Ahmed Issack Hassan As an additional mechanism, original copies of these forms signed by all agents and the Presiding/Returning Officers were given to the agents, one was pinned outside the station, one was sealed in the ballot box with the ballot papers and one was physically submitted to the constituency/national tallying centre. These not only enhanced transparency but also ensured that even if one form went missing, aback-up original form would be readily available. Election fraud was rife in Kenya and such a move tremendously enhanced public confidence in the handling of such strategic materials by the Commission. The movement, storage and dissemination of such materials was executed according to a well-thought out security plan. For instance, every dispatch was accompanied by security personnel and a back-up was readily available in case of any eventuality. In addition, the national and regional warehouses are well guarded and movement of materials under strict control. Before any material is dispatched to the region/constituency, it is recorded in the log, packed and sealed for that particular destination. The seal is then broken upon arrival in the presence of the agents of the candidates/sides. This mechanism pre-empted any claims of lack of transparency on the part of the Commission and thus enhanced confidence of the opponents and of the voters in the exercise. 7.4 During the Constitutional Referendum In order to develop an effective security operational plan for the referendum exercise, security agencies required from the 108 ELECTION SECURITY IN NIGERIA: MATTERS ARISING Security Challenges in Election Management: Towards Nigeria's 2011 Elections, “Case Study of security challenges in Kenyan Elections” Commission the total number of voters disaggregated into polling stations, constituencies and provinces. This information was used to develop a criterion to man the polling stations depending on the number of voters and/or the political environment of the area. The security agencies designated the country into what they called“security zones” depending on the volatility of the area and possible eruption of violence. Some areas which were considered hot spots, either because of past experience in the 2007 general elections and its aftermath or based on reports of those monitoring political campaigns, were accorded extra attention and therefore more security personnel deployed. The development of the security plan was very methodical; it commenced with identification of the need, based on the set criterion, on the number of security personnel required. Every OCPD was required to present their needs from the divisional level, district, provisional and finally this was consolidated at the national level. The information was collated and a comprehensive report was developed and shared with the Commission. The need for security is core in any operation; this need was even more important during the referendum exercise, considering the aftermath of the 2007 post election violence was still fresh in Kenyans' minds. The referendum was an exercise in equal magnitude to the general election, the only difference being that there were opposing sides rather than opposing parties. The strategy used by the security agents to boost their capacity was to borrow additional personnel from other uniformed services such as the Kenya Wildlife Services ELECTION SECURITY IN NIGERIA: MATTERS ARISING 109