especially during the Golden Age, it was of course quite good and there was= a considerable improvement in living standards in almost all parts of the community. That the performance was relatively poor is no argument against integration. To repeat: If the purpose of integration is political, it can = be perfectly acceptable that a price in terms of (rela=ADtive) economic perfor= mance and benefits is being paid. <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman&q= uot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 28] Tables on the Economic Performance = of the EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> (12 member countries; 1960-1994)<o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>= Plea= se note: Shaded areas indicate better performance than EEC/EC <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>= 1. Growth of Real GD= P<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso= -ansi-language: EN-GB"><o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDb <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a EU-15<o:p></o:p> b Number of countries varies<o:p></o= :p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> 2. Inflation (GDP) (yearly averages in per cent)<span= lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-ans= i-language: EN-GB"><o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC = <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 6,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 12,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 10,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 14,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 38,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 41,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 10,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 14,9b<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 12,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a&= nbsp; EU-15<o:p></o:p> b&= nbsp; Includes high inflation countries Mexico (average 29.8%) and Turkey (average 70.8%)<= o:p></o:p> c Number of countries varies<o:p></o= :p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font= -size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-farea= st-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 29] 3. Employment growth (yearly averages)<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,25<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,17<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,25<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,06<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,03<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,25<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6b<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,33<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a &nbs= p; EU-15<o:p></o:p> b &nbs= p; 1960-68<o:p></o:p> c &nbs= p; Number of countries varies<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> 4. Standardized Unemployment Rates</sp= an> (yearly averages)<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 10,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 7,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerlandc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> ..<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> ..<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,9e<o:= p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austriac<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 13,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDcd<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 11,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a &nbs= p; Germany, France, Italy, U.K., Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Value = for 1994 in=ADcludes Finland and Sweden<o:p></o:p>= b &nbs= p; EU-15<o:p></o:p> c &nbs= p; "Commonly used definitions" of unemployment in some cases; <o:p></o:p><= /p> d &nbs= p; number of countries varies<o:p></o:p> e &nbs= p; 1995-97<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <b= r clear=3D"all" style=3D"mso-special-character:line-break;page-break-before= :always">  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 30] 5. Net Lending of Government</p= > (surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a percenta= ge of GDP; yearly averages)<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1988-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,35<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -5,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +5,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> +5,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDb<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt= ; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECDc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt= ; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:25.5pt;margin= -bottom: 0cm;margin-left:49.65pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;mso-pagin= ation: widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt"><= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<sp= an style=3D"mso-tab-count:1"> &nbs= p; EC-15, excluding Luxemburg, including Norway<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right:25.5pt;margin-b= ottom: 0cm;margin-left:49.65pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;mso-pagin= ation: widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt"><= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">b<sp= an style=3D"mso-tab-count:1"> &nbs= p; Number of countries varies<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right:25.5pt;margin-b= ottom: 0cm;margin-left:49.65pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;mso-pagin= ation: widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt">c 19 OECD countrie= s<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:1.0pt;margin-right:25.5pt;margin= -bottom: 1.0pt;margin-left:49.65pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;line-height:10.0pt;mso-line-h= eight-rule: exactly;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt"> = <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> 6. General Government Net Debt Interes= t Payments (as a percentage of nominal GDP)<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-= ansi-language: EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1979<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1985<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1990<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1998<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/ECa<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECDb<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> A negative s= ign means higher interest receipts than payments <o:p></o:p> a EC-15, excluding Luxemburg, including Norway<o:p></o:p> b 22 countries<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"mso-ansi-font-size:12.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB= ">Sources of Tables 1-6: OECD, Economic Outlook (various issues), OECD 1989, 1995<o:p></= o:p>  <o:p></o:p> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font= -size:14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-farea= st-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 31] <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111943"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889891"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798390"> </a><a name=3D"capitel25"></a> The EU as a Policy Maker</h3> The EC and EU-Treaties name many polic= y areas, yet in only very few of them does the EU have exclusive or strong competencies. This does not really matter much, if one looks at it from the point of view= of facilitating institutionalised dialogues across the EU and beyond it. In ea= ch of the many policy areas the member countries are involved in continuous dialogue. As the treaties lend themselves to extensive interpretations, practically any issue in the fields of government and politics can be taken= up at the level of the EU. In a sense the ineffectiveness of thes= e dialogues and their curious dynamics =96 you solve one problem and you find seven new= ones =96 are a guarantee of their permanence. Effective negotia=ADtions with goo= d results in little time, even though they are of course desirable as such, t= here=ADfore are not necessarily a sign of progress of integration. Negotiations are cumbersome =96 and that is precisely the point. In spite of that queer logic, in some = areas the EC has proved to be a relatively good policy maker. The aim to create a moneta= ry union helped a great deal to bring down inflation rates and new government = debt in most member countries (unfortunately at the price of lower growth rates = and higher unemployment). For the member governments it was convenient to have = the EU, because they could put the blame for their unpopular policies onto the = EU =96 or the Bundesbank.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn104" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn104" name=3D"_ftnref104" title= =3D"">[104]</a> In recent years, the European Commissi= on has shown its teeth in competition policy and has been able to make points against me= mber governments, which often want to protect their turf. It has taken some spectacular decisions by imposing record fines on several firms and by bloc= k=ADing or conditioning some mergers. Equally, in some cases it forcefully interven= ed against subsi=ADdies by member governments for private enterprises. These accomplishments have been made possible by European integration. They also = led to some functional spill-over, as most member countries did not even have legislation on competition in the past. The strengthening and the centralisati= on of competition policy at the EC level, in spite of many limitations, produced results which would not have been achieved by most member countries by themselves. It made it more difficult for national governments and for the = EC itself to pursue active industrial policies. "Even if the economic fashion were to change in the foreseeable future, an interventionist policy would b= e extremely difficult to pursue for political and institutional reasons."<a styl= e=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn105" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/007= 30.htm#_ftn105" name=3D"_ftnref105" title=3D"">[105]</s= up></a> Therefore, EC competition policy, as i= s its task, has pushed us toward more market efficien=ADcy and more effective decision taking: the rule of law tends to prevail. That has strengthened the EU as a formal institution, i.e. its character as a state. However, there are some downsides=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 32] too: more, and particularly stronger rules, leave less room for compromising and negotiating, and therefore reduce the need for institutionalised dialogue. On the other hand, the application of stronger rules can lead to fierce opposition by the affected interest groups and mem= ber countries, and therefore arouse anti-EU feelings and weaken the cohesion of= the Union. The basic problem, here as elsewhere, is that it is unclear to what extent the EU has the legitimacy to assume state functions. In regional development policy, which = after agriculture receives the second highest share in the EU-budget<a sty= le=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn106" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn106" name=3D"_ftnref106" title=3D"">[106]</s= up></a>, the EU has played an important role, a= nd has made efforts to orient its poli=ADcies along objective criteria and follow less the desires of governments and politicians. There are enormous differences in income among countries and regions of the EU. The difference in per capita income betwee= n Ham=ADburg and the Portuguese= Norte, the poorest region of t= he EU, is in the order of 10 to 1. Unemployment in the poorer regions is often well a= bove the EU average. The basic purpose of the regional funds is to support the development of backward regions and the transformation of regions in indust= rial decline (among them, for example, east Germany). Other purposes are to figh= t long-term and youth unem=ADployment and to develop rural areas. Even though= all governments try to get as much money back as possible, there still is a considerable transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer members of= the EU. Without the EU, transfers of such magn= itude would obviously not exist.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn107" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn107" name=3D"_ftnref107" title= =3D"">[107]</a> Nevertheless, when compared with the magnitude of interregional transfers within nations<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn108" href=3D"= https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn108" name=3D"_ftnref108" t= itle=3D"">[108]</a>, these transfers are quite small and amount only to a small fraction of the GDP of the EU-15.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn109"= href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn109" name=3D"_ftn= ref109" title=3D"">[109]</a> In fact, the scarcity of these funds, for many observers, is a matter of concern with respect to the stability of the monetary union. Cumulative differences in economic growth and asymmetric regional shocks co= uld turn out to be the Achilles=92 heel of monetary union and cause problems fo= r the cohesion of the EU.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn110" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn110" name=3D"_ftnref110" title= =3D"">[110]</a> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 33] To these limitations one might add tha= t the results of EU regional policy generally have not been very satisfactory.</s= pan><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn111" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/full= text/id/00730.htm#_ftn111" name=3D"_ftnref111" title=3D"">[111]</s= up></a> Nevertheless, it reflects a veritable effort of a com= mon EU-economic policy. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the transfers depends o= n the willingness of the richer member countries to sacrifice some of their resources. Their insufficiency with respect to EMU may soon become apparent= . Eastern enlargement of the EU and the programs for the Mediter=ADranean cou= ntries also will seriously test the willingness of member countries to put forward= the necessary means. On the other hand, there are a number = of areas too where the EU should be active but isn=92t. There are tax havens within the = EU from which companies and private investors obtain immen=ADse benefits at th= e expense of the treasuries of the member countries =96 and therefore of the = ones who in fact pay their taxes. Incredible as it may seem, the EU through its regional policies has actually supported the creation of such tax havens.</= span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn112" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/ful= ltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn112" name=3D"_ftnref112" title=3D"">[112]</s= up></a> Hence, with the exception of a few pol= icy fields the EU is not a very effective policy maker. Yet, in terms of integration t= his need not be a serious defect. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc470889892"></a><a name=3D"_Toc463111944"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798391"> </a><a name=3D"capitel26"></a> Advantages and Disadvantages of Size </h3> We have already seen that large countr= ies or economically integrated regions do not necessari=ADly do better economicall= y than small countries. Within a large economic area cumulative diffe=ADrential processes of economic growth are more likely than in smaller ones. To maint= ain minima of social coherence and political legitimacy, it is necessary to ameliorate differences in develop=ADment potentials and to provide income s= upport to needy people and deficit-ridden public insti=ADtutions. For these purpos= es all developed countries operate complex transfer systems. Depen=ADding on its l= evel, the political integration of countries requires solidarity of the richer toward the poorer countries. This can = be considered a disadvantage of size <a name=3D"_Toc463111945">On the other= hand, there are some economic advantages of size too. The main one is the sturdiness it confers to the economy: A large country is not much affected by changes in the value of its currency = as most economic activities are related to the home market. A large country li= ke the US can get away, even for extended periods of time, with seriously distorted economic fundamentals and questionable economic policies (for example, the huge and still growing US current account deficit and her bubb= le economy). Equally, a large country is barely affected by economic and polit= ical crises in other countries, so long as they are consid=ADerably smaller.</sp= an></a><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn113" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/f= ulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn113" name=3D"_ftnref113" title=3D""><spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-tex= t-raise: 0pt">[113]</a> One can expect then that the EU with the full implementation of the European Moneta= ry Union will be able to reap the benefits of economic sturdiness. Furthermore= , to the extent that the Euro will be held a reserve currency, the benefits of <= i style=3D"mso-bidi-font-style:normal">seignorage will accrue to Eurola= ndia. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 34] The sturdiness of a large economy, of course, means that even minor changes in = its econo=ADmic performance or policies can have serious repercussions in smaller economies. The latter=92s au= tonomy is smaller, they have to be more flexible, must avoid structural rigidities= , and can not easily afford policy mistakes.<a style=3D"mso-foo= tnote-id: ftn114" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn114" name= =3D"_ftnref114" title=3D""><= span style=3D"mso-special-character:footnote">= [114]</a> Benign neglect is not an option for them. Benign neglect of the smaller countries is but one option for a large country. For example, the US has actively meddled in the economic and general affairs of both Mexico and Nicara=ADgua. Econo= mic dependency makes small countries vulnerable and politically dependent too. The dominant power has many means an= d ways to put on the pressure and even to inflict pun=ADishments. It can allo= w itself to be arrogant. It can use the small neighbouring countries as a val= ve to diffuse political pressure at home.<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn115" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn115" name= =3D"_ftnref115" title=3D""><= span style=3D"mso-special-character:footnote">= [115]</a> And it can defend its so-called national interests (usually large companies and organised interes= t groups) abroad. One can consider the possibility of such behaviour an advantage of size. Whatever v= iew one prefers, the EU is well experienced in this field. A harmless example i= s when it persuaded , in the course of the project "Europe 1992", non-EC capital to be invested within its frontiers. Yet there are less harm= less cases too: In negotiations over fishing rights with Morocco and other count= ries in North and West Africa the EU repeatedly and shamelessly imposed unequal = trea=ADties upon them. Another case is the dumping of its heavily subsidised agricultur= al surpluses into Africa and Eastern Europe resulting in large damages to the local production. In fact, in most cases such ruthless externa= l behaviour of the EU was the result of internal compromising among membe= r countries and their interests, and the inability of the EU to find rational= and sustainable solutions to some of its problems. That is one of the downsides= of the institutionalised dialogue of the EU. In other words, in a number of ca= ses we have integrated further by inflicting considerable damage on small or politically weak countries. If the EU had a unitary, single EU foreign and security policy<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn116" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/0073= 0.htm#_ftn116" name=3D"_ftnref116" title=3D"">[116]</a>, such an export of internal problems might be amended in the name of coherence. But to what purpose would we want to have= a coherent foreign and security policy? Would we want to be fair to the small= and weak countries in our periphery? Would we be ready to support their develop= ment efforts financially, through technical assistance etc.? Would we throw open= our doors for their exports and for training their people =96even though some w= ill find ways to stay? Or, would our main interest lie in the stabilisation of = an hegemonic order in our backyard, preventing emigration to the EU and maintaining political regimes to our liking. Currently, the signs are ominous: After the Kosovo war many voices are demanding, for instance, a Rapid Deployment Force<= /i> for the EU =96 in order "to provide ourselves for stability [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 35] on our continent".<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn117" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn117" name=3D"_ftnref117" title= =3D"">[117]</s= up></a> Where exactly on our continent?, one naturally asks. Where does it end? Don=92t we really mean o= ur =91sphere of influence=92? Or even the world? "Where there is European capi= tal , there are European interests" could well become one of our measuring rods= . For an economic giant that feels like a political dwarf, it would not be without logic to move in that direction. The EU as a regional power is not the onl= y issue affecting the process toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Th= e other issues are its relations with= the dominant power =96 the US and its role in the power games of the 21<sup= >st century given the emergence of China and the possible re-emergence of Russi= a. There the danger is that we could relapse into the old European balance-of-power ga=ADmes<a style=3D"mso-footnote= -id: ftn118" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn118" name= =3D"_ftnref118" title=3D""><= span style=3D"mso-special-character:footnote">= [118]</a>, yet on a world scale. We know that size "not only leads to power, it is power".<a styl= e=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn119" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/007= 30.htm#_ftn119" name=3D"_ftnref119" title=3D"">[119]</a> The primary causes of= war during the 19th and the 20th century in Europe were the size and the econom= ic and military capabilities of some countries. EU aspirations to rise to superpower status could give way to a new Cold War. They could also challen= ge other countries to rise to similar status. Systems with four or five great powers are even more unstable and dangerous than systems with only two powe= rs . Hence, the EU faces a dilemma: If it aspires to become a world power, it accelerat= es or even sets in motion a spiral of mutual distrust, conflict and re-armamen= t. If it resigns itself to the role of a subservient political dwarf, it will = be reproached for not harnessing, in spite of its size and economic importance= , US unilateralism; for not preventing further humiliations; for not defending i= ts interests effectively; and for not mediating conflicts in other parts of th= e world. Clearly, neither option is desirable. Could this unpromising dilemma situation be avoided? =B7 = ; First, one might note, of = course not in the spirit of justifying existing unipolarity, that such an arrangement = is less unstable, less dangerous and potentially less destructive than multipo= =ADlarity.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn120" href=3D"https:/= /library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn120" name=3D"_ftnref120" title=3D= "">[120]</a> =B7 Second, one might remember= Jean Monnet=92s method of engrenage = and institution building: Are we not already involved in the process of develop= ing international rules and laws and of transferring sovereignty to internation= al bodies? Will this in the end not be more effective to limit inter alia hegemonic power? Such an approach makes things easier for the smaller countries too. They can, more = than large countries, benefit from international rules and institutions =96 at l= east as long as these are=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 36] not made or controlled by superpower interests. The EU itself offers an excellent example: The smaller member countries enjoy the = same rights as the larger ones and possess much recourse against the infringemen= ts of their interests by the latter (which still try, of course).</span= > To conclude, there are some economic advantages of size but there are disadvantages too. It is cumbersome and it costs money to maintain a suffic= ient degree of social and political co=ADherence in a large economic area. Some = of the most prosperous countries are small. The political advantages of size are, to put it mildly, ambivalent. There can b= e much scope for unscrupulous behaviour against politically weak countries. T= he desire to become a counter=ADvailing hegemonic power evokes the dangers of = a new Cold War and of balance-of-power games, an old, and as we (still) believe, eradicated European disease. Monnet=92s approach could help to restrain the= power of states, even of hegemonic ones. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc470889893"></= a><a name=3D"_Toc478798392"><spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB"> </a><a name=3D"capitel27"></a> Lessons to be learnt?</h3> = Summarising the results, of this section, we find 1.&nbs= p; In the case of the EEC/EC, economic integration was a means to the end of politica= l inte=ADgration. Political integration did not depend on economic or other benefits of integration. In terms of the political priorities even welfare losses can be justified as the price to be paid for political integration.<= /span> 2.&nbs= p; Economic integration was always a matter of negotiations and packaging: it can hardl= y be expected that such procedures lead to an optimisation of economic welfare.<= /span> 3.&nbs= p; As long as world trade was not liberalised, a case could be made in favour of a customs=92 union on the basis of economies of scale. Now it is difficult to= make such a case. The eco=ADnomic benefits derived from the liberalisation of th= e internal market of the EC have not been large. Further benefits on this gro= und cannot be expected in the future, because by now there are only a few intra= -EU restrictions left. 4.&nbs= p; European integration was in any case not an exercise in free-market economics, but, = espe=ADcially during the early post-war years and much of the Golden Age, a comprehensive devel=ADopment effort. At that it was quite successful. This could be a les= son for other countries and regions. Russia and other Eastern European countrie= s have learned the hard way that free markets without such a comprehensive development effort destroy rather than create the conditions for economic growth and prosperity. 5.&nbs= p; The specific contribution of EEC economic integration to the high growth rates = and the high levels of welfare achieved during the Golden Age (1950-73) was probably negligible. Nevertheless growing prosperity during this period conferred legitimacy on European inte=ADgration. 6.&nbs= p; During the crisis decades that followed the Golden Age, the EC did not offer much resil=ADience. To the contrary, its economic performance was remarkably inf= erior to most other OECD countries. 7.&nbs= p; Policy making remains a matter of the member countries in most policy areas. In a = few areas [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 37] the EC has shown a certain effectiveness and it has induced improvements in policies of member countries. Ineffectiveness does not have to be a disadvantage in terms of the more fundamental, political purposes of integration. 8.&nbs= p; The size of an integrated economic area makes it more robust against developments in other countries and regions of the world. If an economic union has a single currency, this curren=ADcy is likely to become a reserve currency and to co= nfer seignorage gains to the union. 9.&nbs= p; Size also confers power that can be exercised on the international stage. Spill-over effects of internal compromising of the EU have already caused considerable damage to small and weak countries. A coherent and common EU security and foreign policy (which remains in the realm of dreams<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn121" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn121" name= =3D"_ftnref121" title=3D"">[121]</a>) could concentrate, for example, on the stabilisation of political regimes i= n the periphery of the EU (of course, in the name of democracy and free marke= t access for our companies!) and on controlling immigration from there. </spa= n> 10. The power conferred by size can al= so be used to countervail hegemonic power. Such an exercise of power evokes the danger= s of a new Cold War and of balance-of-power games, an old European disease, whic= h we (still) believe to have defeated for good. The alternative is international institution building in the spirit of Jean Monnet. Engrenage could well be more effective in containing US hegemon= ic unilateralism. <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> <h2><a name=3D"_Toc463111946"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889894"></a><a name= =3D"_Toc478798393"> </a><a name=3D"capitel3"></a> 3. Institutionalised Dialogue and other Roads to Peace<o:p></o:p></h2> = As a result of the process of European integration, Europe has been enjoying a long period= of stable peace. Military might and menace play no role in the relations withi= n the European Union. That is an enormous achievement in view of the bloody history of our continent. There had not been a grand design for = this. Instead the process took place under rather dif=ADficult historical and pol= itical conditions. It was path dependent to a very high degree, i.e. it could not = be planned in advance and its progress often enough depended simply on good lu= ck. With hindsight, probably the most important element in this process was the creation of insti=ADtutionalised dialogues in an ever larger number of poli= cy fields both within and outside the framework of the EEC/EC/EU. This led to = what has been called at the beginning of this paper a "new culture of conflict management" in Europe. Negotiations within the EU are a rathe= r cumbersome and slow affair =96 and that is precisely the point: a permanent need to me= et, consult, negotiate, travel, plus the pleasures of the excel=ADlent cuisine = in Brussels and of friendships developed over the years. The persons directly invol=ADved in these processes of institutionalised dialogue probably were = not even aware that they were part and parcel of a new architecture of peace fo= r Europe =96 in their own mind they were struggling to define or to defend th= eir country=92s positions. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 38] Neither effective negotiating nor econ= omic efficiency were essential for integration. To the contrary: the logic of political integration =96 the permanent need to negotiate =96 often runs co= un=ADter to effective decision taking and economic efficiency. Nevertheless, one is always waging a battle to improve both ... Therefore it would be certainly misplaced to judge the process of integration in terms of the effectiveness= of political decision-taking or of the economic benefits it generates (or does= not generate). Pure logic and historical experience indicate that peace can har= dly be gained without political compromising and economic sacrifices.</p= > The European way toward a peace commun= ity was unique, as all historical processes are. Generalisations are inherently ver= y difficult and are always cognitively biased. Therefore one should tread thi= s territory with the greatest of caution. Personally, I found that something = can be learnt from Monnet=92s approach, that is supra-national integration and = the creation of a mul=ADtiplicity of institutionalised dialogues. In spite of m= any defects, this is where the EU has excel=ADled. An integral part of Monnet's approach was to get the priorities right. This is where the EU does not exc= el and looking at the present and future challenges it faces these fears are n= ot easi=ADly dispelled. If the ulterior aim is to create a sta= ble order of peace, one can ask, besides the peculiar way taken by Western Europe, what other means could be used for that end. I can see nine alterna=ADtives, the advantages and disadvantages of which are briefly discussed. They are arran= ged in order of their potential contribution to the formation of a stable peace community. = 1. Treaties of non-aggression: Their purpose is to prevent wars, but they are treat= ies of con=ADvenience for the signatories. They are not really based on trust a= nd they are not intended to build trustful relationships among them. Whether a= nd how they are observed, will depend on all sorts of circumstances. They cann= ot eliminate the possibility of war. 2.&nbs= p; Power balance politics</i= >: As we know from European history in particular, this is a danger=ADous game and one that ge= ts easily out of hand. The Cold War was a special case with only two powers: Without nuclear deterrence on both sides, it might not have been stable for such a long time. Historically, the succession of one dominant power by ano= ther was usu=ADally achieved through war. 3.&nbs= p; Hegemonic power: The = main purpose of a hegemonic power is not peace as such, but other interests. These however mi= ght suffer from military conflicts within the hegemonic sphere. = During the Cold War there were hot wars which reflected either the inherent logic = of the Cold War or the idiosyncrasies of the hegemon. = If there are several hegemons or would-be hegemons, a durable peace cannot be expect= ed. The ability of the hegemon to prevent wars by its military prowess depends = on internal power coalitions and on what public opinion is ready to bear. Henc= e, it cannot be relied upon. = Hegemonic peace always depends to a certain extent on force, coercion and submission.= Its inherent asymmetry contains the seeds of opposition and rebellion, and therefore potential instability. Once the hegemon=92s clout becomes less impressive, opposition to the harsh dis=AD [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 39] cipline it imposes is almost unavoidable. = When the period of 'peaceful co-existence' began in the early 1960s, demands for political reform started to flourish, the European integration progress alm= ost came to a halt and France began to reassert herself vis-=E0-vis the United States. 4.&nbs= p; External federator: I= n order to induce countries to form a 'Union' the common enemy must be perceived to be very strong and menacing. The 'Union' would then make the greatest effort to bui= ld up its military potential. As long as there is no fear of 'guaranteed mutua= l destruction' these efforts might even increase the likelihood of war.<a sty= le=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn122" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn122" name=3D"_ftnref122" title=3D"">[122]</a> 5.&nbs= p; Economic interdependence<= /i>: There are good arguments as to why trade should foster peace; yet there are arguments too against this proposition.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn123" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn123" name=3D"_ftnref123" title= =3D"">[123]</s= pan></a> There is strong historical evidence against it: Just before World War I for= eign trade as a share of GDP in the European coun=ADtries had already reached le= vels comparable to the ones of the 1990s. The world economy was highly integrate= d then, yet this still could not prevent the war. The causes of the war were = not economic. Yet, as has been stressed by Carr (1968) the process of the socialisation of the nation-state, i.e. the domestication of capital and it= s political subordination, was already far advanced. The laissez-faire, single-world economy was replaced by a multiplicity of national economies. Capital and government came to live in a symbiotic relationship and nationa= l enterprises were an integral part of the war efforts. = Economic nationalism has not disappeared. Even nowadays we tend to perceive, for ins= tan=ADce, Japan and other East Asian countries as competitors. And much of the talks = on globali=ADsation are driven by fears that capital dissociates itself again = from the nation-state. Under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that economic interdependence is a promoter of peace. 6.&nbs= p; International treaties: Such treaties deal with conflicts of interest between nations and therefore define the ri= ghts and responsibilities of the parties involved. They do not deal with common interests, but with the separation of interests. If circumstances change, t= he conflicts can remerge. 7.&nbs= p; International co-operation: It involves at least some elements, which the parties have in common. Hence, it can strengthen bonds among them and can even expand into areas other than the o= nes originally signed for. 8.&nbs= p; Political integration= : Some common interests and even some common good ought to be present in cases of politic= al integration. The more areas of policy making are incorporated into the poli= tics of the Union, the stronger the inner bonds become. = The question of the legitimacy of political integration cannot be neglected. If= it remains a matter of the political and governmental elites, and if the resul= ts of integration as perceived [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 40] by the citizenries are not satisfactory, it can breed opposition. Hence even political integrati=ADon can be reversible. In= any case, it requires continuous management of potential conflicts. 9.&nbs= p; Social integration: E= uropean integration has been an affair of the European elites. Because of the prominence of supra-national integration and institutionalised dialogue, it could not be otherwise. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to identify European integration only with the political and governmental elites. = In fact everyday life of the European tribes has become quite Europeanised and internatio=ADnalised. Quite a number of Europeans do not live in their coun= try of origin but in some other country of the EU or elsewhere in the world. A vas= t majority of the people have spent time in other countries of Europe for holiday, business or study. Tens of millions are on the move every summer. There are no more border controls. Trains and motorways form inte=ADgrated European networks. Young people spend a school or college year in other countries. You can watch at least some television programs from other EU countries everywhere and so on. Social intercourse across countries has bec= ome quite intensive and we take pleasure in it. We still might make jokes about= the others (just as we do about the people from the neighbouring town or villag= e), but basically we perceive each other as equals. The times when the European tribes hated each other seem very remote and almost incomprehensible. </spa= n> = That means, social integration, through unfettered travel, tourism, exchange programs, city partnerships, sports leagues, language learning, curricula w= ith information on other coun=ADtries and peoples etc. is of primary importance= for the development of a peace community, as well as for its permanence and acceptance by the citizenries. Once one has found out that the "others" are just human beings like oneself, the mental constructions of "strangers" lose their vilifying basis and cannot easily be manipulated anymore by nationalist demagogues.<a style=3D"mso-footno= te-id: ftn124" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn124" name= =3D"_ftnref124" title=3D"">[124]</s= up></a> <spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB"> <= /span>Alas, this may be too optimistic a view. Certainly, wars among the members of the EU have become impossible. Social integration was both a result and a cause of this elimination of the possibility of war. Unfortunately that does not mean tha= t social and ethnic conflicts have disappeared. To the contrary such conflict= s are becoming more frequent and widespread, particularly within cities and regions. The ethnification of politics can, as in former Yugo=ADslavia, eve= n lead to military conflict. The biggest future challenge for Europe could well be= internal peace =96 especially = in times of rising economic and social inequalities. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 41] =  <o:p></o:p> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"f= ont-size: 14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";ms= o-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> <h2 style=3D"margin-top:0cm"><a name=3D"_Toc463111947"></a><a name=3D"_= Toc470889895"></a><a name=3D"_Toc478798394"> </a><a name=3D"capitel4"></a> References</h2> Arnold, Hans, Europa am Ende? Die Aufl= =F6sung von EG und NATO. M=FCnchen: Piper Verlag, 1993. Barber, Tony, Bright picture disguises regional imbalances. In: Financial Times Survey, Euro-Zone Economy, Dec. 3, 1999, p. 3. Bayoumi, T./Masson, P.R., Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: lessons for monetary union in Europe, in: European Economic Review, 1996. Belke, Ansgar/Gros, Daniel, Asymmetric Shocks and EMU: Is There a Need for a Stability Fund?</i= > In: Intereconomics, Nov./Dec. 1998, pp. 274-288 Boulding, Kenneth E., Stable Peace, Austin, Texas, 21989 Carr, E.H., Nationalism and After, London: MacMillan, 1968 (orig. 1945). Cecchini, Paolo (avec la collaboration= de Michel Capinat, Alexis Jacque=ADmin), 1992= . Le D=E9fi. Nouvelles donn=E9es =E9conomiques de l'Europe sans fronti=E8res= . Paris: Flammarion/Commission Europ=E9enne, 1988. Cramon Daiber, Birgit, Wilde Rede an Europa. Europa ist nicht, was es war. Europa ist nich= t, was es sein will. Existiert Europa? Berlin: Edition Lit.europe, 1994.</= span> Curzon, Gerard und Victoria, Follies in European Trade Relations with Japan. In: World Econo= my, Vol. 10, 2, 1987, 155-76. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Die Zeit, 27.8.93.</= span> Dahrendorf, Ralf, Alle Eier in einen Korb. Interview. In: Der Spiegel, Nr. 50, 19= 95, pp. 27-33. Dell, Edmund, The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe. Oxford Univ. Press, 1995. DeMause, Lloyd, Reagans Amerika, Frankfurt, 1987. Duch=EAne, Fran=E7ois, Jean Monnet. The First Statesman of Interdependence, N.Y., Lond= on: W.W. Nor=ADton, 1994 Eatwell, John, The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community. In: Jonathan Michie, John G. Smith, eds., Unemployment in Europe, London et al.: Academic Press, 1994, pp. 209-19. Engel, Christian, Die schleichende Zentralisierung Europas. Friedrich-Ebert-Stift= ung, August 1995. Europ=E4ische Kommission, Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1995, in: Europ=E4ische Wirtschaft, Nr= . 59, 1995. Frankel, Benjamin, ed., The Cold War 1945-1991, Vol. 3, Resources. Detroit et al.: Manl= y, 1993. Friend, Julius W., The Linchpin: French-German Relations 1950-1990, New York 1991.= Gasteyger, Curt, Europa zwischen Spaltung und Einigung 1945 bis 1993, Bundeszent= rale f=FCr politi=ADsche Bildung, Bd. 321, 1994. Geske, Otto-Erich, Wor=FCber entscheidet das Bundesverfassungsgericht beim L=E4nderfinanzausgleich? In: Wirtschaftsdienst, VIII, 1999, pp. 487-496= . Hirschman, Albert O., Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, o= r Feeble?, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XX, Dec. 1982, 1463-84.