From: Snapshot-Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/01172.htm Subject: =?utf-8?Q?System=20transformation=20and=20social=20protection=20/=20[Alfr?= =?utf-8?Q?ed=20Pfaller]=20-=20[Electronic=20ed.]=20-=20Bonn,=20[2002=20-?= =?utf-8?Q?=202]=20Bl.=20=3D=2024=20KB,=20Text=20.=20-=20(Policy=20informa?= =?utf-8?Q?tion=20/=20International=20Policy=20Analysis=20Unit)=20
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=C2=A9=20Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung?= Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 14:57:58 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----MultipartBoundary--qO3jEybX6tRRjt9gY9364y3yET3o5lTz6WuYSyy1l8----" ------MultipartBoundary--qO3jEybX6tRRjt9gY9364y3yET3o5lTz6WuYSyy1l8---- Content-Type: text/html Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: https://library.fes.de/fulltext/id/01172.htm System transformation and social protection / [Alfred Pfaller] - [Electronic ed.] - Bonn, [2002 - 2] Bl. =3D 24 KB, Te= xt . - (Policy information / International Policy Analysis Unit) <br>Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2002 <br><br><font size=3D-1><i>=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stif= tung</i></font>
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System transformation and social protection / [Alfred Pfaller] - [Electronic ed.] - Bonn, [2002 - 2] Bl. =3D 24 KB, Te= xt . - (Policy information / International Policy Analysis Unit)
Electronic ed.: Bonn : FES Library, 2002

=A9 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

=3D"INHALT"




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Social Protec= tion was Built into the Old System

The centrally planned economies of the pre-1990 socialist world did = not need formal welfare-state arrangements of social protection because =84= social welfare" was woven into the central processes of production, distrib= ution and income generation. All productive resources, including labor of v= arious skills, were mobilized by the planning agencies of the government to= contribute to social production. In turn, participation in the production = process entitled people to share in the consumption of the product both wh= ile they were still active producers and when they were no longer able to w= ork, due to old age, illness, disability or child birth. The state-run econ= omy produced what the planners considered as desirable for current individu= al and collective =84consumption" (including military build-up) and for fut= ure economic growth. And it was the state planners who decided on the distr= ibution of consumption rights =96 by determining money incomes and prices. = Goods and services considered as essential were made available at very low = prices or even for free. Education was accessible to everyone who qualified= with regard to age, aptitude and to some extent political loyalty. Simila= rly, access to medical services was completely independent of individual pu= rchasing power. Basic housing was provided for a token.=20

Typically, access to many social services such as day care for child= ren or recreation as well as to consumer goods was organized through the fi= rm or institution that people worked for. Firms could be generous in these = respects because their financial capacity did not depend on the balance of = production costs and sales revenues but on allotments by the government for= the purpose of workers=92 salaries and =84welfare". Part of the =84social"= task assigned to the firm was the employment of people to a large extent i= ndependently of productive needs. In this way, unemployment was practically= not allowed to materialize, everybody willing and able to work was kept i= n the job-based distribution system of individual and collective consumptio= n rights.

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Liberated Mar= kets Need Political Intervention

With the transition to a market economy, consumption rights have to = be earned in the market, subject to the price formation process determined = by supply and demand (including the fluctuations of aggregate demand due to= changes in the balance of savings and investment as well as the shifts in = demand and supply structures). The unmitigated market process carries sever= al risks for people=92s standard of living and basic life chances:

  • There is no guarantee that people who have no other productive = asset but their ability to work will earn =96 for themselves and their depe= ndents =96 an income that is somehow in line with the nation=92s per capita= income. There is the real danger that at times they will not find a job at= all or that the jobs available offer a salary very much below the national= average.=20

Those who are not able to work can either consume to the extent that t= hey have accumulated or inherited wealth that yields returns or can be turn= ed into cash; or, they depend on income support by the larger community (at= state or local level), the family or some charitable person or organisatio= n.

  • Certain goods and services that are essential for human well-be= ing, such as shelter and medical treatment, or that are decisive for life-t= ime income chances, such as higher education, will not be available to = those whose income cannot pay for the costs of those goods and services.

In other words: the market carries the risk of significant social exclus= ion. But society can decide politically not to tolerate exclusion, i.e. to = secure for every citizen a standard of living that is not too far below the= national average =96 which, in turn, depends on the productive capacity of= the national economy. In this case, arrangements are required to correct e= x post the results of the market process and perhaps to intervene ex ante i= n the market process so as to make it produce as few =84casualties" as poss= ible. Without some sort of welfare state, significant segments of the popul= ation run a substantial risk of having to live in outright misery or even n= ot to live long at all.

