From: Snapshot-Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/bueros/london/01151.htm Subject: =?utf-8?Q?Europe's=20role=20in=20the=20new=20global=20order=20/=20John=20?= =?utf-8?Q?Lloyd=20-=20[Electronic=20ed.]=20-=20London,=202001=20-=209=20B?= =?utf-8?Q?l.=20=3D=2040=20KB,=20Text=20.=20-=20(Working=20papers=20/=20Fr?= =?utf-8?Q?iedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,=20London=20Office=20;=202001,8)=20
E?= =?utf-8?Q?lectronic=20ed.:=20Bonn=20:=20FES=20Library,=202001=20

=C2=A9=20Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung?= Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 14:36:40 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq----" ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq---- Content-Type: text/html Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/bueros/london/01151.htm Europe's role in the new global order / John Lloyd - [Electronic ed.] - Lon= don, 2001 - 9 Bl. =3D 40 KB, Text . - (Working papers / Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, London Office ; 2001,8) <br>Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001 <br><br><font size=3D-1><i>=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung</i></font> <= link rel=3D"SCHEMA.dc" href=3D"http://purl.org/metadata/dublin_core_element= s#title">
=3D"TITLE/INFO"


Europe's role in the new global order / John Lloyd - [Electronic ed.] - Lon= don, 2001 - 9 Bl. =3D 40 KB, Text . - (Working papers / Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, London Office ; 2001,8)
Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2001

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

=3D"CONTENTS"


  • 1. Defence and Security
  • 2. New forms of engagement in globalisation
  • 3. Building New Bridges with Islam
  • 4. New Challenges for the Partnership with the US


    • Social democrat policy makers and thinkers from Britain, Germany and Fra= nce came together in London in November to discuss a range of issues, all o= f these highly conditioned by the events of September 11 2001, and their af= termath. The discussion was accompanied by a paper which organised the tal= ks into four main areas: defence and security; globalisation; relations wit= h Islam; and EU-US relations. =20

    These discussions ranged widely and deeply. What emerged was a larg= e concern in the short term for a war on terrorism seen as both necessary a= nd full of danger; but also a desire to make both Europe's role, and social= democratic values and approaches more prominent and vivid, even in the mid= st of the cares and responsibilities of governments.

    3D"Page

    1. = Defence and Security

    The attacks of September 11 on the United States give stark prominen= ce to threats and conflicts which had been foreshadowed =96 if not in the p= recise way in which the calamity struck. Indeed, a recent work by Anthony= Lake, National Security Advisor to President Bill Clinton, puts terrorist = threats of various kinds as one of the most urgent dangers facing the Unite= d States. The British Ministry of Defence's paper Future Strategic Con= text for Defence (February 2001) argues that=20

      "nationalism, religion and single-issue activism will continue to produc= e extremists prepared to use terrorism to achieve their aims. Use of impro= ved communications and information systems will enable some groups to bette= r co-ordinate their activities. Such groups may pose the most immediate, i= f small scale and localised, threat to UK interests, as they are less likel= y to be constrained by political considerations or threat of retaliation."= =20

    Also well known and well flagged are the greater resources of terror ava= ilable to such groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union has made stocks o= f nuclear fissile materials, chemical and biological warfare materials, les= s secure; and it has 'liberated' generations of defence research scientists= with poor salaries and living conditions, whose experience and knowledge w= ould be of value to the terrorist groups. Even without the Soviet/former = Warsaw Pact insecurities, the high military technology is now more availabl= e than a decade ago on the market, or through crime networks =96 which are = themselves expanding significantly, also in part because of the sudden grow= th of overt criminality in the former Soviet Union and its equally rapid = =91globalisation=92.

    Containment, seen by the West as a strategy of containing the Soviet= Union's aggressive tendencies, was also =96 it is clear in retrospect =96 = a way of containing huge potential threats to the West. Now, Russia does not pose a conventional threat to NATO forces and, though it remain= s a very large strategic power, its relative poverty makes it cautious and = its relative rapprochement with the West makes it unlikely to confront it. = Since September 11, it has made a great deal of common cause with the Wes= t =96 in large part because it perceives its main threat to come from radic= al Islamic groups, a perception now shared by the US. Widescale instabili= ty could threaten the West, both by mass exodus and a further marked drop i= n weapons security.

    China faces very large internal problems and has a relatively= weak military, though it is seeking to improve technology and the projecti= on of forces. It has a limited strategic nuclear capacity, which could re= ach Europe, but a policy of no first use. Territorial integrity is its mai= n concern: Taiwan is the potential flashpoint =96 but so far has been manag= ed, if with many tensions. Like Russia, regional instability could threate= n the West.

