Appendix II security agencies to gradually result in policing for citizenship rather than policing for vested interests. 'Election Security in Theory and Practice: Perspective of a Resident Electoral Commissioner,' was the subject explored in chapter four by the REC himself, Mike Igini. The 20-page(43 to 62) presentation shed light on the theoretical and empirical perspectives to security, and of the history and consequences of violence-ridden elections in Nigeria. The author drew attention to documented experiences in global best practises in election security from such countries as Ghana, South Africa and the United States of America. Violence-free elections have helped to deepen democratic governance in those countries. They also contrast sharply with the flawed and insecure elections in such countries as Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan(page 46). In the context of security deficits in Nigeria, the importance of strategic policy for security of elections in Nigeria as provided by INEC was underscored. In this regard, the roles of ICCES and EMBs were not only argued to be far-reaching but that they need to be further consolidated upon at both national and state levels. Arising from his experience in the conduct of 2011 general elections and the February, 2012 Cross River State governorship elections, the author argued for the need to put in place a template for deployment of security personnel during elections. The template or model suggested was seen as unique because, in the posting of security personnel, details such as“the name of the security personnel, service organisation, command or unit location, service number, mobile phone number, local government area of deployment, registration area and polling unit”(page 11) are made available to 124 Appendix II stakeholders. The proposed template thus has a strong appeal to serve as a guide to deployment and in establishing culpability. A logical outcome of the Cross River Model was that, at the end of the two elections earlier referred to, no report of abandonment of duty by security personnel was received(page 55). To further guarantee future election security, Igini proposed: a. The need to review section 150 of the Electoral Act that gives power to INEC to try electoral offenders but without express power and capacity to investigate(page 58); b. To establish an election offences commission to expeditiously pursue the prosecution of election offences, the continuing education of voters and the institution of speedy and effective conflict resolution mechanisms(page 60). 'Lai Olurode and M. K. Hammanga wrote chapter five of the book, the longest of all chapters apparently because of the primacy of the issues involved. The authors devoted attention to the practical issues of deployment of security personnel in elections with a focus on lessons learnt from past experiences. A concise security personnel deployment template was recommended in tandem with a similar suggestion in the previous chapter. Aspects of the proposal were that: i. Deployment of security personnel must not be arbitrary, late or left uncoordinated, ii. Vital information about security personnel themselves and the areas of their postings must be made available to pertinent stakeholders to enable effective coordination and control of security matters, 125