</= span> Hobsbawm, Eric, Age of Extremes, The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991. London= et al.: Penguin, 1994. Hondrich, Karl Otto, Der Krieg und Europas Grenzen. In: Merkur, 53, 7, Juli 1999. </= span> Huntington, Samuel P., The Erosion of National Interest. In: Foreign Affairs, 76, 5, 1= 997, pp 28-64. Justi, Johann Heinrich Gottlob von, <i= style=3D"mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Die Chim=E4re des Gleichgewichts von = Europa, eine Abhandlung, worinnen die Richtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit dieses zeitherigen Lehrgeb=E4udes des Staatskunst deutlich vor Augen geleget, und = dabey allenthalben neue und r=FChrende Betrachtungen =FCber die Ursachen der Krie= ge und den wesentlichen Grunde, worauf die Macht eines Staates ankommt, beygebrach= t werden. Altona: David Iversen, 1758. Kamppeter, Werner, Steuerflucht im Binnenmarkt. In: Mitbestimmung, 10, 1997, pp. 20-23. Kohr, Hans, Disunion Now. A plea for a society based upon small autonomous units. In: The Co= m=ADmonweal, Vol. XXXIV, 23, Sept. 26, 1941, pp. 540-42. Kohr, Leopold, The Breakdown of Nations, Llandybie, Carmarthenshire: Christopher Davies, 1= 957. Kolko, Gabriel, The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-= 45, London, 1969. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 42] Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power, National Security, the Truman Administrat= ion, and the Cold War, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992. McCallum, John, A Canadian Lesson for EMU, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, Brussels, December 16, 1997 Maddison, Angus, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development. A Long-Run Comparative Vi= ew. Oxford University Press, 1991. Marglin, Stephen, Schor, Juliet B., ed= s., The Golden Age of Capitalism. R= einterpreting the Postwar Experience. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991. Mitrany, David, The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional? In: Groom, A.J.R., Taylor, Paul, ed., Function= alism, Theory and Practice in International Relations, London: University of London Press, 1975, pp. 53-78 (Revised version of an article with the same title in the J. of Common Market Studies, Dec. 1995). Monnet, Jean, M=E9moires, Paris: Librairie Fayard, 1976. Moreau Defarges, Philippe, France and EU. Paper presented at the International Symposium, = A New European Order and Euro-Japan Relations, Chuo University, Dec. 19-20, 1= 995. M=F6schel, Wernhard, Europapolitik zwischen deutscher Romantik und gallischer Klarheit</= i>, In: Aus Poli=ADtik und Zeitgeschichte, B 3-4, 13.1.1995, pp. 10-16.<= /p> Nahrendorf, Rainer, Teure St=FCtze, Handelsblatt, Feb. 21, 1996. OECD, Economic Outlook, various issues (latest: June 1999). OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1987, Paris, 1989, and 1990-1987, Paris, 1995.<= /p> OECD, Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, Paris, 1987. Olson, Mancur, Economic Nationalism and Economic Progress. In: The World Economy, Vol. 10, 3, S= ept. 1987, pp. 241-64. Sachs, J./Sala-i-Martin, X., Fiscal Federalism and optimum currency areas: evidence from Euro= pe and the United States, in: M. Canzonieri et al., eds., Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the = US, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Samuelson, Paul A., Full Employment after the War, in: S. Harris, ed., Post-war Economic Problems, New York, 1943, 27-53. Scharpf, Fritz W., Games in Hierarchies and Networks. Analytical and Empirical Approac= hes to the Study of Governance Institutions. Frankfurt: Campus; Boulder, Co= l.: Westview Press, 1993. Schmitt, Burkhard, Auch die Bundesrepublik strebte einst nach Atomwaffen, Frankfur= ter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.9.1995, 10. Southey, Caroline, High jobless reat haunts EU leaders. Financial Times, Dec. 16/1= 7, 1995, II, p. 2. Tsoukalis, Loukas, The New European Economy. The Politics and Economics of Integra=ADt= ion. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1993. Walker, Martin, The Cold War, London: Vintage Books, 1994. Weidenfeld, Werner, Europ=E4ische Einigung im historischen =DCberblick. In: W. Weid= enfeld, W. Wessels, Hg., Europa von A-Z. Taschenbuch der europ=E4ischen Integration. Bonn: Institut f=FCr Euro= =ADp=E4ische Politik, Europa Union Verlag, 1994. Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang, = Europe from A to Z, Guide to Europe= an Integration, Institut f=FCr Europ=E4ische Politik, 1998. Weizs=E4cker, Richard von, Europa mu=DF erwachsen werden. Die Zeit, 21.10.99, S. 2.= Working Group on European Integration,= Strengthen the European Parliament= . The European Parlia=ADment Controls the European Union. National Parliaments Co= ntrol their Governments. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Division of Foreign Poli= cy Research, Working Paper No. 3, 1997 (1997a). Working Group on European Integration,= Binnenmarkt und W=E4hrungsunion er= fordern Angleichung der Unternehmens- und Kapitalbesteue=ADrung. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abteilung Au=DFenpolitikfor=ADschung, Arbeitspapi= er Nr. 4, 1997 (1997b). Woyke, Wichard, Europ=E4ische Politische Gemeinschaft. In: Woyke, Wichard, Hg.,= Europ=E4ische Ge=ADmeinschaft. Problemfelder-Institutionen-Politik M=FCnchen 1984 (Pipers W=F6rterbuch= zur Politik). Zielinski, Michael, Friedensursachen, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995. <hr>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p> </div><font= size=3D"+1"> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:18.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman&q= uot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section4"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;mso-= bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:&quo= t;Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"><b= r clear=3D"all" style=3D"page-break-before:always"> Intern= ational Policy Analysis Unit =96 Analyseeinheit Internationale Politik<o:p></o:p></= b>  <o:p></o:p> Recent Publications <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> </div> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Frutiger 45 Light";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman= ";mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section5"> Globali= zation and Justice Modernization of Social Democracy<o:p></o:p> Alf= red Pfaller:<o:p></o:p> Social Democracy = in the Globalized Post-industrial Society<o:p></o:p> (24 pages, March 2000; German version in preparation)<o:p></o:p> Mic= hael Ehrke:<o:p></o:p> =84Globalization = With a Human Face=93<o:p></o:p> Angels=E4chsische Dokumente zum =84Dritten Weg=93<o:p></o:p> (13 Pages, Februa= r 2000; in German)<o:p></o:p> Knu= t Emmerich:<o:p></o:p> Der d=E4nische Erfolgsweg zum Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit<o:p></o:p> (20 pages, Decemb= er 1999)<o:p></o:p> Alf= red Pfaller:<o:p></o:p> F=FChrt internati= onale Konkurrenz zum Sozialabbau? Elf Argumentationsfiguren<o:p></o:p> (12 pages, Decemb= er 1999)<o:p></o:p> Mic= hael Ehrke:<o:p></o:p> Revisionism Revis= ited<o:p></o:p> The Third Way and European Social Democracy<o:p></o:p> (23 pages, Novemb= er 1999, also available in German)<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> Working= Group on "Europ=E4ische Integration" <o:p></o:p>= The EU needs further reforms of the CAP prior to eastward enlargement<o:p></o:p= > Working Paper Nr.= 9<o:p></o:p> (4 pages, to be published in April 2000; also available in German)<o:p></o:p> Verst=E4rkte Zusammenarbeit in der EU<o:p></o:p> Thesen<o:p></o:p>= (7 pages, March 2= 000)<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> The EU must concentrate its constitutional reform on a few essentials <o:p></o:p></span= > Working Paper Nr.= 8 (November 1999; also available in German)<o:p></o:p> The EU needs an efficient and effective Commission<o:p></o:p> Working Paper Nr.= 7<o:p></o:p> (May 1999, also available in German)<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> Other Publications<o:p></o:p> Wol= fgang Quaisser / Monika Hartmann / Elmar H=F6nekopp / Michael Brandmeier:<= /i><o:p></o:p></= p> Die Osterweiterun= g der Europ=E4ischen Union: Konsequenzen f=FCr Wohlstand und Besch=E4ftigung in Europa<o:p></o:p></span= > (167 pages, voraussichtlich M=E4rz 2000)<o:p></o:p> Mic= hael Frenkel / Lukas Menkhoff:<o:p></o:p> Stabile Weltfinan= zen?<o:p></o:p> Die Debatte um ei= ne neue internationale Finanzarchitektur<o:p></o:p> (133 pages, Febru= ary 2000, nur im Buchhandel, Preis DM 36</= u>)<o:p></o:p> Oli= ver Thr=E4nert (ed.):<o:p></o:p> Preventing the proliferation of weapons of = mass destruction : what role for arms control?<o:p></o:p> (154 pages, Octob= er 1999)<o:p></o:p> Wer= ner Kamppeter:<o:p></o:p> Nachkriegszeit in Kosovo: W=FCste oder Wirtschaftswunder?<o:p></o:p> (18 pages, June 1= 999)<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>= <div style=3D"border:solid windowtext .75pt;padding:1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt= "> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:3.45pt;margin= -bottom: 6.0pt;margin-left:0cm;border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext .75pt; padding:0cm;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt">Most of the above publications are available onlin= e: http://www.fes.de <o:p></o:= p> Please direct your orders to<sp= an lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Frutiger 45 L= ight";mso-ansi-language: EN-GB">:<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:3.0pt;margin-right:3.45pt;margin= -bottom: 0cm;margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;border:none;mso-border-alt:solid = windowtext .75pt; padding:0cm;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt">Ursula M=FCller, International Policy Analysis Unit, Friedrich Ebert Foundation,<b= r> 53170 Bonn, Germany Tel. (0)228.883-212, Fax: (0)228.883.625; e-mail: Ursula.Mueller@fes.de<o:p></o:p> </div>  <o:p></o:p></p= > </div> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Frutiger 45 Light";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman= ";mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section6">  <o:p></o:p></p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote-list"> <hr align=3D"left" size=3D"1" width=3D"33%">  <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn1"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn1" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref1" name=3D"_ftn1" title=3D"= ">[1]</= span></a> Zielinsky, 1995, p.18. Boulding defines as stable peace a situation "in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved." (1989, p.13).<o:p></o:p></span= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn2"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn2" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref2" name=3D"_ftn2" title=3D"= ">[2]</= span></a> The Cold war "was about the balance of power, a war of the German succession, and at the same time it was an ideological confrontation." (Walker, 1994, p. 5).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn3"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn3" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref3" name=3D"_ftn3" title=3D"= ">[3]</a> "The CIA estimated that a swift economic collapse might catapult the French or Italian Communists to power. ... If the United States did not act vigorousl= y, the French, Italian, or Greek Communists might win power legally or seize i= t violently." The same report of Sept. 1947 emphasised that the "greatest po=ADtential danger to U.S. security lies ... in the possibility of the economic collapse of Western Europe and of the consequent accession = to power of elements subservient to the Kremlin." (Leffler, 1992, pp.189f.).<o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn4"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn4" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref4" name=3D"_ftn4" title=3D"= ">[4]</= span></a> Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 240. To expect another Great Slump after the end of World War II w= as not at all far-fet=ADched. Paul Samuelson (1943, p. 51) spoke of the possib= ility, in the US, of "the greatest period of unemployment and industrial dislocation which any economy has ever faced". The main concern of American policy-makers right after the war was the prevention of such a slu= mp. They wanted to achieve this by the combination of traditionally high US tar= iffs and of a drive for the vast expansion of Ameri=ADcan exports. For the latte= r reason they wanted to impose a free-trade regime =96 yet only on others (Ko= lko, 1969). "Aggressive expansion was plainly in the minds of American policy-makers as soon as the war was over. It was the Cold War which encour= aged them to take a lon=ADger view, by persuading them that helping their future competitors to grow as rapidly as possible was politically urgent." (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 275). Walker (1994, p. 2 passim) argues that the Cold W= ar was the major engine of the Golden Age of high growth and rising prosperity (1950-73). And Hobsbawm asks (1994, p. 276) what would have happened to the German economy, if its recovery had depended on the Europeans, who feared i= ts revival. How fast would the Japanese economy have recovered, if the USA had= not found itself building up Japan as the industrial base for the Korean and th= e Vietnam War? 1949-53 and 1966-70 were the years of peak Japanese growth. <o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn5"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn5" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref5" name=3D"_ftn5" title=3D"= ">[5]</= span></a> The original American plans for the world economy were attacked by Molotov duri= ng his speech at the Paris peace conference in October 1946: "It is surely not so difficult to understand that if American capital were given a free h= and in the small states ruined and enfeebled by the war, as the advocates of th= e principle of 'equal opportunity' desire, American capital would buy up the local industries, appro=ADpriate the more attractive Rumanian, Yugoslav and= all other enterprises, and would become the master in these small states. Given such a situ=ADation, we would probably live to see the day when in your own country, on switching on the radio, you would be hearing not so much your o= wn language as one Ame=ADrican gramophone record after another or some piece o= r other of British propaganda. The time might come when in your own country, = on going to the cinema, you would be seeing American films sold for foreign consumption. It is not clear that such unrestricted applications of the principles of 'equal oppor=ADtunity' would in practice mean the veritable economic enslavement of the small states and their subjuga=ADtion to the ru= le and arbitrary will of strong an enriched foreign firms, banks and industrial corporations? Was this what we fought for when we battled the fascist invaders?" (Walker, 1994, p. 46).No doubt that these words "have an oddly prophetic ring today" (ibid., p. 45). In a sense it demonstrates how difficult it is to foresee historical developments and to construct causalities. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn6"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn6" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref6" name=3D"_ftn6" title=3D"= ">[6]</= span></a> The Americans henceforth (since autumn 1946) "envisaged a Western economic and a Western geo=ADpolitical entity as their pre-eminent concern". (Charles Maier, according to Leffler, 1992, p. 120). "U.S. goals were to promote the recovery of Western Europe, check Soviet influence, thwart Communist ga= ins, and lower occupation costs." They would have preferred "a single Europe modelled on the USA in its political structure as well as its flourishing free enterprise economy." <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn7"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn7" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref7" name=3D"_ftn7" title=3D"= ">[7]</= span></a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 182. See also Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 241. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn8"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn8" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref8" name=3D"_ftn8" title=3D"= ">[8]</= span></a> Adenauer's first objective was the restoration of national sovereignty for Germany. Th= e integration into Western Europe and the Western hemisphere to an important extent was a means to that end. The opposi=ADtion leader, Kurt Schumacher, = wanted a united and, if necessary, neutral Germany. He spoke in "disturbing tones of traditional German nationalism" and denounced Adenauer as the "Chancellor of the Occupation, of the Allies" (Walker, 1994, p. 91) and as showing "indifference to the fate of 18 million East Germans."(Leffler, 1992, p. 320). <o:p></o:p> Adenauer's position in turn was equally clear, at least rhetorically: Germany's defeat should not mean "that it must renounce forever the right to regain lost territories beyond the Oder-Neisse. If we were to opt for the West, as he preferred to do, he had to be able to convince his domestic opponents that = he was neither compromising long-term German sovereignty nor relinquishing hop= e for unification nor territo=ADrial rectification." (ibid., p. 454). "In France, German rhetoric could easily be interpreted as ingratitude and illustrative of German aspirations to regain a position of preponderance in Europe." (ibid., p. 320).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn9"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn9" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref9" name=3D"_ftn9" title=3D"= ">[9]</= span></a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 371.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn10"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn10" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref10" name=3D"_ftn10" title= =3D"">[10]</a> France was forced to accept the tri-zonal fusion of Germany in the summer of 1948.= As a result Georges Bidault lost the French Foreign Ministry. He was felt to h= ave given too much away. (Duch=EAne, 1994, 398, p. 185).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn11"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn11" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref11" name=3D"_ftn11" title= =3D"">[11]</a> A neutral Germany "was not an outlandish proposi=ADtion; in 1954, just such a= n agreement was reached over Austria" (Walker, 1994, p. 91). "Many Germans still felt that they had much to gain from remai=ADning neutral in = the East-West struggle" and "that formal association with NATO would kill pro=ADspects for the eventual unification of their country." (Leffler, 1992= , p. 409). George F. Kennan advoca=ADted in 1952 a unified, neutralised Germa= ny (ibid., 461). In 1958 he repeated this proposition. Adenauer recei=ADved a stunning shock when Dulles in a letter to him implicitly proposed a unified= , neutral and de=ADmilita=ADri=ADsed Germany in July 1958. Adenauer's reactio= n was to turn to France and accept de Gaulle's concept of Western Europe (Walker, 19= 94, 121f.). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn12"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn12" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref12" name=3D"_ftn12" title= =3D"">[12]</a> At that time the "greatest worries (of US officials) related to the poor state of Europe's defenses and the uncertainty over Germany's loyalty to th= e West." (Leffler, 1992, p. 383). A few months earlier Char=ADles Bohlen, the= n serving as the US minister in Paris, explained: "as soon as Germany recaptures her freedom of manoeuvre she will inevitably begin to play the W= est off against the East with the very real danger of coming to rest on the sid= e of the Soviet Union. This is the nightmare of the West European nations ... an= d it should be ours as well."(ibid., p. 345). President Truman time and again expressed his reservations about German rearmament (ibid., p. 389). French fears were more concrete: "if Germany is resuscitated, her resources and technical proficiency would be used by the USSR against France." (ibid., p. 202). More precisely France had "apprehensions about the long-term ramifications of a power=ADful Germany that could act independently or in c= oncert with Moscow." (ibid., p. 207). Earlier, Stalin too had expressed fears of a revived and powerful Germany. Yet he had opposed dismemberment because he worried about German irredentism (ibid., p. 154). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn13"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn13" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref13" name=3D"_ftn13" title= =3D"">[13]</a> Leffler, 1992, pp. 202 and 207. These demands were contained in documents of early 1= 948.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn14"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn14" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref14" name=3D"_ftn14" title= =3D"">[14]</a> Because such extensive controls of Germany would have weakened the cohesion of West= ern Europe and, as was mentioned, because the US needed the Germany=92s economi= c strength and her rearmament. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn15"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn15" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref15" name=3D"_ftn15" title= =3D"">[15]</a> From the British point of view the Treaty of Dunkirk had more than a German dimension. It also reflected the fear of the foreign secretary Ernest Bevin "that French unhappiness with Anglo-American policy in Germany might drive the French into the arms of the Kremlin." (Leffler, 1992, p. 153). That shows too how complicated and open to all possibilities European politics w= ere at that time. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn16"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn16" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref16" name=3D"_ftn16" title= =3D"">[16]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 186. Later, in 1954 Germany became a member of the WEU. The Treaty= of Brussels, modified the same year, still contained an implicit security guarantee against Germany. Cf. Zielinski, 1995, p. 103.<o:p></o:p></= p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn17"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn17" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref17" name=3D"_ftn17" title= =3D"">[17]</a> It "was the greatest British commitment in Europe at the time and encouraged hopes of further inte=ADgration." (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 186).<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn18"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn18" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref18" name=3D"_ftn18" title= =3D"">[18]</a> = Leffler, 1992, p. 203. "Without German rearmament ... the WEU did not pose credible military de=ADterrent to the Soviet Union." (Frankel, 1993, p. 60).<o:p></o= :p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn19"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn19" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref19" name=3D"_ftn19" title= =3D"">[19]</a> Delivered on Sept. 19, 1946, reprinted in Gasteyger, 1994, pp. 39-40. Churchill wrote= in a newspa=ADper article in 1946 that European integration was "(t)he only wa= y to prevent war" (according to Edwina Currie in her address to the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, Bonn, 9.9.93). On the other hand, Chur=ADch= ill did of course play a role in the initial escalation of the Cold War. Cf. Leffler, 1992, pp. 107-110.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn20"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn20" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref20" name=3D"_ftn20" title= =3D"">[20]</a> For a comprehensive presentation and analysis of Jean Monnet=92s very impressiv= e life, the multipli=ADcity of his initiatives and his "method" to develop and push them through, see Duch=EAne, 1994.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn21"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn21" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref21" name=3D"_ftn21" title= =3D"">[21]</a> The following analysis is based on Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 168-9.<o:p></o:p>= </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn22"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn22" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref22" name=3D"_ftn22" title= =3D"">[22]</a> Monnet acquired the confidence of British and American leaders and officials when, under his initia=ADtive, the Allied Maritime Transport Council was formed, = which co-ordinated military and civil supplies of the Allies during 1917-18. Even more important was the period 1939-43 when he actually lived in the US and played a leading role in the British Purchasing Commission (as a British Citizen provided with a passport signed by Churchill!) and in gearing the U= S economy into war production. Keynes believed that Monnet "had shortened the war by one year"; for others he was an "Unsung Hero of World War II" (title of an essay by Robert Nathan) and "one of the real architects of our victory" (Lord Halifax). (Duch=EAne, 1994, chapters 1 and 2, passim). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn23"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn23" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref23" name=3D"_ftn23" title= =3D"">[23]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 456 (emphasis added, WK). "La coop=E9ration entre les nations, si importante soit-elle, ne r=E9sout rien.= " <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn24"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn24" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref24" name=3D"_ftn24" title= =3D"">[24]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 394-5.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn25"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn25" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref25" name=3D"_ftn25" title= =3D"">[25]</a> In later years, whenever Monnet said of something that it was "an OEEC affair", he meant nothing would come of it. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 169). On th= e other hand, it must be noted that Monnet successfully linked the Marshall a= id to the Monnet Plan, and played a crucial role in it. Monnet's position was = so strong that the "Americans would not give their approval to any proposal which Monnet didn't feel fitted in with his plans." (According to A. Hartman, who worked at the time with the Economic Co-operation Administrati= on mission in France; ibid., p. 173).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn26"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn26" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref26" name=3D"_ftn26" title= =3D"">[26]</a> Cf. Monnet, 1976, p. 456. (emphasis added, WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn27"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn27" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref27" name=3D"_ftn27" title= =3D"">[27]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 190, 197.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn28"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn28" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref28" name=3D"_ftn28" title= =3D"">[28]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 422 (Duch=EAne's translation, 1994, p. 199).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn29"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn29" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref29" name=3D"_ftn29" title= =3D"">[29]</a> In 1941 Monnet expounded something like the Schuman Plan for coal and steel to Paul-Henri Spaak (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 182). Monnet developed a scheme rathe= r similar to the Schuman Plan in 1943 (ibid. p. 126-8). In the summer of 1947 Monnet held numerous discussions with the senior American in Euro=ADpe, Under-secretary William Clayton. "Their intensive review of the German policy led in the end to the Schuman Plan" (ibid. p. 168), even though, more immediately, it was an initial sketch of the Internatio=ADnal Ruhr Authority. All this happened less than two months after the announcement of= the Marshall Plan in whose preparation Clayton had played an important role.<sp= an style=3D"display:none;mso-hide:all"> It is interesting to note that Clay= ton had prepared at the end of May a famous memorandum to Acheson, which was an important stepping stone for the Marshall Plan which was announced a week l= ater (Leffler, 1992, pp. 158-62). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn30"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn30" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref30" name=3D"_ftn30" title= =3D"">[30]</a> In the memorandum Monnet wrote for Schuman, he qualified his solution as one "which would re=ADmove for the Germans the humiliation of endless controls, and for the French the fear of a Germany without controls." (According to Friend, 1991, p. 17; Zielinski, 1995, p. 107).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn31"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn31" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref31" name=3D"_ftn31" title= =3D"">[31]</a> Monnet in conversation with Schuman (emphasis added, WK). He continued: "We lost peace in 1919 because we there (in Versailles, WK) introduced discriminatio= n and the spirit of superiority. We are on the way to commit the same error again." "Nous avons manqu=E9 la paix en 1919 parce que nous y avons introduit la discrimination et l'esprit= de sup=E9riorit=E9. Nous sommes en train de commencer les m=EAmes erreurs."</s= pan> (Monnet, 1976, p. 410; translation WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn32"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn32" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref32" name=3D"_ftn32" title= =3D"">[32]</a> "This proposition has an essential political message: to drive a wedge into the bastions of national sovereignty that is small enough to be acceptable and = deep enough to move the States towards the necessary unity for peace." "Cette proposition a une port=E9e politique essentielle: ouvrir dans le rempart des souverainet=E9s nationale= s une br=E8che suffisamment limit=E9e pour rallier les consentements, suffisammen= t profonde pour entra=EEner les Etats vers l'unit=E9 n=E9cessaire =E0 la paix= ." (Monnet, 1976, 429; translation WK). For him nationalism was the demon to b= e exorcised (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 371).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn33"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn33" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref33" name=3D"_ftn33" title= =3D"">[33]</a> Leffler, 1992, p. 349. "The interdependence of production thus established will make all war bet=ADween France and Germany not only unthinkable, but physic= ally impossible." (Schuman, acc. to Wise, in: Zielinski, p. 108).<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn34"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn34" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref34" name=3D"_ftn34" title= =3D"">[34]</a> After Monnet had explained the Schuman Plan to Adenauer the latter said: "Monsieur Monnet, I consider the realisation of this French position as the most important task that awaits me." "Monsieur Monnet, je consid=E8re la r=E9alisation de la proposition fran=E7aise comme la t=E2che plus importante que m'attende. Si = je parviens =E0 la mener =E0 bien, j'estime que je n'aurai pas perdu ma vie." = (Monnet, 1976, p. 450; translation WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn35"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn35" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref35" name=3D"_ftn35" title= =3D"">[35]</a> The Schuman Plan was thought to be "so vague on essential details" by the Belgian Foreign Minister that "it was impossible to speak definitely about it". Macmillan called it "a plan to have a plan". (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 209).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn36"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn36" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref36" name=3D"_ftn36" title= =3D"">[36]</a> Based on Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 240 passim.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn37"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn37" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref37" name=3D"_ftn37" title= =3D"">[37]</a> Britain did not participate in the negotiations of the Schuman Plan nor join the EC= SC. They did not want to commit themselves to a supra-national High Authority. = On this point Monnet was inflexible. Later Britain laun=ADched the Eden Plan w= hich was a "bizarre attempt" to subordinate the new community to the inter-governmental Council of Europe (Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 209, 237). After protracted negotiati=ADons Britain became an associate member of the ECSC i= n a sort of inter-governmental extension. (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 261 passim.). <o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn38"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn38" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref38" name=3D"_ftn38" title= =3D"">[38]</a> The reason why Britain, in the perception of Jean Monnet, did not join the ECSC= is remarkable: "Britain has no confidence that France and the other countries of Europe have the ability or even the will effectively to resist a possibl= e Russian invasion. Britain believes that in this conflict continental Europe will be occupied but that she herself, with America, will be able to resist= and finally conquer. She there=ADfore does not wish to let her domestic life or= the development of her resources be influenced by any views other than her own,= and certainly not by continental views." (after his London talks in 1950; Monnet, 1976, p. 400; translation Walker, 1994, p. 93). For Tsoukalis (1993, p. 16) this was one of several "complete misjudgements by the government in London."<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn39"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn39" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref39" name=3D"_ftn39" title= =3D"">[39]</a> Alan Milward (Tsoukalis, 1993, p. 17) has referred to the ECSC "as a protoplasmic organization which could take virtually any shape the High Authority and the member countries would eventually wish to give it." <span= style=3D"display:none;mso-hide:all">Flexibility and suppleness are after a= ll the main weapons of legal documents in the battle against time. Monnet insisted repeatedly, that the purpose of the ECSC was political and moral, = not economic. Adenauer agreed on this and said to him: "J'envisage comme vous cette entreprise sous son aspect le plus =E9lev=E9 - elle appartient =E0 l'= ordre de la morale. C'est la responsabilit=E9 morale que nous avons =E0 l'=E9gard de= nos peuples, et non la responsabilit=E9 technique que nous devons mettre en =9C= uvre pour r=E9ali=ADser un si vaste espoir. L'accueil en Allemagne a =E9t=E9 ent= housiaste, aussi nous ne nous accrocherons pas =E0 des d=E9tails. Cette initiative, vo= ici vingt-cinq ans que j l'attends." (Monnet, 1976, p. 449). <o:p></o:p>= </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn40"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn40" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref40" name=3D"_ftn40" title= =3D"">[40]</a> Hence it is difficult to agree with Mitrany (1975, p. 69) when he writes: "The ESCS and Euratom were straight functional bodies and could get on with thei= r allotted task without offending the position of other countries, while remaining open to possible links with them." He argues that "functional arrange=ADments have the patent virtue of technical self-determination: the range of their task can be clearly defi=ADned, and = that in turn determines the powers and resources needed for their performance (p= . 68). This hardly corresponds to the realities of the ECSC.<o:p></o:p></span= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn41"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn41" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref41" name=3D"_ftn41" title= =3D"">[41]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, Ch. 7, for the convoluted evolution of the new institution= s within a difficult set=ADting. Trade across frontiers in the common market = for steel doubled as a proportion of steel consump=ADtion. That was certainly a= n important success. On the other hand, the steelmasters were colluding withi= n the common market, "where the treaty powers of the High Authority were in no doubt whatsoever." (p. 248). "The High Authority failed to take firm hold of its field. The managers of the twenty major steel firms were l= eft largely undisturbed." The governments continued to condition coal and steel. (p. 252). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn42"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn42" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref42" name=3D"_ftn42" title= =3D"">[42]</a> The ECSC was unable to face the coal crisis of 1958/59. The member states were = too divided bet=ADween coal-producing and coal-consuming countries to agree. Ga= ullism was matched in Germany by ill will towards sectoral integration. The basic industries, used to cartel planning under government patro=ADnage, wanted t= o break the High Authority. Erhard prophesied its end within 3 years. Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 393, 317.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn43"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn43" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref43" name=3D"_ftn43" title= =3D"">[43]</a> Louis Lister, according to Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 252 (emphasis added, WK).<o:p></o:= p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn44"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn44" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref44" name=3D"_ftn44" title= =3D"">[44]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 252. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn45"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn45" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref45" name=3D"_ftn45" title= =3D"">[45]</a> Significantly, instead of the High Authority the EEC just had a 'Commission'.<o:p></o:p></= span> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn46"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn46" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref46" name=3D"_ftn46" title= =3D"">[46]</a> In Germany the SPD voted against the EDC as it had voted against the ECSC on grounds that both treaties hindered German reunification (Duch=EAne, 1994, = p. 285).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn47"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn47" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref47" name=3D"_ftn47" title= =3D"">[47]</a> The Pleven Plan proposed to rivet (rattach=E9) the European Army to the politic= al institutions of the European Union (Monnet, 1976, p. 505). According to Duc= h=EAne (1994, p. 234) Monnet and others saw the EPC more of a way of reasserting civilian control over the military than as a step to a federal union. The emphasis in Monnet's M=E9moires (pp. 579f) is much more on the latter aspec= t, however.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn48"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn48" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref48" name=3D"_ftn48" title= =3D"">[48]</a> For a complete 'European state' essential elements like common legal and social systems were lack=ADing. The EDC/EPC had a common military command, yet, paradoxically, no common foreign policy. See Woyke, 1984, p. 227.<o:p></o:p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn49"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn49" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref49" name=3D"_ftn49" title= =3D"">[49]</a> In fact, the French government had signed the EDC treaty only under the condit= ion that no immediate attempt should be made to ratify it. "The EDC was rotting before the ink was dry." (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 233).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn50"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn50" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref50" name=3D"_ftn50" title= =3D"">[50]</a> In Nov. 1953 de Gaulle launched a personal attack against "the inspirer". "The 'Europe of Jean Mon=ADnet' now became the ritual red rag to the more militant opponents of the EDC." Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 254.<o:= p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn51"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn51" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref51" name=3D"_ftn51" title= =3D"">[51]</a> When the EDC was touched off the agenda of the French National Assembly the triumphant majo=ADri=ADty burst into the Marseillaise (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 254). Cf. also Zielinski, 1995, p. 101.<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn52"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn52" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref52" name=3D"_ftn52" title= =3D"">[52]</a> In the same interview with the New York Times he said: "I will do everything against it. I will work with the Communists to block it. I will make a revolution against it. I would rather go with the Russians to stop it." (Walker, 1994, p. 97).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn53"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn53" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref53" name=3D"_ftn53" title= =3D"">[53]</a> As Churchill (ibid.) put it, "I meant it for them, not for us". He also spoke of "EDC tomfoolery" (Duch=EAne, 1994, 245) and of a "sludgy amalgam".<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn54"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn54" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref54" name=3D"_ftn54" title= =3D"">[54]</a> Leffler, 1992, p. 389f.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn55"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn55" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref55" name=3D"_ftn55" title= =3D"">[55]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 398.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn56"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn56" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref56" name=3D"_ftn56" title= =3D"">[56]</a> By the simultaneous accession of Germany to NATO and WEU a system of arms cont= rols was devi=ADsed, in fact if not in form, for Germany. Nevertheless membershi= p of both organisations was perceived in Germany as an enhancement of its nation= al sovereignty. (Zielinski, 1995, p. 104).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn57"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn57" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref57" name=3D"_ftn57" title= =3D"">[57]</a> In the words of the famous saying of Lord Ismay, the purpose of NATO was "to keep the Soviets out, the US in, and the Germans down".<o:p></o:p></= p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn58"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn58" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref58" name=3D"_ftn58" title= =3D"">[58]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 98. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn59"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn59" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref59" name=3D"_ftn59" title= =3D"">[59]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 256.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn60"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn60" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref60" name=3D"_ftn60" title= =3D"">[60]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 259.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn61"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn61" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref61" name=3D"_ftn61" title= =3D"">[61]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 256.