Morocco / Michael Field. - [Electronic ed.]. - Bonn, 2000. - 20 S. =3D 58 Kb, Text . - (FES-Analyse) Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001 =A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung

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FES

Morocco / Michael Field. - [Electronic ed.]. - Bonn, 2000. - 20 S. =3D 58 Kb, Text . - (FES-Analyse)
Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

=3D"INHALT"

[Essentials]

King Mohammad VI, who succeeded to the throne in July last ye= ar, has adopted a style of rule very different from his father=92s. He is = emphasising the need to help the poor and underprivileged in society. He i= s arousing great expectations among his people.
There have already been substantial changes in policy. = The long serving Interior Minister, Driss Basri, has been fired, and the go= vernment appears more willing to resolve the conflict over the Western Saha= ra. The improvement in human rights, which began in the mid-1990s, has bee= n continued. Opponents of the monarchy have been allowed to return from ex= ile.
There is much talk of "administrative reform" and "elimi= nating corruption", but little tangible progress in these areas so far. The= re are not likely to be more formal constitutional reforms. Much was chang= ed in the later years of Hassan II. What is needed now is for the democrat= ic process to be allowed to operate. The politicians and parliament have t= o show themselves to be effective if they are to earn public respect. The = King has to allow some of his own enormous powers over the day to day runni= ng of the country gradually to be transferred to the government and parliam= ent.
Much was done to modernise the economy in the 1980s and = 1990s - though structural reform remains incomplete. The changes so far ha= ve produced strong growth in a few small areas but overall GDP growth rates= remain low - around 2/2.5 per cent. Flows of foreign investment are disapp= ointing - companies are put off by bureaucracy and corruption, and they do = not find officials very welcoming. The price of land is high. Capital tra= nsactions are complicated by exchange controls.
The economy remains dependant on agriculture. Big annua= l variations in the cereals harvest affect confidence throughout the countr= y and determine the rate of GDP growth. The state=92s debt is equivalent to= 91 per cent of GDP. It is actively managed and is steadily being reduced,= but it still constrains spending on infrastructure and education.
The government hopes that growth will be increased to 6 = per cent a year by the restructuring and investment that will be forced on = Moroccan industry by the removal of protective tariff barriers. This is du= e to begin in March this year, when the new Treaty of Association with the = EU comes into force.
Further stimulus should come from the continuation and e= xtension of the privatisation programme. In the long term the government a= nd the World Bank agree that the country has to improve its education syste= m.

King Mohammad VI

From the day he succeeded his father at the end of July last year, the n= ew Moroccan monarch, Mohammad VI, has given a different tone to his rule. = His father, Hassan II, who had come to the throne in 1961, was able, farsig= hted and lucky, but he lived in some isolation from his people. He was unf= orgiving to his enemies and he was much attached to his privileges and prer= ogatives as king.

King Mohammad, who is 36 but looks younger, is seeking to win legiti= macy by being close to his people, particularly the poor and underprivilege= d. In a speech in August he declared: "We Mohammad VI succeed (our father)= to be at your service, dear people, and at the service of Morocco." He re= ferred to the improved human rights his people had enjoyed during (the late= r part of) his father=92s reign - this being significant as a statement of = his own intentions - and he went on to say that he wanted all his people to= have lives that were dignified and decent. He stressed the need to improve the lot of the very poor in the countryside, the unemployed, wo= men and the disabled. He did not posses a "magic wand" with which to s= weep away these people=92s problems, he said, but he would confront them ho= nestly. In this respect it was essential that Morocco should improve its e= ducation system.

The King has backed his words with encouraging and much reported ges= tures. Within weeks of his accession he made a visit to the Rif, a wild mo= untainous area in the north of the country, which was utterly neglected by = his father after it rose in rebellion in the late 1950s when Hassan, then c= rown prince, was its governor. In recent years the Rif has been famous for= its cultivation of hashish, which gives the country some $2bn of exports a= year. It has suffered from a lack of government infrastructure spending o= r effective policing. The last is a most striking feature, because other r= egions are very thoroughly policed, with check points on all the main roads= .

In his visits to towns and villages the King has gone out of his way= to meet the poor. He has been photographed kissing handicapped children. = He has paid surprise visits to hospitals - and in one well publicised case= found the management entirely absent. In a more elevated social milieu he= surprised his entourage by insisting on paying a restaurant bill in the fa= mous Mamounia Hotel in Marrakesh. The gesture was intended as a message to= senior government officials that in future they should not stay and dine a= t smart hotels and have the bills sent to be paid by their ministries. =20

Inevitably the young King has aroused great expectations. When he r= eturns to his palace on the outskirts of Rabat in the evenings he finds cro= wds waiting to hand him petitions listing grievances and requests for help.= The sense of expectation is increased, to some extent, by Moroc= co having a new government. This is a socialist/nationalist coaliti= on of parties, led by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires and the Is= tiqlal, which from the 1960s until the spring of 1998 were in opposi= tion. The government, appointed in March 1998, did not achieve much during= its first 16 months in power - in fact its performance was regarded as slightly disappointing. But if from now on it finds itse= lf working with a king who has partly similar reforming ideas, it may becom= e more effective.