    Before September 11, the main areas of regional instability and pote= ntial conflict were seen as:=20

    • The Balkans - where a legacy of Communism, and of the au= thoritarian-nationalist regimes of Milosevic and Tudjman, causes continuing= conflict and will entail keeping NATO forces in the area for the foreseeab= le future. However, the presence of NATO has ensured the arrest of a numbe= r of major figures accused of war crimes, now on trial at The Hague =96 inc= luding Slobodan Milosevic himself.

    • The Caucasus and Transcaucasus, where the conflicts= include the Russian intervention in Chechnya to stop secession; the Georgi= an conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conf= lict. Russia is the sole practical outside 'agency' in these conflicts

    • South Asia, where relations between India and Pakis= tan, especially over the national status of Kashmir, are very bad, and wher= e both are nuclear armed. There are arguments on whether their nuclear sta= tus provides more or less stability.

    • North Africa, especially Algeria, where continued d= eterioration could cause refugee crises.

    • The Middle East, now assuming much larger importanc= e. Iraq remains under the control of Saddam Hussein, who continues to pose= a military threat to neighbouring states. The breakdown of talks between = Israel and Palestine and the fighting between them shows no respite. Suppor= t for Israel by the US in particular and the West in general has been ident= ified by Osama bin Laden and many others =96 including the Saudi ruling dyn= asty =96 as a large contributory cause to the September 11 attack.

    Asymmetry has suddenly become a popular word in military circles. Part = of what is meant by it is that NATO now has no conventional challenge, and= thus potential enemies will pursue unconventional strategies =96 one such = we have seen displayed. The trend since the end of the Cold War has been r= apidly away from the possibility of conventional force confrontation, thoug= h not yet so radically that the possibility can be discounted. =20

    However, the threats are now multiple. Weapons of mass destruction = are now proliferating, and will further. The spread of technology is more = rapid than before, since there are no effective bars. Though Europe is not= yet in target of rocket- delivered weapons of mass destruction, it will be= come so within the next two decades.

    Coalitions of forces are already much more popular than in the past,= and will become more so. NATO forces will be drawn into further wars whic= h do not directly threaten European or North American territory. These deve= lopments will produce strains between members of the coalitions with differ= ent interests and politics. =20

    The European defence contribution remains an unknown factor. It has= suffered, since first being proposed, from lack of fit between different f= orces, the quite different approaches to warfare and strategy between diffe= rent European states, the presence of NATO which tends to crowd out Europea= n initiatives, jealously guarded national military industries, the suspicio= n of the US that European defence would weaken NATO and the fact that most = countries are decreasing military expenditure =96 making a European capacit= y with independent intelligence and strategic capability much harder. =20

    September 11 has accelerated =96 or perhaps caused =96 another evide= nt trend. France has been distrusted in the US, especially in military cir= cles. On the US side, that distrust is seen as a reflection of the distanc= e which France has taken from NATO, and alleged leakages of intelligence in= the Kosovo conflict. On the French side, the coolness in the relationship= is seen as reflecting US dislike for France's independent foreign policy s= tance, especially in the Middle East. French policy makers believe that th= eir country's independent stance foreshadows what will be the inevitable po= licies of other European states, including Britain, as Europe gains authori= ty in international affairs. =20

    However, France has taken an unambiguously supportive stance towards= the US, and on its action against terrorism. This seems to reflect a broa= d and deep consensus in French civil society, and may have continuing and p= ermanent effects on its attitude towards NATO membership and towards the Eu= ropean defence force =96 influencing it towards a view that NATO and the ne= w force should be closely intertwined. =20

    Reaction in Germany has been even more marked: in a speech to the Bu= ndestag after his visit to New York in early October, Chancellor Schr=F6der= said that Germany's role outside of its borders would include "participati= on in military operations to defend freedom and human rights and to create = stability and security". In this way, the September 11 attacks have given = depth and meaning to Schr=F6der's speeches in the early years of government= on a more independent Germany =96 and seem to presage the emergence of Ger= many as a military force. German troops will operate outside of German bou= ndaries =96 a profound psychological shift for the country. However, there= may remain implicit limits, such as operations by German troops in the Mid= dle East.

