Managing Election- Relation Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana The enormous power and influence of'Big Men' and significant traditional figures who often operate'outside' the formal state means that formal institutions are sometimes unable to reach the nooks and crannies of the informal systems(Nugent, 1995). As a consequence, it becomes fairly easy for individuals to act in contravention of formal laws and take refuge in the informal system. Since clientelism is usually sustained through the distribution of material resources, the system often deprives the state of the needed wherewithal, first, to adequately provide basic public goods such as law and order and, secondly, to institutionalize and regularize the entire political system by bringing all aspects of the system under formal state control. Political competitors, on the other hand, would normally resort to the use of violence as available resources for inducement through bribes and vote buying dwindle. The reduction in state viability often means ensuing conflicts become even more difficult to contain. To a large extent, clientelism and the use of electoral violence have become particularly difficult to deal with because all significant political competitors in Ghana find them attractive as cost­effective political strategies. Therefore, even though Ghana has managed to conduct a number of elections, it does not necessarily follow that the level of democratic consolidation is improving. The nature and scope of violence that accompanied the 2008 elections, like other elections before it, clearly point to the fact that prevailing conditions are not yet right or are not likely to favour long-term stabilization. Given that oil politics is also beginning to feature in an already fraught situation, the political and economic incentives for resorting to 44