Policy Changes: Western Sahara, Human Rights

The King has already made some changes of substance as well as style.= In November he sacked Driss Basri, who had served as his father=92= s Interior Minister since 1973. Basri had been extremely powerful. King H= assan had depended on him. In the 1990s it had become possible = for the press and politicians to criticise Basri - they could never critici= se the King - and since the middle of the decade he had begun to lose a lit= tle of his power. He surrendered the Information portfolio in 1995 and whe= n the new government was formed in 1998 he lost Rural and Urban Affairs. B= ut he remained responsible for Morocco=92s policy in the Western Sahara, he= controlled the police and internal intelligence and he appointed the provi= ncial governors. He was shrewd, often charming and efficient - he got thin= gs done - and he gave the country a degree of political stability it lacked= in the early years of King Hassan=92s reign. What he created, however, wa= s a typical Middle Eastern "security state" in which the police assumed a r= =F4le which went far beyond what was necessary for ordinary criminal invest= igations and the maintenance of public order. People deemed to represent a= threat to the government or to be disloyal - who in recent years had not i= ncluded members of the opposition parties - were pursued with cruel vindict= iveness. The over-regulation of society bred corruption. Basri=92s sac= king was greeted with enthusiasm by the press and people.

With the departure of Basri has gone a change in the government= =92s policy on the Western Sahara. This long stretch of territory on t= he Atlantic coast was occupied by Morocco in stages, in 1975 and 1979. An = independence movement, led by the Polisario Front and backed by Algeria, ha= s been contained, and since a cease-fire in 1991 both sides have agreed the= re should be a referendum on the territory=92s future, supervised by the Un= ited Nations. Most of the last nine years has been spent in arguments over= who should be entitled to vote. This involves deciding which parts of the= population are real Sahraouis and which have been sent in by the Moroccans= . Similarly there are arguments over which tribes living in Morocco, Mali = and Mauritania left the territory during the war, and are therefore entitle= d to a vote, and which were never there in the first place. Under Basri= , the Moroccan government gave the appearance of being helpful, whil= e it carefully frustrated or delayed every UN initiative.= =20

In the last year it seems that all parties, including the = Algerians, have been coming to accept that a referendum may not be t= he ideal solution, in that its result would be unlikely to be accept= ed by the losing side. The Moroccans have been shifting their think= ing towards a formula which would give them sovereignty and the Sahraouis s= elf government. Since the removal of Basri discussions on th= ese lines have become more open, and the government has been trying to = some degree to win the hearts and minds of the Sahraouis, rather = than just intimidating them. At the same time, by coincidence, the = Franco-German satellite television station, ARTE, which can easily be recei= ved in Morocco, last November broadcast a programme on the Sa= hara. For many Moroccans this was a revelation. They had not <= b>been told before that the Sahraouis did not welcome their occupation. Th= e programme made a big impact. =20

The King has moved to improve human rights - though here there we= re important improvements in the last five years of his father=92s r= eign. In 1994 the Ministry of the Interior released most of the country=92= s political prisoners. This was partly a mark of the regime= =92s increasing self-confidence and sense that it was accepted by most of t= he population, and partly a response to embarrassing international c= riticism of its behaviour. Many of those released were people who had = been involved in two coup attempts, involving attacks on the King=92s aircr= aft and then on his birthday party, in 1972 and 1973. The conspirators had= been held in prison in a place called Tazmamart, at the extreme eastern en= d of the High Atlas, close to where the mountains merge into the Sahara des= ert. Tazmamart is not marked on any map and until the late 1980s even its = name was unknown. The prisoners there were kept in solitary confinement wi= thout light, medical treatment or any means of communicating their whereabo= uts to their families. Half of those arrested in 1973 died and several wen= t mad. With them in Tazmamart and other jails were various students, journ= alists and academics who in the 1970s and 1980s had done no more then criti= cise the r=E9gime, particularly the King, and sensitive areas of government= policy. After these people were released, and given government stipends o= f a few hundred dollars a month, those left in prison were a few Islamist a= gitators, arrested recently, and some supporters of Polisario. Soon after = the releases the government allowed back into the country some elderly poli= ticians who had been in exile. It also created a Ministry of Human Rights = and a Tribunal Administratif, to judge disputes between citizens and the au= thorities.

Some attempt was made to educate the police about human rights an= d stop them using torture. A journalist who had written article= s on human rights found himself invited by the police to address officers o= n this subject. He told them that it was not necessary to beat up suspects= when arresting them and that police in other countries obtained informatio= n by investigation. He was struck by the rather simplistic response of som= e in his audience. Their view was that if prisoners were not guilty the po= lice would not be arresting them, and that if they were not going to be bea= ten up the arrests would be pointless. In 1996 and 1997 there was some "ba= cksliding" on human rights. There were more frequent reports of torture an= d deaths in police custody. This was in spite of instruction on human righ= ts being included in police training.

In February 1999 there was an extraordinary episode which stemmed fr= om the Interior Ministry=92s decision to ban a meeting of unemployed gradua= tes, including a large delegation of blind graduates, in Agdal, a suburb of= Rabat. When the graduates decided to ignore the ban and march to one of t= he ministries to demand government help in finding jobs, the police violent= ly broke up the demonstration. In the same month, however, the government = allowed a conference on Human Rights in the Arab World to be held in Rabat,= and it was planned that Amnesty International would hold its annual meetin= g there - the first meeting it would ever have held in Africa. The meeting= never took place, because the Ministry of the Interior saw a draft of Amne= sty=92s annual report, containing criticisms (as well as praise) of Morocco= =92s record on political prisoners and women=92s issues. It asked the orga= nisation to go elsewhere. The meeting was eventually held in Lisbon.