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn62"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn62" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref62" name=3D"_ftn62" title= =3D"">[62]</a> Monnet announced his resignation in November 1954, apparently because he had fears about the fate of the ECSC - and because he felt that he needed all his tim= e in order to mobilise support for the Com=ADmu=ADnity in the member states. Alr= eady in October 1952 Spaak had confided to MacMillan that if the EDC failed, the EC= SC would collapse too. (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 259).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn63"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn63" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref63" name=3D"_ftn63" title= =3D"">[63]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 258.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn64"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn64" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref64" name=3D"_ftn64" title= =3D"">[64]</a> Their special relationship also had to do with British bases in the Middle East a= nd Asia and Britain's "role as a surrogate of American interests" (Walker, 1994, p. 191).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn65"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn65" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref65" name=3D"_ftn65" title= =3D"">[65]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 123. Britain, for instance, received Thor missiles from the US, wh= ich were the only nuclear missiles that could reach the Soviet Union at that ti= me. They were to be manned by British troops, and a dual key would be required = to fire them, one held by the Americans, the other by the Bri=ADtish (ibid., p= . 119). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn66"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn66" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref66" name=3D"_ftn66" title= =3D"">[66]</a> One should not overestimate this move however, as Hobsbawm (1994, p. 241) has pointed out: "The most that an allied or client state could allow itself to do was to refuse complete integration into the mi=ADlitary alliance with= out actually leaving it."<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn67"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn67" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref67" name=3D"_ftn67" title= =3D"">[67]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 121. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn68"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn68" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref68" name=3D"_ftn68" title= =3D"">[68]</a> Walker, 1994, pp. 121f, 124. As an immediate result of the Suez crisis the British = air force in Ger=ADmany was halved and the army reduced by 20%. Adenauer was sh= ocked when MacMillan explained this to him. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn69"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn69" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref69" name=3D"_ftn69" title= =3D"">[69]</a> Because of the new anxieties generated by German national rearmament, integration seemed more than ever the way to harness Germany to safe purposes. Adenauer himself expressed the gravest misgi=ADvings that no one could guarantee tha= t the lethal combination of Ruhr magnates and German military would not reappear = (in a famous midnight chat with Spaak and Joseph Bech which was overheard by Lo= thar Ruehl, the correspondent of Der Spiegel; Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 267). <o:p></o= :p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn70"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn70" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref70" name=3D"_ftn70" title= =3D"">[70]</a> A month after Kennedy offered Britain, in order to accommodate its nuclear pretensions, the Polaris submarine missile system (which had not been offer= ed to France and infuriated her), de Gaulle talked of Britain as the "American Trojan Horse inside Europe" and cast his veto against British entry into the Common Market. Logically enough he continued: "The end would be a colossal Atlantic Community dependent on America and directe= d by America, which would soon swallow up the European Commu=ADnity. A week late= r he signed the Franco-German Friendship Treaty. (Walker, 1994, 181, p. 202). <o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn71"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn71" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref71" name=3D"_ftn71" title= =3D"">[71]</a> Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 241.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn72"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn72" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref72" name=3D"_ftn72" title= =3D"">[72]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 258 passim.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn73"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn73" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref73" name=3D"_ftn73" title= =3D"">[73]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 265. In bringing Germany into NATO, Adenauer unilateral= ly renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons. French and American politicia= ns wondered how long this self-denying ordinance would last. At times, in priv= ate, Adenauer himself talked as if the renunciation might be tem=ADporary (ibid.= ). In fact, in November 1957 France, Germany and Italy had agreed to produce atom= ic weapons and their delivery systems. The United States were kept in the dark= . In extreme secrecy these three countries signed another agreement in April 195= 8 on the common construction of a gas diffusion plant in Pierrelatte. After his return to power de Gaulle stopped this co-operation in June 1958. He wan=AD= ted force de frappe to be an entirely national project in order to be able to u= se the bomb as an exclusive=ADly French diplomatic tool. (Schmitt, 1995).... von 1964 bis 1969 wehrte sich die Bundesregierung dagegen, den Atomwaffensperrvertrag zu unterzeichnen. Friedrich Zimmermann, M=E4rz 1968: "Der Aufbau eines eigenst=E4ndigen Europas wird behindert, weil ein k=FCnftiges Europa keinen Zugang zu der wahren Verteidungswaffe, der Atombo= mbe, mehr hat." Alfred Seidl, Bayernkurier, Aug 1973: "Sollten die Staaten Westeuropas innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist nicht zur Errichtung einer nuklearen europ=E4ischen Streitmacht unter Einschlu=DF der Bundeswehr komme= n, dann wird jede Bundesregierung gezwungen sein, ihrerseits die Ausr=FCstung der Bundeswehr mit Kernwaffen in Erw=E4gung zu ziehen." J. Gottschlich, Deutsch= e Finger nah am Dr=FCcker, TAZ, 7.9.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn74"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn74" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref74" name=3D"_ftn74" title= =3D"">[74]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 269 passim. on this paragraph.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn75"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn75" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref75" name=3D"_ftn75" title= =3D"">[75]</a> Spaak "preferred collusion by France and Germany to conflicts between them." (ibid., p. 271).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn76"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn76" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref76" name=3D"_ftn76" title= =3D"">[76]</a> Monnet was under a double French veto: to continue as president of the High Author= ity and as a chair=ADman of any inter-governmental conference on new initiative= s of European integration (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 280).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn77"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn77" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref77" name=3D"_ftn77" title= =3D"">[77]</a> For details, see Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 279-83.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn78"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn78" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref78" name=3D"_ftn78" title= =3D"">[78]</a> See Weidenfeld, 1994, pp. 18-19.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn79"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn79" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref79" name=3D"_ftn79" title= =3D"">[79]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 456 (translation, WK). <sp= an style=3D"display:none;mso-hide:all">"Les propositions Schuman ... sont r=E9volucionaires ou elles ne sont rien. Leur pincipe fondamental est la d=E9legation de sourverainet=E9 dans un domaine limit=E9, mais d=E9cisif. .= .. La coop=E9ration entre les nations, si importante soit-elle, ne r=E9sout rien.= Ce qu'il faut chercher, c'est une fusion des int=E9r=EAts des peuples europ=E9= ens, et non pas simplement le maintien de l'=E9quilibre de ces int=E9r=EAts."</span= ><o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn80"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn80" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref80" name=3D"_ftn80" title= =3D"">[80]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 429. "Cette proposition = a une port=E9e politique essentielle: ouvrir dans le rempart des souverainet= =E9s nationales une br=E8che suffisamment limit=E9e pour rallier les consentemen= ts, suffisamment profonde pour entra=EEner les Etats vers l'unit=E9 n=E9cessair= e =E0 la paix." Nationalism was for him the demon to be exorcised (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 371).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn81"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn81" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref81" name=3D"_ftn81" title= =3D"">[81]</a> As is argued by Zielinski, 1995, p. 109, specifically for the ECSC (applying h= is criteria of symme=ADtry, symbiosis, homology, transcendency).<o:p></o:p></s= pan> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn82"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn82" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref82" name=3D"_ftn82" title= =3D"">[82]</a> Wei= denfeld/Wessels, 1998, p. 56.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn83"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn83" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref83" name=3D"_ftn83" title= =3D"">[83]</a> Scharpf, 1993.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn84"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn84" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref84" name=3D"_ftn84" title= =3D"">[84]</a> Most negotiations take place in the Council of Ministers, that is in committees = and working groups composed exclusively of public servants. Once a compromise h= as been reached, often after long periods of negotiations, national parliament= s or the European Parliament, to all intents and purposes, cannot challenge thes= e compromises. See Working Group ..., 1997. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn85"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn85" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref85" name=3D"_ftn85" title= =3D"">[85]</a> Which has grown far beyond what the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam allow fo= r. For instan=ADce, the Council of Ministers ought to consist of only two coun= cils; in fact, there are around 20. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn86"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn86" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref86" name=3D"_ftn86" title= =3D"">[86]</a> For a careful analysis of this topic, see Zielinski, 1995, pp. 30-43. Kant spok= e of the constitutional republic ("republikanische Staatsverfassung"), which comes close to what we call democracy nowadays (ibid. p. 35). <o:p></= o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn87"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn87" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref87" name=3D"_ftn87" title= =3D"">[87]</a> Kant (1947, p. 13) argues that the citizens would have to decide to bring the distress of war upon themselves: to fight themselves, to bear direct costs = of war as well as the costs of mending the war da=ADmages, the payment of war = debts. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn88"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn88" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref88" name=3D"_ftn88" title= =3D"">[88]</a> Dahrendorf, 1995, p. 29.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn89"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn89" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref89" name=3D"_ftn89" title= =3D"">[89]</a> One might add political participation, an area where the EU certainly does not excel. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn90"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn90" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref90" name=3D"_ftn90" title= =3D"">[90]</a> Cramon Daiber, 1994, p. 67. die bisherig= e Legitimation ... materieller Wohlstandsgewinn f=FCr alle .. bereits jetzt n= icht mehr tragf=E4hig <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn91"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn91" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref91" name=3D"_ftn91" title= =3D"">[91]</a> Cf. Arnold, 1993, pp. 55-56: The EEC was not established in order to overcome economic difficul=ADties. Very much to the contrary, the prosperous economi= c development of those years was to be made fruitful for the politically motivated integration process of Western Europe.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn92"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn92" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref92" name=3D"_ftn92" title= =3D"">[92]</a> Ironically, "one of the main objectives of the Treaty of Paris had been precisely to avoid the reappea=ADrance of such a cartel." (Tsoukalis, 1993, p. 42). Cartels had existed before the war.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn93"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn93" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref93" name=3D"_ftn93" title= =3D"">[93]</a> Subsidies for coal mining in Germany, for example, were in the order of 80000 DM per person em=ADployed in 1994 (15th Report on Subsidies of the Federal Governm= ent; German economic research insti=ADtutes; according to Nahrendorf, 1996). <o:= p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn94"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn94" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref94" name=3D"_ftn94" title= =3D"">[94]</a> These costs amounted to 142.2 billion dollars for the EU (OECD data, Economist, J= une 5th, 1999, p. 123), i.e. 380 dollars per capita. Quite a sacrifi= ce for a family of, say five members. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn95"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn95" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref95" name=3D"_ftn95" title= =3D"">[95]</a> Arnold (1993, p. 63) goes as far as to say: "The economy of the EC becomes largely stateless".<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn96"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn96" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref96" name=3D"_ftn96" title= =3D"">[96]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 87.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn97"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn97" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref97" name=3D"_ftn97" title= =3D"">[97]</a> This need not mean much, however, in terms of consumer welfare and development (Olson, 1987, p. 243): 1. In separate studies Kreinin and Truman found that the formation of the Europea= n Community added 2 per cent or less to its members manufacturing consumption= . 2. Bela Balassa found that the creation of the Common Market led to only 0.3 p= er cent increase in the ratio of the annual increment of trade to that of GNP.= 3. "Many economists have estimated or concluded that the degree of protection is not of overwhelming importance for the level of development or the rate = of growth of a country. ... (They) also regard changes in the degree of protec= tion as relatively unimportant in comparison with the size of the welfare state,= or the quality of monetary and fiscal policy, in explaining economic perfor=AD= mance." <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn98"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn98" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref98" name=3D"_ftn98" title= =3D"">[98]</a> The EC was not unsympathetic to such processes of concentration. Viscount Davig= non, the EC Commissioner for industrial affairs, promoted the "corporate search for extensive networks" and the creation of the Round Table of European Industrialists, "which has acted both as a powerful lobby be=ADhind the scenes and a means of promoting closer ti= es and co-operation among the heads of some of the largest firms. Such moves were arguably not unrelated to the wave of mergers, acquisitions, and co-ope=ADr= ation agreements across national borders ..." (Tsoukalis, 1993, pp. 50, 51)<o:p><= /o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn99"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn99" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref99" name=3D"_ftn99" title= =3D"">[99]</a> Martin Wolf, Financial Times, Sept. 1, 1999, p. 12; based on the latest edition of the Human Deve=ADlopment Rep= ort (UNDP). The fact that some of these countries are members of the EU does no= t invali=ADdate the argument. It would, if the larger EU-members were at leas= t as well off as the smaller ones (which they are not). The question remains: Wh= y are smaller countries generally able to generate higher incomes than the la= rger ones? <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn100"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn100" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref100" name=3D"_ftn100" tit= le=3D"">[100]</a> The data for the period 1960-73 include the 6 countries, which joined the EEC/E= C during the 1970s and 1980s. The underperformance of the EEC is not due to inclusio= n of these countries. With the exception of the U.K. their performance in terms = of GDP, investment and employment growth was nor=ADmally better (in some cases considerably better) than that of the original 6 countries. <o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn101"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn101" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref101" name=3D"_ftn101" tit= le=3D"">[101]</a> Southey, 1995. In 1994 almost 50 per cent of the unemployed of the EC-12 had been without work for more than one year. About 22 per cent of the 15-24 year-ol= ds were unemployed. (ibid.).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn102"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn102" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref102" name=3D"_ftn102" tit= le=3D"">[102]</a> According to Eurostat in September 1999 there were 12,8 million unemployed in the EU. This re=ADpresents 10 per cent of the workforce. These figures disguise eno= rmous differences between regions and age groups. Unem=ADployment runs between 25= and 30 per cent in some southern regions in Spain in Italy. In Eastern Germany = it now stands at more than 18 per cent. Youth unemployment is 24 and 33 per ce= nt in France, Spain and Italy. (Barber, 1999).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn103"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn103" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref103" name=3D"_ftn103" tit= le=3D"">[103]</a> Marglin/Schor, 1991. The relative stability of Cold-War international order (and of the EEC/EC, as it was an outgrowth and an integral part of that ord= er) can be considered a necessary condition for the successful economic develop= ment of Western Europe and elsewhere (see the section "The First Eu=ADrope" above). The post-war boom no doubt contributed its share to the stability o= f that order. What has been analysed in this section is whether European integration as such improved economic performance, so to speak, above the t= rend of the times. And there the answer tends to be in the negative.<o:p></o:p><= /span> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn104"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn104" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref104" name=3D"_ftn104" tit= le=3D"">[104]</a> "Even if anyhow France has to adjust its economy to international competition, Eu= rope is an easy scapegoat." (Moreau Defarges, 1995, p. 3).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn105"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn105" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref105" name=3D"_ftn105" tit= le=3D"">[105]</a> Quotations in this section are taken from Tsoukalis, 1993, p. 115 passim. The final po= int coincides with a central argument of Arnold, 1993. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn106"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn106" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref106" name=3D"_ftn106" tit= le=3D"">[106]</a> For the period 2000-06 the so-called Structural Fund will amount to Euro 195 billion (152 billion for 1994-99). To this Euro 18 billion of the Cohesion = Fund should be added. The member countries are required to co-finance the projec= ts (normally 50%).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn107"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn107" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref107" name=3D"_ftn107" tit= le=3D"">[107]</a> After the Portuguese revolution, the death of Franco and political turmoil in Gre= ece, the unity of the Western Alliance was menaced. To retain these countries fi= rmly integrated into the West was the political payoff of their admission to the European Union and of the costs of their integration. <o:p></o:p></p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn108"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn108" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref108" name=3D"_ftn108" tit= le=3D"">[108]</a> In the US 30-40 percent of the cyclical variations of regional incomes are compensated for by the federal government (Sachs/Salas-i-Martin, 1992; see also: Bayoumi/Masson, 1996). In Canada, 8 per=ADcent of the federal budget = goes to needy provinces (MacCullum, 1997). In Germany (Geske, 1999, p. 488) the financial transfer system (Finanzausgleich) alone moved DM 56,8 billion in = 1998 (3% of GDP); to this the amounts transferred by other systems would have to= be added. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn109"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn109" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref109" name=3D"_ftn109" tit= le=3D"">[109]</a> The total EU-budget is limited to 1,28% of the GDP of the member countries. The share of the Structural and the Cohesion Fund in the EU-budget is approx. 3= 1%, or 0,4% of the EU-GDP. Only part of these funds are actually net transfers = to certain member countries. Most of the money takes a round trip through Brussels.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn110"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn110" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref110" name=3D"_ftn110" tit= le=3D"">[110]</a> See, for example, Belke/Gros, 1998; Eatwell, 1994.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn111"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn111" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref111" name=3D"_ftn111" tit= le=3D"">[111]</a> EC regional policy has reduced notably the ability of member governments to pu= rsue their own re=ADgional policies and obliged them to modify and to discontinu= e existing programs. (Engel, 1995, p. 16.).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn112"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn112" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref112" name=3D"_ftn112" tit= le=3D"">[112]</a> Working Group ..., 1997b; Kamppeter, 1997.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn113"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn113" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref113" name=3D"_ftn113" tit= le=3D"">[113]</a> Olson, 1987, p. 244.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn114"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn114" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref114" name=3D"_ftn114" tit= le=3D"">[114]</a> Possibly, together with the smaller costs of maintain social and political cohesion, = that explains the on average better performance of smaller economies. <o:p></o:p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn115"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn115" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref115" name=3D"_ftn115" tit= le=3D"">[115]</a> Such pressure can even be based on paranoid fears; see DeMause, 1987.<o:p></o:p>= </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn116"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn116" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref116" name=3D"_ftn116" tit= le=3D"">[116]</a> It still remains in the realm of dreams: It is subject to unanimity. The membe= r countries have the greatest difficulties to agree on common positions and a= re extremely reluctant to give real competencies to Mr Solana. <o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn117"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn117" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref117" name=3D"_ftn117" tit= le=3D"">[117]</a> See for instance, Weizs=E4cker, 1999.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn118"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn118" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref118" name=3D"_ftn118" tit= le=3D"">[118]</a> Justi, 1758, is an early book on balance of power theory =96 with some very decisi= ve, even modern criticisms of it. "The teaching of the balance of power among the free powers has caused enough blood=ADshed, misery and misfortune in Eu= rope. Too often it has been used as a pretext for unnecessary wars. It has render= ed millions of human beings to the slaughterhouse, and many more millions driv= en into ex=ADtreme poverty and wantonness" "Das Lehrgeb=E4ude des Gleichgewichts unter den freyen M=E4ch= ten hat genug Blutvergie=DFen, Elend und Ungl=FCck in Europa angerichtet. Es is= t genug der Deckmantel zu unn=F6tigen Kriegen gewesen, die Millionen Menschen auf d= ie Schlachtbank geliefert, und weit mehr Millionen andre in die =E4u=DFerste A= rmuth und D=FCrftigkeit versetzet haben." (Vorbericht, p. 3; translation WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn119"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn119" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref119" name=3D"_ftn119" tit= le=3D"">[119]</a> Kohr,1957, p. 27; see particularly, chapter 2.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn120"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn120" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref120" name=3D"_ftn120" tit= le=3D"">[120]</a> = Furthermore, the internal basis of the hegemonic power erodes in time. See Huntington, 1= 997.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn121"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn121" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref121" name=3D"_ftn121" tit= le=3D"">[121]</a> Because the member countries of the EU find it very difficult to agree on common positions. Fur=ADthermore they are extremely reluctant to delegate real competencies for foreign policy and security mat=ADters to the EU, and to concentrate these competencies in one pair of hands.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn122"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn122" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref122" name=3D"_ftn122" tit= le=3D"">[122]</a> On the other hand, a society can be stabilised internally, either because inte= rnal conflicts are pro=ADjected onto the external enemy or because the conflicti= ng parties dampen their demands and behaviour in order not to weaken their cou= ntry =96 or are forced to do so by the government.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn123"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn123" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref123" name=3D"_ftn123" tit= le=3D"">[123]</a> Cf. Hirschman, 1982. See also the last sentence of the quotation of Justi in th= e final footnote.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn124"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn124" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref124" name=3D"_ftn124" tit= le=3D"">[124]</a> Justi (1758, pp. 90/91) explains this wonderfully: Some members of a people cross= the mountains or a large stream. They meet people unknown to them. "If they find that these unknown people do not cause them any harm, their fears will disappear and they will socialise among themselves. It is therefore fear an= d the drive to socialise what the peoples are inclined to in their natural st= ate; by no means it is their enmity. ... As long as two peoples do not offend ea= ch other in the basic principle of their own inte=ADrest and their own happine= ss, the drive to socialise will not be hindered. ... However, when one nation becomes an obstacle or causes damage to the other's proper interest, then a fountain of enmity and war is struck. Such an occasion will present itself = all too often in the interchange and in the deeds of the peoples, particularly = with respect to commerce." Which is also a belated comment on the peace-genera= =ADting qualities of economic interdependence. (einige Mitglieder eines Volkes =FCberqueren die Berge oder einen gro=DFen Strom un= d treffen auf ein ihnen unbekanntes Volk) "Finden sie, da=DF ihnen dieses unbekannte Volk nichts B=F6ses zuf=FCget; so wird die Furcht verschwinden, = und sie werden sich gesellschaftlich zueinander thun. Die Furcht und der Trieb zur Gesellschaft ist also dasjenige, worzu die V=F6lker in ihrem nat=FCrlichen = Zustande geneigt sind; keinesweges aber zur Feindschaft, .... So lange also zwey V= =F6lker einander in dem Hauptgrundsatze des eignen Interesse und der eigenen Gl=FCckseligkeit nicht beleidigen; so wird dem Triebe der Gesellschaft kein= Abbruch geschehen. ... So bald aber eine Nation der andern in ihrem eignen Interess= e hinderlich und sch=E4dlich f=E4llt; / so ist die Quelle der Feindschaft und= der Kriege vorhanden; und diese Gelegenheit mu=DF sich bey dem Umgange und Hand= lungen der V=F6lker, und inbesonderheit in Ansehung der Commercien (!) nur gar zu = oft erreignen."<o:p></o:p> </div> </div> </body></html> ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_oben.gif R0lGODlhoAAPAMQAABBAcCBNeaCzxjBZg/Dz9sDN2eDm7GCAoNDZ43CNqZCmvLDA0FBzloCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAACgAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+cCzPZfOQj2A+DWQ/QAPDJLiVCsacY+k4AZ89SBEA AeREj8Lo+WjamEsqbUyuMovMQeCBaEISWdF3wDA8BiZkQuSwB7ACYHglPAAOCw97EGt2g4sEBAci AAcEXl1gYmWbNDYlAwhcCiNfKwAKXAh/WFEpPCRWOiRFfwBFXAJ/P1xunL4shmBpkw4NCb2LmSoO CQ0OmhDCDo4jYKsjAQ7XJMUNB47ZwtC/5CqeIwZaJAOvpRAMD5IkNtsQCAiAYE5RVuoG+AgIjCCA D8UXZeUSpjgnAg0JRLq6LHuwgNuDURBeqdA44gAPJjYkoVLERyJDhShTv6pcybKly5cwUzrgwkUL AwI1xex6EOlEACRPCAzBQlMdDlEkQhn4ZIeLATw7gSCLuekkxFl3fEh8F6/EzFYQ2MniiIJjHAio ZmKUsnUEAConqZY7eXHHqC8BbhKoVyRPEpr7DCGSNFMSnKFnozGBS7Ot3DIn73lNpPXYVFJZSaRj tULJs4GNqRRYyoeZSSOP56KuAukAgAGIZLlLgWiBmkoExJDdV2KBQLcEtACwEyibw4OLU6cMR2ZJ PZVMlIcAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA---- Content-Type: text/css Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: cid:css-aeb96236-2f1c-4264-9395-dc79767523cc@mhtml.blink @charset "windows-1252"; @font-face { font-family: Helvetica; } @font-face { font-family: Tahoma; } @font-face { font-family: "Frutiger 45 Light"; } @font-face { font-family: Swiss; } p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-s= ize: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } h1 { margin: 9pt 0cm 12pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-aft= er: avoid; font-size: 14pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } h2 { margin: 18pt 0cm 12pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-af= ter: avoid; font-size: 14pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-decoratio= n: underline; } h3 { margin: 12pt 0cm; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-after: = avoid; font-size: 14pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } h4 { margin: 12pt 0cm; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-after: = avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-variant: small= -caps; } h5 { margin: 12pt 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; brea= k-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-varia= nt: small-caps; font-weight: normal; } h6 { margin: 5pt 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break= -after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style:= italic; } p.MsoHeading7, li.MsoHeading7, div.MsoHeading7 { margin: 5pt 0cm 0.0001pt; = text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt;= font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; } p.MsoHeading8, li.MsoHeading8, div.MsoHeading8 { margin: 12pt 0cm 3pt; font= -size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; } p.MsoHeading9, li.MsoHeading9, div.MsoHeading9 { margin: 12pt 0cm 3pt; font= -size: 9pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; font-style: = italic; } p.MsoToc1, li.MsoToc1, div.MsoToc1 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 1= 2pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;= } p.MsoToc2, li.MsoToc2, div.MsoToc2 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt 12pt; font-si= ze: 11pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; } p.MsoToc3, li.MsoToc3, div.MsoToc3 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 24pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc4, li.MsoToc4, div.MsoToc4 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 36pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc5, li.MsoToc5, div.MsoToc5 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 48pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc6, li.MsoToc6, div.MsoToc6 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 60pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc7, li.MsoToc7, div.MsoToc7 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 72pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc8, li.MsoToc8, div.MsoToc8 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 84pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc9, li.MsoToc9, div.MsoToc9 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 96pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoFootnoteText, li.MsoFootnoteText, div.MsoFootnoteText { margin: 0cm 0c= m 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; font-size: 11pt; font-family: "Times New R= oman"; } p.MsoHeader, li.MsoHeader, div.MsoHeader { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-s= ize: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoFooter, li.MsoFooter, div.MsoFooter { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-s= ize: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoTof, li.MsoTof, div.MsoTof { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt 24pt; text-inden= t: -24pt; line-height: 13pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Helvetica; } span.MsoFootnoteReference { } span.MsoPageNumber { } span.MsoEndnoteReference { vertical-align: super; } p.MsoToaHeading, li.MsoToaHeading, div.MsoToaHeading { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.00= 01pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; } p.MsoBodyText, li.MsoBodyText, div.MsoBodyText { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; = text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Time= s New Roman"; } p.MsoSubtitle, li.MsoSubtitle, div.MsoSubtitle { margin: 6pt 0cm 3pt; text-= align: center; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L1, li.L1, div.L1 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 14.2pt; text-align: justify;= text-indent: -14.2pt; line-height: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Ti= mes New Roman"; } p.L2, li.L2, div.L2 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt 28.4pt; text-indent: -14.2pt= ; line-height: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L3, li.L3, div.L3 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 68.05pt; text-indent: -22.7p= t; line-height: 17pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L4, li.L4, div.L4 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 90.7pt; text-indent: -22.7pt= ; line-height: 17pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L5, li.L5, div.L5 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 4cm; text-indent: -22.7pt; l= ine-height: 14pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.LB, li.LB, div.LB { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 11.35pt; text-align: justify= ; text-indent: -11.35pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.LL, li.LL, div.LL { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 5cm; text-indent: -5cm; font= -size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.S1, li.S1, div.S1 { margin: 9pt 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-he= ight: 13.3pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New = Roman"; } p.S2, li.S2, div.S2 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-he= ight: 13pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Ro= man"; font-weight: bold; } p.S3, li.S3, div.S3 { margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt; text-align: center; line-height= : 10pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"= ; } span.standardcharacter { } p.W1, li.W1, div.W1 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-i= ndent: 14.2pt; line-height: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New = Roman"; } p.W2, li.W2, div.W2 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; line-h= eight: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.W3, li.W3, div.W3 { margin: 6pt 0cm 6pt 1cm; text-align: justify; font-si= ze: 11pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.W5, li.W5, div.W5 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 17pt; text-indent: -17pt; li= ne-height: 10pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.WF, li.WF, div.WF { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; line-height: 17pt; font-siz= e: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; } p.WK, li.WK, div.WK { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; line-height: 17pt; font-siz= e: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; } p.WV, li.WV, div.WV { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 42.55pt; font-size: 12pt; fo= nt-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.DocumentMap, li.DocumentMap, div.DocumentMap { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; = background: navy; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Tahoma; } p.DocumentMap2, li.DocumentMap2, div.DocumentMap2 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001p= t; background: navy; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Tahoma; } p.DocumentMap1, li.DocumentMap1, div.DocumentMap1 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001p= t; background: navy; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Tahoma; } @page { } @page Section1 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 1cm 42.5pt 2cm 42.55pt; } div.Section1 { page: Section1; } @page Section2 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 68.05pt 70.9pt 2cm 3cm; } div.Section2 { page: Section2; } @page Section3 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 68.05pt 70.9pt 2cm; } div.Section3 { page: Section3; } @page Section4 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 42.55pt 2cm 59.55pt; } div.Section4 { page: Section4; } @page Section5 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 42.55pt 2cm 59.55pt; } div.Section5 { page: Section5; } @page Section6 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 2cm 2cm 2cm 70.9pt; } div.Section6 { page: Section6; } ol { margin-bottom: 0cm; } ul { margin-bottom: 0cm; } ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA------