    September 11 has seemed to privilege the action of individual member= states against action by the EU =96 and even against NATO. The EU has bee= n seen as weak. A rotating presidency, which often puts small countries in= the leadership position at times of crisis =96 as now, with Belgium's pres= idency =96 can deprive it of the necessary authority, even as the mechanis= m gives the smaller states a stake in the Union. It has not coordinated th= e defence response; that has been led by Britain, France and Germany, which= had to face accusations of cutting out the contribution of other states, e= specially Italy and Spain. It has said it wishes to develop a coherent mil= itary force; but its member states continue to cut defence budgets, and the= shape of the force is still unclear. However, with sufficient political w= ill a European force may appear over the next decade. The September 11 att= acks will be likely to accelerate that trend. =20

    The US now knows that security is not gained by unilateralism =96 on= ly by multilateral action. However, it is not yet clear if the US will bec= ome more multilateral in the long term, beyond the duration or outside of t= he bounds of the war against terrorism. The US has greatly stepped up its = efforts to get a Middle East settlement, and has turned around in its polic= y towards Russia. But it is not clear if these initiatives will last, or i= f the US penchant for doing it its way will continue to hold sway.



    2. = New forms of engagement in globalisation

    Globalisation is made up of a number of interrelated features. It i= ncludes the greatly accelerated interconnection between the world's finance= centres; the increasing internationalisation of production and distributio= n; the view of the world as one unit for investment purposes; the spread of= media-culture industries across ever-larger parts of the globe while their= products reach almost all parts of it; the policies of the =91Bretton Wood= s=92 institutions in using global resources for world development and analy= sing the world economy; the spread of United Nations agencies; and the grea= t growth, in several waves, of non-governmental organisations. It comprehe= nds many apparently contradictory trends =96 such as a rise of sometimes mi= litant and violent nationalism; a resurgence of fundamentalisms in various = religions, coupled with a rapid spread of cosmopolitanism, as citizens of a= ll countries live, work and travel increasingly abroad; the development of = English as a lingua franca of these cosmopolitan classes; and the efforts t= o tie together states, including previously hostile states, into close regi= onal alliances, of which the European Union is by far the most ambitious.

    Globalisation faces a number of serious challenges.

    • The fundamentalist challenge was shown on September 11. In its= Islamic-fundamentalist version, it is an equation of globalisation with We= stern oppression in general and American power in particular. Like most te= rrorist movements, it treats history as a collage of extremely selective op= pression, from the Crusades through to Western support for the state of Isr= ael. Its main elements presently are the issue of Palestine, and the prese= nce of US soldiers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

    • The anti-globalisation movements' challenge is not terrori= st, but is based in radical opposition. These movements are highly active = and confident, and in the space of a very few years have established themse= lves as uncompromising, even apocalyptic critics of capitalist globalisatio= n. They are diverse, but tend to agree that the effects of globalisation, = often defined as capitalist globalisation, are harmful =96 tto the poor, to= the environment and to non-human animals. The only gainers from globalisa= tion are, they believe, the rich, overwhelmingly concentrated in the West.

    • Globalisation's enemy within is world slowdown and recessi= on. Part of this is governed by long-term trends, especially in demography= . Europe will be adversely affected by demography in coming years, forcing= a new approach to education, immigration and other policies. The US, by c= ontrast, will remain a young society, with likely positive effects on its c= ommercial dynamism. In the short term, slowdown and recession will be driv= en by business confidence, especially in making transborder investments. A= prolonged recession, coupled with the uncertainties produced by September = 11, could thrown the process into reverse, at least temporarily. Two of th= e largest success stories of the last decade have been China and India, who= se growth has been strong; both, however, face enormous structural problems= which could be exacerbated by recession.

    Social democrats have drawn on similar sources of inspiration and ideali= sm to those claimed by the new movements; but for decades, their major part= ies have claimed the rights and responsibilities of power, and thus must ap= peal and deliver to mass electorates. Social democratic governments, which= remain in power in a large majority of the European states, found themselv= es the target of movements which claimed allegiance to many of the goals to= which the democratic left parties were historically committed, and which t= hey still believe they are serving. Their own political approach to global= isation =96 to see it as a field in which social democratic values could be= gradually spread internationally, through extending democratic practices a= nd institutions to a global level =96 has been so far tentative. It is als= o largely confined to academic articles and speeches, including the remarka= ble speeches given by Tony Blair to the Labour Party conference in October = and to the Lord Mayor's Banquet in November, both of which dedicated the ad= vanced states to a much more active engagement with the poor ones. =20

    The social democratic parties have so far given only sketches of ans= wers to what will become a central concern of our age, made more urgent by = September 11: that of the possibilities of global politics and of the found= ations of global justice. Yet, in creating a global market, we are willy-n= illy creating the outlines of a global society. The left has only begun to= feel that it should bring to that table the concerns which inform its dome= stic practice: for greater equality, for social justice, for the right of f= ree expression, for non-exploitative relations, and for personal (including= economic) security. =20