What was striking was the open debate in Morocco over these issues a= nd the very loud protests that greeted the attack on the graduates=92 march= in February. The press carried quite personal attacks on Driss Basri and = the Prime Minister. Moroccan society as a whole has become much = more prepared to complain about the police - and about corruption in= the police and other parts of the bureaucracy. Whereas a few y= ears ago it was accepted that to get minor officials to perform their dutie= s, or deter traffic police from over-zealous harassment of drivers, little = bribes had to be paid, there are now many Moroccans who are prepared to arg= ue with officials. They demand fair treatment and professional performance= of the officials=92 duties.

The changes initiated by the new King, therefore, do not m= ark a complete reversal of government policy. They are rathe= r an advance of policies which were already being put into effect in a tent= ative fashion. The most important new step, in September, was the King= giving permission for the return of Ibrahim Serfati, a famous, outspoken c= ritic of the monarchy in the 1970s. Serfati had been imprisoned and then e= xiled on his release in 1991. In November the King allowed the return of t= he family of Mehdi Ben Barka, a radical politician who had disappeared in P= aris in 1966. He was found by a French court to have been kidnapped and mu= rdered by Moroccan agents. It is now understood that the government will t= ell the families of others who "disappeared" or died in prison in the 1960s= , =9270s and =9280s exactly what happened to their relations. Compensation= will be paid.

It was difficult for the government to do this while King Hassan was= alive because many of the disappeared and exiles such as Serfati had attac= ked the King personally and had been, or still were, committed to overthrow= ing him. Under a new King, who was a child when most of the arrests and ki= llings took place, a line can be drawn under the events of the past. It= is acknowledged by both the government and the families of victims that th= e period of confrontation in Moroccan politics is finished, t= hat there is consensus, more or less, on the type of government the Kingdom= should have, and that society can discuss the events of the early p= art of King Hassan=92s reign with a degree of detachment. The governme= nt is determined that there should be no campaign for those responsible for= past abuses, including Basri, to be put on trial. The official line is th= at their actions were a response to different circumstances in a different = era.

Reforming the Bureaucracy

The freer atmosphere of the last six years, and of the period since J= uly 1999 in particular, has seen more open public debate of a= ll sorts of issues and the emergence of "civil society". Many new a= ssociations and societies have been established. Morocco now has ab= out 17,000 non-governmental organisations - NGOs. Many are char= ities concerned with poverty and illness. A body that has made quite a big= impact recently is AFAK, which is headed by a former minister of health. = The organisation devotes itself to teaching people about the benefits of hy= giene and a clean environment - something which Morocco notably lacks. It = arranges school visits and has organised teams to clean beaches.

Both the individuals and the government are campaigning against corr= uption, which has been ingrained in the bureaucracy from the top to the bot= tom. Corruption has become a fashionable topic for discussion. The govern= ment hopes this will create a movement against the vice. It might make peo= ple who are asking for bribes more embarrassed about what they are doing an= d the rest of society more aware if its rights so that it refuses to pay. = One of the independent bodies that has emerged is an institution called Tra= nsparency Maroc, a branch of Transparency International, which has fighting= corruption as its sole aim. Each year it holds a "day free of corruption"= .

The relatively new socialist/nationalist administration of= Abderrahmane Youssoufi, which came to power in March 1998, is trying to build a more human, responsive government machine. Ther= e has been much talk of it "creating a new atmosphere", of "administrative reform" and of the "consolidation of the rule of law" = - but there has been tangible progress in only a few areas. Whe= n it came to power the government found there were thousands of judgements = against its own agencies which had not been executed; it removed whatever o= bstacles had been put in place. There have been improvements in prison con= ditions. There have been some limited initiatives to reduce bureaucracy. = Early in 1999 it was decided that in the ports the customs should check jus= t a proportion of the containers being brought in by each importer, rather = than every one. The change reduced clearance times from more than a week t= o one or two days. Officials said the move illustrated a change in the gov= ernment=92s attitude towards its citizens. Traditionally it worked on the = basis that because some people were dishonest everybody had to be controlle= d; now it is beginning to relate the amount of control to the assumption th= at most people are rea-sonably honest.

The public is very aware of the general change in atmosphere in M= orocco, but it feels the government is not responding fast enough to= its rising expectations. People are not very impressed by the scale of ad= ministrative change under M. Youssoufi. There is likewise a = concern among some of the intelligentsia that the new king may <= b>not contribute as much as they hope to changing the way the country is ru= n. Although he has fired Basri, it is noticed that he has placed his o= ld school friends in positions of power in the government and media. He ha= s given prominence to the army, possibly to counterbalance the Ministry of = the Interior. The suspicion is that he is consolidating his own enormous p= ower rather than letting some of it pass to the government, which is a more= or less democratic institution. It may be that this is only the natural i= nstinct of a young man who has just inherited the throne. If, on the other= hand, it indicates the conventional passion for control of Middle Eastern = rulers it will set a limit on the movement towards the more open government= , serving the people, that the King has said he wants. The creation of a g= overnment that responds to public sentiment, and the reduction of corruptio= n in the bureaucracy, must depend on more power being with ministers and me= mbers of parliament, who can be attacked in the press and who will lose pow= er in a general election if the public does not like their performance.

Political Reform

The feeling among the Moroccan intelligentsia is that it is much more im= portant for the King and his government to change the way the country is ru= n - change the way the government operates at all levels - than to introduc= e further big constitutional reforms.

