THINK PIECE 09 Summary • Monopoly on the use of force is a concept that is strongly interlinked with the idea of a state providing security. Therefore it is crucial to consider the different meanings and implications of»security« when reflecting on the future of the monopoly on the use of force. • suggest that two broad avenues for thinking about security may be distinguished from each other. The first perspective displays a preference for the question what security is. By contrast, the second perspective emphasizes what security does. • is security?«: Many critiques of traditional security studies do not contest the ontology of security itself, but instead denote variations of an »essentialist« understanding of the security paradigm. • does security do?«: Security can also be understood as an inter-subjective social practice. The securitization literature argues that security is what people say. It is a self­referential practice that does not refer to something»more real« and attains visibility only in deliberate social conduct. 1 Security What Is It? What Does It Do? Marc von Boemcken and Conrad Schetter In a world of perceived uncertainty and danger, the desire for security becomes a central concern of political thought and action. Against the threatening forces of unpredictability, rapid transformation and complexity, it appears to channel a diffuse longing for greater reliability, stability and tangibility. Ironically, however, the term »security« does not itself possess any stable or consensual meaning. Rather, it marks the perimeters of a highly contested terrain. For how is security to be achieved? Who is to be secured, against which dangers? And, moreover: what actually happens when we»speak security«? To reflect upon any in/security problematic would require us to, first of all, locate our own position and argument vis-à-vis a careful consideration of some basic questions pertaining to the concept and nature of security itself. For this purpose, we suggest that two broad avenues for thinking about security may be distinguished. The first perspective displays a preference for the question as to what security is(»What is security?«). By contrast, the second perspective emphasizes what security does (»What does security do?«). In the following, both questions will be addressed, arguing that they differ considerably in terms of their ontological, epistemological and normative assumptions. It is, however, not the purpose of this paper to identify the»best« way security can or should be encountered as an object of analysis. Its modest objective is, quite simply, to encourage explicit reflection of the term in question, thereby hopefully diminishing the chances of it being applied in an ambiguous or somewhat vague manner. What is security? If one sets out to think about security, an obvious starting point might be to ask: what is security anyway? Posing such a question is anything but a trivial exercise, for it already makes an implicit assumption about the very nature of security itself: namely, that such a thing as »security« actually exists. Security, in other words, would refer to an actual condition of existence that is independent of its enunciation in day-to-day discourse. This ontological condition of security has been imagined in quite different ways. For example, in the great debate between Realism and Idealism in International Relations theory it was either thought of as a relative condition in the present or as an absolute condition of the future. In both cases, however, references to