Frieden im Nahen Osten - wird aus Hoffnung Wirklichkeit? : Podiumsdiskussio= n am 29. Juni 2000 / [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abteilung Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Refe= rat Naher und Mittlerer Osten]. - [Electronic ed.]. - Bonn, 2000. - 41 S. = =3D 96 Kb, Text. - ISBN 3-86077-960-5 Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001 =A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung

From: Snapshot-Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/iez/00921.htm Subject: =?utf-8?Q?Frieden=20im=20Nahen=20Osten=20-=20wird=20aus=20Hoffnung=20Wirk?= =?utf-8?Q?lichkeit?=20:=20Podiumsdiskussion=20am=2029.=20Juni=202000=20/?= =?utf-8?Q?=20[Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,=20Abteilung=20Internationale=20Zu?= =?utf-8?Q?sammenarbeit,=20Referat=20Naher=20und=20Mittlerer=20Osten].=20-?= =?utf-8?Q?=20[Electronic=20ed.].=20-=20Bonn,=202000.=20-=2041=20S.=20=3D?= =?utf-8?Q?=2096=20Kb,=20Text.=20-=20ISBN=203-86077-960-5=20
Electronic?= =?utf-8?Q?=20ed.:=20Bonn=20:=20FES=20Library,=202001=20

=C2=A9=20Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung?= Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 14:28:18 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ----" ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: text/html Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/iez/00921.htm Frieden im Nahen Osten - wird aus Hoffnung Wirklichkeit? : Podiumsdiskussio= n am 29. Juni 2000 / [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abteilung Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Refe= rat Naher und Mittlerer Osten]. - [Electronic ed.]. - Bonn, 2000. - 41 S. = =3D 96 Kb, Text. - ISBN 3-86077-960-5 Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001 =A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung

FES

Frieden im Nahen Osten - wird aus Hoffnung Wirklichkeit? : Podiumsdiskussio= n am 29. Juni 2000 / [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abteilung Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Refe= rat Naher und Mittlerer Osten]. - [Electronic ed.]. - Bonn, 2000. - 41 S. = =3D 96 Kb, Text. - ISBN 3-86077-960-5
Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

=3D"INHALT"

Vorwort / R= =FCdiger Sielaff

Podiumsdiskussion:

[Seite der Druckausg.: 1-2 =3D Titelblatt]
[Seite der Druckausg.: 3]

Vorwort=

Der Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten wird seit 1993 von vielen Mensche= n in Europa mit gro=DFer Spannung und auch mit vielen Hoffnungen verfolgt.= =20

Der Vorsitzende der Pal=E4stinenischen Autorit=E4t, Yassser Arafat, = hatte f=FCr die pal=E4stinensische Seite erkl=E4rt, im September 2000 einen= eigenen Staat proklamieren zu wollen. Auf israelischer Seite hatte Ministe= rpr=E4sident Ehud Barak f=FCr das Jahr 2000 =96 au=DFer dem bereits umgeset= zten R=FCckzug israelischer Truppen aus der Besatzungszone im S=FCdlibanon = =96 ein endg=FCltiges Abkommen mit den Pal=E4stinensern, ein Referendum in = Israel =FCber die R=FCckgabe der seit 1967 besetzten Golan-H=F6hen an Syrie= n und ein Friedensabkommen mit Syrien angek=FCndigt.=20

Divergierende nationale Interessen sowie der innenpolitische Druck a= uf die jeweiligen F=FChrungen haben die Hoffnung auf eine schnelle Verwirkl= ung eines Friedens immer weiter sinken lassen. Die Gespr=E4che mit Syrien k= amen zum Erliegen. Die Verhandlungen in Camp David brachen zusammen. Letzte= Bem=FChungen in Paris scheiterten und der Oktober 2000 sah schlie=DFlich d= ie =84Al-Aksa Intifada=84.

Um die aktuelle Situation im schwierigen und komplexen Nahost-Friede= nsproze=DF zu analysieren und einen Blick in die Zukunft zu werfen, hatte d= ie Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hochrangige Vertreter aus Israel, aus Pal=E4sti= na und aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu einer Tagung mit einer =F6ffen= tlichen Podiumsdiskussion =84Frieden im Nahen Osten =96 wird aus Hoffnung W= irklichkeit ?=84 am 29.6.2000 in ihr Berliner Konferenzzentrum eingeladen.

Mit Yasser Abed Rabbo, dem pal=E4stinensischen Minister f=FCr Inform= ation und Kultur, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Mitglied des Pal=E4stinensischen Legis= lativrates und Ministerin a.D. f=FCr Wissenschaft und Forschung, und Dr.=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 4]

Efraim Sneh, Stellvertretender Verteidigungsminister des Staates Isr= ael, Colette Avital, Mitglied der Knesset, sowie Gernot Erler, MdB und Stel= lvertretender Vorsitzender der SPD-Fraktion, war das Podium durch erfahrene= politische F=FChrungspers=F6nlichkeiten prominent besetzt. Die lebhafte Di= skussion moderierte Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer, Islamwissenschaftlerin an de= r Freien Universit=E4t Berlin. Die Podiumsteilnehmer griffen alle die Frage= n auf, die auch nach der =84Al-Aksa-Intifada=84 noch immer die Menschen im = Nahen Osten, aber auch in Europa, bewegen. Keiner kann die Grundfrage nach = Frieden mit einem klaren =84Ja=84 oder auch =84Nein=84 beantworten. Beide S= eiten stehen unter innenpolitischem Druck, sehen die historische Chance, si= nd aber auch mit vielf=E4ltigen historischen Belastungen und psychologische= n Argumenten, vor allem aber religi=F6senTraditionen, konfrontiert. Interna= tionales Recht und internationale Einfl=FCsse kommen noch hinzu.=20

Beachtlich ist, dass trotz der gro=DFen Interessenunterschiede diese= Podiumsteilnehmer sich darin einig waren, dass der Dialog zwischen den Kon= fliktparteien nicht abreissen d=FCrfe. Sie waren alle f=FCr die M=F6glichke= it zu einem solchen Dialog auf neutralem Boden dankbar.

In der aktuellen Situation ist es sicherlich hilfreich, die Argument= e dieser Podiumsdiskussion sich zu vergegenw=E4rtigen und dazu beizutragen,= dass der Dialog =96 wann, wo und wie auch immer =96 fortgesetzt werden kan= n und geeignete Ansatzpunkte daf=FCr zu finden und zu nutzen. Die Friedrich= -Ebert-Stiftung wird sich weiterhin darum bem=FChen.=20

R=FCdiger Sielaff

Leiter des Referates Naher und Mittlerer Osten / Nordafrika=20

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung =20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 5]

Ernst Breit

Sehr geehrte Frau Dr. Ashrawi, sehr geehrter Herr Minister Abed Rabb= o, sehr geehrter Herr Minister Dr. Sneh, sehr geehrter Herr Abgeordneter Er= ler und =96 last but not least =96 sehr geehrte Frau Professor Dr. Kr=E4mer= , meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren!

Im Namen des Vorstandes der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung m=F6chte ich Si= e zu unserer heutigen Podiumsdiskussion =84Frieden im Nahen Osten =96 Wird = aus Hoffnung Wirklichkeit?=84 ganz herzlich willkommen hei=DFen.

Ich freue mich besonders, dass sich heute Abend hier bei uns im Haus= e politische F=FChrungspers=F6nlichkeiten aus Israel und den pal=E4stinensi= schen Gebieten gemeinsam mit deutschen Nahost-Experten an einen Tisch setze= n, um die gegenw=E4rtige Situation im Nahost-Friedensprozess zu analysieren= und einen Blick in die Zukunft zu werfen.

Die =DCberschrift zu unserer heutigen Diskussion signalisiert bereit= s, dass es heute nicht nur darum gehen kann, konkrete technische Fragen zur= Umsetzung eines Friedens zwischen Israel und Pal=E4stina zu stellen. Vielm= ehr stellt sich zunehmend die Grundsatzfrage: Frieden im Nahen Osten =96 Wi= rd aus Hoffnung Wirklichkeit? Kann es Realit=E4t werden, dass die verschied= enen Interessengemeinschaften, Religionen, V=F6lker und Staaten im Nahen Os= ten in Frieden zusammen oder zumindest nebeneinander leben k=F6nnen? Kann d= ies zu Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts verwirklicht werden oder muss es eine Ut= opie bleiben?

Wahrscheinlich sind wir uns darin einig, dass es sich um einen schwi= erigen und komplexen Friedensprozess handelt. Besonders interessiert uns nu= n von den Politikerinnen und Politikern zu erfahren, welche Perspektiven f= =FCr eine Konfliktl=F6sung und f=FCr eine langfristige Krisenpr=E4vention b= estehen. Und: Welche Rolle k=F6nnen die regional Verantwortlichen, aber auc= h die internationale Politik mittel- und langfristig =FCbernehmen?

Dass das Thema unserer heutigen Diskussion hochaktuell ist, k=F6nnen= wir in den t=E4glichen Nachrichten verfolgen. In diesem Monat haben sich d= ie

[Seite der Druckausg.: 6]

israelischen Truppen aus dem S=FCdlibanon zur=FCckgezogen. Der Gene= ralsekret=E4r der Vereinten Nationen, Kofi Annan, besuchte in der letzten W= oche die Region, um sich vor Ort pers=F6nlich ein Bild zu machen. Er wies n= achdr=FCcklich darauf hin, dass alle UN-Resolutionen zu erf=FCllen seien, a= ber er pl=E4dierte vor allem auch daf=FCr, dass der Dialog zwischen den Kon= fliktparteien nicht abrei=DFen d=FCrfe.

Der Fortgang und die Gestaltung des Prozesses, der 1993 mit den gehe= imen Verhandlungen in Oslo begann und einen ersten konkreten Schritt mit de= r Unterzeichnung der israelisch-pal=E4stinensischen Prinzipienerkl=E4rung m= achte, war gepr=E4gt von gro=DFen Hoffnungen, aber auch von Entt=E4uschunge= n. Unter der Regierung von Benjamin Netanjahu kam der Prozess zwischenzeitl= ich praktisch zum Erliegen.

Mit dem im Mai 1999 gew=E4hlten Premier Ehud Barak, dessen Wahl 14 T= age nach dem Ende der f=FCnfj=E4hrigen Interimsperiode stattfand, keimte ne= ue Hoffnung auf baldige Fortschritte im Friedensprozess auf. Diese scheint = allerdings inzwischen wieder geschrumpft, vor allem auf pal=E4stinensischer= Seite.