    Such a global politics would crucially include =96 indeed, its first= sketch already does include =96 a court in which criminals would be judged= . At the same time as Osama Bin Laden was identified as the man most likel= y to be the perpetrator of the Manhattan and Pentagon attacks, another alle= ged mass murderer, Slobodan Milosevic, was on trial in The Hague. It would= also include a strengthening of the UN, especially of its Economic and Soc= ial Council. Aid must be re-focussed =96 on the poorest states, especially= in Africa, in order to stimulate development there. =20

    The patient construction of such institutions and policies is what m= ight, in time, ensure that the values we saw outraged on September 11 gain = wider currency; a mere punishment, in itself, cannot. The effort to create= a system of global governance is probably now unavoidable, if the twin cha= llenges of the new global movements and of the new global terrorism are to = have an answer. =20

    That creation must be accompanied by a more robust challenge of the = global movements' propositions and actions. Poverty in other states is not= the result of the wealth of the West. Democratic values are not just West= ern: they have universal application, and the UN Charter on Human Rights ha= s a more or less universal signatory list. However, ideas cannot be impose= d on other states, and a great deal of work needs to be done to make of hum= an rights a truly universal concept. If humankind is really to enjoy acces= s to rights, the often rapacious governments and ruling groups must somehow= be circumvented and the opportunity to enjoy rights offered to them =96 a = difficult task. In this, media can be at least an occasional aid; it show= s different ways of life and freedoms.



    3. = Building New Bridges with Islam

    Islam, of concern to relatively few outside of it until September 11= , is now at the centre of Western states' concerns. It has been the subjec= t of two kinds of approach. =20

    The first is broadly followed by most governments in the West. It i= s a careful =96 indeed, insistent =96 discrimination between radical groups= who speak in the name of Islam, as the Al-Quaera network of Osama bin Lade= n and Islam proper. Tony Blair has said he has read the Koran, and finds i= t a source of inspiration and of concern with peace and forgiveness. At on= e extreme of this view are those Western commentators, generally on the lef= t, who agree with all or part of the anti-global and even radical Islamic c= ase: that the West is imperialist and oppressive and has brought most, if n= ot all, of the terror on itself.

    Radical Islamic groups are in a class of their own in West-hating (p= articularly America-hating). In different areas in different ways, they ha= ve developed a shifting narrative of victimisation at the hands of the West= in general and America in particular. The Gulf war against Iraq and the c= ontinuing sanctions on the country; the attacks launched on Libya with inte= nt to kill Colonel Ghadaffi in 1993 (CHK); the sanctions, applied particula= rly by the US, against Iran; the US support for Israel, seen as an occupier= of Moslem land and a bridgehead of imperialism, a vision of oppression whi= ch has grown in scale since the breakdown of the Camp David summit in 2000 = =96 these are part of a litany of justification for hatred, and provide a s= ea of acceptance, even of joyous acceptance, of the September 11 action. = =20

    Osama bin Laden, the Saudi multi-millionaire turned mujahaddin who is the first suspect for the organisation of the terrorist action, ha= s made clear in successive interviews his detestation of America, and sough= t to give it the status of a religious war, or jihad. "Hostility to= wards America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God= ", he said in an interview with Time in 1999. He has identified Jew= s ands "Crusaders" (Christians) as the imperialists on Moslem soil, to whom= the fight must be carried. He represents the sharpest and most extreme ed= ge of a loose movement of groups and states, which have identified imperial= ism, materialism, godlessness and immorality =96 all reaching their acme in= America =96 as objects of active hostility, as enemies in a fitful but rea= l war. He is also, in part, a product of the last days of the anti-Soviet = campaigns: trained and armed with thousands of others by the CIA, he gained= his self confidence in fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980= s, learning there that once the Soviet Union was destroyed, America must be= next. =20

    The Middle Eastern states have for long tended to see the US =96 at = least publicly =96 through their hostility to Israel. Indeed, in the 1990s= the traditional distaste for the US as Israel's protector was fleshed out = with a fiercer hatred, which saw the West in general as an oppressor. Even= where, as in the Gulf War, Moslem states expressed hostility to Saddam Hus= sein and support for the US-led intervention and war against Iraqi forces, = they were usually forced by public pressure to backtrack on their support b= efore the war's end. =20

    In turn, the US tends to see the Islamic fundamentalism professed by= some governments and movements in the region =96 especially Iran, in the e= ighties and early nineties =96 as a new ideological threat to the west. Pr= esident George Bush talked of Saddam Hussein of Iraq as "Hitler revisited";= the conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer wrote of Iran as "the wor= ld's new Comintern". The 1994 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New Yor= k by Islamic extremists, associates of Bin Laden =96 planned to achieve man= y more deaths than it did and to topple the twin towers =96 brought home fo= r the first time the sense that a religious civilisation had dedicated itse= lf to America's humbling.

