From: Snapshot-Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/stabsabteilung/01090.htm Subject: =?utf-8?Q?Lebanon=20:=20a=20critical=20assessment=20/=20Fawaz=20A.=20Gerg?= =?utf-8?Q?es=20-=20[Electronic=20ed.]=20-=20Bonn,=202001=20-=2017=20S.=20?= =?utf-8?Q?=3D=2055=20KB,=20Text.=20-=20(FES-Analyse)=20
Electronic=20e?= =?utf-8?Q?d.:=20Bonn=20:=20FES=20Library,=202001=20

=C2=A9=20Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung?= Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 14:33:52 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE----" ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: text/html Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/stabsabteilung/01090.htm Lebanon : a critical assessment / Fawaz A. Gerges - [Electronic ed.] - Bonn, 2001 - 17 S. =3D 55 KB, Text.= - (FES-Analyse) <br>Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001 <br><br><font size=3D-1><i>=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung</i></font>
FES 3D"HOME" 3D"MAIL" 3D"SEARCH" 3D"HELP" 3D"NEW"
3D"[DIGI=
=3D"TITELINFO"


Lebanon : a critical assessment / Fawaz A. Gerges - [Electronic ed.] - Bonn, 2001 - 17 S. =3D 55 KB, Text.= - (FES-Analyse)
Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

=3D"INHALT"








  • Neither the withdrawal of Israel's forces nor the death of As= sad in 2000 seemed to have changed a basic fact about tiny Lebanon: it is s= till being used as a staging arena for its neighbours' military-diplomatic = operations and a political football kicked at their political convenience. = Unfortunately, the Lebanese people are active agents and participants in th= is charade.

  • Israel presented a peaceful face to the world, demonstra= ting its respect for international obligations by its withdrawal from Leban= on as stipulated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 425. Israel portrayed = itself as a besieged state, willing to live peacefully with its neighbours,= who supposedly continue their aggression and who threaten its very existen= ce.=20

  • The atmosphere is prepared internally and externally for= Israel to retaliate against its two neighbours in case hostilities are res= umed. It would be the height of misguided brinkmanship to count that= Israel would remain passive in the future. It is in Lebanon's natio= nal interests to cooperate fully with the United Nations.=20

  • Lebanon should not expect any Western aid to rebuild the= devastated south as long as the Lebanese-Israeli border remains volatile. = The Syrian leadership appeared to know that the rules of game have changed = in south Lebanon. Its critical reading of the dangerous new situation motiv= ated it to cooperate fully with the UN efforts to maintain stability.

  • Beirut's ability to build a modern state depends to a la= rge extent on redefining the one-sided Syrian-Lebanese relationship. The pr= oject of a modern state in Lebanon is unlikely to be implemented as long as= the political survival of its ruling elite remains dependent on Damascus. = Constructing a modern state will remain out of reach as long as Lebanese-Sy= rian interactions are hostage to tribal and sectarian interests rooted in B= eirut's complex political system.

  • The results of the summer 2000 Parliamentary elections r= eflected the dismal failure of the Huss cabinet to tackle the structural pr= oblems in the Lebanese economy: financial restructuring, reducing the total= budget deficit and national debts as well. Internal political bickering an= d short sightedness also complicated the government's efforts to tackle the= entrenched socio-economic crisis.

  • Lebanon experienced the slowest growth of all Arab count= ries, zero percent growth in GDP, the total budget deficit amounted to $3 b= illion, or 52.2 percent of spending. The public debt also increased by ten = percent, standing at about $24 billion and expected to top $27 billion by t= he end of 2001.


3D"Page <= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Next Item">

Israel's retre= at from South Lebanon: implications

Israel's 22-year occupation of a security zone in southern Lebano= n is a classic case of power overextension. Israeli decision makers belated= ly discovered that their ambition to dominate tiny Lebanon and isolate it f= rom its natural environment crashed on the rocks of intangible variables. I= sraeli leaders miscalculated egregiously in assuming that their military su= periority would trump the resolve of the Shiite followers of Hizbullah (Par= ty of God). Despite a huge imbalance of forces between Israel and "the Isla= mic resistance", Hizbullah delivered painful blows to Israel's military app= aratus and forced it into a protracted, costly war of attrition whose conse= quences reverberated within Israeli civil society. This two-decade conf= lict finally mobilized Israeli public opinion to demand an end to Israel's = occupation of the so-called security belt in south Lebanon.=20

A qualification is in order here: Hizbullah's achievement could easi= ly be reversed by Israel and turned into a strategic defeat unless Lebanon'= s humble victory is conceptualised and its lessons learned: the critical= question is, what does a victor do with his victory, and what does a defea= ted power do with its defeat?

One of the major shortcomings that afflicted the Arabs from the onse= t of their conflict with Israel was belittling of the Jewish state's will t= o power and independence. On the whole, Arabs considered Israel a Western d= ependency, incapable of acting unilaterally in defence of its national inte= rests, such as taking war and peace initiatives. While Israel concentrated = on building viable and democratic institutions and establishing close diplo= matic with the Western powers, young army officers seized and monopolized p= ower in the Arab world and uppressed all forms of secular and religious opp= osition. Unlike Israel, which planted and nourished the seeds of a healt= hy civil society, the new Arab man on horseback bypassed and repressed civi= l society and became entrapped in inter- and intra-Arab dispute. These prol= onged and costly conflicts sapped the strength of Arab state and society as= well.=20

By contrast, the Lebanese example shows clearly the efficacy and suc= cess of shared responsibility between state and society. Hizbullah's effect= ive performance resulted from the fact that it coordinated its actions with= the Lebanese government and co-opted other Sunni Muslims and Christians, w= ho fully embraced it, particularly during the last phase of the Israeli occ= upation. It may be convincingly argued that the weakness of the central aut= hority in Beirut made possible the emergence of socio-religious forces that= challenged Israeli occupation and played a decisive role in Israel's withd= rawal from the south.

Can, however, this humble victory be maintained and consolidated wit= hout restoring the sovereignty and constitutional responsibility of the Leb= anese state and rebuilding its institutions? It is essential that the Beiru= t government assume its legitimate duties in maintaining law and order in t= he south by deploying its armed forces. Despite widespread calls by the int= ernational community for Lebanon to deploy its army in the liberated securi= ty zone, the Lebanese government has not done so. Bringing the Lebanese sta= te in does not imply giving it a new hegemonic role over society; rather it= means the construction of a new healthy relationship between the two and l= inking the center (Beirut) with one of the historically marginalized region= s (the south). With regard to south Lebanon, the consolidation of the victo= ry requires the return of all Lebanese state institutions, including its se= curity forces, and the reclaiming by the state of its sovereignty over all = national territories. For the most part in the last year, Lebanese authorit= ies did not act to achieve these objectives.=20

<= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Previous Item"> <= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Next Item">

Lebanon's dipl= omacy; Hizbullah's performance

Throughout the year, the procrastination of the Lebanese governme= nt to assume its legitimate duties in the south sent the wrong signals to t= he world community regarding their willingness to insure stability and orde= r in the liberated areas. This ambivalence served Israel's diplomacy an= d invited competition and even fighting Amal and Hizbullah, the two dominan= t Shiite political rivals in the south. Despite their good intentions and d= eclarations, throughout 2000 the two organizations came close to a major co= nfrontation. In July 2000, several fighters from each group were either kil= led or injured in a bloody clash in the south. By contrast, Israel prese= nted a peaceful face to the world, demonstrating its respect for internatio= nal obligations by its withdrawal from Lebanon as stipulated by U.N. Securi= ty Council Resolution 425. Israel portrayed itself as a besieged state, wil= ling to live peacefully with its neighbours, who supposedly continue their = aggression and who threaten its very existence. In effect, Israel prepared = the ground internationally for future punitive actions against Lebanon and = its patron, Syria, in case of an attack from across its northern border. The United States and the European countries expressed their understandin= g for the new Israeli position and warned Lebanon and Syria against any arm= ed action.=20

