Afghanistan:

No Peace Without the Majority of the Population

A political analysis by Dr. Almut

Wieland-Karimi, Friedrich Ebert Foundation

The majority of the Afghans are neither supporters of

the Taliban nor of the Northern Alliance - they constitute the civilian

opposition.

The democratic movement is a tender bud which could play

an important role in the Afghanistan of the future.

An all-embracing national feeling is the foundation for

a possible agreement among the Afghans.

Germany has the confidence of all conflicting parties

and could thus take up a prominent role as mediator.

Particularly experienced non-governmental organizations,

e.g. the political foundations could offer valuable support to their Afghan

partners in building up democratic structures.

There is nothing apart from a comprehensive UN’s mandate

and a long-term international commitment that could effect a lasting political

solution for Afghanistan.

The Civilian Opposition - Badly

Neglected

One central aspect in the current political debate on

Afghanistan is being badly neglected: What do the majority of the roughly

20 million Afghans think about their political future? They support neither

the Taliban nor the Northern Alliance. Their lives are rather determined

by traditional organizational units at a local and regional level, legitimized

by local council meetings (shuras or jirgas). These councils include religious,

ethnic, tribal, village, or valley chiefs. On the one hand, they certainly

depend on the higher political and military framework conditions, however,

they have been able to maintain a great deal of autonomy and independence.

At the local level, simple forms of a functioning administration have developed.

Affiliation with war factions or alternative political groupings is mostly

determined by these councils which act as electors or multipliers if one

was to translate it into our language. Correspondingly, Afghanistan is

not nearly as disorganized as it might seem from the outside.

The major part of the population is first of all war-weary

and trusts little in the military-political forces having disqualified

themselves over the last 20 years - starting with the Communist DVPA regime,

to the Mudjaheddin characterized by rivalries and the Northern Alliance

emerging from there, up to the Taliban. After more than 20 years of war,

the majority of the population is yearning for peace and especially because

the humanitarian need has never reached such horrifying dimensions as today:

Up to seven million people, which is approximately a third of the population

is on the run and winter has already set in in the mountains. This catastrophe

was triggered by the civil war and the inability of the war factions to

provide the people with supplies. In addition to that there is a drought

having lasted for years and most recently, the fear of the urban population

of the current military actions.

As regards a medium-term perspective, it is important

that humanitarian aid does not indirectly support one of the civil war

factions. Traditional civilian forces and their leaders could be strengthened

through material aid (food, reconstruction aid) and a political incorporation

in a consultation mechanism. Because one has to be aware of the fact that

a lasting political solution - and thus a medium-term improvement of the

living conditions - will only be achieved if it is supported by the majority

of the Afghans.

The Democratic Movement - A Tender

Bud In Need of Care

Apart from the traditional political structures, there

is another force which could strengthen a political process of solution:

the democratic opposition. Its representatives can be identified, addressed,

and questioned. They are not at all anonymous in a way that they could

not - or not yet - be included in the political process. However, this

is hardly or not at all being attempted. So far, hardly any Western politician

has tried to get in contact with the democratic opposition in Afghanistan

itself. This needs to happen immediately!

The history of the democratic movement goes back to the

beginning of the last century. At the same time as the Young Turkish Movement

headed by Mustafa Kemal Pascha (Atatürk) came into being a so-called

Young Afghan or Constitutionalism Movement (mashrutiyyat) developed in

Afghanistan. In 1923, it scored its first success with the establishment

of a modern constitution. Mahmud Tarzi, actively involved together with

King Amanullah, was one of the guiding intellectual forces. Contrary to

the situation in Turkey, however, their achievements met with strong conservative

resistance resulting in the Democrats being driven to the underground in

1929. Nevertheless, a number of well-educated and intellectual circles,

the major part of the opinion-makers, committed themselves over decades

to democratic values. Depending on the political situation leaders of the

national-democratic movement were persecuted by the state or they were

given new impetus, as happening in the middle of the 1960s, and stood as

candidates in the elections. One part of the success story is that with

the Constitution of 1964 Afghan women were given equal rights. During this

time different democratic parties came into being, mostly formed around

individual people or magazines.

After the putsch of 1973 and even more so after the Soviet

invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 and the beginnings of the resistance movement,

democratically oriented groups were largely caught in the crossfire: Different

groups such as the NEFA (National Unity Front Afghanistan) organized their

own resistance incorporating left-wing and moderate democratic forces.