Zumindest konnte im September 1999 mit dem Abkommen von Sharm El-She= ikh in =C4gypten zun=E4chst die Blockade des Prozesses durchbrochen werden.= Die Verhandlungspartner einigten sich auf eine z=FCgige Umsetzung der noch= nicht erf=FCllten Verpflichtungen aus der Interimsperiode sowie auf den so= fortigen Beginn der Verhandlungen =FCber den endg=FCltigen Status. Diese so= llten, so war es urspr=FCnglich geplant, bis Mitte September 2000 abgeschlo= ssen sein. Der Vorsitzende der pal=E4stinensischen Autorit=E4t, Yassir Araf= at, hat f=FCr die pal=E4stinensische Seite erkl=E4rt, im September 2000 ein= en eigenen Staat proklamieren zu wollen. Auf israelischer Seite hat Ministe= rpr=E4sident Ehud Barak f=FCr das Jahr 2000 au=DFer dem R=FCckzug israelisc= her Truppen aus der Besatzungszone im S=FCdlibanon ein endg=FCltiges Abkomm= en mit den Pal=E4stinensern, ein Referendum in Israel =FCber die R=FCckgabe= der seit 1967 besetzten Golan-H=F6hen an Syrien und ein Friedensabkommen m= it Syrien angek=FCndigt. Mittlerweile scheint es allerdings, als ob die div= ergierenden nationalen Interessen sowie der innenpolitische Druck auf die j= eweiligen F=FChrungen=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 7]

die Hoffnung auf eine schnelle Verwirklichung eines Friedens im Nahe= n Osten schrittweise vernichten w=FCrden.

Aber ich m=F6chte der Diskussion nicht vorgreifen, sondern lediglich= den schleichenden Pessimismus skizzieren, auf den wir im Zusammenhang mit = dem Nahost-Friedensprozess in zunehmendem Ma=DFe sto=DFen.

Meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren, wie k=F6nnen wir als Deutsche= respektive Europ=E4er dazu beitragen, dass der Friedensprozess bzw. die Ve= rhandlungen zwischen den Israelis und Pal=E4stinensern erfolgreich vorangeb= racht und schlie=DFlich auch umgesetzt werden k=F6nnen? Sicherlich liegt un= ser Hauptbeitrag darin, auf verschiedenen Ebenen als Vermittler und Moderat= oren immer wieder einen Dialog der Konfliktparteien zu erm=F6glichen. Ander= erseits muss es unser Anliegen sein, zur Umsetzung nachhaltiger Strategien = zur Konfliktpr=E4vention beizutragen.

Wir als Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung bem=FChen uns um diese Unterst=FCtz= ung durch verschiedene Projektma=DFnahmen, die unsere B=FCros in der Region= durchf=FChren, aber auch dadurch, dass die deutsche =D6ffentlichkeit in di= esen Prozess einbezogen wird.

In der Hoffnung, dass unsere heutige Podiumsdiskussion ein kleiner B= eitrag zur Fortf=FChrung des Dialogs zu einem anhaltenden Frieden im Nahen = Osten sein m=F6ge, w=FCnsche ich uns allen eine spannende Diskussion und bi= tte jetzt Frau Professor Dr. Kr=E4mer, ihr Amt als Moderatorin zu =FCberneh= men.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudr= un Kr=E4mer

Peace in the Middle East =96 can it be transformed into reality? Wil= l hope become reality? This is the title of tonight=92s discussion and this= is the issue that the panellists will hopefully address in their individua= l contributions to the debate. As everyone knows, it is a vital question fo= r everyone living in the Middle East and of crucial importance for people l= iving outside of it. We are dealing with a protracted conflict that involve= s a=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 8]

host of issues, peace and hope, the future and the past, identity an= d a good life, good governance and many other concerns.

It is obviously not easy to be brief on such a vital and crucial iss= ue and yet brevity is exactly what I will have to ask from our panellists f= ully knowing how hard it will be for them to limit themselves to 5 to 10 = minutes, making an introductory statement rather than giving a report on th= e state of the art of the past, present and future of peace in the Middle E= ast. We have what you can safely call a panel of distinguished speakers, al= l of them with a long and varied experience in political life, and in negot= iations more specifically, some also in academic life, who are fully qualif= ied to speak out on the issue and to stimulate a debate among themselves as= well as among the German audience present in this room.

Even on a panel like this and in spite of the fact that the Middle E= ast is said to be a turbulent zone of world politics, there has to be some = order in the sequence of speakers and this order is not easy to establish. = We suggested to the speakers that they speak in the following order: Dr. Ha= nan Ashrawi, Colette Avital =96 and it=92s not ladies first, it=92s sheer c= oincidence =96, Yasser Abed Rabbo, Dr. Efraim Sneh, Gernot Erler.

On the panel =96 and again this is not based on protocol and rank bu= t just on sheer seating order =96 we have Yasser Abed Rabbo, Minister of In= formation and Culture of the Palestinian National Authority, a leading memb= er of the PLO Executive Council and of course one of the foremost represent= atives of the Palestinian people in various negotiations between the Palest= inians on one hand and the Israelis on the other.

Next to him is Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, who I think will be equally known = to most people in this audience: a member of the Palestinian Legislative Co= uncil, a former Minister of Higher Education, who represented the Palestini= an people in various official and unofficial capacities, as well as one of = the foremost advocates of Palestinian civil society.

To my right we have Dr. Efraim Sneh, Deputy Minister of Defence of= =20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 9]

the State of Israel and one of the most prominent members of the Isr= ael Labour Party and a very experienced politician and activist.

Next to him is Mrs. Colette Avital, who after a career in the diplom= atic service, moved into politics. She is a member of Knesset as well and C= hair of the International Department of the Israel Labour Party.

Last but not least we have Gernot Erler, a Member of the Deutsche Bu= ndestag and indeed Deputy Head of the Social Democratic Group in the German= Parliament (Stellvertretender Vorsitzender der SPD-Fraktion), who within t= he Social Democratic Party is in charge of international affairs.

So this is an impressive round of people and if I may once again urg= e you to be brief and clear and stimulating so that we can have a discussio= n after the first round of presentations from the speakers and then give th= e floor to the audience. I will ask people to please briefly introduce them= selves, with their names and if they like their affiliation, and to move to= the microphones. The other request I will make, and I will not be beseechi= ng anyone, is to be brief and ask questions and not to make lengthy stateme= nts.

So, in spite of the fact that Hanan Ashrawi asked not to always be t= he first speaker, I would ask her to take up this role again and speak to u= s for about 5 to 10 minutes.

Dr. Hanan Ashr= awi

Thank you Professor Kr=E4mer and thank you to the Friedrich Ebert Fo= undation for this invitation. Now that I have been volunteered to be first,= I take the liberty to use the time, which ever way I see fit. I can tell y= ou that a very quick answer is available for the question that we=92ve been= asked. I don=92t know whether it is shall peace be a reality; will hope be= a reality or can hope become a reality? I think the answer is very simple.= Hope is an existential state, it=92s a state of mind and reality is, of co= urse,

[Seite der Druckausg.: 10]

concrete conditions on the ground. So the gap between hope and real= ity is always a gap that is qualitative. Two spheres of existence, sometime= s entirely unrelated, but given the fact that we=92ve been asked this quest= ion, yes, but not by default. Hope becomes a reality when you have the will= , the mind set, the work plan, the commitment, the clear objectives, the ro= ad map to translate this existential state into a concrete state; a state o= f being.

And if you want to relate this to the Palestinian-Israeli peace proc= ess, I can say that we=92ve been losing more and more hope gradually, and t= here=92s been more erosion of support and confidence in the peace process o= n the Palestinian side as a result of a perpetual state of crises, one afte= r the other. And I don=92t think I=92ve seen the Palestinian people in such= a state of collective grievance or a sense of victimisation and quite ofte= n a sense of lack of hope, or let=92s say a lack of unrealistic expectation= s of the peace process, given the way the peace process has been conducted = and its impact on Palestinian lives. I=92ve always said Palestinians have a= lways been victims of conflict and war and now they see themselves as victi= ms of a peace process, of a process itself that has intruded in their lives= and in many ways violated their rights and created this junction between t= he image and reality, between people=92s perceptions of what=92s going on a= nd between the actual reality on the ground.

There are three ways in which people in Palestine measure the peace = process and intentions of the Israeli side. The first is through concrete a= ctions. So long as there are collective punitive measures; so long as there= is a state of closure; so long as there are house demolitions; confiscatio= n of IDs but more importantly the building of settlements; the expansion of= settlements; the confiscation of land and so on. So long as people feel th= at this peace process is an abstraction with no relationship to reality, an= d no relationship to behavioural patterns on the ground, and that Israelis = are still conducting themselves as occupiers rather than peace partners, wi= th the mentality of control and of collective punitive measures. After all,= we said this afternoon, that mentality of the occupier is not very easy to= shed because it generates patterns of behaviour and feelings of power and = perhaps even of superiority that are not easily=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 11]

abandoned. This is one thing that we see on the ground. So the Pales= tinians feel that this process has not protected their land, their rights, = their lives, has not given them freedom of movement, has not given them eco= nomic well-being; on the contrary, economic conditions have been worse, dep= rivation is prevailing and that=92s why we have this one gauge. On this one= level the peace process has been a failure in the perception of the Palest= inians.

Again in terms of the second factor is the implementation of signed = agreements. There have been many signed agreements. And they are not even a= greements. We have invented many words; we sign protocols, we sign declarat= ions of principles, we sign memoranda, we sign declarations, we=92ve exhaus= ted the language for terms we sign, but not a single agreement has ever bee= n implemented fully, honestly or on time. Not a single timetable has been h= onoured. And all agreements were subject to renegotiation, were re-opened a= nd subject to modification and of course non-implementation in full. This h= as contributed to erosion of confidence and support. If you sign an agreeme= nt it should be honoured. If you are involved in a peace process and you co= mmit yourself then you undertake to fulfil your commitments and obligations= .

I have also described elsewhere, those of you who have read some of = the things that I have written, I said we invented a whole new peace proces= s: sign first and negotiate later. Which is what happened with all the agre= ements. Not a single one, I mean if I want to give you a whole list of them= starting with the DOP and moving through with the Paris Declaration =96 th= e Paris Agreement, the Economic Agreement, the Cairo Agreement, the Gaza-Je= richo Agreement, the Taba Interim Agreement and then the Protocol on Hebron= and then the Wye River Memorandum and then Wye 2 and Sharm El-Sheikh and s= o on. We have a series of agreements, each of them a renegotiation of the p= revious agreement and a modification of previous agreements. And so far agr= eements have not been honoured, particularly when it comes to issues of red= eployment, anything that has to do with relinquishing the land and giving i= t back to the Palestinians, which is one major component of Palestinian rea= lity and the credibility of the peace process, and the other is the human f= actor, the

[Seite der Druckausg.: 12]

non-release of Palestinian prisoners. These two have seriously led = to doubts questioning and undermining the peace process.

The third factor, along with not-honouring agreements, is the fact t= hat many bilateral actions have been taking place by Israel to pre-empt or = pre-judge the outcome of permanent status of negotiations. We talked about = settlements but also about Jerusalem. All sorts of actions are taking place= by Israel to change and alter the character of Jerusalem; to change its co= mposition demographically and geographically and in terms of its status wit= hin Palestinian reality. So it=92s been undermined from within and isolated= as a Palestinian city and as the potential future capital of Palestine.

And all issues on the Permanent Status Agenda are issues that should= be negotiated. They cannot be pre-determined by one side, otherwise there= =92s no need to agree on an agenda. And on the agenda, of course, you have = settlements and boundaries, you have water, you have Jerusalem and you have= the refugees. So when we got to that third point, the Israeli strategy and= positions with the permanent and status issues, we immediately were faced = with a brick wall of absolutist ideology that Jerusalem is the eternal capi= tal of Israel for ever and ever, Amen, and that it will not be divided. Not= that we are asking for it to be divided, we want the Jerusalem that was oc= cupied in 1967 to be returned and then we will negotiate the status of the = whole city of Jerusalem, East and West.