    In his Clash of Civilisations, a work which grew sharply in i= nfluence after September 11, Samuel Huntingdon shows that Moslem states hav= e been involved in more "intergroup violence" at the end of the 20th century than other 'civilisations'. In an attempt to explain this, he= suggests a range of answers:=20

    • that Islam has been from its inception a "religion of the sword= ", and Mohammed a noted military commander;=20

    • that the religion spread quickly and massively, and (as wi= th any empire) it left behind many conflicts;=20

    • that Moslem societies are "indigestible", in that they are= militant in their faith and communal values, whether as a majority or a mi= nority within states;=20

    • that the surge of Western power in the last two centuries = left a general sense of inferiority and resentment, and an impression of we= akness which allows Moslems to be victimised;=20

    • that, in the last two or three decades, there has been a b= irth explosion in Moslem societies, producing very many, often unemployed, = young men;=20

    • and finally, that Islam has no one centre, and thus there = is fierce competition between states and groups for one to prove itself the= leader =96 often by being militantly anti-American. =20

    Whichever one or more of these give an explanation, the fact of Moslem h= ostility is un-matched by other religious civilisation, groups or states = =96 including Russia and China. At the same time, the fact that the larges= t reserves of oil are in Arab-Moslem hands means that the West has made str= enuous efforts to support the ruling dynasties in the =91pro-Western=92 sta= tes, especially Saudi Arabia. Part of the agenda of the radical Moslem gro= ups is a replacement of these dynasties, seen as corrupt and insufficiently= Islamic, with their own rulers =96 a nightmare for the West.

    The West has, in the past few decades, developed a series of attitud= es and passed a raft of laws outlawing discrimination on racial or religiou= s grounds. Western countries, with the US in the fore, have taken in hundr= eds of thousands of immigrants from Asian states, including Afghans fleeing= from the Taliban regime with whom Bin Laden is allied. France, Germany an= d the UK have all, in differing ways, sought to integrate Moslem minorities= into their societies. Their rights to separate religious practices are gu= aranteed. America has been a pioneer in multiculturalism =96 a policy oft= en contentious, but never seriously challenged, by successive governments. = Both the US and the EU states have made it a plank of their foreign and ai= d policies, recommending multicultural solutions to states whose ethnic gro= ups live in hostility to each other =96 as they did in the states of the fo= rmer Yugoslavia into which they were drawn by war. =20

    At present, it appears that a significant strain within Islam =96 ce= rtainly present in groups who claim to be its most fervent disciples =96 no= w regard Western values, Western customs and often Westerners themselves as= intolerable. The rejection of the West's culture at times makes no distinc= tion between a distaste for American TV and films (one shared by most Europ= ean cultural elites) and a contempt for attitudes and strategies such as, f= or example, to end discrimination against women, or homosexual men and wome= n. An effort to be inclusive meets a rejection of the very philosophy of a= multicultural society, including by those living within multicultural soci= eties.

    These elements within Moslem societies represent a large and continu= ing problem between these societies and the West, one which the events of S= eptember 11 have thrown into harsh relief. They are particularly severe fo= r social democrats: for it is the values and practices of the centre left w= hich have been to the fore in adumbrating practices and legislation against= discrimination and for the extension of civil and human rights. It was a = conservative figure, the Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi, who in Septembe= r 2001 bluntly stated in a speech in Berlin that Western civilisation was "= superior" to the Islamic because of the former's development of civil right= s. It was a bad time to say it, when a broad coalition =96 including many = Islamic states =96 was being constructed against terrorism, and it proposed= a hierarchy of civilisations which flies against the necessary respect to = be shown to other cultures. But it forced, or should have forced, the left= to reflect that its strategies for the betterment of mankind are seen as i= ntolerable and imperialistic intrusions into states' and societies' network= s of customs, traditions and laws. =20

    The need for a deepening of dialogue with Islamic states and groups = is now very urgent. An effort must be made to make these dialogues open an= d pointed, with both sides prepared to examine their own assumptions, as we= ll as their views of the other. This should be done between political grou= ps, scholars, commentators, trade unions, business groups and all other ins= titutions of civil society. The aim must be not just to produce a passive = understanding =96 helpful as that would be =96 but an active process of pro= blem solving.