From: Snapshot-Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm Subject: Lessons of European Integration / Werner Kamppeter. - April 2000 Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 14:18:14 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA----" ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA---- Content-Type: text/html Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm = Lessons of European Integration / Werner Kamppeter. - April 2000</ti= tle>  </head> <body lang=3D"DE" style=3D"tab-interval:35.4pt"> <div class=3D"Section1"> Analyseeinheit Internationale Politik<= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso= -ansi-language: EN-GB"><o:p></o:p> International Policy Analysis Unit<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> Werner K= amppeter <o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:18.0pt;margin-ri= ght:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:70.9pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:right= ; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly">Lessons = of European Integration<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>= <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right= :0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:99.25pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:righ= t; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly"> <o:p></o:p> Apri= l 2000<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> European history is an almost incessant stream of blood, misery and destruc=ADtion = =96 within Europe itself and elsewhere in the world. We Europeans were always p= rone to generate ever new situations of conflict and to solve them by violent me= ans. <o:p></o:p> Unbelievable as it may seem against this background, we now have enjoyed half a century = of unprecedented peace and prosperity. We can be certain, at least in Western Europe, that all conflicts are resolved peacefully, that is without recours= e to mili=ADtary force and to the menace of military force. In fact, we have dev= eloped a new culture of conflict management: we follow accepted procedures that le= ad to negotiated solu=ADtions. <o:p></o:p> The process of European integration was central to the formation of the Europea= n peace community. Because this process can be credited with converting the belligerent Euro=ADpe of the past into a non-aggressive and stable peace community, many of the institutio=ADnal, democratic and economic deficienci= es of the EU necessarily appear in a much milder light. On the other hand, it wou= ld be very worth while to find out whether other regions in the world could le= arn any lessons from this experience.<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp;<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp;<o:p></o:p> </div> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Frutiger 45 Light";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman= ";mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section2">  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o= :p></o:p> Dr. Werner Kamppeter<o:p></o:p><= /span> International Policy Analysis Un= it<o:p></o:p> Friedrich Ebert Foundation <o:p>= </o:p> D-53175 Bonn, Germany<o:p></o:p>= Fax: (xx49)(0)228.883-625<o:p></= o:p> e-mail: Werner.Kamppeter@fes.de<= o:p></o:p> <span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Swiss= ; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:&q= uot;Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:DE;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Analyseeinheit Internationale Politik<o:p></o:p> International Policy Analysis Unit<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> Werner K= amppeter <o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:18.0pt;margin-ri= ght:0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:70.9pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:right= ; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly">Lessons = of European Integration<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>= <p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"right" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right= :0cm; margin-bottom:0cm;margin-left:99.25pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:righ= t; line-height:18.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly"> <o:p></o:p> Apri= l 2000<o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p> Contents<o:p></o:p></spa= n>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel1"> 1. European integration Why it happened and how it happened </a> </= span><o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel11"> The First Europe: The Cold War, the German Problem and Supra-nationalism </a> _____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fullt= ext/id/00730.htm#capitel111">The Limits of Hegemonic Power</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel112"> Alliances Agains= t Germany: Counterproductive</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel1113">Jean M= onnet: Supra-national Integration of Equal Partners</a> ____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel114">The Dec= line of Supra-nationalism</a> _ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel115">NATO, t= he Anglo-Saxon =91special relationship=92 and the German-French Axis</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel12">The Seco= nd Europe: The Common Market</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel13">Lessons = to be learnt?</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel2">2. Benefi= ts of Integration</a> _______ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel21">Politica= l Objectives and Market Efficiency</a> _____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel22">Economic= Benefits: Economies of Scale?</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel23">Better C= hances for Economic Development?</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel24"> Comparative Economic Performance of the EEC/EC</a> _____ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel25">The EU a= s a Policy Maker</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel26">Advantag= es and Disadvantages of Size</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel27">Lessons = to be learnt?</a> <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel3">3. Instit= utionalised Dialogue and other Roads to Peace</a> __ <o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#capitel4">Reference= s</a> _____ <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></= o:p>  <o= :p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p></spa= n>  <o:p></o:p></spa= n>  <o:p></o:p></spa= n> </div> <span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Swiss= ; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:&q= uot;Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:DE;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section3">  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p> [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 1] If there is a constant in European history, it is war. Our political systems and the people at the to= p of them were somehow prone to generate ever new situations of conflict and to solve them by violent means. European history is an almost incessant stream= of blood, misery and destruc=ADtion =96 within Europe itself and elsewhere in = the world. Furthermore, the width and depth of this stream increased with the s= ize and the strength of centrally organised states and with the development of military technology. Against this historical background Wes= tern Europe and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe have enjoyed half a century of unprecedented peace and prosperity. Almost two generations have not been involved in a war nor have they experienced the misery it causes. The absen= ce of war is in itself an amazing and precious achievement. Yet, an even great= er achievement is, what might be called, a new culture of conflict management: Of course there are still conflicts and plenty of conflicting interests, but we follow accepted procedures that lea= d to negotiated solu=ADtions. We can be certain that all conflicts a= re resolved peacefully, that is without recourse to mili=ADtary force and to the menace= of military force. Military force has simply ceased to be part of the tactical= and strategic games that are played within the European Union (EU). In this sen= se we can say that the EU has become a peace community: It is characterised not only by the ab=ADsence of war, but b= y the absence of the possibility of war among its members.<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn1" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn1" name=3D"_= ftnref1" title=3D"">[1]</a> Small wonder that the neighbouring countries of the EU have, apart from the= eco=ADnomic benefits they expect, such a strong interest in joining the club.</p= > If you ask people in the EU, a vast ma= jority will agree that a war among the member states has ceased to be a possibility. If= you ask them how this was achieved, most of them will cite European integration= as being the most important factor. Even if you ask those who are highly criti= cal of the ways and means of European integration, most of them would probably agree that the danger of an intra-EU war has practically vanished =96 and s= till many of them might give credit to the European integration process for it. = Yet Europe has not only stopped to cau= se havoc within itself, but also to other countries. After centuries of conquest and subjugation of the world, Europe seems to have lost its impe=ADrialist driv= es. With very few exceptions the European colonies were relinquished. Neither t= he European Community nor its member countries initiated any military conflict= s outside Europe. Of course some countries gave military support to the US du= ring the Vietnam War, yet the price they paid in terms of the legitimacy of thei= r political regimes was a high one. [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 2] From the perspective of past European = behaviour this is quite astonishing, because the havoc caused inside and outside Euro= pe increased with the size of its centrally organised states and with the development of military technology. For both reasons one could have expecte= d an aggressive and destructive Europe on an unprecedented scale. That it was no= t the case can be explained by the Cold War and the difficulties that the EC member governments had in agree=ADing to common foreign policies. As the Co= ld War came to an end and as the EU is trying to establish a unitary policy framew= ork for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) there are some fears that Europe might return to its former behaviour and impose its will on others b= y military intervention and threats. If the process of European integration= can be credited with converting the belligerent Euro=ADpe of the past into a non-aggressive and stable peace community, then many of the institutio=ADna= l, democratic and economic deficiencies of the EU necessarily appear in a much milder light. On the other hand, it would be very worth while to find out whether other regions in the world could learn any lessons from this proces= s of integration. "To learn from history" is an old and controversial issue. Historic circumstances are never interpreted in the sa= me way. If one wants to draw any lessons from them, one has to abstract from t= he concrete events as such or to generalise. Depending on one=92s preferences = and cogniti=ADve biases, which can never be entirely subdued or avoided, one me= ntally derives these abstrac=ADtions and generalisations. There is always the dang= er of teleological constructions: Because Europe after half a decade of integrati= on has become a peace community (itself a mental con=ADstruction), one looks f= or all the elements in history which contributed to this end, that is, re=ADinterp= reting them in the light of the final outcome =96 and excluding or overlooking man= y other elements which in their time were of much greater importance than is admitted within such a perspective. It is, for instance, commonly assumed = that the basis of European integration was economic integration (as will be shown a largely exaggerated and even false claim). As European integra=ADtion was a success in pacifying formerly belligerent nations, it is then argued that o= ther regions should integrate economically too. Such inferences about European integra= tion are not warranted and even false: European in=ADtegration was from the very beginni= ng an essentially political integration. Economic integration was at times instrumentalised to that end, but its overall contribution to the pacificat= ion of the European continent was and remains limited. <a name=3D"_Toc463111929"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889877"><sp= an style=3D"mso-bookmark:_Toc463111929">In order to av= oid easy generalisations and possibly unfounded lessons derived from them, we will l= ook first with some detail at the historic events and constellations that surrounded the initial efforts of European integration during the early post-World-War-II years and the 1950s =96and try to draw some lessons from = this experience. Then we will change the focus and ask what benefits can be expe= cted from integration. In the final section, at a primarily conceptual level, different routes to integration will be briefly discussed.</a= > <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"f= ont-size: 16.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";ms= o-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> [Seit= e der Druckausg.: 3] <h2 style=3D"margin-top:0cm"><sp= an style=3D"mso-bookmark:_Toc463111929"><a name=3D"_Toc478798376"> </a><a name=3D"capitel1"></a> 1. European integration Why it happened and how it happened<o:p></o:p></h2> <h3 style=3D"margin-top:0cm"><a name=3D"_Toc463111930"></a><a name=3D"_Toc4= 70889878"></a><a name=3D"_Toc478798377"> </a><a name=3D"capitel11"></a>The First Europe: The Co= ld War, the German Problem and Supra-nationalism</h3> The most central historical condition = that set the stage for all the efforts to integrate Western Europe militarily, institutionally and politically was of course the Cold War. The anti-Hitler coalition of the USA and the USSR fell apart soon after the War was over. T= he ideologies and the economic and strategic interests of the two superpowers proved to be too conflicting.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn2" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn2" name=3D"_ftnref2" t= itle=3D"">[2]</a>= The economic and political collapse in western Europe could have made it easy prey for Stalin.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn3" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn3" name=3D"_ftnref3" t= itle=3D"">[3]</a>= The situation in 1946-47 seemed so tense that Washington felt that "the development of a strong European economy was the most urgent priority" and the Marshall Plan, "a massive design for European recovery, was launched accordingly, in June 1947. ... fortunately for them = (the Europeans, WK), the original American plan for a post-war world economy of = free trade, free convertibility and free markets, dominated by the US proved unrealistic".<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn4" href=3D"https://libra= ry.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn4" name=3D"_ftnref4" title=3D"">[4]</a>,<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:= ftn5" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn5" name=3D"_= ftnref5" title=3D"">[5]</a> [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 4] This economic and military reconfigura= tion of Western Europe as a part of the anti-Soviet alliance required some sort of = a union of those countries.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn6" href=3D"h= ttps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn6" name=3D"_ftnref6" title= =3D"">[6]</a>= But it also had realistically to rest on German economic strength and on the re-armament of Germany within Nato. As a result "from Marshall aid onwards, the United States began to see the economic recovery of German= y and later its military contribution to Western defence as vital to the Euro= pean, and by extension, world balance."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn7" h= ref=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn7" name=3D"_ftnref7= " title=3D"">[7]</a>= Such a policy had not only to reckon w= ith the opposition of the Soviet Union but also of both Britain and France. The Bri= tish still saw themselves as a world power, while the French saw themselves as t= he prime victims of German aggression and dreamed of a strong France and a wea= k and partitioned Germany. With them, as well as with most other Europeans, t= he idea of a rearmed and economically strong Germany naturally aroused feeling= s of fear and even horror. How could it be guaranteed that German economic and military prowess would not in the fu=ADture become a menace again for Franc= e and the other European countries? Such fears were not calmed when in Germany ho= pes to reverse the division of the country and to regain territories lost to Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were repeatedly voiced.<= a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn8" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id= /00730.htm#_ftn8" name=3D"_ftnref8" title=3D"">[8]</sup= ></a> The perceived strategic needs of the C= old War and the "German problem" became a major American dilemma. How could it be solved? Basically three options existed: a.= imposition of a solution through American hegemonic power; b. alliances against Germany; c. &n= bsp; reconciliation and co-operation among the Western European countries. [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 5] <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111931"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889879"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798378"> </a><a name=3D"capitel111"></a> The Limits of Hegemonic Power<o:p></o:p></h4> The United States was of course the= hegemonic power in Western Europe. However the exer=ADcise of this power in= volved serious limits. If it was not handled with great care, it could easily lead= to the escalation of conflicts among the European countries and therefore weak= en the alli=ADance. Besides the long-term consequences of American involvement= and its duration were dif=ADficult to predict.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-i= d:ftn9" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn9" name=3D= "_ftnref9" title=3D"">[9]</a>= The political, military and economic dependency on the US and the imposi=ADtion of Ame=ADrican policy aims by sheer power were bound to breed resentment against the US hegemon.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn10"= href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn10" name=3D"_ftnr= ef10" title=3D"">[10]</a> What about the possibility of a unified and neutral Germany =96 that eventually might remerge as a continental power?<a style=3D"mso-foot= note-id: ftn11" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn11" name=3D= "_ftnref11" title=3D"">[11]</su= p></a> Or what about a German-Soviet alignment = =96 which even the US policy makers considered to be a serious possibility up to the early 1950s.= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn12" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn12" name=3D"_ftnref12" title=3D"">[12]</su= p></a> Naturally, France's sense of vulnerabi= lity was shared by other countries in Europe, especially the smaller ones. As a resu= lt France wanted "guarantees to insure German demilitarization" and "extensive powers to control the production and distribution of Ruhr coal, coke, and steel in order to promote its economic self-interest and insure i= ts security."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn13" href=3D"https://library= .fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn13" name=3D"_ftnref13" title=3D"">[13]</a> Precisely these guaran=ADtees the US hegemon would not or could not offer without endangering its own objectives.<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn14" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn14" name=3D= "_ftnref14" title=3D"">[14]</su= p></a> Clearly, European complexities and ani= mosities could not be easily domesticated by hege=ADmonic power, even under Cold War conditions. [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 6] <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111932"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889880"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798379"> </a><a name=3D"capitel112"></a> Alliances Against Germany: Counterproductive<o:p></o:p></h4> European alliances against Germany wer= e also tried. The first one was established by the Trea=ADty of Dunkirk.<a = style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn15" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/= 00730.htm#_ftn15" name=3D"_ftnref15" title=3D"">[15]</su= p></a> It served as a model for the Brussels Tr= eaty, which was to become in 1954 the Western European Union (WEU). The five signatories (France, GB, Benelux) "pledged them=ADselves to mutual armed assistance against the Soviet Union and Germany."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn16" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn16" name=3D"_ftnref16" ti= tle=3D"">[16]</a> On the one hand US officials were delighted by Bevin's =96 the British foreign secretary =96 initiative to organise Western Europe into a = viable block.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn17" href=3D"https://library.fes= .de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn17" name=3D"_ftnref17" title=3D"">[17]<= /span></a> Yet, on the other hand, it was= quite clear that such a treaty could not be in the American strategic interest. As George Kennan put it in a let= ter to George Marshall: "The general adoption of a mutual assistance pact based squarely on defense against Germany is a poor way to prepare the grou= nd for the eventual entry of the Germans into the concept."<a style=3D"= mso-footnote-id:ftn18" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm= #_ftn18" name=3D"_ftnref18" title=3D"">[18]</su= p></a> Both thought that it was far more import= ant to design a security system that would co-opt German power against the Soviet Union, instead of = one that ostracised Germany and made a = rapprochement with the Soviet Union even more likely. <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111933"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889881"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798380"> </a><a name=3D"capitel113"></a> Jean Monnet: Supra-national Integration of Equal Partners<o:p></o:p></h4> The third approach to the German probl= em, that of reconciliation and co-operation among the western European countries, had b= een proposed early on by Churchill in his famous speech at the University of Z=FCrich. A peaceful Europe could not be based on feelings of hate and veng= e=ADance. Instead it required trust among the European peoples and a sort of United States of Europe. As a first step, a partnership between Germany and France ought to be formed.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn19" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn19" name=3D"_ftnref19" title=3D"= ">[19]</a> The reconciliation of these two countries was a necessary condition for a united and internally peaceful Western Europe. But how could both be achieved? This approach was tried with varying s= uccess in various cases, among them the Organisa=ADtion for European Economic Co-oper= ation (OEEC), the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)= , the European Defence Community and its political twin the European Politica= l Community, Euratom, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the</p= > [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 7] European Community. The spiritus r= ector behind the creation of these institutions was Jean Monnet, 'Mr Europe', as he came= to be called in the 1950s.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn20" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn20" name=3D"_ftnref20" title= =3D"">[20]</a> The first case was that of the OEEC, t= hat is the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:f= tn21" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn21" name=3D"= _ftnref21" title=3D"">[21]</a> Its main task was to distribute the funds of the Marshall Plan. The Americans insisted that the West Europeans should agree among themselves on= the amount of their collective request for aid and present a long-term plan to = the US Congress. This raised for the first time the question of integration ver= sus sovereignty. France assumed the initiative. Jean Monnet, who enjoyed ample confidence among the American leadership and officials<a style=3D"ms= o-footnote-id:ftn22" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_= ftn22" name=3D"_ftnref22" title=3D""><= sup>[22]</su= p></a>, heavily influen=ADced the French propos= al for the OEEC. It contained the "functionalist" institutions typical of Monnet's projects: a small and independent executive committee with real decision-making power composed of distinguish= ed Europeans with no official governmental connecti=ADons; an executive body h= eaded by a Director General; and an assembly of government repre=ADsentatives dec= iding, in this case, under the unanimity rule. The Americans wanted to go further limiting national vetoes in the assembly. Yet, most of the European countries, l= ed by Britain, wanted neither planning nor limits on sovereignty nor middlemen meddling in their relations with the United States. The OEEC that emerged w= as predictably inter-governmental. And because of its inter-governmental chara= cter Monnet lost all interest in it: In his thinking it was not an institution a= t the service of European integration. "The co-operation among nations, as important as it may be, does not solve any= =ADthing."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn23" href=3D"https://lib= rary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn23" name=3D"_ftnref23" title=3D""><sp= an class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[23]</su= p></a> National sovereignties remained unaffec= =ADted, decisions which one did not like could be ignored, discipline was too lax, while the common interest was too imprecise.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn24" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn24" name=3D"_ftnref24"= title=3D"">[24]</a> The failure to build a strong system led to unrestrained competition for as large a part of the share as pos=ADsible.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn25" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn25" name=3D"_ftnref25" title=3D"">[25]</su= p></a> For him strong system was one which sought the fusion of the interests of the Euro=ADpean peoples a= nd not simply the racking up of som= e balance of these interests.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn26" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn26" name=3D"_ftnref26" title=3D= "">[26]</a> [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 8] A second, somewhat more successful cas= e was the Schuman Plan. Jean Monnet was its ar=ADchitect. It led to the establishment= of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). = 1. The strategic situation at = the time was the following: The US had decided that German coal, steel and its industrial capacity were needed in the defences of Western Europe. The three Western occupational powers were united and the Federal Republic was formed. German= y was clearly on the way to become a sovereign nation again. French policy to= ward Germany was in a shambles and the anxieties were correspondingly large. Eve= n though the US did not talk openly yet of German rearmament, the issue was o= n everybody's mind. Acheson had asked Schuman, the French foreign minister, t= o propose a new German policy for the three allies (for the Foreign Minister'= s meeting in London in May 1950). = Another big= problem was the Saar. France had annexed it to shift the balance of power in coal and steel in its favou= r. To the German government the Saar was German. If the French succeeded, the = case for reunification with East Germany would be undermined. Because of the Saa= r the first official visit of Schuman to Bonn in January 1950 "was a disaster". "The reciprocating engine of hostility could spring to life again any time."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn27" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn27" name=3D"_ftnref27" title= =3D"">[27]</a> = 2. Against this background it = was necessary to develop a strategy based on sound concepts. Schuman had no idea what to pro= pose to Acheson and Bevin in London, although he had pondered deeply and consult= ed many people."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn28" href=3D"https://libr= ary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn28" name=3D"_ftnref28" title=3D""><spa= n class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[28]</a> How to deal with the contradictory need, on the one hand, to inte=ADgrate Germany as an equal partner within the logic of the Cold War and, on the ot= her hand, to control the resurgent heavy industry of the Ruhr, the potential ba= se for a new German military might? The Ruhr Authority, which had been created= for the second purpose, was humiliating for Germany and therefore an unstable arrangement. Ger=ADmany could be expected to get rid of it sooner or later.= The Saar problem was even more delicate. = Monnet had = pondered these problems for about a decade.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn29" href=3D"https://li= brary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn29" name=3D"_ftnref29" title=3D""><s= pan class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[29]</a> The discrimination of Germany had to end.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-= id:ftn30" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn30" name= =3D"_ftnref30" title=3D"">[30]</su= p></a> "Peace can only be based on equality."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn31" href=3D"https://= library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn31" name=3D"_ftnref31" title=3D""> [31]<= /a> Under this assumption he proposed to place the coal a= nd steel industries of France and Germany under a supra-national autho=AD [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 9] rity. The rule of law of the common authority would reign. France and Germany would limit sovereignty in favour of that authority. <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn32" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn32" name=3D"_ftnref32" title=3D""> [32] </a> Other countries could join if they so desired. Coal a= nd steel would stop being German and French coal and steel, there would be only Euro=ADpea= n coal and steel, and both would be enmeshed like cogwheels ('engrenage' was the vogue word for this process, much favoured b= y Monnet). One could expect that the High Authority, as it was to be called, would not tolerate unilateral rearmament efforts of Ger=ADmany. If the Fren= ch and German coal and metallurgical industries were fully integrated, Germany wou= ld not be able to wage a war against France or other countries.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn33" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn33" name=3D"_ftnref33" title=3D"">[33]</su= p></a> A French take-over of the Saar's economi= c resources would stop making sense under such an arran=ADgement. A harmonious settlement would be= come possible (as it did). = 3. The setting out of sound co= ncepts and principles in the Schuman Plan, which were greeted with enthusiasm by Adena= uer<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn34" href=3D"https://library.fes.de= /fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn34" name=3D"_ftnref34" title=3D"">[34]</su= p></a>, was an important political first step.<= /span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn35" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn35" name=3D= "_ftnref35" title=3D"">[35]</su= p></a> As a next step the institutional framewo= rk and the tasks to be assigned to it had to be laid down. The tasks had to be more or less 'technical', such as the promotion of a common market in coal and steel, th= e encouragement of competition, joint modernisation and export programs, the standardi=ADsation of freight rates and the harmonisation of working and li= ving conditions etc. = In contrast= the institutions were eminently political. The High Authority w= as given extensive powers including the right to levy taxes, to influence investment decisions, and also to im=ADpose minimum prices and production q= uotas in times of 'crisis'. For Monnet, who became its first president, the High Authority was endowed with real authority and he wanted to exer=ADcise it w= ithout reference to national governments. This was of course not easy, and relatio= ns with the inter-governmental Council= of Ministers were complex and not always smooth. Relations with the Consultative Committee, which had onl= y advisory capacity and was do=ADminated by industry, were awkward too. In contrast, the High Authority and the Common Assembly became natural allies, as the latter viewed itself as a supra-national European institution. Finally there was the Court of Justice whose decisions were generally respec=ADted.</= span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn36" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/full= text/id/00730.htm#_ftn36" name=3D"_ftnref36" title=3D"">[36]</su= p></a> Clearly the ECSC was an institution with= strong supra-national traits.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn37" href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn37" name=3D"_ftnref37" title=3D"">[37]= </a>,<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:= ftn38" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn38" name=3D= "_ftnref38" title=3D"">[38]</a>= [Seite de= r Druckausg.: 10] = 4. The tasks and the instituti= onal framework, that is 'function' and 'form' in functionalist theo=ADries, were only loose= ly related.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn39" href=3D"https://library.f= es.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn39" name=3D"_ftnref39" title=3D"">[39]</span= ></a> That was no accident, since = the integration of the two sectors was only partially an end in itself.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn40" h= ref=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn40" name=3D"_ftnref= 40" title=3D"">[40]</a> Unsurprisingly, in strictly economic terms the ECSC could only be a partial success too, and it was a partial success only during the very earl= y years.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn41" href=3D"https://library.fes= .de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn41" name=3D"_ftnref41" title=3D"">[41]<= /span></a> It soon outlived its economic = purposes.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn42" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn42" name=3D= "_ftnref42" title=3D"">[42]</su= p></a> The main purposes of the ECSC was eminen= tly political. Economic integration= was instrumentalised for political reasons =96 and not the other way around. = 5. In terms of the underlying = political purposes the ECSC was rather successful, especially du=ADring the initial years. Fir= stly, the political emphasis on European integration=20 =20 made compro=ADmises possible that would not otherwise have been reached= . Secondly, the new system for=AD [Seite der Dr= uckausg.: 11] ced the member states into constant negotiations with one another. Therefore, interestingly, economic union in fa= ct increased rather than reduced the need for inter-governmental negotiation a= nd agreement!<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn43" href=3D"https://lib= rary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn43" name=3D"_ftnref43" title=3D""><sp= an class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[43]</a> Thirdly, the rule of law was firmly established. Rulings of the Court were never challenged or ignored. Fourthly, the problem of the Saar f= ell into place almost without effort because steel balances had stopped to be a yardstick of relations bet=ADween France and Germany. "(O)n balance, the new Community repre= sented a major shift in relations b= etween the mem=ADber states towards a confederal norm. It gradually lowered tension all roun= d, raised trust and in this sense laid the foundation of a new Europe."= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn44" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn44" name=3D"_ftnref44" title=3D"">[44]</su= p></a> In this sense the Schuman Plan was more = than an answer to an impasse of French foreign policy and more than a deal between France and Germany. On the other hand, even though it was the only truly supra-nationa= l institution, it was never as supra-national as it was intended to be or lik= ed to present itself. With its own loss of effectiveness in the economic field= , it was overshadowed more and more by the EEC, which had much less executive po= wer<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn45" href=3D"https://library.fes.de= /fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn45" name=3D"_ftnref45" title=3D"">[45]</su= p></a> and was much more subject to agreements = between govern=ADments, particularly after de Gaulle's return to power. Finally, in 1967, the institutions of the ECSC were integrated with those of the EEC. <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111934"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889882"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798381"> </a><a name=3D"capitel114"></a> The Decline of Supra-nationalism<o:p></o:p></h4> Another, less successful case of supra= -national integration was the European Defence Commu=ADnity (EDC). The pattern= of the creation of the ECSC was repeated. A perceived threat to French securit= y - after the Korean war had broken out, the US considered it indispensable to rearm Germany - led to a French proposal of a supra-national European army = along the lines of the Schuman Plan. Again Monnet worked in the background, altho= ugh less than with the Schu=ADman Plan. Again Britain stayed apart. The Pleven = Plan, as it was called, proposed a European Army under the Atlantic umbrella run = by a European Minister of Defence and a Council of Ministers, with a joint commander, common budget and common arms procurement. Yet, this Plan was clearly discriminatory against Germany: for Germany it was to be the army, for all the others an army; a German Defence Minister, a German General Staff and German full divisions were not foreseen. After difficult negotiations, in the course of which some of the more glaring discriminations were diluted, the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952.= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn46" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn46" name=3D"_ftnref46" title=3D"">[46]</su= p></a> Once it was signed, the European Po= litical Community came on the agenda.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn47" = href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn47" name=3D"_ftnre= f47" title=3D"">[47]</a> A constitutio=ADnal commission was formed in order to= draft a constitution for a European Union. The blue=AD [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 12] print contained a directly elected European Parliament, a Senate elected by parliaments of member states, an Executive Council of five members with a President to be elected by the Sen= ate, who was to be responsible to the two chambers; a Council of Ministers from member states to serve as a liaison between the European executive and memb= er governments; and a European Court of Justice. The EPC was to be the roof fo= r the ECSC and the EDC. The three would have formed the core<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn48" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn48" name=3D"_ftnref48" title=3D"">[48]</su= p></a> of a European state with a federal const= itution. It would have been the triumph of supra-national aspirations. Yet these aspirations received a deadl= y blow when the French parliament in August 1954 did not ratify the EDC.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn49" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn49" name=3D"_ftnref49" title=3D"">[49]</su= p></a> De Gaulle's influence had made itself fe= lt.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn50" href=3D"https://library.fes.de= /fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn50" name=3D"_ftnref50" title=3D"">[50]</su= p></a> The underlying reason was national sover= eignty.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn51" href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn51" name=3D"_ftnref51" title=3D"">[51]</su= p></a> For de Gaulle the proposal to integrate = the French and German armed forces was "plain idiocy".<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn52" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn52" name=3D"_ftnref52" ti= tle=3D"">[52]</a> The British government, characteristically, was all in favour of European integration and a European army, yet only as long as it did not include the Brit=ADish.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn53" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn53" name=3D"_ftnref53" title= =3D"">[53]</a> US officials, although not publicly, had "found the Pleven Plan totally unacceptable", because it made German rearmament contingent on the creation of a new set of European institutions. This made NATO total= ly inoperable, precluded US participation in a European defence force and dela= yed German rearmament for the indefinite future.<a style=3D"mso-footnote= -id: ftn54" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn54" name=3D= "_ftnref54" title=3D"">[54]</su= p></a> Unsurprisingly, the US had stayed on t= heir track of strengthening NATO. Once the EDC had failed, France found that it "had to swallow the very German national army inside NATO, which the EDC had bee= n intended to avoid."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn55" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn55" name=3D"_ftnref55" title=3D"= ">[55]</a> Germany, as a full Atlantic ally, was placed under a NATO integrated command headed by an American and it was placed under similar restrictions as the ones foreseen in the Pleven Plan.<a style=3D"mso= -footnote-id:ftn56" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_f= tn56" name=3D"_ftnref56" title=3D""><s= up>[56]</su= p></a> This 'double containment'<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn57" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn57" name=3D"_ftnref57" title=3D"">[57]</a> strategy was [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 13] bound to mollify French (and American) anxieties. Even though, it "was a curious paradox, that to create a credible NATO to defend Europe against the Russians to the East, both Britain and the US had= to commit their forces to the north German plain to reassure the French that a rearmed Germany would not turn its guns once more against its neighbour to = the West."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn58" href=3D"https://library.fes= .de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn58" name=3D"_ftnref58" title=3D"">[58]</a> Whatever the small print, after the fa= ilure of the EDC military defence and security were again under the firm control of the American hegemon. Bipolarity and the position of the hege=ADmon became even= more firmly established when the Warsaw Pact was created shortly after the acces= sion of Germany to NATO. This left the European integration in = an uncomfortable situation, because this "first Europe" of an already declining ECSC and a failed EDC "was in many ways a security Europe, n= ot an economic one. ... The shared characteristic both of the ECSC and the Europe= an Army was that they were primarily addressed to German power. Each had econo= mic aspects, but neither was economic in essence. ... the EDC proved that it wa= s dangerous, even impossible, to pursue further European union by direct secu= rity or political means."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn59" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn59" name=3D"_ftnref59" title=3D= "">[59]</a> Monnet had come precisely to this conc= lusion: the EDC crisis had proved that the sources of power lay in the nations, channel= led through the governments, not the Community in Lux=ADembourg.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn60" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn60" name=3D"_ftnref60" title=3D"">[60]</su= p></a> The demise of 'security Europe' not on= ly meant that the US and NATO assumed full leader=ADship in matters of military secu= rity, but also that supra-national concepts became less attractive. In fact, the watering down of the supra-national concepts of the Schuman Plan had alread= y begun during the negotiation of the EDC treaty and been accentuated during = the EPC talks.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn61" href=3D"https://library= .fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn61" name=3D"_ftnref61" title=3D"">[61]</a> The departure of Jean Monnet from the presidency of the High Authority - he was the High Aut= hority - in 1955 further undermined its supra-national character.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn62" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn62" name=3D"_ftnref62" title=3D"">[62]</su= p></a> Besides, the political cli=ADmate in Fra= nce, and, partly as a reaction, elsewhere changed. Monnet did not escape unscathed from the wreck= of the EDC and became for the first time a publicly controversial figure. The = idea of a Europe in some sense above the nations was no longer stated in the ope= n. "The gov=ADernments rejected anything or anyone that threatened, like Monnet, openly to compete with their mono=ADpoly."<a style=3D"mso-fo= otnote-id:ftn63" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn6= 3" name=3D"_ftnref63" title=3D"">= [63]</su= p></a> National sovereignty had won a decisive = battle against supra-nationality. The future masters of Europe were the = governments of the member states. Nevertheless the supra-national institutions created under the leadership of Jean Monnet - the High Authority, the Consultative Committee, the Common Assembly and the Court of Justice - did not disap=AD [Seite der Dr= uckausg.: 14] pear. They became under new names the core institutions of the European Economic Commu=ADnity (EEC) and its successors, that is the European Community and t= he European Union. <h4><a name=3D"_Toc463111935"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889883"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798382"> </a><a name=3D"capitel115"></a> NATO, the Anglo-Saxon =91special relationship=92 and the German-French Axis<o:p></o:p></h4> With the demise of 'security Europe' a= nd the reaffirmation of NATO American leadership in matters of military security w= as clearly established. NATO became a necessary condition for stable and peace= ful relations among the European nations. Yet it could not be a sufficient one because the demise of supra-nationality left the doors open again for rival= ry and conflict among the European nation-states; doors which could not be clo= sed easily by the American hegemon. Instead, unwillingly or not, the United Sta= tes contributed to the conflicts which came to afflict the alliance and the relations between France and Great Britain in particular. In the first place the United States c= ontinued to cultivate a special relationship with Great Britain in nuclear and strategi= c matters.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn64" href=3D"https://library.f= es.