Israeli leaders sent unambiguous messages about the changed rules= of the game after their hasty retreat from the south: Lebanon and Syria, n= ot just Hizbullah, would be responsible for any outbreak of hostilities on = the northern border. As then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak put it, = if one Israeli civilian is harmed, Tel Aviv will retaliate against Syria an= d Lebanon with all its power. Indeed, all signs emanating from Tel Aviv poi= nt in the direction of such retaliation in case Israeli civilians are harme= d. In a tête-à-tête with a retired officer, Barak confided t= hat he would use all the weapons in Israel's arsenal against anyone who dar= ed to attack Israel from Lebanon. In fact, even without a specific provocat= ion, official and public figures alike called on Barak to attack Syrian and= Lebanese targets to avenge Israeli military honour and test the new contai= nment policy. Thus, the atmosphere is prepared internally and externally= for Israel to retaliate against its two neighbours in case hostilities are= resumed.=20

Despite an initially awkward diplomatic performance in the first few= weeks after Israel's withdrawal, Lebanon and Hizbullah appreciated the new= realities and showed restraint. Lebanon neither escalated the conflict nor= fell into the trap of confrontation with the United Nations. Hizbullah als= o acted responsibly by refraining from unilateral action and attempting to = transcend the sectarian divide. Although Hizbullah has made a bloody record= , its new discourse emphasized the need for national unity and sought to bu= ild bridges to the other communities. Time and again, Hizbullah made it cle= ar that it had no intention of encroaching on or replacing the state in the= liberated territories.=20

Internally, despite some minor incidents, the Party of God challenge= d others to imitate its example, particularly the Palestinians. Its calls f= or Jihad seemed to have resonated among Palestinian youths, who rebelled an= d inaugurated another intifada in September 2000.=20

To what extent will Hizbullah's continue to exhibit the same rest= raint and political acumen in the future? Will the party revisit its ideolo= gical program in light of the substantive changes that have occurred on the= Lebanese scene and fully accept the complex domestic reality? And will Hiz= bullah prove once again that it has grown deep roots in the Lebanese soil a= nd will no longer serve as a Trojan horse, as some claim, for regional acto= rs?=20

Several questions need to be addressed here: Does Lebanon and its re= sistance have a comprehensive blueprint for developing the devastated south= ? Do they really recognize the thorny challenge of development, which may b= e more difficult than the military confrontation with Israel? Can Hizbullah= 's rank and file be fully integrated into Lebanese civil society, and throu= gh what means and institutions? Are there any hurdles that might undermine = the transition process from the resistance to that of citizenship? And will= Hizbullah devote its energy to politics and gradually shed its paramilitar= y character?=20

These last two questions raise the important issue of how to enable = Hizbullah to participate fully in the political field, with all that implie= s for a substantive shift in its ideological and tactical structure. No cau= sal relationship exists between the military success of liberation movement= s and their capacity to confront the challenges of political and human deve= lopment. Unfortunately, Arab modern history is littered with failed example= s of developmental projects of populist liberation movements. Lebanon's = achievement will thus ultimately depend on the country's ability to convert= its intangible capital into a springboard to a comprehensive development s= trategy. Such conversion requires the reform and modernization of the count= ry's political and legal institutions.=20

Throughout the summer 2000 Hizbullah confounded its enemies by showi= ng restraint both internally and externally. Rather than continuing its str= uggle against Israel, its leadership appeared to recognize the inherent dan= gers of overextending itself and Lebanon's precarious political and geo-str= ategic position. Any further military operations against Israel would raise= questions about Hizbullah's true intentions and would endanger Lebanon's f= ragile peace.

<= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Previous Item"> <= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Next Item">

Misguided brin= kmanship along the Israeli-Lebanese border?

Hizbullah's initial restraint has given way to inflated discourse an= d misguided brinkmanship. Since October 2000, Hizbullah has inaugurated a n= ew military campaign to liberate the disputed Sheba Farms. Although Lebanon= has finally convinced the international community of its sovereignty over = the Farms, it has lost a great deal of credibility by appearing to sanction= Hizbullah's armed tactics in the south. The party's new military campaign = led some local and international observers to fear that the Palestinian int= ifada, that has left almost 500 Palestinians dead and thousands injured, ma= y easily spiral out of control and spread into neighbouring Lebanon, threat= ening to revive the dormant front in south Lebanon and endangering the frag= ile peace there.=20

On October 7, cutting through the security fence in the disputed She= ba Farms along the Israeli-Lebanese border, Hizbullah fighter=92s captured = three Israeli soldiers, signalling their intention to renew the struggle ag= ainst the Jewish state unless the latter accedes to their demands. These= include the release of scores of Lebanese detainees still being held by Is= rael and the return Israeli-occupied Sheba Farms, which Syria and Lebanon h= ave said it belongs to the Lebanese and which Israel says it seized from Sy= ria in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (the United Nations has determined the Far= ms to be Syrian territory unrelated to Israeli withdrawal). Hizbullah's act= ion was also designed to show solidarity with the besieged Palestinians. As Hizbullah's secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, put it after t= he kidnapping, "we say to the Palestinian people that you are not alone." O= n 16 November, Hizbullah attacked an Israeli patrol also in the Sheba Farms= and injured a few soldiers. The party's leadership has vowed to continue i= ts attacks until Israel withdraws from all occupied Lebanese territories an= d releases the prisoners. In the meantime, Israel continues to violate Leba= non's air and land, unrestrained by UN warnings.

Regardless of whether Hizbullah's armed actions are legitimate or no= t, they threaten to pit Lebanon against the United Nations and the internat= ional community which have already certified Israeli withdrawal from south = Lebanon based on UN Resolution 425. UN officials, including the secretary g= eneral, Kofi Annan, and his representative for southern Lebanon, Rolf Knuts= son, criticized Lebanese authorities in strong terms for permitting armed i= ncursions from their borders and implicitly held them responsible for viola= ting UN understandings. The UN Security Council also approved Annan'= s report that appears to pin the blame on the Lebanese government for its i= nability or unwillingness to deploy troops along its Israeli border. The Un= ited Nations also criticized Israel for flying warplanes over Lebanese terr= itory and demanded "that (Israeli air) violations come to an end immediatel= y."

