Appendix II l Deployment of security and election personnel should be done based only on informed security report targeted at ensuring the safety or integrity of the officers. l There is the need to begin to institutionalize security mapping to identify flash points to help in effective deployment of security during elections. l Polling units should be sanitized and decentralized to ensure effective security coverage. Congestion of several polling units in one location should be discouraged. l There is need to have INEC intelligence unit to advise the Commission and compare notes with the operations of other security agencies. l There is need for synergy and coordination with respect to financing and logistics of elections. Some of these include the need for early planning and coordination to meet election security challenges, the sustenance of ICCES, and the institutionalisation of security mapping(pages 17-18). Chapter two(pages 19 to 30), written by Lancelot Anyanya, is an 'Assessment of 2011 Elections in View of Recommendations from the 2010 Workshop.' In October 2010, a workshop was organised by INEC in conjunction with one of its important development partners, FES with a focus on security challenges of election management. The activity brought together the academia, election managers, policy makers and security practitioners to brainstorm and come up with 120 Appendix II practical security strategies and approaches to ensure peaceful and credible elections in 2011 against the background of the then rising insecurity in the country. Aside from the general introduction, the author enumerated twenty-five far-reaching recommendations that emanated from the 2010 Workshop on how to improve election security in Nigeria in 2011(pages 21-25). The assessment by Anyanya of the performance of the 2011 elections is interesting. The violence in the aftermath of the 18th April, 2011 presidential elections stood in direct contrast to the gains of the said elections. He wrote(page 25): Gory images of widespread violence, dead bodies, burnt vehicles and charred property would sadly linger for long in the memories of some as the defining image of that election. Even in a country seemingly accustomed to electoral violence, it has to be admitted that 2011 was unprecedented in scale, scope and severity. Violence broke out almost simultaneously in some or most parts of the following states: Kano, Kaduna, Adamawa, Katsina, Plateau, Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, Katsina and Sokoto … within three days over 800 persons lost their lives to the election violence and about 65,000 were displaced. It is within the above context that the gains made in the 2011 elections are to be understood and analysed. For example, the United States Institute for Peace(USIP) saw the elections as the best run since the beginning of Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Also the Commonwealth Observer Group opined that the elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency were both credible and creditable and reflected the will of the Nigerian people(page 3). 121