When it comes to boundaries 2:4 talks about 1967 boundaries, which s= tates the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and we ar= e told now in no uncertain terms that there can be no return to the 1967 bo= undaries =96 I am an academic also and my time frame is 50 minutes per lect= ure, I will try to be brief =96 that=92s why it=92s so misleading to just g= ive you in a capsule =84headlines", we should be able to talk for hours abo= ut these things and we should deal with them and what the solution is.

Now when it comes to the third element, we said actions on the groun= d, policies and measures. We said implementation of signed agreements and n= ow we=92re talking about how to deal with permanent status issues

[Seite der Druckausg.: 13]

and policy positions with permanent status issues. So if you are to= ld that Jerusalem is the eternal capital and indivisible and so, =9167 boun= daries do not apply to our negotiations, the settlers will continue to be u= nder Israeli sovereignty and some settlements will be annexed to Israel or = we will have a situation of extraterritoriality, and the Israelis will have= to make all sorts of arrangements to protect the security of the settlers = and the mobility of the settlers linking them to Israel, etc. And when it c= omes to borders and crossing points and all issues, if there is such a unil= ateral position by Israel that is absolute, why negotiate?

The problem is that we have made a historical shift, we have made a = real commitment to the negotiated settlement of this conflict. Unfortunatel= y, instead of rising to the level of this commitment, of this transformatio= n of mentalities and mind-sets we ended up with a peace process incorporati= ng the mentality of power politics, the mentality of the occupation in the = sense that the Israelis can dictate to the other side, and that Palestinian= realities can be shaped on the basis of the power disequilibrium in a way = that would undermine, negate, and violate international law, international = legality and the terms of reference of the peace process.

So, for example, the refugees, the right of return. This is not a ri= ght which we invented. It is not exclusive to Palestinians. It is a right t= hat is recognised by international humanitarian law applicable to all peopl= es. And I don=92t see why, when it comes to the Palestinians, we have to ab= andon that right or modify it. We were told all afternoon about how realist= ic and pragmatic we must be. Realism and pragmatism do not mean self-negati= on.

One last conclusion: the Palestinian State is not a concession from = the Israelis. It is our right. And it should be as a minimum on the territo= ries occupied in 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital. We accept that, that t= o us is a major shift in mentalities. It cannot be a state within a state, = within Israel, it cannot be a state-let or a mini-state or a quasi-state or= a pseudo-state or a fragmented-state or a series of reservations. If it is= to be viable, if we=92re going to have genuine peace and a comprehensive p= eace then the Palestinian State is an essential component of the future rea= lities of=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 14]

the region, a state that is viable, that is sovereign, that is not a= n adjunct or an appendix to Israel, that is capable of being an equal playe= r in the region as a democratic and contemporary state, that is not constan= tly trying to re-define Israeli occupation, and that is not surrounded by = Israeli power and entirely dependent on Israel.

Absent that state, then I personally don=92t believe that anybody is= doing us a favour by granting us such a pseudo-state with internal fragmen= tation, with no territorial continuity and no real sovereignty. That is a = recipe for future conflict or disaster. All historical conflicts should = address the causes, should have the courage to open up all files and to un= dertake a real shift and mind set in the sense that the politics of inclusi= on is not the politics where one side is right and the other is wrong, or o= ne side is strong and can dictate to the other. Empowerment of the Palestin= ians, a genuine state, a recognised sovereign state is the essential compon= ent for a just and lasting peace in the region. Thank you.

Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer

Thank you very much indeed for this brief and clear statement. Madam= e Avital.

Colette Avital=

Thank you very much and I think I will begin by saying what Henry VI= II told his fifth wife. =84This will be short". I will try to keep the time= and to be short.

To be very honest I was debating with myself whilst listening to Han= an Ashrawi whom I have known for a long time, whether I will answer some of= what she said or whether I will make my own presentation. I think I will v= ery quickly use my time first by saying what we want to achieve and I will = perhaps have time to answer some of the things which I think need an answer= .

[Seite der Druckausg.: 15]

I would like however to start in saying that I join her in her hope/= desire/wish that there should be a sovereign-free Palestinian State = which should be an equal actor in the area. I fully share this hope and des= ire which I believe will become a reality. And I don=92t think that by sayi= ng this I=92m doing anyone a favour. If anything, I think I=92m doing my pe= ople, the Israelis, also a service by saying it because I think it=92s a mo= ral right and I believe that as long as there will not be peace and equalit= y and justice we will continue to maintain the seeds of conflict. So I do f= ully share that hope.

I think however that I am more hopeful, I believe much more that thi= s is going to become a reality. I hope or I believe that it is really up to= us. I think there has been a will, there has been a road map. We are now r= eaching the hour of truth and when you reach the hour of truth it is very d= ifficult. Some of the issues which we =96 and I=92m speaking now of the Isr= aelis =96 address are difficult and I believe that for the Palestinians it = must be equally difficult. I can only represent ourselves. When we reach an= d when we touch the hour of truth we are faced with very difficult choices.= We know the end more or less. We know what the contours are going to be. W= e know what the choices are. But it is very difficult to get there.

Now I will go on by saying that I, in a way, represent or am aligned= with the government that has made a very obvious choice, that of peace. No= t only is it a government that is committed to peace, but it is a governmen= t that has made a choice of its partners in the coalition, has put aside so= me of the domestic considerations which are very difficult. After all, when= Ehud Barak was elected as Prime Minister he was elected over two issues: F= irstly, the peace process; secondly, the very deep crisis that the Israeli = society was going through: fragmentation, economic problems, social problem= s. To a large degree he is the subject of a lot of criticism at home for no= t dealing at all with the domestic agenda and really giving time and energy= and being focussed only on the peace process. Those of you who are present= here today know that this is a government which is undergoing a very diffi= cult political crisis, and again the choice of partners in our coalition ha= s been those who would help us achieve the peace=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 16]

process. However, this is not easy, because the Israeli population a= lso has to face extraordinarily difficult choices.

I will pick up one example. The Palestinians feel as victims of the = peace process. I fully understand that because in every single conflict we = live in mirror images. Many Israelis feel as victims, the double victims of= the peace process, they feel as victims because social issues are neglecte= d. They feel as victims because they feel that they will have to be evacuat= ed maybe from territories and from their homes which they, for better or fo= r worse, believe are theirs. So there is a feeling of being a victim on bot= h sides, especially when you make peace. People are attached on both sides = to the land, and the truth is not only objective, the truth is also subject= ive, and unless we address that, we do not understand.

Now Israelis lives in a democracy, and my second proposition is at t= hat time, at this particular point in our lives this is not necessarily pla= ying in our favour. The more time passes, the more difficult it is to uproo= t people from their homes. If we would have made peace with the Palesti= nians thirty years ago, we would not have had the kind of problems that we = have today. However, I prefer also to look at the other side of the coin an= d to say that there has been a real transformation in public opinion in Isr= ael. What seemed to be unthinkable three, four, five years ago: the proposi= tion to speak with the PLO; the proposition to make a territorial compromis= e; the proposition to accept the Palestinian State is today accepted by 75%= of the population. So I think that if you look at this picture and if you = take into account that people have undergone a positive transformation as w= ell, that many agreements which have been signed have been fulfilled to the= last iota, and I would like to say to the last iota at least by the Israel= is, you will understand that we have already travelled a long road.

Now I say my third proposition: time is of essence because the clock= is ticking, because this government is a government that I think can deliv= er peace. I don=92t think any other government or any other leader in Israe= l but Ehud Barak can deliver peace. And my personal feeling is one of a sen= se of urgency, notwithstanding the domestic difficulties that we will

[Seite der Druckausg.: 17]

have to face because I think there is a particular juncture in our = time: Ehud Barak as Prime Minister; a coalition that still helps him; and t= he President in the White House who is interested to push the peace process= forward and this is not necessarily bound to repeat itself very often in h= istory. And therefore, I personally (and I can speak only for myself) think= that it is very important to face the hour of truth. And if I look at ours= elves and at the Palestinians, I look at us as two players with a set of ca= rds in their hands and it looks like we are holding our cards very close to= our chest and the question is, who=92s going to show the deck of cards tha= t he has in his hand first?

So I think, that I know how difficult it is on both sides: I know th= at peace can become reality, but I know that it is going to be difficult to= get there. But I think it takes courage and determination and yes, I=92m g= oing to repeat the word: realism and pragmatism. We both know that we=92re = not going to get everything. We both know we will have to make compromises.= We both know that we have =96 as the French say =96 =84to put water in our= wine". We both know that we have to pay a price for peace. I can assure yo= u this government is and will pay a price for peace. But I think that we ha= ve to try to adjust hopes to realities, and if the question is: =84Can hope= become a reality?" my answer is: =84Yes, depending on what your hope is". = I think none of us will be able to get 100% of what we desire. And I believ= e therefore that it is very important at this point of the game that we are= both flexible because we=92re getting to the point where we will have to m= ake very important decisions.

And I would like maybe to say two more things, if I have two more mi= nutes. One is that in order to be able to get to the peace that we so much = need and that we so much deserve on both sides, and in order to make the ki= nd of concessions that we have to make, we have to look at each other with = serenity, with equality. We have to agree not to agree on certain issues, b= ut we also have to try to understand what it is that we mean by peace.

And for me this is important because maybe at this point peace is no= t an equal notion for the Israelis and the Palestinians. In order to achiev= e=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 18]

peace it is not merely a question of signing agreements and of imple= menting them, it is a question also of building peace and of building confi= dence and of building human relationships. Peace is not only a separation, = I know that we cannot achieve right now the European model of peace and we = have to go first through separation and first through our own sovereignties= and only later will we be able to be more generous with each other and thi= nk what sovereignty means in today=92s world of interdependence. But right = now I think we also have to have a strategy of how we build the peace.

And last but not least I would like to say that I was hoping to also= hear other things from Hanan Ashrawi because honestly you have people here= present tonight who know things. There has not been one day of closure in = the past year. The demolition of houses which are personally condemned by m= any of us, too, has been stopped. There has not been, certainly in the last= months, any taking away, any confiscation of land. As a matter of fact the= Deputy Minister of Defence present here tonight has asked the Prime Minist= er=92s permission to take 250 dunums of land in order to build roads and ev= en that was denied. So I think we should try to see also that some of the t= hings which Hanan Ashrawi rightly condemns have been stopped. I=92m not say= ing this in order to in any way shape or form self-defence. I am saying thi= s in order to try on the one hand to set the record straight, but also in o= rder to say: let us move forward. We cannot always look backwards. If we lo= ok backwards we will continue to hear on each side that we=92re victims, we= =92ll continue to hear what we=92re missing, what we=92re losing, and we wi= ll continue to postpone this agreement. I think the sooner we make this agr= eement between us, the sooner there will be a Palestinian State, the better= off we all are. Thank you.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer

Thank you very much indeed. We have powerful speakers on this panel = and therefore I don=92t have to make any comments at this point. Let me sim= ply pass the word on to Mr. Abed Rabbo.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 19]

Yasser Abed Ra= bbo

Thank you very much. I think there=92s one thing that I might agree = frightens me: that these two ladies didn=92t leave much for us to say.