Furthermore, the Clinton administration bluntly warned Lebano= n that it would pay heavy costs if it does not control and pacify its borde= r with Israel. The direct manner and blunt tone in which Washington's warni= ng was delivered by the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon reflects its seriousness= and displeasure with the Lebanese government. It also represents an implic= it signal that Washington might turn the other way if Israel delivers on it= s threats and bombs Lebanon. Being more diplomatic and nuanced than his Ame= rican counterpart, the French Ambassador cautioned against military = escalation in southern Lebanon and called indirectly on the Lebanese govern= ment to be extra careful and vigilant.=20

Although Hizbullah's daring operations were loudly applauded by Arab= and Iranian public opinion inflamed by Israel's brutal crackdown against P= alestinian civilians, it carries considerable risks to Lebanon and Syria, a= nd it threatens further escalation. To begin, Lebanon, a small and vulne= rable country, cannot afford to challenge or violate UN resolutions and und= erstandings. Lebanon badly needs to align itself with international legitim= acy, not appear as an international renegade. To ignore UN warnings would p= lay into Israeli hands and would empower the latter to unleash its destruct= ive military apparatus against civilian targets. Without the UN safety net,= Lebanon would be exposed to Israeli military wrath, with devastating conse= quences to society and economy. The fact that the Israeli government ha= d not retaliated against Lebanon after Hizbullah's kidnapped three of its s= oldiers and an alleged intelligence officer, who was duped to visit Beirut,= should not lull the Lebanese authorities into a state complacency.=20

If Hizbullah resumes its military operations in the Sheba Farms, Isr= ael would likely choose the time and place to punish Lebanon and its patron= , Syria. For example, as soon as Hizbullah fighters seized the Israeli sold= iers in October, Israeli Prime Minister Barak said he would hold Damascus a= nd Beirut accountable for their safe return. His deputy defence minister, E= phraim Sneh issued a sterner warning to Syria: "We consider Syria, who cont= rols Lebanon, as responsible for everything that happens there. It is the r= ole of Syria now to stop the aggression promptly. Otherwise, Syria is the a= ddress for our response." No doubt American intervention with Tel Aviv, cou= pled with the fear for soldiers' lives and further escalation of Arab-Israe= li tensions, prompted Israeli leaders to bid their time and wait and see.= =20

However, it would be the height of misguided brinkmanship to coun= t and assume that Israel would remain passive in the future. The Israel= i military is reportedly dissatisfied with the civilian leadership for fett= ering its hands in Lebanon and weakening its deterrence capability. Further= attacks on the Israeli army would provide with plenty of ammunition to ret= aliate against Lebanon and even Syrian targets there. The escalating intifa= da in Palestine may also motivate the Israeli government and his generals t= o expand the theatre of operations into Lebanon and Syria to divert world a= ttention from the terribly deteriorating human tragedy in Palestinian terri= tories and force the Syrians into the negotiating table. Israel's desperate= domestic situation, coupled with the lack of decisive leadership in the Un= ited States, might also prompt him to go on the offensive in an effort to e= scape coming to terms with Palestinian fundamental rights. To put it bluntl= y, neither the Lebanese government nor Hizbullah should gamble on the fact = that Israel is incapable of taking the initiative and retaliating against L= ebanon. This estimate does not take into account the new developments in Pa= lestine, Israel, and the United States. It is in Lebanon's national inte= rests to cooperate fully with the United Nations lest Israel uses and abuse= s the UN cover to operationalise its strategy.=20

Next, Lebanon already paid dearly for its ambivalence toward sending= its armed forces into the south and pacifying the area. Despite UN and Wes= tern requests for the Lebanese government to deploy troops along its Israel= i border, the latter refused to do so saying that it does not want to serve= as Israel's border guard and lest the army finds itself in confrontation w= ith Hizbullah. The result is that the United States and the European powers= have procrastinated in convening an international aid conference to assist= in developing the war-torn southern region. Although neither the United St= ates nor the European Union draws a direct link between the delay in provid= ing assistance to Lebanon and the Beirut government's inability or unwillin= gness to maintain order and stability in the south, they acknowledge the ne= ed to pacify the area before granting any substantive financial assistance.= Have no doubt about: the link is there, notwithstanding the diplomatic den= ials by the Americans, the Europeans, and even the Lebanese. Lebanon sho= uld not expect any Western aid to rebuild the devastated south as long as t= he Lebanese-Israeli border remains volatile.

Lebanon has established its legal rights to the Sheba Farms. After S= yria had finally sent written instructions to the United Nations to this ef= fect (in 2001), Israel may no longer pretend or claim not to be occupying L= ebanese territory. However, the question that is worth stressing, should Le= banon defy UN wishes and continue its struggle against Israel until it with= draws from the Farms? Or should Lebanon use diplomatic channels, including = the United Nations, to force Israel out of the Farms? Should the diplomatic= option not be given a priority at this dangerous stage, and should not Isr= ael's occupation of the Farms be made plainly clear to the world community,= which was not initially convinced by the Lebanese case? Is it not about ti= me that the Lebanese people begin to debate this critical and highly inflam= mable issue that can easily drown their life and society in bloodshed and d= estruction?=20

<= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Previous Item"> <= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Next Item">

The Syrian-Leb= anese relationship

Immediately after Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the regional actors ha= d a vested interest in de-escalation, particularly Syria, which underwent a= political-economic transition. The death of Assad in June 2000 after 30 ye= ars of uninterrupted rule and his replacement by son, Bashar, made the Syri= an leadership cautious and hesitant to take risks. According to reliable re= ports from Washington, the US-administration impressed upon Damascus the ne= ed for political stability in Lebanon after the hasty exist of Israeli forc= es from the south. In return, Washington promised to keep the Syrian-Israel= i track alive. Little wonder that although in the first few weeks after Isr= ael's withdrawal, Syrian rulers expressed their uneasiness about this new d= evelopment, they suddenly shifted gear and showed diplomatic flexibility an= d moderation. For example, Syria's foreign minister, Farouq al-Shara also s= tressed that his country opposes any military escalation in south Lebanon a= fter Israel's departure. He also expressed his satisfaction at Hizbullah=92= s responsible conduct in the areas vacated by Israel. Syria's stabilizing r= ole was informed by the need to keep channels of communications open to Was= hington as well as to deprive Israel of any justification for unleashing it= s military apparatus. The Syrian leadership appeared to know that the ru= les of game have changed in south Lebanon. Its critical reading of the dang= erous new situation motivated it to cooperate fully with the UN efforts to = maintain stability.

The continued stalemate on the Syrian-Israeli track might motivate D= amascus to exert pressure on Tel Aviv by giving the nod to Hizbullah to hea= t up the Lebanese front in the south. By the end of the year 2000, that is = exactly what transpired. Although Syrian officials deny their involvement i= n Hizbullah's actions, they stress their support for armed resistance. The = Syrians seem to be determined to re-establish the linkage between the Syria= n and Lebanese tracks. The critical question will depend on Israel's abi= lity to act on its threat and attack Syrian forces directly. At any rate, n= either the withdrawal of Israel's forces nor the death of Assad in 2000 see= med to have changed a basic fact about tiny Lebanon: it is still being used= as a staging arena for its neighbours' military-diplomatic operations and = a political football kicked at their political convenience. Unfortunately, = the Lebanese people are active agents and participants in this charade.= =20

Ironically, in their attempt to both please and outbid their Syrian = patrons, Lebanese officials miscalculated and acted prematurely regarding S= heba farms, a strip of land occupied by Israel and claimed by both Lebanon = and Syria. Although in the first few months after Israel's withdrawal Syria= n rulers sent ambiguous signals about their claims to the farms, by the end= of 2000 the Syrian foreign minister subsequently agreed "fully" with the U= N report that did not include Sheba farms in Israel's withdrawal and left o= pen the question of their ownership. This did considerable damage to Lebano= n's diplomatic credibility. Whatever the reasons behind Syria's revived pos= ition, it saved Lebanon from escalating tensions. In the summer of last yea= r, Lebanese diplomacy committed serious blunders by failing to appreciate t= he complex dynamics of regional and international politics; otherwise, it w= ould have coordinated its position more closely with Syria before outbiddin= g it later. Lebanon's stand was viewed as a convenient pretext both to sabo= tage Israel's planned withdrawal and to rationalize the continuation of hos= tilities if withdrawal failed to occur. Syria's rational decision seems to = have freed Lebanon's hands.