Morocco saw a number of important political reforms in the last deca= de of King Hassan=92s reign. They began in 1991 when five parliamentary op= position parties - old fashioned, left-wing and nationalist - presented the= King with a petition demanding some moderate constitutional changes. In a= modified form these were put to the people in a referendum and duly approv= ed by virtually 100 per cent of the electorate. They provided that future = governments should reflect the balance of parties in the Chamber of Represe= ntatives, the parliament, and that the prime minister, who would continue t= o be chosen by the King, would have to submit his government=92s programme,= and each annual budget, to votes of confidence. The King was left with th= e right to dismiss a government, but the broad intention of the reform was = to make governments responsible in most matters to the parliament. In futu= re the parliament could not simply be ignored.

In June 1993 an election was held with a new electoral list and the = voting age lowered from 21 to 20. The poll was by no means totally clean, = but it was reckoned to be fairer than previous contests and its outcome ref= lected roughly the true strength of the parties. The biggest blocks of sea= ts, though not an overall majority, were won by two of the opposition parti= es, the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) and the nationalist I= stiqlal. These results applied only to the two thirds of seats that were f= illed by direct voting. Three months later voting took place in the profes= sional associations, trades unions, chambers of commerce and similar bodies= which filled the remaining one third of seats. Here, possibly on the init= iative of Driss Basri rather than the King, there was more active manipulat= ion, and the result was an increase in the small overall majority of the "g= overnment" parties. These "parties" were little more than collections of o= ffice seekers, conservative, loyal and happy to vote as they were told.

In spite of the manipulation, it was accepted in political circles t= hat the USFP had won the right to form the next government - but the King w= ould not offer it the post of Prime Minister, nor the ministries of the Int= erior, Foreign Affairs and Justice. It was offered 29 other less important= ministries, and it refused them. The King was obliged to form a technocra= t government. This lacked moral authority, and it was generally accepted t= hat it was not in keeping with the spirit of the referendum.

In September 1996, therefore, another referendum was held, asking th= e people to approve the removal from the Chamber of Representatives of the = deputies from the professional associations and their installation in a sep= arate upper house, to be called the Chamber of Advisers. The new system, w= hich was approved by a massive majority, provides for the upper house to be= composed of elected members - 60 per cent from the local governments, whic= h have been given greater independence, 20 per cent from the trades unions = and 20 per cent from professional associations. The Chamber is able to del= ay or modify legislation, but not veto it.=20

The first elections under the new system were held in mid-November 1= 997 for the Chamber of Representatives and at the beginning of December for= the Chamber of Advisers. The elections for the lower house, which were th= e important ones, produced three blocks of roughly equal size, representing= left, right and moderates. The left had slightly more seats than the othe= rs and the USFP came out as the biggest single party, among 16 that contest= ed the election. The USFP and its allies claimed they would have done bett= er had not Basri=92s officials tried to rig the vote. After three months o= f discussions, in March 1998 the King appointed the USFP leader, the 73 yea= r old Abderrahmane Youssoufi, Prime Minister, at the head of a seven party = coalition. The King continued his practice of appointing the ministers of = the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Justice, but he allowed the government to= create a new ministry for Defence. Previously the armed forces had report= ed directly to himself as commander-in-chief.

What Morocco has now is a system that is semi-democratic. It has a = parliament which was reasonably fairly elected in 1997 - and may be wholly = fairly elected in future. The parliament and the governing political parti= es carry weight - though in 1998 and 1999 the influence of the government w= as reduced by its parties=92 members being a bit vague about their practica= l policies, as opposed to election slogans, and having rather little idea o= f what they had to do to put their ideas into effect. They were suffering = from having spent 40 years in opposition. Under both Hassan II and Mohamma= d VI, the government has been working with kings who retain very great powe= rs. The present King may in time surrender some of his powers - perhaps by= not directly appointing ministers, or by allowing his family to be treated= as if it comes under the law in Morocco, not above it. He may intervene l= ess in government, once he feels he has established himself securely at its= head. But it is not likely that he will hand over powers through any form= al constitutional act or further parliamentary reform.

From now on, in the words of a Moroccan publisher and academic, t= he development of politics "will be a matter of the normal de= mocratic game starting to function". Bit by bit, assuming the count= ry remains stable, the government and parliament will take some of t= he powers and prerogatives of the King. And if the governments run the cou= ntry effectively they will gradually win legitimacy.

At present the King certainly commands more respect and legitimacy t= han the politicians. This is because ordinary Moroccans traditionally have= seen politicians as corrupt, selfish office seekers of little importance, = and the King as the person they can trust to look after their interests. W= estern commentators, particularly journalists, who criticise the state of d= emocracy in Morocco, find this difficult to understand. Hassan II worked c= arefully at building links with almost every part of the population - the B= erbers (other than the tribes of the Rif), the Jewish community (some 30,00= 0), different Muslim religious sects, the mainstream religious leaders, the= secular minded townspeople, the small, mainly foreign Christian community = - so that everybody felt he represented them. His son will do the same. <= b>The politicians, in contrast, represent mainly the intelligentsia,= which is quite a small body. The present government represents a broader = section of the population which wants to see change - but it is stil= l far from having the legitimacy that the majority party in a Europe= an parliament enjoys. It will be a long time before the average Mor= occan starts to trust politicians, sees them as being relevant to hi= s own concerns and learns to use them to further his own interests.