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn64" name=3D"_ftnref64" title=3D"">[64]</span= ></a> This intensified de Gaulle's= suspicion of the Anglo-Saxons. As a result, "(t)he closer Britain cleaved to America, the more de Gaulle leaned to Adenauer."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn65" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn65" name=3D"_ftnref65" title=3D= "">[65]</a> Second, America's behaviour towards it= s NATO partner France was at times humiliating and hard to bear. General Norstad refused to inform President de Gaulle, for instance, about the deployment o= f nuclear weapons in France! This difficult relationship culminated in France= 's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance and the request for all troops = to leave French soil, in 1966.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn66" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn66" name=3D"_ftnref66"= title=3D"">[66]</a> Third, the US humiliated both France a= nd Great Britain at Suez, a plot they had prepared secretly with Israel, yet without American knowledge. In the aftermath of this crisis Western European leader= s asked themselves "whether America would stick by them through thick and thin - particularly in the days before an American election" one of which was due then.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn67" href=3D"https://libr= ary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn67" name=3D"_ftnref67" title=3D""><spa= n class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[67]</a> Fourth, Kennan, Dulles and others had = suggested, even in public, to unify, demilitarise and neutralise Germany. This America= n fashion for theories of German neutralisation was a stun=ADning shock, not = only for Adenauer, and, unsurprisingly, inclined him towards France.<a st= yle=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn68" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn68" name=3D"_ftnref68" title=3D"">[68]</su= p></a> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 15] In other words: In the back of the NAT= O alliance an Anglo-Saxon special relationship and a German-French axis were nurtured. Franco-German unity was to become the core of further European integration = and of the domestication of the 'German problem', which, in the percep=ADtion especially of France, had become more acute.<a style=3D"mso-footnote= -id: ftn69" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn69" name=3D= "_ftnref69" title=3D"">[69]</su= p></a> Britain was consistently excluded= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn70" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn70" name=3D= "_ftnref70" title=3D"">[70]</su= p></a>, even though it had always had affinitie= s with the idea of liberalising trade. Finally, the evolving stra=ADtegic position of Europe a= lso contained the seeds of European opposition against the American hegemon, i.= e. of the notion of a European world power, which was to get stronger with "a growing gap between the overwhelming military, and therefore political domination of the alli=ADance by Washington, and the USA's gradually weaken= ing economic predominance.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn71" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn71" name=3D"_ftnref71" title= =3D"">[71]</a> <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111936"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889884"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798383"> </a><a name=3D"capitel12"></a> The Second Europe: The Common Market</h3> This was the background against which = the second 'economic' Europe evolved. Its central pieces were the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom. Again Monnet worked busily, yet eve= n more hidden, behind the scenes as with the earlier projects of European int= e=ADgration. Unlike other leaders, Adenauer for example felt embittered and depressed, Monnet could not be disheartened by the failure of EDC/EPC.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn72" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn72" name=3D"_ftnref72" title=3D"">[72]</su= p></a> Monnet, of course, would not abandon h= is overriding aim of supra-national institution buil=ADding. His intentions le= aned more and more towards a new Community in a new sector, civil nuclear power. Such a proposal had several advantages: First, nuclear power was believed t= o be the basis of a new industrial revolution, yet its development required amou= nts of investment beyond the means even of the larger western European nations. Second, just like the integra=ADtion of coal and steel had provided the mat= erial for the great symbolic burial of old feuds in Europe, nuclear power could provide the basis for Europe's great symbolic entry into the mod=ADern worl= d. Third, the French inferiority complex which had played havoc with the EDC o= ught to be irrelevant, because France's nuclear effort was larger than those of = all its Community partners put together. Fourth, joint regulation could also en= sure that Germany's nuclear devel=ADopment would remain strictly civilian.</span= ><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn73" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext= /id/00730.htm#_ftn73" name=3D"_ftnref73" title=3D"">[73]</su= p></a> Finally, no limits would be put by the n= ew organisation [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 16] on the efforts of French to develop nuclear weapons. Hence, it seemed that = the new Commu=ADnity would be based on a set of sound economic, symbolic, tactical = and strategic reasons. In terms of the institutions to be formed the approach w= as similar to the Schuman Plan. Eventually Spaak proposed Monnet's pro= gramme for the new Community for civil nuclear power (and for an extension of the ECSC= to all of energy and transport, including airlines). To Monnet's great surpris= e the German government was not interested in the new Community, while Erhard= , already credited with the German Wi= rtschaftswunder, was openly opposed to it. A meeting with German officials established the b= asic fact of the coming negotiations, namely that Germany would not swallow Eura= tom without a general common market= . Monnet in fact had pondered about the = creation of a common market and came to the con=ADclusion that time was not ripe for it= .<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn74" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/f= ulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn74" name=3D"_ftnref74" title=3D"">[74]</su= p></a> He had a substantial reason that is stil= l put forward now=ADadays: In his opinion it was not possible to dissociate a common market from federal social, monetary and conjuncture policies. If a common market was formed without this common framework, it "= would be so near free trade, lacking institutions as to undermine his political purposes." (emphasis added). In fact, right after the failure of th= e EDC pressure for a Free Trade Area in the OEEC was put forward by Britain, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia. Erhard too favoured such a solution. Mon= net and Spaak however ignored these pressures. Instead, they agreed that the priority was to integrate Germany and that only supra-national Communities could achieve this. A Free Trade Area with Britain clearly would have been = an inter-governmental affair (or even less), while France would have been a hyper-reluctant member of such a scheme. Hence it would have weakened integration.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn75" href=3D"https://libra= ry.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn75" name=3D"_ftnref75" title=3D""><span= class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[75]</a> Adenauer largely sided with Monnet and Spaak. Because of the prevailing contradictor= y attitudes - Adenauer against Erhard - Bonn offered an "amazing spectacle" in 1955-56. But in France the situation was even more complicated: to champion= a common market in public would have been political suicide; a Free Trade Are= a was unthinkable; supra-nationality was too controversial to be discussed; a= nd the Atomic Ener=ADgy Commissariat feared that Euratom could block France's = road to nuclear weapons. On top of that, Monnet had become practically a persona= non grata in Paris. Only the B= enelux countries presented a more coherent picture. They tried to force the issue = by presenting a memorandum in which they combined the 'sectoral' with the 'general', i.e. the common market approach. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 17] Expectations were extremely low when t= he foreign ministers' conference began in Messina in June 1955. Monnet did not attend because of a French veto<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn76" href=3D"h= ttps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn76" name=3D"_ftnref76" titl= e=3D"">[76]</a>, neither did Adenauer, for fear of failure. Nevertheless, after cumbersome negotiations<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn77" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn77" name=3D"_ftnref77" title= =3D"">[77]</a> a compromise was struck that was to lead directly to the Rome treaties of 1957: Germany agreed to something less than free trade, i.e. a common market with an institutional core shaped along the lines of the ECSC= ; Belgium swallowed certain supra-national traits and sacrificed its preferen= ces for British-style inter-gov=ADernmentalism; the nuclear-power community gav= e France a chance to stay in the process, while it was stripped of most aspec= ts that could have interfered with French sovereignty in nuclear matters. Monn= et, the personification of the supra-national principle was partially eclipsed.= The institutional core of his approach was confirmed at Messina, although it wa= s to be much more inter-governmental in character. At Messina the Community of the six wa= s reasserted. Other groupings might have seemed, in nuclear power especially,= to make more sense. Yet the main purpose was not to create 'func=ADtionalist' institutions which could solve in a pragmatic and efficient manner specific problems, but to navigate the endangered European ship through hazardous straights and into more pro=ADmising waters. In fact, Messina became a clas= sic case of "European packaging": Propositions, which are not viable, because there are contradicting nationa= l positions attached to them, can become viable once two or more propositions= are negotiated simultaneously.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn78" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn78" name=3D"_ftnref78" ti= tle=3D"">[78]</a> A larger and more diverse negotiable mass makes it easier to compromise in a process of give and take. Such packages from now on became = a common feature of the processes of European integra=ADtion. Yet packaging, = even though it helped to further integration, also reaffirmed the role of the nation-state as the interests that entered these packages were always "national" (whatever that meant in reality) interests. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111937"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889885"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798384"> </a><a name=3D"capitel13"></a> Lessons to be learnt?</h3> In order not to step into the trap of = deriving lessons from superficial generalisation, the process of integration of West= ern Europe until the foundation of the EEC has been looked at in detail. Lookin= g back, what were the most salient features of the period studied? </p= > <spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB">1. European i= ntegration began under very specific and rather complex geo-strategical, politi=ADcal and ec= onomic conditions after World War II. The Cold War created a favourable set=ADting= for integration. It may have been a necessary condition, but it was by no means= a suffi=ADcient one. = 2. The "German problem" was es= pecially delicate: The economic and military potential of Ger=ADmany had to be devel= oped again, yet this potential also had to be restrained. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 18] = 3. Integration was favoured by= the US hegemon. Yet the hegemon was not always clear and coherent, and could do rather litt= le when the Europeans either did not agree with it or did not agree among themselves. = 4. After two world wars, every= body dreamt of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. There was probably only one person =96 Jean Monnet =96 who had a clear vision (yet no grand design) of the future of Eu= rope and, more importantly, a recipe of how to go about it. Furthermore, he was fortunate to have gained the trust of the political establishment in the US= , Britain and France during the war years. = 5. A close look at the events = reveals that there was much muddling-through. Outcomes depen=ADded as much on contingencies as= on open or hidden political games. There were advances and setbacks. The proce= ss itself was path dependent. Outcomes therefore could not be pre=ADdicted. In= the end it was often just luck, when in spite of all difficulties some compromi= se was struck that took integration one step further ahead (at Messina for instance). = 6. At the time of the signing = of the Treaties of Rome (1957) the signatory countries (not to speak of Western Europe as a wh= ole) still had a long way to go to become a peace commu=ADnity =96 it was not ev= en clear that it could become one. It is obvious then that very specific = historical conditions and contingencies reigned at that time. No grand design and no grand, rational strategy towards integration existed, nor would it probably have had a chance to succeed. Jean Monnet, certainly a gift from heaven for Euro=ADpean integration, did not have a grand design but a method that well= fit the path dependency of integration =96 and he had the right connections. Wi= thout him European integration would not be where it is today, but even with him = it could have taken a different route. Things cannot be otherwise =96 unless o= ne believes that history is some sort of a teleological construction. <= /p> Hence, what could be learnt then from = the early years of integration in Europe? Historical conditions across time and place= do not tend to appear twice. Hence there is little to be learned from historic experience as such. What could be of interest however is, apart from his an= d other peoples=92 perseverance, Monnet=92s method of integration. Using his = own words, it can be summarised as follows: = All countries must be equal partners: "Peace can only be based on equality." = 1. "The fundamental principle = is the delegation of sovereignty in= a limited, but decisive area. ... The co-operation among nations, as important as it m= ay be, does not solve anything. What ought to be sought is a fusion of the interests ... and not simply the maintenance of the balance of these interests."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn79" href=3D"https://librar= y.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn79" name=3D"_ftnref79" title=3D"">[79]</a> = "This propo= sition has an essential political message: to drive a wedge into the bastions of national sovereign= ty that is small enough to be acceptable and deep enough to move the States towards the necessary unity for peace."<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id: ftn80" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn80" name=3D= "_ftnref80" title=3D"">[80]</su= p></a> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 19] = 2. Creation of institutions: A= small and independent executive committee= with real decision-making power composed of distinguished personalities with no official governmental con=ADnections; an executive body headed by a Director General; and an assembly of government representatives. = 3. Such an institutional set, = a. creates transparency among member countries, b. is based on the principle of 'every= body controls everybody', c. forces the member states into constant negotiations with one another, and d. allows for compromises, which could otherwise not = be reached. Such institutions fulfil the criteria of a peace community.= <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn81" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/= id/00730.htm#_ftn81" name=3D"_ftnref81" title=3D"">[81]</su= p></a> Under Monnet=92s leadership there was = a strong emphasis on supra-nationalism. It had to be scaled down. The member states regained some sovereignty. The balance between supra-natio=ADnalism and inter-governmentalism has been shifting since then in one or the other direction. Nowadays we have for the whole of the = EU only one set of Monnet-type institutions (Euro=ADpean Commission, Council of Ministe= rs, European Parliament, European Court of Justice, ...) and not several sets a= s he had had in mind (ECSC, EDC, Euratom). Over the years the need for negotiati= on and agreement became ever larger. The Council of Ministers, the most power= =ADful organ of the EU, has become a very complex "consensus seeking machine"<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn82" href=3D"https://library.f= es.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn82" name=3D"_ftnref82" title=3D"">[82]</a>. The Europe=ADan Commission and the European Parliament are closely integrated into this machine. Initiati=ADves, consultations and decisions i= nvolve frequent and time-consuming to-ing and fro-ing among the Commission, the Parliament and its Committees, the Council and its working groups, the Core= per (Permanent Representatives Committee), the conciliation committees of the Parliament and the Council. Outside the EU there are a number of other institutions too, where the respective member governments are in permanent contact and dialogue (NATO, OSCE, OECD, ...), and there are many bilateral = fora as well. Thus, every week hun=ADdreds of institutionalised dialogues are ta= king place in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe. </spa= n>The secret of the success, in terms of the formation of a peace community, of this sor= t of in=ADstitutionalised, permanent, multi-level dialogue is that civilised for= ms of social intercourse have become deeply ingrained. Over many years government officials have been spending a lot of time in meetings, committees, negotiations, luncheons etc. with officials from other European countries a= nd of European institutions. This intensive social intercourse together with t= he insti=ADtutional and political need to permanently negotiate has given rise= to a new culture of conflict mana=ADgement in Europe, spoken of at the beginning= . Here is the essence of our peace commu= =ADnity. The ever increasing need for negotiati= ons has been due to several factors: 1.&nbs= p; The Treaties of the EC and the EU are vague and often lend themselves to extens= ive inter=ADpretations. 2.&nbs= p; Even though the EU possesses strong and exclusive competencies only in a few policy [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 20] areas, almost any political and governmental issue has a European dimension and therefore needs to be discussed at the European level. 3.&nbs= p; =91National interests=92 are usually at variance. 4.&nbs= p; Negotiations lead to compromises. Compromises always leave some degree of dissatisfac=AD= tion and therefore bear the seed of new negotiations. In case of packaging, dissatisfaction is particularly likely to remain high: several issues, whic= h do not lend themselves to a solution separately, are linked and an overall compromise is found in a complex process of give and take. 5.&nbs= p; Stepwise solutions and path dependency easily lead to incoherences with respect to s= olu=ADtions found in the past and in other policy fields. 6.&nbs= p; Circumstances change and make past compromises inadequate or obsolete. <a name=3D"_Toc463111938">Naturally, o= ne can have doubts as to the efficiency and the democratic legitimacy of such all-perva= ding institutionalised dialogues. In a sense they are the perfect means to produ= ce second-best and third-best solutions. On the other hand this kind of give a= nd take occurs at the national and sub-national level too. Our political syste= ms have long been transformed into systems where most outcomes are the result = of complex negotiations which involve, just like in Brussels, not only government institutions, but all sorts of organised interests as well.</a><a st= yle=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn83" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn83" name=3D"_ftnref83" title=3D"">[83]</a> That is of course no excuse, because interest-group politics and dealings of governments=92 elit= es behind closed doors<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn84" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn84" name=3D"_ftnref84" ti= tle=3D"">[84]</su= p></a>,<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn85" href= =3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn85" name=3D"_ftnref85"= title=3D"">[85]</a> do not accord well wi= th democratic principles. Here, not only the EU, but also its member states su= ffer from a democratic deficit. There could well be a dilemma here. Immanuel Kant argued long ago that democracie= s do not fight wars against each other.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id= :ftn86" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn86" name= =3D"_ftnref86" title=3D"">[86]</su= p></a> The reason he gave is that the citizenry abhors the costs and miseries of war.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn87" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn87" name=3D"_ftnref87" title=3D"">[87]</a> The =91functionalist= =92 integration of government elites makes war structur=ADally impossible. Ther= efore it is an even better way to secure peace. Yet, the democratic con=ADtrols o= f these government elites are weak. If they were stronger, the mass media=92s pecul= iar perception of =91national interests=92, for example, would be propelled to = the negotiating tables. Tendencies of a re-nationali=ADsation of European polit= ics (which are becoming stronger in any case) would be reinforced and the integrationist force of institutionalised dialogues would be weakened. A pr= oper relationship between Monnet=92s eng= renage =96 the enmeshing of govern=AD [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 21] ments in Community institutions and the transfer of national sovereignty to them =96 and demo=ADcracy can not be established ea= sily. This difficulty is illustrated by Ralf Dahrendorf's lack of faith in Monnet: Political decisions ought not to be taken through functionalist tricks, but= in principle politically, that is by elected governments and parliaments.</spa= n><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn88" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/= fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn88" name=3D"_ftnref88" title=3D""><span= lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-text= -raise: 0pt">[88]</a> He would start, as he= has repeatedly expressed, with a Euro=ADpean Constitution, that clearly delinea= tes the competencies of a European government and of national governments and defines citizens=92 rights etc. It would be discussed extensively by the Eu= ropean publics and parliaments and thus would gain legitimacy and acceptance. It i= s clear, unfortunately, that this route would not have led anywhere in the ea= rly years of European inte=ADgration. This, of course, does not mean that it co= uld not be implemented elsewhere. One won=ADders however, under which historica= l circumstances the desire for such a grand scheme of inte=ADgration could be strong enough in the potential member countries of a union to initiate such= a dialogue and to take it to a happy conclusion. Furthermore, one wonders to = what extent the dangers of an institutionalised and hermetic dialogue could real= ly be avoided in such an under=ADtaking. <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> <h2> <a name=3D"_Toc470889886"></a><a= name=3D"_Toc478798385"> </a><a name=3D"capitel2"></a> 2. Benefits of Integration<o:p></o:p></h2> Economic growth and social justice are= the two most important positive sources of legitima=ADcy<a style=3D"mso-foot= note-id: ftn89" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn89" name=3D= "_ftnref89" title=3D"">[89]</su= p></a> =96 in contrast to the negative sources = of nationalism and of external or internal enemies. There is no doubt that during the "Golden Age" (1950-73) high rates of economic growth, re=ADductions in income inequalities and the expansion of social security systems all were importan= t sources of legitimacy for the governments of the EEC countries. During the Golden Age it was easy to find satisfaction in the idea that those economic benefits had something to do with European integration. Yet, when growth slowed, and unemployment and inflation accelerated after 1973 this sort of satisfaction, unfortunately, has become much more difficult to achieve. The European publics became less optimistic and more critical. Thus the costs t= o consumers and taxpayers of the Common Agricultural Policy has become a recurring topic in public deba=ADte. Equally, the deregulative measures car= ried out in the course of Delors=92 Inte= rnal-Market-1992 project were widely perceived as undercutting social and environmental standards and even as a contributive factor to unemployment. Therefore, the hitherto perceived basis of legi=ADtimacy of the EC =96 economic and social benefits for all =96 has been suffering.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:= ftn90" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn90" name=3D= "_ftnref90" title=3D"">[90]</a> The political record of the EEC/EC in = terms of creating a peace community is amazing. Its economic record is therefore ope= n to some doubt at least. What is the relationship between political and economi= c integration? Does political integration increase economic welfare in the [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 22] integrating countries? Or to be more precise: What economic or other benefi= ts can one expect from regional integration? Can such benefits be observed in = the case of European integration? <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111939"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889887"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798386"> </a><a name=3D"capitel21"></a> Political Objectives and Market Efficiency<span= lang=3D"EN-GB"> </h3> The economic benefits of integration h= ave, especially after the creation of the EEC, whose centrepiece is the Common Market, alwa= ys played an important role in public discourse and in the official presentati= ons of the EEC/EC and their member governments. It is worthwhile to remember however t= hat, in fact, the real purpose of the ECSC, Euratom and the integration of the Comm= on Market was not the improvement of economic conditions, but always political integration. After the failure of EDC and EPC it became clear that direct political integration was not possible. As a consequence, the development o= f common econo=ADmic institutions and economic integration were deemed to be = easier as intermediate steps toward political integration.<a style=3D"mso-f= ootnote-id: ftn91" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn91" name=3D= "_ftnref91" title=3D"">[91]</su= p></a> Therefore, even if the EEC economic po= licies did not produce the expected economic bene=ADfits, they could still make sense,= if they led in the end to higher levels of integration and co-operation among = the member countries. In other words, even if higher levels of integration and co-operation led to losses in economic performance and incomes, these losse= s could simply be the price that had to be paid for the creation of a more peaceful Europe. To put it more blunt=ADly: Why should one expect at all th= at economic-political integration leads to peace and econo=ADmic prospe= rity? Should we not undertake measures intended to improve peaceful co-operation because they are unlikely to produce economic benefits? =B7&= nbsp; The formation of the ECSC = is a case in point. Soon after it was established its steel and coal industries were tur= ned into protective cartels.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn92" href=3D"h= ttps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn92" name=3D"_ftnref92" titl= e=3D"">[92]</a> They received ever more subsidies =96 to the detriment of consumers and taxpayers.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn93" href=3D"https://lib= rary.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn93" name=3D"_ftnref93" title=3D""><sp= an class=3D"MsoFootnoteReference">[93]</a> Nevertheless, without the ECSC the relations between France and Germany, and the EU as such, would not be what they are today. =B7&= nbsp; The same can be said of th= e infamous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Its blunders in terms of the principles o= f economic liberalism are well known. Yet, in terms of political inte=ADgrati= on, it was a central part of the development of the EEC and a cornerstone of Euro= =ADpean integration. In spite of its hideous costs (it still absorbs half of the EC budget and puts a heavy burden on taxpayers and consumers<a style=3D= "mso-footnote-id:ftn94" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.ht= m#_ftn94" name=3D"_ftnref94" title=3D"">[94]</su= p></a>), it continues to be an integrationist s= uccess: A=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 23] European cartel which has served the interests of its members more or less well (especially= the larger farmers and agro-industry), while generating a permanent need for negotiations and reforms =96 precisely because of its structural defects an= d its enormous costs. =B7&= nbsp; During the "Golden Age" (1950-73) it was popular to associate the then prevailing high growth rates= and the rising standard of living with European integration. This, of course, g= ave legitimacy to European integration. In fact, the economic performance of th= e EEC, even though it was quite remarkable in absolute terms, was not superio= r to that of other OECD countries. During the "crisis decades" (Hobsbawm) that followed, the relative per=ADformance of the Community declined notabl= y. It is safe to conclude that European i= ntegration involved costs to taxpayers and consumers and that it did not improve the economic performance of the member countries. To repeat, that is no argumen= t against integration, because the purposes of integration were political. In= the case of the ECSC and CAP, economic efficiency and political integration cou= ld not go hand in hand. Equally, the below-average economic performance of the= EU can probably be attributed to the logic of political integration and the si= ze of the EC/EU. By contrast, economic integration that= aims to improve economic efficiency can have nega=ADtive effects on political integration. CAP is a fully regulated policy area, which stabilises agri=AD= cultural markets, gives preference to EC producers (truly a "fortress Europe") and requires EU-wide solidarity. By comparison the Internal Market 1992 project is a "gigantic operation of deregulation", which tends to eliminate national regulatory power but does not establish a comparable regulatory power at the EU-level.<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn95" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730= .htm#_ftn95" name=3D"_ftnref95" title=3D"">[95]</su= p></a> This has led to, in the opinion of many = obser=ADvers and interest groups, a race to the bottom for social and environmental standards, consu= =ADmer protection etc. Such claims may be exaggerated. But one wonders all the sam= e how dere=ADgula=ADtion should be able to make a contribution to political integration. The main advantage of the market mechanism is precisely the independence and autonomy it gives to economic actors. The market does not create political or other kinds of communities. Hence, to perceive European integratio= n only in terms of market efficiency and the benefits derived therefrom, is short-sig= hted and even wrong. Pure and simple economic integration can undermine politica= l integration and its legitimacy. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111940"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889888"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798387"> </a><a name=3D"capitel22"></a> Economic Benefits: Economies of Scale?</h3> At a council meeting on 31 October 194= 9 of the Organisation for European Economic Devel=ADopment (OEEC), the body which implemented the Marshall Plan, Paul Hoff=ADman, the OEEC administrator, del= ivered a plan for "the integration of the Euro=ADpe=ADan economy", which circum=AD= scribed very clearly the purposes of the Common Market. He said: "The substance of such integration wou= ld be the formation of a single large market within which quantitative restrictio= ns on the movement of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments, [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 24] and eventually all tariffs are permanently swept away. The fact that we ha= ve in the US a single market of 150 million consumers has been indispensable to the strength and efficiency of our economy. The creation of a permanent, freely trading area comprising 270 million consumers in Western Europe, would have= a multitude of helpful consequences. It would accelerate the devel=ADopment o= f large-scale, low-cost production industries. It would make the effective us= e of all resources easier, the stifling of healthy competition more difficult."<= /span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn96" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/ful= ltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn96" name=3D"_ftnref96" title=3D"">[96]</su= p></a> In view of American mass production te= chnologies and of the trade conditions at that time, the vision of Paul Hoffman made a= lot of sense. After all, as Adam Smith had recognised, the division of labour i= s limited by the size of the market. And after the war the national markets w= ere very small and trade protection was high. Therefore the benefits of the division of labour and of economies of scale could not be fully taken advan= tage of, and that hampered improve=ADments in productivity and incomes. The form= ation of a customs=92 union =96 elimination of all internal obstacles to trade, y= et maintenance of common tariffs and other trade regulations =96 could make mu= ch sense under these conditions. In fact, trade among the EEC-countries during that period increased somewhat faster than production.<a style=3D"ms= o-footnote-id:ftn97" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_= ftn97" name=3D"_ftnref97" title=3D""><= sup>[97]</su= p></a> Nevertheless, the Common Market for ma= ny years was a far cry from being truly liberalised. Roughly 30 years (!) after the Trea= ties of Rome Jacques Delors launched the program "Europe 1992" which aimed at the "completion of the internal market". It did not have too much effect on intra-EC trade, yet it helped to create, at least transitorily, expectations of optimism and growth (after a prolonged period of Euro-scepticism). Investment, especially intra-EU foreign direct investment= , increased - and made national oligopolies somewhat more European.<a = style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn98" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/= 00730.htm#_ftn98" name=3D"_ftnref98" title=3D"">[98]</su= p></a> For=ADeign direct investment from outsid= e the EU increased too, mainly driven by the (largely unjus=ADtified) fear of investors not to be admitted later into the "fortress Europe". Yet, one wonders if the vision of Paul= Hoffman has still much relevance nowadays =96 becau=ADse world trade is largely liberal= ised: In a world of GATT and WTO where free trade prevails, the size of the market cannot be really improved by regional integration =96 the biggest market si= mply is the world market. With it no regional formation could possibly compete i= n terms of the potentials of the division of labour and of large-scale production. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 25] This is corroborated by the fact that = some of the smallest countries are among the ten most prosperous ones: Singapore, the U= S, Switzerland, Hongkong, Norway, Japan, Denmark, Bel=ADgium, Austria and Cana= da. Seven of the first ten have less than 10 million inhabitants. They all are internationally open, market economies: The size of a country or of a union= of countries does not seem to be a necessary condition for prosperity.<= a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn99" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/i= d/00730.htm#_ftn99" name=3D"_ftnref99" title=3D"">[99]</su= p></a> Therefore we conclude that argu=ADments = about economies of scale and customs=92 unions have ceased to be relevant (if they ever were). </= p> <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111941"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889889"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798388"> </a><a name=3D"capitel23"></a> Better Chances for Economic Development?</h3> After the war Europe did not develop i= n an environment of a free-market economy. As has been mentioned in the first section (see especially footnote 4), initially the US wanted, in order to h= elp her own industry, to create a free-trade regime in Europe (but not in the U= S!). Only under the pressures of the Cold War did the hegemon changed its plans. Instead, a systematic effort was made to rebuilt and modernise the European economies =96 and to make them, against the promises of socialism in Easter= n Europe, socially a success too. All that involved huge efforts by the Europ= ean governments to create the necessary infrastructural and institutional conditions for a modern economy. Naturally, the European economies were all= owed to protect themselves against superior competitors from America in the area= s where they deemed that necessary and desirable. Otherwise, how could they develop= ? Hence, one can say that in Western Eur= ope comprehensive, national development strategies were developed, which allowe= d for the protection of industries against superior North Ameri=ADcan competi= tors, while the EEC provided a larger market in a world that was still segmented = by high tariff barriers. In this there could well be a lesson f= or other countries and regions. In fact, such strategies have been tried, particular= ly in Latin America (Andean Pact, Central American Economic Uni=ADon, Mercosur= , NAFTA). Unfortunately these efforts were not as successful as in the Euro= =ADpean case. Possibly there was too much emphasis on economic integration and free trade, and too little on political integration and on national and regional development strategies and institution building. However, easy generalisati= ons and critique should be avoided. They should be based on in-depth analyses o= f these experiences. <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font= -size:14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-farea= st-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 26] <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111942"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889890"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798389"> </a><a name=3D"capitel24"></a> Comparative Economic Performance of the EEC/EC</h3> Let us turn now to the economic "fundamentals" and see whether the historical evidence sup=ADports claims of a superior economic performance of the EEC/EC. Take first the "Golden Age" of post-wa= r economic growth (1950-73). During that period the performance of the EEC in terms of growth, inflation, investment and employment (Tables 1-6; see belo= w) was not superior to the other OECD countries =96 to the contrary it was usu= ally inferior. As Maddison and others have shown, the Golden Age corresponded to= a secular trend, which was largely shaped by institutions, technology, human capital formation and by the adoption of American Fordist, i.e. mass-production methods. The OECD countries were involved in a process of catching up with the more advanced United States a= nd Canada, where, correspondingly, growth and capital formation advanced at a somewhat slower pace. The tables 1-6 clearly indicate that t= he performance of the EEC countries during the Golden Age was not as brilliant= as that of the other catching-up countries of the OECD.<a style=3D"mso-= footnote-id: ftn100" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn100" name= =3D"_ftnref100" title=3D"">[100]</s= up></a> =B7&= nbsp; During the "crisis decades= " (Hobsbawm) that followed the Golden Age, the relative perfor=ADmance= of the EEC/EC did not improve at all. Instead it declined notably: Its GDP gro= wth was consistently lower and its rate of inflation higher than in most refere= nce countries and country groupings (Tables 1-2). =B7&= nbsp; The investment and employm= ent creation gap became notorious, while unemployment rose to record levels (Tables 3-4)= . Over the whole period from 1960 to 1994 employment growth was scandalously = low. Over two decades jobs were created almost exclusively in the public sector, very few in the private economy.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn101" href=3D= "https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn101" name=3D"_ftnref101" = title=3D"">[101]</s= pan></a> In recent years job growth is somewhat higher, but still far below that in reference countries, while unemployment reached new record levels. The situation is particularly severe for the young and for persons above 45 as = well as for certain regions in the EU-member countries. <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn102" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fu= lltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn102" name=3D"_ftnref102" title=3D"">[102]</a> =B7&= nbsp; Finally, EC governments ac= cumulated public debt at a much faster pace than most other OECD countries. As a resu= lt the interest payments on public debt have become an ever larger burden (Tab= les 5-6). Hence, judging by the empirical eviden= ce, it is probably safe to conclude that the integration and the economic policies of= the EEC/EC did not generate additional economic benefits of any=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 27] significance that went beyond the ones of the Golden-Age period. It is ther= efore no accident that the EEC is entirely ignored in Maddison's discussion of the causes of growt= h (1991) as well as in other research on the Golden Age.