The infelicitous argument over the Sheba farms is part of a larger p= roblem affecting Syrian-Lebanese relations. Beirut's ability to build a = modern state depends to a large extent on redefining the one-sided Syrian-L= ebanese relationship. The irresponsible manner with which Lebanese official= s approached the Sheba farms in 2000 shows clearly the unhealthy nature of = this relationship. The project of building a modern state in Lebanon is unl= ikely to be implemented as long as the political survival of its ruling eli= te remains dependent on Damascus. Constructing a modern state in Lebanon wi= ll probably remain out of reach as long as Lebanese-Syrian interactions are= hostage to tribal and sectarian interests rooted in Beirut's complex polit= ical system.

However, the beginning of 2001 witnessed critical developments on th= e Lebanese-Syrian front. Israel's retreat, coupled with Assad's death and t= he Parliamentary elections in August and September, emboldened many Lebanes= e citizens and motivated them to question the nature and character of their= country's dependency on Damascus. The debate on this issue is no longer re= stricted to the Christians, particularly the Maronites and their Patriarch,= Nasrallah Sfeir, who advocated the restructuring of Syrian-Lebanese relati= ons in order for Lebanon to regain its independence and sovereignty and for= Syria to end its flagrant interference in the country's internal affairs. = In August last year during their annual retreat the Maronite bishops inaugu= rated the new campaign by releasing a statement that called for a dramatic = shift in Lebanon's relations with Syria. Sfeir subsequently escalated the o= nslaught against Damascus' hegemony and criticized the Lebanese authorities= for their submission and dependence.=20

For a while in the summer 2000, the dominant call for reclaiming Leb= anon's sovereignty was restricted to the Maronite Christians, threatening t= o get transformed into a sectarian fight between, on the one hand, the Musl= ims, who appeared to be pro-Syrian and, on the other, the Christians, who a= dvanced a Lebanon's first approach. During the Parliamentary elections and = in its aftermath, however, Walid Jumblatt, an influential Druze leader, dro= pped a historic bomb by joining the growing calls in Lebanon for Syria to r= efrain for interfering in the country's internal affairs as well as re-depl= oy its troops from Beirut and other cities and towns to the Bekaa valley in= accordance with the Taif accords. Jumblatt and other critics pointed that = Syria and its ruling clients in Beirut ignored and violated the main clause= in the Taif accords, which regulated the Syrian military presence in Leban= on. The Syrians and their allies in Lebanon could no longer accuse the oppo= sition of being narrow, sectarian, and unrepresentative. Jumblatt's interve= ntion changed the nature of the debate and broadened the opposition's socia= l and political base.=20

In the last months, the wall of silence and fear collapsed and civil= society engaged in a heated debate about Syria's role in Lebanon. The geni= e is out of the Pandora's box and neither the new Syrian President, Bashar,= nor his Lebanese counterpart, Emille Lahoud, could put it back safely in t= he box and lock it. The new leadership in Damascus showed signs of confusio= n and hesitation and did not know how to contain or respond to the assertiv= e voices emanating from Beirut. This ambivalence manifested itself in the i= nitiative by the speaker of the parliament, Nabih Berri, who tried to media= te between the Syrians and Patriarch Sfeir. Berri informed Sfeir that the S= yrians had already decided to re-deploy their troops before Sfeir's call fo= r their withdrawal. Lahoud reportedly felt that Berri's initiative overshad= owed his presidential prerogative and that he, as head of state, should be = in charge of how Beirut's interacts with Damascus. The Syrian leadership co= ncurred and withdrew the carpet from under Berri's feet, thus embarrassing = the latter, one of Syria's closest clients, and re-establishing Lahoud's so= le authority over this critical question.=20

Regardless of Syria's military presence and political pre-eminence i= n Lebanon, particularly its ability to play off the ruling elite and the va= rious religious sects against each other, the last year marked a watershed = in Damascus' previous hegemony over its small neighbour. The Syrians author= ities faced critical challenges that they cannot escape from addressing for= too long. Indeed, a consensus is gradually emerging in Lebanon regardin= g the need to bring the bilateral Lebanese-Syrian relationship into a balan= ce based on respect for one another's sovereignty and independence. Many vo= ices in Lebanon have begun to openly question Syria's role in their country= . It is doubtful if Syria can maintain its traditional role and dominance i= n Lebanon for long. Israel's retreat from the south complicated Syrian-= Lebanese relations, especially after Assad's death. Aware of the upheaval i= n Lebanon, the new Syrian president alluded to the need for greater efforts= to improve the nature of the "special relationship" between the two countr= ies.

It remains to be seen, however, if the Syrian leadership would have = the will and vision to chart a dramatically new course of action with Leban= on. Observers of Syria agree that the economic, political, and strategic= importance of Lebanon to Damascus has increased rather than decreased foll= owing Israel's departure and will continue even if Syria signs a peace trea= ty with the Jewish state. The Syrian ruling elite has built intricate finan= cial and economic links in Lebanon and benefits considerably by preserving = the status quo there. In this case, Syria's political dominance of Leba= non serves the elite's vested economic interests. Assad's death did not dra= matically alter this reality. The critical question to address revolves aro= und Syria's strategy to deal with the restiveness and upheaval that are roc= king its Lebanon's boat. How will the unseasoned Bashar Assad contain the g= rowing calls and demands in Lebanon for restructuring the one-sided relatio= nship? Will Syrian rulers employ old, effective means, such as the fear of = rekindling the bloody fires of sectarianism, to divert attention from their= new predicament in Lebanon and keep the unruly Lebanese under a tight leas= h? Will the Lebanese again fall victims to their own sectarian divide? Or w= ill the liberation of south Lebanon contribute to the emergence of a new an= d inclusive nationalism that may serve as the basis of a modern state, one = that has often been aborted in the contemporary history of Lebanon?=20

The key question is whether the liberation of south Lebanon will pro= mote a rethinking of traditional loyalties and a nurturing of liberal const= ructs. Of course, the project of building a modern state must await both th= e rethinking of the unequal Lebanese-Syrian relationship and intra-Lebanese= relations as well. The fear is that the seizure and monopoly of Lebanon's = external role could retard the further evolution of its quasi-liberal insti= tutions. In this context, to what extent does the current Syrian-Lebanese r= elationship inhibit the growth and consolidation of liberal institutionalis= m in Lebanon? Do the tensions and contradictions inherent in Syrian-Lebanes= e relations strengthen Lebanon's culture of sectarianism and fuel and produ= ce authoritarianism as well? What are the prospects of state- and nation-bu= ilding in light of the emergence of the new elite and its dismal subservien= ce? And how does the further dilution and monopolization of Lebanon's exter= nal role complicates Lebanon's crisis of governance and economics?

<= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Previous Item"> <= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Next Item">

The parliament= ary elections and Hariri's comeback

The question of Syrian-Lebanese relations and Lahoud's conduct la= y at the heart of the Parliamentary elections and the decisive victory by t= he opposition, particularly the coalition assembled by Hariri and Jumblatt.= As usual, Damascus aimed at drawing the broad contours of the politica= l map by assisting in the construction of convenient, loyal electoral coali= tions. Although partly successful, the elections resulted in a backlash aga= inst Damascus=92 preponderant influence as well as the economic failure of = the Salim Huss' cabinet to deliver on its promises after two years in power= .=20

The new dynamic in electoral politics witnessed a rapprochement b= etween the Christian community and Druze leader, Jumblatt, a move that help= ed both parties in the elections because it was directed against both the S= yrian and Lebanese governments. Jumblatt, a shrewd politician, sensed t= he general dissatisfaction in Christian and Druze ranks and capitalized on = anti-Syrian sentiment to score a decisive victory, more than 80 percent of = the Druze votes. Similarly, Hariri, a Sunni leader, was not on good terms w= ith either the Syrians or the Lahoud administration and in 1998 was replace= d by Huss as Prime Minister. Lahoud and Huss made the discrediting of Harir= i, his men, and his previous policies one of their top priorities. They not= only accused Hariri's tenure of being monstrously wasteful but also un-aba= shedly corrupt, dragging several of his close associates into courtrooms an= d prisons. Lahoud and Huss went as far as to devise a new electoral law in = greater Beirut, specifically designed to reduce Hariri's influence and marg= inalize him in the upcoming elections.

