www.iepn.org December 2016 Russia in the Middle East: EU& Israeli perspectives Herzliya, 26-27 September 2016 Edited by: Jan Busse, Itamar Gazala, Dr. Rem Korteweg, Dr. Roby Nathanson and Dr. Werner Puschra The annual meeting of the Israeli-European Policy Network(IEPN) in Israel focused on the role and influence of Russia in the Middle East. As mentioned by one of the participants, the current situation in the Middle East can be described as the“era of Putin”. Most of the Russian efforts now concentrate on Syria. There are virtually three different wars currently taking place in Syria: Internal – between the Assad regime and the rebels; Regional – the Saudis, the Turks and the Qataris are backing the opposition, while Russia and Iran are backing the regime and; A confrontation between great powers – Russia vs. the US. All three conflicts are connected and therefore a durable ceasefire would have to include all of them. There was consensus among the participants that five factors explain Russia’s involvement in Syria. In decreasing order of importance, it allows Russia to: leverage its role in Syria to improve its geopolitical position vis-à-vis the West; distract attention away from Russia’s domestic economic weaknesses; protect Russia’s military interests in the region and ensure it has a veto over any outcome in Syria; demonstrate loyalty to its allies(as opposed to the US which angered Israel and Saudi Arabia with the conclusion of the Iran deal, and withdrew support from Hosni Mubarak during the Arab Spring) and prevent regime change(also in light of the colour revolutions) and; fight terrorists, many of which have a North Caucasian background. Russia’s support for Assad is also beneficial for Hizbullah and Iran. These actors will be strengthened in the region. Russia’s involvement also strengthens the myth used by jihadi groups; that all major powers are fighting against the Sunnis. Shia-Sunni tensions are expected to increase and consequently, disorder will characterize post-conflict Syria. The inability of Assad to consolidate gains on the battlefield raises serious questions. Apparently Assad’s army is so weak that Russia has to rely on Shia militias from Iraq to occupy territory it has bombed. These militias listen to Tehran, if to anyone at all. A good deal of the discussion focused on whether Vladimir Putin would ultimately abandon Assad. Though the Kremlin has regularly signalled its dislike of Assad, Russia now depends on Damascus to deliver results in Syria and so it cannot push too hard. Assad, Putin(and Khamenei) all have different ideas about the Syrian end-game. Besides, military overstretch could become an issue; Russia’s special forces are deployed in Syria, as are some of its most modern aircraft. Looking ahead, one likely scenario is that Russia will advance Assad’s position until January 2017, when a new US president takes office; after that, Putin might want to strike a deal. But since Putin’s domestic popularity is based on foreign policy strength, he is unlikely to be all too conciliatory. Moscow seems to have plans for the broader region as well. For instance, Russia is rebuilding its ties with Egypt. Though its involvement in the Syrian war may be more opportunistic, efforts to strengthen ties with Egypt appear more deliberate. Many discussions are taking place between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Putin. As part of his flirt with Cairo, Putin is discussing the sale of nuclear power stations. The Kremlin is conducting similar discussions in Riyadh, as well. Minutes and Conclusions of the Seminar The European Perspective: Attitudes towards Russia are a sensitive issue within the framework of EU-Israel relations. The EU is trying 1 11 1