First of all, because time is limited, let me confine my statement t= o specific points.

The first point is, this conflict as all other conflicts, cannot be = resolved unless both sides respect the terms of reference for the conflict,= for the solution of the conflict. Otherwise we will find ourselves in prot= racted long forms of confrontation that will lead towards more deterioratio= n and more bloodshed, etc etc.

We have the experiences behind us. Israel for a long time tried to m= ake solutions for the conflicts with different Arab countries. And they rea= ched a solution with Egypt on the basis of implementing 2 : 4 : 2. They rea= ched a solution with Jordan on the same basis and they are seeking to make = peace with Syria on the basis of 2 : 4 : 2, and they are now measuring the = borders to the last inch with Lebanon for implementing 4 : 2 : 5.

Our case is not an exception. The implementation of 2 : 4 : 2 which = means ending the occupation of the Palestinian land and territory, and we s= hould not escape from this fact by talking about compromises or concessions= on equal basis made by the two sides.

The second issue is that we had agreements. We signed agreements in = the past five or six years. The last one was the Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement.= And all these agreements claimed that they are based on the terms of refer= ence for the negotiations, and they aim at implementing 2 : 4 : 2. We canno= t hope that there will be progress in future negotiations unless we respect= what we had agreed upon through very difficult negotiations in the past. U= nless we implement what was agreed upon, and I=92m referring here to the Sh= arm El-Sheikh Agreement.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 20]

In Sharm El-Sheikh there was an agreement that Israel will implement= the third phase of redeployment from the West Bank, which means according = to the Oslo Agreement, all the territories except the issues left for the f= inal status and that means: Jerusalem, settlements, and military locations.= This was the approach we had adopted in the beginning. We are not starting= the process today, we did not start it in Sharm El-Sheikh, and we cannot s= ay tomorrow, let us have a new beginning, let us start from a point which w= e decide is away from what we had agreed upon in the past.

Until now the Israeli government, the government of Mr. Barak, had t= ried to cancel the commitments made in Sharm El-Sheikh through different ap= proaches. One of them asking to merge the issues of the Sharm El-Sheikh Agr= eement, of the Interim Agreement, of the third phase =85 what will we agree= upon in the future and implement it.

The third point is, the Palestinian public opinion is looking at thi= s process with diminishing credibility. Because we are talking about peace = and at the same time =96 sorry I am living in a region where all these thou= ghts of peace, that the demolition of houses has stopped, the confiscation = of land is no more taking place, and all these nice doings =96 we don=92t s= ee them, we see a nightmare. And until today there=92s a continuation of th= e policy of confiscation of land. Until last month there were houses that a= re being demolished =96 and the Palestinians look, they compare between thi= s =96 the same time the same day, there are orders, I don=92t know who is t= aking the orders, sometimes not the Defence Ministry, sometimes it is the H= ousing Ministry, sometimes I don=92t know who=92s giving these orders, this= doesn=92t concern me, this is not my issue, the same day that the house is= demolitioned because a Palestinian had built it, violating the law, the la= w that does not permit a Palestinian to build any house on his own land. Th= e same day there are housing units that are decided by the Israeli governme= nt to be built on Palestinian land in the West Bank, the same day, and the = Palestinian compare this to that and say, what kind of peace is this? So, w= e want to have steps that guarantee really that we have equality, that occu= pation will end, that the mentality of hegemony will also reach an end.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 21]

The other point I want to refer to is that I was participating in th= e negotiations and I=92m still of course involved in supervising the negoti= ations within the Palestinian leadership. I heard and I still hear about pe= rcentages of land. Sometimes it is 80%, sometimes it goes back to 70%, some= times it moves up to 90% etc.. I=92m not going to discuss these percentages= of land. I=92m going to discuss just one thing. The concept of the Israeli= solution which of course is contradicting the terms of reference, but this= concept is based on one thing: the continuation of the hegemony, the contr= ol over the Palestinian people, because according to this concept, Israel w= ants to annex territories under different names and titles. Some of them be= cause they are realities of settlements and these realities are expanding d= aily. They are not affixed realities by the way. And some under the pretext= of security needs and some under some other pretexts. And according to thi= s the Palestinian territory in the West Bank will be divided into three can= tons at least, surrounded by Israel from all sides, and cut away from the n= eighbouring countries. We are cantons inside Israel. That=92s the solution,= that=92s the concept which we cannot accept and we will never accept to ne= gotiate it, or to try to improve it, here or there. This whole concept is a= concept of hegemony, of the continuation of occupation and Israel should l= eave this concept, the concept where we will have a solution based on creat= ing a Palestinian independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, on = an equal basis, because this will enable us really to co-exist, co-exist fo= r a long time ahead, and co-exist in order to build new relations between u= s and with the neighbouring countries in the region.

The moment of truth =96 I agree and I quote this from Mrs. Avital = =96 has come and the moment of truth needs courage. And I=92ll tell you wit= hout hesitation we showed the utmost courage. We showed courage by acceptin= g all the agreements that led to the beginning of this process. By acceptin= g the fact which was stated in the Letters of Recognition that were exchang= ed at the beginning of the Oslo Agreement or when Oslo was signed. And in t= hese Letters we said in clear words that we recognise Israel although we we= re still under occupation and Israel at that time did not recognise us. We = said even more, we said we recognise the right of Israel to exist and Israe= l did not at that time recognise our right to

[Seite der Druckausg.: 22]

exist within a state, they only recognised the PLO as the represent= ative of the Palestinian people.

But we took courageous steps. The courageous steps now are needed on= both sides. When I look at the Israeli concept of solution and I listen to= statements saying that there should be courage in order to take bitter dec= isions I think that this is only directed towards the Palestinians to take = such decisions and not decisions that should be on equal footing and on an = equal basis.

I think we all have difficulties. The Palestinian public opinion gav= e chances for peace and the Palestinian public opinion is ready to give mor= e chances, but at this moment the proof for the real intentions to make pea= ce lies only =96 and I repeat =96 in implementing what we had agreed upon a= nd lies only in respecting what we will agree upon through a mechanism, an = international mechanism for monitoring, supervising the implementation of t= he agreements that we will sign and this needs the participation of Europe,= the participation of the United States and the United Nations. Otherwise w= e will end with a bitter, not bitter choices or bitter solutions, but a bit= ter endless conflict. Thank you very much.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer

Thank you for making a strong argument relatively brief. Thank you v= ery much indeed. Mr. Sneh.

Dr. Efraim Sne= h

Good evening. Firstly, I would like to thank the Friedrich Ebert Fou= ndation for the initiative of this evening, which even if it is not ended i= n full agreement between the parties it will be ended in better understandi= ng of the parties. But I have some doubt about the title =84Can Peace becom= e Reality?" To the same extent it can be asked =84Can Despair become Realit= y?". And this is an inevitable question because the prevailing notion

[Seite der Druckausg.: 23]

is that if there is no agreement very soon there will be confrontat= ion. And confrontation is the ultimate expression of despair. Even Yasser A= bed Rabbo mentioned this option of confrontation and I would like to make a= very clear statement.

Confrontation is not an option. I am allowing myself to say this bec= ause in this confrontation I am not the weaker side. But I think we should = avoid it at all costs. I will explain why. If there is confrontation, this = would destroy confidence on both sides, in both communities, the Israeli an= d the Palestinians. In the visibility of Israeli-Palestinian peace a confro= ntation would stop the negotiation instead of encouraging and stimulating t= he negotiation. In this case the confrontation is not a trigger for an enha= nced negotiation, just the other way. It would stop the negotiation. A conf= rontation would leave Arafat and actually Arafat and the Palestinian people= with a state which is fragmented as you justifiably said on 9% of historic= Palestine. The end of this will mean the Palestinian state will be on 9% o= f historic Palestine. If today the GNP per capita in Gaza Strip and the Wes= t Bank is $ 1,300, this state will have even a lower GNP per capita than th= at. This state would be, and I say it with great concern, this state would = be doomed to poverty, and worst of all it will leave the Palestinian people= and the Israeli people with a conflict with no limit of time, an endless c= onflict. Why endless conflict? Because it will be no partner for peace. In = the future there will be no partners, neither on our side nor on the Palest= inian side.

If this government of ours fails to reach peace with the Palestinian= s which other government has a chance to do it? No one. This would be the e= nd of Oslo, the end of any hope, and when there is no hope, the leadership,= the future leadership will be a leadership which stands out for the lack o= f hope. It will be a leadership which I will not be more specific, at least= I may allow myself to say it, in the Palestinian side it would not be a se= cular leadership. And on our side I am not so sure whether it will be secul= ar as well. After confrontation those who made the despair and the hatred t= heir banner will win.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 24]

You know I must say something: When I spoke to an Israeli audience I= received the same answer. And I would like to ask honestly, in those three= years between Rabin, Peres and Barak =96 Has the peace process gained prog= ress or did it go backwards? More settlements, more hatred, so I don=92t ad= vise anyone to bet or to gamble on the option that the hard line government= in Israel will be like Nixon was to China. It worked in the United States,= in Israel it worked the other way. So I don=92t advise anyone to do this g= amble.

Since I only have ten minutes and part of it I have already used, I = would like to state in the most authorised way: what are the conditions tha= t we try to impose under negotiation? And I will say it one after one and I= don=92t expect any sympathy. Some of these conditions I don=92t have sympa= thy for, either, but I know that it is a result of the reality and I have t= o face reality.

One, that West to the Jordan River there will be no army and no heav= y weapons. There will be a military Israeli presence along the Jordan River= . The solution in Jerusalem is not by repartition, that we shall share Jeru= salem by expanding Jerusalem and not by dividing Jerusalem. And we are sitt= ing here in the most divided capital in history which is Berlin. I don=92t = want a Berlin Wall in the middle of Jerusalem and I don=92t want a Check Po= int. We have to share Jerusalem but an extended Jerusalem, not a divided on= e.

I said very clearly we can share an extended Jerusalem not a divided= Jerusalem. We want to keep most of the settlers under Israeli sovereignty.= We cannot uproot them and if we wait for a solution in 10 more years, they= will be more than 180,000. If we came to the negotiation table before Oslo= there were less than 180,000. But this is the situation right now, and it = is a condition for the implementation of any future agreement that most of = these settlers will be under Israeli sovereignty.

And we cannot accept an influx of refugees to the territory of Israe= l. If somebody wants to influx or to transfer people from Beit Jamali and b= ack to the Galilee this is something which is not acceptable. And I say=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 25]

very clearly these are the Israeli terms. They are not pleasant to a= nybody maybe but they stand out for a certain reality.

It is not conditions that we want to impose. If we want to implement= Israeli-Palestinian agreement we have to keep these terms, otherwise we ar= e speaking in theory. I can say very nice things but it will not be approve= d by the Israeli people. After hearing those conditions no one will convinc= e me that even in spite of those terms that I stated in the most strictly r= esponsible and authorised way, in these conditions one cannot establish a v= iable, economically successful Palestinian state with territorial continuit= y. Not a cluster of enclaves. I don=92t believe in cluster of enclaves. I f= ully understand, maybe more than many others, that the territorial continui= ty is essential for the viability of the Palestinian state. I fully underst= and the need for free access or free passage between the Palestinian state = and other Arab countries.