Regardless of the veracity and legitimacy of some of these charge= s, the Sunni community in greater Beirut resented the bitter campaign again= st its generous son and did not forgive Huss for his perceived subordinatio= n to Lahoud. At the heart of this resentment lie the contested prerogatives= of both the Sunni premier and Maronite president. Hariri was also assi= sted by an amateur government that invested much energy and resources to di= scredit him by assaulting his character and legacy. Far from discrediting H= ariri or Jumblatt in the eyes of the electorates, the media onslaught by th= e government produced opposite results. Hariri and the opposition benefited= considerably from the public's sympathies and widespread dissatisfaction w= ith Lahoud-Huss' policies. The perceived interference by shadow army office= rs in the presidential palace did not help either; neither did Huss' consta= nt stress on the role of "political money" utilized - supposedly by Hariri = - in the election campaigns.=20

The results were a rout for the anti-Hariri camp. Hariri won hand= somely, 80 percent of the Sunni vote in Beirut, and all seats in his precin= ct, 19 in all. Huss, a highly respected politician, lost his own seat in th= e Parliament and his allies as well. Hariri made his political comeback= overnight. Despite their previous misgivings, both the Syrian and Lebanese= governments acknowledged the obvious and accepted Hariri's return to power= . In October, Hariri appointed new cabinet and said that priority will go t= o leading Lebanon out of a recession. The elections were mainly a referendu= m on the performance of the Lahoud-Huss administration as well as Syria's h= eavy handedness and control of political life in Lebanon. Both were found w= anting by a restive electorate, who voted for the opposition. This is not t= he whole story, however. It was the "loaf of bread" that facilitated Hariri= 's political comeback.

<= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Previous Item"> <= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Next Item">

It is the econ= omy, stupid!

More than anything else, the results of the summer 2000 Parliamen= tary elections reflected the dismal failure of the Huss cabinet to tackle t= he structural problems in the Lebanese economy. Far from being the year of = a breakthrough, the last year witnessed a deterioration in the living stand= ards of most Lebanese and increased poverty and the alienation of the youth= s and their desire to emigrate. One popular story has it that every mor= ning the Canadian Embassy places 300 applications for immigration outside i= ts main door - and that by 9 a.m. they are all gone. One would expect a sim= ilar situation at other Western and Gulf embassies. Many citizens had high = hopes that Huss would succeed in turning the sinking wheel of the economy a= round and plant the seeds of recovery. These initial hopes crashed on the r= ocks of political and financial reality and lack of vision and fear of risk= taking measures that paralysed economy and society further. In other words= , the Huss cabinet failed in carrying through its economic program that = was based on financial restructuring, reducing the total budget deficit and= national debts as well. Internal political bickering and short sightedness= also complicated the government's efforts to tackle the entrenched socio-e= conomic crisis.

Some statistics are in order. In 2000 Lebanon experienced the slo= west growth of all Arab countries, zero percent growth in GDP, accordin= g to the 2000 edition of World Outlook, the annual forecasting guide. Some = private forecasting reports indicated negative growth rate. Finance ministe= r George Corm kept his promise to reduce the total budget deficit to below = the 43 percent mark in 1999, defying those specialists who said that the fi= gure would top 50 percent. However, his prediction that the total budget de= ficit will be 46 percent of spending by year's end (2000) was off the mark.= According to the finance ministry, by the end of the year, the total budge= t deficit amounted to $3 billion, or 52.2 percent of spending. Mainly dwind= ling revenues caused the deficit and a high government spending after it ad= opted austerity measures the previous year. The public debt also increas= ed by ten percent, standing at about $24 billion and expected to top $27 bi= llion by the end of 2001, from that of 1999 and the government acknowle= dged the need for more effective strategies to manage and reduce the balloo= ning public debt, especially since it exceeded 140 percent of the GDP.

According to a recent study entitled Employment and Unemployment in = Lebanon, 2000 conducted by The Centre for Development Studies and Projects = (MADMA), the total labour force in Lebanon in the year 2000 was estimated a= t about 1.1 million individuals, of whom 165,000 were unemployed. What is a= larming is that the larger portion of the unemployed, 49.1 percent, are bet= ter educated. These young men and women are more inclined to emigrate, a= situation which, left unchanged, will leave Lebanon bereft of talents as w= ell as vulnerable and incapable of competing in today's competitive and sop= histicated markets. Some unofficial reports put the number of unemploym= ent around 40 percent, a fact, as a local newspaper correctly noted, that h= ardly surprises when one considers the sheer number of idle young men stand= ing about on Beirut's street corners.=20

How long will the government be able to keep these unemployed and= restive young men quiet? What will be the social and political consequence= s of any further deterioration in the peoples' already strained standards o= f living? How will discontent manifest itself? And to what extent will dism= al socio-economic conditions dress in sectarian cloths and rekindle social = conflict? For example, the last year witnessed a highly disturbing phen= omenon - a bloody four-day insurrection by a young group of Sunni militants= in the Dinnieh region in north Lebanon. The military staged a show of forc= e, mobilizing hundreds of troops, backed by tanks and artillery to put down= this uprising. At least 50 soldiers, militants, and civilians were killed.= Sixty-three people were tried, at least eight of whom people were reported= ly sentenced to death, though none of the sentences has been carried out. T= hese militants hoped to manipulate the wretched social and economic conditi= ons in the north to gain public sympathy, particularly among Muslims, fuel = general dissatisfaction and disorder. The fact that the Lebanese authoritie= s put down this insurrection should not lull them into complacency. Now = in some areas in Lebanon dismal living social conditions provide a fertile = territory for social discontent.

Although after Hariri assumed office in October 2000 made improving = the sickly economy his top priority, Lebanon's structural problems defy sim= ple and quick remedies. His hands are also fettered by domestic political c= onsiderations and geo-strategic realities. In the final analysis, the cr= isis confronting the Lebanese leadership is as much political as it is econ= omic. During a two-day visit to Beirut in December 2000, World Bank pre= sident James Wolfensohn put his finger on Lebanon's festering wounds. He= warned his Lebanese interlocutors not to expect critical financial assista= nce by the world community unless they stop their internal political bicker= ing and put their house in order: it is no longer "a question of winning or= losing internal battles," adding that "if the boat's got some holes in it,= you all sink together unless you come together." Wolfensohn also stressed = the urgent need for debt reduction and restoring confidence in the Lebanese= economy by not only cutting taxes but also avoiding waste by collecting th= em more efficiently. He added that Hariri's plan to stimulate growth must b= e accompanied by steps such as privatisation. Nevertheless, in Wolfensohn's= view, the first condition for recovery revolves around domestic stability = and internal political unity of the ruling elite because unless that is ach= ieved, the government's efforts would be in vain.=20

Despite the elites' awareness of the enormity of the economic burden= , they are unlikely to close ranks. They are neither independent nor free t= o pursue the national interest. Furthermore, some of the new elite lack a s= olid social base, which makes them insecure and motivates them to outbid ea= ch other. The new elite does not see eye-to-eye on many important issues= , such as the nature of the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, the role of Hizbu= llah's in south Lebanon, and the question of peace and war with Israel.= Developments in recent months showed the existence of serious disagreement= s among Lebanese politicians, and there are no apparent signs pointing to t= he dilution and disappearance of these differences in the near future. L= ebanon's economic survival is likely to remain hostage to internal politica= l bickering.