The Islamists

The idea of Western style, party dominated democracy in Morocco, as i= n other Arab countries, is promoted by the educated middle classes. = It is an imported idea - increasingly popular and for practical pur= poses the best option for political development - but it does not co= me out of Moroccan society itself. If Morocco were to move in some = sudden and unsupervised way to a government which was truly represen= tative of the mass of the people, and therefore wholly democratic, t= hat government would be populist and totalitarian. It might well be Islami= st. This would not be because every Moroccan is deeply religious in= a fundamentalist sense, or because Moroccans are very impressed by = what they have heard, and seen on television, about Islamist governments an= d political movements elsewhere, in Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Iran and = Afghanistan. It would be because the secular political parties do not yet = have clear ideological or social labels which cause people to associ= ate themselves with them, whereas everybody knows about Islam. Many= voters would be inclined to think that a vote for an Islamic party would b= e morally safe and responsible.

There is some debate among the Moroccan intelligentsia and in press = and government circles about how strong is the Islamist movement = in the country. The debate is somewhat academic because at present = the major part of the movement is illegal and operates outside the c= ountry=92s normal political life. There is a moderate Islamist party, = the Mouvement Populaire et Democratique, which has twelve seats in the parl= iament and is seen by the monarchy as a safety valve for militant sentiment= . More important is the Justice and Charity movement, Al-Adl wal Ishan, wh= ich is headed by Cheikh Abdesalem Yassine. This organisation was banned in= 1990 and for most of the time since the Cheikh has been under house arrest= . Its leaders say they would be prepared to take part in parliamentary pol= itics, but only if the parliament were given real power. This is a way of = saying that they would want to participate in politics only if it became wh= olly democratic, possibly giving them the opportunity of Islamising governm= ent and society. They make no secret of their opposition to the monarchy i= n its present form.

Justice and Charity is active in the universities. The students=92 = unions swing between being dominated by the Islamists and the leftists. Be= tween a quarter and a third of students have taken to wearing Islamic dress= , though as in other Arab countries, some may have adopted the uniform out = of a desire to conform to the fashion or avoid criticism by the more aggres= sive militants, rather than out of real conviction. There is certainly muc= h less commitment to Islamism than there was to Gamal Abdel-Nasser=92s repu= blicanism and Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time it was= difficult to find a single student in any Arab university who was not repu= blican.

Outside the universities, in the poorer parts of the towns, where th= ere is very high unemployment, the Islamists seem to have less presence tha= n one might expect. There are certainly some people in these quarters who = dress in an Islamist fashion, but they are outnumbered by young men in bagg= y jeans and girls in tight jeans and T-shirts. =20

There are several forces in Morocco that militate against the spread= of radical Islam. One is that the monarch associates himself with the rel= igious establishment and initiates all the big Islamic feasts. He has the = title "Commander of the Faithful". Another is that the development of civi= l society, and particularly the growth of women=92s organisations is highli= ghting the shortcomings of Islamist ideas. And at a more popular level the= re are pockets of cultural resistance to the austere, orthodox, unitarian i= deas of the militants. From the time of the Arab invasion in the seventh c= entury Islam in Morocco - and to a lesser extent in the other Maghreb count= ries, Algeria and Tunisia - has been mixed with the remnants of earlier rel= igious beliefs, and with local traditions and superstitions. People visit = their dead relations in the cemeteries. They pray in the shrines of dead s= aints,=20

known as marabouts. These are small, domed, white buildings,= which are a very attractive feature of the Moroccan countryside.

In several places there are local holy men who will say payers and i= n some cases perform sacrifices for visitors. The latter practice, which s= upports thriving local markets for sacrificial animals and birds, and for t= heir meat and skins, is wholly outside proper Islamic doctrine. An orthodo= x Muslim should make a sacrifice just once a year, at the time of the Eid a= l Adha, the feast that accompanies the pilgrimage to Mecca. A particularly= bizarre cult is found in the ruined cemetery of members of the fourteenth = century Merinid dynasty in Rabat. Here, in a beautiful wild garden, among = a group of marabouts and a nesting colony of storks, is a pool with = sacred eels. Visitors pay the attendants a few dirhams to buy food to thro= w to the eels. Such strange cults provide some solace for their devotees a= nd little incomes for a few people. =20

To the Islamic militants such cults are abhorrent, as they are to st= ricter Sunni Muslims elsewhere, particularly in Saudi Arabia. The North Af= rican militants used to be able easily to collect money from the Saudis and= other Gulf Arabs, in the name of purifying Islam in their countries - but = funds are now less forthcoming since the donors have realised that much of = their money has been used for political purposes. In the Islamists=92 camp= aign to extend their influence in Morocco the popular cults are an obstacle= . The adherents of the cults are firmly opposed to the Islamists, and the = Moroccan population as a whole, which has a strong tradition of religious t= olerance, believes that the cults should be allowed to continue.

Constraints on Economic Growth

In its economic development Morocco has reached much the same stage a= s it has in political reform. It has initiated many changes = since the early 1980s, and it has now to follow through the reforms that ar= e currently under implementation and wait for a more liberal, more p= rivate sector dominated economy to bring higher growth. =20

The government was forced by debt to begin economic reform in 1983. = In return for negotiating a rescheduling of its debts, the International M= onetary Fund obliged the government to control its spending, mainly by free= zing its salaries bill and removing subsidies on some basic foodstuffs. Th= e state=92s income was increased by making the tax system more efficient, i= ntroducing VAT and lowering the rates of personal and corporate tax, which = increased citizens=92 willingness to pay. The effect of these measures to-

gether was to reduce the budget deficit from 12 per cent of GDP in 1= 983 to around 3 per cent in the 1990s.