However, due to their political motivation they were marginalized by the

Islamic or Islamistic Mudjaheddin. Most of all, the democratic resistance

was lacking the support of the West: money, logistics, and weapons were

given to other political parties. They were a special thorn in the flesh

of the Pakistani Intelligence Service and well-known leaders such as Qayyum

Rahbar, Massim Ludin, Sayyid Majrouh and many others were murdered, which

considerably weakened the movement.

Inspite of all this, their cells have continued to exist

in Afghanistan and in exile. The following groups or parties are to be

mentioned by means of examples: Afghan Mellat ("Afghan Nation"), describing

itself as Social Democratic, includes different wings actively involved

in a spectrum from Liberal-Intellectuals to Pashtun-Chauvinists. Wulusi

Mellat ("People’s National") split off from this group. Further groups

worth mentioning are Setam-e Melli, a splitting-off from the former Communist

Party DVPA, Shulah-ye Jawid ("Eternal Flame"), a group dominated by urban

intellectuals, and the Pashtun Social Democratic Party. Years of efforts

as part of a political process led to the uniting of these groups under

one umbrella organization: The "Alliance for Democracy" was founded in

Aachen in June 2001 and it incorporates - as of now - eight groups. The

majority of their supporters are in Afghanistan. However, due to the politically

dangerous situation and the lack of security for the activists, their organization

centers are located in Western exile. For obvious reasons there is no empirically

reliable data on their strength in numbers but it is assumed that each

group has thousands of active members.

It could be promising in the current situation that the

democratic forces are joining together with the above mentioned politically

independent majority of the population to form a civilian opposition, i.e.

an additional force in Afghanistan. The democratic groups have numerous

advantages: Unlike others involved in Afghanistan they have not disqualified

themselves in the eyes of the people. Women are actively involved in their

groups. Taking into account the situation in Afghanistan, they dispose

of an extraordinary potential of well-trained specialists (doctors, engineers,

teachers, etc.) and they have built bridges to other countries. Furthermore,

ethnic and religious identities play a secondary role. There are already

first examples of southern and south-western provinces where council meetings

are constituting, in which traditional chiefs are represented but which

also include democratic representatives and intellectuals. The greatest

difficulties these oppositional initiatives are facing are the impending

winter and the lack of supplies but also the lacking international support,

which, nevertheless, is given to the war parties and the supporters of

the king.

Learning From the Mistakes of

the Past!

What kind of realistic approaches could there be for

a political solution of the conflict? It is generally agreed that nothing

but a political solution will lead to an enduring stabilization of Afghanistan

and the adjacent region. What has become clear over the last weeks is that

the USA as leader of the anti-terror alliance is pursuing a determined

military strategy but without a sufficiently clear-cut political strategy

for Afghanistan. The more important it becomes that the different interests

of the Afghan people, the Afghan political and military players, the bordering

states, and the international players are included in the current phase

of discussion, consultation, and negotiation in order to enable them to

move towards one another. It is already clear that the prospect of real

peace will be determined by the fact whether Afghanistan is again in the

limelight only temporarily or whether medium- and long-term strategies

persistently pursued by a national as well as international pro-peace-alliance

will take effect.

One of the mistakes made is that in the 1980s the West

exclusively supported religiously motivated but not the democratically

oriented resistance groups. After 1992, after the end of the East-West

Conflict and the collapse of the pro-Soviet governorship, Afghanistan was

left to its own devices or rather in the hands of armed groups. The former

Mudjaheddin groups strongly armed by their respective supporters got caught

up in a bloody regionalized civil war taking the lives of ten thousands

of people and reducing the city of Kabul to rubbles. This war over the

power in Kabul connected with massive human rights violations, which the

people have never been able to forget, constituted the prerequisite for

the success of the radically Islamistic Taliban. Starting in 1995, the

troops around Mullah Omar were at first, after tremendous territorial gains,

able to establish a certain security and stability. Very soon however,

it turned out that the Taliban, formed up as a military force, disposed

of no political ambitions or know-how whatsoever: Lacking infrastructure

and reconstruction measures combined with massive human rights violations

let the Taliban become a terror regime. Usama Bin Ladin and his supporters

enjoy the right of hospitality and Afghanistan without the functioning

institutions of a state ended up on the list of the "rogue states".