Under the central planning regime, most allocation of economi= c resources was subject to political decision-making (as opposed to decentr= alized decision-making by buyers and sellers in the market). Thus, the deci= sion to avoid large-scale economic exclusion could be integrated easily, li= ke any other collective goal (such as the quest of military might), into th= e overall economic planning process. In the market economy, most of the res= ources to be dedicated to collective goals have to be extracted from the = =84private sector", although state enterprises might generate some market i= ncome for the =84caretaker of the collective will". That is to say, politic= al command, which ideally represents the will of the citizens=92 majority, = has to overrule individual spending (or saving) preferences. This political= command can oblige citizens and residents to pay a certain part of their i= ncome directly as taxes to the government or as contributions to special fu= nds such as a collective pension system or a health insurance.

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The Limits to= Taxation

The new method of securing collectively desired patterns of resource= allocation (in our case: avoidance of exclusion) by means of taxation give= s rise to a general problem. In the political arena, people might well supp= ort decisions in favor of welfare-state arrangements that protect them agai= nst poverty or outright misery in various contingencies of life. But at the= same time they might resist and resent the necessary taxation. They might = assume a free-rider position, trying to avoid taxes, but at the same time c= laiming the benefits of the system whenever the need arises. We should expe= ct such free riding to become a generalized phenomenon, as the state is not= readily perceived as the collective agency of the citizens for the citizen= s, but rather as an unloved disciplinary agent, suspected, in addition, of = being wasteful or even corrupt. Moreover, the very practice of successful t= ax avoidance creates and reinforces a culture of =84legitimate" cheating (w= ith those who do not being regarded as fools).=20

Explicit taxation (rather than implicit resource allocation by centr= al planners) also raises overtly the issue of the distribution of the tax l= oad. People might support the magnitude of tax-financed government spending= but resent the particular tax which is levied on their income, assets or c= onsumption. One such group of tax =84resenters" and avoiders even has the e= ndorsement of an influential school of economics: business people. =84Exces= sive" taxation of businesses is said to harm national prosperity on two gro= unds:

  • It stifles entrepreneurial initiative, the very engine of wealth= -creation, and

  • it diminishes the national economy=92s competitiveness, ma= king it more difficult (a) to sell national products in internationally con= tested markets and (b) to attract foreign investment.

If, in addition, the relatively low administrative capacity of the trans= formed state apparatus in transition countries is taken into account, it be= comes clear that there are economic limits to a welfare-state system of soc= ial protection even if the citizens of transition countries and their elect= ed representatives opt for it politically. We should expect a strong tensio= n between the politically articulated desire for protection and the politic= al system=92s ability to mobilize the necessary resources.=20

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The Logic of = Insurance: Mobilizing Individual Self-interest

In view of the new limits to collective action that result from the = limits to taxation, solutions to the various needs for social protection sh= ould=20

  • be designed so as to rely as much as possible on individual inc= entives to make provisions for the risks of life;

  • give priority to the most pressing needs for protection an= d for avoiding exclusion, leaving other goals =96 that might be politically= popular as well =96 unattended;

  • avoid hinderingbusiness incentives to invest and employ pe= ople, thus reducing the need for welfare-state income support.=20

In order to extend the limits to tax-financed protection, a clear link s= hould be established, wherever possible, between a person=92s payment into = a protection scheme and his/her entitlement to the scheme=92s benefits. Thi= s applies to people who do earn a taxable income in the market, most common= ly =96 but not exclusively =96 as employees. For this group, the relationsh= ip between payments and benefits is most readily established for old age p= ensions and for income support during temporary unemployment. But it can be= done as well for income support during times of illness. It would be a mat= ter of establishing =96 public or adequately controlled private =96 insuran= ce systems which offer the corresponding benefits in relation to the contri= butions paid. Contributors themselves have an incentive to pay in order to = maintain their claims.=20

However, it is important that cheaper ways to reap the benefits are = excluded. Moreover, in order to avoid a taxation-of-labor effect, which wou= ld harm employment in times of labor abundance, it would be best if contrib= utions were paid not by employers, but exclusively by the prospective benef= iciaries =96 as is the case with an ordinary private insurance. But, emplo= yers could be instrumental in pooling risks and collecting contributions, t= hus reducing =84dead-weight" transaction costs.=20

A certain complication is posed by the continuing cash-flow needs of= pay-as-you-go pension systems, on which the current generation of pensione= rs depends. This is one strong reason for compulsory membership, which, in = turn, re-introduces to some extent the problem of tax resistance (especiall= y if the benefits of the system are not valued highly in comparison with al= ternative ways of providing for old age).