The Moroccan dirham was devalued in stages by 40 per cent and in 199= 3 was made convertible for most current account transactions, including all= sorts of trade and the repatriation of profits by foreign companies. A sy= stem of import licensing was abolished and a start made on demolishing prot= ective tariffs. In 1983 the highest tariff level was 400 per cen= t and the average for industrial products 100 per cent. In 1999 the top ra= te for industrial products, which was also the most common rate, was= 50 per cent.

Starting in 1990 the government embarked on a programme of structura= l reform, with a decree which made it legal for foreigners to own 100 per c= ent of a business in Morocco. In 1993 it began the privatisation of its co= mmercial holdings. It listed for sale 37 hotels and stakes in 75 companies= . These excluded assets such as the Office Ch=E9rifien des Phosphates and = Royal Air Maroc, which were considered to have special strategic importance= - though once a few sales had been completed successfully the government a= dded the country=92s two oil refineries to the list. By the time of the el= ections in November 1997, which brought the USFP to power, the Ministry of = Privatisation had sold 18 hotels and 33 companies or stakes in companies, i= ncluding the refineries.

When it began privatisation the government introduced measures to st= imulate the stock market, including privatising the exchange, authorising t= he marketing of mutual funds and transferring the broking business from the= banks to independent broking firms. It then began the modernisation of th= e country=92s commercial law and the deregulation of the banking system. = =20

The outcome of the reforms has been an economy which is modern an= d flourishing in parts. The tourist business has been growing quite= fast, and many of the privatised hotels have been refurbished and are bein= g run by more efficient and motivated staffs. The stock market and = the market for debt have been transformed and there are signs of change in the banking sector - led by the fast spread of automatic teller mach= ines. The country=92s privatised gasoline stations are being refurb= ished; many have attached to themselves rather good restaurants. There has= been an extraordinary spread of private telephone kiosks offering d= omestic and international calls. Some big cash and carry supermarke= ts have opened in the outskirts of Casablanca and Rabat. A small pr= ivate airline, Regional Airlines, has been established, in th= e face of some resistance from Royal Air Maroc.

This is in no sense a complete list. There are changes underway = in most of the companies that have been privatised and there are a f= ew

towns, such as Berrechid south of Casablanca, that are gro= wing fast - mostly under the stimulus of foreign companies investing= in factories to produce relatively simple products for the Moroccan market= . But what is striking about the areas of visible growth is that th= ey are quite isolated. There are no very obvious links between the stock <= /b>market, tourism, telephone kiosks, gasoline stations and foreign owne= d factories. One cannot identify broad economic sectors or big geo<= /b>graphical regions that are expanding fast.

Overall Moroccan growth remains disappointingly low. = If agriculture and closely related sectors are removed from the calculation= the average figure for growth in the mid- and later 1990s is 3.5 per cent.= If agriculture is included the figure falls to some 2/2.5 per cent. Mean= while the population, about 28 million, is growing by 1.9 per cent a year. = Unemployment is 19 per cent, and up to 35 per cent among urban youth aged = 15 to 25. In a successful developing economy one would expect investment b= y the private sector to be growing by 12-15 per cent a year; in Morocco rec= ently it has been growing by only 4 or 5 per cent. Businessmen say they ha= ve not been able to find attractive opportunities. There is a lack of conf= idence. =20

Likewise foreign direct investment has grown slowly. In 1988-90 it = was in the range of $100-200m and in 1995, 1996 and 1998 it was still only = $400-450m. Two years, 1997 and 1999, saw exceptional inflows of over $1bn = caused by three particularly big projects/privatisations.

Companies that have invested in Morocco have mostly found the pro= cess slow and difficult. They have encountered massive bureaucracy. Moroccan law governing commercial transactions sets = out more stages and demands many more documents, stamps and signatur= es than would be needed in the Anglo-Saxon world or in most European countries. There is a general requirement that documents and signatures b= e legalised. In the lower parts of the bureaucracy, and in many par= ts at a higher level, there is pervasive corruption. Officials dema= nd to be paid not just to help companies take short cuts through the= bureaucratic maze, but to carry out their proper duties and not put a = company=92s papers at the bottom of the pile on their desk.

Many companies report they have a general sense that, whatever th= ey say, the government and bureaucracy are not very welcoming to foreign investment. Officials accept it is a necessity, but in = their hearts they do not really like it. They would feel more at ho= me in the old world of state ownership, controls and import substitution. Few seem to understand that new investment creates additional GDP and m= akes society as a whole richer. They do not see that in trying to encourag= e foreign investment Morocco is competing with two other Arab countries, Tu= nisia and Egypt, eastern Europe, south and east Asia and development areas = within the EU. Nor do they see that if the country is to get companies to = come to it, it has to make itself at least as attractive as these other pla= ces - and that this is as much a matter of attitudes, and of the system of = administration, as of tax breaks and investor incentives. =20

Two more specific complaints concern the price of land and exchange = controls. Land in industrial zones is extraordinarily exp= ensive, and foreigners, including Moroccan registered foreign owned com= panies, are not allowed to buy agricultural land - which itself commands pr= ices that are out of proportion to the yields it can give. Exchange con= trols are important in that they can greatly complicate international banki= ng transactions. Foreign investors are allowed to do all the transacti= ons they would normally expect to do, but there is a battery of controls de= signed to ensure that Moroccan capital does not leak out at the same time. = This means that when a company finds itself doing something a little bit o= ut of the ordinary - for example making a transfer to finance an overdraft = abroad, being used because foreign banks tend to be more helpful than Moroc= can institutions - it encounters difficulties.