Isolation of the Taliban combined with UN sanctions were

the only tools the community of states chose in order to counter this powder

keg. As early as with the wanton destruction of the Buddha statues in Central

Afghan Bamiyan in the spring of 2001 it became clear that the direction

taken by the international community had to be a blind alley since neither

the UN nor the Islamic states were able to influence the Taliban leaders.

The analysis of the political development in Afghanistan in the last decade

finally shows very clearly that the pacification of the region and the

stemming of internationally threatening potentials can only be achieved

by means of a medium- and long-term commitment by the community of states.

These threatening potentials include not only the currently very present

terrorist network Al-Qaida but also the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan,

drug production, arms trade, low-level socio-economic development, and

migration streams.

What Can the International Community

Do?

Helping the needy people to survive, a major part of

which is fleeing the country can first of all only be done by massive internationally

coordinated humanitarian emergency assistance and immediate aid measures.

These efforts are already running at full speed. It is important that the

search for possible political solutions is to be started now and that comprehensive

reconstruction measures are introduced parallel to the humanitarian and

military actions.

Although there is actually a consensus on the fact that

basically no solution is to be forced on the Afghans from the outside as

such a solution would hardly be a lasting one, a clear contradiction to

practical politics can be noted: The civil war factions and the king both

being discussed as representations of interests for a political solution

receive massive support from abroad. However, a political conflict resolution

will only be crowned by success if all Afghan interests - including the

civilian opposition and the democratic movement - are included on an equal

footing, that is without any preferential treatment.

The United Nations’ Security Council will determine what

the mandate for a UN mission in Afghanistan will look like. At the moment

it is beyond doubt that there will be such a mandate. Due to the divergent

national and regional interests and the almost complete destruction of

an infrastructure which was only rudimentary anyways, only a comprehensive

and medium- to long-term mandate will establish the preconditions for a

lasting success.

First of all, the UN will face the difficulties of disarming

the civil war factions and of filling up the military power vacuum which

can only be filled up temporarily by the anti-terror alliance. The Islamic

States Organization (especially with Muslim soldiers under a UN mandate)

could play an important role in this context since the American and British

military presence will meet with religiously and politically motivated

opposition by the war factions as well as by the population. Another option

would be to integrate the simple fighters of the civil war factions - not

their military leaders - as soldiers in a central military force to be

newly constructed, to train them, and to place them for a transitional

period under UN command. The disarmament is mainly problematic if one takes

into account that weapons are widely spread in the whole country and in

the region, that commanders are in principle easily bought, and that an

entire generation has learned nothing except for handling weapons.

The fact that they are easily bought can of course be

used positively at first in terms of removing the Taliban regime, however,

as a second step one will have to raise the issue of how to integrate the

warlords of both civil war factions into society. The implementation of

a rehabilitation program for the former fighters is imaginable only after

a clear-cut ending of the military phase and after a manifestation of intent

by the international community to commit itself to the consolidation of

peace in Afghanistan. In addition, moderate forces on the side of the Northern

Alliance and the Taliban should be granted the right to take up a position

in a government as this is the only guarantee that they will be able to

see themselves as participants in a peace process. It is also to be examined

whether leading warlords of both sides should be taken to an international

court and held responsible for their crimes and/or human rights violations.

Another key factor for a successful political solution

will be the role of the bordering states: Taking up the "6 + 2 Meeting"

(Afghanistan’s bordering states plus the USA and Russia) headed by the

United Nations' Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA), they should be

included in a comprehensive consultation process where, on the one hand,

interests could be negotiated and pressure exerted but which could also

offer incentives for the approval of compromise solutions.

Furthermore, the UN should - similarly to East Timor -

temporarily take over the administration and the functions of the government

while supporting existing administrative structures. Not until a minimum

of state structures is functioning and parallel to that basic agreements

on a future state are reached by means of a political process with the

participation of large sections of the Afghan population, can a loya jirga

ceremoniously confirm a consensus on the future structure of this state

and thus turn it into a binding agreement. Within this process the former

king Zaher Schah will take up the responsibility to summon the loya jirga

and to act as its patron. With the help of the UN administration a constitution

for Afghanistan is to be drawn up, possibly using the democratically oriented

constitution of 1964 as an important basis, and elections are to be prepared.