    But the dialogue must be frank and open. If criticisms are to be ma= de of the non-Islamic world, those making them must be open to criticism in= return. Previous efforts to start and maintain such a dialogue =96 as in = France =96 are not encouraging. Increasingly, in European and North Americ= an societies, Moslems are a significant minority within the population, tak= ing citizenship of the country in which they live. Yet at best, the relati= ons between the minority and the rest of the society are tolerant, but indi= fferent: real interaction is rare; intermarriage is strenuously resisted; m= uch energy is spent on seeking separate Moslem education.

    The questions facing both Western and Moslem societies are not wheth= er or not Islam is an 'enemy of the West'. It is whether or not Islam can = co-exist with societies which are plural, tolerant, open to many faiths and= non-discriminatory. These values are held by all non-extremist political = parties in the West to be central to a good society; and it is hard to ima= gine any deep dialogue, let alone any agreements, with Moslem groups or sta= tes which do not respect these principles. But we have yet to determine wh= ether or not these principles can form a common basis.

    Further, societies in all parts of the world, both developed and dev= eloping, are undergoing processes of modernisation which include both econo= mic and political elements. Moslem societies cannot be immune. These proc= esses now beat at the gates of the conservative regimes in the Arab world, = which have attempted to keep modernisation into a fenced-off sector of thei= r economy, and allow little fundamental change in ruling practice. The sig= ns are that this cannot last much longer, but that a radical takeover of th= ese regimes would lead to murderous civil war within these states themselve= s and be hugely damaging to Western economies.

    A large issue in the relations between Islamic societies and the dev= eloped Western states is the policies =96 in some cases the existence =96 o= f the state of Israel. About the latter the West can make no compromise: t= he existence of the state of Israel, as other recognised states, is not a m= atter for debate or bargaining. The policies, however, are different: in an= increasingly interdependent world, Israel has no more licence than any oth= er state to pursue policies damaging to peace and the world economy. The d= eepening conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and the insecu= rity which both sides use as a weapon against the other, cannot be allowed = to continue: it has consequences too serious for the rest of the world. =20

    The US is now re-engaging in the area, and proclaiming the necessity= of creating a viable and independent Palestinian state. It is not clear, h= owever, how much diplomatic weight will be added to an approach which grows= out of the exigencies of war. In any case, Europe must now become a more = active interlocutor for the Israelis and Palestinians. Germany is second o= nly to the US in its involvement in Israel, while the other European states= have close and long-standing ties with the Middle Eastern world, which wou= ld allow a multilateral and rich dialogue, with many possibilities for brea= kthroughs.



    4. = New Challenges for the Partnership with the US

    There is no question that the US Bush administration, and more deepl= y the mood it represents, has presented a large challenge to centre-left-le= d European governments. They could ignore it while Bill Clinton remained i= n office, since he sought to share many of the concerns and values of Europ= ean left governments. Now, however, the policies are in more evident confl= ict, and lie deep under the solidarity instantly shown in the face of the M= anhattan and Pentagon attacks. US unilateralism, its recoil from efforts = =96 as by the International Criminal Court =96 to establish norms of intern= ational justice; its unwillingness, until after September 11, to restrain I= srael in the Sharon government's destruction (in awful symmetry with the Pa= lestinian leadership) of a base for future negotiations; its determination = to put domestic growth above any and all considerations of ecological damag= e to the biosphere, its unequivocal commitment to a defence system which co= mpromises all other defence strategies, present friend and potential enemy = alike - all of these directly or largely contradict the tentative efforts m= ade by European states to globalise justice, equity and representation as w= ell as business and media. If, as Robert Cooper writes "solving the proble= m of international legitimacy will be the major challenge for the 21st cent= ury", it is presently a challenge to which the US did not seem willing to r= ise

    European governments, whose Union constitutes the only alternative p= ole of Western global influence, have now a particular responsibility to us= e their influence to draw the US into creating the institutions of an inter= dependent world. These institutions - those created at Bretton Woods, thos= e developed or developing since, as the EU and those in embryo - now must t= ake over more and more of the burden of global governance from states, incl= uding states as powerful as the US. They must develop sufficient common st= rength and influence to demonstrate that a world of supranational instituti= ons is a more secure and rewarding one than a flight into defiant strength.= That is both harder, but much more urgent, after Manhattan. It is partic= ularly the task of social democratic governments - who must have the convic= tion of their ideals to argue the case with the present US administration.

    There are some signs - though they are not unambiguous - that this a= rgument may be heard more clearly now. Among the lessons European leaders = of the centre-left have sought to draw from the aftermath of September 11 h= as been one of global interdependence" and both the solidarity shown with t= he US across the world, as well as the accent on building new alliances and= developing new solidarities with the developing states, are strong signals= of the possibility of a new commitment.