There are more fundamental problems facing the Moroccan economy t= han its difficulties in attracting foreign investment. One is its d= ependence on agriculture. Morocco is a greener, more fertile co= untry than one might expect, and it receives far more rain than its Maghreb= neighbours. Its problems are that the rainfall is erratic - one year in t= hree, or recently one year in two, produces a drought - and most of its far= mers are ignorant, lacking in capital, and attached to bad practices that p= revent them making the best of what rain does fall in poor years.

The output of cereals, which are the most important part of the coun= try=92s farming, has varied in the last decade between a low of 1.8m tonnes= in 1995 and a peak of 10.1m tonnes in 1996. The farmers=92 spending affec= ts the prosperity of the small country towns and this in turn affects busin= ess in Casablanca and the other major cities. The prospect of a good or ba= d crop greatly affects confidence in all parts of the economy. So although= agriculture=92s contribution to gross domestic product is no more than 15 = to 20 per cent, depending on the year, the performance of this sector has a= disproportionate effect on the growth of the economy as a whole. In 1995 = the country=92s GDP growth was minus 6.5 per cent; in the following year it= was plus 12 per cent.

The government realises that it needs to spend much more on bringing= infrastructure and basic services to poor rural areas, and that it needs t= o improve the country=92s very weak state education system, but it is hinde= red by its debts. In 1999 its external debt was $19bn, and its domestic de= bts DH 125bn - worth $13bn. The two debts together were equivalent to 91 p= er cent of GDP. Debt servicing was taking between 30 and 40 per cent of th= e budget. Almost all the rest of the budget was being spent on salaries.

The debt is being actively managed. Where it has the opportunity th= e government has been buying back debt, at the market discount of around 20= per cent of face value, and refinancing it by re-borrowing in low interest= currencies. It has been offering debt-equity swaps and steadily switching= to internal debt. To do this it needs to maintain reasonably healthy fore= ign exchange reserves, currently around six months=92 imports cover. It is= partly because it needs the country=92s foreign exchange for debt refinanc= ing that the government has not made the dirham wholly convertible. Before= it takes this step it says it wants to have six months=92 imports cover fo= r a considerable period and to have further reduced the foreign element in = its debt. Its assumption is that if it were to remove controls and float t= he dirham, there would be an immediate fall in the currency=92s parity of s= ome 15 to 20 per cent. This would revalue the $19bn of foreign debt by the= same percentage in dirham terms. This disadvantage would not be offset in= the short term - over two or three years - by any increase in earnings fro= m manufactured exports or tourism, because both these sectors need investme= nt before they can yield higher revenues.

Government Economic Policies

The government is very aware of the need for higher economic growth. As= well as needing more money for its own budget, it is concerned about unemp= loyment, political stability and the general standard of living of its peop= le. It has announced it will push growth to around 6 per cent by the end o= f 2001 - though it has given no clear analysis of how it will achieve this = ambitious target. The truth is that it has no alternative but to push ahea= d with the liberalising policies of its predecessor, and hope these will ha= ve a stimulating effect.
By far the biggest change will come from the implementation of th= e Treaty of Association with the European Union, which was signe= d by Morocco in 1996 and now, after numerous signing and ratification delay= s at the European end, is due to come into effect at the beginning of March= this year. The treaty is concerned mainly with Morocco=92s imports of ind= ustrial goods from the EU and the European Free Trade Association; it does = not alter the quota r=E9gime applying to Morocco=92s exports of agricultura= l goods to Europe, nor the tariffs, often very high, that are levied on imp= orts of food, livestock and other agricultural products into Morocco. Once= the treaty is in force, Moroccan tariffs on industrial goods will change, = and be partially dismantled in four ways:

The 2=BD or 10 per cent tariff applied to equipment being b= rought in for investment projects will be abolished immediately.
The duties applied to raw materials, spare parts and p= roducts not manufactured locally will be removed over a period of fo= ur years. The reductions will be of 25 per cent a year.
The system of reference prices - which enables the cus= toms authorities to set their own prices as a basis for levying duti= es - will be eliminated within three years.
Products that are also made by Moroccan firms w= ill continue to be taxed at current rates for three years. Then the= duties will be removed over a ten year period at a rate of 10 per cent a y= ear.