Furthermore, the administration together with the political players in

Afghanistan will take up the task to set up or to commission a reconstruction

plan and - as a next step - to coordinate it at an international level.

In addition, to name just the most important steps on this path, framework

conditions for the revival in the economy and the ending of the war-economy

are to be established.

What Could a Specifically German

Contribution Look Like?

Germany enjoys a high reputation in Afghanistan and has

the confidence of all parts of the society. It does not have the negative

burden of a colonial past in the region. On the contrary: Until 1979 there

was a very friendly German-Afghan partnership felt to be on an equal footing

manifesting itself in a strong commitment in the field of development policy

in the 1970s and 1980s. With Paktia in the south of Kabul, an entire province

was developed by means of a masterplan - a show piece of German know-how

and German-Afghan cooperation. University twinning programs fostered a

lively scientific exchange. Until today, German non-governmental organizations

have been supporting small development projects in Afghanistan. With this

background, Germany could take up a prominent role within the framework

of its international involvement as mediator between the competing interests.

Taking into account the objective of bringing in democratic

values to a greater extent into the conflict resolution process and of

expanding the basis of Afghan interests, democratic groupings should receive

special support. A specifically German contribution should be to support

the democratic movement in Afghanistan and in exile within the international

discussion and consultation process. This includes its participation in

international negotiations which up to now have been dominated on the Afghan

side by the king and the Northern Alliance as a consequence of international

support. It is also important to pass on the message to the Afghan people

that in the political solution process hopes are not only placed in the

king and the civil war factions but that they themselves will also have

the opportunity to become actively involved in the political conflict resolution.

Well-directed support of local and regional political-administrative structures

or civilian forces in the form of the shuras as well as a community building

program would be an important starting point to achieve this. These measures

could be implemented within the framework of well-tried German institutions

and tools in the field of development cooperation.

It is also conceivable to offer a repatriation program

for the more than 80,000 Afghans living in Germany. A disproportionately

high number of well-trained people can be found amongst them who could

play an important role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan - together

with German institutions. In this area, one can fall back on the experience

with a program for Bosnians on the one hand but also on the Specialists

Program Afghanistan provided by the GTZ [German Agency for Technical Cooperation]

which finally failed because of the continuation of the war after 1992.

The determining factor for the success of such a program will be whether

permanent or temporary repatriates can be guaranteed that the implementation

of the peace settlement will be persistently supported by the international

community.

National Feeling – Basis For Conflict Resolution

Inspite of the 20 years of war in Afghanistan, the painful

losses and experiences and inspite of the fragmentation of the society,

there is - in contrast to other countries in a civil war situation - a

common basis for conflict resolution: an all-embracing Afghan national

feeling. Belonging to the Afghan nation links ethnic groups, tribes, as

well as religious communities, and political groups. The bordering states,

on the other side, try to use these loyalities for their own vested interests

in Afghanistan - in Afghanistan itself there are no efforts toward autonomy

along ethnic or religious lines. In view of this perspective, the repeatedly

expressed demand for an agreement among the Afghans themselves, has - at

least in principle - a chance of success. However, this requires international

support because up to now regional and international players have constantly

intervened in the conflict.

The basis for the main Afghan contribution to conflict

resolution will be first of all a basic consensus within Afghanistan itself

on the aim of reaching a political solution. Efforts in the field of national

reconciliation and a political direction will only be successful if they

lead to one process: Through the organization of small shuras and jirgas

inside and outside of Afghanistan from the local unit to the regional level

delegates can be appointed who will be accepted by all sections of the

population. At the end of this first phase, the representatives elected

in this way would participate in a loya jirga which could be held to publish

these first agreements reached and thus underline them. It is important

that by doing it in such a way all sections of the population, but also

and above all the Afghan women, are included. Important advisory council

meetings in former times used to also include women - although there was

not an adequate percentage represented.

The cooperation with the UN has to be an item on the agenda

of the local and regional council meetings as well because positive results

can only be achieved if the people support their conflict mediation and

reconstruction programs in a constructive way. The self-conception of the

political forces, however, requires that the military groups, i.e. the

Northern Alliance and the Taliban have to be willing to lay down their

arms for a political solution. Especially middle-class intellectuals and

specialists in the country and in exile should be able to become actively

involved in the process of reconstruction whereas returning Afghans could

also build bridges between societies which constitutes an important element

in international cooperation.