<a style=3D"ms= o-footnote-id:ftn103" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#= _ftn103" name=3D"_ftnref103" title=3D"">[103]</s= up></a> On the other hand, in the struggle aga= inst the problems of the Crisis Decades that followed, the EEC/EC hardly proved more resourceful than the other non-integrated OECD countries. To the contrary, = it is difficult not to conclude that the EEC/EC=92s performance was deplorable= . It may be disheartening to hear that t= he performance of the EEC/EU has been relatively poor. In absolute term= s, especially during the Golden Age, it was of course quite good and there was= a considerable improvement in living standards in almost all parts of the community. That the performance was relatively poor is no argument against integration. To repeat: If the purpose of integration is political, it can = be perfectly acceptable that a price in terms of (rela=ADtive) economic perfor= mance and benefits is being paid. <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman&q= uot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 28] Tables on the Economic Performance = of the EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> (12 member countries; 1960-1994)<o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>= Plea= se note: Shaded areas indicate better performance than EEC/EC <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>= 1. Growth of Real GD= P<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso= -ansi-language: EN-GB"><o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDb <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a EU-15<o:p></o:p> b Number of countries varies<o:p></o= :p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> 2. Inflation (GDP) (yearly averages in per cent)<span= lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-ans= i-language: EN-GB"><o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC = <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 6,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 12,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 10,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 14,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 38,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 41,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 10,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 14,9b<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 12,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a&= nbsp; EU-15<o:p></o:p> b&= nbsp; Includes high inflation countries Mexico (average 29.8%) and Turkey (average 70.8%)<= o:p></o:p> c Number of countries varies<o:p></o= :p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font= -size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-farea= st-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 29] 3. Employment growth (yearly averages)<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,25<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,17<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,25<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,06<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,03<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,25<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6b<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,33<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a &nbs= p; EU-15<o:p></o:p> b &nbs= p; 1960-68<o:p></o:p> c &nbs= p; Number of countries varies<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> 4. Standardized Unemployment Rates</sp= an> (yearly averages)<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:none; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1987-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:solid windowt= ext 1.5pt; border-left:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a <o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 10,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 9,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 7,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Switzerlandc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> ..<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> ..<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,9e<o:= p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austriac<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 4,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 13,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 5,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 9,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDcd<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 6,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 11,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 8,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 8,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 7,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> a &nbs= p; Germany, France, Italy, U.K., Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Value = for 1994 in=ADcludes Finland and Sweden<o:p></o:p>= b &nbs= p; EU-15<o:p></o:p> c &nbs= p; "Commonly used definitions" of unemployment in some cases; <o:p></o:p><= /p> d &nbs= p; number of countries varies<o:p></o:p> e &nbs= p; 1995-97<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <b= r clear=3D"all" style=3D"mso-special-character:line-break;page-break-before= :always">  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 30] 5. Net Lending of Government</p= > (surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a percenta= ge of GDP; yearly averages)<o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1960-73<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1974-79<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1980-87<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1988-94<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995-98<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<o:= p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/EC<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,35<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -5,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +5,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> +5,5<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Iceland<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> +1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECDb<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt= ; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECDc<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 2.25pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt= ; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:25.5pt;margin= -bottom: 0cm;margin-left:49.65pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;mso-pagin= ation: widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt"><= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">a<sp= an style=3D"mso-tab-count:1"> &nbs= p; EC-15, excluding Luxemburg, including Norway<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right:25.5pt;margin-b= ottom: 0cm;margin-left:49.65pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;mso-pagin= ation: widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt"><= span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB">b<sp= an style=3D"mso-tab-count:1"> &nbs= p; Number of countries varies<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:0cm;margin-right:25.5pt;margin-b= ottom: 0cm;margin-left:49.65pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;mso-pagin= ation: widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt">c 19 OECD countrie= s<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:1.0pt;margin-right:25.5pt;margin= -bottom: 1.0pt;margin-left:49.65pt;text-indent:-14.2pt;line-height:10.0pt;mso-line-h= eight-rule: exactly;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:decimal 216.0pt"> = <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> 6. General Government Net Debt Interes= t Payments (as a percentage of nominal GDP)<s= pan lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-= ansi-language: EN-GB"> <o:p></o:p> <div align=3D"center"> <table border=3D"1" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" style=3D"border-col= lapse:collapse; border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext 2.25pt;mso-padding-alt:0cm 3.5= 5pt 0cm 3.55pt"> <tbody><tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt">  <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1979<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1985<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1990<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1995<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1998<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> EEC/ECa<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,1<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> United States<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Canada<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;padding:= 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 5,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Japan<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Australia<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,5<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,9<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Austria<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 1,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Finland <o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,9<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Norway<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -2,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -0,6<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> -0,7<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border-top:none;bor= der-left:solid windowtext 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt;padding:0cm 3.55pt= 0cm 3.55pt"> Sweden<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> -1,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 0,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;backgrou= nd:#F2F2F2; mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.5= 5pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-r= ight:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,8<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-bottom:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total smaller OECD<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,2<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,3<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-t= op:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 4,0<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:solid win= dowtext 1.5pt; border-left:none;border-bottom:none;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,0<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width=3D"189" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:5.0cm;border:solid window= text 1.5pt; border-top:none;padding:0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> Total OECDb<o:= p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 1,4<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,7<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border:none;border-b= ottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 3,1<o:p></o:p> </td> <td width=3D"76" valign=3D"top" style=3D"width:2.0cm;border-top:none;bord= er-left:none; border-bottom:solid windowtext 1.5pt;border-right:solid windowtext 1.5pt; background:#F2F2F2;mso-shading:windowtext;mso-pattern:gray-5 auto;padding= : 0cm 3.55pt 0cm 3.55pt"> 2,6<o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </div> A negative s= ign means higher interest receipts than payments <o:p></o:p> a EC-15, excluding Luxemburg, including Norway<o:p></o:p> b 22 countries<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> &nbs= p;<o:p></o:p> <spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"mso-ansi-font-size:12.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN-GB= ">Sources of Tables 1-6: OECD, Economic Outlook (various issues), OECD 1989, 1995<o:p></= o:p>  <o:p></o:p> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font= -size:14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-farea= st-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 31] <h3><a name=3D"_Toc463111943"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889891"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798390"> </a><a name=3D"capitel25"></a> The EU as a Policy Maker</h3> The EC and EU-Treaties name many polic= y areas, yet in only very few of them does the EU have exclusive or strong competencies. This does not really matter much, if one looks at it from the point of view= of facilitating institutionalised dialogues across the EU and beyond it. In ea= ch of the many policy areas the member countries are involved in continuous dialogue. As the treaties lend themselves to extensive interpretations, practically any issue in the fields of government and politics can be taken= up at the level of the EU. In a sense the ineffectiveness of thes= e dialogues and their curious dynamics =96 you solve one problem and you find seven new= ones =96 are a guarantee of their permanence. Effective negotia=ADtions with goo= d results in little time, even though they are of course desirable as such, t= here=ADfore are not necessarily a sign of progress of integration. Negotiations are cumbersome =96 and that is precisely the point. In spite of that queer logic, in some = areas the EC has proved to be a relatively good policy maker. The aim to create a moneta= ry union helped a great deal to bring down inflation rates and new government = debt in most member countries (unfortunately at the price of lower growth rates = and higher unemployment). For the member governments it was convenient to have = the EU, because they could put the blame for their unpopular policies onto the = EU =96 or the Bundesbank.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn104" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn104" name=3D"_ftnref104" title= =3D"">[104]</a> In recent years, the European Commissi= on has shown its teeth in competition policy and has been able to make points against me= mber governments, which often want to protect their turf. It has taken some spectacular decisions by imposing record fines on several firms and by bloc= k=ADing or conditioning some mergers. Equally, in some cases it forcefully interven= ed against subsi=ADdies by member governments for private enterprises. These accomplishments have been made possible by European integration. They also = led to some functional spill-over, as most member countries did not even have legislation on competition in the past. The strengthening and the centralisati= on of competition policy at the EC level, in spite of many limitations, produced results which would not have been achieved by most member countries by themselves. It made it more difficult for national governments and for the = EC itself to pursue active industrial policies. "Even if the economic fashion were to change in the foreseeable future, an interventionist policy would b= e extremely difficult to pursue for political and institutional reasons."<a styl= e=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn105" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/007= 30.htm#_ftn105" name=3D"_ftnref105" title=3D"">[105]</s= up></a> Therefore, EC competition policy, as i= s its task, has pushed us toward more market efficien=ADcy and more effective decision taking: the rule of law tends to prevail. That has strengthened the EU as a formal institution, i.e. its character as a state. However, there are some downsides=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 32] too: more, and particularly stronger rules, leave less room for compromising and negotiating, and therefore reduce the need for institutionalised dialogue. On the other hand, the application of stronger rules can lead to fierce opposition by the affected interest groups and mem= ber countries, and therefore arouse anti-EU feelings and weaken the cohesion of= the Union. The basic problem, here as elsewhere, is that it is unclear to what extent the EU has the legitimacy to assume state functions. In regional development policy, which = after agriculture receives the second highest share in the EU-budget<a sty= le=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn106" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn106" name=3D"_ftnref106" title=3D"">[106]</s= up></a>, the EU has played an important role, a= nd has made efforts to orient its poli=ADcies along objective criteria and follow less the desires of governments and politicians. There are enormous differences in income among countries and regions of the EU. The difference in per capita income betwee= n Ham=ADburg and the Portuguese= Norte, the poorest region of t= he EU, is in the order of 10 to 1. Unemployment in the poorer regions is often well a= bove the EU average. The basic purpose of the regional funds is to support the development of backward regions and the transformation of regions in indust= rial decline (among them, for example, east Germany). Other purposes are to figh= t long-term and youth unem=ADployment and to develop rural areas. Even though= all governments try to get as much money back as possible, there still is a considerable transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer members of= the EU. Without the EU, transfers of such magn= itude would obviously not exist.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn107" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn107" name=3D"_ftnref107" title= =3D"">[107]</a> Nevertheless, when compared with the magnitude of interregional transfers within nations<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn108" href=3D"= https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn108" name=3D"_ftnref108" t= itle=3D"">[108]</a>, these transfers are quite small and amount only to a small fraction of the GDP of the EU-15.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn109"= href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn109" name=3D"_ftn= ref109" title=3D"">[109]</a> In fact, the scarcity of these funds, for many observers, is a matter of concern with respect to the stability of the monetary union. Cumulative differences in economic growth and asymmetric regional shocks co= uld turn out to be the Achilles=92 heel of monetary union and cause problems fo= r the cohesion of the EU.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn110" href=3D"https= ://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn110" name=3D"_ftnref110" title= =3D"">[110]</a> [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 33] To these limitations one might add tha= t the results of EU regional policy generally have not been very satisfactory.</s= pan><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn111" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/full= text/id/00730.htm#_ftn111" name=3D"_ftnref111" title=3D"">[111]</s= up></a> Nevertheless, it reflects a veritable effort of a com= mon EU-economic policy. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the transfers depends o= n the willingness of the richer member countries to sacrifice some of their resources. Their insufficiency with respect to EMU may soon become apparent= . Eastern enlargement of the EU and the programs for the Mediter=ADranean cou= ntries also will seriously test the willingness of member countries to put forward= the necessary means. On the other hand, there are a number = of areas too where the EU should be active but isn=92t. There are tax havens within the = EU from which companies and private investors obtain immen=ADse benefits at th= e expense of the treasuries of the member countries =96 and therefore of the = ones who in fact pay their taxes. Incredible as it may seem, the EU through its regional policies has actually supported the creation of such tax havens.</= span><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn112" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/ful= ltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn112" name=3D"_ftnref112" title=3D"">[112]</s= up></a> Hence, with the exception of a few pol= icy fields the EU is not a very effective policy maker. Yet, in terms of integration t= his need not be a serious defect. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc470889892"></a><a name=3D"_Toc463111944"></a><a name=3D"= _Toc478798391"> </a><a name=3D"capitel26"></a> Advantages and Disadvantages of Size </h3> We have already seen that large countr= ies or economically integrated regions do not necessari=ADly do better economicall= y than small countries. Within a large economic area cumulative diffe=ADrential processes of economic growth are more likely than in smaller ones. To maint= ain minima of social coherence and political legitimacy, it is necessary to ameliorate differences in develop=ADment potentials and to provide income s= upport to needy people and deficit-ridden public insti=ADtutions. For these purpos= es all developed countries operate complex transfer systems. Depen=ADding on its l= evel, the political integration of countries requires solidarity of the richer toward the poorer countries. This can = be considered a disadvantage of size <a name=3D"_Toc463111945">On the other= hand, there are some economic advantages of size too. The main one is the sturdiness it confers to the economy: A large country is not much affected by changes in the value of its currency = as most economic activities are related to the home market. A large country li= ke the US can get away, even for extended periods of time, with seriously distorted economic fundamentals and questionable economic policies (for example, the huge and still growing US current account deficit and her bubb= le economy). Equally, a large country is barely affected by economic and polit= ical crises in other countries, so long as they are consid=ADerably smaller.</sp= an></a><a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn113" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/f= ulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn113" name=3D"_ftnref113" title=3D""><spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;mso-tex= t-raise: 0pt">[113]</a> One can expect then that the EU with the full implementation of the European Moneta= ry Union will be able to reap the benefits of economic sturdiness. Furthermore= , to the extent that the Euro will be held a reserve currency, the benefits of <= i style=3D"mso-bidi-font-style:normal">seignorage will accrue to Eurola= ndia. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 34] The sturdiness of a large economy, of course, means that even minor changes in = its econo=ADmic performance or policies can have serious repercussions in smaller economies. The latter=92s au= tonomy is smaller, they have to be more flexible, must avoid structural rigidities= , and can not easily afford policy mistakes.<a style=3D"mso-foo= tnote-id: ftn114" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn114" name= =3D"_ftnref114" title=3D""><= span style=3D"mso-special-character:footnote">= [114]</a> Benign neglect is not an option for them. Benign neglect of the smaller countries is but one option for a large country. For example, the US has actively meddled in the economic and general affairs of both Mexico and Nicara=ADgua. Econo= mic dependency makes small countries vulnerable and politically dependent too. The dominant power has many means an= d ways to put on the pressure and even to inflict pun=ADishments. It can allo= w itself to be arrogant. It can use the small neighbouring countries as a val= ve to diffuse political pressure at home.<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn115" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn115" name= =3D"_ftnref115" title=3D""><= span style=3D"mso-special-character:footnote">= [115]</a> And it can defend its so-called national interests (usually large companies and organised interes= t groups) abroad. One can consider the possibility of such behaviour an advantage of size. Whatever v= iew one prefers, the EU is well experienced in this field. A harmless example i= s when it persuaded , in the course of the project "Europe 1992", non-EC capital to be invested within its frontiers. Yet there are less harm= less cases too: In negotiations over fishing rights with Morocco and other count= ries in North and West Africa the EU repeatedly and shamelessly imposed unequal = trea=ADties upon them. Another case is the dumping of its heavily subsidised agricultur= al surpluses into Africa and Eastern Europe resulting in large damages to the local production. In fact, in most cases such ruthless externa= l behaviour of the EU was the result of internal compromising among membe= r countries and their interests, and the inability of the EU to find rational= and sustainable solutions to some of its problems. That is one of the downsides= of the institutionalised dialogue of the EU. In other words, in a number of ca= ses we have integrated further by inflicting considerable damage on small or politically weak countries. If the EU had a unitary, single EU foreign and security policy<a style= =3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn116" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/0073= 0.htm#_ftn116" name=3D"_ftnref116" title=3D"">[116]</a>, such an export of internal problems might be amended in the name of coherence. But to what purpose would we want to have= a coherent foreign and security policy? Would we want to be fair to the small= and weak countries in our periphery? Would we be ready to support their develop= ment efforts financially, through technical assistance etc.? Would we throw open= our doors for their exports and for training their people =96even though some w= ill find ways to stay? Or, would our main interest lie in the stabilisation of = an hegemonic order in our backyard, preventing emigration to the EU and maintaining political regimes to our liking. Currently, the signs are ominous: After the Kosovo war many voices are demanding, for instance, a Rapid Deployment Force<= /i> for the EU =96 in order "to provide ourselves for stability [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 35] on our continent".<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn117" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn117" name=3D"_ftnref117" title= =3D"">[117]</s= up></a> Where exactly on our continent?, one naturally asks. Where does it end? Don=92t we really mean o= ur =91sphere of influence=92? Or even the world? "Where there is European capi= tal , there are European interests" could well become one of our measuring rods= . For an economic giant that feels like a political dwarf, it would not be without logic to move in that direction. The EU as a regional power is not the onl= y issue affecting the process toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Th= e other issues are its relations with= the dominant power =96 the US and its role in the power games of the 21<sup= >st century given the emergence of China and the possible re-emergence of Russi= a. There the danger is that we could relapse into the old European balance-of-power ga=ADmes<a style=3D"mso-footnote= -id: ftn118" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn118" name= =3D"_ftnref118" title=3D""><= span style=3D"mso-special-character:footnote">= [118]</a>, yet on a world scale. We know that size "not only leads to power, it is power".<a styl= e=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn119" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/007= 30.htm#_ftn119" name=3D"_ftnref119" title=3D"">[119]</a> The primary causes of= war during the 19th and the 20th century in Europe were the size and the econom= ic and military capabilities of some countries. EU aspirations to rise to superpower status could give way to a new Cold War. They could also challen= ge other countries to rise to similar status. Systems with four or five great powers are even more unstable and dangerous than systems with only two powe= rs . Hence, the EU faces a dilemma: If it aspires to become a world power, it accelerat= es or even sets in motion a spiral of mutual distrust, conflict and re-armamen= t. If it resigns itself to the role of a subservient political dwarf, it will = be reproached for not harnessing, in spite of its size and economic importance= , US unilateralism; for not preventing further humiliations; for not defending i= ts interests effectively; and for not mediating conflicts in other parts of th= e world. Clearly, neither option is desirable. Could this unpromising dilemma situation be avoided? =B7 = ; First, one might note, of = course not in the spirit of justifying existing unipolarity, that such an arrangement = is less unstable, less dangerous and potentially less destructive than multipo= =ADlarity.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn120" href=3D"https:/= /library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn120" name=3D"_ftnref120" title=3D= "">[120]</a> =B7 Second, one might remember= Jean Monnet=92s method of engrenage = and institution building: Are we not already involved in the process of develop= ing international rules and laws and of transferring sovereignty to internation= al bodies? Will this in the end not be more effective to limit inter alia hegemonic power? Such an approach makes things easier for the smaller countries too. They can, more = than large countries, benefit from international rules and institutions =96 at l= east as long as these are=20 [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 36] not made or controlled by superpower interests. The EU itself offers an excellent example: The smaller member countries enjoy the = same rights as the larger ones and possess much recourse against the infringemen= ts of their interests by the latter (which still try, of course).</span= > To conclude, there are some economic advantages of size but there are disadvantages too. It is cumbersome and it costs money to maintain a suffic= ient degree of social and political co=ADherence in a large economic area. Some = of the most prosperous countries are small. The political advantages of size are, to put it mildly, ambivalent. There can b= e much scope for unscrupulous behaviour against politically weak countries. T= he desire to become a counter=ADvailing hegemonic power evokes the dangers of = a new Cold War and of balance-of-power games, an old, and as we (still) believe, eradicated European disease. Monnet=92s approach could help to restrain the= power of states, even of hegemonic ones. <h3><a name=3D"_Toc470889893"></= a><a name=3D"_Toc478798392"><spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB"> </a><a name=3D"capitel27"></a> Lessons to be learnt?</h3> = Summarising the results, of this section, we find 1.&nbs= p; In the case of the EEC/EC, economic integration was a means to the end of politica= l inte=ADgration. Political integration did not depend on economic or other benefits of integration. In terms of the political priorities even welfare losses can be justified as the price to be paid for political integration.<= /span> 2.&nbs= p; Economic integration was always a matter of negotiations and packaging: it can hardl= y be expected that such procedures lead to an optimisation of economic welfare.<= /span> 3.&nbs= p; As long as world trade was not liberalised, a case could be made in favour of a customs=92 union on the basis of economies of scale. Now it is difficult to= make such a case. The eco=ADnomic benefits derived from the liberalisation of th= e internal market of the EC have not been large. Further benefits on this gro= und cannot be expected in the future, because by now there are only a few intra= -EU restrictions left. 4.&nbs= p; European integration was in any case not an exercise in free-market economics, but, = espe=ADcially during the early post-war years and much of the Golden Age, a comprehensive devel=ADopment effort. At that it was quite successful. This could be a les= son for other countries and regions. Russia and other Eastern European countrie= s have learned the hard way that free markets without such a comprehensive development effort destroy rather than create the conditions for economic growth and prosperity. 5.&nbs= p; The specific contribution of EEC economic integration to the high growth rates = and the high levels of welfare achieved during the Golden Age (1950-73) was probably negligible. Nevertheless growing prosperity during this period conferred legitimacy on European inte=ADgration. 6.&nbs= p; During the crisis decades that followed the Golden Age, the EC did not offer much resil=ADience. To the contrary, its economic performance was remarkably inf= erior to most other OECD countries. 7.&nbs= p; Policy making remains a matter of the member countries in most policy areas. In a = few areas [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 37] the EC has shown a certain effectiveness and it has induced improvements in policies of member countries. Ineffectiveness does not have to be a disadvantage in terms of the more fundamental, political purposes of integration. 8.&nbs= p; The size of an integrated economic area makes it more robust against developments in other countries and regions of the world. If an economic union has a single currency, this curren=ADcy is likely to become a reserve currency and to co= nfer seignorage gains to the union. 9.&nbs= p; Size also confers power that can be exercised on the international stage. Spill-over effects of internal compromising of the EU have already caused considerable damage to small and weak countries. A coherent and common EU security and foreign policy (which remains in the realm of dreams<a style=3D"mso-footnot= e-id: ftn121" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn121" name= =3D"_ftnref121" title=3D"">[121]</a>) could concentrate, for example, on the stabilisation of political regimes i= n the periphery of the EU (of course, in the name of democracy and free marke= t access for our companies!) and on controlling immigration from there. </spa= n> 10. The power conferred by size can al= so be used to countervail hegemonic power. Such an exercise of power evokes the danger= s of a new Cold War and of balance-of-power games, an old European disease, whic= h we (still) believe to have defeated for good. The alternative is international institution building in the spirit of Jean Monnet. Engrenage could well be more effective in containing US hegemon= ic unilateralism. <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> <h2><a name=3D"_Toc463111946"></a><a name=3D"_Toc470889894"></a><a name= =3D"_Toc478798393"> </a><a name=3D"capitel3"></a> 3. Institutionalised Dialogue and other Roads to Peace<o:p></o:p></h2> = As a result of the process of European integration, Europe has been enjoying a long period= of stable peace. Military might and menace play no role in the relations withi= n the European Union. That is an enormous achievement in view of the bloody history of our continent. There had not been a grand design for = this. Instead the process took place under rather dif=ADficult historical and pol= itical conditions. It was path dependent to a very high degree, i.e. it could not = be planned in advance and its progress often enough depended simply on good lu= ck. With hindsight, probably the most important element in this process was the creation of insti=ADtutionalised dialogues in an ever larger number of poli= cy fields both within and outside the framework of the EEC/EC/EU. This led to = what has been called at the beginning of this paper a "new culture of conflict management" in Europe. Negotiations within the EU are a rathe= r cumbersome and slow affair =96 and that is precisely the point: a permanent need to me= et, consult, negotiate, travel, plus the pleasures of the excel=ADlent cuisine = in Brussels and of friendships developed over the years. The persons directly invol=ADved in these processes of institutionalised dialogue probably were = not even aware that they were part and parcel of a new architecture of peace fo= r Europe =96 in their own mind they were struggling to define or to defend th= eir country=92s positions. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 38] Neither effective negotiating nor econ= omic efficiency were essential for integration. To the contrary: the logic of political integration =96 the permanent need to negotiate =96 often runs co= un=ADter to effective decision taking and economic efficiency. Nevertheless, one is always waging a battle to improve both ... Therefore it would be certainly misplaced to judge the process of integration in terms of the effectiveness= of political decision-taking or of the economic benefits it generates (or does= not generate). Pure logic and historical experience indicate that peace can har= dly be gained without political compromising and economic sacrifices.</p= > The European way toward a peace commun= ity was unique, as all historical processes are. Generalisations are inherently ver= y difficult and are always cognitively biased. Therefore one should tread thi= s territory with the greatest of caution. Personally, I found that something = can be learnt from Monnet=92s approach, that is supra-national integration and = the creation of a mul=ADtiplicity of institutionalised dialogues. In spite of m= any defects, this is where the EU has excel=ADled. An integral part of Monnet's approach was to get the priorities right. This is where the EU does not exc= el and looking at the present and future challenges it faces these fears are n= ot easi=ADly dispelled. If the ulterior aim is to create a sta= ble order of peace, one can ask, besides the peculiar way taken by Western Europe, what other means could be used for that end. I can see nine alterna=ADtives, the advantages and disadvantages of which are briefly discussed. They are arran= ged in order of their potential contribution to the formation of a stable peace community. = 1. Treaties of non-aggression: Their purpose is to prevent wars, but they are treat= ies of con=ADvenience for the signatories. They are not really based on trust a= nd they are not intended to build trustful relationships among them. Whether a= nd how they are observed, will depend on all sorts of circumstances. They cann= ot eliminate the possibility of war. 2.&nbs= p; Power balance politics</i= >: As we know from European history in particular, this is a danger=ADous game and one that ge= ts easily out of hand. The Cold War was a special case with only two powers: Without nuclear deterrence on both sides, it might not have been stable for such a long time. Historically, the succession of one dominant power by ano= ther was usu=ADally achieved through war. 3.&nbs= p; Hegemonic power: The = main purpose of a hegemonic power is not peace as such, but other interests. These however mi= ght suffer from military conflicts within the hegemonic sphere. = During the Cold War there were hot wars which reflected either the inherent logic = of the Cold War or the idiosyncrasies of the hegemon. = If there are several hegemons or would-be hegemons, a durable peace cannot be expect= ed. The ability of the hegemon to prevent wars by its military prowess depends = on internal power coalitions and on what public opinion is ready to bear. Henc= e, it cannot be relied upon. = Hegemonic peace always depends to a certain extent on force, coercion and submission.= Its inherent asymmetry contains the seeds of opposition and rebellion, and therefore potential instability. Once the hegemon=92s clout becomes less impressive, opposition to the harsh dis=AD [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 39] cipline it imposes is almost unavoidable. = When the period of 'peaceful co-existence' began in the early 1960s, demands for political reform started to flourish, the European integration progress alm= ost came to a halt and France began to reassert herself vis-=E0-vis the United States. 4.&nbs= p; External federator: I= n order to induce countries to form a 'Union' the common enemy must be perceived to be very strong and menacing. The 'Union' would then make the greatest effort to bui= ld up its military potential. As long as there is no fear of 'guaranteed mutua= l destruction' these efforts might even increase the likelihood of war.<a sty= le=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn122" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00= 730.htm#_ftn122" name=3D"_ftnref122" title=3D"">[122]</a> 5.&nbs= p; Economic interdependence<= /i>: There are good arguments as to why trade should foster peace; yet there are arguments too against this proposition.<a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn123" href=3D"https:= //library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn123" name=3D"_ftnref123" title= =3D"">[123]</s= pan></a> There is strong historical evidence against it: Just before World War I for= eign trade as a share of GDP in the European coun=ADtries had already reached le= vels comparable to the ones of the 1990s. The world economy was highly integrate= d then, yet this still could not prevent the war. The causes of the war were = not economic. Yet, as has been stressed by Carr (1968) the process of the socialisation of the nation-state, i.e. the domestication of capital and it= s political subordination, was already far advanced. The laissez-faire, single-world economy was replaced by a multiplicity of national economies. Capital and government came to live in a symbiotic relationship and nationa= l enterprises were an integral part of the war efforts. = Economic nationalism has not disappeared. Even nowadays we tend to perceive, for ins= tan=ADce, Japan and other East Asian countries as competitors. And much of the talks = on globali=ADsation are driven by fears that capital dissociates itself again = from the nation-state. Under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that economic interdependence is a promoter of peace. 6.&nbs= p; International treaties: Such treaties deal with conflicts of interest between nations and therefore define the ri= ghts and responsibilities of the parties involved. They do not deal with common interests, but with the separation of interests. If circumstances change, t= he conflicts can remerge. 7.&nbs= p; International co-operation: It involves at least some elements, which the parties have in common. Hence, it can strengthen bonds among them and can even expand into areas other than the o= nes originally signed for. 8.&nbs= p; Political integration= : Some common interests and even some common good ought to be present in cases of politic= al integration. The more areas of policy making are incorporated into the poli= tics of the Union, the stronger the inner bonds become. = The question of the legitimacy of political integration cannot be neglected. If= it remains a matter of the political and governmental elites, and if the resul= ts of integration as perceived [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 40] by the citizenries are not satisfactory, it can breed opposition. Hence even political integrati=ADon can be reversible. In= any case, it requires continuous management of potential conflicts. 9.&nbs= p; Social integration: E= uropean integration has been an affair of the European elites. Because of the prominence of supra-national integration and institutionalised dialogue, it could not be otherwise. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to identify European integration only with the political and governmental elites. = In fact everyday life of the European tribes has become quite Europeanised and internatio=ADnalised. Quite a number of Europeans do not live in their coun= try of origin but in some other country of the EU or elsewhere in the world. A vas= t majority of the people have spent time in other countries of Europe for holiday, business or study. Tens of millions are on the move every summer. There are no more border controls. Trains and motorways form inte=ADgrated European networks. Young people spend a school or college year in other countries. You can watch at least some television programs from other EU countries everywhere and so on. Social intercourse across countries has bec= ome quite intensive and we take pleasure in it. We still might make jokes about= the others (just as we do about the people from the neighbouring town or villag= e), but basically we perceive each other as equals. The times when the European tribes hated each other seem very remote and almost incomprehensible. </spa= n> = That means, social integration, through unfettered travel, tourism, exchange programs, city partnerships, sports leagues, language learning, curricula w= ith information on other coun=ADtries and peoples etc. is of primary importance= for the development of a peace community, as well as for its permanence and acceptance by the citizenries. Once one has found out that the "others" are just human beings like oneself, the mental constructions of "strangers" lose their vilifying basis and cannot easily be manipulated anymore by nationalist demagogues.<a style=3D"mso-footno= te-id: ftn124" href=3D"https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftn124" name= =3D"_ftnref124" title=3D"">[124]</s= up></a> <spa= n lang=3D"EN-GB"> <= /span>Alas, this may be too optimistic a view. Certainly, wars among the members of the EU have become impossible. Social integration was both a result and a cause of this elimination of the possibility of war. Unfortunately that does not mean tha= t social and ethnic conflicts have disappeared. To the contrary such conflict= s are becoming more frequent and widespread, particularly within cities and regions. The ethnification of politics can, as in former Yugo=ADslavia, eve= n lead to military conflict. The biggest future challenge for Europe could well be= internal peace =96 especially = in times of rising economic and social inequalities. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 41] =  <o:p></o:p> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"f= ont-size: 14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";ms= o-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <a href=3D"https://library.fe= s.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#OBEN"><img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/= digbib/e_oben.gif" width=3D"160" height=3D"15" border=3D"0" alt=3D"Page Top= "></a> <h2 style=3D"margin-top:0cm"><a name=3D"_Toc463111947"></a><a name=3D"_= Toc470889895"></a><a name=3D"_Toc478798394"> </a><a name=3D"capitel4"></a> References</h2> Arnold, Hans, Europa am Ende? Die Aufl= =F6sung von EG und NATO. M=FCnchen: Piper Verlag, 1993. Barber, Tony, Bright picture disguises regional imbalances. In: Financial Times Survey, Euro-Zone Economy, Dec. 3, 1999, p. 3. Bayoumi, T./Masson, P.R., Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: lessons for monetary union in Europe, in: European Economic Review, 1996. Belke, Ansgar/Gros, Daniel, Asymmetric Shocks and EMU: Is There a Need for a Stability Fund?</i= > In: Intereconomics, Nov./Dec. 1998, pp. 274-288 Boulding, Kenneth E., Stable Peace, Austin, Texas, 21989 Carr, E.H., Nationalism and After, London: MacMillan, 1968 (orig. 1945). Cecchini, Paolo (avec la collaboration= de Michel Capinat, Alexis Jacque=ADmin), 1992= . Le D=E9fi. Nouvelles donn=E9es =E9conomiques de l'Europe sans fronti=E8res= . Paris: Flammarion/Commission Europ=E9enne, 1988. Cramon Daiber, Birgit, Wilde Rede an Europa. Europa ist nicht, was es war. Europa ist nich= t, was es sein will. Existiert Europa? Berlin: Edition Lit.europe, 1994.</= span> Curzon, Gerard und Victoria, Follies in European Trade Relations with Japan. In: World Econo= my, Vol. 10, 2, 1987, 155-76. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Die Zeit, 27.8.93.</= span> Dahrendorf, Ralf, Alle Eier in einen Korb. Interview. In: Der Spiegel, Nr. 50, 19= 95, pp. 27-33. Dell, Edmund, The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe. Oxford Univ. Press, 1995. DeMause, Lloyd, Reagans Amerika, Frankfurt, 1987. Duch=EAne, Fran=E7ois, Jean Monnet. The First Statesman of Interdependence, N.Y., Lond= on: W.W. Nor=ADton, 1994 Eatwell, John, The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community. In: Jonathan Michie, John G. Smith, eds., Unemployment in Europe, London et al.: Academic Press, 1994, pp. 209-19. Engel, Christian, Die schleichende Zentralisierung Europas. Friedrich-Ebert-Stift= ung, August 1995. Europ=E4ische Kommission, Jahreswirtschaftsbericht 1995, in: Europ=E4ische Wirtschaft, Nr= . 59, 1995. Frankel, Benjamin, ed., The Cold War 1945-1991, Vol. 3, Resources. Detroit et al.: Manl= y, 1993. Friend, Julius W., The Linchpin: French-German Relations 1950-1990, New York 1991.= Gasteyger, Curt, Europa zwischen Spaltung und Einigung 1945 bis 1993, Bundeszent= rale f=FCr politi=ADsche Bildung, Bd. 321, 1994. Geske, Otto-Erich, Wor=FCber entscheidet das Bundesverfassungsgericht beim L=E4nderfinanzausgleich? In: Wirtschaftsdienst, VIII, 1999, pp. 487-496= . Hirschman, Albert O., Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, o= r Feeble?, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XX, Dec. 1982, 1463-84.</= span> Hobsbawm, Eric, Age of Extremes, The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991. London= et al.: Penguin, 1994. Hondrich, Karl Otto, Der Krieg und Europas Grenzen. In: Merkur, 53, 7, Juli 1999. </= span> Huntington, Samuel P., The Erosion of National Interest. In: Foreign Affairs, 76, 5, 1= 997, pp 28-64. Justi, Johann Heinrich Gottlob von, <i= style=3D"mso-bidi-font-style:normal">Die Chim=E4re des Gleichgewichts von = Europa, eine Abhandlung, worinnen die Richtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit dieses zeitherigen Lehrgeb=E4udes des Staatskunst deutlich vor Augen geleget, und = dabey allenthalben neue und r=FChrende Betrachtungen =FCber die Ursachen der Krie= ge und den wesentlichen Grunde, worauf die Macht eines Staates ankommt, beygebrach= t werden. Altona: David Iversen, 1758. Kamppeter, Werner, Steuerflucht im Binnenmarkt. In: Mitbestimmung, 10, 1997, pp. 20-23. Kohr, Hans, Disunion Now. A plea for a society based upon small autonomous units. In: The Co= m=ADmonweal, Vol. XXXIV, 23, Sept. 26, 1941, pp. 540-42. Kohr, Leopold, The Breakdown of Nations, Llandybie, Carmarthenshire: Christopher Davies, 1= 957. Kolko, Gabriel, The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-= 45, London, 1969. [Seite der Drucka= usg.: 42] Leffler, Melvyn P., A Preponderance of Power, National Security, the Truman Administrat= ion, and the Cold War, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992. McCallum, John, A Canadian Lesson for EMU, in: Wall Street Journal Europe, Brussels, December 16, 1997 Maddison, Angus, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development. A Long-Run Comparative Vi= ew. Oxford University Press, 1991. Marglin, Stephen, Schor, Juliet B., ed= s., The Golden Age of Capitalism. R= einterpreting the Postwar Experience. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991. Mitrany, David, The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional? In: Groom, A.J.R., Taylor, Paul, ed., Function= alism, Theory and Practice in International Relations, London: University of London Press, 1975, pp. 53-78 (Revised version of an article with the same title in the J. of Common Market Studies, Dec. 1995). Monnet, Jean, M=E9moires, Paris: Librairie Fayard, 1976. Moreau Defarges, Philippe, France and EU. Paper presented at the International Symposium, = A New European Order and Euro-Japan Relations, Chuo University, Dec. 19-20, 1= 995. M=F6schel, Wernhard, Europapolitik zwischen deutscher Romantik und gallischer Klarheit</= i>, In: Aus Poli=ADtik und Zeitgeschichte, B 3-4, 13.1.1995, pp. 10-16.<= /p> Nahrendorf, Rainer, Teure St=FCtze, Handelsblatt, Feb. 21, 1996. OECD, Economic Outlook, various issues (latest: June 1999). OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1987, Paris, 1989, and 1990-1987, Paris, 1995.<= /p> OECD, Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, Paris, 1987. Olson, Mancur, Economic Nationalism and Economic Progress. In: The World Economy, Vol. 10, 3, S= ept. 1987, pp. 241-64. Sachs, J./Sala-i-Martin, X., Fiscal Federalism and optimum currency areas: evidence from Euro= pe and the United States, in: M. Canzonieri et al., eds., Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the = US, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992. Samuelson, Paul A., Full Employment after the War, in: S. Harris, ed., Post-war Economic Problems, New York, 1943, 27-53. Scharpf, Fritz W., Games in Hierarchies and Networks. Analytical and Empirical Approac= hes to the Study of Governance Institutions. Frankfurt: Campus; Boulder, Co= l.: Westview Press, 1993. Schmitt, Burkhard, Auch die Bundesrepublik strebte einst nach Atomwaffen, Frankfur= ter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13.9.1995, 10. Southey, Caroline, High jobless reat haunts EU leaders. Financial Times, Dec. 16/1= 7, 1995, II, p. 2. Tsoukalis, Loukas, The New European Economy. The Politics and Economics of Integra=ADt= ion. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1993. Walker, Martin, The Cold War, London: Vintage Books, 1994. Weidenfeld, Werner, Europ=E4ische Einigung im historischen =DCberblick. In: W. Weid= enfeld, W. Wessels, Hg., Europa von A-Z. Taschenbuch der europ=E4ischen Integration. Bonn: Institut f=FCr Euro= =ADp=E4ische Politik, Europa Union Verlag, 1994. Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang, = Europe from A to Z, Guide to Europe= an Integration, Institut f=FCr Europ=E4ische Politik, 1998. Weizs=E4cker, Richard von, Europa mu=DF erwachsen werden. Die Zeit, 21.10.99, S. 2.= Working Group on European Integration,= Strengthen the European Parliament= . The European Parlia=ADment Controls the European Union. National Parliaments Co= ntrol their Governments. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Division of Foreign Poli= cy Research, Working Paper No. 3, 1997 (1997a). Working Group on European Integration,= Binnenmarkt und W=E4hrungsunion er= fordern Angleichung der Unternehmens- und Kapitalbesteue=ADrung. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abteilung Au=DFenpolitikfor=ADschung, Arbeitspapi= er Nr. 4, 1997 (1997b). Woyke, Wichard, Europ=E4ische Politische Gemeinschaft. In: Woyke, Wichard, Hg.,= Europ=E4ische Ge=ADmeinschaft. Problemfelder-Institutionen-Politik M=FCnchen 1984 (Pipers W=F6rterbuch= zur Politik). Zielinski, Michael, Friedensursachen, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995. <hr>  <!= --[endif]--><o:p></o:p> </div><font= size=3D"+1"> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:18.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman&q= uot;;mso-ansi-language: EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section4"><span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;mso-= bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-fareast-font-family:&quo= t;Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"><b= r clear=3D"all" style=3D"page-break-before:always"> Intern= ational Policy Analysis Unit =96 Analyseeinheit Internationale Politik<o:p></o:p></= b>  <o:p></o:p> Recent Publications <o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> </div> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Frutiger 45 Light";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman= ";mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section5"> Globali= zation and Justice Modernization of Social Democracy<o:p></o:p> Alf= red Pfaller:<o:p></o:p> Social Democracy = in the Globalized Post-industrial Society<o:p></o:p> (24 pages, March 2000; German version in preparation)<o:p></o:p> Mic= hael Ehrke:<o:p></o:p> =84Globalization = With a Human Face=93<o:p></o:p> Angels=E4chsische Dokumente zum =84Dritten Weg=93<o:p></o:p> (13 Pages, Februa= r 2000; in German)<o:p></o:p> Knu= t Emmerich:<o:p></o:p> Der d=E4nische Erfolgsweg zum Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit<o:p></o:p> (20 pages, Decemb= er 1999)<o:p></o:p> Alf= red Pfaller:<o:p></o:p> F=FChrt internati= onale Konkurrenz zum Sozialabbau? Elf Argumentationsfiguren<o:p></o:p> (12 pages, Decemb= er 1999)<o:p></o:p> Mic= hael Ehrke:<o:p></o:p> Revisionism Revis= ited<o:p></o:p> The Third Way and European Social Democracy<o:p></o:p> (23 pages, Novemb= er 1999, also available in German)<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> Working= Group on "Europ=E4ische Integration" <o:p></o:p>= The EU needs further reforms of the CAP prior to eastward enlargement<o:p></o:p= > Working Paper Nr.= 9<o:p></o:p> (4 pages, to be published in April 2000; also available in German)<o:p></o:p> Verst=E4rkte Zusammenarbeit in der EU<o:p></o:p> Thesen<o:p></o:p>= (7 pages, March 2= 000)<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p> The EU must concentrate its constitutional reform on a few essentials <o:p></o:p></span= > Working Paper Nr.= 8 (November 1999; also available in German)<o:p></o:p> The EU needs an efficient and effective Commission<o:p></o:p> Working Paper Nr.= 7<o:p></o:p> (May 1999, also available in German)<o:p></o:p>  = <o:p></o:p> Other Publications<o:p></o:p> Wol= fgang Quaisser / Monika Hartmann / Elmar H=F6nekopp / Michael Brandmeier:<= /i><o:p></o:p></= p> Die Osterweiterun= g der Europ=E4ischen Union: Konsequenzen f=FCr Wohlstand und Besch=E4ftigung in Europa<o:p></o:p></span= > (167 pages, voraussichtlich M=E4rz 2000)<o:p></o:p> Mic= hael Frenkel / Lukas Menkhoff:<o:p></o:p> Stabile Weltfinan= zen?<o:p></o:p> Die Debatte um ei= ne neue internationale Finanzarchitektur<o:p></o:p> (133 pages, Febru= ary 2000, nur im Buchhandel, Preis DM 36</= u>)<o:p></o:p> Oli= ver Thr=E4nert (ed.):<o:p></o:p> Preventing the proliferation of weapons of = mass destruction : what role for arms control?<o:p></o:p> (154 pages, Octob= er 1999)<o:p></o:p> Wer= ner Kamppeter:<o:p></o:p> Nachkriegszeit in Kosovo: W=FCste oder Wirtschaftswunder?<o:p></o:p> (18 pages, June 1= 999)<o:p></o:p>  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>=  <o:p></o:p>= <div style=3D"border:solid windowtext .75pt;padding:1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt= "> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:6.0pt;margin-right:3.45pt;margin= -bottom: 6.0pt;margin-left:0cm;border:none;mso-border-alt:solid windowtext .75pt; padding:0cm;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt">Most of the above publications are available onlin= e: http://www.fes.de <o:p></o:= p> Please direct your orders to<sp= an lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Frutiger 45 L= ight";mso-ansi-language: EN-GB">:<o:p></o:p> <p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-top:3.0pt;margin-right:3.45pt;margin= -bottom: 0cm;margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;border:none;mso-border-alt:solid = windowtext .75pt; padding:0cm;mso-padding-alt:1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt 1.0pt">Ursula M=FCller, International Policy Analysis Unit, Friedrich Ebert Foundation,<b= r> 53170 Bonn, Germany Tel. (0)228.883-212, Fax: (0)228.883.625; e-mail: Ursula.Mueller@fes.de<o:p></o:p> </div>  <o:p></o:p></p= > </div> <span lang=3D"EN-GB" style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.0pt;fo= nt-family: "Frutiger 45 Light";mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman= ";mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-GB;mso-fareast-language:DE= ;mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> <div class=3D"Section6">  <o:p></o:p></p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote-list"> <hr align=3D"left" size=3D"1" width=3D"33%">  <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn1"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn1" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref1" name=3D"_ftn1" title=3D"= ">[1]</= span></a> Zielinsky, 1995, p.18. Boulding defines as stable peace a situation "in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved." (1989, p.13).<o:p></o:p></span= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn2"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn2" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref2" name=3D"_ftn2" title=3D"= ">[2]</= span></a> The Cold war "was about the balance of power, a war of the German succession, and at the same time it was an ideological confrontation." (Walker, 1994, p. 5).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn3"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn3" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref3" name=3D"_ftn3" title=3D"= ">[3]</a> "The CIA estimated that a swift economic collapse might catapult the French or Italian Communists to power. ... If the United States did not act vigorousl= y, the French, Italian, or Greek Communists might win power legally or seize i= t violently." The same report of Sept. 1947 emphasised that the "greatest po=ADtential danger to U.S. security lies ... in the possibility of the economic collapse of Western Europe and of the consequent accession = to power of elements subservient to the Kremlin." (Leffler, 1992, pp.189f.).<o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn4"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn4" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref4" name=3D"_ftn4" title=3D"= ">[4]</= span></a> Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 240. To expect another Great Slump after the end of World War II w= as not at all far-fet=ADched. Paul Samuelson (1943, p. 51) spoke of the possib= ility, in the US, of "the greatest period of unemployment and industrial dislocation which any economy has ever faced". The main concern of American policy-makers right after the war was the prevention of such a slu= mp. They wanted to achieve this by the combination of traditionally high US tar= iffs and of a drive for the vast expansion of Ameri=ADcan exports. For the latte= r reason they wanted to impose a free-trade regime =96 yet only on others (Ko= lko, 1969). "Aggressive expansion was plainly in the minds of American policy-makers as soon as the war was over. It was the Cold War which encour= aged them to take a lon=ADger view, by persuading them that helping their future competitors to grow as rapidly as possible was politically urgent." (Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 275). Walker (1994, p. 2 passim) argues that the Cold W= ar was the major engine of the Golden Age of high growth and rising prosperity (1950-73). And Hobsbawm asks (1994, p. 276) what would have happened to the German economy, if its recovery had depended on the Europeans, who feared i= ts revival. How fast would the Japanese economy have recovered, if the USA had= not found itself building up Japan as the industrial base for the Korean and th= e Vietnam War? 1949-53 and 1966-70 were the years of peak Japanese growth. <o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn5"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn5" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref5" name=3D"_ftn5" title=3D"= ">[5]</= span></a> The original American plans for the world economy were attacked by Molotov duri= ng his speech at the Paris peace conference in October 1946: "It is surely not so difficult to understand that if American capital were given a free h= and in the small states ruined and enfeebled by the war, as the advocates of th= e principle of 'equal opportunity' desire, American capital would buy up the local industries, appro=ADpriate the more attractive Rumanian, Yugoslav and= all other enterprises, and would become the master in these small states. Given such a situ=ADation, we would probably live to see the day when in your own country, on switching on the radio, you would be hearing not so much your o= wn language as one Ame=ADrican gramophone record after another or some piece o= r other of British propaganda. The time might come when in your own country, = on going to the cinema, you would be seeing American films sold for foreign consumption. It is not clear that such unrestricted applications of the principles of 'equal oppor=ADtunity' would in practice mean the veritable economic enslavement of the small states and their subjuga=ADtion to the ru= le and arbitrary will of strong an enriched foreign firms, banks and industrial corporations? Was this what we fought for when we battled the fascist invaders?" (Walker, 1994, p. 46).No doubt that these words "have an oddly prophetic ring today" (ibid., p. 45). In a sense it demonstrates how difficult it is to foresee historical developments and to construct causalities. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn6"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn6" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref6" name=3D"_ftn6" title=3D"= ">[6]</= span></a> The Americans henceforth (since autumn 1946) "envisaged a Western economic and a Western geo=ADpolitical entity as their pre-eminent concern". (Charles Maier, according to Leffler, 1992, p. 120). "U.S. goals were to promote the recovery of Western Europe, check Soviet influence, thwart Communist ga= ins, and lower occupation costs." They would have preferred "a single Europe modelled on the USA in its political structure as well as its flourishing free enterprise economy." <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn7"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn7" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref7" name=3D"_ftn7" title=3D"= ">[7]</= span></a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 182. See also Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 241. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn8"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn8" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref8" name=3D"_ftn8" title=3D"= ">[8]</= span></a> Adenauer's first objective was the restoration of national sovereignty for Germany. Th= e integration into Western Europe and the Western hemisphere to an important extent was a means to that end. The opposi=ADtion leader, Kurt Schumacher, = wanted a united and, if necessary, neutral Germany. He spoke in "disturbing tones of traditional German nationalism" and denounced Adenauer as the "Chancellor of the Occupation, of the Allies" (Walker, 1994, p. 91) and as showing "indifference to the fate of 18 million East Germans."(Leffler, 1992, p. 320). <o:p></o:p> Adenauer's position in turn was equally clear, at least rhetorically: Germany's defeat should not mean "that it must renounce forever the right to regain lost territories beyond the Oder-Neisse. If we were to opt for the West, as he preferred to do, he had to be able to convince his domestic opponents that = he was neither compromising long-term German sovereignty nor relinquishing hop= e for unification nor territo=ADrial rectification." (ibid., p. 454). "In France, German rhetoric could easily be interpreted as ingratitude and illustrative of German aspirations to regain a position of preponderance in Europe." (ibid., p. 320).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn9"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn9" href=3D"http= s://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref9" name=3D"_ftn9" title=3D"= ">[9]</= span></a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 371.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn10"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn10" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref10" name=3D"_ftn10" title= =3D"">[10]</a> France was forced to accept the tri-zonal fusion of Germany in the summer of 1948.= As a result Georges Bidault lost the French Foreign Ministry. He was felt to h= ave given too much away. (Duch=EAne, 1994, 398, p. 185).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn11"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn11" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref11" name=3D"_ftn11" title= =3D"">[11]</a> A neutral Germany "was not an outlandish proposi=ADtion; in 1954, just such a= n agreement was reached over Austria" (Walker, 1994, p. 91). "Many Germans still felt that they had much to gain from remai=ADning neutral in = the East-West struggle" and "that formal association with NATO would kill pro=ADspects for the eventual unification of their country." (Leffler, 1992= , p. 409). George F. Kennan advoca=ADted in 1952 a unified, neutralised Germa= ny (ibid., 461). In 1958 he repeated this proposition. Adenauer recei=ADved a stunning shock when Dulles in a letter to him implicitly proposed a unified= , neutral and de=ADmilita=ADri=ADsed Germany in July 1958. Adenauer's reactio= n was to turn to France and accept de Gaulle's concept of Western Europe (Walker, 19= 94, 121f.). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn12"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn12" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref12" name=3D"_ftn12" title= =3D"">[12]</a> At that time the "greatest worries (of US officials) related to the poor state of Europe's defenses and the uncertainty over Germany's loyalty to th= e West." (Leffler, 1992, p. 383). A few months earlier Char=ADles Bohlen, the= n serving as the US minister in Paris, explained: "as soon as Germany recaptures her freedom of manoeuvre she will inevitably begin to play the W= est off against the East with the very real danger of coming to rest on the sid= e of the Soviet Union. This is the nightmare of the West European nations ... an= d it should be ours as well."(ibid., p. 345). President Truman time and again expressed his reservations about German rearmament (ibid., p. 389). French fears were more concrete: "if Germany is resuscitated, her resources and technical proficiency would be used by the USSR against France." (ibid., p. 202). More precisely France had "apprehensions about the long-term ramifications of a power=ADful Germany that could act independently or in c= oncert with Moscow." (ibid., p. 207). Earlier, Stalin too had expressed fears of a revived and powerful Germany. Yet he had opposed dismemberment because he worried about German irredentism (ibid., p. 154). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn13"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn13" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref13" name=3D"_ftn13" title= =3D"">[13]</a> Leffler, 1992, pp. 202 and 207. These demands were contained in documents of early 1= 948.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn14"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn14" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref14" name=3D"_ftn14" title= =3D"">[14]</a> Because such extensive controls of Germany would have weakened the cohesion of West= ern Europe and, as was mentioned, because the US needed the Germany=92s economi= c strength and her rearmament. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn15"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn15" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref15" name=3D"_ftn15" title= =3D"">[15]</a> From the British point of view the Treaty of Dunkirk had more than a German dimension. It also reflected the fear of the foreign secretary Ernest Bevin "that French unhappiness with Anglo-American policy in Germany might drive the French into the arms of the Kremlin." (Leffler, 1992, p. 153). That shows too how complicated and open to all possibilities European politics w= ere at that time. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn16"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn16" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref16" name=3D"_ftn16" title= =3D"">[16]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 186. Later, in 1954 Germany became a member of the WEU. The Treaty= of Brussels, modified the same year, still contained an implicit security guarantee against Germany. Cf. Zielinski, 1995, p. 103.<o:p></o:p></= p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn17"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn17" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref17" name=3D"_ftn17" title= =3D"">[17]</a> It "was the greatest British commitment in Europe at the time and encouraged hopes of further inte=ADgration." (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 186).<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn18"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn18" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref18" name=3D"_ftn18" title= =3D"">[18]</a> = Leffler, 1992, p. 203. "Without German rearmament ... the WEU did not pose credible military de=ADterrent to the Soviet Union." (Frankel, 1993, p. 60).<o:p></o= :p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn19"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn19" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref19" name=3D"_ftn19" title= =3D"">[19]</a> Delivered on Sept. 19, 1946, reprinted in Gasteyger, 1994, pp. 39-40. Churchill wrote= in a newspa=ADper article in 1946 that European integration was "(t)he only wa= y to prevent war" (according to Edwina Currie in her address to the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, Bonn, 9.9.93). On the other hand, Chur=ADch= ill did of course play a role in the initial escalation of the Cold War. Cf. Leffler, 1992, pp. 107-110.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn20"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn20" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref20" name=3D"_ftn20" title= =3D"">[20]</a> For a comprehensive presentation and analysis of Jean Monnet=92s very impressiv= e life, the multipli=ADcity of his initiatives and his "method" to develop and push them through, see Duch=EAne, 1994.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn21"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn21" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref21" name=3D"_ftn21" title= =3D"">[21]</a> The following analysis is based on Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 168-9.<o:p></o:p>= </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn22"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn22" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref22" name=3D"_ftn22" title= =3D"">[22]</a> Monnet acquired the confidence of British and American leaders and officials when, under his initia=ADtive, the Allied Maritime Transport Council was formed, = which co-ordinated military and civil supplies of the Allies during 1917-18. Even more important was the period 1939-43 when he actually lived in the US and played a leading role in the British Purchasing Commission (as a British Citizen provided with a passport signed by Churchill!) and in gearing the U= S economy into war production. Keynes believed that Monnet "had shortened the war by one year"; for others he was an "Unsung Hero of World War II" (title of an essay by Robert Nathan) and "one of the real architects of our victory" (Lord Halifax). (Duch=EAne, 1994, chapters 1 and 2, passim). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn23"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn23" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref23" name=3D"_ftn23" title= =3D"">[23]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 456 (emphasis added, WK). "La coop=E9ration entre les nations, si importante soit-elle, ne r=E9sout rien.= " <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn24"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn24" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref24" name=3D"_ftn24" title= =3D"">[24]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 394-5.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn25"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn25" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref25" name=3D"_ftn25" title= =3D"">[25]</a> In later years, whenever Monnet said of something that it was "an OEEC affair", he meant nothing would come of it. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 169). On th= e other hand, it must be noted that Monnet successfully linked the Marshall a= id to the Monnet Plan, and played a crucial role in it. Monnet's position was = so strong that the "Americans would not give their approval to any proposal which Monnet didn't feel fitted in with his plans." (According to A. Hartman, who worked at the time with the Economic Co-operation Administrati= on mission in France; ibid., p. 173).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn26"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn26" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref26" name=3D"_ftn26" title= =3D"">[26]</a> Cf. Monnet, 1976, p. 456. (emphasis added, WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn27"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn27" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref27" name=3D"_ftn27" title= =3D"">[27]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 190, 197.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn28"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn28" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref28" name=3D"_ftn28" title= =3D"">[28]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 422 (Duch=EAne's translation, 1994, p. 199).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn29"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn29" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref29" name=3D"_ftn29" title= =3D"">[29]</a> In 1941 Monnet expounded something like the Schuman Plan for coal and steel to Paul-Henri Spaak (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 182). Monnet developed a scheme rathe= r similar to the Schuman Plan in 1943 (ibid. p. 126-8). In the summer of 1947 Monnet held numerous discussions with the senior American in Euro=ADpe, Under-secretary William Clayton. "Their intensive review of the German policy led in the end to the Schuman Plan" (ibid. p. 168), even though, more immediately, it was an initial sketch of the Internatio=ADnal Ruhr Authority. All this happened less than two months after the announcement of= the Marshall Plan in whose preparation Clayton had played an important role.<sp= an style=3D"display:none;mso-hide:all"> It is interesting to note that Clay= ton had prepared at the end of May a famous memorandum to Acheson, which was an important stepping stone for the Marshall Plan which was announced a week l= ater (Leffler, 1992, pp. 158-62). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn30"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn30" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref30" name=3D"_ftn30" title= =3D"">[30]</a> In the memorandum Monnet wrote for Schuman, he qualified his solution as one "which would re=ADmove for the Germans the humiliation of endless controls, and for the French the fear of a Germany without controls." (According to Friend, 1991, p. 17; Zielinski, 1995, p. 107).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn31"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn31" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref31" name=3D"_ftn31" title= =3D"">[31]</a> Monnet in conversation with Schuman (emphasis added, WK). He continued: "We lost peace in 1919 because we there (in Versailles, WK) introduced discriminatio= n and the spirit of superiority. We are on the way to commit the same error again." "Nous avons manqu=E9 la paix en 1919 parce que nous y avons introduit la discrimination et l'esprit= de sup=E9riorit=E9. Nous sommes en train de commencer les m=EAmes erreurs."</s= pan> (Monnet, 1976, p. 410; translation WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn32"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn32" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref32" name=3D"_ftn32" title= =3D"">[32]</a> "This proposition has an essential political message: to drive a wedge into the bastions of national sovereignty that is small enough to be acceptable and = deep enough to move the States towards the necessary unity for peace." "Cette proposition a une port=E9e politique essentielle: ouvrir dans le rempart des souverainet=E9s nationale= s une br=E8che suffisamment limit=E9e pour rallier les consentements, suffisammen= t profonde pour entra=EEner les Etats vers l'unit=E9 n=E9cessaire =E0 la paix= ." (Monnet, 1976, 429; translation WK). For him nationalism was the demon to b= e exorcised (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 371).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn33"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn33" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref33" name=3D"_ftn33" title= =3D"">[33]</a> Leffler, 1992, p. 349. "The interdependence of production thus established will make all war bet=ADween France and Germany not only unthinkable, but physic= ally impossible." (Schuman, acc. to Wise, in: Zielinski, p. 108).<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn34"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn34" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref34" name=3D"_ftn34" title= =3D"">[34]</a> After Monnet had explained the Schuman Plan to Adenauer the latter said: "Monsieur Monnet, I consider the realisation of this French position as the most important task that awaits me." "Monsieur Monnet, je consid=E8re la r=E9alisation de la proposition fran=E7aise comme la t=E2che plus importante que m'attende. Si = je parviens =E0 la mener =E0 bien, j'estime que je n'aurai pas perdu ma vie." = (Monnet, 1976, p. 450; translation WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn35"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn35" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref35" name=3D"_ftn35" title= =3D"">[35]</a> The Schuman Plan was thought to be "so vague on essential details" by the Belgian Foreign Minister that "it was impossible to speak definitely about it". Macmillan called it "a plan to have a plan". (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 209).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn36"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn36" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref36" name=3D"_ftn36" title= =3D"">[36]</a> Based on Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 240 passim.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn37"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn37" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref37" name=3D"_ftn37" title= =3D"">[37]</a> Britain did not participate in the negotiations of the Schuman Plan nor join the EC= SC. They did not want to commit themselves to a supra-national High Authority. = On this point Monnet was inflexible. Later Britain laun=ADched the Eden Plan w= hich was a "bizarre attempt" to subordinate the new community to the inter-governmental Council of Europe (Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 209, 237). After protracted negotiati=ADons Britain became an associate member of the ECSC i= n a sort of inter-governmental extension. (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 261 passim.). <o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn38"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn38" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref38" name=3D"_ftn38" title= =3D"">[38]</a> The reason why Britain, in the perception of Jean Monnet, did not join the ECSC= is remarkable: "Britain has no confidence that France and the other countries of Europe have the ability or even the will effectively to resist a possibl= e Russian invasion. Britain believes that in this conflict continental Europe will be occupied but that she herself, with America, will be able to resist= and finally conquer. She there=ADfore does not wish to let her domestic life or= the development of her resources be influenced by any views other than her own,= and certainly not by continental views." (after his London talks in 1950; Monnet, 1976, p. 400; translation Walker, 1994, p. 93). For Tsoukalis (1993, p. 16) this was one of several "complete misjudgements by the government in London."<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn39"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn39" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref39" name=3D"_ftn39" title= =3D"">[39]</a> Alan Milward (Tsoukalis, 1993, p. 17) has referred to the ECSC "as a protoplasmic organization which could take virtually any shape the High Authority and the member countries would eventually wish to give it." <span= style=3D"display:none;mso-hide:all">Flexibility and suppleness are after a= ll the main weapons of legal documents in the battle against time. Monnet insisted repeatedly, that the purpose of the ECSC was political and moral, = not economic. Adenauer agreed on this and said to him: "J'envisage comme vous cette entreprise sous son aspect le plus =E9lev=E9 - elle appartient =E0 l'= ordre de la morale. C'est la responsabilit=E9 morale que nous avons =E0 l'=E9gard de= nos peuples, et non la responsabilit=E9 technique que nous devons mettre en =9C= uvre pour r=E9ali=ADser un si vaste espoir. L'accueil en Allemagne a =E9t=E9 ent= housiaste, aussi nous ne nous accrocherons pas =E0 des d=E9tails. Cette initiative, vo= ici vingt-cinq ans que j l'attends." (Monnet, 1976, p. 449). <o:p></o:p>= </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn40"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn40" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref40" name=3D"_ftn40" title= =3D"">[40]</a> Hence it is difficult to agree with Mitrany (1975, p. 69) when he writes: "The ESCS and Euratom were straight functional bodies and could get on with thei= r allotted task without offending the position of other countries, while remaining open to possible links with them." He argues that "functional arrange=ADments have the patent virtue of technical self-determination: the range of their task can be clearly defi=ADned, and = that in turn determines the powers and resources needed for their performance (p= . 68). This hardly corresponds to the realities of the ECSC.<o:p></o:p></span= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn41"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn41" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref41" name=3D"_ftn41" title= =3D"">[41]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, Ch. 7, for the convoluted evolution of the new institution= s within a difficult set=ADting. Trade across frontiers in the common market = for steel doubled as a proportion of steel consump=ADtion. That was certainly a= n important success. On the other hand, the steelmasters were colluding withi= n the common market, "where the treaty powers of the High Authority were in no doubt whatsoever." (p. 248). "The High Authority failed to take firm hold of its field. The managers of the twenty major steel firms were l= eft largely undisturbed." The governments continued to condition coal and steel. (p. 252). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn42"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn42" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref42" name=3D"_ftn42" title= =3D"">[42]</a> The ECSC was unable to face the coal crisis of 1958/59. The member states were = too divided bet=ADween coal-producing and coal-consuming countries to agree. Ga= ullism was matched in Germany by ill will towards sectoral integration. The basic industries, used to cartel planning under government patro=ADnage, wanted t= o break the High Authority. Erhard prophesied its end within 3 years. Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 393, 317.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn43"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn43" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref43" name=3D"_ftn43" title= =3D"">[43]</a> Louis Lister, according to Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 252 (emphasis added, WK).<o:p></o:= p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn44"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn44" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref44" name=3D"_ftn44" title= =3D"">[44]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 252. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn45"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn45" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref45" name=3D"_ftn45" title= =3D"">[45]</a> Significantly, instead of the High Authority the EEC just had a 'Commission'.<o:p></o:p></= span> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn46"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn46" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref46" name=3D"_ftn46" title= =3D"">[46]</a> In Germany the SPD voted against the EDC as it had voted against the ECSC on grounds that both treaties hindered German reunification (Duch=EAne, 1994, = p. 285).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn47"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn47" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref47" name=3D"_ftn47" title= =3D"">[47]</a> The Pleven Plan proposed to rivet (rattach=E9) the European Army to the politic= al institutions of the European Union (Monnet, 1976, p. 505). According to Duc= h=EAne (1994, p. 234) Monnet and others saw the EPC more of a way of reasserting civilian control over the military than as a step to a federal union. The emphasis in Monnet's M=E9moires (pp. 579f) is much more on the latter aspec= t, however.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn48"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn48" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref48" name=3D"_ftn48" title= =3D"">[48]</a> For a complete 'European state' essential elements like common legal and social systems were lack=ADing. The EDC/EPC had a common military command, yet, paradoxically, no common foreign policy. See Woyke, 1984, p. 227.<o:p></o:p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn49"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn49" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref49" name=3D"_ftn49" title= =3D"">[49]</a> In fact, the French government had signed the EDC treaty only under the condit= ion that no immediate attempt should be made to ratify it. "The EDC was rotting before the ink was dry." (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 233).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn50"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn50" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref50" name=3D"_ftn50" title= =3D"">[50]</a> In Nov. 1953 de Gaulle launched a personal attack against "the inspirer". "The 'Europe of Jean Mon=ADnet' now became the ritual red rag to the more militant opponents of the EDC." Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 254.<o:= p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn51"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn51" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref51" name=3D"_ftn51" title= =3D"">[51]</a> When the EDC was touched off the agenda of the French National Assembly the triumphant majo=ADri=ADty burst into the Marseillaise (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 254). Cf. also Zielinski, 1995, p. 101.<o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn52"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn52" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref52" name=3D"_ftn52" title= =3D"">[52]</a> In the same interview with the New York Times he said: "I will do everything against it. I will work with the Communists to block it. I will make a revolution against it. I would rather go with the Russians to stop it." (Walker, 1994, p. 97).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn53"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn53" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref53" name=3D"_ftn53" title= =3D"">[53]</a> As Churchill (ibid.) put it, "I meant it for them, not for us". He also spoke of "EDC tomfoolery" (Duch=EAne, 1994, 245) and of a "sludgy amalgam".<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn54"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn54" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref54" name=3D"_ftn54" title= =3D"">[54]</a> Leffler, 1992, p. 389f.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn55"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn55" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref55" name=3D"_ftn55" title= =3D"">[55]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 398.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn56"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn56" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref56" name=3D"_ftn56" title= =3D"">[56]</a> By the simultaneous accession of Germany to NATO and WEU a system of arms cont= rols was devi=ADsed, in fact if not in form, for Germany. Nevertheless membershi= p of both organisations was perceived in Germany as an enhancement of its nation= al sovereignty. (Zielinski, 1995, p. 104).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn57"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn57" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref57" name=3D"_ftn57" title= =3D"">[57]</a> In the words of the famous saying of Lord Ismay, the purpose of NATO was "to keep the Soviets out, the US in, and the Germans down".<o:p></o:p></= p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn58"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn58" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref58" name=3D"_ftn58" title= =3D"">[58]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 98. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn59"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn59" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref59" name=3D"_ftn59" title= =3D"">[59]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 256.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn60"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn60" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref60" name=3D"_ftn60" title= =3D"">[60]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 259.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn61"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn61" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref61" name=3D"_ftn61" title= =3D"">[61]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 256.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn62"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn62" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref62" name=3D"_ftn62" title= =3D"">[62]</a> Monnet announced his resignation in November 1954, apparently because he had fears about the fate of the ECSC - and because he felt that he needed all his tim= e in order to mobilise support for the Com=ADmu=ADnity in the member states. Alr= eady in October 1952 Spaak had confided to MacMillan that if the EDC failed, the EC= SC would collapse too. (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 259).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn63"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn63" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref63" name=3D"_ftn63" title= =3D"">[63]</a> Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 258.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn64"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn64" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref64" name=3D"_ftn64" title= =3D"">[64]</a> Their special relationship also had to do with British bases in the Middle East a= nd Asia and Britain's "role as a surrogate of American interests" (Walker, 1994, p. 191).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn65"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn65" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref65" name=3D"_ftn65" title= =3D"">[65]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 123. Britain, for instance, received Thor missiles from the US, wh= ich were the only nuclear missiles that could reach the Soviet Union at that ti= me. They were to be manned by British troops, and a dual key would be required = to fire them, one held by the Americans, the other by the Bri=ADtish (ibid., p= . 119). <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn66"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn66" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref66" name=3D"_ftn66" title= =3D"">[66]</a> One should not overestimate this move however, as Hobsbawm (1994, p. 241) has pointed out: "The most that an allied or client state could allow itself to do was to refuse complete integration into the mi=ADlitary alliance with= out actually leaving it."<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn67"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn67" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref67" name=3D"_ftn67" title= =3D"">[67]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 121. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn68"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn68" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref68" name=3D"_ftn68" title= =3D"">[68]</a> Walker, 1994, pp. 121f, 124. As an immediate result of the Suez crisis the British = air force in Ger=ADmany was halved and the army reduced by 20%. Adenauer was sh= ocked when MacMillan explained this to him. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn69"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn69" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref69" name=3D"_ftn69" title= =3D"">[69]</a> Because of the new anxieties generated by German national rearmament, integration seemed more than ever the way to harness Germany to safe purposes. Adenauer himself expressed the gravest misgi=ADvings that no one could guarantee tha= t the lethal combination of Ruhr magnates and German military would not reappear = (in a famous midnight chat with Spaak and Joseph Bech which was overheard by Lo= thar Ruehl, the correspondent of Der Spiegel; Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 267). <o:p></o= :p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn70"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn70" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref70" name=3D"_ftn70" title= =3D"">[70]</a> A month after Kennedy offered Britain, in order to accommodate its nuclear pretensions, the Polaris submarine missile system (which had not been offer= ed to France and infuriated her), de Gaulle talked of Britain as the "American Trojan Horse inside Europe" and cast his veto against British entry into the Common Market. Logically enough he continued: "The end would be a colossal Atlantic Community dependent on America and directe= d by America, which would soon swallow up the European Commu=ADnity. A week late= r he signed the Franco-German Friendship Treaty. (Walker, 1994, 181, p. 202). <o= :p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn71"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn71" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref71" name=3D"_ftn71" title= =3D"">[71]</a> Hobsbawm, 1994, p. 241.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn72"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn72" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref72" name=3D"_ftn72" title= =3D"">[72]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 258 passim.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn73"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn73" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref73" name=3D"_ftn73" title= =3D"">[73]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 265. In bringing Germany into NATO, Adenauer unilateral= ly renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons. French and American politicia= ns wondered how long this self-denying ordinance would last. At times, in priv= ate, Adenauer himself talked as if the renunciation might be tem=ADporary (ibid.= ). In fact, in November 1957 France, Germany and Italy had agreed to produce atom= ic weapons and their delivery systems. The United States were kept in the dark= . In extreme secrecy these three countries signed another agreement in April 195= 8 on the common construction of a gas diffusion plant in Pierrelatte. After his return to power de Gaulle stopped this co-operation in June 1958. He wan=AD= ted force de frappe to be an entirely national project in order to be able to u= se the bomb as an exclusive=ADly French diplomatic tool. (Schmitt, 1995).... von 1964 bis 1969 wehrte sich die Bundesregierung dagegen, den Atomwaffensperrvertrag zu unterzeichnen. Friedrich Zimmermann, M=E4rz 1968: "Der Aufbau eines eigenst=E4ndigen Europas wird behindert, weil ein k=FCnftiges Europa keinen Zugang zu der wahren Verteidungswaffe, der Atombo= mbe, mehr hat." Alfred Seidl, Bayernkurier, Aug 1973: "Sollten die Staaten Westeuropas innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist nicht zur Errichtung einer nuklearen europ=E4ischen Streitmacht unter Einschlu=DF der Bundeswehr komme= n, dann wird jede Bundesregierung gezwungen sein, ihrerseits die Ausr=FCstung der Bundeswehr mit Kernwaffen in Erw=E4gung zu ziehen." J. Gottschlich, Deutsch= e Finger nah am Dr=FCcker, TAZ, 7.9.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn74"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn74" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref74" name=3D"_ftn74" title= =3D"">[74]</a> Cf. Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 269 passim. on this paragraph.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn75"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn75" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref75" name=3D"_ftn75" title= =3D"">[75]</a> Spaak "preferred collusion by France and Germany to conflicts between them." (ibid., p. 271).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn76"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn76" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref76" name=3D"_ftn76" title= =3D"">[76]</a> Monnet was under a double French veto: to continue as president of the High Author= ity and as a chair=ADman of any inter-governmental conference on new initiative= s of European integration (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 280).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn77"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn77" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref77" name=3D"_ftn77" title= =3D"">[77]</a> For details, see Duch=EAne, 1994, pp. 279-83.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn78"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn78" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref78" name=3D"_ftn78" title= =3D"">[78]</a> See Weidenfeld, 1994, pp. 18-19.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn79"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn79" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref79" name=3D"_ftn79" title= =3D"">[79]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 456 (translation, WK). <sp= an style=3D"display:none;mso-hide:all">"Les propositions Schuman ... sont r=E9volucionaires ou elles ne sont rien. Leur pincipe fondamental est la d=E9legation de sourverainet=E9 dans un domaine limit=E9, mais d=E9cisif. .= .. La coop=E9ration entre les nations, si importante soit-elle, ne r=E9sout rien.= Ce qu'il faut chercher, c'est une fusion des int=E9r=EAts des peuples europ=E9= ens, et non pas simplement le maintien de l'=E9quilibre de ces int=E9r=EAts."</span= ><o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn80"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn80" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref80" name=3D"_ftn80" title= =3D"">[80]</a> Monnet, 1976, p. 429. "Cette proposition = a une port=E9e politique essentielle: ouvrir dans le rempart des souverainet= =E9s nationales une br=E8che suffisamment limit=E9e pour rallier les consentemen= ts, suffisamment profonde pour entra=EEner les Etats vers l'unit=E9 n=E9cessair= e =E0 la paix." Nationalism was for him the demon to be exorcised (Duch=EAne, 1994, p. 371).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn81"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn81" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref81" name=3D"_ftn81" title= =3D"">[81]</a> As is argued by Zielinski, 1995, p. 109, specifically for the ECSC (applying h= is criteria of symme=ADtry, symbiosis, homology, transcendency).<o:p></o:p></s= pan> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn82"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn82" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref82" name=3D"_ftn82" title= =3D"">[82]</a> Wei= denfeld/Wessels, 1998, p. 56.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn83"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn83" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref83" name=3D"_ftn83" title= =3D"">[83]</a> Scharpf, 1993.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn84"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn84" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref84" name=3D"_ftn84" title= =3D"">[84]</a> Most negotiations take place in the Council of Ministers, that is in committees = and working groups composed exclusively of public servants. Once a compromise h= as been reached, often after long periods of negotiations, national parliament= s or the European Parliament, to all intents and purposes, cannot challenge thes= e compromises. See Working Group ..., 1997. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn85"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn85" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref85" name=3D"_ftn85" title= =3D"">[85]</a> Which has grown far beyond what the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam allow fo= r. For instan=ADce, the Council of Ministers ought to consist of only two coun= cils; in fact, there are around 20. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn86"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn86" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref86" name=3D"_ftn86" title= =3D"">[86]</a> For a careful analysis of this topic, see Zielinski, 1995, pp. 30-43. Kant spok= e of the constitutional republic ("republikanische Staatsverfassung"), which comes close to what we call democracy nowadays (ibid. p. 35). <o:p></= o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn87"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn87" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref87" name=3D"_ftn87" title= =3D"">[87]</a> Kant (1947, p. 13) argues that the citizens would have to decide to bring the distress of war upon themselves: to fight themselves, to bear direct costs = of war as well as the costs of mending the war da=ADmages, the payment of war = debts. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn88"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn88" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref88" name=3D"_ftn88" title= =3D"">[88]</a> Dahrendorf, 1995, p. 29.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn89"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn89" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref89" name=3D"_ftn89" title= =3D"">[89]</a> One might add political participation, an area where the EU certainly does not excel. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn90"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn90" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref90" name=3D"_ftn90" title= =3D"">[90]</a> Cramon Daiber, 1994, p. 67. die bisherig= e Legitimation ... materieller Wohlstandsgewinn f=FCr alle .. bereits jetzt n= icht mehr tragf=E4hig <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn91"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn91" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref91" name=3D"_ftn91" title= =3D"">[91]</a> Cf. Arnold, 1993, pp. 55-56: The EEC was not established in order to overcome economic difficul=ADties. Very much to the contrary, the prosperous economi= c development of those years was to be made fruitful for the politically motivated integration process of Western Europe.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn92"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn92" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref92" name=3D"_ftn92" title= =3D"">[92]</a> Ironically, "one of the main objectives of the Treaty of Paris had been precisely to avoid the reappea=ADrance of such a cartel." (Tsoukalis, 1993, p. 42). Cartels had existed before the war.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn93"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn93" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref93" name=3D"_ftn93" title= =3D"">[93]</a> Subsidies for coal mining in Germany, for example, were in the order of 80000 DM per person em=ADployed in 1994 (15th Report on Subsidies of the Federal Governm= ent; German economic research insti=ADtutes; according to Nahrendorf, 1996). <o:= p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn94"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn94" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref94" name=3D"_ftn94" title= =3D"">[94]</a> These costs amounted to 142.2 billion dollars for the EU (OECD data, Economist, J= une 5th, 1999, p. 123), i.e. 380 dollars per capita. Quite a sacrifi= ce for a family of, say five members. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn95"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn95" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref95" name=3D"_ftn95" title= =3D"">[95]</a> Arnold (1993, p. 63) goes as far as to say: "The economy of the EC becomes largely stateless".<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn96"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn96" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref96" name=3D"_ftn96" title= =3D"">[96]</a> Walker, 1994, p. 87.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn97"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn97" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref97" name=3D"_ftn97" title= =3D"">[97]</a> This need not mean much, however, in terms of consumer welfare and development (Olson, 1987, p. 243): 1. In separate studies Kreinin and Truman found that the formation of the Europea= n Community added 2 per cent or less to its members manufacturing consumption= . 2. Bela Balassa found that the creation of the Common Market led to only 0.3 p= er cent increase in the ratio of the annual increment of trade to that of GNP.= 3. "Many economists have estimated or concluded that the degree of protection is not of overwhelming importance for the level of development or the rate = of growth of a country. ... (They) also regard changes in the degree of protec= tion as relatively unimportant in comparison with the size of the welfare state,= or the quality of monetary and fiscal policy, in explaining economic perfor=AD= mance." <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn98"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn98" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref98" name=3D"_ftn98" title= =3D"">[98]</a> The EC was not unsympathetic to such processes of concentration. Viscount Davig= non, the EC Commissioner for industrial affairs, promoted the "corporate search for extensive networks" and the creation of the Round Table of European Industrialists, "which has acted both as a powerful lobby be=ADhind the scenes and a means of promoting closer ti= es and co-operation among the heads of some of the largest firms. Such moves were arguably not unrelated to the wave of mergers, acquisitions, and co-ope=ADr= ation agreements across national borders ..." (Tsoukalis, 1993, pp. 50, 51)<o:p><= /o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn99"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn99" href=3D"htt= ps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref99" name=3D"_ftn99" title= =3D"">[99]</a> Martin Wolf, Financial Times, Sept. 1, 1999, p. 12; based on the latest edition of the Human Deve=ADlopment Rep= ort (UNDP). The fact that some of these countries are members of the EU does no= t invali=ADdate the argument. It would, if the larger EU-members were at leas= t as well off as the smaller ones (which they are not). The question remains: Wh= y are smaller countries generally able to generate higher incomes than the la= rger ones? <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn100"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn100" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref100" name=3D"_ftn100" tit= le=3D"">[100]</a> The data for the period 1960-73 include the 6 countries, which joined the EEC/E= C during the 1970s and 1980s. The underperformance of the EEC is not due to inclusio= n of these countries. With the exception of the U.K. their performance in terms = of GDP, investment and employment growth was nor=ADmally better (in some cases considerably better) than that of the original 6 countries. <o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn101"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn101" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref101" name=3D"_ftn101" tit= le=3D"">[101]</a> Southey, 1995. In 1994 almost 50 per cent of the unemployed of the EC-12 had been without work for more than one year. About 22 per cent of the 15-24 year-ol= ds were unemployed. (ibid.).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn102"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn102" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref102" name=3D"_ftn102" tit= le=3D"">[102]</a> According to Eurostat in September 1999 there were 12,8 million unemployed in the EU. This re=ADpresents 10 per cent of the workforce. These figures disguise eno= rmous differences between regions and age groups. Unem=ADployment runs between 25= and 30 per cent in some southern regions in Spain in Italy. In Eastern Germany = it now stands at more than 18 per cent. Youth unemployment is 24 and 33 per ce= nt in France, Spain and Italy. (Barber, 1999).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn103"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn103" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref103" name=3D"_ftn103" tit= le=3D"">[103]</a> Marglin/Schor, 1991. The relative stability of Cold-War international order (and of the EEC/EC, as it was an outgrowth and an integral part of that ord= er) can be considered a necessary condition for the successful economic develop= ment of Western Europe and elsewhere (see the section "The First Eu=ADrope" above). The post-war boom no doubt contributed its share to the stability o= f that order. What has been analysed in this section is whether European integration as such improved economic performance, so to speak, above the t= rend of the times. And there the answer tends to be in the negative.<o:p></o:p><= /span> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn104"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn104" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref104" name=3D"_ftn104" tit= le=3D"">[104]</a> "Even if anyhow France has to adjust its economy to international competition, Eu= rope is an easy scapegoat." (Moreau Defarges, 1995, p. 3).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn105"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn105" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref105" name=3D"_ftn105" tit= le=3D"">[105]</a> Quotations in this section are taken from Tsoukalis, 1993, p. 115 passim. The final po= int coincides with a central argument of Arnold, 1993. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn106"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn106" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref106" name=3D"_ftn106" tit= le=3D"">[106]</a> For the period 2000-06 the so-called Structural Fund will amount to Euro 195 billion (152 billion for 1994-99). To this Euro 18 billion of the Cohesion = Fund should be added. The member countries are required to co-finance the projec= ts (normally 50%).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn107"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn107" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref107" name=3D"_ftn107" tit= le=3D"">[107]</a> After the Portuguese revolution, the death of Franco and political turmoil in Gre= ece, the unity of the Western Alliance was menaced. To retain these countries fi= rmly integrated into the West was the political payoff of their admission to the European Union and of the costs of their integration. <o:p></o:p></p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn108"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn108" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref108" name=3D"_ftn108" tit= le=3D"">[108]</a> In the US 30-40 percent of the cyclical variations of regional incomes are compensated for by the federal government (Sachs/Salas-i-Martin, 1992; see also: Bayoumi/Masson, 1996). In Canada, 8 per=ADcent of the federal budget = goes to needy provinces (MacCullum, 1997). In Germany (Geske, 1999, p. 488) the financial transfer system (Finanzausgleich) alone moved DM 56,8 billion in = 1998 (3% of GDP); to this the amounts transferred by other systems would have to= be added. <o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn109"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn109" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref109" name=3D"_ftn109" tit= le=3D"">[109]</a> The total EU-budget is limited to 1,28% of the GDP of the member countries. The share of the Structural and the Cohesion Fund in the EU-budget is approx. 3= 1%, or 0,4% of the EU-GDP. Only part of these funds are actually net transfers = to certain member countries. Most of the money takes a round trip through Brussels.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn110"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn110" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref110" name=3D"_ftn110" tit= le=3D"">[110]</a> See, for example, Belke/Gros, 1998; Eatwell, 1994.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn111"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn111" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref111" name=3D"_ftn111" tit= le=3D"">[111]</a> EC regional policy has reduced notably the ability of member governments to pu= rsue their own re=ADgional policies and obliged them to modify and to discontinu= e existing programs. (Engel, 1995, p. 16.).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn112"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn112" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref112" name=3D"_ftn112" tit= le=3D"">[112]</a> Working Group ..., 1997b; Kamppeter, 1997.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn113"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn113" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref113" name=3D"_ftn113" tit= le=3D"">[113]</a> Olson, 1987, p. 244.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn114"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn114" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref114" name=3D"_ftn114" tit= le=3D"">[114]</a> Possibly, together with the smaller costs of maintain social and political cohesion, = that explains the on average better performance of smaller economies. <o:p></o:p= > </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn115"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn115" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref115" name=3D"_ftn115" tit= le=3D"">[115]</a> Such pressure can even be based on paranoid fears; see DeMause, 1987.<o:p></o:p>= </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn116"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn116" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref116" name=3D"_ftn116" tit= le=3D"">[116]</a> It still remains in the realm of dreams: It is subject to unanimity. The membe= r countries have the greatest difficulties to agree on common positions and a= re extremely reluctant to give real competencies to Mr Solana. <o:p></o:p></sp= an> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn117"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn117" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref117" name=3D"_ftn117" tit= le=3D"">[117]</a> See for instance, Weizs=E4cker, 1999.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn118"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn118" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref118" name=3D"_ftn118" tit= le=3D"">[118]</a> Justi, 1758, is an early book on balance of power theory =96 with some very decisi= ve, even modern criticisms of it. "The teaching of the balance of power among the free powers has caused enough blood=ADshed, misery and misfortune in Eu= rope. Too often it has been used as a pretext for unnecessary wars. It has render= ed millions of human beings to the slaughterhouse, and many more millions driv= en into ex=ADtreme poverty and wantonness" "Das Lehrgeb=E4ude des Gleichgewichts unter den freyen M=E4ch= ten hat genug Blutvergie=DFen, Elend und Ungl=FCck in Europa angerichtet. Es is= t genug der Deckmantel zu unn=F6tigen Kriegen gewesen, die Millionen Menschen auf d= ie Schlachtbank geliefert, und weit mehr Millionen andre in die =E4u=DFerste A= rmuth und D=FCrftigkeit versetzet haben." (Vorbericht, p. 3; translation WK).<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn119"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn119" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref119" name=3D"_ftn119" tit= le=3D"">[119]</a> Kohr,1957, p. 27; see particularly, chapter 2.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn120"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn120" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref120" name=3D"_ftn120" tit= le=3D"">[120]</a> = Furthermore, the internal basis of the hegemonic power erodes in time. See Huntington, 1= 997.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn121"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn121" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref121" name=3D"_ftn121" tit= le=3D"">[121]</a> Because the member countries of the EU find it very difficult to agree on common positions. Fur=ADthermore they are extremely reluctant to delegate real competencies for foreign policy and security mat=ADters to the EU, and to concentrate these competencies in one pair of hands.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn122"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn122" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref122" name=3D"_ftn122" tit= le=3D"">[122]</a> On the other hand, a society can be stabilised internally, either because inte= rnal conflicts are pro=ADjected onto the external enemy or because the conflicti= ng parties dampen their demands and behaviour in order not to weaken their cou= ntry =96 or are forced to do so by the government.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn123"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn123" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref123" name=3D"_ftn123" tit= le=3D"">[123]</a> Cf. Hirschman, 1982. See also the last sentence of the quotation of Justi in th= e final footnote.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D"mso-element:footnote" id=3D"ftn124"> <a style=3D"mso-footnote-id:ftn124" href=3D"ht= tps://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/00730.htm#_ftnref124" name=3D"_ftn124" tit= le=3D"">[124]</a> Justi (1758, pp. 90/91) explains this wonderfully: Some members of a people cross= the mountains or a large stream. They meet people unknown to them. "If they find that these unknown people do not cause them any harm, their fears will disappear and they will socialise among themselves. It is therefore fear an= d the drive to socialise what the peoples are inclined to in their natural st= ate; by no means it is their enmity. ... As long as two peoples do not offend ea= ch other in the basic principle of their own inte=ADrest and their own happine= ss, the drive to socialise will not be hindered. ... However, when one nation becomes an obstacle or causes damage to the other's proper interest, then a fountain of enmity and war is struck. Such an occasion will present itself = all too often in the interchange and in the deeds of the peoples, particularly = with respect to commerce." Which is also a belated comment on the peace-genera= =ADting qualities of economic interdependence. (einige Mitglieder eines Volkes =FCberqueren die Berge oder einen gro=DFen Strom un= d treffen auf ein ihnen unbekanntes Volk) "Finden sie, da=DF ihnen dieses unbekannte Volk nichts B=F6ses zuf=FCget; so wird die Furcht verschwinden, = und sie werden sich gesellschaftlich zueinander thun. Die Furcht und der Trieb zur Gesellschaft ist also dasjenige, worzu die V=F6lker in ihrem nat=FCrlichen = Zustande geneigt sind; keinesweges aber zur Feindschaft, .... So lange also zwey V= =F6lker einander in dem Hauptgrundsatze des eignen Interesse und der eigenen Gl=FCckseligkeit nicht beleidigen; so wird dem Triebe der Gesellschaft kein= Abbruch geschehen. ... So bald aber eine Nation der andern in ihrem eignen Interess= e hinderlich und sch=E4dlich f=E4llt; / so ist die Quelle der Feindschaft und= der Kriege vorhanden; und diese Gelegenheit mu=DF sich bey dem Umgange und Hand= lungen der V=F6lker, und inbesonderheit in Ansehung der Commercien (!) nur gar zu = oft erreignen."<o:p></o:p> </div> </div> </body></html> ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_oben.gif R0lGODlhoAAPAMQAABBAcCBNeaCzxjBZg/Dz9sDN2eDm7GCAoNDZ43CNqZCmvLDA0FBzloCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAACgAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+cCzPZfOQj2A+DWQ/QAPDJLiVCsacY+k4AZ89SBEA AeREj8Lo+WjamEsqbUyuMovMQeCBaEISWdF3wDA8BiZkQuSwB7ACYHglPAAOCw97EGt2g4sEBAci AAcEXl1gYmWbNDYlAwhcCiNfKwAKXAh/WFEpPCRWOiRFfwBFXAJ/P1xunL4shmBpkw4NCb2LmSoO CQ0OmhDCDo4jYKsjAQ7XJMUNB47ZwtC/5CqeIwZaJAOvpRAMD5IkNtsQCAiAYE5RVuoG+AgIjCCA D8UXZeUSpjgnAg0JRLq6LHuwgNuDURBeqdA44gAPJjYkoVLERyJDhShTv6pcybKly5cwUzrgwkUL AwI1xex6EOlEACRPCAzBQlMdDlEkQhn4ZIeLATw7gSCLuekkxFl3fEh8F6/EzFYQ2MniiIJjHAio ZmKUsnUEAConqZY7eXHHqC8BbhKoVyRPEpr7DCGSNFMSnKFnozGBS7Ot3DIn73lNpPXYVFJZSaRj tULJs4GNqRRYyoeZSSOP56KuAukAgAGIZLlLgWiBmkoExJDdV2KBQLcEtACwEyibw4OLU6cMR2ZJ PZVMlIcAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA---- Content-Type: text/css Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: cid:css-aeb96236-2f1c-4264-9395-dc79767523cc@mhtml.blink @charset "windows-1252"; @font-face { font-family: Helvetica; } @font-face { font-family: Tahoma; } @font-face { font-family: "Frutiger 45 Light"; } @font-face { font-family: Swiss; } p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-s= ize: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } h1 { margin: 9pt 0cm 12pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-aft= er: avoid; font-size: 14pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } h2 { margin: 18pt 0cm 12pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-af= ter: avoid; font-size: 14pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; text-decoratio= n: underline; } h3 { margin: 12pt 0cm; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-after: = avoid; font-size: 14pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } h4 { margin: 12pt 0cm; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-after: = avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-variant: small= -caps; } h5 { margin: 12pt 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; brea= k-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-varia= nt: small-caps; font-weight: normal; } h6 { margin: 5pt 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break= -after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style:= italic; } p.MsoHeading7, li.MsoHeading7, div.MsoHeading7 { margin: 5pt 0cm 0.0001pt; = text-align: center; line-height: 22pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt;= font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; } p.MsoHeading8, li.MsoHeading8, div.MsoHeading8 { margin: 12pt 0cm 3pt; font= -size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; } p.MsoHeading9, li.MsoHeading9, div.MsoHeading9 { margin: 12pt 0cm 3pt; font= -size: 9pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; font-style: = italic; } p.MsoToc1, li.MsoToc1, div.MsoToc1 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 1= 2pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;= } p.MsoToc2, li.MsoToc2, div.MsoToc2 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt 12pt; font-si= ze: 11pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; } p.MsoToc3, li.MsoToc3, div.MsoToc3 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 24pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc4, li.MsoToc4, div.MsoToc4 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 36pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc5, li.MsoToc5, div.MsoToc5 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 48pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc6, li.MsoToc6, div.MsoToc6 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 60pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc7, li.MsoToc7, div.MsoToc7 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 72pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc8, li.MsoToc8, div.MsoToc8 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 84pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoToc9, li.MsoToc9, div.MsoToc9 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 96pt; font-si= ze: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoFootnoteText, li.MsoFootnoteText, div.MsoFootnoteText { margin: 0cm 0c= m 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; font-size: 11pt; font-family: "Times New R= oman"; } p.MsoHeader, li.MsoHeader, div.MsoHeader { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-s= ize: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoFooter, li.MsoFooter, div.MsoFooter { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; font-s= ize: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.MsoTof, li.MsoTof, div.MsoTof { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt 24pt; text-inden= t: -24pt; line-height: 13pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Helvetica; } span.MsoFootnoteReference { } span.MsoPageNumber { } span.MsoEndnoteReference { vertical-align: super; } p.MsoToaHeading, li.MsoToaHeading, div.MsoToaHeading { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.00= 01pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; } p.MsoBodyText, li.MsoBodyText, div.MsoBodyText { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; = text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Time= s New Roman"; } p.MsoSubtitle, li.MsoSubtitle, div.MsoSubtitle { margin: 6pt 0cm 3pt; text-= align: center; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L1, li.L1, div.L1 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 14.2pt; text-align: justify;= text-indent: -14.2pt; line-height: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Ti= mes New Roman"; } p.L2, li.L2, div.L2 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt 28.4pt; text-indent: -14.2pt= ; line-height: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L3, li.L3, div.L3 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 68.05pt; text-indent: -22.7p= t; line-height: 17pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L4, li.L4, div.L4 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 90.7pt; text-indent: -22.7pt= ; line-height: 17pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.L5, li.L5, div.L5 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 4cm; text-indent: -22.7pt; l= ine-height: 14pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.LB, li.LB, div.LB { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 11.35pt; text-align: justify= ; text-indent: -11.35pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.LL, li.LL, div.LL { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 5cm; text-indent: -5cm; font= -size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.S1, li.S1, div.S1 { margin: 9pt 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-he= ight: 13.3pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New = Roman"; } p.S2, li.S2, div.S2 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: center; line-he= ight: 13pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Ro= man"; font-weight: bold; } p.S3, li.S3, div.S3 { margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt; text-align: center; line-height= : 10pt; break-after: avoid; font-size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"= ; } span.standardcharacter { } p.W1, li.W1, div.W1 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; text-i= ndent: 14.2pt; line-height: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New = Roman"; } p.W2, li.W2, div.W2 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; line-h= eight: 18pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.W3, li.W3, div.W3 { margin: 6pt 0cm 6pt 1cm; text-align: justify; font-si= ze: 11pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.W5, li.W5, div.W5 { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 17pt; text-indent: -17pt; li= ne-height: 10pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.WF, li.WF, div.WF { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; line-height: 17pt; font-siz= e: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-weight: bold; } p.WK, li.WK, div.WK { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; line-height: 17pt; font-siz= e: 12pt; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-style: italic; } p.WV, li.WV, div.WV { margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt 42.55pt; font-size: 12pt; fo= nt-family: "Times New Roman"; } p.DocumentMap, li.DocumentMap, div.DocumentMap { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001pt; = background: navy; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Tahoma; } p.DocumentMap2, li.DocumentMap2, div.DocumentMap2 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001p= t; background: navy; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Tahoma; } p.DocumentMap1, li.DocumentMap1, div.DocumentMap1 { margin: 6pt 0cm 0.0001p= t; background: navy; font-size: 12pt; font-family: Tahoma; } @page { } @page Section1 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 1cm 42.5pt 2cm 42.55pt; } div.Section1 { page: Section1; } @page Section2 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 68.05pt 70.9pt 2cm 3cm; } div.Section2 { page: Section2; } @page Section3 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 68.05pt 70.9pt 2cm; } div.Section3 { page: Section3; } @page Section4 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 42.55pt 2cm 59.55pt; } div.Section4 { page: Section4; } @page Section5 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 42.55pt 2cm 59.55pt; } div.Section5 { page: Section5; } @page Section6 { size: 21cm 842pt; margin: 2cm 2cm 2cm 70.9pt; } div.Section6 { page: Section6; } ol { margin-bottom: 0cm; } ul { margin-bottom: 0cm; } ------MultipartBoundary--Ui3LhLpPuZiRKIlZT36oda7q2IlEHtMzdYGKcoZkKA------