A parallel series of tariff cuts is being introduced as a result of Moro= cco=92s membership of WTO. This obliges it to cut duties on all equipment = and raw materials imports - from all sources - to a maximum of 10 per cent = by 2003.
The treaties are obviously going to have a major impact on Morocc= an industry. Since the EU agreement was signed the general opinion = in Morocco has been that about a third of local manufacturing companies wil= l collapse, a third will have to adapt and a third, including some w= hich already compete with big volumes of smuggled goods, will contin= ue as before. The analysis is rather glib, and much the same as tha= t given in other Arab countries which have signed new associa= tion treaties. In reality nobody knows quite what the effect will be.
The Moroccan government, and companies, are now talking of a process= of mise =E0 niveau, under which industry will be brought to a compe= titive level. A large number of companies, particularly medium sized firms= with turnovers of $2m plus are looking for European or American partners, = to give themselves some more capital, so that they can modernise their oper= ations. They also want expertise, so that they can make themselves more co= mpetitive by improving the quality of their production and marketing. A fe= w major state owned companies, including the car assembly business, Somaca,= are going through the same process in the context of privatisation.
Many companies, large and small, have been turning to the government= and asking what they should do. They seem more often to suppose that the = government will help them than to accept that they should look after themse= lves. They are particularly looking for easier credit - Moroccan banks are= not helpful to small and medium sized companies, whatever their publicity = might say. The companies also want advice on what they should do to make t= hemselves more efficient. The government is pinning its faith on gradually= increasing competition in the banking sector - seen in falling interest ra= tes and a search for sources of fee income - providing much of the help the= companies need. But the banks too are looking to the government. As a ba= nker said to Roula Khalaf of the Financial Times in December last year, "As= to lending to small and medium sized companies and upgrading industry ... = it is not up to us to find solutions. We have to sit down with the governm= ent and look for them".
The government has taken some steps to help small companies adjust -= though it has not gone nearly as far as the authorities in Tunisia, which = have set up a system to assist with renewing staff and equipment, with tax = breaks and subsidies. The Moroccan response has included the establishment= of a loan guarantee fund, in co-operation with the EU, for companies with = assets of not more than $2m and a mise =E0 niveau programme costing = not more than $1m. The EU=92s r=F4le is to provide the capital of the fund= . Some small amounts of money are being provided through professional and = trade associations to retrain managers and help with the modernisation of a= ccountancy and financial controls - which will be important for companies t= hat might be seeking bank loans for the first time. It is intended that si= milar help will be offered through an EU financed business centre in Casabl= anca.
Probably the schemes to assist companies will not come properly into= operation until the EU association treaty comes into force, tariff cuts st= art to be made and companies find themselves forced to start making changes= . Even then those companies that find themselves competing with European p= roducts will have a very generous thirteen years to adjust before their tar= iff protection disappears completely.
It is the government=92s hope that the adjustment process will stimu= late economic growth. Investment in new plant, and building, will pump mon= ey into the economy and provide employment - which should offset the loss o= f jobs in companies that are forced to close. When local businesses increa= se their investment it has been noticed in the past that this has stimulate= d a bigger flow of small and medium sized foreign investments, and it is as= sumed this link will continue to operate in the future.
A second, smaller, stimulus for change and growth will come from the= government=92s continuing programme of privatisation. The programme of th= e previous government had slowed somewhat by 1997, as the easiest prospects= had been sold, and for ideological as well as practical reasons the centre= left government that took office in March 1998 felt it had to review the p= rogramme. After a year it produced a list of five hotels and fourteen comp= anies which it was keeping from the old government=92s list, and it added f= our new major state agencies or corporations. It had already quietly sold,= or was negotiating the sale of, five other hotels. All that it had taken = off the old list were businesses which it had been obvious for some time we= re unsaleable. Some of these had already closed their operations. For = all its sceptical rhetoric at the time it took office, it appeared that the= USFP/Istiqlal government=92s approach to privatisation was v= ery much like that of its predecessor. =20
Since it published its new list the Ministry of Privatisation has so= ld a small farming company and its remaining shares in the fertiliser compa= ny, Fertima. The old government had floated some of the shares of Fertima = on the stock exchange in 1996 but had been unable to find a foreign buyer t= o take a core stake in the rest. The Ministry eventually sold 51 per cent = of the company to a Portuguese firm and a group of Moroccan investors.
New corporations being offered for sale by the government are the st= ate tobacco monopoly, the state shipping company, the ports office and the = state telephone company. In July 1999, in an entirely separate initiative,= the government sold a GSM mobile telephone licence for nearly $1bn to a gr= oup led by Telefonica of Spain. This second GSM network will provide compe= tition for the existing state company=92s GSM business. The state company= =92s charges for all parts of its service are unusually high. =20
In the autumn of 1999 the Ministry of Privatisation was starting to = think about a sale of the state airline, Royal Air Maroc. This company, in= which Air France has a minor holding, had not been on any privatisation li= st before because it was regarded as strategically important, and it was ma= king only a small loss. The new idea is that the Ministry might look for a= foreign strategic partner, and then, six months or more later, float some = shares on the stock exchange. It was looking for bids from investment bank= s for a valuation of the airline.
For the longer term the government knows that its country=92s eco= nomic development must be assisted by improvements in its very weak = education system. In many state schools the education on offer is hard= ly worth having. Students may leave school able to count but hardly able t= o do mathematical calculations, without any scientific knowledge, with litt= le French and virtually no knowledge of geography or of countries and cultu= res beyond the Arab world. Eighty per cent of the country=92s agricultural= workforce and 40 per cent of the industrial workforce is illiterate. Thir= ty per cent of children never go to school.
World Bank reports have criticised Moroccan education on several occ= asions and the government has often said it intends to improve it. In Marc= h last year King Hassan wrote a letter to his ministers telling them they h= ad to tackle the educational system at all levels. The World Bank is encou= raging adult education groups and initiatives by individuals and independen= t organisations. Its hope is not just that schools run by these groups wil= l do valuable work in them-
selves, but that their existence will help influence the government = away from its rigid and centralised approach to education.
Over the last twenty years the World Bank has channelled more len= ding to Morocco than to most other developing countries - the Kingdo= m has been one of its major foreign clients. Recently the flow of lending = has averaged $400m a year. Most of the money has gone to inf= rastructure projects. The Bank has been criticised - and is now criti<= b>cising itself - for a lack of emphasis on social issues. It sees = that in the poorer country areas of Morocco in the last twenty years there = has been no development. It is now its policy to push the governmen= t into changing this. Happily its views are the same as those of th= e new King.
=A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | t= echnical support | net edition=20 fes-library | Januar 2001

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