Well-known Interests Having an

Influence on a Possible Solution

First of all, the bordering states already mentioned

above are to be taken into consideration trying to carry through with different

intensities their interests in Afghanistan. It is only the motivation which

is similar: None of the bordering states want to have a government in Afghanistan

which is ill-disposed towards them - confronted with this option, they

would rather prefer a continuation of the armed conflict. The bordering

states find their clientele in Afghanistan on the basis of ethnic or religious

connections: The Pashtuns, the majority ethnos in Afghanistan and the border

region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, who were spread over the two states

by the Durand line drawn by the British colonial power play an important

role for Pakistan. The Pakistani Intelligence Service and parts of the

Pakistani army are dominated by the Pashtuns. The Iranians have connection

especially with the Shiite dominated hizb-e wahdat, a member of the Northern

Alliance. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are linked through ethnic

common features primarily with North Afghanistan. They again influence

the interests of Russia which is mainly afraid of the Islamistic forces.

Based on its arch enmity with Pakistan, India supports above all the non-Pashtun

and non-Islamistic forces. Only if the interests briefly laid out above

are taken into account and are balanced out when forming a future government

in Afghanistan, there might be a chance that the respective clientele will

not be supported financially or with weapons anymore.

The Taliban regime is noticeably losing its stability

as some of the military, traditional, and religious leaders have already

declared their independence or have deserted to the Northern Alliance.

Even the Taliban stand for an alliance - dominated by the Pashtun majority

- and only its core is made up of "students of religion" (taliban) who

received a military basic training in one of the religious schools. The

Taliban have lost the backing of the overwhelming majority of the people

because over the last years it was mainly the ordinary people that had

to suffer in particular from the rigidity and the unwillingness to compromise

of the Taliban regime. The extent of the humanitarian catastrophe and the

tormenting have provoked resistance even in strictly traditional tribal

areas, although the control by the Taliban has always been limited in the

rural areas anyways. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the danger

that with numerous civilian casualties as a consequence of the foreign

military actions, a solidarity effect among the Afghan people against the

USA and with the Taliban might come into being. This will be decisively

dependant on the fact whether the message can be passed on that the attacks

are aimed at the Taliban and Al-Qaida and not at the Afghan people. With

this in mind, one has to be aware of the fact that there is little access

to the media in Afghanistan - apart from a few radio sets that can be used

to receive the international radio stations Voice of America, BBC, and

Deutsche Welle as well as some magazines by the opposition circulating

on the quiet.

The Northern Alliance is a heterogeneous military alliance

formed for this purpose only whose cohesion is guaranteed by the common

enemy in the form of the Taliban. Since the murder of Ahmad Shah Massud

the alliance has been considerably weakened and the rivalries among themselves

have been strengthened again by the hope for a prominent role. Commanders

such as General Dostum, Muhammad Fahim, and Ismail Khan are already disputing

President Rabbani’s right to his position who is officially still in office.

The core of the Northern Alliance is made up of Islamistic warlords having

forfeited everybody’s sympathy as a consequence of not seizing the political

opportunities after 1992. To see them as a potential guarantor of a pacification

of the country can only be attributed to short-term military objectives.

One should not underestimate the memory of the Afghans. In the last weeks,

a cautious change in American politics could be noted, moving away from

the one-sided support of the Northern Alliance and still owing them the

financial and logistical support, the prospect of which had been held out

to them.

The international community of states and especially the

US administration believe that the former king, overthrown in 1973, today

87 years old and living in Roman exile is capable of taking up a leading

role in this process. Three different "processes" (Rome, Frankfurt, Cyprus)

strongly influenced by the exile situation involving primarily former Afghan

bureaucrats and monarchists in exile view the preparation and summoning

of a great council meeting (loya jirga) by the king as a central tool in

the process of conflict resolution. The loya jirga did achieve positive

results in the history of Afghanistan but it can only be successful if

it takes place at the end of a process of negotiations in which all decision-makers

of the country were included. This is exactly where the deficit begins

to emerge because on the one hand the royal family itself but also the

three "processes" or initiatives are at loggerheads with one another. The

king, on the other hand, relies on his advisors who, however, do not bring

to him all the important political movement and groups but only Afghans

coming as individuals. Excessive US support of the king could, in addition

to that, have negative effects in the end because it undermines the demand

for a self-supported solution by the Afghan people. There is already a

list of a 120 head strong "National Council" being set up without a preceding

political process during which opinion-leaders and widely spread Afghan

interests could have been developed.