<= img src=3D"https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif" border=3D"0" al= t=3D"Previous Item">

Human Rights a= nd personal freedoms

The deteriorating economic and political conditions negatively affec= ted human rights and personal freedoms and liberties. Political arrests, su= mmary trials, and prison torture were widely practiced in Lebanon while asy= lum seekers were forcefully expelled, according to Amnesty International's = (AI) 2001 report. Detailing accounts of political arrests, the report state= d, "hundreds of people, mostly students and people suspected of opposing th= e government, were arrested, mostly for holding protests or peaceful demons= trations."=20

Suspected members of radical Islamic groups and students associated = with the Free Patriotic Movement of exiled former army commander General Mi= chel Aoun were singled out. Last August, at least six people were jailed af= ter calling for a boycott of parliamentary elections. In September, at leas= t 90 suspected Lebanese Forces members were arrested in Mount Lebanon comme= morating the 19th anniversary of the assassination of the LF founder, Presi= dent-elect Bashir Gemayel. The report underlined alleged cases of unjust tr= ials, saying that more than 1,000 political prisoners were sentenced in sum= mary trials by military courts. In April, 12 students affiliated with the F= ree Patriotic Movement were handed sentences ranging from 10-45 days in pri= son for assaulting members of the Internal Security Forces. The report adde= d that more than 2,300 former SLA members or convicted collaborators were s= entenced by military courts and given summary trials that barely lasted sev= en minutes per case. "This haste," according to AI's report, "doesn't give = way for proving anyone's innocence, nor to discovering war criminals."=20

As for "torture and mistreatment," AI said they had received reports= of "brutal conduct on behalf of police officers," none of whom were report= ed to have been investigated. The reported accounts included physical and p= sychological torture, beating, electrocution, and unethical interrogation m= ethods such as hanging suspects down from wooden stakes in a process common= ly called farrouj, or roasted chicken. The report also tackled other issues= such as the harassment and pursuit of two human rights activists, Kamal Ba= tal, the director of MIRSAD, a human rights organization, and his lawyer, M= ohammed Moghrabi, on vice allegations. According to AI hundreds of politica= l refugees in Lebanon, from Sudan, Iraq and other countries, were detained = and many were tortured and forced to give up their refugee status and retur= n to their countries of origin, despite the potential threat to their safet= y.=20

The report spoke of Khiam prison, liberated during the Israeli withd= rawal May 2000, where inhumane treatment and torture of Lebanese citizens b= y SLA members had resulted in at least 16 deaths over the past 15 years.=20

There is, it seems, a causal relationship between economic and po= litical decline and setbacks for human rights and personal freedoms in Leba= non. Instead of expanding the space of freedom to compensate for deteriorat= ing social and economic conditions, the state is steadily and gradually enc= roaching upon society. As the Amnesty International's report shows, the con= duct of the internal security services threatens citizens' basic freedoms a= nd liberties as well as plants the seeds of authoritarianism in Lebanon. Lebanese politicians, including Hariri and Berri, expressed their fear an= d their inability to reign in the security services, particularly their dis= regard for the constitution and law. They have portrayed them as unruly, ou= t of control, and a danger to Lebanon's liberal institutions; a state withi= n a state. Although never stated explicitly, it is insinuated that the secu= rity services are not accountable to the Lebanese cabinet or government. Fr= om whom then do the security services take their orders? What does this sit= uation reveal about the nature and character of the state in Lebanon?=20

For all their historical importance, developments in the last time d= id not dramatically change the complex dynamics of Lebanese politics or the= country's geo-strategic predicament. Lebanon's political class still la= cks the vision, courage, and a blueprint to empower the citizens and free t= heir genius. Internal political bickering lies at the heart of the crisis t= hat tearing the Lebanese body politic apart. The danger is that these polit= ical tensions strengthen the culture of sectarianism and impede efforts to = tackle the country's structural difficulties. Lebanon's very destiny al= so remains intricately inter-wined with its regional environment. Will Leba= non be able in the near future to address these problems decisively and res= olve as well, or will it, as usual, improvise and apply half-measures which= prolong its peoples' agony and suffering?



    Fawaz A. Gerges holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in internati= onal affairs and Middle Eastern affairs at Sarah Lawrence College, New York= . He conducted intensive research on the rising social and political moveme= nts in the Arab world. His latest book, America and Political Islam: Clash = of Cultures Or Clash of Interests?, was published by Cambridge University P= ress, 1999. He has written several books and many articles on various aspec= ts of Middle East history and politics.