The Palestinian national dream is having a state which can be a home= land for the Palestinian people with an economy which can be developed, whi= ch can be the fastest growing economy in the Arab world, which will give ho= pe and jobs to a new generation of young Palestinian intellectuals, that wi= ll be integrated not on a colonial basis but which will be connected econom= ically with Israel and with Jordan to maximise the synergy between our peop= le. I believe that it is feasible.

And since it is feasible we have to do it quickly. We have to give u= p many, many dreams in both states. But it is high time. That=92s my messag= e. We can do it, I am sure. I am very familiar with the problems, everythin= g is solvable and, believe me, in five years we will only regret why we did= n=92t do it earlier and this is my message.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer

Thank you very much indeed for another clear and strong message. We = move to the last speaker in this first round. And may I just remind you=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 26]

that we will have another round among the panellists and then move o= n to the general discussion. So it=92s now on Mr. Erler to speak to us.

Gernot Erler

Thank you, Madame Chairperson. Ladies and Gentlemen, I=92ll try to b= e a bit shorter and that is no risk for you, because I am not from the regi= on and I am not a specialist in Middle East affairs, even not after a coupl= e of visits to the region. The last one ended two weeks ago =96 by the way = in a splendid way organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and I am grat= eful for this.

I must confess that after my last visit including a tour throughout = the country, the Golan Heights, the Israeli-Lebanese border, the West Bank = and the Gaza Strip, I came back with more questions than answers. The probl= em is only that the current search for peace in the region does not demand = questions but answers. The bridge or the transfer between hope and reality = in my view needs some conditions or pre-conditions. I=92m not sure after th= at what I have seen that all the conditions we need are really existing jus= t now.

That brings me to my first point. Let me begin with a short look at = the current Israeli position. I think a stable government and the clear pos= ition for the negotiations are important pre-conditions for successful peac= e talks. Unfortunately, in the last few weeks we got the impression that th= e Barak government lost part of their stability inside the coalition. It st= arted with trouble regarding the Shas party and now the National Religious = Party threatens with abandoning the partnership inside the coalition, relat= ed to the government position with regards to the settlement problem.

That means now domestic problems inside the coalition, partly egoist= ic partisan objectives of different coalition partners were mixed up with t= he negotiating position of the government. I think that is the threat. That= =92s by the way not an Israeli speciality, we know that from other democrat= ic

[Seite der Druckausg.: 27]

societies, there is a mixture of domestic and coalition problems an= d objective political positions. But in this case, in this moment, the impa= ct of the coalition problems on the peace process is in my view a very ques= tionable one.

But in addition to that obviously we have also different positions i= nside the government itself. Prime Minister Ehud Barak just now works in fa= vour of a trilateral peace summit, sort of second Camp David and calls the = summit the only way towards a lasting peace treaty. Foreign Minister David = Levy told the public, in the last days, that he finds it too early for a su= mmit and that he denies the whole idea. It is not surprising that under the= se circumstances, Madeleine Albright=92s visit to Israel this week could no= t become a success.

I would like to ask our guests from Israel a question in that contex= t. Is there a chance to improve the stability and workability of the Barak = government to stay a reliable partner in the peace process that is sponso= red and protected and sustained by the United States?

In my view that is the crucial point for the chances of the peace ta= lks and that is the question to the panel for the transfer from hope to rea= lity.

My second point is settlement policy. I totally understand that ther= e must be security for the existing settlers, for their families, for the f= uture of their families. I think without that there could not be a peace pr= ocess, a real lasting peace settlement. But I got the impression from my vi= sit that there is evidence for the continuation of the settlement policy of= the former government. I was surprised about this. I expected a different = impression after all that I have heard here in Germany about the policy of = Barak. But after what I have seen and what we have seen over there in the r= egion, it is evident that there is a great part of continuation with the se= ttlement policy. I have not the right to speak about confiscation of land o= r of occupation policy but what I feel is continuity.

But that is of course again the resource for a question. I do not un= derstand the strategy behind. What is the strategy in the deciding phase of= a

[Seite der Druckausg.: 28]

peace process? To enlarge the problem? I do not speak about solving= the problems that exist. But why enlarge the problem? In my view that is n= ot understandable.=20

I must say that is not only my personal approach. I remember a solut= ion of the European Council held in Berlin in March last year on the Middle= East peace process. There was a chapter that the European Council appealed= to both of the parties to refrain from any actions anticipating results of= the peace process (and there was directly in the language) including conti= nuation of the settlement activities. That is the chapter from the European= Council conclusion on Middle East policy of the last year. So I think that= is also the European approach to this issue.

My last point is connected with the Palestinian position. I find tha= t the negotiating position of the Palestinian side is more or less clear re= garding the boundaries, regarding the refugee problem, regarding more or le= ss also about the status of East Jerusalem. Those are the most important po= sitions. But I wonder what is the role, the proclamation of the Palestinian= state will and can play in the peace process. There is in my view a lack o= f transparency and liability of the Palestinian position.

I got different information about the decision making process within= the Palestinian side, whether they will anyway proclaim statehood on Septe= mber 13, maybe without a treaty, maybe without a result of peace talks, or = maybe later. I think again speaking about pre-conditions of chances, and th= at means speaking about the bridge between hope and reality and that we nee= d transparency, also in this case it is expected from the Palestinian side.

I am not happy that I have more questions than answers, so let me co= nclude with only one statement. I think that Efraim is right when he said c= onfrontation is not an option. I think that is a good basis for a very broa= d consensus between us. The European and the German approach is: we want to= help. If we can we want to assist the peace process. We feel committed to = do that. But at first we have to understand the situation. I=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 29]

think that is not so easy. Maybe our guests can contribute to that a= bit more. Thank you.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudr= un Kr=E4mer

This was the first round. We have all realised that we have a very s= pecial selection of speakers on this panel: They are all committed to peace= . They have all shown it in the past. They are showing it in the present. T= hey are all courageous, etc.. They share some basic assumptions about the p= resent state of affairs and the way things could move in the future.

One remarkable point of agreement is that they all stand for or supp= ort the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state. They all share th= e sense (and it is difficult not to have this sense), that this is a matter= of great urgency, that you cannot afford to wait and that things might get= worse rather than better if you delay decisions and if you do not face up = to some very bitter truths. There are deadlines everyone knows about and th= ere are developments on the ground that account for this sense of urgency.

You have all addressed a number of underlying issues that nonetheles= s make it very difficult to move ahead: You have spoken of the lack of trus= t, of the sense that the participants in the process were not really lookin= g directly into each other=92s eyes, that they were not treated as equal pa= rtners in the process, that some felt they were not given proper respect. Y= ou have spoken of a number of concrete issues that have to be faced and the= y were spelt out with admirable clarity by Mr. Sneh: the issue of the settl= ers, of territory, of refugees, of military presence, and, last not least, = the question of Jerusalem.

If I may just invite you to avoid one thing in the second round, nam= ely to correct each other on minor points, and to focus on the issues which= you think should be addressed in the present situation and possibly even s= uggest a way of doing it. For instance, this idea of sharing an expanded Je= rusalem: What would that mean to both, Israelis and Palestinians?=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 30]

Obviously I don=92t want to impose one issue, but it might be useful= to just take one or two subjects rather than going off in all directions.

We are all trying to be fair and to apply equity and justice as far = as this is possible. Could I suggest a reversal of the speaking order as co= mpared to the first round?

[Voice from panel: Wonderful, everyone will have to stay to the last= .]

I am sure no one would dare or even wish to leave before. They will = be kept spellbound.

If you accept my suggestion, Efraim Sneh will be the first to speak = in the second round.

Dr. Efraim Sn= eh

First, just to resolve the dispute between the two ladies, I have to= carry on myself the responsibility that I officially have. It=92s true I k= now what our policy is because I=92m in charge of it. There is, in this pre= sent stage of the negotiations, there is no confiscation of land. And even = if I agreed to something the Prime Minister does not allow me. We don=92t a= ccept anything which lies in the territory of Jerusalem municipality and th= is is not in the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defence. There is no demol= ition of houses.

What do you think about Walijeh? It=92s inside Jerusalem, it= =92s not in the territory of the West Bank. But here it=92s a different sto= ry. I don=92t argue with you about Walijeh. So if you think about all the d= ata that Ambassador Avital said, it comes from me because I am in charge of= it.

This leads me to refer to the remark of our friend Gernot Erler. I d= on=92t know what you have seen because maybe what people show you are build= ings that were started in the time of the previous government and these are= just now incomplete because we don=92t touch them. If somebody

[Seite der Druckausg.: 31]

signed a contract, paid money and an apartment is waiting for him, = we do not stop it. Now if you ask about the beginning of new settlements th= ere is a very clear policy. We do not expand any settlement. If I, and I ca= n=92t relate the responsibility to anyone else, because I am in charge. I a= m responsible. I am in a permanent fight with the settlers. I speak to them= very very clearly, and they don=92t like it. In the time of the negotiatio= ns, we will not change the map. And it is strictly forbidden to expand or e= ven to start planning expansion of settlements because we consider it somet= hing which is against the spirit of the negotiations.

There are very few exceptions and I will explain exactly one. If in = the middle of the territory of the built up area there is a plot, a piece o= f land which is empty, and there are all the licences, it is approved but n= othing which expands the volume of a certain settlement, then we allow buil= ding. This is the policy regarding settlements. And the fact is that I am a= ccused by the settlers, by the right wing, that we are worse than the Briti= sh Mandate, we hate the Jews, and so on. This is the policy and I am person= ally responsible for this. Nothing can be done without my signature.

Now I will go to the real things. You asked a question: What can be = done to strengthen the government? Is the government stable enough? We took= measures that cost us a very high political price. That we kept Shas which= is an ultra-orthodox party inside the government and Meretz which is our c= losest ally left the government but remained in the coalition and our voter= s are vehemently angry at us, really angry at us. But we did it only for on= e purpose: to secure a parliamentary majority for the Palestinian agreement= . There is no other reason. It=92s against our domestic agenda. We want a p= rogressive, secular Israel. And for this Meretz is the parting lodger. Even= the Likud is a more convenient partner than Shas if it comes to an enlight= ened modern state. But we paid this price and it may cost us votes in the f= uture. And we did it only to give a reasonable broad basis for the future a= greement with the Palestinians. There is for us no other reason whatsoever = to do it.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 32]

But what I am concerned about is not only the majority in the parlia= ment, in the Knesset. We promised to take the agreement with the Palestinia= ns after it is drafted and to get it approved in a referendum. I am concern= ed to have a majority in the people, not a majority in the Knesset, I hope = that I secured my majority in the Knesset. But now I help to build a broad = majority =96 and listen, it is an agreement which brings the building, the = establishment of the Palestinian state, of sharing the territory of the lan= d that we called Israel and the Palestinians called Filistin, to share it, = to a Two State Solution. This is something which we are going to bring to r= eferendum. No one can call it in any other =85 consideration now.