Scenarios as a Consequence of

US-American Military Presence

The expected, increasingly steady military US presence

in Central Asia reacting not only to Usama Bin Ladin and the Taliban but

also to the oil and natural gas resources in the region as well as to the

emerging global players China and India, will change the geopolitical balance

in South and Central Asia. This could have positive effects on Pakistan.

Its participation in the anti-terror alliance could lead to a strengthening

of Musharraf and to the marginalisation of Islamistic forces. Furthermore,

a debt relief and improvement of the relationship with India via a resolution

for the Kashmir conflict could save the country from the threatening collapse.

On the other hand, the possibility cannot be ruled out that due to the

widely spread disapproval of the American presence the Islamists might

gain the upper hand, the army might split up and the pulling out of the

international alliance might entail an economic collapse. As Pakistan is

a nuclear power, this might have incalculable consequences.

The unstable governments in the Central Asian republics

could, on the one hand, benefit from the military US presence because the

Islamistic opposition with its headquarters located mostly on Afghan territory

could be considerably weakened. This would markedly increase the prospects

of the implementation of economic and democratic reforms. A failure of

the efforts towards reform could, on the other hand, lead to the contrary,

that is autocracy and repression of these governments becoming even more

pronounced. Iran’s tentative move closer to the Western powers could soon

come to an end as a consequence of the military presence being felt as

imperialistic. The Conservatives were strengthened and forces of reform

around Khatami were weakened. If the mainly Shiite sections of the population

in Afghanistan affiliated with the Iran were taken into consideration in

an adequate way, the incorporation of Iran as an equal partner in a political

solution for Afghanistan could also result in a strengthening of the reformist

powers and beyond that in moving closer to the USA indirectly via Afghanistan.

For now, the following possible military scenarios could

develop in Afghanistan: The Northern Alliance supported by international

military actions is able to take Kabul and additional cities. Or: The Taliban

prove their steadfastness, a cohesion which is stronger than generally

expected, and they succeed in surviving the winter in Kabul. Thirdly, it

is conceivable that British and American troops succeed in occupying the

cities, the hinterland, however, remains in the sphere of influence of

the Taliban. This would call to mind the negative experience of the Soviet

Union in Afghanistan clearly failing in a similar situation. The last imaginable

scenario could be that international troops gain the upper hand in terms

of military strength in Afghanistan while parallel to the military action

an implosion of the Taliban regime takes place.

Depending on these different military variants, the starting

position for a political solution for Afghanistan will be better or worse:

The Northern Alliance growing stronger or the staying of the Taliban increases

the risk of warlordism in Afghanistan as it has taken root over the last

decade in different forms and without a political perspective. From the

ranks of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance a new warlord faction supported

by additional foreign Islamistic mercenaries could develop - this would

be the worst case scenario. A consequence of this would be the expansion

of the humanitarian catastrophe and the hardship among refugees as well

as the strengthening of internationally threatening terror centers. The

positive scenario for Afghanistan, on the other hand, could be that international

military presence and an internationally coordinated commitment might result

in the fact that after stemming the war factions, a new government, considerably

improved living conditions, a process of nation-building and reconstruction

might come into being. In view of the geostrategic significance of the

region this latter scenario is actually the only one which could lie in

the interest of the international community - thus, a long-term commitment

is what is called for.

There Is a Chance!

There will not be a panacea for the complex questions

and challenges on the path towards a political solution. Nevertheless,

the experiences and findings from the Afghan past and from international

conflict mediation initiatives in other regions of the world could provide

a constructive kind of help in this process which has to be used systematically.

Even today it is already certain that the prospects of a political solution

to the Afghanistan conflict which has lasted for more than 20 years have

never been so good: The dismay of the international community emerging

from the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 resulted in an unprecedented

determination, particularly on the side of the only remaining world power

USA. The possible success - a stable peace settlement - depends, and this

is to be emphasized again, on the participation of all the important groups

in Afghanistan - also including the democratic groups in the country -

and on a long-term international commitment in Afghanistan.

Responsible in terms of media inquiries:

Dr. Almut Wieland-Karimi, Phone: 0049-30-26935-915, E-Mail:

[email-masked]

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastraße 17, D-10785

Berlin, Germany