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Managing election-related violence for democratic stability in Ghana
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Managing Election- Relation Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana stability(Clapham, 1982; Brown, 2004). In this context, patronage does provide an avenue for maintaining strong political parties by offering rewards to party supporters. It also lets the President surround himself with people who share his vision, and fosters a culture of loyalty and trust. It additionally introduces new people with fresh ideas into the political scene, thereby improving upon governance(Weingrod, 1968). However, the tendency for corruption, incompetence and greed usually derails the entire process, leading to'witch hunting' by opposition forces when they assume power. In addition, the net impact of this evolving neo-patrimonial system of governance in Ghana especially is to effectively disenfranchise and exclude significant numbers of citizens, women and men alike, from meaningful participation in political life(USAID, 2011). This is because the nature of political patronage in the African politico­economic systems is often a zero-sum game, where there is simply'not enough cake for everyone'. As such, there are always groups or even regions that are going to be left out in the sharing of the'national cake'(Titeca, 2006:52-53). At the grassroots level, patronage networks are manifested through unequal relationships between the supposed'big men', usually political elites and their supporters. For example, Ichino and Nathan(2011; 2012) contend that the introduction of primary elections in new democracies to select political nominees for both presidential and parliamentary elections has propelled the tendency of patronage and clientelism. Thus, aspiring candidates compete for nomination through the distribution of patronage(usually financial and material rewards) to local party members, rather than through policy positions or the democratic 185