Do I have a chance? And here I said earlier, if I bring an agreement= which doesn=92t divide Jerusalem, which doesn=92t uproot 180,000 Israelis = from their homes and does not set the defence border of Israel 15 kilometre= s from the Mediterranean, if this is the case I tell you I have a clear maj= ority and I can do it because I will gain the majority of Israel, even the = majority of the Jews. If I don=92t do it I have no chance, and this is a de= cision that we face. I am fully convinced in the terms that I told you, we = can have this agreement approved and with a very nice majority. If we take = something from it, I am not so sure. And this is the decision that we have = to accept. =85

Yasser Abed R= abbo

Of course, in this meeting we are not going to negotiate all the iss= ues that are on the agenda. But let me refer to something. I don=92t know w= hen we are speaking about settlements, if we are talking about two differen= t things. What we see on the ground is a process of continuation of the set= tlement policy without any change compared to the policy of the previous Is= raeli government. This is what we see on the ground. The Palestinian peasan= ts are faced in their villages with settlers who confiscate land, including= Palestinian privately owned land and the settlers themselves, under the pr= otection of the Israeli army, they move the fence to include more Pa= lestinian land and territory.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 33]

On this occasion I take the opportunity to ask maybe, and I=92m sayi= ng it seriously, to ask my friend Efraim Sneh, that when we are going back = tomorrow, we=92ll go next week on a tour. It=92s not a continent, it=92s no= t Australia, it needs one day, one hour to look and see near my house, A= rumala, I watch a city which is being newly built called Keriatsava<= /u>, and I watch the infrastructure of a new city, a new settlement. I have= many examples. The last example which I read in the Israeli newspapers, th= at Mr. Yitzhak Levy, the Minister of Housing, had issued a tender a few day= s ago to build a new settlement with 400 housing units. This was only the d= ay before yesterday. And there are other examples about this.

But anyway the people are witnessing the fact that the policy is con= tinuing inside Jerusalem, outside Jerusalem, around Jerusalem and in all Pa= lestinian territories. This is one point.

The second point is that we will declare the establishment of a Pale= stinian state. And we cannot do it on a symbolic basis, just a symbolic dec= laration. It=92s impossible to do that, and by the way we did this symbolic= declaration over 12 years ago in Algeria. Now this should be implemented o= n the ground. It should be a fact. And we wish that this will be the result= of Israeli withdrawal, so that the Palestinian state will be the outcome o= f declaring sovereignty of the Palestinian authority on the ground and esta= blishing a state. We cannot say it should be the outcome of the negotiation= s.

And let me differentiate between the two things. Because we will nev= er accept to make our right in self-determination questionable and an issue= of negotiations. What is under negotiations is the implementation of 2 : 4= : 2 and not our right to self-determination and to creating a Palestinian = state. So for this reason we said that the time limit for this is the 13th of September.

I listen to the Israeli conditions and positions which Mr. Sneh has = repeated today. For me, for all the Palestinians, all the Arabs, all the Is= lamic world, all the Christian world, Jerusalem is Jerusalem. I cannot expa= nd Jerusalem and include some villages here or there and then share=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 34]

it, divide it by the way, let=92s not hide ourselves behind words. I= n all the pole positions there=92s a kind of a division of Jerusalem. And w= ho says that Jerusalem is not divided by the way? We want the solution that= will unite Jerusalem, that will make it a real open city. But this solutio= n cannot be reached if one part of Jerusalem does not recognise the right o= f the other part on an equal basis. If one part of Jerusalem will want to a= nnex the other part and to tell us, well, compose a new capital for yoursel= f and call it Jerusalem in the outskirts of present Jerusalem. For these so= lutions I sometimes =96 forgive me to be frank =96 admire the Israeli imagi= nation, sometimes, but in this case I don=92t admire it. Because such compl= icated issues cannot be resolved in naming regions and villages, giving the= m another name, it is impossible.

I cannot look =96 it=92s a bad example =96 at somebody and say well = if I call her Brooke Shields she will look prettier, this is impossible. So= this is not the case. Jerusalem is Jerusalem. Let=92s face the facts. We d= on=92t want a division of the city. We want to create a unity of the city b= ut on a real basis, on the basis that the Palestinians will have their righ= t in this city as a part of the Palestinian territory that was occupied in = 1967.

I listen sometimes to the expression used =84separation". There are = different terminologies that are used here. Sometimes we speak about separa= tion. Sometimes we speak about a united city, an open one. Sometimes we spe= ak about division or sharing or whatever. We don=92t want this formula of s= eparation if it means to build a wall between the two sides. We want open b= orders. We want open relations. We want to have really the kind of relation= s that we can develop in the future.

But these relations cannot be built unless we solve something today.= We solve the basic issues. When I listen to the 4 or 5 no=92s to Jerusalem= . Take any part and call it Jerusalem, whatever you like. No to the refugee= s, no to the settlements, in fact no to any solution for the settlements be= cause the majority of the settlements will be dealt with as settlement bloc= ks. The Palestinians will have no borders, except with Israel and may be th= ey will have access or a road, or whatever it is, to the outside world. Thi= s is not a solution that can live. This is a solution which is against=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 35]

international legality, against the facts on the ground and the solu= tion will carry in itself the seeds of continuing confrontation.

Confrontation is not my choice. Confrontation is the choice of a bad= solution or a non-solution that is imposed on us. Confrontation was never = our choice. We wanted to reach a solution but at the same time there=92s a = wide-spread attitude among the Palestinians, and I want to say it clearly t= oday. This attitude is based on, and I will say it in blunt words, it is ba= sed on the fact that Israel which had refused to accept 4 : 2 : 5 for over = 20 years, had accepted 4 : 2 : 5 through the Lebanese language. So let us u= se the Lebanese language in the negotiations with Israel. This is an attitu= de which is spreading among the Palestinians and among the region.

Why? Because there=92s a feeling that there is a strong side and the= re is a weak side. And the strong side wants to impose its conditions onto = the weak side. With these conditions that Mr. Sneh has repeated, I know thi= s, what are the bitter compromises that you made in any of these conditions= ? You kept the settlements, all of them, the majority of them, 80% of them.= You kept them, you kept the borders, you kept Jerusalem under your control= , you kept everything that you want, you kept the facts on the ground. Wher= e is the bitter compromise you reached? And you kept the refugees outside. = In this case, I know we are not going to negotiate today, but this is not e= ven a starting point. Thank you very much.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer

It is a thankless task to cut people short who have important things= to say and the issue is as I said vital and not an object of academic deba= te. I am fully aware of that and yet, if you=92re going to allow the audien= ce to have something to say as well, rather than just sit and listen for tw= o hours and more I have to impose the rule of time and the sense of urgency= even in this formal matter.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 36]

Colette Avita= l

I would like to look at the audience and try to figure out what the = audience leaves this place with. Are they leaving with a confused mind abou= t, what=92s going to happen? Are they going to leave, desperate about what = is going to happen? And I would like to say to you two things.

First, I think that in the whole history of the State of Israel we d= id not have to face the kind of decisions that we=92re taking now. I think = that the decision which Ehud Barak is called to take by the 13^th= September is equal in its weight on our lives in Israel and in the whole r= egion as that of Ben Gurion when he established the State of Israel. I thin= k maybe one does not understand and appreciate the weight of that decision = and I think therefore it requires courage. And when I said that it requires= courage I did not mean only on the Palestinian side. I am speaking only fo= r the Israeli side. It requires courage because the Israeli population is a= population that also feels that it has a certain experience because the co= nflict is a very highly emotional one. Our conflict with the Palestinians a= nd therefore the solutions cannot be compared to those we have had in the p= ast with the Egyptians or with the Jordanians. Our attachment to the land i= s not equal to that because we never had a real attachment to the land of E= gypt, to the Sinai.

I think one has to realise, that this kind of a conflict was a highl= y emotional one because it was existential, and when it=92s existential, it= is action and reaction and action and reaction, and there have been trauma= s.

And when I listen to some of my colleagues getting up and making fie= ry speeches in the Knesset, about giving up Abu Dis as if Abu Dis was part = of our heritage, believe me it=92s not an easy thing.

Now, the Ehud Barak government decided to give up three Arab village= s, to pass them on to the Palestinian Authority very soon. Abu Dis was one = of them, and the government almost fall on that issue, even though the deci= sion had already been taken in 1995. When we managed to pass that through t= he parliament, and, yes, with the help of Shas by the way (and let me tell = you if we had had =85 in the government we=20

[Seite der Druckausg.: 37]

could not have taken such a decision. So this is my only answer abou= t the stability of the government). Soon as we passed that decision one day= afterwards there was an outburst of hostilities and of violence in the ter= ritories.

And the Israeli public with usual emotion and stereotypes said, and = maybe rightly so, =84Aha, you see, you see what you=92re doing? You=92re en= dangering us." You=92re putting us to the test and this is what we=92re get= ting back. Why? Because it is very easy for any public that has gone throug= h traumas to go back to stereotypes and say =84Aha you see we cannot trust = them".

I am only mentioning this because it is very easy to fall into despa= ir, and to say there is despair. There is also despair on the Israeli side.= And our role as leaders is to try and overcome that despair and to move on= wards and to try to build other images. And it=92s not going to be easy for= anyone.

And believe me, you will see demonstrations in Israel and you will s= ee ugly pictures painted of Ehud Barak with the Kuffiyek. And you will see = many right wingers saying to Ehud Barak =84You are a traitor". And we will = have to overcome that.

Decisions are not going to be easy for us and because many people in= Israel feel that we are abiding by agreements and that we do not get an eq= ual response from the other side. This is part of the public opinion that w= e live with.

And there are ministers in the government of Israel who would like t= o leave the government because they feel that we should not give up Abu Dis= now, since we do not get anything in return from the Palestinians. This is= the situation under which we live and I=92m saying this because we have to= take into account, the government must survive if we want to reach an agre= ement: we have to be fair on the one hand and to go step by step, taking so= metimes resolutions which are not very popular.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 38]

I think that despair is not a strategy. I choose hope as a strategy = and I would like not to expand on that but I would like everyone here to th= ink that if hope is a strategy, then it means that we act from a point of v= iew that things are doable, that things are possible, that we may make one = more effort and one more effort. And I know that the bridges are not easy t= o cross and we have done difficult things before.

And let me just mention one of them. I have listened very carefully = to what Yasser Abed Rabbo had to say about Lebanon. And I would like people= to understand =96 and maybe many of you understand this already =96 we hav= e not left Lebanon because of weakness. It took courage to decide to pick u= p and go without any counterpart, and it is very easy now for people to say= the Israelis have been defeated. We have left Lebanon because we have deci= ded that, because we said one year ago we were going to do it, with or with= out an agreement. And let me just explain that what has happened in Lebanon= is not the kind of model that is going to happen between us and the Palest= inians. And I hope that I have misunderstood the statement of Mr. Abed Rabb= o, I hope that the idea of using Lebanon as a model and the language of thr= eat as a model is not going to be the kind of relationship that we are tryi= ng to build. Thank you.=20

Dr. Hanan Ash= rawi

It is not often that I find myself almost speechless, I=92m almost s= peechless but not entirely, I am overwhelmed.