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Insurance Cum= Solidarity: the Health System

Not all elements of social protection can follow the pure logic of i= nsurance. Take provision for medical treatment in the case of illness: defi= ning benefits in relation to contributions would exclude those who earn too= little to pay for the costs of adequate protection (disregarding =84non-es= sential" benefits such as private rooms in hospitals, aesthetic surgery etc= . as well as extremely expensive treatments with verylimited health benefit= s). If the restoration and maintenance of good health in accordance with th= e possibilities of medical art and technology is not to become a privilege = of the well-to-do =96 which would be a gross violation of social justice wh= en defined as absence of social exclusion =96 health insurance must charge = contributions in relation to income while handing out benefit= s in relation to need. Such a system is immanently unattractive for = those whose households have above average incomes per person because they h= ave to subsidize the health services for their poorer compatriots with thei= r relatively high contributions. For them, private insurances with strictly= cost-related contributions would be more advantageous. Therefore, opting o= ut of the public system with its income-related (rather than level-of-benef= it-related) contributions would have to be precluded for them. If they pay = their contributions but still prefer to buy medical treatment in the free m= arket no harm would be done. But, of course, this would raise the problem o= f tax resistance by those who do not really benefit from the system to whic= h they have to contribute.=20

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Tax-financed = Redistribution

There are parts of welfare-state protection for which no individual = self-interest can be mobilized via appropriate financing methods. They incl= ude all sorts of income support =96 in cash and kind =96 for the poor who d= o not earn an adequate market income and who did not have the chance of mak= ing provisions in earlier times.=20

In the highly developed welfare-states of the western industrialized= world, these types of pure redistribution schemes have traditionally claim= ed only a small part (seven to ten percent) of the overall welfare-state bi= ll. Lately, however, this percentage has been increasing. The reason is tha= t the market economy has been producing more =84casualties" than it used to= in the hey-days of welfare capitalism. A larger part of the labor force ha= s found itself unable to earn a decent wage income, either due to protracte= d unemployment (for which the first tier of unemployment insurance no longe= r provides) or due to very low wages for many jobs.=20

In the transition countries, the problem of insufficient wage income= during working-age has much larger proportions. For the transition shock h= as led to large-scale destruction of jobs as protected former markets vanis= hed and large parts of the production structure proved unable to survive in= contested markets, or as companies, in order to survive, took to large-sca= le labor-shedding. On the other hand, in quite a few transition countries, = the problem has not yet unfolded to its full magnitude because large state = enterprises have continued their old labor-hoarding practice precisely in o= rder to avoid even more unemployment. In this respect, remnants of the old = socialist welfare-state system have been kept alive.

Income support for those unable to provide for themselves over the l= ife-cycle cannot be financed by contributions in the same way protection ag= ainst the contingencies of life is. It must rely on taxes, to which the abo= ve mentioned limitations apply. The same holds, to a significant extent, fo= r education. If it is =96 above a certain base level =96 not to become a pr= ivilege of the well-to-do, it has to be financed by all citizens, those wit= h children and those without. This, in turn, makes it a =84natural" candida= te for tax-based financing, even though the well-to-do could, in addition, = be asked to pay for their share of education.=20

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Optimizing Ou= tcomes Under Tight Resource Restrictions

Part of the overall welfare-state package corresponds to the logic o= f insurance. Its financing is relatively unproblematic. This part caters to= those who cannot be considered =84casualties" of the market economy, i.e. = those who earn a =84decent", albeit modest, income in the market. But we al= so have =96 varying significantly from country to country =96 a need for re= latively large sums of tax-financed redistribution, for both income support= and public goods like education. And we have states with relatively low ta= xation capacity. This combination of challenges and constraints would sugge= st the following strategy:

  • Organize the insurance part, which caters to the protection nee= ds of the employed and reasonably well remunerated members of society (incl= uding their families), in a way that does not absorb precious tax revenues.= Establish a firm sense of =84ownership" for the protection which is being = bought by individual contributions. At the same time, implant the idea of s= ocial contributions as part of the wage rather than something grante= d in addition to the wage. Otherwise a conflict is bound to emerge between = social protection (which raises labor costs) and employment (which should b= e by far the most important source of income).=20

  • Do not hand out public goods to those who can pay for them= . This applies, for instance, to education. But make sure, at the same time= , that those who cannot pay have equal access. Avoid a second-tier, lower-q= uality supply for the less well-to-do.

  • Preclude the possibility that the well-to-do opt out of th= e public health system, at least as far as contributions are concerned.

  • Give priority in re-distributive tax spending to those ite= ms which imply the biggest effect in lifting poor citizen=92s and their chi= ldren=92s standard of living. In pratice, it might be better to offer =84es= sentials" as public goods rather than top up low incomes with public transf= ers so as to enable every citizen to buy these essentials in the market. Th= is overrules private spending preferences, which offends liberal sentiment = but also protects children=92s rights and limits self-destructive irrespons= ibility. Perhaps more importantly for transition countries, it saves the hi= gh administrative costs of pervasive and repeated means-testing. =84Essenti= als" should include high-standard health services and the full range of edu= cation. Low-cost housing and free (or low-cost) public meals could come nex= t in line.

Alfred Pfaller




Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 5310 Bonn, fax: 0228 / 883 625, e-mail: Pfalle= rA@fes.de



=A9 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | technical sup= port | net edition=20 fes-library | Februar 2002
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