    In a way which was not the case in the nineties or before, Europe an= d America have come to represent two differing - but not wholly opposing - = ways of influencing the world. This in part reflects their differing natur= es: the US, as a strong state with unparalleled wealth and military force, = tends to see the world as a series of states with which it wishes to co-ope= rate but can, in the last analysis, dominate or ignore. The European Union= , with little state power, is used to negotiating deals and projects at var= ious levels of power and authority. For the first, unilateralism is always= an option; often - as in the first months of the Bush administration - the= preferred one. For the EU and its member states, it is not. =20

    The values of cooperation and the practice of negotiating power are = generally more in tune with the contemporary world that strong borders and = unilateral action. But not always: especially in the provision of military= force. Europe has been dependent on the US for the latter for over half a= century: and must face up (see section 1) to the imperatives of lessening = that dependence. =20

    Interdependence cannot mean dependence. The creation of the Euro, a= nd the development of a Common Security and Foreign Policy, are counters to= this. Europe is not a state, and is unlikely ever to become one; it thus = has not the coherence of the US (or any other state) in making and executin= g policy, and can at times be slow in reactions to urgent situations, as af= ter September 11. But it has another strength: that of a multilateral appr= oach which is part of its nature. It has deep and inalienable civic princi= ples: but it has no view of itself as in principle virtuous, and thus beyon= d the restraint of conventions and of international law. It is deeply like= d to the US by treaty, common struggle, culture, language, tradition and ec= onomic system. It has a duty to share burdens with the US - one of which a= s been the burden of keeping the peace within Europe and round its borders.= It must become the major player in the relationship between Russia and th= e West - the more since President Putin makes it increasingly plain that he= wishes his main orientation in foreign policy to be with Europe. =20

    Both the US and Europe need each other: now, the nature of their int= erdependence must be again examined, and with it the nature of interdepende= nce everywhere.


    John Lloyd is a former foreign correspondent for the Financial= Times and Associate Editor of the New Statesman


    This paper is based on a British-German-French seminar Europe's R= ole in the New Global Order, organised by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung = London and the Policy Network, and held on 1 November 2001 in London

    The opinions expressed in publications of the Friedrich-Ebert-Sti= ftung London Office are those of the author(s) and do not necessaril= y represent the views of the Foundation.


    Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

    London Office

    Director: Dr Gero Maass

    The Chandlery

    Office 312

    50 Westminster Bridge Road

    London SE1 7QY

    United Kingdom

    Tel: +44 (0)20 7721 8745

    Fax: +44 (0)20 7721 8746

    email: feslondon@dial.pipex.com

    web: www.fes.de/london

    =A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | technical support | net edition=20 fes-library | Dezemer 2001 ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_prev.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAACBNeRBAcDBZg8DN2XCNqaCzxuDm7PDz9tDZ41BzlmCAoLDA0JCmvICZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+zSM/RyLOsjM6D+H8DoGI8RAiDKTHQBTTkWIAyKPx fJAUBYSM8OoyH8GEVjiFOAhKEc8HFAQeiOvDJl0OH4UABKB1lkcxIgVzeg4LVF4wYCZ/EAFaCjw4 aSIAMgo7OCNoMwZOjgs4BSOhonqJLgBADqdmbSQBqz8Cqq0iAqyrJAIKDQlRO8CVnwG9vsKoLE0i CT1SiBAGC2o9q0LNXHt4I5Q8dCODN9AQgRADPbbJLcslf0SjZosnBgZEyJQAB3EjApQG+yIM2PkU 8IC6gwgTKlzIsKHDRDFmHMAkBYcBIfEmDVDwgKKINwskyfg4SGK2Z1Uqjh2YdPIhuzUoRQwwGI+g oAfCZnKzY2naiAAHkMT8csPOwxNNACQwcCAKHgcKztEROcOOPhFoMNb5YjMGmXHlHBiQIc2mwxhs klDhCJCHWQj9GPQb161jiVA3GJDAayIfQJfy1IIrs8baJhoAY8FxEiNkgKVFvhT4MQiRkkgJBuk9 yvnFrBOqHCBzBCTdixAAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_next.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAAICZs/Dz9sDN2XCNqeDm7BBAcCBNeaCzxtDZ4zBZg2CAoJCmvLDA0FBzlkBm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAXPICSOZGmeaKqubOu+8Ag8IkFADyA+h+P7I0PggTA5Ho6YchmbBQSj3K73 SxYCgQIk8YD+Bo/Bj0kul2YkgRT3aLshiIBhBF6Mjkmz3mwA3ucQVWN+dwmCVXuJTQ9XNzg6OFRj IgtdDw0leIqbMGg1Q5BrJWADEGoJJJqcq6ytrq+wsUwzSFGhbm8MlzJhuL6yrDMzeWuiqQ8McFnH ecDBNAoPCo87vjQiBQTIRrXOzyLR0aGQJgIBleQiqt6cnoFtoZJAXFAQQkV33ez7/C4hADs= ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_oben.gif R0lGODlhoAAPAMQAABBAcCBNeaCzxjBZg/Dz9sDN2eDm7GCAoNDZ43CNqZCmvLDA0FBzloCZs0Bm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAACgAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu+cCzPZfOQj2A+DWQ/QAPDJLiVCsacY+k4AZ89SBEA AeREj8Lo+WjamEsqbUyuMovMQeCBaEISWdF3wDA8BiZkQuSwB7ACYHglPAAOCw97EGt2g4sEBAci AAcEXl1gYmWbNDYlAwhcCiNfKwAKXAh/WFEpPCRWOiRFfwBFXAJ/P1xunL4shmBpkw4NCb2LmSoO CQ0OmhDCDo4jYKsjAQ7XJMUNB47ZwtC/5CqeIwZaJAOvpRAMD5IkNtsQCAiAYE5RVuoG+AgIjCCA D8UXZeUSpjgnAg0JRLq6LHuwgNuDURBeqdA44gAPJjYkoVLERyJDhShTv6pcybKly5cwUzrgwkUL AwI1xex6EOlEACRPCAzBQlMdDlEkQhn4ZIeLATw7gSCLuekkxFl3fEh8F6/EzFYQ2MniiIJjHAio ZmKUsnUEAConqZY7eXHHqC8BbhKoVyRPEpr7DCGSNFMSnKFnozGBS7Ot3DIn73lNpPXYVFJZSaRj tULJs4GNqRRYyoeZSSOP56KuAukAgAGIZLlLgWiBmkoExJDdV2KBQLcEtACwEyibw4OLU6cMR2ZJ PZVMlIcAADs= ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_inhalt.gif R0lGODlhaQAPAMQAABBAcCBNefDz9uDm7KCzxnCNqTBZg2CAoNDZ41BzlpCmvLDA0ICZs8DN2UBm jP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAAA AAAALAAAAABpAA8AQAX/ICSOZGmeaKqubOu6QnMaD1M6TwE1DwTEONvoIRsxHo5kMrCT/Ro4B4lo OhAQj9zL9RMcRI6GDIdgAgg1Ee9BANcCygdCCTgql7sB2+2AJ+V0aAcAEA4LQlssAWtZAzqFelkC jzs9I3qIEFRGWZ1pYiR6UkNFIguebISJLg4FDAmqIgEJDAcGJAYOtyIAfX53SQC/Sky5uz4OwsB0 PgcMr0yrKw0DKA8KJQdIlU+FaaQkdndMYgEPC96jIptqObHSKwrfvAk7AtEiCAKEPLyRmewgHDkB yocAAdvAjVAnYoAAeBAjSpxIsaLFixMdYPEkpADCTgpUrYkW5AiqLA5MjHKs9IAkEpWo+nzsRKki mnq4IDh8x4Mcm21BppQSaKmEGDRMoghdirFEwIXz3NjoJy5qQJhZpsqQ94dhQAeRBixgWLHBwxN7 SGiT0o+oPIBDB5ooeMQO0xMBBCDACECPgiQFBox5MABWGC2VRmizGhfJuCacEq4bSuSAgwRosDVF pstELrKbE/UKligEADs= ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq---- Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/images/digbib/e_titel.gif R0lGODlhZQAPALMAAMDN2YCZsyBNeRBAcDBZg6CzxtDZ43CNqUBmjP///wAzZgAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAACH5BAAAAAAALAAAAABlAA8AQASqUMlJq7046827/12QIFUSVABAiRYwIjAygHStxUVywIRk KoKYwRATsFCv2MzGbE5EJIkokVBNUiuqduTajpxgUGyMIAR5ZzJCELQQ1MuwPPSl/CjYZ6KVhMXn gBhQJSd4VlJ7SIGLjI2Oj5CRNF5aAFNVl14BR3iUUZJzg3aFV4cKnFeJoI2iE3elWXxen6tgrT6k EnmIfLWsdUAICQU9sHpkAy7IvszNGhEAOw== ------MultipartBoundary--Mfc14UbQDbNUanwxdFRRjz9P33kI0C0iaJTXDV5Puq------