=A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | t= echnical support | net edition=20 fes-library | September 2001
------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_prev.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAADBZgxBAcPDz9tDZ4yBNeWCAoKCzxpCmvODm7HCNqbDA0FBzlsDN2YCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaJo6T8M6aizPtFo8RvkwZPOIvoeQN2r1foHHAcV4CB6DmnQq AjiujgQ0ANkdgT/CYvAgiIwjX/WBgEHGDQiDCBAMuNR8Ssjnuw99CnhqIzdREAaBeBAAZHwDMHMj AWQFepclVlhYXA4AJARuoZwkDmYjoSQBWS54AJ8jVqeYtCNNbl1EYLsigKdovF4nc3UCsLW0AQIC i7YIJAwCvMWwDM8jA9IQCg+4EKtyRNxLyOXm5+jpVAAMBezH6vEiTX1CMMK8QUIClmdxaT9ELHjC h1+4WFvkTQmAQMAvXRAIEYJwww2wiAG5wYNgRlIdBM0UzkjU7wxEid0cUxwQoKDIv10ElDAZQMab SBkAoJgQcDKgGoYPjuHDKMIOE5CJctyUQSbBJgdctBjwBOjfxAUJpXpK9I/AMqcOGgiII+lbpaWY Rm2MMWoWqCtu1YUAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_next.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAACBNeRBAcPDz9nCNqTBZg9DZ47DA0FBzlpCmvGCAoODm7KCzxsDN2YCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+qWAQDwE8B/KMTOH8v4Do0SgxGKTGYwB0ACDKhxQJ q1ohD4OIhhPphL2mQ4gtAoAF3w+gZAKfSgjgoHg8r/hWnSC6CUgMUoIPDlFSgFQihoJFcSMDD4l5 kyNnZBAEDiMBTphiY2dvn2uhTU+lY5SqJpB8Bq8FEAFEImFNZLSISUumUDtedqvCEAkPCloQCwW5 EEcozLWSSpoljgQCAnfD29zd3t/g4S4OSyMCD2QHXYGDhIuLgw3wtIsCCeJVBn8QA9gIIgWoODsB rZk0QiYcEUOIzwWNARAEDCgWQB01doOoFRyoqB09Qg50IGvoQl8/EQoQLgTkIYnExoPUdslSIIAP SRc3yi2swUMNkABnHiyIaXCXmzW+RqgrcOmm06cpQgAAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_oben.gif R0lGODlhoAAPAMQAAICZsxBAcCBNeTBZg/Dz9qCzxnCNqWCAoODm7NDZ45CmvLDA0FBzlsDN2UBm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAACgAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+cCzLwGNAtXM2T5mTD4DJ8dAJHo2kaPFoOhkQoi5A SDZEStLB6Vxgr5DCY6tjBkQOhyE4a6+2h9PPxPMVgcISsVb4jhhjCAkjRFt9EFlZJYI1AyNWBGdS ODYlAQJumSkCaY6an6CgA2mhpRBrXA+ONalCXESpTVexV7B5iGAiCk2YaE0Kj2A8qSJHbI8Pkb46 EAMJqQhQppm7TQkAZ5StWD0kcyK0UUVHfVlUfQMPwOIOR16JqTpiZwkEwRBMnHdIhGnt025qKEhz 4JmOGgb8/XNgMBslZuAKKHQ0CQIVfms8iagXoOJFYbksPjgkAg6uEdWY//FY4GDUrlsAY8qcSbOm CwEGACQcwUnhQn8dfXaK4tNRUIcDNFpsSeLoiKQiRvns57AZUxEdqw4AoBOizRZUEjgScADBQRsK e9Uh6kBMQqYjJ4ojoOzkCAQIKvnKq1ZYgqmU8JJoQODYpIs3LJaF+XXTg78mEKblZsdrXH8Ui4jB pGjeLk9SNttt8BdoszHkghEBNolw40wCACzISwCTZH9qu434BuHy0Embs2yRJpgdhF0OEpVOc4aA l1MPpCkhNylBLi6MXw/pJQKQEN7IKuMZcodSFQjU0wDqU7HGebsjFhBQyONMliN5dWxZ5yu7dhIM 5OUEAdKwgl1vTkDEWyY4FVFyRQIIlABHgzWARMIa0mBFwCCKXMRMANV04dV/JJZoYgshAAA7 ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_inhalt.gif R0lGODlhaQAPALMAAICZsxBAcPDz9iBNeaCzxjBZg9DZ42CAoLDA0HCNqeDm7FBzlsDN2UBmjP// /wAzZiH5BAAAAAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAT58MlJq7046827/xzjTAzzDA7TOM2zJk3cGOazOIdkCNIK WKsWaEi0iEgCB6HHcjVJNYki+WNWXbGEAxYrej+OcLM0CSRbQQp5VzngVuLwL/2td2SNwKPQKJTz DwGAEwV+f0ISggMTeI12jxhHEiUoS2kveDQTBA4BAA6GPkBPkKUVkg9kgQJnToipJgEOCHizTleM pKa7vL2+v8DBXnEtIgJ6rslQFJ8Oi1YTcdLCXqglnIuXuqp7OAoKubhMr9RE1ibY2tIpEwIIJ0rQ FXTlRecSn59o2zUI6wu3RpGr52EGCz3cmu17RcYNwAn+BCnBk00XwYsYOUQAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_titel.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAABBAcDBZg6CzxiBNefDz9uDm7HCNqdDZ45CmvGCAoLDA0B9MeYCZs8DN2UBm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+4sOUTVMyD+k8guM7AcjOYWrkRDUIgNAYCnm/oOJI ahRgrsAP6gNAkoCf4BHd9aJPIo1q5Ymc5p9jADk8DG8CwYuFyUY7D4IkODqChw82gYiLZF82IwWO OzMlAGOHDXR9LFpyPwtyYZ8+AaNyQWF8gD9eWkEiqkqkm0IGDA6rnC5/VZAjhYBcpWlFbJoPCsVx xDi6EAW/uyu9I0mEVE+VhmpVx7F6k9VvDwgkCePT6uvs7e7v8PErRoiHBoz1mY2Cio4kjF8EbYKT b8YAO4cKdJMXYxsSaRCCkXNIbiGSY2PoEKSIzqEZhiPSXQOWbV+iYmusSdkY40McIhtGihAA2ZAG RInaTDhJ+VAEDhxEKN14UEtENJoQqoU5cGAhTmbEdhgQ5cBOrkckxVEMiCDAAAMECjxDSpbdqKIw QgAAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/d_digbib.gif R0lGODlhHADoAKIAAP///73e/2Ol/4S1/0KM/yF7/wBj/wAAACwAAAAAHADoAEAD/2i63P4wyjle CWSaEbr/X6ExBQBkAaAMQDW+8HrGUeewAq1HJSAyqdxuKBgYj0jkD1ZgmZ6BpST1rFpnE4HNAAJJ I84OlECgDs9oSU+UUgQ1xaTc+B1xrthhMzCo8/BjdiYKgCYZMVSFAAE0BWR+aTAEJkIkKYyRmZqb k1VRm0NOV5iIhYegGj2AGDoCq3ocfKeotCMlpAs4tbsOlx4mH4a8qVYGa3qPwy+TmC0ylS9bDLrK 1Z1SnRnMEARGK3N0Md2JAQKQECkDZOvswtXv8PEOwCJNT7MQsV2LIfINF1UMdKKxjYsKg9CYdBtg zp+DgjsSKcoTL44JOZRoDNq0R//Wjlu9ACTU0GmUPyeETMmTqAhfvB7lyGhxp4adqxYy052rpQVT l37+ylw05mknEGcpGdCcMnGpw6cTjrXZgFQSIBfxWKp8CnMSwyBGQ2ZgIYYiPIstkmSMsfEjGQXs 4hIIywuckYYwFvXCRHbEzSsVerikhdJAS4d/+ZGjaxDrPLPomkKGSrmy5ctcNX5acHOwBFEz1+oA KLKUZM+YR8dCQ8WMQdQPCk5l4XjERYD2fLQaxTi1mjtXYDuAOac3UVw04hwBJiesVkDCfU9om6sq