Well, first of all, I would just like to point out that when people = talk about both sides making difficult decisions, we have to remember that = both sides do not enjoy equal power. We do not occupy Israeli land, we do n= ot hold Israeli prisoners, we have not confiscated any of your land nor hav= e we demolished homes. And I would also like on this occasion to invite bot= h Colette and Efraim to come and visit the people whose lands have been con= fiscated, whose homes have been demolished. So you can tell them that this = is a fiction, this is a figment of their own imagination.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 39]

Because also last month we had a meeting in Gaza and most of the = people couldn=92t go because there was the closure. And not only that but = I think you should tell all the people of Gaza and the West Bank why they c= annot go to Jerusalem which is Palestinian because there are check points t= hat tell you if you don=92t have a blue ID you cannot get through to Jerusa= lem. So I think, yes, I agree we should be very honest in our presentation = of realities and truths.=20

Secondly, I find a new language. I know Colette has always been very= warm and gentle in her presentation and I appreciate this warmth and gentl= eness. But there is a new diction about uprooting people from their homes, = uprooting Jews from their homes, uprooting Israelis from their homes. I don= =92t consider the settlers who live next to my house, people who are in the= ir homes, they are in my home. And they are there illegally and they would = not be there except for the power of occupation and land confiscation.=20

I would like the same sympathy for the Palestinians who were uproote= d from their ancestral homes =96 not from Brookland, =85 people are from Br= ookland, they speak American, they don=92t speak Hebrew =96 Palestinians wh= o have lived for thousands of years in Palestine. Now we=92re telling them = they have no right to return, a right that all refugees in the world have, = except for Palestinians. While Israel can legislate a law of return. Now if= there is enough room for any Jew in the world to come to Israel, I don=92t= see why there is no room for the original people of the land to go to thei= r homes. After all, Israel was recognised on the basis of its acceptance, w= as admitted to the UN on the basis of its acceptance of Resolution 194, not= just 181.

Now to remind you of the lack of symmetry: The Two State Solution. O= f course, we are all attached to the land. The Palestinians are attached to= their land also, not theoretically, I mean there are land deeds, property,= villages, even cactus to tell you about the villages that were dest= royed. I don=92t want to go into that, this attachment to the land has to b= e translated on both sides by recognition that there are Palestinian rights= and that the

[Seite der Druckausg.: 40]

land can be shared and that when the Palestinians accepted the Two = State Solution, it was a historical turning point.

And that should be appreciated. But the Two State Solution is not op= en ended. I still think, I am of those =96 I think within Palestine you are= going to see two points of view =96 but I still believe that the Two State= Solution is possible, to share the land, that=92s the only way. However, t= here are many who believe that it=92s already too late, that if you continu= e the fragmentation of the West Bank, separation of West Bank and Gaza, con= trol over our borders, building more settlements and bypass roads with extr= a-territoriality, and, of course, maintaining the settlements and the settl= ers under Israeli sovereignty, creating an apartheid situation. That alread= y the conditions are too late for a viable Palestinian State and therefore = for a Two State Solution.

There are many Palestinians, I am sure you have heard and you have r= ead, who are calling for the bi-national state. And that such a Palestine i= s non-viable and has no hope for any future as an active democratic player.= So I would say that even as the PLO Central Council is ready to meet on Su= nday/Monday to discuss this issue, that if Israeli ideology continues to ma= ke the Two State Solution not a viable option, then it seems to me Zionism = will self negate it because as we discussed this afternoon you cannot take = the land without the people and you can=92t continue to fragment and tear a= part the Palestinian land and then say, well, we still have the option of t= he Two States. It=92s not going to happen.

And I certainly would repeat, I do not want a quasi-state. I do not = want an autonomy to be called a state. We know what states are. And if we w= ant to overcome the whole historical legacy of one nation entirely denied i= ts land, its rights, its future, its right to development, then I think we = have to understand that self-determination has to be exercised so we can be= engaged in the region as equals and we can make peace. But in the absence = of that, of a viable state, non-fragmented, contiguous, with sovereignty, w= ith boundaries then I don=92t think that there will be peace.

[Seite der Druckausg.: 41]

I am for hope but I don=92t think you can make peace only with wonde= rful words and proclamations. Hope is something that is translated into ded= icated, concrete, systematic, committed action on the ground. And in so muc= h as I do not presume to tell the Israelis how to run there own lives, or t= heir economy, or to solve their own internal problems, I hope that the Isra= elis will not tell us how to run our own state or to think that we have the= responsibility.

So I just want to end by saying that I also believe there is a third= party role. If you don=92t understand =96 you said, you have to understand= , but I=92m sure you do since you=92ve been there and you=92ve seen what=92= s going on. I believe that it=92s not just a bilateral issue. The Palestini= an question has always been an international responsibility, and UN resolut= ions are resolutions taken by the international community. And I believe pe= ace is a global investment and we are a real test case because this is the = most complex situation. I think there is a role for the EU, I think there i= s a role for Germany. And I think that there is room now to be creative and= to look at what went wrong and to intervene in a positive way to rectify i= t. This is the best way to translate hope into action. Thank you.=20

Prof. Dr. Gudrun Kr=E4mer

Thank you very much indeed. We have had a number of clear and though= tful statements, and I don=92t think anyone came to this room expecting cle= ar answers to all the problems that people on the ground and in the world a= t large are faced with when talking about peace and hope in the Middle East= . Of course that always leaves a certain sense of dissatisfaction because s= ome issues have not been addressed. Others have been addressed in a way tha= t did not please everyone. Some issues have been left in the open as some c= riticism could not be responded to and, last but not least, we have already= spent two hours, or more than that.=20

=A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | technical su= pport | net edition=20 fes-library | Januar 2001