habGDR+UjkoUlOwGN+c2DrF6bQ2XfpAG750e9xiFD09Y+A0c+NTP8UR/z2MhXh3I+SFH0iJfpEND ClLghp5kk/0j14Nz8SfIQfJJ+FER+y2gykUsnRcZJjep51RkWFE34gP5WZGhhSxaWEBoxkR4IIcH pbCiQHoZJIOHTJVjIxXgkQbMSC02kKKKRZ601TI5IoVgDCBx8QltyalDFBRJ2radeS+0h0d21GV5 HYVL9ncIhMmIGUFTm8FBoAK45UZkA+W5MUOdEEBhRCIiUDmCUFBAc19l8ZWpZi1eupcXJUsAyuMN OT4UZg3WNXBiSE3tp5xdfRz6XgIAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/fes-log1.gif R0lGODlhfQBPAPIAAP////f3/4yM/4SE/0pK/wgI/wAA/wAAACH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAB9AE8AQAP/ CLrc/jDKSau9T5jNuyGFJxIBMHRkKHKCum6EsBAvV8iBW5SAQNctG4+R68gAPE0tVeMQTKjia+cy HBmnpmgnHUm6WpYiiXJ0d+OqocoEqlc3xW8zmHlAQuT8FdygG2BHZE14WjJvKHtLYFMDQz2CCwFX SJQYXwpKU4wvhS8DiiOPmWU9o4ATAXWXmD1annBxr3urch61mh8OAgKjAb69rBY8YDG/LTEDyooE ygM+HaAdBc7KvNVszgJZMA970Fuj3GuKN7+TzGMQPmpPrkYMtHvU1ZSBWKUN37R2Noh0DPqEA6Yt mJlzvhAq/JUK4Zdr1gxKUvjFIZFt9U4J28ix/6PHj7ncEdExZN64NmvMVKGUawWulTrK+YpBUiU8 JKSc2PQD5s/JM75W6mvCy4OgfxssjQG6M6m6j1Cjqpr0C9SxbRqjBswnSSgSFyj/xIvGwGvObnp4 qV2LkS1bElpxvkPboEotAKF4OuDXUmnIiREYQhCsFViBw4eNYazGOGK9xY2fQY5sTZW2DNUmLVa6 YPIQdB6ocU6zpZmlvmM5SLNBoHVre2ah6NxrZA8suLJXiKwwREUzZe3OOu1Hx/aX2HhDN4OVkt/Q EePInQMnRm7c69iza9/OnfvC7+APnlsKvkT5wecBWQR0jRex9eJPtRxR5bDLkJyMIL2T3N8bKv82 zEVUTYB4NYgfjPWiQ1co/JSNNvc859IC4wDIR2APVqNIJAIW4FprjiAVhwIOTvMhSlbQFsZwX22C oQ2UGSjcbqTpFV0dJTrBWE+uqXEDPwGE9suCoXjYmgoCicVgdcR8eNcYJzYAyomuOULliT5cWVkD Wb4W0JWusQcCYh4+c6JGOz413x37wRUkIXnZEMybYVxlnmZ2EiNRXAd+8J1dmYAFFEXO5ebUdFEc sxASio733XV9rpAfPJMWN80yoXFZinvl9VIeOnzO2JQBd8WppC3+cLXVbD5o5tarr2a1UaT0rWjf Es719MhfkkjmVkS/ysqRsN1p5yqeahHL537/K34gTxMe2mqcikmVw1mFetj6mXCnanoTqpbONlhs J3lTGxD4oKtSDERIEqdeAqZIHKnvkjrSt4bSCK4VfN1i6DRSNkGYdZ1talRq4dL1QIQ1buCLUYXG W8OIBVKaLbRDoDbvagqPqlSl8EZclr89MEsxwcWmrPLKLLfs8sswxyzzzDTXvCyZOFOTM2JeBspz Djsj1kLQPc8QtJHE4PzIAIhQQeYpQAut5ivMppQjH1X72Z8hANS0plEE3sskt24Nqko2UehQtl1q hdJaNMeokWQA5fiKx9weTy3ukmtkfGnaAVZcXcE13AXTxFmdAYGMEgPuh1py47cfwxQuwQsz/5MW cFyzYzfuBMhaXx0Ocv++Yt4/3fLdLIe8ik3ONFdcfSrlLXbChur8jRu4A4y3zrfmAumSr+KCs0h3 aIDWdzproUmEDt7Fy9unvkz1tI3jWDdbh3MtPbEg6FaErTrrqiLhgd+L7Bf8Fo5sjPv5nSEVPNQH o2zzR1dxqhF8+FPmzCSUcZ7/HBPAXQ3wf5nQHygq46pifc0JJhsSnMLwBPDtQH+q6IV7rEIVXmQn UjkLnmvu0BOcvY01JxTCmG7lHz+t5Rmu0mAMXqisS0xvVLUQlPj2VQvK8Ypun/JUp2p4gT7RA0LZ gMUhEvEh6thLOAbY1aZSkYrRzAqKQjKZgv+awLGJnaYUwHpVGH+lr44YkUrFuEa9fqONNa5jU8Ia mBmsKIwbRu8uX+vWN0SYgVJMZYhBJOIwuNUYEbaNEAlyzjxG0TqqDEYCe4IKrW6RtfXdoVAtwaOq sLIQISrEg9gZwgEhEhnCjBIy9mhMry4zR08tZSKRTBn/7keBRXkkhjUE3yyiUa81SKt8W+NX/RwQ HR4wjRCPKMkWOOeEZ0Hrl3ublxPhlS6eFImFn9MbNRm1qsEFs4tlHJk3y0UtYU6omnCYiRPId6ms aIyH09LdOIG5D8RVrhOBMcO8REE4bzrzE66TF4noeS4W8LF0jyPCAFHGDoDGixL/PGfDBJp9L3Ox wDnFjI6c0CmkOE7rnd+M58LIBTDeFRQgEyUEe3hxu4yd7HisGmZIgTm+gOLmYtYkC0e9WE40GDMM fwBpRMM5UUvoMg4iwykLVLEFbNKBGJ3JCzV2hTOIkokdPDvOVRd2zC1IZIUnG8lWx9BVfraLlmhN q1rXytaZJQAAIf4zUmVkdWNlZCAzMSUgQCB3d3cucmFzcGJlcnJ5aGlsbC5jb20vZ2lmd2l6YXJk Lmh0bWwAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/lone2.gif R0lGODlh2QEbALMAAAAAABgYGDExMVJSUmtra4yMjK2trbW1tcbGxufn5+/v7/////////////// /////yH5BAEAAA8ALAAAAADZARsAQAT+8MlJq7046827/2AojmRpnmiqrmzrvnAsW8lBCEEF7Dwg 7T/fgzcEAovBoO8oRCKJzqOodsvplsPohCmUdhSIAmFg6VG4v223iSZ6QWAx+dxDR9fL5jc8LmPt RnhJM4SFhh0JBgMBeoZvGmYsiYuNhxOTjJaSipkpjx6YlZqjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vV2qwhFBForJO npEtnytSvYMxv7ezxcYPobGDgGvLzbZ3ztDRI8mxbs/MINa41Nq5bc9TnI3D0nd52+R+uHbQtcfx llQ4Afb3+Pn6+/z9/v/4BBA4kEBEnDEDEipcyLChw4QECiBQsEfOw4sYM2KMOBFOAgT+BwyIHEmy pMmTJA8gSECRg4KPIVHKnFlSJUt5OHPq3Mmzp8+fpl6CNKAsF9ALQkP6CQSsqAcFLwvSmdH0A9QE Urs1rfo06tJgR8PK4Bbsm9k6555kwwNPHSV2f9ikowZqHQYodeTSfeMuBFlwbM+67TR1Wt4kccUq rvtWE1d2K/6OkoyT8ojHFywv3jzWLmdE5PKKHk06wAADWTWEIs26teu8plGrqwKwtj6BBEHTts3b Hu7UnxcnpUm8uPHjJm22DHEVq/Pn0KNLhw7VatTp2LNr1149uPfv4MOLH0++vPnz6I++Xs++vfv3 8OPLn0+/vv37+PPr38+/P+v0rDT+VxRmPQl4hVzE0HWCObwkiAKDdzn4YF8AinfQHFohqBc2dJjj xS5qqUGgBRculccwDI443IEXgLhLJDDONcKKhQGWooxPwUTUgTLGuEU3Fer0143nCKagj95IiIFk RmTxIV7iIGIDDi3W0heSRim4zZRWZFjkWltWAReU0nAYJE9D6pXkl5AZSWE1nslippGMEVYlWGzi +Wad5aj5yDd8tvmmGSCeWVmcgInopzgv4ogWYhqWwGQXZSE54qTwuIilLWDC2ZiXSiyaJQeTZvgk kIYe+ukhmKmpgmaGwGqMrB+MSAGtqYqHa3C7xtCrK6vtFxtwS4bG37C5HhOsf8xhAoCsXwbs1htA v+lWz7TYUjsQsRpcqNG3DXG0XLd8gGvuQuIma4y357brrrvpMqcjcsYp98W89OZLnL1wXLfdv9F1 94W/ABeMlcDqztKcwQw37DBL4yYs8cQUV2zxxS1GAAA7 ------MultipartBoundary--AJENGtWZFG9ce0rU3PjwEapS66YfpcfxD1OvHvIfYE------