------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAADBZgxBAcPDz9tDZ4yBNeWCAoKCzxpCmvODm7HCNqbDA0FBzlsDN2YCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaJo6T8M6aizPtFo8RvkwZPOIvoeQN2r1foHHAcV4CB6DmnQq AjiujgQ0ANkdgT/CYvAgiIwjX/WBgEHGDQiDCBAMuNR8Ssjnuw99CnhqIzdREAaBeBAAZHwDMHMj AWQFepclVlhYXA4AJARuoZwkDmYjoSQBWS54AJ8jVqeYtCNNbl1EYLsigKdovF4nc3UCsLW0AQIC i7YIJAwCvMWwDM8jA9IQCg+4EKtyRNxLyOXm5+jpVAAMBezH6vEiTX1CMMK8QUIClmdxaT9ELHjC h1+4WFvkTQmAQMAvXRAIEYJwww2wiAG5wYNgRlIdBM0UzkjU7wxEid0cUxwQoKDIv10ElDAZQMab SBkAoJgQcDKgGoYPjuHDKMIOE5CJctyUQSbBJgdctBjwBOjfxAUJpXpK9I/AMqcOGgiII+lbpaWY Rm2MMWoWqCtu1YUAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAACBNeRBAcPDz9nCNqTBZg9DZ47DA0FBzlpCmvGCAoODm7KCzxsDN2YCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+qWAQDwE8B/KMTOH8v4Do0SgxGKTGYwB0ACDKhxQJ q1ohD4OIhhPphL2mQ4gtAoAF3w+gZAKfSgjgoHg8r/hWnSC6CUgMUoIPDlFSgFQihoJFcSMDD4l5 kyNnZBAEDiMBTphiY2dvn2uhTU+lY5SqJpB8Bq8FEAFEImFNZLSISUumUDtedqvCEAkPCloQCwW5 EEcozLWSSpoljgQCAnfD29zd3t/g4S4OSyMCD2QHXYGDhIuLgw3wtIsCCeJVBn8QA9gIIgWoODsB rZk0QiYcEUOIzwWNARAEDCgWQB01doOoFRyoqB09Qg50IGvoQl8/EQoQLgTkIYnExoPUdslSIIAP SRc3yi2swUMNkABnHiyIaXCXmzW+RqgrcOmm06cpQgAAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_oben.gif R0lGODlhoAAPAMQAAICZsxBAcCBNeTBZg/Dz9qCzxnCNqWCAoODm7NDZ45CmvLDA0FBzlsDN2UBm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAACgAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+cCzLwGNAtXM2T5mTD4DJ8dAJHo2kaPFoOhkQoi5A SDZEStLB6Vxgr5DCY6tjBkQOhyE4a6+2h9PPxPMVgcISsVb4jhhjCAkjRFt9EFlZJYI1AyNWBGdS ODYlAQJumSkCaY6an6CgA2mhpRBrXA+ONalCXESpTVexV7B5iGAiCk2YaE0Kj2A8qSJHbI8Pkb46 EAMJqQhQppm7TQkAZ5StWD0kcyK0UUVHfVlUfQMPwOIOR16JqTpiZwkEwRBMnHdIhGnt025qKEhz 4JmOGgb8/XNgMBslZuAKKHQ0CQIVfms8iagXoOJFYbksPjgkAg6uEdWY//FY4GDUrlsAY8qcSbOm CwEGACQcwUnhQn8dfXaK4tNRUIcDNFpsSeLoiKQiRvns57AZUxEdqw4AoBOizRZUEjgScADBQRsK e9Uh6kBMQqYjJ4ojoOzkCAQIKvnKq1ZYgqmU8JJoQODYpIs3LJaF+XXTg78mEKblZsdrXH8Ui4jB pGjeLk9SNttt8BdoszHkghEBNolw40wCACzISwCTZH9qu434BuHy0Embs2yRJpgdhF0OEpVOc4aA l1MPpCkhNylBLi6MXw/pJQKQEN7IKuMZcodSFQjU0wDqU7HGebsjFhBQyONMliN5dWxZ5yu7dhIM 5OUEAdKwgl1vTkDEWyY4FVFyRQIIlABHgzWARMIa0mBFwCCKXMRMANV04dV/JJZoYgshAAA7 ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_inhalt.gif R0lGODlhaQAPALMAAICZsxBAcPDz9iBNeaCzxjBZg9DZ42CAoLDA0HCNqeDm7FBzlsDN2UBmjP// /wAzZiH5BAAAAAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAT58MlJq7046827/xzjTAzzDA7TOM2zJk3cGOazOIdkCNIK WKsWaEi0iEgCB6HHcjVJNYki+WNWXbGEAxYrej+OcLM0CSRbQQp5VzngVuLwL/2td2SNwKPQKJTz DwGAEwV+f0ISggMTeI12jxhHEiUoS2kveDQTBA4BAA6GPkBPkKUVkg9kgQJnToipJgEOCHizTleM pKa7vL2+v8DBXnEtIgJ6rslQFJ8Oi1YTcdLCXqglnIuXuqp7OAoKubhMr9RE1ibY2tIpEwIIJ0rQ FXTlRecSn59o2zUI6wu3RpGr52EGCz3cmu17RcYNwAn+BCnBk00XwYsYOUQAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_titel.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAABBAcDBZg6CzxiBNefDz9uDm7HCNqdDZ45CmvGCAoLDA0B9MeYCZs8DN2UBm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+4sOUTVMyD+k8guM7AcjOYWrkRDUIgNAYCnm/oOJI ahRgrsAP6gNAkoCf4BHd9aJPIo1q5Ymc5p9jADk8DG8CwYuFyUY7D4IkODqChw82gYiLZF82IwWO OzMlAGOHDXR9LFpyPwtyYZ8+AaNyQWF8gD9eWkEiqkqkm0IGDA6rnC5/VZAjhYBcpWlFbJoPCsVx xDi6EAW/uyu9I0mEVE+VhmpVx7F6k9VvDwgkCePT6uvs7e7v8PErRoiHBoz1mY2Cio4kjF8EbYKT b8YAO4cKdJMXYxsSaRCCkXNIbiGSY2PoEKSIzqEZhiPSXQOWbV+iYmusSdkY40McIhtGihAA2ZAG RInaTDhJ+VAEDhxEKN14UEtENJoQqoU5cGAhTmbEdhgQ5cBOrkckxVEMiCDAAAMECjxDSpbdqKIw QgAAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_digbib.gif R0lGODlhHADoAKIAAP///73e/2Ol/4S1/0KM/yF7/wBj/wAAACwAAAAAHADoAEAD/2i63P4wyjle CWSaEbr/X6ExBQBkAaAMQDW+8HrGUeewAq1HJSAyqdxuKBgYj0jkD1ZgmZ6BpST1rFpnE4HNAAJJ I84OlECgDs9oSU+UUgQ1xaTc+B1xrthhMzCo8/BjdiYKgCYZMVSFAAE0BWR+aTAEJkIkKYyRmZqb k1VRm0NOV5iIhYegGj2AGDoCq3ocfKeotCMlpAs4tbsOlx4mH4a8qVYGa3qPwy+TmC0ylS9bDLrK 1Z1SnRnMEARGK3N0Md2JAQKQECkDZOvswtXv8PEOwCJNT7MQsV2LIfINF1UMdKKxjYsKg9CYdBtg zp+DgjsSKcoTL44JOZRoDNq0R//Wjlu9ACTU0GmUPyeETMmTqAhfvB7lyGhxp4adqxYy052rpQVT l37+ylw05mknEGcpGdCcMnGpw6cTjrXZgFQSIBfxWKp8CnMSwyBGQ2ZgIYYiPIstkmSMsfEjGQXs 4hIIywuckYYwFvXCRHbEzSsVerikhdJAS4d/+ZGjaxDrPLPomkKGSrmy5ctcNX5acHOwBFEz1+oA KLKUZM+YR8dCQ8WMQdQPCk5l4XjERYD2fLQaxTi1mjtXYDuAOac3UVw04hwBJiesVkDCfU9om6sq habGDR+UjkoUlOwGN+c2DrF6bQ2XfpAG750e9xiFD09Y+A0c+NTP8UR/z2MhXh3I+SFH0iJfpEND ClLghp5kk/0j14Nz8SfIQfJJ+FER+y2gykUsnRcZJjep51RkWFE34gP5WZGhhSxaWEBoxkR4IIcH pbCiQHoZJIOHTJVjIxXgkQbMSC02kKKKRZ601TI5IoVgDCBx8QltyalDFBRJ2radeS+0h0d21GV5 HYVL9ncIhMmIGUFTm8FBoAK45UZkA+W5MUOdEEBhRCIiUDmCUFBAc19l8ZWpZi1eupcXJUsAyuMN OT4UZg3WNXBiSE3tp5xdfRz6XgIAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/fes-log1.gif R0lGODlhfQBPAPIAAP////f3/4yM/4SE/0pK/wgI/wAA/wAAACH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAB9AE8AQAP/ CLrc/jDKSau9T5jNuyGFJxIBMHRkKHKCum6EsBAvV8iBW5SAQNctG4+R68gAPE0tVeMQTKjia+cy HBmnpmgnHUm6WpYiiXJ0d+OqocoEqlc3xW8zmHlAQuT8FdygG2BHZE14WjJvKHtLYFMDQz2CCwFX SJQYXwpKU4wvhS8DiiOPmWU9o4ATAXWXmD1annBxr3urch61mh8OAgKjAb69rBY8YDG/LTEDyooE ygM+HaAdBc7KvNVszgJZMA970Fuj3GuKN7+TzGMQPmpPrkYMtHvU1ZSBWKUN37R2Noh0DPqEA6Yt mJlzvhAq/JUK4Zdr1gxKUvjFIZFt9U4J28ix/6PHj7ncEdExZN64NmvMVKGUawWulTrK+YpBUiU8 JKSc2PQD5s/JM75W6mvCy4OgfxssjQG6M6m6j1Cjqpr0C9SxbRqjBswnSSgSFyj/xIvGwGvObnp4 qV2LkS1bElpxvkPboEotAKF4OuDXUmnIiREYQhCsFViBw4eNYazGOGK9xY2fQY5sTZW2DNUmLVa6 YPIQdB6ocU6zpZmlvmM5SLNBoHVre2ah6NxrZA8suLJXiKwwREUzZe3OOu1Hx/aX2HhDN4OVkt/Q EePInQMnRm7c69iza9/OnfvC7+APnlsKvkT5wecBWQR0jRex9eJPtRxR5bDLkJyMIL2T3N8bKv82 zEVUTYB4NYgfjPWiQ1co/JSNNvc859IC4wDIR2APVqNIJAIW4FprjiAVhwIOTvMhSlbQFsZwX22C oQ2UGSjcbqTpFV0dJTrBWE+uqXEDPwGE9suCoXjYmgoCicVgdcR8eNcYJzYAyomuOULliT5cWVkD Wb4W0JWusQcCYh4+c6JGOz413x37wRUkIXnZEMybYVxlnmZ2EiNRXAd+8J1dmYAFFEXO5ebUdFEc sxASio733XV9rpAfPJMWN80yoXFZinvl9VIeOnzO2JQBd8WppC3+cLXVbD5o5tarr2a1UaT0rWjf Es719MhfkkjmVkS/ysqRsN1p5yqeahHL537/K34gTxMe2mqcikmVw1mFetj6mXCnanoTqpbONlhs J3lTGxD4oKtSDERIEqdeAqZIHKnvkjrSt4bSCK4VfN1i6DRSNkGYdZ1talRq4dL1QIQ1buCLUYXG W8OIBVKaLbRDoDbvagqPqlSl8EZclr89MEsxwcWmrPLKLLfs8sswxyzzzDTXvCyZOFOTM2JeBspz Djsj1kLQPc8QtJHE4PzIAIhQQeYpQAut5ivMppQjH1X72Z8hANS0plEE3sskt24Nqko2UehQtl1q hdJaNMeokWQA5fiKx9weTy3ukmtkfGnaAVZcXcE13AXTxFmdAYGMEgPuh1py47cfwxQuwQsz/5MW cFyzYzfuBMhaXx0Ocv++Yt4/3fLdLIe8ik3ONFdcfSrlLXbChur8jRu4A4y3zrfmAumSr+KCs0h3 aIDWdzproUmEDt7Fy9unvkz1tI3jWDdbh3MtPbEg6FaErTrrqiLhgd+L7Bf8Fo5sjPv5nSEVPNQH o2zzR1dxqhF8+FPmzCSUcZ7/HBPAXQ3wf5nQHygq46pifc0JJhsSnMLwBPDtQH+q6IV7rEIVXmQn UjkLnmvu0BOcvY01JxTCmG7lHz+t5Rmu0mAMXqisS0xvVLUQlPj2VQvK8Ypun/JUp2p4gT7RA0LZ gMUhEvEh6thLOAbY1aZSkYrRzAqKQjKZgv+awLGJnaYUwHpVGH+lr44YkUrFuEa9fqONNa5jU8Ia mBmsKIwbRu8uX+vWN0SYgVJMZYhBJOIwuNUYEbaNEAlyzjxG0TqqDEYCe4IKrW6RtfXdoVAtwaOq sLIQISrEg9gZwgEhEhnCjBIy9mhMry4zR08tZSKRTBn/7keBRXkkhjUE3yyiUa81SKt8W+NX/RwQ HR4wjRCPKMkWOOeEZ0Hrl3ublxPhlS6eFImFn9MbNRm1qsEFs4tlHJk3y0UtYU6omnCYiRPId6ms aIyH09LdOIG5D8RVrhOBMcO8REE4bzrzE66TF4noeS4W8LF0jyPCAFHGDoDGixL/PGfDBJp9L3Ox wDnFjI6c0CmkOE7rnd+M58LIBTDeFRQgEyUEe3hxu4yd7HisGmZIgTm+gOLmYtYkC0e9WE40GDMM fwBpRMM5UUvoMg4iwykLVLEFbNKBGJ3JCzV2hTOIkokdPDvOVRd2zC1IZIUnG8lWx9BVfraLlmhN q1rXytaZJQAAIf4zUmVkdWNlZCAzMSUgQCB3d3cucmFzcGJlcnJ5aGlsbC5jb20vZ2lmd2l6YXJk Lmh0bWwAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/lone2.gif R0lGODlh2QEbALMAAAAAABgYGDExMVJSUmtra4yMjK2trbW1tcbGxufn5+/v7/////////////// /////yH5BAEAAA8ALAAAAADZARsAQAT+8MlJq7046827/2AojmRpnmiqrmzrvnAsW8lBCEEF7Dwg 7T/fgzcEAovBoO8oRCKJzqOodsvplsPohCmUdhSIAmFg6VG4v223iSZ6QWAx+dxDR9fL5jc8LmPt RnhJM4SFhh0JBgMBeoZvGmYsiYuNhxOTjJaSipkpjx6YlZqjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vV2qwhFBForJO npEtnytSvYMxv7ezxcYPobGDgGvLzbZ3ztDRI8mxbs/MINa41Nq5bc9TnI3D0nd52+R+uHbQtcfx llQ4Afb3+Pn6+/z9/v/4BBA4kEBEnDEDEipcyLChw4QECiBQsEfOw4sYM2KMOBFOAgT+BwyIHEmy pMmTJA8gSECRg4KPIVHKnFlSJUt5OHPq3Mmzp8+fpl6CNKAsF9ALQkP6CQSsqAcFLwvSmdH0A9QE Urs1rfo06tJgR8PK4Bbsm9k6555kwwNPHSV2f9ikowZqHQYodeTSfeMuBFlwbM+67TR1Wt4kccUq rvtWE1d2K/6OkoyT8ojHFywv3jzWLmdE5PKKHk06wAADWTWEIs26teu8plGrqwKwtj6BBEHTts3b Hu7UnxcnpUm8uPHjJm22DHEVq/Pn0KNLhw7VatTp2LNr1149uPfv4MOLH0++vPnz6I++Xs++vfv3 8OPLn0+/vv37+PPr38+/P+v0rDT+VxRmPQl4hVzE0HWCObwkiAKDdzn4YF8AinfQHFohqBc2dJjj xS5qqUGgBRculccwDI443IEXgLhLJDDONcKKhQGWooxPwUTUgTLGuEU3Fer0143nCKagj95IiIFk RmTxIV7iIGIDDi3W0heSRim4zZRWZFjkWltWAReU0nAYJE9D6pXkl5AZSWE1nslippGMEVYlWGzi +Wad5aj5yDd8tvmmGSCeWVmcgInopzgv4ogWYhqWwGQXZSE54qTwuIilLWDC2ZiXSiyaJQeTZvgk kIYe+ukhmKmpgmaGwGqMrB+MSAGtqYqHa3C7xtCrK6vtFxtwS4bG37C5HhOsf8xhAoCsXwbs1htA v+lWz7TYUjsQsRpcqNG3DXG0XLd8gGvuQuIma4y357brrrvpMqcjcsYp98W89OZLnL1wXLfdv9F1 94W/ABeMlcDqztKcwQw37DBL4yYs8cQUV2zxxS1GAAA7 ------MultipartBoundary--XPPCcCPHOIaeDYXkMFXG5vxeAlbPm9kANqIalQaVGJ------